
9 Globalization and the Transformation of Armed Groups

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Globalization has enabled the transformation of armed groups, broadly defined to include terrorists, insurgents, militias, and criminal organizations, from regional challenges to a major, strategic security threat. Globalization has heightened their organizational effectiveness, their lethality, and their ability to operate on a truly worldwide scale. Although armed groups are not a new phenomenon, what is new is their ability to exploit the opportunities inherent in a globalized world. The twenty-first-century armed group is no longer relegated to the far reaches of the earth, but operates in the major urban centers of the very Western powers that are said to command globalization.

The transformation of armed groups is a key aspect of a newly emerging security paradigm for the twenty-first century. Armed groups exploit the opportunities inherent in a globalized world in ways that states, particularly weak states, cannot. Connected by the instantaneous and virtually untraceable communications technologies of the modern age, armed groups find refuge in the weak and ungoverned spaces between states, while directing operations at the heart of the globalized world. The integrated world economy provides the markets and the means to move goods from previously isolated zones of conflict, vastly increasing the financial strength of armed groups. The networks that move drugs now move people too—not just human traffickers and their wretched cargo, but well-trained operatives who exploit the anonymity of globalization to conduct operations and raise funds. Globalization has also created strange bedfellows. Criminal organizations in Asia and Latin America are linked to Marxist insurgencies, right-wing militias, and terrorist groups that find themselves increasingly motivated by the profit such trade brings. This network vastly increases the organizational reach and the resource base of armed groups. It also expands the nature of the threat to individual states, regions, and the broader international system.

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The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it will explore how globalization enables the transformation of armed groups by examining the direct ways in which they exploit the economic, technological, and cultural variants of globalization and the indirect ways in which armed groups have exploited the impact of globalization on the state. The second purpose of this chapter is to consider how the transformation of armed groups has emerged as a key component of a new security paradigm for the twenty-first century. This transformation is intimately tied to the nature of weak and failed states. I will argue that demise of the state is *not* a key component of this new paradigm, despite arguments to the contrary from the globalization school. Instead, two key aspects of this new paradigm are the *uneven* erosion of state sovereignty and the emergence of the armed group as a significant global actor and a major strategic threat.

FOUR VARIANTS OF GLOBALIZATION

Conceptually, *globalization* is an imprecise term. The literature varies widely, and there is little agreement on what globalization is beyond a vague theme of “interconnectedness,” a linkage between the global and the local, and an equally vague sense about change. Globalization can be defined simply as a “sum of techniques”¹—containerized shipping, satellite communications, and networked connectivity—or more broadly as a process, a transformation, even a revolution. The effects of globalization have not been uniformly felt. It brings greater interdependence and propels isolated peoples and regions into modernity with all its attendant benefits. Yet the dark side of globalization is its power to obliterate traditional cultures, weaken sovereignty, and further isolate the “haves” from the “have-nots.”

It is useful to distinguish four variants of globalization. *Economic* globalization is the most widely acknowledged and accepted version of globalization. It encompasses large and rapid change in terms of the flow of trade, investment, finance, capital, and labor, all of which have created a truly global integrated economy.² In macroeconomic theory, greater integration is a positive-sum game—everyone benefits from greater efficiency in resource allocation, rising income, and improved distribution of world income.³ Yet the greater interpenetration of global economic markets has not resulted in a uniform spread of the costs and benefits. Whereas strong states have seen their economies grow and their global market share increase, weaker states invariably have not. The result is a widening gap between rich and poor states, a disparity that further undermines the sovereignty, security, and legitimacy of those states on the fringes of the globalized world.

The second variant is *technological* globalization. It arises from the fundamental changes in communications wrought by the technologies that brought us the Internet, open and free access to knowledge and information, and instant communications. Armed groups exploit these technologies to broadcast their messages across the globe, to recruit, to mobilize, and to conduct and control operations. The technologies of globalization have transformed the armed group into a formidable foe, one whose activities are hard to trace and even harder to combat.

The third variant is *cultural* globalization, often viewed as synonymous with “Americanization,” the source of a new unbridled imperialism that will destroy traditional societies. The more extreme version of this argument characterizes globalization as a cultural

invasion aimed at global homogenization.⁴ A more nuanced view acknowledges that globalization fosters conflict and resentment.⁵ Through “individually accessible, ordinary networked communications such as personal computers, DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones,”⁶ as well as movies, radio, and television, cultural globalization encompasses the transmission of other cultures. These media glorify the “branded products” and “branded lifestyles” associated with a mostly Western culture.⁷ For populations living subsistence lifestyles, these images starkly contrast the lives of those in the West who benefit the most from globalization with those on the fringes of the globalized world. Cultural globalization has made these populations profoundly aware of just how badly they live. Societies excluded from the benefits of globalization increasingly challenge the legitimacy of the governments that rule them. Powerless and dislocated, these populations are ripe for exploitation. Armed groups use these images of disparity, exclusion, and cultural onslaught to mobilize and recruit.

Political globalization broadly defines the impact of the other three variants on the state. This variant of globalization suffers the most from a lack of definitional clarity. At one extreme, political globalization is seen as a force that will ultimately destroy the state.⁸ Yet the economic and technological forces of globalization have also strengthened the state’s ability to monitor its citizens and their movements, collect revenue, and combat the rising challenge of armed groups. Herein lies the paradox of globalization. Strong states are made stronger by globalization and weak states are further weakened by it. As Wolf notes, globalization is a choice.⁹ To participate in an integrated world economy, states choose to loosen restrictions on capital flows, goods and services, and people.¹⁰ Loosening controls to participate in international trade creates opportunities armed groups can exploit. For weak states, the decision to participate fully in the integrated global economy is thus fraught with peril.

These four variants of globalization have each contributed to the transformation of armed groups. As we attempt to identify how these broad changes have enabled armed groups in more specific terms, it is important to note that these categories, while conceptually distinct, are interrelated in practice. Armed groups have directly exploited the economic, technological, and cultural variants of globalization while benefiting indirectly from the impact of globalization on the state.

THE DIRECT EXPLOITATION OF GLOBALIZATION

The sheer volume, speed, and geographic spread of globalization confer a degree of anonymity on those who participate. Armed groups have effectively exploited this anonymity in three distinct ways. First, the sheer size of the global economy enables armed groups to mask their trade of legal and illegal goods, to move people, and to evade detection. Second, the ability to communicate and operate anonymously over vast distances enables armed groups to create linkages with other groups having disparate ideologies, objectives, memberships, and operational structures. Third, the heightened connectivity of the globalized world has enabled armed groups to transmit information and recruit on an international scale while masking their authorship and intentions amid the noise of legitimate global interaction.

Therefore, globalization has compressed time and space. The technology of global transport now links the vast reaches in record time. Tracing the transit of illegal goods requires highly sophisticated means of detection and highly reliable anticipatory intelligence, both of which are frequently beyond the capacities of weak states in which many armed groups operate. The magnitude and speed of worldwide transit further compound the detection and intelligence tasks. When the time to off-load is measured in hours in many of the world's busiest ports, such cargo easily disappears amid the sheer number of containers transiting a port in any given day.¹¹ Similar issues of speed and size affect air, rail, and truck transport. Detecting illicit cargo remains a challenge for the wealthiest and most technologically advanced states. For states that barely manage to provide basic services, such technologies are simply beyond their capacities to employ. The vast quantity of goods being moved and the speed with which they transit ports of entry are highly exploitable given the severely constrained capabilities of most states in which, and through which, armed groups operate.

Armed groups exploit the sheer volume of trade and the compression of time and space to evade detection. Criminal organizations benefit from the anonymity of the global market to move drugs and other illegal cargo. Insurgents and militia can procure the necessary arms, including large weapons, and export their illicit goods, masking their shipments amid the vast trade in legal goods.

Armed groups have also exploited the anonymity of globalization to move people, masking the movements of advance teams and operatives among those of the large numbers of legitimate businessmen, students, and vacation travelers as well as the large movements of populations escaping zones of conflict. The sheer number of people who travel for legitimate purposes allows armed groups to penetrate states, particularly where state regulation of movement is compromised. In the West, where the technologies to track people and the intelligence to anticipate such movements are robust, this ability of armed groups has been constrained. They have thus adapted. Al-Qaeda now targets Muslim converts in the West, exploiting their Western passports and identities to move operatives and mount operations within the West.

The anonymity of globalization has created "marriages of convenience" among groups with vastly different ideological and political goals. The result has been a shift away from "stand-alone groups" to "transnationally internettted groups,"¹² or what others have termed "mixed groups."¹³ Hezbollah forged alliances with criminal organizations to move drugs and provide transshipment protection in return for financial gain.¹⁴ The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have forged partnerships with major drug organizations, protecting the coca cultivation, processing, and shipment in areas they control. These are only a few examples of a growing network of connected armed groups that coordinate activities and forge profitable relationships to procure goods and resources, such as arms, and vastly expand their global reaches. Such linkages among disparate groups further cloak the origins and purposes of their activities and multiply exponentially the task of those who seek to monitor and track them.

Finally, armed groups exploit the anonymity inherent in global connectivity to transmit information. Globalization has fueled an "expansion of chaotic connectivity" with

“few institutional frameworks or standards [to] provide structure in cyberspace.”¹⁵ The Internet has opened new “highways of evasion.”¹⁶ Worldwide, more than a billion users are now connected to the Internet, and achieving the ability to control the flow of information, to restrict access to the Internet, and to identify suspect Web sites and chat rooms is a nearly impossible task even for the most technologically advanced states in the West.

The anonymity of the Internet means that the authority of information and sources can rapidly become meaningless. Cronin characterizes this flow of information as the “dark side of freedom of speech.”¹⁷ Do the details and pictures of violence against Muslims depict real events or have the images been doctored to promote a group’s ideology? Who posts the information and under what authority? The challenge is not only to identify the source of information on the Web but also to verify the veracity of images that can be altered with increasingly sophisticated technologies that are becoming widely accessible. Such media are powerful tools to mobilize populations, and the image-based nature of the information resonates even among target populations where literacy is low or nonexistent.¹⁸

In regions of the world where landline telephones are absent or unreliable or where high-speed Internet is not available, cell phones are an inexpensive and readily accessible alternate conduit for downloading images and videos. Tracking the flow of information and images via the use of individual cell phones requires highly sophisticated technologies beyond the capacities of many of the states whose populations are targeted by armed groups. Absent the cell phone and the Internet, slick productions on DVDs can be passed from person to person, replacing oral messages on cassette tape.

Another direct enabler of armed groups is the information and communication technologies that have transformed how armed groups are organized and how they operate. This transformation is apparent in three significant changes. First, globalization has fostered new network organizational structures that ensure the survivability and redundancy of armed-group leaderships and allow the organization to shift operations swiftly from one geographic region to another. Second, decentralized organizational structures shift the initiative to the local level and heighten the group’s lethality and its operational effectiveness. Finally, information and communication technologies ensure that armed groups can maintain direction over cells and subgroups dispersed across the globe and coordinate operations over vast distances.

Information and communications technologies have fostered new network forms of organization that are flatter and less hierarchical in structure.¹⁹ These new organizational structures have transformed how armed groups operate. Armed groups that adopt a network structure have little or no hierarchical structure and multiple leaders. The networked armed group thus has an organizational measure of redundancy and hence of survivability. If a prominent leader is killed, the organization survives. Network forms of organization also enable the dispersal of subgroups or cells across regions and around the world. This dispersed structure ensures that when groups have to relocate operations swiftly, there are other established cells or subgroups that can continue the group’s mission and ensure its survival.²⁰

Network organizations enable decentralized operations and decision making, allowing for local initiative and autonomy. Given that armed groups are increasingly dispersed over vast distances, an organizational structure that facilitates local initiative and decision making reduces the likelihood of communications being intercepted and operations being compromised. It also increases the capacity of the group to seize opportunities created by local conditions. The flatter organizational design of a network ensures that “members do not have to resort to a hierarchy—they know what they have to do.”²¹ Local initiative and decentralization transform the armed group into a more efficient and potentially more lethal organization. The increasing reliance on converts by al-Qaeda in Europe adds another dimension to the benefits of local initiative. Given that local converts have far greater knowledge of the physical and political terrains, an armed group that is organized to encourage local initiative will be able to operate with far greater effectiveness and lethality.

Finally, information and communication technologies ensure that the armed group can maintain direction over cells and substructures dispersed internationally. Although globalization has eased the movement of people, a key constraint on such wide dispersal is the need to maintain control and direction.²² Globalization has enabled armed groups to overcome this constraining variable. Through the use of the World Wide Web, e-mail, and electronic bulletin boards and through cell phones, fax machines, and computer conferencing, the armed group can share operational information and coordinate attacks over vast distances. Chat rooms allow dispersed groups such as Hamas to conduct and coordinate the planning of operations and the movement of people. The cell phone can be used to pinpoint the timing of explosions or to facilitate coordination among linked armed groups.²³ These same technologies link criminal organizations as they coordinate the movement of goods across broad regions.

Yet another direct enabler of armed groups is the integrated global economy, which has transformed the capacities of armed groups to profit from the trade of both legal and illegal goods and resources and to circumvent the penetration of their financial networks by the state. Since the 1990s, many armed groups have lost their state sponsors, and thus their main sources of arms and financial resources. Some armed groups have seized control of the production of key resources in the regions they control, plying these goods on the global market to fund expanded operations and further weakening the capacities of the states in which these groups operate. Others have forged highly profitable alliances with other armed groups, particularly criminal organizations, trading protection and transport for a share in the vast profits. These “marriages of convenience” have further expanded the networks of armed groups, many of which operate on a global scale.

As the efforts to trace the assets of armed groups have become increasingly sophisticated, groups like al-Qaeda have turned to commodities not only as a source of profit but also as a way to protect and move funds. In the case of al-Qaeda, the decision was made to shift its financial resources from the formal banking system, trading it for commodities such as diamonds and tanzanite, which hold their value over time, are difficult to trace, have a high value-to-bulk ratio, and can be easily sold in small quantities on the world market.²⁴ Estimates suggest that al-Qaeda transferred some \$30 to \$300 million

into commodities through a lucrative connection with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.²⁵ The significance of this network illustrates how globalization has enabled armed groups to expand their financial resources despite the loss of state sponsors by exploiting nontraditional financial methods made possible by a globalized economy. These methods have the added benefit of shielding the group's activities and its resources from international efforts to monitor them and seize their assets.

The global economy has also expanded access to the means necessary to conduct operations. Although the needs of an insurgency or militia may differ greatly from those of a terrorist group or a criminal organization, all armed groups need some basic weapons and basic survival goods.²⁶ Some armed groups can manufacture their own explosive devices.²⁷ Others rely on unsophisticated weapons and explosives obtainable locally, usually by theft or "trade" with local militaries. But most must rely on the global arms trade to procure the necessary weapons. Globalization has made the supply of goods, particularly arms, easily available in even the most remote parts of the world.²⁸ Globalization has vastly expanded the market, facilitating linkages among buyers and suppliers and easing the transit of arms and other supplies. Most significant for global security, globalization removed the armed group's dependence on the state for arms and other key resources. The result has been to further weaken state sovereignty while expanding the lethality and operational effectiveness of the armed group.

Armed groups have thus exploited globalization in direct ways to mask their activities and intentions, to evade detection, to adopt new organizational structures, and to foster highly lethal and profitable networks. They have exploited the integrated global economy to reduce their dependence on the state and to conduct increasingly lethal operations. By directly exploiting the benefits and opportunities inherent in an increasingly globalized world, armed groups have been transformed into a truly worldwide threat that directly challenges the sovereignty of the state.

THE INDIRECT EXPLOITATION OF GLOBALIZATION

Armed groups have also indirectly exploited globalization through its impact on the state. Globalization has not led to the demise of the state, but it has served to further undermine weak states, creating crises of governability and legitimacy. Armed groups need the state, albeit weakened, to function and survive. Weak states can be categorized as "bad government states" and "fractured society states."²⁹ Both categories are characterized by fundamental legitimacy deficits.

Holsti suggests that there are two dimensions to legitimacy: the vertical and the horizontal.³⁰ The vertical dimension involves the "right to rule." It is measured by the degree to which populations accept the authority of the state, consent to its rule, and offer their loyalties to the state and its institutions. The horizontal dimension of legitimacy involves the definition of the community that is to be ruled. States that define citizenship irrespective of ethnic or sectarian affiliation are states that enjoy a high degree of horizontal legitimacy. States that restrict the definition of citizenship to only one ethnic or sectarian group are states that suffer from a horizontal legitimacy deficit. The nature of the legitimacy deficit translates into two categories of weak states: the bad government state and the fractured society state.

The bad government state is a category of weak state defined in terms of *state capacity*. In bad government states, the social contract collapses and the government is deemed illegitimate because it fails to provide key political goods to its inhabitants.³¹ Rotberg identifies a hierarchy of political goods, the most important of which is security, especially human security. The state's prime responsibility—its part of the social contract—is to prevent cross-border infiltrations, eliminate domestic threats, prevent crime, and enable citizens to resolve their differences without recourse to violence.³²

Security is the gateway for the provision of other political goods, including key social services such as education; public health policies and medical care; public infrastructures, including basic utilities, communications systems, and transportation networks, as well as a money and banking system, a reliable infrastructure for fiscal extraction, and an effective judicial system. None of these public goods can be provided with uniformity if a basic level of state security cannot be maintained.

The bad government state is one that fails to provide some or all of these political goods. Given that many of these states are also on the margins of the globalized world, their capacities to respond to the challenge of armed groups is severely constrained. In much of Africa, we find states that exhibit an almost complete inability to provide basic services to their populations. Human security is nonexistent, and large parts of their territories are left unadministered. This fundamental weakness creates both political and geographic vacuums that armed groups exploit.

The fractured society state is a category of weak state defined not by its failure to deliver security and other essential political goods (although it frequently fails to provide these goods to all of its citizens) but by a fundamental lack of *legitimacy*.³³ Fractured society states are deeply divided states.³⁴ Populations are fractured along ethnic and sectarian cleavages, and political power resides with only one ethnic or sectarian group. In fractured society states, some or all of the population rejects the government's right to rule, and the rights of citizenship are restricted to one population group, often a group that shares the same ethnic identity with those who rule. Fractured society states thus suffer from both a horizontal and a vertical legitimacy deficit.

Many fractured society states were created during the period of decolonization after 1945. Many of these states are what Jackson terms "quasi-states": states that are granted external sovereignty without any meaningful internal sovereignty.³⁵ Many contain "captured populations"—groups encapsulated in states with little historic or ethnic affiliation to the states in which they find themselves or to the ruling parties. As a result, fractured society states are states whose territorial confines include populations that may be merely disenfranchised but are more likely to suffer from some form of discrimination if not violence. These states frequently exist on the margins of the globalized economy, not because of a lack of capacity, as is the case with bad government states, but because they are shunned by the international community for their exclusionary policies, as was the case with Serbia during the 1990s, or because they suffer from severe communal conflict. Although the number of violent communal conflicts has declined since the 1990s, many of the underlying issues remain unresolved.³⁶ These conflicts leave a legacy of wounded societies that are ripe for exploitation. These legacies are also difficult to

overcome given that portions of the population view the fractured society state as illegitimate.

Bad government and fractured society states are both exploited by armed groups in different ways. Armed groups fill the vacuums created by the incapacity of bad government states to occupy and control regions where government rule is absent. These vacuums become the safe havens and sanctuaries armed groups exploit to evade detection, plan operations, train forces, and stockpile supplies. These safe havens can also be exploited to produce key resources, such as drugs, and to provide key corridors through which these drugs and operatives can move between regions and across the globe. In some cases the bad government state is an unwitting ally. Its sovereignty is exploited to shield the armed group, and the state is frequently too weak to take steps to counter the armed group's influence. In other instances, the state forms an alliance with the armed group, "taxing" the group's profits in exchange for protection and key political goods such as diplomatic passports. Both vastly increase the capacity of the armed group and the challenge it presents to international security.

Armed groups exploit fractured society states in different ways. In these states, armed groups exploit the state's legitimacy deficit, targeting excluded populations, particularly if they are ethnic kindred. They step into the vacuum created by the legitimacy deficit to offer alternate governments—ones that provide security, employment, and even basic social services, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. These armed groups fundamentally challenge the fractured society state because they can claim legitimacy in ways the state cannot.

In fractured society states, armed groups can function as states within the state. They tax populations, engage in international diplomacy, provide political goods and services, and field forces capable of challenging the security forces of the state. Armed groups thus offer alternate governance. Given the profits armed groups can earn by exploiting globalization, these groups frequently have budgets that exceed those of the states they challenge.

The armed group is a powerful enemy. It may enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy than the sovereign government. It may also have resources that dwarf those of the sovereign state. As these weak states attempt to counter armed groups using the meager resources they control, their ability to provide services to still-loyal populations is further constrained. Such states face a vicious cycle compounded by ever-increasing demands on their constrained resources against an enemy that can exploit globalization in ways the weak states cannot.

ARMED GROUPS AND THE 21ST-CENTURY SECURITY PARADIGM

The transformation of armed groups has far-reaching implications for how we define the security landscape of the twenty-first century. This chapter has addressed two inter-related aspects of the new security landscape, namely, the uneven erosion of state sovereignty and the rise of the armed group as a strategic threat.

Globalization has been a key factor in both the transformation of armed groups and the declining ability of weak states to counter them. Globalization has heightened the operational effectiveness of armed groups and it has undermined both state capacity and

state legitimacy. Bad government states and fractured society states are caught in the paradox of globalization. Efforts to loosen restrictions on the movement of goods, people, and ideas in order to expand state capacity also expand the capacity of armed groups. The disturbing conclusion is that armed groups are uniquely positioned to exploit the benefits of globalization in ways the state, particularly the weak state, cannot. Globalization has created a far more capable and lethal enemy. The transformed armed group operates on an international scale, exploiting globalization to heighten its organizational effectiveness and lethality. The ability of weak states to counter this growing threat has been severely constrained by the erosion of state governability and legitimacy.

It is clear that the transformation of armed groups and the erosion of state sovereignty are two significant changes that will shape how we define a new security paradigm for the twenty-first century. The point here is not to suggest that the state is on the verge of disappearance but rather to argue that sovereignty is being undermined and eroded where states are already weak. I do not suggest that the armed group is the sole cause of this erosion of sovereignty. Rather, the armed group exploits already-weakened states to heighten its operational effectiveness and its global reach. In this way, weak states are further undermined. Coupled with their marginalization in the global economy, weak states are increasingly disempowered by globalization while the armed group is empowered by it.

The transformation of armed groups has far-reaching implications. Although states remain the predominant actors in the international system, by exploiting the forces of globalization, the nonstate armed group has emerged as a qualitatively and quantitatively new global actor.

NOTES

1. See Stanley Hoffman, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (July/August 2002).
2. Keith Griffin, "Economic Globalization and Institutions of Global Governance," *Development and Change* 34, no. 5 (November 2004): 790.
3. *Ibid.*, 789.
4. Fauzi Najjar, "The Arabs, Islam and Globalization," *Middle East Policy* 12 (Fall 2005): 92.
5. Hoffman, "Clash of Globalizations," 113.
6. Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New *Levée en Masse*," *Parameters* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 77.
7. John Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, Adelphi Paper 352 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 24.
8. For a discussion of this debate, see Jan Aart Scholte, "Global Capitalism and the State," *International Affairs* 73, no. 3 (July 1997): 427–29.
9. Martin Wolf, "Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?" *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2001, 182.
10. *Ibid.*, 184.
11. Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, 19.
12. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment; Readings and Interpretations*, ed. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer (New York: McGraw Hill, 2006), 41.
13. See Thomas X. Hammes, *Transnational and Non-state Actors and the New Landscape of War* (Cambridge: Radcliff Institute for Advanced Study, 9–10 March 2007), 6.

14. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "The Era of Armed Groups," 23, in *The Future of American Intelligence*, ed. Peter Berkowitz (Hoover Press, 2005), available at media.hoover.org/documents/0817946624_1.pdf (accessed 23 September 2007).
15. Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization," 82.
16. Mackinlay, *Globalisation and Insurgency*, 22.
17. Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization," 84.
18. *Ibid.*, 83.
19. Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," 39.
20. *Ibid.*, 63.
21. Louis Beam, quoted in *ibid.*, 51.
22. Anthony Vinci, "The 'Problems of Mobilization' and the Analysis of Armed Groups," *Parameters* 36, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 52.
23. James Briggs, "Guide to the Armed Groups Operating in the Niger Delta, Part 2," *Terrorism Monitor* 5 (26 April 2007): 8, available at www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_005_008.pdf (accessed 23 September 2007).
24. Douglas Farah, "The Role of Conflict Diamonds in Al Qaeda's Financial Structure," Social Science Research Council, programs.ssrc.org/gsc/gsc_activities/farah/ (accessed 15 September 2007).
25. *Ibid.*
26. Vinci, "The 'Problems of Mobilization' and the Analysis of Armed Groups," 51.
27. *Ibid.*, 55.
28. David Capie, "Armed Groups, Weapons Availability and Misuse: An Overview of the Issues and Options for Action" (background paper, meeting organized by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in advance of the Sixth Meeting of the Human Security Network, Bamako, Mali, 25 May 2004), www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/issueareas/perpetrators/armgroup.html (accessed 6 September 2007).
29. Dorff suggests two different categories of weak states—the bad government state and the ungovernable state. I have chosen to use the term "fractured society state" in place of "ungovernable state" to highlight the absence of horizontal *and* vertical legitimacy in multiethnic states. See Robert H. Dorff, "Failed States after 9/11: What Did We Know and What Have We Learned?" *International Studies Perspectives* 6, no. 1 (February 2005): 22–24.
30. Kalevi J. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97.
31. Dorff, "Failed States after 9/11," 22.
32. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.
33. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, 84.
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35. Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 21.
36. Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy* (College Park, MD: Center for International Development & Conflict Management, May 2005), 1.