

## Evaluate the role played by the United Nations during the Gulf War of 1991 and the Iraq War of 2003

The United Nations (UN) is an international body of nations, its role is to protect, and promote, peace, security, human rights, international law, and social progress, and standards of living.<sup>1</sup> Through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) the UN promotes international peace and security, with the Council taking ‘the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression’.<sup>2</sup> The five permanent members of the UNSC are the nations who take the lead in the Council, and these nations are and were at the time; USA, UK, Russia, France and China.<sup>3</sup> Across the two wars the USA, under the leadership of George H.W Bush and George W. Bush, took a lead role in both invasions against the Saddam Hussain’s Iraq.<sup>4</sup> The Gulf War started with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with Hussein aiming to claim Kuwaiti oil reserve, fulfil part of his expansionist aims, and to wipe out Iraqi debt to Kuwait. UN involvement in the matter came as the annexation of Kuwait had violated UN charter chapter VII.<sup>5</sup> The UNSC also issued 12 resolutions condemning Iraq’s actions in 1990 alone, calling for them to withdraw, and issuing sanctions against Iraq.<sup>6</sup> The Iraqi War began as part of the ‘War on Terror’ of which Iraq had been labelled as part of the ‘Axis of Evil’, and due to claims that Iraq were harbouring weapons of mass destruction as outlined by George W. Bush (WMDs).<sup>7</sup> UN involvement officially began in November 2002 after the passing of Resolution 1441, which saw the UN send inspectors to ensure compliance with previous resolutions that prohibited Iraq holding WMDs.<sup>8</sup>

The UN’s had a successful role in the Gulf War. The UN’s initial role in the Gulf War was preventing war from occurring and reaching a peaceful resolution to the situation. In the aftermath of Saddam Hussain’s Iraq invading and occupying Kuwait the UN, and the UNSC issued 12 Resolutions condemning Iraq’s actions. These resolutions called for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait and issuing sanctions that cut it off from world trade in order to force Saddam Hussain into withdrawing from Kuwait.<sup>9</sup> The UN offering Iraq the number of opportunities it did to withdraw from Kuwait, demonstrates that it was first and foremost was committed to peace in the region. Due to the UN’s commitment to peace in the region, it allowed the Middle Eastern States the chance to stabilise their own region, and discipline

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html>, 1945)

<sup>2</sup> United Nations, *United Nations Security Council*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>)

<sup>3</sup> United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Current Members*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/current-members>)

<sup>4</sup> F. Gregory Gause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) pg 94

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Chapter VII: Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html> 1945)

<sup>6</sup> United Nations, *Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1990*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1990> , 1990)

<sup>7</sup> G.W. Bush, *2002 State of the Union Address*, (Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/politics/100000004021075/the-axis-of-evil-speech.html> , Washington DC, 2002)

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1441*, (United Nations, New York City, 2002) pg 3 & 6-7

<sup>9</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, (I.B.Tauris, London, 2006) pg 200

Iraq themselves before intervening, this was an attempt to prevent the heightening of western influence within a region where western influence was already a contentious issue.<sup>10</sup> Arab attempts to reign in Saddam Hussain were led by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Mubarak of Egypt, and King Hussein of Jordan, however these attempts ultimately failed as Saddam Hussain refused to attend a summit to discuss Iraq's actions.<sup>11</sup> President Bush upon the passage of Resolution 678 outlined a peace plan, this peace plan was an attempt by the Americans to end the crisis by diplomatic means instead of committing to a military solution for the Crisis, Bush's actions were backed, and supported by the UN, and saw the Iraqi's release all hostages as a gesture of goodwill.<sup>12</sup> Other attempts at initiating talks also received the UN's backing, such as Algerian President Cadli Benjedid's attempt to restart talks between King Fahd, President Bush and Saddam Hussain.<sup>13</sup> When Bush's talks with Iraq stalled, the UN Secretary-General, Pérez de Cuéllar personally intervened, this showed the UN's executive attempting to actively prevent war from occurring, citing that they had a moral duty to avoid war.<sup>14</sup> Whilst the UN, USA, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt ultimately failed in their attempts to reach peace with Iraq, and a diplomatic ending to the Crisis, Saddam Hussain's stubbornness, and fatalistic approach to the conflict was blamed for the breakdown in negotiations.<sup>15 16</sup>

The Gulf War was the one of the most effective UN backed military operations, with incredibly low Coalition force casualties.<sup>17</sup> This is supported by the war lasting just under 7 months. The conflict was backed by the UN through the UN charter, and UNSC resolutions, specifically, Article 51 of the UN Charter, and UNSC Resolution 678.<sup>18 19</sup> Article 51 gives nations the right of collective self-defence after the UNSC had taken steps towards peace, of which resolution 678 was the final step.<sup>20</sup> Resolution 678 was the clear final step towards peace, as it gave Iraq 'one final opportunity', as a goodwill gesture, to withdraw from Iraq before giving states the right 'to use all necessary means to uphold and implement' all of the resolutions to 'restore international peace and security in the area' after the given deadline of 15<sup>th</sup> January 1990.<sup>21</sup> The UN backed operation was successful in bringing together the Arab world, with many Arab states contributing forces to the operation to fight the Iraqis, with many of these states, such as, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, having previously supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.<sup>22 23</sup> Perhaps more cutting for the Iraqis was the

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<sup>10</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 104-105

<sup>11</sup> Ibid pg 105

<sup>12</sup> P Salinger, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War*, (Middle East Journal, Vol.49, No.4, 1995) pg 607-608

<sup>13</sup> Ibid pg 608

<sup>14</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 226

<sup>15</sup> Ibid pg 226

<sup>16</sup> P Salinger, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War*, pg 610 – 612 & 608

<sup>17</sup> Ibid pg 612

<sup>18</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 91

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 678* in *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry, C. Cerf, (Times Books, London, 1991) pg 155

<sup>20</sup> United Nations, *Chapter VII Article 51*, (Available at: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>), 1945)

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 678* in *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry, C. Cerf, pg 155-156

<sup>22</sup> L. Fawcett, *International Relations of the Middle East*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) pg 286

<sup>23</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, Pg 71-72

condemnation of their action from their closest allies in the region, Jordan and Yemen, as they refused to recognise the annexing of Kuwait.<sup>24</sup>

The Gulf War demonstrated that the UN Charter worked and operated how it had been envisioned when it was created in 1945.<sup>25</sup> The Gulf War demonstrated that the idea of collective self-defence, and how Article 51 worked and the legal cover that it offered states when engaging in collective self-defence against other UN member states.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, it also demonstrated the extent that UN members would go to in order to protect one of the core principals of the UN, which was that land could not be taken by force, and Saddam Hussain and Iraq felt the full force of the repercussions of this.<sup>27</sup> The response from the UN, the UNSC also proved that the world, and the UN could properly operate in a post-Cold War world. In the aftermath of the War the UN played a key role in successfully managing Iraq's return to international trade, by overseeing Iraq's finances in the 'Oil for Food' program, and the removal of their oil trading sanctions in 1999.<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, the UN gave their protection to Kurdish refugees in the North of Iraq, and created protected enclaves for the Kurds in the North to protect them from Saddam Hussain.

Whilst the UN did have some positive effects, before, during and in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, they did have some shortfalls. The UN was essentially treated as an arm of American foreign policy throughout the conflict. Whilst Bush did attempt to open diplomatic channels with Saddam Hussain in November 1990, it was his first attempt at peace since Iraq invaded Kuwait in the August.<sup>29</sup> Whilst the American and the Iraqis did have one meeting, there was no resumption of relations after the Americans refused to renegotiate dates.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, where the Americans failed, the UN also failed. The UN Secretary-General's negotiations with Iraq were fruitless, as Saddam Hussain refused to submit to UNSC resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait, the UN General Secretary later said to President Mitterrand of France "I cannot conceal that I made no progress in Baghdad".<sup>31</sup> Iraqi officials, and Saddam Hussain maintained that the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent War could have been avoided had President Bush called him to negotiate, and the fact that the UN stepped in to negotiate only two days before the withdrawal deadline demonstrates that preventative measures that should have happened simply didn't happen.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the UNSC did not ask the UN to intervene at any point, the Secretary General intervened upon his own violation, this shows the UN to be acting in a poor manner as the UN did not communicate well with its self, this also shows poor decision making as the UN had been praised for its role in ending the recent Iran-Iraq war and these negotiation skills were something badly needed by the UNSC.<sup>33</sup> The resolutions that the UN,

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid pg 104

<sup>25</sup> N. Chomsky, *The uses (and abuses) of the United Nations* in *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry, C. Cerf, pg 308

<sup>26</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 91

<sup>27</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 104

<sup>28</sup> Ibid pg 125

<sup>29</sup> P Salinger, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War*, (Middle East Journal, Vol.49, No.4, 1995) pg 607

<sup>30</sup> Ibid pg 607

<sup>31</sup> Ibid pg 610

<sup>32</sup> Ibid pg 613

<sup>33</sup> P Salinger, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War*, pg 613

and the UNSC wanted Iraq to submit to had also been manipulated to be deliberately ambiguous to allow the USA the excuse to intervene without violating UN directives.<sup>34 35</sup> The resolutions issued by the UN and the UNSC can hardly be quantified as a success, as Iraq and Saddam Hussain ignored them, refusing to leave Kuwait despite the number of calls and resolutions demanding that Iraq withdraw.<sup>36 37</sup>

The act of going to War with Iraq was done under Article 51 of the UN Charter, this meant that the Coalition forces were outside of the jurisdiction of the UNSC and the UN.<sup>38</sup> The decision to go to war was not made at the UNSC, as any decision would have been vetoed by France and Russia and would have rendered any military intervention illegal, making a decision as a Coalition outside of the UNSC meant that the war was out of the control of the UNSC.<sup>39</sup> Unlike the Korean War, the forces deployed in the Gulf War were not UN force they did not carry the UN flag, it was a collection of forces from a variety of nations, this took control out of the UN's hands, and led to the war essentially being controlled by the Americans.<sup>40</sup> Saddam Hussain had indicated in his meeting with the UN General-Secretary that he would prefer diplomatic means to ending the crisis were they given more time, however the US favoured war and refused to give in, shown by the US deploying troops to the middle east on 7<sup>th</sup> August 1990, two weeks before the deadline, and by Bush pushing a bill through congress that supported American use of military action in Kuwait before the deadline.<sup>41 42</sup> This shows that the UN, and UNSC was unsuccessful in its aims of promoting peace as its most powerful member was on a war footing way before it needed to be.

This Gulf War demonstrated that in a post-Cold War world the UN was still being frustrated by Superpowers, and that the US was now the biggest barrier to peacekeeping.<sup>43</sup> The UN was unable to protect the stability of the area and also was unable to prevent the US from looking after its own interests in the region. The US benefited from a weakened Iraq in the region, as it strengthened its allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, and gave it more control over oil.<sup>44</sup> In the aftermath, the UN were unsuccessful in acquiring complicity to its resolutions, ceasefire agreement, and peace deal. Iraq continued with its development of WMDs, contrary to the resolutions, and furthermore the UN was unable to ensure the dismantling of WMD programs in Iraq as UN inspectors were refused access that they were entitled to.<sup>45</sup> The UN was unable to prevent a return to normality for Iraq as the US obstructed this path. The US refused to lift sanctions in a bid to topple Saddam Hussain, they did this by unilaterally enforcing the sanctions in an attempt to enable a regime change, the UN were

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<sup>34</sup> K. Kaur, *United Nations and the Gulf Crisis*, (India Quarterly, Vol.48, No.1/2, 1992) pg 65

<sup>35</sup> R. Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2018) pg 252-253

<sup>36</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 131

<sup>37</sup> K. Kaur, *United Nations and the Gulf Crisis*, pg 64

<sup>38</sup> Ibid pg 67

<sup>39</sup> Ibid pg 67

<sup>40</sup> Ibid pg 66-67

<sup>41</sup> Ibid pg 67

<sup>42</sup> P Salinger, *The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War*, Pg 611

<sup>43</sup> N. Chomsky, *The uses (and abuses) of the United Nations in The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry, C. Cerf, pg 309

<sup>44</sup> K. Kaur, *United Nations and the Gulf Crisis*, pg 68

<sup>45</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 382, 384, 388

unable to prevent these actions as the Americans were following UN resolutions despite the UN's wish for peace in Iraq.<sup>46 47</sup> The UN sanctions, which they were unable to change due to the USA's veto, had a crippling effect on the Iraq people, reducing the middle class, and leading to Saddam becoming more tyrannical, the UN was unable to deal with this issue as it has no power of enforcement against the big five.<sup>48 49</sup> The UN was also internally criticised for its handling of the Oil for Food program when the UN's program leaders quit over the program's deficiencies and the cost to human life that UN sanctions were having on Iraq.<sup>50</sup>

The UN did well in their management of the Iraq War, and were simply upholding the laws, sanctions and resolutions that they themselves had imposed upon Iraq. Iraq had been ignoring and circumventing the sanctions, and resolutions imposed upon them by the UNSC throughout the 1990s, by refusing UN weapons inspectors access, and attempting to conduct international trade despite the UNSC's demands.<sup>51 52</sup> The most high profile Iraq government resolution violations were the gaining of access to scud missiles, refusing UN inspectors access to ministries and trading with Syria throughout 2001.<sup>53 54</sup> Saddam Hussain's willingness to deceive the UNSC, his and his nations lack of conformity to the resolutions, and his refusal to allow inspectors into Iraq has been deemed by some as Hussain brining the war upon himself.<sup>55</sup> UN were shown to have strong management of the Iraq War, as its mechanisms forced the USA, and the UK to go through it to ensure that any war with Iraq was internationally legal.<sup>56</sup> Resolutions 1441 was the recognising that Iraq had violated previous UNSC resolutions, and acted as a warning to Saddam Hussain and Iraq that they would face 'face serious consequences as a result of continued violations', and recalled the usage of Resolution 678 as a threat.<sup>57</sup> UNSC resolutions are strong devices; they condemn nations, empower others, and be used as bargaining chips between members. The USA, and the UK were forced to make concessions and compromises in the passing of Resolutions 1441.<sup>58</sup> US allies in the middle east protested that the USA allowed Israel to occupy Palestinian territory, in response they sponsored Resolution 1379 that supported a two-state solution to the conflict which its allies supported.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, the US, and UK had to compromise on the internals of the resolution in order to gain the support of the rest of the UNSC, changing the tone and wording to satisfy the Council, these changes lead to the Resolution passing unanimously.<sup>60</sup> The altering of the resolution from its original form, showed the UN working correctly and in a good way to find a solution approved by all. This was shown once again with the passing of Resolution 1483, which authorised military

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<sup>46</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 253-254

<sup>47</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 122-123

<sup>48</sup> Ibid pg 122

<sup>49</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 378

<sup>50</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 125

<sup>51</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 382, 384, 388

<sup>52</sup> J. Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, (Free Press, London, 2004) pg 196

<sup>53</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 189

<sup>54</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 382, 384

<sup>55</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, (Hutchinson, London, 2004) pg 7

<sup>56</sup> J. Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pg 196-197

<sup>57</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1441*, (Available at <https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/1441.pdf> , 2002) pg 1, 5

<sup>58</sup> J. Greenstock, *Iraq: The Cost of War*, (Arrow Books, London, 2016) pg 121-122

<sup>59</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 194

<sup>60</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 121-150

intervention in Iraq.<sup>61</sup> The passage of 1483 was able to happen as the UN was correctly operating and following its own rulings, as the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) had found that Iraq had violated 1441.<sup>62</sup> UNMOVIC found that Iraq was in possession of long range missiles, believed that it owned WMD stock, stock that appeared in papers but was unaccounted for, whilst The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) also believed that Saddam Hussain had also produced 25,000 litres of anthrax, 550 Artillery Shells with Mustard, and between 100-500 tonnes of chemical Agents.<sup>63 64</sup>

The USA, and UK recognised the UNSC as the highest international authority, hence why Bush and particularly Blair were practically anxious to have UN, and international support before making any aggressive movements in the Middle East.<sup>65</sup> The Coalition forces contained American, British, Australian, and Polish soldiers, and were supported by Kurdish Militia fighters.<sup>66 67</sup> Whilst there were not UN forces, they were UN backed. The invasion of Iraq had particular support from Eastern Europe where Saddam Hussain was seen to be exhibiting Stalinist elements to his rule.<sup>68</sup> The invasion and subsequent control of Iraq lasted from March to May 2003, after which, Resolution 1483 was passed that outlined the movement towards peace in Iraq.<sup>69</sup> Resolution 1483 removed sanctions against Iraq, established the Coalition Provisional Authority and recognising its authority over Iraq, and outlined the role of the UN moving forwards.<sup>70 71</sup> The UN were to provide humanitarian relief, support Iraqi reconstruction, and oversee the “restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance”.<sup>72</sup> The UN were also still to be in control of Iraqi finances, and oil money until democracy was established, and the nation and stabilised.<sup>73</sup>

The UN failed to exert its authority over international affairs, and nations during the events of the Iraq War. One of the main reasons for this was the US. Key American Neo-Conservative Politicians within the Bush administration such as Vice President Cheney, and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld were particularly hawkish and favoured a unilateral response

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<sup>61</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 250-251

<sup>62</sup> Ibid pg 167-168

<sup>63</sup> Ibid pg 189-190

<sup>64</sup> C. Powell, *Presentation to the U.N. Security Council: A Threat to International Peace and Security in The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry & C. Cerf, (Touchstone, New York City, 2006) pg 470-473

<sup>65</sup> J. Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pg 192

<sup>66</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003*, (Available at: <https://www.defence.gov.au/publications/lessons.pdf>)

<sup>67</sup> MAJ I. J. Peltier *Surrogate Warfare: The Role of U.S. Army Special Forces*, (Available at:

<https://web.archive.org/web/20090211141158/http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=%2Fp4013coll3&CISOPTR=363>)

<sup>68</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 107

<sup>69</sup> Ibid pg 212

<sup>70</sup> Ibid 212

<sup>71</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 157 & 160

<sup>72</sup> United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1483*, (Available at: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1483>)

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<sup>73</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 189

to dealing with Iraq.<sup>74</sup> These politicians worked upon the new Bush Doctrine which favoured American primacy in the region, coupled with pre-emptive strikes against enemies, and threats to America.<sup>75</sup> UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw believed that Cheney and Rumsfeld had always wanted to attack Iraq, and that they wanted to finish the job they started in the Gulf War, and 9/11 gave them the perfect excuse to invade Iraq as international tolerance for Iraq changed, although the threat it posed had not.<sup>76</sup> Key members of the administration had also vocally indicated that they wanted war, with Rumsfeld claiming in 2001 that "Sanctions are fine, but we really want to think about is going after Saddam", and Bush told National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice "Fuck Saddam. We're taking him out" in 2002.<sup>77</sup> Bush had also told the UNSC that he believed that Iraq was responsible for 9/11, but he did not have clear evidence to support it, so therefore was no plan to attack Iraq at the time, however, he was simultaneously instructing the Pentagon and Rumsfeld to outline a plan of attack against Iraq, deliberately misleading and lying to the UNSC.<sup>78</sup>

The US managed to, alongside the UK, successfully side line the UN without much resistance, and gain primacy during the process of going to war, this led to the removing of the UN's goal of a diplomatic end.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, the UN General Secretary did not want the UN to have a role in the conflict and went along with being side lined as long as the UN were involved in the transition period, this shows the UN failing to act in the way that it should in a period of conflict as it was neglecting its duty to peace.<sup>80</sup> The US also never had the intention of going through the UN, but only did to ensure the war was legal, this shows the US had the feeling that through the UN they could simply do whatever they want regardless of procedures, and the continuation of the war despite 50 Members of the UN criticising the UN's authorise war with Iraq supports this view.<sup>81</sup> During the Gulf War the UN looked to the Middle Eastern leader to see if military intervention in the region was desired, however, in 2003 that was not the case, major players in the region such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Syria were against war, but were forced into supporting the war due to their financial dependence on the US, this was a disregard for international precedent set in 1991 which the UN did nothing to rectify.<sup>82</sup> This move also exposed the US's attempt to gain hegemony in the region.<sup>83</sup>

The US and UK were able to mislead and manipulate the UN and UNSC through its manipulation of UN organs, and intelligence. The appointment of members to UNMOVIC was a contentious issue within the UNSC, as countries that were against war wanted to appoint dovish inspectors, whilst the UN wanted hawks within UMOVIC that would report favourable information.<sup>84</sup> <sup>85</sup> Despite this UNMOVIC claimed that there was no reliable

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<sup>74</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 98

<sup>75</sup> J. Kampfner, *Blair's Wars*, pg 191

<sup>76</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 193

<sup>77</sup> Ibid pg 193-194

<sup>78</sup> Ibid pg 190-191

<sup>79</sup> Ibid pg 160 & 195-196

<sup>80</sup> J. Greenstock, *Iraq: The Cost of War*, pg 225-229

<sup>81</sup> Ibid pg 7-8 & 132

<sup>82</sup> L. Fawcett, *International Relations of the Middle East*, pg 255 & 267

<sup>83</sup> Ibid pg 252-253

<sup>84</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 112-114

<sup>85</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 150

evidence that Iraq had WMDs, which was supported by Iraq documents that outlined its dismantle of its nuclear program.<sup>86</sup> The lack of favourable information emerging from UNMOVIC prompted the US and UK to ignore these reports, and instead focus on unreliable reports from the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency, that claimed that Iraq were in possession of WMDs, a NIE document that outlined that Iraq had reconstructed its WMD program after expelling UN Inspectors and a UNSCOM report that outlined that Saddam Hussain had also produced 25,000 litres of anthrax, 550 Artillery Shells with Mustard, and between 100-500 tonnes of chemical Agents.<sup>87 88 89</sup> The US also created the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) which collected information that worked to draw a connection between 9/11, Iraq and Al-Qaeda.<sup>90</sup> These reports were proved to be unreliable by UNMOVIC, and the CIA who followed the leads and sources, showed the true extent of the manipulation and lying that was happening in front of the UN, and UNSC.<sup>91 92</sup> Colin Powell's presentation to the UN in February 2003 also demonstrated the true extent of the lying and manipulation of the UN, as Powell presented information that was either; not properly verified, incorrect, or out of date.<sup>93</sup>

The UN and UNSC also did not properly function during the passage of the Resolutions. Resolution 1441 was unclear in whether it needed a follow up resolution to support military intervention, or not, putting any attempt to go to war on uneven footing, furthermore, the resolution condemned Iraq for violating previous resolutions ignoring recent documents that Iraq had submitted to prove that were compliant with resolutions.<sup>94</sup> Due to the ambiguous wording of Iraq centred resolutions, the US and UK were able to put together legal footing that made invasion legal, using Article 51, Resolutions 1441, 678 and 687.<sup>95</sup> The manipulation of the UNSC led to the invasion being authorised, despite reservations by the other 3 permanent members who believed that Iraq could be dealt with peacefully.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore the US' determination to invade, coupled with the UN being side lined ensured that Saddam Hussain was not listened to when he declared in early 2003 that he did not want war.<sup>97</sup> The UN also failed to properly execute its role in the aftermath of the War. The UN did not issue any condemnation of the USA and UK after it was found that Iraq had no Nuclear weapons, instead it allowed national inquiries such as the Iraq inquiry, and Chilcot report to fill the void.<sup>98</sup> The UN were also unable to oversee a successful transition

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<sup>86</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 212-214 & 150

<sup>87</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War* pg 150 & 204-205 & 207

<sup>88</sup> Ibid pg 189-190

<sup>89</sup> C. Powell, *Presentation to the U.N. Security Council: A Threat to International Peace and Security in The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry & C. Cerf, (Touchstone, New York City, 2006) pg 470-473

<sup>90</sup> Ibid pg 210-215

<sup>91</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 185

<sup>92</sup> T. Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, (Anchor Books, New York City, 2008) pg 572

<sup>93</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 149

<sup>94</sup> J. Keegan, *The Iraq War*, pg 112

<sup>95</sup> Ibid pg 123-124 & 104-105

<sup>96</sup> The Foreign Ministers of France, Russia, and Germany, *Iraq's Disarmament can be Achieved by Peaceful Means* in *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry & C. Cerf, (Touchstone, New York City, 2003) pg 501-502

<sup>97</sup> S. Hussain, *Iraq has no Interest in War (Interview with Tony Benn)* in *The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions* eds. M.L. Sifry & C. Cerf, (Touchstone, New York City, 2003) pg 464

<sup>98</sup> L. Fawcett, *International Relations of the Middle East*, pg 351



to democracy with society breaking down, which led to US forces staying until 2011.<sup>99</sup> The UN were also unable to prevent the outbreak of Religious extremism in the nation, and saw the beginning of the Iraq civil war, and the redeployment of Coalition troops in 2014.

In conclusion, UN played a stronger role in the Gulf War than they did in the Iraq War, this is mainly due to role that the US played in the Iraq War in 2003, where they successfully sided with the UN, and its executive to achieve its foreign policy aims in the region. Overall, the UN did not play a strong role in either of the conflicts, and essentially acted as a function for the US to use in order to achieve legality for their actions, and goals. The UN showed its weakness in the Gulf War by being unable to enforce resolutions, the UNSC issuing 12 resolutions in 1990 condemning Iraq, all of which were ignored by Saddam.<sup>100 101</sup> Whereas In the Iraq War the UN's checks and balances were not seen to be doing anything to prevent war, with bargaining occurring within the UNSC in order to achieve support seen with the US sponsoring Resolution 1379 in order to gain support for Resolution 1441, and the dependency of smaller states such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria upon the US prevented them from being able to speak out against their financial providers.<sup>102 103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 220

<sup>100</sup> A. Munro, *Arab Storm: Politics and Diplomacy behind the Gulf War*, pg 131

<sup>101</sup> K. Kaur, *United Nations and the Gulf Crisis*, pg 64

<sup>102</sup> F. Gregory Cause III, *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, pg 194

<sup>103</sup> L. Fawcett, *International Relations of the Middle East*, pg 255 & 267

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