# Whole Person Approach to Insider Threat

Insider Threat Roundtable
October 2020
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Trusted insiders who commit crimes do not just "pop-up."


In roughly 80% of insider espionage/sabotage cases, investigators have identified social/organizational precursors that could have been addressed before the attack.

(Shaw & Fisher, 2005)




### **Critical Pathway**

Critical Pathway to Insider Risk (Shaw & Sellers, 2015)





#### Conceptual Illustration: Getting "left of boom"...




Greitzer et al. (2018)

### Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat (SOFIT)






#### **SOFIT: Individual Factors**



#### Varied Weights of Indicators

Not every factor is equally indicative of insider threat.



Greitzer et al. (2019)


## Professional Stressors







### **SOFIT: Organizational Factors**



### Requires Coordination and Information Sharing Among Diverse Stakeholders

- Cybersecurity
- Security
- Management
- May include Human Resources


Incident Response Team

#### Trusted Workforce TW2.0

- Behavioral indicators define "Attributes of Trust"
- Informed by Critical Pathway model


INSA Whitepaper: Human Resources and Insider Threat Mitigation: A Powerful Pairing

Need: Greater involvement by Human Resources, Worker Representatives, Privacy Advocates to establish a proactive Insider Threat program



Maturity

#### **Insider Threat Program Maturity**



Henderson & Cavalanca (2019)

### Summary: Insider Threat Program Should be...

- Comprehensive
  - Whole Person + Organizational Self-Assessment
- Inclusive
  - Engagement across departments/stakeholders and all levels of Organization
- Proactive
  - Cyber/technical monitoring to provide cyber defense and forensic data
  - Human behavioral data to identify at-risk individuals
  - Organizational assessment to identify contributing systemic factors
- Supportive
  - Mitigation is not just punitive—address individual risk factors and correct adverse organizational factors that increase risk and vulnerabilit

### References and Further Reading

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- Greitzer, FL, M Imran, J Purl, ET Axelrad, YM Leong, DE Becker, KB Laskey, & PJ Sticha. (2016). "Developing an ontology for individual and organizational sociotechnical indicators of insider threat risk." The Eleventh International Conference on Semantic Technology for Intelligence, Defense, and Security (STIDS 2016), Fairfax, VA, November 15-16, 2016. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1788/STIDS 2016 T03 Greitzer etal.pdf
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- Henderson, J & N Cavalanca: 2019 Insider Threat Program Maturity Model Report.
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- Shaw, ED & L Sellers. (2015). Application of the critical-path method to evaluate insider threats. *Studies in Intelligence*, 59(2), 1-8. <a href="https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-2/pdfs/Shaw-Critical%20Path-June-2015.pdf">https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-2/pdfs/Shaw-Critical%20Path-June-2015.pdf</a>

#### See also:

PsyberAnalytix Blog: <a href="https://psyberanalytix.com/franks-blog">https://psyberanalytix.com/franks-blog</a>

INSA Whitepaper: Human
Resources and Insider Threat
Mitigation: A Powerful Pairing
<a href="https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/INSA">https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/INSA</a> In
T Sept252020.pdf

INSA Whitepaper: Categories of Insider Threat https://www.insaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/INSA WP Categories of Insider Threats-1.pdf

## Thank You for Your Attention!

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