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Is empathy the missing link in teaching business ethics? A course-based educational intervention with undergraduate business students

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**IS EMPATHY THE MISSING LINK IN TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS?
A COURSE-BASED EDUCATIONAL INTERVENTION WITH
UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS STUDENTS**

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the School of Education

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Christopher P. Adkins
April 2009


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
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*This work is dedicated with much love and gratitude
to my parents, Charles and Jane Adkins,
to my three sons, John, Samuel, and Noah,
and most especially to my amazing wife, Shelly Lynne.*

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Is Empathy the Missing Link in Teaching Business Ethics?

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ABSTRACT

Past approaches to teaching ethics have been rooted primarily within the cognitive developmental tradition, with the focus on developing moral reasoning. Recent studies in cognitive neuroscience and social psychology have challenged this emphasis, highlighting the primacy of the emotion in driving moral decision-making. This study proposed that empathy may be an appropriate construct for integrating both processes, and that an moral education intervention that focused on empathetic perspective-taking based on Martin Hoffman's work may prove effective in both advancing moral reasoning and empathy. This approach was applied using a quasi-experimental design with undergraduate business students (N = 181) within a semester-long business ethics course. It was predicted that the class section receiving the empathetic perspective-taking intervention would show more growth on both perspective-taking (Interpersonal Reactivity Index, PT subscale) and moral reasoning (Defining Issues Test-2) measures than the comparison groups receiving the principled moral reasoning approach. Results from repeated measures ANOVAs by group indicated statistically significant differences for the comparison group increases on moral reasoning (DIT-2 N2 score); no difference was seen in the intervention group on either moral reasoning or perspective-taking. The results, however, did indicated a significant difference by gender for the intervention group on one of the subscales, Empathetic Concern, with women increasing and men decreasing in empathetic concern. A discussion of the results offers specific suggestions for integrating empathy into business ethics courses, balancing moral reasoning with

emotional engagement and addressing issues related to gender. Also, this study suggests the need for skill-based, context specific measures of empathy.

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Is Empathy the Missing Link in Teaching Business Ethics?

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

Teaching business ethics remains a challenge for faculty, business schools, and businesses for several reasons. First, one confronts a fundamental philosophical question: Can ethics be taught? While debated for centuries, the recent criticisms of business schools for failing to produce ethical leaders reveals the implicit assumption that ethics can indeed be taught or at least influenced and shaped by our environment. If business ethics can be taught, a second challenge emerges for faculty: how should we go about such teaching? What are the ideal outcomes and means for assessing progress? What approaches are most effective in reaching these goals? Over the last decade, researchers and educators have offered a wide variety of pedagogical approaches (Sims, 2002), although the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of these approaches remains an issue of concern. Universities and business have moved forward nonetheless, needing to educate ethical employees, managers, and executives. When one chooses an approach for teaching business ethics, another assumption lies beneath the surface: that we understand the processes that lead to moral action. This leads to a third and most significant challenge for teaching ethics, business or otherwise: the mysterious nature of moral behavior. Why do we choose the good over the harmful? What leads us to our decision? What goes on inside our hearts and minds? Once we arrive at our answer to moral dilemmas, why don't we always follow through and put our decision into action? Why do we sometimes choose to do things that we know are wrong?

First Challenge: Can Ethics Be Taught?

The recent criticisms of business schools in light of corporate scandals and the new efforts of ethics education rest on the assumption that ethics can indeed be taught. However, prior to the current corporate scandals, some educators and researchers had decided that there was little, if anything at all, their business schools could do to change the values and behavior of their students (Sims, 2002; Etzioni, 2002). David Messick, an ethics professor at Kellogg Business School, doubts the impact of his classes:

The average age (of an M.B.A. student) is 28 to 30. Their character is largely formed by the time they get here. If they don't have a sound moral compass, nothing I teach in a 10-week course is going to embed one there.
(Ford Foundation Report, 2002)

In addition, there are some faculty, as Etzioni highlights from his time at Harvard, that argue that ethics has little or no place in business schools because it lacks the scientific study characteristic of other business subjects (Etzioni, 2002). Other faculty argue that regulation and enforcement offer a more satisfactory and effective approach than teaching business ethics (Gordon, 2007; Beggs and Dean, 2007).

While few may publicly declare such sentiment in light of the present corporate climate, one may still wonder what effect such ethical initiatives may have. Seshadri, Broekemeir, and Nelson (1998) reviewed mixed results from business ethics courses, noting that many studies focused on changes in "attitudes, orientations, reasoning, or social awareness" (p. 305) but failed to show if such ethics training would "positively impact ethical decisions made in the workplace" (p. 305). Considering Professor Messick's common assumption that the moral views of MBA students are determined far

before MBA students begin their graduate education, is there any evidence that indicates that business schools can influence student values?

A study from The Aspen Institute (2002) not only suggests that business education can change students' attitudes in regard to ethics, but indicates that these graduate programs actually may encourage single-minded focus on the bottom line. This longitudinal survey of MBA students from 13 international institutions tracked the change in business attitudes from their time of entry until graduation. As the executive summary reports, the research indicates several key transformations in student views:

- 1) There is a shift in priorities during the two years of business school from customer needs and product quality to the importance of shareholder value.
- 2) MBA students are unsure as to whether and how social responsibility contributes to business success. However, they would like to learn more about it— and want business schools to provide concrete examples and integrate social responsibility into the core curriculum.
- 3) Students in all three waves believe that they will have to make decisions during their business careers that will conflict with their values.
- 4) Today's MBAs do not believe that they can change the values or culture of a company. If it comes to a conflict of values, they are likely to leave rather than to try to change the organization. (Aspen Institute, 2002)

A more recent study by James Beaghan (2008) confirms that many students would like to see more discussion of business ethics in their educational program. He also observes that the importance given to business ethics by both students and faculty may vary by the nature of institution (public vs. private, religious vs. non-religious).

These overall changes in attitudes suggest that business schools are indeed shaping students' perspectives in regard to business values and social responsibility. While some professors may still doubt the effectiveness of ethical education, it is apparent that business schools have potential to influence, and this suggest that such potential may be used to encourage ethical values. As one MBA professor interpreted the Aspen study,

The most important thing this research shows is that business education does socialize and shape students' views. It teaches them about what is possible, and about what is appropriate. This tells me that business schools cannot hide behind the old story that they are merely about technical and managerial skills. They have always been 'in the business' of shaping values and attitudes— whether they want to admit it or not." (Aspen, 2002)

Recent studies have embraced this sentiment and offered a defense of teaching business ethics (Sims, 2002; Williams & Dewett, 2005; Bradstreet-Grinois, 2007) as models for such instruction, to be discussed in the next section.

Second Challenge: How to Effectively Teach Business Ethics

As they seek to address accreditation standards regarding ethics, AACSB members are not debating over whether ethics should be included, but are arguing over

how to include ethics in curricula. In an article on the recommended changes to the AACSB guidelines, the Chronicle of Higher Education noted that “some 120 business professors have signed a letter calling on the association to require that all M.B.A. students take at least one stand-alone ethics course.” (Mangan, 2003) This recommendation would strengthen the proposed standards which simply require ethics be included as a priority subject in curricula, leaving business schools the discretion to either include a separate mandatory ethics course or integrate ethics across their existing curriculum. While the single course approach has had supporters over the past four decades of debate, there is increasing support for the integration approach (Sims, 2002).

The approaches for business ethics interventions extend beyond the structural issues of integrated versus stand-alone courses. Before developing the structure and delivery of such ethics programs, one must first define the objectives for the educational intervention. Sims (2002) provides an extensive review of the literature, noting the variety of objectives for business ethics programs. A primary objective has been to raise sensitivity to ethical issues in business settings so students will be able to “recognize” or “identify” problems that may arise in the workplace (Sims , 2002). Recognition, however, is not seen as sufficient, and most programs seek to cultivate the ability of moral reasoning. Multiple approaches have been employed by business schools to foster such skill. Lampe (1997) characterized the “traditional” approach as the emphasis of learning normative philosophical theories as the foundation for ethical decision-making. This approach also consists of the discussion of moral dilemmas, often using the case method approach, or by applying the philosophical theories to the cases. This approach, however, has been criticized for failing to offer students a sense of right or wrong

behavior (Lampe, 1997; Bok, 1988). The discussions often only prompt a discussion of possibilities and do not reach a resolution toward a particular action. Moreover, the cases under discussion may be too theoretical or far removed from “real” business decisions or from the students’ immediate sphere of influence or concern (Lampe, 1997; Sims, 2002; Adams et. al, 1999). As a result, some suggest the development of more relevant moral dilemmas, and for more straightforward cases that encourage ethical action, particularly when teaching undergraduate students (Lampe, 1997). Others suggest incorporating techniques from the Total Quality Management (TQM) approach that would ask students and educators to deliberately develop outcomes for student learning that would regularly be assessed so as to promote continuous improvement (Fort and Zollers, 1999; Sims, 2002).

While raising moral awareness and reasoning remain the primary goals of many business ethics programs, some programs are beginning to expand their objectives. Brinkmann and Sims (2001 in Sims, 2002) offer the following goals for those teaching business ethics:

1. Knowing thyself, your own moral values and thresholds.
2. Learning to see moral issues, conflicts, and responsibilities.
3. Learning to identify the specific moral aspects of a situation.
4. Learning to share moral understanding.
5. Learning how to handle moral issues and conflicts.
6. Acquiring moral courage.
7. Acquiring a critical attitude toward the business school curriculum and its disciplines. (p. 20)

Brinkmann and Sims argue that these objectives provide a more holistic approach to teaching business ethics. In addition to addressing moral awareness and reasoning, their objectives encompass moral motivation, character, and behavior, and ultimately include the concept of moral identity or moral self. To achieve such objectives, Sims (2002) advocates an experiential learning approach, where students actively engage in decision-making through such exercises as simulations, role-playing of real-life scenarios, and field-based experiences. Other researchers are also advocating such experiential approaches. Schumann et. al (1997) proposes the use of computer-based simulations in teaching business ethics as means for engaging students both intellectually and behaviorally. Kracher (1999) advocates the integration of community service in business ethics courses to foster a sense of social responsibility and ethical action. Jones and Ottaway (2001) examined the use of on-site visits to corporations as a component of a business ethics course and found both qualitative and quantitative support for the intervention in fostering student learning. Glass and Bonnici (1997) suggest instructors engage students in role-playing and debates in working with undergraduate business students. Reflection (often through debriefing with the instructor or through journaling) upon these experiences is essential if one is learning from such experiences (Sims, 2002; Kracher, 1999).

Third Challenge: The Complex Nature of Moral Decision-Making and Moral Behavior

Choosing an approach to teaching business ethics implies that one knows, or at least has some sense, of the processes that lead to moral behavior. Educational efforts also assume that one or more of these processes can be influenced, and a commitment to impact these processes accordingly. With his cognitive-developmental stage theory of

moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg focused on the process of moral reasoning or moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1980, 1981; Kuhmerker, 1991). This emphasis on reasoning has been widely criticized for lacking a full appreciation for the importance of motivation, identity, and emotion in driving moral behavior. (Gilligan, 1982; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2002) Despite these criticisms, much of moral education has been focused on developing moral reasoning. Yet recent studies in neuropsychology are highlighting the activity of emotion in the brain when considering moral dilemmas. This next section will provide an overview of Kohlberg's theory, followed by a discussion of the recent findings in cognitive neuroscience on the influence of emotion on moral decision-making.

Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Development

In the 1950s, Lawrence Kohlberg sought to expand Jean Piaget's developmental framework to the realm of moral reasoning, and in doing so, launched his study of moral judgment. Rejecting the behaviorist perspective that morality consists of conforming to societal norms, he focused on the individual's perspective, and the thinking by which the individual determined right from wrong. To probe the individual's moral reasoning, he posed moral dilemmas for their reflection, and asked how they would resolve such situations. Their responses provided him with the data to propose a developmental "hard" stage theory of moral cognition. (Rest and Narvaez, 1994) His six stages offer a developmental sequence in which one moves from simplistic understanding to more complex ways of moral reasoning. The six stages may be considered within three levels (Gielen, 1991):

Level 1: Preconventional. Expectations and motivations for moral behavior come from the external or outside the self (societal norms and rules).

Stage 1: Morality of Obedience. One understands right behavior as following rules, and behaves in order to avoid punishment. An egocentric, simplistic viewpoint that does not consider the perspectives of others.

Stage 2: Morality of Instrumentalism. While one recognizes that others have interests, one only cooperates when it is one's own self-interest. Concrete individualistic perspective.

Level 2: Conventional. Expectations, rules, norms are experienced as part of oneself.

Stage 3: Morality of Interpersonal Relationships. One understands moral behavior as maintaining relationships, living up to expectations, showing concern for others. Golden rule perspective.

Stage 4: Morality of Law and Duty. Everyone should uphold the laws or rules of the institution or system. Understands self in relation to the system and social duties.

Level 3: Post-conventional. One has abstracted moral principles from societal or interpersonal expectations.

Stage 5: Morality of Social Contract. Rational perspective with awareness of the relativity of some societal values, yet upholds due

to social contract. Also aware of some nonrelative values that must always be upheld.

Stage 6: Morality of Universal Ethical Principles. One follows universal moral principles through one's own deliberate choice, even if laws violate such principles. (Gielen, 1991)

Kohlberg's research of the stages of moral development is a common starting point for many counselors and educators, and in understanding his framework, one must look carefully at the psychological and philosophical assumptions that underlie his theory. As Gielen (1991) notes, Kohlberg's psychological perspective is rooted in the cognitive-developmental approach, which assumes that "cognitive growth leads to qualitative transformations in worldview" (p. 21). He understood the stages as expanding on the work of Jean Piaget, and aligned with John Dewey's perspective that children are ultimately philosophers attempting to understand and interpret their experiences in the world (Kohlberg in Kuhmerker, 1991). The psychological assumption that human beings are "meaning-making" (Kegan, 1984) individuals who develop over time also suggests Kohlberg's philosophical assumptions regarding human nature and morality. In reflecting on his approach to empirical research, Kohlberg notes that "what was to count as moral or as developmental advance must start with some philosophic definitions, assumptions, and arguments. These assumptions would be open to question in light of empirical findings, but one could not start with the effort to be value free." (Kohlberg, 1991, p. 14) This assertion illustrates one philosophical (and even psychological) assumption regarding human nature: in understanding reality, human beings bring some perspective of value in interpreting the phenomena. Secondly, Kohlberg's research

across cultures suggests that he began with the assumption that there is a universal human nature that can obtain across various social influences. Further examination of the progression of the stages reveals a third philosophical assumption of the primacy of the universal value of justice (rooted specifically, as Kohlberg himself notes, in the philosophies of Kant and Rawls) (1991). For Kohlberg, human beings develop morally as they develop cognitively, and through such cognitive development human beings can progress toward a moral worldview grounded on universal justice. His cognitive-developmental perspective and structural stage is rooted in the assumption that higher is better in regard to both cognitive and moral development.

As Rest (1999), Thoma (1994), and others have argued, Kohlberg's stages are not comprehensive or complete in the context of overall moral development, and even Kohlberg was aware of his limited scope: "The research programme of myself and my Harvard colleagues has moved from restricting the study of morality to the study of moral development to restricting it to the study of moral judgment (and its correspondence with action) to restricting it to the form or cognitive-structural stage of moral judgment as embodied in judgments of justice (Kohlberg in Rest, 1994, p. 9). In response, Rest (1994) expands moral development to include four components: moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and moral character. Such division of the moral process finds its roots in the Greek philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle, who recognized that the value of moral philosophy and deliberation encompassed not only an individual's moral knowledge, but their intentions and character as well. His four component model has provided an expanded framework for understanding and studying moral processes, and the connection of moral reasoning, intentionality, and moral action (Bebeau, 2002;

Bebeau, Rest, & Narvaez, 1999) Thoma (in Rest & Narvaez, 1994) has attempted to illustrate this link, advocating a research model (the U score measure) that shows the connection between actual and implied decisions on the DIT.

While researchers have attempted to establish the causal link between moral reasoning and action, the connection has not yet been empirically established (Haidt, 2001). Moreover, cognitive-developmental approaches such as Kohlberg's and Rest's have been criticized for overlooking the importance of the emotions in moral action, and it may be that the emotions play a powerful role in driving moral decisions and actions.

The Importance of Emotion: New Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience

The need to attend to affective role in moral decision-making had been acknowledged in the field of moral psychology, but recent findings in cognitive neuroscience have provided new empirical evidence that emotion is indeed actively engaged when considering at least some moral situations. Joshua Greene and colleagues (Greene et. al, 2004; Greene, 2003; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2005) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine the brain activity of participants when reflecting on moral situations. They hypothesized that different types of moral dilemmas would activate different areas of the brain. This hypothesis was validated by their research studies as they strove to delineate what neural functioning correlated to particular elements of moral scenarios.

In one of their first studies, Greene et. al. (2001) noted a significant difference in the brain's response to moral dilemmas that were perceived as more or less personal. This distinction can best be illustrated by considering the scenarios offered to participants. The trolley dilemma exemplifies a moral-impersonal situation:

A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? (Greene et. al., 2001)

Greene and his colleagues note that most participants respond that they are willing to engage the switch and thus harm the one in order to save the five. Following this scenario, participants are offered a similar yet slightly altered version of the trolley dilemma known as the footbridge dilemma:

Now consider a similar problem, the footbridge dilemma. As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. In this scenario, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge, onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? (Greene et. al., 2001)

This “moral-personal” dilemma asks the individual to personally engage in a direct ethical violation that causes serious harm to another person. They hypothesized that the “moral-personal” dilemmas would be more likely to activate an emotional response. The fMRI scores supported this hypothesis, showing increased activity in those areas of the brain that previous research has associated with emotion: medial frontal gyrus (bilateral), posterior cingulated gyrus (bilateral), angular gyrus (right and left). Moral-

impersonal scenarios activated those areas of the associated with working memory: dorsolateral prefrontal and parietal regions. (Greene et. al, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002).

That the brain responds differently, and is influenced by emotion in scenarios that require individuals to engage in direct harm, is not a surprising discovery when one considers theoretical decision-making in contrast to naturalized decision-making. It is much easier to consider doing harm in hypothetical situations as opposed to doing real harm in the live moment. Yet what is particularly striking about these neuropsychological studies is that even hypothetical situations can trigger an emotional response in the human being. The participant knows that the footbridge dilemma is an imaginary scenario that one is likely to never encounter, but the brain still registers an emotional response. Why is this the case? Why doesn't the brain recognize the scenario as simply an intellectual exercise?

A close review of these studies reveals several significant findings:

- 1) *An emotional distinction between "personal" and "impersonal" situations.* In Greene et al. (2001), they hypothesized that "some moral dilemmas...engage emotional processing to a greater extent than others...and these differences in emotional engagement affect people's judgments." The results from the fMRI for the medial frontal gyrus (bilateral), posterior cingulated gyrus (bilateral), angular gyrus (right and left) revealed a significant increase in brain activity for the "moral-personal" dilemmas, with the "moral-impersonal" only showing a slight increase over the "non-moral" dilemmas. These "moral-

personal” dilemmas represented scenarios that were “intuitively ‘up close and personal’”, with the individual being asked to consider personally engaging in ethical violation, often against another person (thus more likely to active an emotional response). Greene et al. recognize that this finding needs further exploration, but they suggest that this difference in emotional response may be helpful in understanding the conditions and circumstances that engage moral emotions. (Greene et al., 2001)

- 2) *The role of emotional interference.* In the same study, Greene and his colleagues (2001) also examined the reaction time of participants in providing their judgment on the various cases. Of particular interest were those few individuals who judged certain actions as “appropriate” in the moral-personal dilemmas despite the likely emotional reaction of “inappropriate” (as most participants concluded). These individuals exhibited longer reaction times in these scenarios than those who judged the action “inappropriate” and longer reaction times than their own judgments about “moral-impersonal” and “non-moral” dilemmas. These results were consistent with the researchers’ theory that emotional interference can and does occur, allowing an individual to make judgments that are inconsistent with their first emotional reactions. That said, it remains clear that the emotional activity for such individuals still remains strong despite their judgment in the case.

3) *Introspection and Emotion may reside in the same regions of the brain.*

In their discussions of the recent neuroimaging studies, Greene and Haidt (2002) note that the same three areas of the brain identified with emotional activity in regard to moral processing are the same three regions associated with the brain's resting activity, "the activity of which is attenuated when people are engaged in goal-directed actions" (p. 522). They suggest that this connection may be rooted in the common task of introspection, and that "the high-level social-emotional processing involved in moral judgment may be a 'turbo-charged' version of the personal ruminations in which we engage when otherwise unengaged" (p. 522). How to interpret this connection further, however, remains unclear.

In discussing his findings, Greene (2005) recognizes that while emotion is clearly actively engaged in moral processing, it is not clear the role that emotion plays. He argues that emotion is likely to play a significant role, referring specifically to studies that cases where brain damage to these emotional areas of the brain has harmed moral decision-making. Referring to the work of Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 1994 in Greene, 2005), he discusses Phineas Gage, a railroad foreman who experienced serious damage to his medial prefrontal cortex resulting from an explosion. Previously known for his upright behavior and good nature, after the accident Gage engaged in "lawless" behavior and had much difficulty socially and in the workplace. This case is similar to another head trauma patient, Elliot, who suffered damage in the same area due to a brain tumor. While performing well on personality tests and even above average on intelligence tests, Elliot's

exhibited particularly weak emotional responses to various prompts designed to engage emotion. He could provide reasoning for not engaging in unethical behavior, but could not feel the emotional weight in such scenarios. While such examples could suggest that moral reasoning is located specifically in these areas of the brain, Greene is careful to note that the difficulties encountered by these individuals extend beyond mere moral processing to social decision-making, and may even extend to other types of judgment. This suggests that there is not a clearly defined moral faculty of the brain, isolated in one region, and isolated from other functions. Rather, moral functioning is likely intertwined with other functions, yet can be observed in certain regions of the brain. (Greene, 2005)

The contrast in brain activity, and particularly the activation of emotion, was an important first finding in highlighting that the brain does not respond to all ethical scenarios in a similar manner, even when the outcome is the same. Yet also significant was that the vast majority of respondents rejected doing harm (pushing the man off the bridge to save the five) in the moral-personal dilemmas while at the same time they agreed to harm (switching the track to hurt the one to save the five) in the moral-impersonal dilemmas. What caused the discrepancy in response? From a rational analysis, the outcome of each proposed action is the same: one individual is harmed to save five individuals. Greene and his colleagues argue that it is the triggering of the emotion in the moral-personal scenario that is the tipping point, thus suggesting that emotional activity has a strong influence in moral decision-making.

Purpose of the Study

This research study sought to address the second challenge, finding effective ways to teaching business ethics, based on new understandings of the third challenge, the

nature of our moral processing. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience questions the primacy of the cognitive processes that lead to moral decisions and actions. A new theoretical approach, the social intuitionist model (to be discussed in the next chapter), challenges the rationalist model of cognitive-developmental theory. This shift away from moral reasoning to moral emotions and intuitions has yet to be incorporated into business ethics education, so both a review of this research and the implications for teaching business ethics is necessary. This recent research also requires a reconsideration of our moral processing that includes moral reasoning, emotions and intuition. Empathy will emerge as a potential construct that integrates cognition and affect, and offer a new direction for focusing business ethics efforts. This research study explored the effectiveness of an educational intervention focused on empathetic perspective-taking and reflection within small groups that integrates both cognition and affect and intends to promote both moral reasoning and empathy development in undergraduate business students.

Significance of the Study

Both role-taking and reflection have been advocated in previous research on teaching business ethics, and empirical evidence supports the effectiveness of these approaches. This study, however, seeks to single out empathetic perspective-taking from other approaches based on the recent research in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology. Most importantly, this study intended to explore the effectiveness of this approach in fostering both the cognitive and affective development in undergraduate business students. Previous research in business ethics has not focused on interventions that develop moral affect or intend to foster empathy in business students. Moreover,

instruments used in previous business ethics interventions have been focused primarily in measuring moral reasoning; this study evaluated the effectiveness of empathetic perspective-taking using measures of reasoning and affect. This empirical investigation of cognitive and affective aspects of moral development intended to highlight effective approaches to teaching business ethics that are consistent with the current research in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Sitting in a college ethics class, you may not realize that a revolution has been brewing. Discussions of utilitarianism and deontology would suggest that reason still reigns as guide for our moral decisions and actions, but psychologists, with the aid of cognitive neuroscience, are suggesting that the driving moral forces may lie in emotion and intuition. The availability of brain imaging (via fMRI technology) has given researchers a glimpse of the brain activity involved in our moral processing, and it appears that emotional and intuitive processes are not only co-occurring with rational ones, but perhaps they are more immediate and influential. That emotion plays an essential role in our moral decision-making is not surprising; one need simply think of the intensity of moral dilemmas in one's own life, and that in such moments our feelings may have a stronger pull than our reasons in guiding our actions. Moreover, the importance of emotion in decision-making has been a primary area for psychologists since the 1980s (Haidt, 2007). The notion of moral intuition, however, has captured researchers' attention with the recognition that much of our decision-making occurs automatically, as opposed to the result of conscious deliberation (Damasio, 1994, 2003; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Narvaez, 2008).

Despite this current interest, little discussion has been given to how these latest findings in cognitive neuroscience should change the way we teach ethics. Many educational approaches to moral decision-making have been rooted primarily in the cognitive developmental tradition and thus have focused on moral reasoning as the means for influencing moral judgments and in turn fostering moral development. Few studies

have explored developing moral emotion and intuition, and in the latter part of this chapter I offer a brief review of these studies in search of common themes. Yet before addressing these empirical studies, I begin with a review of one of the most widely discussed theories in the literature: Jonathan Haidt's Social Moral Intuitionist Model (2001). Haidt suggests that for most of us, we arrive at moral judgments by way of moral intuition, not by way of moral reasoning. His account emphasizes both the immediacy by which such judgments "appear" to us, as well as their strong affective pull in evaluating the rightness or wrongness of an action or character. According to Haidt, we often immediately feel and judge what is moral though we may not be able to articulate why, and in trying to articulate our rationale, we end up searching for reasons to support our answer (our initial intuition), as opposed to reasoning toward an answer (Haidt, 2007)

Although Haidt's model, with its sharp limiting of the causal role of reasoning in determining moral judgments, has proven to be controversial in the literature, his model offers an important starting point in considering educational implications for three reasons: 1) his model is widely discussed in the literature as the primary alternative to the rationalist models (i.e., Kohlberg) that have dominated moral education; 2) his model, while emphasizing intuition, also embraces the importance of moral emotion and interpersonal interaction in influencing moral judgment, two ideas which have been highlighted in the literature but do not always receive emphasis in rationalist models; 3) while Haidt suggests that most of the time for most of us our moral judgment is result of an immediate moral intuition, his model does allow for the possibility that intuitions may be shaped and influenced. By beginning with Haidt, we can see what alternatives to

ethics education may arise if the focus shifts from reasoning to emotionally charged intuition.

Haidt's model offers a worthy point of departure, but it is necessary at the outset to highlight that debate continues over the roles of reason, emotion and intuition in moral decision-making. Several researchers have argued that Haidt's model has overemphasized the importance of moral intuition and underestimated the contribution of moral reasoning (Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004; Narvaez, 2008). Others have supported Haidt's corrective in integrating emotion and intuition, yet offered alternative descriptions on the relationship between emotion and intuition (Gigerenzer, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), and how intuitive judgments might be shaped (Horgan & Timmons, 2007; Pizzaro & Bloom, 2003; Prinz, 2006). Amidst these varying interpretations, researchers are recognizing that moral decision-making is a complex process where environmental conditions play a significant role in determining how intuition and reason are activated, and that more empirical research is needed to assess the dynamics of moral decision-making.

Although further clarity is needed, one can begin exploring the educational implications of this latest research. Within the context of Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model, we can ask: how might we educate our emotionally charged intuitions? Can such an immediate and seemingly automatic process be educated or influenced? An examination of Haidt's model suggests that our initial intuitions can only be replaced by new intuitions, and that our first and immediate intuition might be challenged by secondary intuitions that come through conversation with others or via private reflection.

Specifically he suggests that role-taking, where one takes the perspective of another, may be a cognitive exercise that stimulates such secondary intuitions.

The notion that role-taking is essential for moral development is not a new idea; indeed, Kohlberg highlighted perspective-taking as one of two necessary conditions for promoting moral growth (Walker, 1980; Kohlberg, 1971). While both the rationalist and intuitionist theoretical approaches advocate role-taking, a close examination of their understandings of role-taking suggests that they have glossed over an important distinction: the difference between simply *seeing* another's point of view and *feeling* another's condition. This difference is essential in light of Haidt's assumption that intuitions are most influential over our decisions and actions when they are emotionally charged. Thus, the triggering of new intuitions requires more than simply taking or *seeing* another's perspective, but *feeling* another's perspective. In support of this distinction, I highlight models from cognitive neuroscience that illustrate how role-taking can stimulate both cognitive and affective processes. Further support can be found in Martin Hoffman's research on empathy and moral development, where he suggests that empathetic role-taking offers an educational approach that engages both cognition and affect. A brief review of moral education interventions to date shows that few programs integrate cognition and affect, and that measures of moral emotion and intuition are needed to determine the potential impact of empathetic role-taking in future studies.

Moral Intuition: Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model

Haidt, a colleague of Greene's, also recognized the influence of emotions in moral decision-making, and developed his social intuitionist model as an alternative approach to the rationalist models that have been the mainstream in moral psychology since

Kohlberg. He proposes that “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments” (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Moreover, he suggests that “moral reasoning is usually an ex post facto process used to influence the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people)”. In asserting these claims, Haidt acknowledges that they are rooted in both philosophical and psychological assumptions, but also asserts that recent studies in cognitive neuroscience (such as Greene’s studies above) provide empirical support.

To help conceptualize Haidt’s theory, it may be helpful to provide his visual representation of the social intuitionist model in contrast the rationalist model it criticizes.

Figure 1

Haidt’s Representation of the Rationalist Model of Moral Judgment (2001, p. 815)




Figure 1. The rationalist model of moral judgment. Moral affects such as sympathy may sometimes be inputs to moral reasoning.

In this representation, Haidt attempts to illustrate the primacy of moral reasoning leading to moral judgment, with emotions only providing the occasional and secondary input to the reasoning process. Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental stage theory, with its emphasis on justice reasoning, exemplifies this approach by focusing upon the individual reasoning process in considering ethical dilemmas. The affective role is minimized, as Haidt quotes from Kohlberg: “Affective forces are involved in moral decisions, but affect is neither moral nor immoral. When the affective arousal is channeled into moral

directions, it is moral; when it is not so channeled, it is not. The moral channeling mechanisms themselves are cognitive.” (Kohlberg, 1971, pp. 230-231 in Haidt, 2001).

Haidt suggests that this assumption of the primacy of cognitive role has not only overlooked the importance of affect, but he argues that it is moral intuition (which includes the emotions), not reasoning, that precedes and leads to judgment (see below).

Figure 2

Haidt's Representation of his Social Intuitionist Model (2001, p. 815)




Figure 2. The social intuitionist model of moral judgment. The numbered links, drawn for Person A only, are (1) the intuitive judgment link, (2) the post hoc reasoning link, (3) the reasoned persuasion link, and (4) the social persuasion link. Two additional links are hypothesized to occur less frequently: (5) the reasoned judgment link and (6) the private reflection link.

As the model above illustrates, the primary link (link 1) in reaching judgment is one's first moral intuition. Haidt defines moral intuition as a type of cognition, but it differs from reasoning in its immediate perception and assessment of a situation, often involving an affective response. Reasoning is a secondary process in his model, either employed after the fact to articulate or provide reasons for one's judgment, either to one's self (link

2: post hoc reasoning) or others (link 3: reasoned persuasion). Along with reasoned persuasion that articulates our reasons to others, he highlights another aspect of the social nature of moral processing: how our judgments may include others' moral judgments (link 4: social persuasion). Here, simply knowing the judgments held by those in their social group may influence one's own judgments. (Haidt, 2001)

While Haidt's model seems to radically diminish the role of moral reasoning, he does allow reasoning to have a role for some individuals and in some situations. Certain individuals may actually be convinced by logical argumentation, thus overriding their initial intuition (link 5). He suggests that such instances are rare, however, and occur when "the initial intuition is weak and the processing capacity high" (Haidt, 2001, p. 819). Individuals may also engage in private reflection (link 6) where one may be able to see the moral situation from another perspective and thus "activate a new intuition that contradicts the initial intuitive judgment" (Haidt, 2001, p. 819).

With links 5 and 6, Haidt concedes that reason and reflection (the areas advocated by the cognitive developmentalists) may exert some force in moral decision-making, at least for some individuals within some contexts. Despite this concession, Haidt asserts that it is moral intuition, and most specifically the emotional reactions, that play the causal roles in influencing moral judgments. He is careful to note that this claim is descriptive, not normative: Haidt is not suggesting that we should make moral decisions in this manner but that his model describes the way in which we most commonly make our moral decisions.

If one assumes that Haidt's social intuitionist model is accurate, or at the very least recognizes that our emotions are actively engaged in personal moral dilemmas and

thus play an important role in influencing our moral decisions and actions, then how do we educate the emotions? Can we influence or change our moral emotions or our moral intuitions? If so, what means may be most effective?

At first glance, one may think that Haidt's model suggests that our moral intuition is out of the range of educational influence. Yet he does emphasize the social aspect of his model, which suggests that our intuitive judgments (link 1) and our post hoc reasoning (link 2) can influence the future intuitions of others (link 4 by way of link 3). As we share our moral judgments and reasons with others, our perspective may impact how others view future situations (link 4). Haidt's fifth link offers another route to influencing the moral judgments, but he argues that if reasoning really is to overpower our initial intuition, one's cognitive ability must be rather high. Such ability to allow an argument to convince us to change our minds might be reserved only for the philosophers (Haidt, 2001). The sixth link, private reflection, also assumes cognitive ability, but focuses less on reasoning and more on the ability to engage in role-taking. As one attempts to see the situation from multiple perspectives, Haidt suggests that these new roles may stimulate secondary intuitions that in turn may challenge and perhaps override our initial intuitions. (Haidt, 2001)

Exploring the Educational Implications of Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model

If we continue exploring Haidt's model as a potential new lens for understanding our moral processing, a moral educator can focus on three processes that may influence moral decision-making: 1) one's ability to develop and articulate moral reasons for their judgments, so they can be shared with others, and thus offer social influence (link 3); 2) one's logical reasoning and moral argumentation (link 5); 3) one's ability to engage in

role-taking so secondary intuitions can be stimulated (link 6). The first two are focused on developing moral reasoning, much like the emphasis on moral deliberation and judgment of the cognitive developmental tradition of Kohlberg and Rest, while the third emphasizes the need for new intuitions that challenge the intuition. For Haidt, developing moral reasoning does not so much influence our own judgment (which was intuitive) so much as in sharing our reasons with others we may influence their judgments. If this is true, then one might suggest that moral education programs should provide ample opportunities for individuals to share their moral reasoning with others so as to possibly persuade others. Such a suggestion is not new; the social nature of moral reasoning was acknowledged and highly valued by Kohlberg and his followers, as is evidenced in their creation of the “just community” where rational dialogue over moral issues could occur regularly (Kuhmerker, 1991). However, they recommended this approach not simply for its social influence, but on the assumption that by hearing such moral reasoning, one might in turn learn and internalize better practices in moral reasoning, and be convinced by the force of the strong logical arguments.

Yet moral intuitionists tend to be skeptical of the force of moral reasoning in driving decision-making (Haidt & Bjorklund, 2008; Gigerenzer, 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). Haidt (2001) argues that moral reasoning is a post hoc exercise following intuition, and is thus the process of searching for reasons that support the initial intuition as opposed to the open, inquisitive, and deliberative process of searching for truth. Borrowing an analogy from Robert Wright, reason is portrayed as a lawyer seeking to defend a position as opposed to a judge that considers multiple arguments to determine the right judgment. In support of this position, Haidt highlights how few

individuals, even amongst philosophers, logically following moral principles to their logical conclusions and implications, particularly when they conflict with one's moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001).

When it comes to importance of fostering moral reasoning, Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) agree with Kohlberg on the importance of moral dialogue, but see the impact resulting less from the moral argument and more in the sparking of new intuitions: "Reasoned persuasion' does not mean persuasion via logical reasons. The reasons that people give to each other are best seen as attempts to trigger the right intuitions in others." (p. 191) Triggering the right intuitions, either via dialogue with others or internal dialogue (via role-taking in private reflection) then, is the primary focus of educational programs from moral intuitionist perspective.

Role-Taking as both Seeing and Feeling

Up to this point we have been discussing the notions of "moral intuition" and "role-taking" (in the context of Haidt's model) without clearly specifying what he means by these terms. He contrasts *intuition* with *reasoning*: "Moral intuition is a kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning" (Haidt, 2001, p. 814). The distinction lies in the process, and our awareness of the process, by which one arrives upon a moral judgment. When one has a moral intuition, the judgment arrives immediately and without our knowing how it arrived: "quickly, effortlessly, and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to consciousness". Haidt frequently uses the word "appear" to describe how a judgment instantly arises from intuition, highlighting our lack of consciousness of how we arrived at such a judgment. Reasoning, on the other hand, is a slower process, one of deliberation, and "involves at least some

steps that are available to consciousness.” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818). Specifically, he defines moral reasoning as “a conscious process” that “is intentional, effortful, and controllable, and that the reasoner is aware that it is going on.” Haidt also notes that the judgment resulting from moral intuition is affectively charged, i.e., “one instantly feels approval or disapproval”. (Haidt, 2001, p. 818).

When Haidt speaks of the role-taking that may occur within private reflection, he does not specify what “role-taking” means. At first glance, one may think that by role-taking he means perspective-taking, i.e., seeing the situation through the eyes of another: “a person comes to see an issue or dilemma from more than one side and thereby experiences multiple competing intuitions” (2001, p. 819). In the cognitive-developmental literature, one often sees the two terms, role-taking and perspective taking, used interchangeably or one used in defining the other term (Walker, 1980; Selman, 1971b ; Kohlberg, 1971). The main emphasis in such instances is seeing another’s perspective, both in terms of their point of view and how another might make sense of the situation in a way different than one’s own. The emphasis on seeing another’s perspective finds further support within social cognitive psychology, specifically the work of Flavell (1968) and Selman (1971a, 1971b, 1994). Selman defines of role-taking as “the ability to view the world (including the self) from another’s perspective” (1971b, p. 1722), and notes that seeing the world from another’s perspective, however, involves several other abilities:

1. “The ability to infer another’s capabilities, attributes, expectations, feelings, and potential reactions.”
2. “The ability to differentiate the other’s view from one’s own.”

3. “The ability to shift, balance, and evaluate both perceptual and cognitive object input, all of which is clearly cognitive.” (Selman, 1971b, p. 1722)

Selman developed a structural-developmental stage model to describe how children make the “decentering” movement from an egocentric perspective toward mutual role-taking where one can both take the other’s perspective but also take a third party view as well of the situation. This emphasis on point of view is the core concept underlying Selman’s structural developmental model of role-taking. (1971a, 1971b)

Haidt does refer to Selman in his discussion of the private reflection link and notes that this is “one of the principal pathways of moral reflection” in the cognitive development tradition of Piaget and Kohlberg. Indeed, Kohlberg specifically emphasized the value of role-taking as “perspective-taking” as a prerequisite for growth in moral reasoning and development. (Kohlberg, 1971; Walker, 1980) Yet in one place Haidt also highlights the emotional component of role-taking, which is more than simply seeing through another’s eyes, but is an effort to imagine how the other feels: “simply by putting oneself in the shoes of another, one may instantly feel pain, sympathy, or other vicarious emotional responses”. Selman also includes “the ability to infer...feelings” in his description of role-taking. While both Haidt and Selman seem to include affect in their understanding of role-taking, I believe an essential distinction needs to be made here in terms of understanding how intuition may be triggered: the difference between *seeing* and *feeling* another’s situation or perspective. This is not a distinction that Haidt or Selman make explicitly, but it is necessary if we are to capture the emotional and empathetic aspects of role taking. Considering Greene’s findings that emotional responses are activated when situations are more personal, and Haidt’s earlier description

of intuition as primarily emotionally charged, then role-taking as a means for stimulating intuitions would need to be more than simply seeing another's point of view, but feeling what the other person is experiencing.

From Seeing to Feeling: Support from Cognitive Neuroscience

One could suggest that for Haidt, as well as for Flavell, Selman and Kohlberg that *seeing* another's point of view in turn stimulates the *feeling*, and this may be true, depending on what one means by *seeing*. The above definitions emphasize viewing "issues or dilemmas" (Haidt) or "the world" (Selman) from multiple perspectives. Such definitions align more closely with the rationalist approach discussed above, where discourse over moral dilemmas is a primary means for foster moral development. Many ethics education programs embrace this rational approach, where analysis of case scenarios includes arguing from or considering multiple points of view. Taking the viewpoint of another may be done without attempting to feel how another feels, however. Consider stakeholder analysis, an organizational strategy for assessing how multiple parties might view and be impacted by an action or decision. Business leaders may consider the perspective of these various parties, but not necessarily in an emotional or empathetic way.

The key to engaging feelings may begin with the imagination. Imagining another's condition brings to mind images that may provoke an emotional, empathetic response. As Hoffman (2000) notes, the moral sentimentalism of David Hume and Adam Smith suggested that imagination of another's emotions may cause us to feel similar emotions in ourselves:

By the imagination we place ourselves in the other's situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter, as it were, into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (Smith, 1759/1965, p.261 in Hoffman, 2000, p. 53).

Smith's assessment is surprisingly rich in foreshadowing some of the latest findings in cognitive neuroscience on how empathy arises. The idea that in seeing another's or imagining another's situation we enter "into his body" and experience similar sensations has been explored by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (2003; 1994). He argues that sympathy (feeling for another) can be transformed into empathy (feeling as another feels) through the work of mirror neurons and a body-mapping process that results in an "internal brain simulation" of another's feelings. Mirror neurons allow us to represent in our brain the same or similar movements we observe in another. The other individual need not be directly present; Damasio suggests that an "as-if-body-loop" mechanism allows us to "mirror" such experiences even if the other is not present, i.e., simply imagining another's situation may trigger a process where our feelings attempt to match another's. These particular mirror neurons act as an emotionally competent stimulus (ECS) that in turn sends signals to the "body-sensing" regions of the brain where one feels as if one were experiencing the sensation in one's own body. The "internal brain simulation" is not a direct match of the other's feelings, however. As Smith suggests above, the experience is likely weaker. Damasio goes further and calls such sensations "false body states" in that they are constructions based on perception of the other possible

sentiments as opposed to stimulated through the body. While falling short of an exact match of another's feelings, Damasio highlights the power and influence of such feelings, and argues that it is in this way that we empathize with others and may in turn be motivated to act on their behalf. (Damasio, 1994; 2003)

Further support for this distinction between *seeing* and *feeling* can be found in the research on the dual processes involved in our decision-making. Social and evolutionary psychologists (Zajonc, 1980; Mikhail, 2000; Haidt, 2007) have proposed that humans assess situations in two simultaneous, parallel ways: 1) very quickly, automatically and unconsciously via our affective and intuitive systems; 2) more slowly, cognitively, and consciously through controlled deliberation and reasoning. The affective system is deeply rooted in our evolutionary history, and is activated rapidly and powerfully in assessing situations. Damasio (2003) offers the following model of how these two processes or "paths" occur within the brain when making decisions:

Figure 3

Dual Processing in Decision-Making (Damasio, 2003, p. 149)




Diagram from Damasio, A. (2003). *Looking for Spinoza*. (*My additions)

Path A begins as we perceive the facts of the scenario and start making sense of the experience in terms of the options available and what the consequences of those various options might be. At the same time (in parallel to path A), our past emotional experiences from situations that resemble the current situation are reawakened outside of our conscious awareness of this process, at least initially (path B). We may become aware of an emotional pull but may not know why, and this “gut feeling” may lead to our decision. Also, the emotional activation may unconsciously impact our understanding of options and consequences, as well as may influence our “reasoning strategies”. Damasio (2003) suggests that the degree of influence and reliance on one or both paths depends on the situation and surrounding circumstances as well the individual’s own background and development.

The paths in the dual processing model are often termed as cool cognition (the reasoning of path A) and hot cognition (the emotionally charged path B). One can consider the *seeing* and *feeling* distinction in role-taking along these same lines, with seeing primarily a cooler, deliberative, sense-making approach in contrast to the warmer, affective, feeling approach of path B. While the degree of influence will vary by individual and by situation, we can assume that path B is always at work beneath the surface of path A. In light of this dual processing activity, how should we develop moral decision-making? The cognitive-developmental approach offers a cooler, rational model for fostering moral reasoning and judgment, while the intuitionists have proposed a model that emphasizes the warmer, affective processes of emotional intuition. Role-taking, as discussed above, offers an educational approach that may be considered both a hot cognition (feeling as another feels) and cool cognition (seeing another’s point of view).

In this next section, I highlight how Martin Hoffman's theory of empathy and moral development offers a theoretical foundation for integrating both hot and cold cognitions, with empathetic role-taking as a means for the primary means for stimulating both processes.

Hoffman's Theory of Empathetic Role-Taking

While Haidt emphasizes that moral intuition plays the primary role in moral decision-making and significantly questions the role of moral reasoning, Martin Hoffman's theory of empathy and moral development considers the balance and interaction of cognition and affect. In seeking to uncover the theoretical foundations of Hoffman's understanding of empathy, it is readily apparent that he is attempting to integrate a variety of psychological and philosophical theories. Hoffman's early research primarily had been dedicated to exploring the "emotional/motivational dimension" of moral development with a particular focus on empathy development in children. His understanding of empathy grew out of his studies of altruism and natural selection where he argued that our empathetic responses were rooted in human's evolutionary development. (Hoffman, 1981) Yet in his recent monograph (Hoffman, 2000), he seeks to illustrate how empathy may provide the integrative link between the affective and cognitive dimensions in prosocial moral development. While empathy has a biological and neurological foundation that precedes cognition (Hoffman, 1981), he asserts that empathy also has a cognitive component that can be developed. In addition, he suggests that empathy can align with both utilitarian and justice-based ethical reasoning to strengthen moral decision-making.

Hoffman defines empathy as “an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 4). He is careful to emphasize that it is the “*affective response*” that distinguishes his understanding of empathy from other definitions where empathy may be considered as primarily cognitive (as the “cognitive awareness of another’s internal states”). (p. 29) Feeling how another feels is not sufficient, however, for often the empathetic response is not simply a “match” with another’s feelings but reflects “feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than his own situation” (p. 30) Hoffman notes that the feeling is simply the “outcome”, and that he wishes to focus on the processes that produces the empathetic response.

In exploring the processes involved in affective empathy, Hoffman begins with the notion of empathetic distress, i.e., when “one feels distressed on observing someone in actual distress” (p. 4). This concept is critical to his theory for several reasons. First, he argues that helping another begins with first recognizing that another needs our help. In other words, the arousal of empathetic distress is a prerequisite for empathic motivation and in turn prosocial moral action. Second, he argues that empathetic distress is first an involuntary response, rooted in our evolutionary makeup and reinforced through conditioning. Here Hoffman embraces the theoretical perspective of evolutionary psychology, building upon his earlier work (Hoffman, 1981) that altruistic behavior and empathetic responses are likely the result of natural selection. Noting the likely neural basis of emotions and empathy in the limbic system (which we share in common with all mammals), the existence of empathetic behavior in primates, and the link between our anatomical emotional structures (facial expressions) and physiological

responses to perceived emotions in others, Hoffman asserts that empathy is rooted in human evolutionary development and thus may be an innate quality of human nature.

What awakens empathetic distress in the human being? Hoffman distinguishes five modes that trigger empathetic response. The first three he describes as “preverbal, automatic, and essentially involuntary: motor mimicry and afferent feedback; classical conditioning; direct association of cues from the victim or his situation with one’s own past painful experience.” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 5) Motor mimicry, in which the individual perceives emotional expression in another and then imitates the expression resulting in feeling what another feels, has been noted in infants: the newborn child often imitates the facial expressions of the mother (and the mother often imitates the expression of the child). Several studies have noted that this automatic imitation continues throughout human development and usually occurs without the individual’s awareness that they are engaging in such mirroring. Classical conditioning can foster empathetic arousal when an individual sees another experiencing distress in the same instance that they themselves are experiencing distress; over time, the individual’s own emotional responses may become linked or triggered to perceiving the emotional expressions of another. Direct association extends the classical conditioning approach by linking emotional expression and memory: in observing the situation of another may recall one’s past experiences of difficulty, and thus arouse empathetic distress whenever one observes a person in a situation similar to one’s in their own past.

While these first three triggers of empathetic distress are simple and involuntary, Hoffman recognizes that they may only trigger weak responses, depending on the closeness of the other to the individual. Moreover, the triggers rely on surface

observations, do not engage language, and do not necessarily connect to the higher-ordered cognitive processes required to consider more complex situations. Two other modes of empathetic arousal are available that address these concerns. Mediated association is stimulated through verbal cues, i.e., language, when in hearing of another's situation, either directly from that individual or through another source, the verbal expression triggers an empathic response. Hoffman notes that this is a complex process that involves more than simply understanding what is being said. Rather, it is the semantic processing of the other's account that allows an individual to *feel* the experience, either by connecting to one's own past experiences or by calling to mind images or sounds that stimulate empathetic response. This process of interpretation engages the affective by way of the cognitive, and requires a higher-level of cognitive processing, particularly when the person in distress is not present.

Role-taking is the fifth and final mode for arousing empathetic distress. In this activity, one attempts to see and feel a situation through the perspective of the other. Such an exercise assumes an even higher level of cognitive functioning rooted in the ability to not only distinguish between self and other, but in the "recognition of other as having inner states independent of one's own." (Hoffman, 2000, p. 26). While role-taking seeks to move the individual beyond their own egocentric perspective, Hoffman observes that the early stages begin with "self-focused role-taking" where the individual considers how they themselves would feel if they were in the situation of the other. The attempt is made to take the other's perspective by imagining placing oneself in the other's circumstances, yet the perspective is still rooted in one's own internal response. "Other-focused" role-taking attempts to feel what the other is feeling. The individuals capable of

this form of role-taking must be able to distance oneself from their own egocentric emotional response and recognize that another individual may have feelings different than their own in similar situations. Hoffman argues that combining both self-focused and other-focused role-taking may prove to be the most effective for it integrates the “emotional intensity of self-focused role-taking” with the more comprehensive and objective emphasis of other-focused role-taking. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 58)

Hoffman’s Theory as a Framework for Integrating Cognition and Affect

This discussion of empathetic distress and its modes of arousal highlight several theoretical foundations that Hoffman seeks to integrate. First, his understanding of empathy and its innate presence in human nature is rooted in *evolutionary psychology*. He builds on this foundation using a *classical conditioning* approach, highlighting the feedback mechanisms that occur even in infancy to reinforce our natural response to mirror the emotions of others. While this evolutionary and behaviorist foundation may be disputed, it is clear from the recent findings in *neuropsychology* that the brain does appear to exhibit an automatic emotional response in certain moral situations. Hoffman extends his theory beyond evolutionary psychology to include the importance of cognition by highlighting the cognitive modes of empathetic arousal, mediated association and role-taking. This recognition is significant for it embraces two essential elements of the Kohlbergian tradition of *cognitive developmental theory*: 1) the assumption that moral development can occur by developing cognitive ability; 2) the ability to take multiple perspectives fosters cognitive complexity and contributes to positive moral development.

Educational Interventions that Utilize Empathetic Role-taking

If empathetic role-taking plays the integrative role that Hoffman's suggests, and can stimulate empathetic, prosocial responses for others (even those not immediately in front of us), then moral educators should include empathetic role-taking in their educational interventions. The final section of this paper begins the search for empirical evidence of effective cognitive-affective interventions, most specifically for those interventions that may foster empathy.

This review of the literature was narrowly focused on discovering moral education interventions that have been designed to foster moral development *by engaging and integrating both cognition and affect*. Upon embarking on a review of the literature, it became immediately apparent that just as the relationship between moral cognition and moral affect is uncertain, it is also difficult to isolate what interventions integrate cognitive-affective elements. One primary reason for this difficulty arises from the widespread use of the Defining Issues Test (DIT) as the primary (if not only) means for assessing moral development. James Rest developed this instrument as a recognition-based application Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJI), with the purpose of assessing moral judgment. As such, the instrument only measures one of the four components of moral development (awareness, judgment, motivation, action), namely judgment or moral reasoning. Both Rest (1986) and King & Mayhew (2002) offered comprehensive reviews of moral education studies as related to the DIT. The challenge for the present paper in reviewing these "moral judgment" studies was to single out programs that also included some intervention related to emotional and affective influences on moral development.

To focus on such programs, I only have included those interventions that deliberately intend to impact affective as well as cognitive development. Interventions intended to foster moral judgment only by means of curricular interventions such as moral dilemmas discussions were not included. However, programs that extend or expand upon moral judgment as it relates to moral motivation and identity development have been included since affect is engaged in motivation. Also, programs designed to foster prosocial moral emotions and behavior, such as empathy-related responding, have been included since they directly intend to influence affect and motivation.

Rest and Thoma (in Rest, 1986) offered a meta-analysis of fifty-five educational interventions that attempted to foster moral development. The majority of the studies was rooted in the cognitive developmental framework, and utilized the Defining Issues Test (DIT) to assess progress in moral judgment. King and Mayhew (2002) also offered a comprehensive overview of studies that used the DIT to measure the moral development of college students. While both of these reviews are focused on interventions on moral judgment (and thus may be focused primarily on cognitive as opposed to affective development), one particular approach addresses personal affective development. As a means for integrating cognitive, moral, and identity development within the context of a cognitive-developmental framework, Sprinthall and Mosher (1971) developed the Deliberate Psychological Educational (DPE) model. The key elements of this approach are the five “conditions of growth” (Sprinthall and Theis-Sprinthall in Foster and McAdams, 1998): 1) a role-taking experience in helping; 2) guided reflection; 3) a balance between action and reflection; 4) continuity; 5) a climate of challenge and support. Categorizing these DPE approaches in his meta-analysis, Rest

(1986) notes an effect size of .36 for these programs (college as well as other populations). Enright et. al. (1983) reviewed nine DPE interventions with adolescents, but none of these interventions focused on the college population. Schmidt (2007) utilized the DPE in a business ethics course with undergraduates with statistically significant results for the experimental group (receiving the DPE as opposed to the non-DPE course) on the post-test DIT.

King and Mayhew (2002) found an array of educational interventions, ranging from course-based interventions (in content areas such as ethics, education, social diversity, psychosocial issues) to extracurricular experiences such as service learning and outdoor education. They note that all of these approaches proved effective in fostering moral judgment as measured by the DIT. Of particular note in regard to personal, affective development are the experiential approaches involved in service learning and character education. In one study, Gorman (1994) found that college students who directly experienced “examples of social injustice” by participating in a service component had higher DIT scores than students who participated only in the course component.

Armon’s (1998) study of college students engaged in a mentor program also supports the importance of direct personal experience in impacting moral development. In his study, college students participated in a “classroom mentor project” where they were paired as mentors with students in an inner-city high school. The college students were advised to not only offer academic support but to specifically foster personal, caring relationships. They also participated in a weekly seminar where they shared their experiences with their fellow mentors and they were required to keep self-reflective

journals. To assess the impact of the experience, the college participants completed self-assessment surveys at the end of each quarter as well as completed follow-up questionnaires. Armon noted that most responses indicated significant changes in their motivation and consideration of social justice issues.

In reviewing the literature on empathy-related interventions, few studies have been done with college students and adults. In their review of Hoffman's work on empathy and moral development, Eisenberg & Morris (2001) discuss several effective interventions that foster empathy and prosocial behavior, but they are either elementary or secondary school-based programs or programs for delinquent youth. While researchers have described the relationship between adolescence and empathy-related responding (Eisenberg & Morris, 2001), these studies have been focused on simply describing this connection as opposed to offering interventions for fostering empathy.

One study on the teaching of empathy is of particular note, however. Hatcher et al. (1994) explored the effectiveness of teaching empathy to both high school and college students using a peer facilitation skills training course rooted in Rogerian methods of counseling. The class included specific behavioral feedback, training in empathetic listening, self-observations, as well as opportunities to practice their skills through role-playing. Using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index to assess cognitive and affective empathic responses, they noted that only the college students group showed increases in interpersonal reactivity. Hatcher and her colleagues concluded that it is likely that the ability to learn empathetic communication occurs with the onset of abstract thought and the ability to take multiple perspectives, and that this developmental readiness occurs at the traditional college age.

Role-taking has also proven to be an effective approach in fostering both moral judgment and prosocial moral behavior. Recently, Comunian and Gielen (2006) presented the effectiveness of incorporating social role-taking and guided reflection in an intervention with Italian university students. The particular intervention, “Optimal Group Technique”, attempts to unite team members and promote community through dialogue and focus on interpersonal communication. Guided reflection (rooted in Sprinthall’s DPE approach), structured group discussions, role-playing and evaluation on the group dynamics were used to promote self-reflection and understanding of multiple perspectives. Using two measures of social role-taking and two moral judgment development tests (not the DIT), they found increases in both moral maturity and opportunities for social role-taking in the experimental group. The researchers emphasize that gains on both measures suggest that role-taking and guided reflection in the context of a group experience may offer a means for fostering both cognitive-affective moral development.

Summary: Implications for Teaching Business Ethics

In reviewing these intervention studies, several common themes emerge regarding effective means for cognitive-affective moral education, and implications for teaching business ethics. First, the importance of experiencing another’s perspective can be linked to both fostering moral judgment as well as prosocial moral responding, such as empathy or sympathy. This theme is consistent with Kohlberg’s emphasis on perspective-taking as essential in fostering growth in moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; Kuhmerker, 1991). However, the above interventions foster perspective-taking through the *experience* of another’s perspective (DPE role-taking; Classroom Mentor Project; Peer-facilitation;

Optimal Group Technique). The experience not only engages one's cognition but one's emotion, and thus may activate and integrate both the thinking and feeling involved in our moral processing.

A secondary theme suggests that reflection on one's role-taking experience may be necessary in fostering cognitive and affective moral development. While the notion of guided reflection is one of the key conditions for growth in Sprinthall's DPE approach, the other effective interventions described above required participants to engage in structured reflections, either through journals, questionnaires, interviews or evaluation exercises. Such exercises may help individuals develop their cognitive and metacognitive abilities as well as integrating their experiences with their sense of identity.

A third theme is related to the social nature of effective cognitive-affective interventions. Participants in the above experimental groups received support and stimulation through their participation in groups. The Classroom Mentor Project engages college students in weekly sessions where students reflected together on their experiences as mentors. Students participating in the peer-facilitation training worked in groups providing feedback on empathetic communication. One of the conditions for DPE interventions is the balance of challenge and support, and often group experiences in educational programs, particularly in counselor education programs, offer such support. Optimal group technique exemplifies the social support involved in sharing of one's experiences and thus the fostering of cognitive and emotional development through such social interaction.

These three themes may be summarized accordingly: effective cognitive-affective moral development interventions should include the personal experience of role-taking, opportunities for guided self-reflection, and group support. While these themes arise from empirical studies, they also resonate with the recent findings in cognitive neuroscience, Haidt's social intuitionist model, and Hoffman's theory of empathy and moral development. Consider the first theme on the importance of experiential role-taking. That the brain reacts differently when a situation is more personal than theoretical is consistent with actively experiencing another's perspective both cognitively and emotionally in the above studies. This experiential role-taking is also consistent with link 6 of Haidt's model, where through private reflection one can enter into another's perspectives so as to stimulate secondary moral intuitions. Consider the second theme of the importance of opportunities for guided reflection in light of Hoffman's description of empathetic role-taking; such a cognitive, reflective effort to consider another's perspective can evoke an affective, empathic response that may motivate a prosocial or moral action. Also, Haidt noted the importance of having time for private reflection so one could reevaluate one's initial intuition by considering multiple perspectives and sparking additional intuitions. Consider the third theme of the support received by reflection and discussion in group settings. As discussed earlier, the social nature of moral development was emphasized by Kohlberg's just community program and is an essential aspect of Haidt's *social* intuitionist model, with its emphasis on influencing moral judgments by sharing of our moral reasons with one another.

If one applies these findings to teaching business ethics, then one would need to create learning environments where students engage in *experiential role-taking*, actively

reflect on these experiences and roles, and share these reflections in group settings.

These three themes are not new to business ethics education; indeed, role-taking, reflection, and team approaches have been used in both graduate and undergraduate settings (Sims, 2002). However, this study singled out these three approaches in light of the importance of integrating both moral thinking and feeling. Such integration has been a goal of moral education since Kohlberg's rationalist approach received criticism, and the recent studies in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology now emphasize that the emotions may be even more powerful in driving moral action than once supposed. Faculty teaching business ethics should design their educational approaches based on these new insights on our moral processing, and these three themes provide greater focus in choosing what approaches should be used. This study built on these new insights, and explored the effectiveness of an educational intervention that incorporated empathetic perspective-taking, supported by personal reflection and small group discussions.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of an empathy-based (cognitive and affective) educational intervention (empathetic perspective-taking) on the moral development of undergraduate business students. As indicated in the above literature review, recent studies have suggested experiential learning models for teaching business ethics, but they have lacked a comprehensive and integrative model. The empathetic role-taking intervention acted as the independent variable; empathetic perspective-taking and moral reasoning acted as the dependent variables of moral development, as measured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT-2), respectively. This intervention was conducted within the curriculum of the undergraduate business program at the College of William & Mary.

Research Design

This research study was based on quasi-experimental, non-equivalent control group design. There was one intervention group (one section of 45 students) and three comparison groups (3 sections of 45 students each, totaling 135 students). The intervention group received the empathetic role-taking intervention over the 15 week semester, while the comparison groups received a moral deliberation approach without empathetic perspective-taking experiences and personal reflection.

Population and Sample

The study focused on a sample of approximately 180 undergraduate business students. The students had just entered the business degree program, having chosen business as their major of study (at a later point they choose a focus area in Accounting,

Finance, Marketing, or Process Management and Consulting). The study extended across the entire first semester (15 weeks) in the business program. In this first semester they were enrolled in introductory business courses, including a weekly course that focuses on business ethics and communications (BUAD 300 Business Perspectives and Applications). The intervention occurred within this course.

Data Gathering & Instrumentation

As discussed in the previous chapter, moral development included both the development of moral reasoning as well as moral affect. Moral reasoning was measured using the Defining Issues Test (DIT-2), the standard measure for moral judgment in ethics interventions. Moral affect was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a standard measure for assessing both cognitive and affective empathy, including perspective-taking.

In order to measure the effects of the intervention on moral development, the DIT-2 and IRI were used as pre-test and post-test measures. Students received the pre-test measures (both DIT-2 and IRI) on the first day of class (week 1) and received the post-test measures (again both DIT-2 and IRI) on the last day of the class (week 15). The pre and post testing design allowed for measures of the overall group as well as provided data for illustrating both individual growth and growth of particular sub-groups (gender, age, level of education).

Demographics Questionnaire

A general demographic questionnaire (designed by the researcher) was used to gather background information about the individual participants such as: age, gender, ethnicity, race, religion, major and minor, career plans, volunteer service involvement.

Moral Development and Defining Issues Test-2

James Rest developed the Defining Issues Test in 1979 at the University of Minnesota as a means for measuring the differences in moral reasoning of individuals (Rest, 1994; Gielen & Lei, 1991). Having researched alongside Kohlberg, Rest wanted to develop an instrument rooted in Kohlberg's stage theory that could more readily administered than Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview (MJJ). More importantly, he wanted an instrument that would measure the reasoning that may operate within the individual's discernment but be beyond their ability to articulate. Rest defines the perspective and intentions of the DIT accordingly:

The DIT is based on the premise that people at different points of development interpret moral dilemmas differently, define critical issues differently, and have different intuitions about what is right and fair in a situation. Differences in the way that dilemmas are defined therefore are taken as indications of their underlying tendencies to organize social experience. These underlying structures of meaning are not necessarily apparent to a subject as articulative rule systems or verbalizable philosophies – rather, they may work 'behind the scenes' and may seem subject as just commonsensical and intuitively obvious. (Rest, 1986, p. 196)

With his intention of providing an instrument where an individual may recognize the moral reasoning that resembles his or her own, Rest developed the DIT as a paper-pencil, multiple choice test that asks the individual to identify the sentiments most important in making decisions about several ethical dilemmas.

Unlike Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview where participants are asked to articulate their own moral reasons for a course of action, the DIT asks the individuals to choose from a series of moral reasoning statements. There are several benefits to this approach. First, from the practical perspective of the research, the DIT is much easier to administer since it is a paper and pencil test, and does not require the researcher to interview the participant. Secondly, the reliability of the DIT has been well-documented with numerous studies having employed the measure (Gielen & Lei, 1991; Rest, 1986; Derryberry & Thoma, 2005). As the most frequently used measure of moral reasoning (Gielen & Lei, 1991), the results of one's study can be evaluated in light of extensive data from previous studies. Third, by asking participants to choose from available reasons as opposed to generate one's own, one could argue that this helps individuals who may struggle to articulate their rationale in the interview setting.

In taking the DIT, the participant is presented with six moral dilemmas. After reading each of the dilemmas, the individual is asked to what action the main character should take, choosing from three alternatives. They are also asked to review a list of twelve moral issues and rate and rank the importance of each of the issues in making their decision about the course of action. Rest notes that these items were selected in order to provide a range of various understandings and approach to justice reasoning, mirroring the various moral judgment stages. While several measures can be extracted from the DIT data, the primary measure is the P-score, the Postconventional-score, which indicates the importance the participant gave to reasons in the higher stages (Postconventional stages 5 and 6). P-scores range from 0-95, with a higher score indicating a higher level

of moral reasoning. Both the internal reliability and the test-retest correlations average in the .80s (Rest & Narvaez, 1994; Rest et. al. 1999).

The DIT-2 was developed by Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, and Bebeau (1999) as an enhanced version of the original DIT, highly correlated with the original and maintaining both the construct and discriminant validity as well as test-retest reliability (Center for the Study of Ethical Development, 2002). The DIT-2 offers several significant updates: 1) the DIT-2 is slightly shorter, incorporating 5 as opposed to 6 dilemmas, using new or slightly revised dilemmas, and offers clearer instructions for participants; 2) it offers a slight increase in its validity criteria, purging fewer subjects than the original DIT; and 3) the DIT-2 offers a new index for assessing moral development, the N2 score.

As mentioned above, the P-score was the primary measure used in most studies as the indicator of increases in moral reasoning. Yet as Mudrack (2003) and Walker (2004) have argued, relying on the P-score alone may overemphasize the post-conventional items of the DIT, and thus overlook the gradations in moral reasoning of participants on the personal-interest and maintaining-norms schemas. The N2 score addresses this concern, incorporating both how the individual has rated post-conventional items as well the difference between personal interest and post-conventional items. Thus, the N2 score indicates the individual's preference for higher level moral reasoning while also capturing their development away from lower level moral reasoning. The DIT-2 also provides moral schema scores for each student. These scores offer another means for evaluating moral reasoning, for the DIT was designed to activate the moral schemas that individuals tend to use.

Empathy and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index

Mark Davis developed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (1980; 1983) as a multidimensional approach to measure empathy (both cognitive and affective). The 28 item, self-report questionnaire is composed of four 7-item subscales: perspective-taking (PT), fantasy (FS), empathic concern (EC), and personal distress (PD): Perspective-taking measures “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others”; Fantasy measures the individual’s “tendencies to transpose themselves imaginatively into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters in books, movies, and plays”; Empathetic Concern measures how an individual focuses on “‘other-oriented’ feelings” such as “sympathy and concern for unfortunate others”; Personal Distress measures “‘self-oriented’ feelings of personal anxiety and unease in tense interpersonal settings.” For each item, the participant is given a sentence to which they are asked to rate on a 5-point Likert scale how well the sentence describes them. Davis’ introduction of the IRI measure indicated strong test-retest reliability (ranging from .62 to .71) and internal reliabilities (ranging from .71 to .77) (Davis, 1980). Davis’s has studied the IRI alongside other empathy measures, revealing strong construct validity; this has been supported by follow-up studies (Davis & Franzoi, 1991; Cliffordson, 2002).

In his discussions of the IRI, Davis (1980; 1983) indicates that the PT scale is most closely associated with theoretical constructs of cognitive empathy, specifically Hoffman’s notion of role-taking. PT has also been shown to have strong positive correlation with social functioning. Empathetic Concern has been closely associated with affective empathy; in a previous study, Eisenberg et. al. (2005) renamed the EC

subscale as “sympathy” to capture the emphasis on concern *for* others as opposed to understanding how another may feel. Fantasy captures the notion of empathetic imagination and while it has been moderately correlated with verbal intelligence, the “fantasy” construct remains the least studied component of empathy. Personal Distress has been correlated with emotional reactivity, and negatively correlated with age.

Since this study was focused on the effectiveness of empathetic role-taking and personal reflection on moral development, the PT scale was of primary concern as the measure for cognitive empathy (other-focused role-taking). EC and FS was used as additional measures of empathy, with EC as the measure of one’s sensitivity to other’s feelings (as opposed to their point of view) and FS as the measure of one’s imaginative ability to take perspective in hypothetical scenarios.

Research Questions

The purpose of this study was to examine how an empathy-based approach to teaching business ethics may impact both the moral reasoning and empathetic perspective-taking of the intervention group in contrast to the groups not receiving the intervention. It was predicted that individuals in the intervention group would exhibit statistically significant increases in empathetic perspective-taking and moral reasoning in contrast to the individuals in the three comparison groups.

Research Hypotheses

- H¹ The intervention group will show significant increases in empathetic perspective-taking from pre-test to post-test scores as measured by the PT scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).

- H² The intervention group will show significant moral stage growth from pre-test to post-test scores as measured by both the P and N2 scores of the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2).
- H³ The intervention group will show higher post-test scores on the PT, EC, and FS scales of the IRI than the control groups.
- H⁴ The intervention group will show higher post-test scores on the P and N2 scores of the DIT-2.

Scoring Procedures

The completed DIT-2 instruments were sent to the Center Study of Ethical Development at The University of Minnesota to be scored electronically; results and analyses were mailed to the researcher. The IRI measures were scored by hand by the researcher, as is standard for this measure.

Data Analysis

The General Linear Model provided the theoretical approach for the quantitative analysis. Having checked the data and testing assumptions for the GLM, the researcher compared the intervention and comparison groups based on their pre-tests, using the mean scores for each group on the DIT-2 (P and N2 scores) and the IRI subscales scores. Also, since the groups were not selected randomly, chi square tests were conducted to see if the groups varied significantly on the variables of gender, age, and education. Using a significance level of $p < .05$, repeated measures analyses of variance were utilized to test the effect of the treatment variable (educational intervention) on the dependent measures [DIT-2 (P and N2 scores) and the IRI subscales scores].

Limitations to the Study

Several aspects of the design and instrumentation of this study created limitations for this study.

Internal Validity

Group Differences. While quasi-experimental studies often use a non-equivalent control group, any pre-existing conditions between groups may threaten the validity of the study. As stated above, the researcher examined the pre-test scores for statistical differences on the measures to reduce such a threat.

History and Maturation. Another challenge arises due to any changes that may have occurred to the group or individuals within the groups due to events that occur during the 15-week experiment that could have influenced how the individuals developed along either of the measures. Age or maturation also were a concern due to the fact that undergraduate students often exhibit significant changes in cognitive and emotional development during the college years. All groups, both intervention and comparison, were, however, approximately the same age and in the same year of their academic study (Intervention mean age = 20.49; Comparison mean age = 20.64) and took part in the same foundation semester in the business program, so these shared experiences should have helped reduce the threats to internal validity.

Testing. One concern with using same instruments in both pre and post test measures is that the participants may become sensitized to the instruments and this familiarity may lead to increases on the post-test scores. Some may even try to improve their scores on the post-test. While using the same dilemmas, the DIT-2 has not been shown to be sensitive to pre-testing in the literature; individuals may recall the dilemmas

but not likely recall the statements they have rate and rank for their moral reasoning. Also, both the DIT-2 and the IRI items do not suggest that there are clear “right or wrong” answers so individuals should not necessarily feel the need to complete the tests in a prescribed manner.

Mortality. Due to the length of the intervention, mortality was a concern should students drop the course. Withdrawal was not expected to be a major concern based on past history of the course and since the course is a degree requirement. Also, due to the fact that the course only meets once a week, missing several classes may reduce the impact of the intervention. Course attendance was required and absenteeism was tracked carefully. Two students, both in the intervention group, withdrew from the course in the second month of the semester, both due to family emergencies.

Instruments. The instruments used may threaten both internal and external validity. As discussed above, both the DIT-2 and IRI have exhibited high levels of both validity and reliability.

Experimenter bias. In this study, both the researcher was the instructor, so experimenter bias may have threatened internal validity since the instructor knew the difference between groups and the intended effect of the intervention.

Sample Size. The central limit theorem [minimum sample size of $N=30$ should ensure that the sampling distribution of the means was normal (Gall, Borg, & Gall, 1997)] was maintained in this study as the experimental group size was greater, $N = 38$, thus helping maintain statistical validity.

External Validity

If results of this study are to be generalizable to other populations, several factors must be considered. First, the sample for this study is restricted to undergraduate business students in the third year of their college study. Moreover, this sample is participating in a larger “foundation semester” experience. While the impact of the intervention should be isolated due to the fact that all groups are having the same curricular experience in the same year of college study (with the exception of the intervention), caution must be used in generalizing to other populations, even other undergraduate business students.

As stated above, pre-testing might also have familiarized participants with instruments and thus have influenced their scores. Also, the Hawthorne Effect may have influenced participant results since they may have been aware that a study is underway. One concern is that the experimental groups may have shared their different class experiences and assignments with students in the other groups. While participants were asked not to discuss their class activities and assignments with other classes, such sharing could have led to treatment diffusion. Despite these concerns, no observations or feedback suggested that students were aware of the different treatments.

Ethical Considerations

In designing this study, the researcher has attempted to minimize any ethical risks to the participants. While the intervention group received the empathy-based approach, the course was designed to advance the moral reasoning of all groups, with all participants receiving instruction in moral reasoning and exposed to the same business ethics issues and cases. While the experiment was part of a required course and thus

students must take the course, all participants were informed of the nature of the study and were given the option not to participate in completing the instruments (2 students chose to do so). Anonymity was preserved by using a confidential coding system where individual pre and post results may be evaluated yet without such results being identified with a particular named individual. Measures and questionnaires were only reviewed upon completion of the course and grades submitted for the course. Participants were informed and assured of the confidentiality of their responses and that their course assessment would in no way be impacted by their participation (or not) in the study. Upon completion of the study, participants were permitted to request a copy of the generalized results and analysis. The study was submitted for approval by the College of William and Mary Human Subjects Review Committee in accordance with ethical guidelines related to treatment and protection of participants.

Summary

Role-taking has been noted as an effective technique for fostering both moral reasoning and empathy, and this approach has been advocated both the cognitive-developmental tradition as well as the social intuitionist approach. However, role-taking has often been considered as simply seeing another's perspective as opposed to also feeling another's perspective. Personal reflection and group sharing have been noted as techniques for stimulating emotionally-charged moral intuitions where one feels moved to take another's perspective and internalizes this new perspective in their own assessment of an ethical situation. This study explored the effectiveness of an educational intervention that promoted empathetic perspective-taking along the metrics of both moral reasoning and empathy. The literature suggests that such an integrative,

emotional approach has not been attempted with undergraduate business students.

Accordingly, the primary significance of this study is two-fold: 1) the development of an approach to teaching business ethics that emphasizes affective engagement in ethical decision-making; 2) the evaluation of such an approach within an important population, the business leaders of tomorrow.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERVENTION

Description of the Intervention

The intervention occurred within an introductory course on business ethics and communications in which all participants (new business majors, typically third year of undergraduate study) were enrolled. The course met once a week for an hour and twenty minutes over a 14-week semester. Of the 14 weeks, the first and last classes were used for completion of the instruments (DIT-2 and IRI), one week the class did not meet due to the Thanksgiving holiday, and for 2 class sessions the class will be focused on a business strategy simulation exercise (a required exercise of the Business Perspectives course). The remaining 9 class meetings were devoted to discussions of ethics cases where students focused on ethical-decision making within various business ethics scenarios. In both intervention and comparison group settings, the instructor lectured on frameworks for ethical reasoning, led large class discussions of ethical dilemmas and facilitated class discussions on ethical cases. Also, throughout the entire first semester in the business program, all students (both intervention and comparison groups) participated in the same team across all of their business classes. The teams were assigned based on distribution of grade point average, gender, and business discipline interest, so as to promote a mixed group (note: students self-selected into one of the four cohort groups when they registered for class; teams were selected only after students had already enrolled in one of the four cohort groups).

The classroom approach for the instructor of the business ethics course followed Sims' (2002) suggestion that "faculty who teach business ethics...act as facilitators of

experiential learning rather than merely as teachers or instructors” (p. 83). Throughout the course, the instructor facilitated discussions of ethical dilemmas (typically one case per class). Each case was chosen to raise certain issues, and in facilitating the discussion the instructor guided the students toward exploring these issues. By using a variety of short cases from week to week, the instructor had the opportunity to gradually introduce more complex cases and issues. In the second week of the course, the instructor gave a brief lecture on a systematic approach to ethical analysis and decision making (Sucher, 2003) that was used to structure the ethical dilemma discussions throughout the course. The cases chosen throughout the course focused on issues that students would likely to encounter in their first few years in the workplace (discrimination, encountering a friend engaged in unethical behavior, honesty with co-workers and fellow employees) yet also included several cases on macro-ethical issues (advertising ethics, outsourcing, international business ethics).

While the instructor approached both intervention and comparison groups as a facilitator of discussion, the following section describes how both the in-class and outside-of-class activities will vary for the two groups.

Case Discussions & Team Presentations

Both groups used the same cases throughout the course. Also each student team was required to present an analysis of one ethical case to the class. However, the emphasis of the discussion and the framework used in discussing the cases and presentations differed, with the intervention group focusing on developing empathetic perspectives of the individuals and/or group in the cases, while the comparison group

focused on developing a well-reasoned resolution to the ethical, legal, and financial issues in the case at hand:

- *Intervention Group.* This group was engaged in empathetic perspective-taking, where students were required to both identify the various stakeholders involved or impacted by the case, and to describe in detail the unique perspective of these stakeholders. The instructor provided instructions for empathetic perspective-taking asking students to consider the physical, emotional, and financial impacts on the various stakeholders. The presenting teams were asked to design presentations that 1) evoked empathy in the audience for each perspective; 2) identified the convergences and divergences in perspectives; 3) offered a recommended ethical course of action that addresses these multiple perspectives, sensitive to both the reasoning and feeling of the various stakeholders. Class discussion followed the presentation, with the instructor helping students identify and empathize with the various stakeholders in the case. In addition, major ethical issues were highlighted and connected with various stakeholder perspectives (for example: loyalty to company vs. loyalty to one's friend vs. loyalty to one's employees).
- *Comparison Group.* The comparison group was focused exclusively on moral reasoning, seeking to apply ethical frameworks to the cases to identify issues and develop a resolution to the ethical dilemmas based on one or more moral principles. The following objectives guided the discussions and team presentations: 1) Engage student teams in ethical dialogue of a dilemma; 2) Practice using an framework for analyzing ethical cases; 3) Highlight the

ethical, legal, and financial issues, and develop a ethical course of action that address these issues. In the class discussion following the team presentation, the instructor facilitated a discussion evaluating the moral reasoning and final recommendation provided by the team. Like the intervention group, the comparison group also had to identify stakeholders, but only as a step in their process of moral reasoning. The instructor assisted in helping students identify the ethical philosophies (for example: utilitarianism for the team to advocate the choice that produced the greatest good for everyone involved) that corresponded to the various rationales proposed by the student teams. The instructor tracked the positions and alternatives proposed on the chalkboard, both to illustrate the various approaches, but also for the closing discussion of theoretical perspectives and examining how well they addressed the ethical issues in the case.

Group Sharing

Student teams in both groups met to prepare their presentations. The comparison groups met with the professor as needed to help develop the arguments for the case. However, the intervention groups were required to meet with the professor before their presentation to help in preparing their session. In these team sessions, the instructor coached the students on empathetic perspective-taking within the case at hand, and helped them develop strategies for evoking empathy in their fellow students in their presentation.

Written Assignments

The comparison group had assignments focused on applying the ethical frameworks (both philosophical and practitioner approaches) to the cases for the week, as well as questions analyzing and evaluating the readings for the week.

The intervention group were given journal reflections throughout the course, describing the internal dialogue they are having within themselves as they consider multiple perspectives. Instructions were provided to the students to guide their reflections. Also, students were asked to assess their own change and/or development of ideas and perspectives at different times throughout the course, with the final assessment asking them to assess how their perspective has changed across the entire course experience.

The Course: Business Perspectives & Applications

The intervention occurred within a required course for new business majors at the beginning of their third year of undergraduate study. The course, Business Perspectives and Applications, was a one-credit, pass/fail course designed to address the themes of business ethics, communications, and teamwork. The majority of class sessions for this course were devoted to business ethics topics, with student teams giving case presentations in each class. For one week in the second half of the semester (week 12), the students participated in an online strategy simulation game where they ran their own company for a week. The course met once a week for an hour and twenty minutes throughout the semester. The following syllabus offers an overview of the course design and objectives:

Syllabus

The College of William & Mary
Mason School of Business

Business Perspectives & Applications (BUAD 300)
Fall Semester 2008

Christopher Adkins
Tyler Hall 237
757-221-2046
christopher.adkins@business.wm.edu

Office Hours: By appointment, and I will posting/announcing times when I will be inviting students to join me for lunch or coffee if you'd like to chat.

How to reach me: I always tell students to that if they need to reach me immediately, it's usually better to call my office, even if you get my voicemail. Often I can check my phone messages more regularly than my email so I can get back to you if you leave me a number where I can reach you. And of course, feel free to email as well.

Course Overview

This course complements the core courses in the BBA Program by integrating business disciplines, ethical considerations, and business communications. The course includes business simulations, team interaction, and presentation skills. The course is graded pass/fail and is completed the first semester as a Business Major. *(from W&M catalog)*

Ethical Decision-Making

The bulk of this course focuses on ethical decision-making. Every class, we will explore both theoretical and personal questions involved in business ethics, using case studies and role-plays to help bring us into various business scenarios. Each team will offer an analysis of an ethical case, presenting their findings to class to launch on discussions. By immersing ourselves in these scenarios and questions, I hope to help you accomplish several goals: 1) raise your awareness of your own process of moral decision-making, including both your thinking and feeling; 2) develop your ability to see situations from multiple perspectives; 3) think critically about the role and importance of ethics in business; 4) develop your own moral imagination so you have a way to integrate the various perspectives in making decisions.

Business Simulation

At around week 11 of the semester, we will spend one week on a business simulation. Here you and your team will participate in an online venture strategy game where you will run your own company for a week. This experience will challenge you to think strategically, and to do so, you will have to integrate and apply what you've learned thus far in finance, marketing and information technology. In addition to this first exposure to strategy, your team will get to know each very well that week, learning how to effectively

make decisions and delegate responsibilities under some tight timelines. The week will culminate in your team's presentation to a panel of executives and faculty, where you will receive feedback both on your strategic decision-making and your communication style.

Presentation Skills & Teamwork

In both parts of our course, you will be working closely with your team, giving an ethics case presentation and a simulation strategy presentation. You will be asked to assess yourself and your team throughout the course. Also, you will receive feedback from your peers, from myself, and from the executive panel (Simulation) to help develop your communication skills.

Course Materials

- Harvard Coursepack, for purchase online with a credit card (about \$12). A link will be posted on Blackboard with directions for purchasing.
- Simulation Registration. [Details to follow regarding online registration. Cost will be approximately \$35, and you will need to use a credit to pay online.]

Readings and Assignments

A schedule of readings and assignments will be posted on Blackboard. The assigned readings and cases may be updated if I need to change the pace or direction based on our class discussions. Also, I may choose to integrate current issues that may arise throughout the semester.

* Please check Blackboard at least **3 times a week** for announcements and updates. I will use Blackboard as the primary means for updating you on changes and posting all course-related details.

Course Expectations

Our classes will be discussion-based, allowing us to learn from each other's perspectives as we explore the case and questions for the day. So when I think of class expectations, there are three keys to success in this class:

- √ **Be there.** We need you there – at every class – so we can learn from you and you from us.
- √ **Be prepared.** Read the cases/readings for before class, and spend some time thinking about our questions for the class (I post these on Blackboard).
- √ **Share your perspective.** We need to hear from everyone in the class. This won't be easy, considering the number of students, but I do want to hear from each of you. I know this can be difficult for some, and if so, let me know – you can join me for one of the weekly coffees/lunches and share your thoughts then. But ideally I'd like you to hear you in class so we all can benefit from your perspective.

Course Evaluation

Your evaluation will be based on four areas of performance. Each student will receive a P or F for each area. To pass the course as a whole, you must receive a P in all four

areas. (Should you not pass one area, you may be required to repeat the course. Failure of two areas will result in a failing grade).

The four components are:

- 1) Ethics presentations. Each team will analyze an ethics case and present their findings to the class. Presentations will vary in style. More details will be discussed in class and posted on Blackboard.
- 2) Assignments. Students will be asked to complete several assignments as posted on Blackboard. The assignments will vary in scope and nature based on the topic at hand, and will be integrated with the current discussions we are having in class. Also, I will often ask you to keep reflections during class to connect your in-class thinking to the assignments outside of class.
- 3) Simulation. This activity will require you to integrate the business concepts and teamwork and communication skills learned throughout the semester as you compete against other teams in running a company. The exercise culminates in our week-long SimWeek where teams present their strategic approaches before a “Board of Directors” of faculty and business professionals. Guidelines regarding attendance, participation, and grading will be distributed in class and posted on Blackboard.
- 4) Attendance, Preparation, and Participation.
 - √ Class Meetings. Attendance will be taken at every class. You are expected to attend every class meeting. More than ONE unexcused absence may result in failing this component.

NOTE: You will be given ONE “Career Pass” that allows you to miss one of our classes for a Friday Career Center event. You will need to let me know in advance when you want to use your pass.
 - √ Events. Throughout the semester, you will be required to attend several events outside of class. You must attend ALL of these events to receive a Passing grade for the course. Required events outside of class are indicated on the class schedule posted on Blackboard.
 - √ Team Meetings. Your team will meet weekly throughout the semester to work on projects in your Marketing, Finance, and Information Systems courses, as well as for Business 300 assignments. For various projects and assignments, each team member will be required to submit an evaluation of their fellow team members. Should these evaluations indicate that a student is not present at their team meetings or not contributing to the team’s efforts, this student will likely receive an “F” in the course.

I recognize that certain occasions may arise (College-approved absences, illness, family emergencies) that require you to miss a class, event, or team meeting. Planned events should be brought to my attention immediately so we can discuss your situation (failure to do so will forfeit the possibility of an excused absence). All College-approved absences required documentation from the supervisor of the activity. Also, please contact

me as soon as possible should a family emergency or personal illness arise. A doctor's note from the Health Center or another physician is required in cases of illness to qualify as an excused absence from a class or event. All students will be expected to make up any missed work due to an excused or unexcused absence.

Should you have concerns throughout the course, just let me know.

Guidelines for Fostering Empathetic Perspective-Taking

The intervention was intended to foster empathetic perspective-taking as defined by Hoffman (2000): "putting oneself in *another's place* and *imagining* how another *feels*" (my italics). Empathetic perspective-taking focuses on three components, and these components will guide the instructor in framing the cases, guiding discussion, and focusing reflective prompts for students' journals:

1. "Putting oneself in another's place" (most closely related to Perspective Taking sub-scale of IRI). In all case presentations and discussions for the intervention, student's were asked to immerse themselves in the role of the particular individual(s) or stakeholders in the case. The first step involved identifying the stakeholders. The second step involved considering both their professional role as well as their personal investment (emotions, family and friends, career interests, character/identity). Building on Stotland's (1969) research, Hoffman suggests that there are two types of role-taking that individuals use when considering roles:
 - a. *Self-focused role-taking*: "How would I feel if I were that person's situation?" This involves bringing one's own values and past experience in making sense of the situation.
 - b. *Other-focused role-taking*: "How would that person feel in that

scenario?" This involves focuses on understanding the other person's values, concerns, and history rather than on one's own experience. Other-focused role-taking requires additional information about the individual(s) impacted in the cases, so the instructor will assist this process by offering additional information such as biographical or historical context for the cases (the control group will not be provided with this information).

Both types of role-taking were employed in the course, but emphasis was given to other-focused role-taking for this tends to moderate over-arousal of empathetic distress and thus facilitating concern for the other as opposed to one's own emotional states.

2. "Imagining" (most closely related to Fantasy sub-scale of IRI).
Imagination is essential if the brain is to be provided with stimuli needed to trigger genuine concern that often provides the motive force leading to prosocial action. The instructor encouraged *imagination* by using techniques such as role-playing in team meetings and presentations and writing narratives both about their own experiences and about individuals in the cases.
3. "Feelings" (most closely related to Empathetic Concern sub-scale of IRI). As emphasized in Chapter 2, the intervention focused on more than just seeing another's perspective, but feeling that person's perspective. Throughout case discussions, the instructor asked students

periodically to check their emotional engagement. Awareness of their own feelings was emphasized in the journals as well. Presenting teams were tasked with giving presentations that evoke emotions in the audience, with the instructor providing guidelines for how to trigger emotions in the audience.

Short Cases for Class Discussion

The course included nine cases for class discussion. Several structural criteria were used in selecting cases. First, the cases selected needed to be fairly short in length due to the fact that the course only met once a week for an hour and twenty minutes. Such time constraints would make lengthy cases difficult to cover and for students to focus their attention on the key ethical issues at hand. At the same time, the cases needed to offer enough depth to set up an ethical conflict for the decision-maker. Lastly, the cases needed to revolve around similar themes so as to offer continuity from week to week throughout the course. Specific themes included: finding oneself with information one is not supposed to have; choosing between self-interest, others-interest, and organizational interest; fairness in decision-making; friendship in the workplace; ethical responsibility when producing, offering, or consuming a product or service.

The sequence of the cases was designed to gradually build in complexity, both in terms of the number of stakeholders and the difficulty of the decision. The cases also progressed in terms of organizational viewpoint: beginning with entry-level employees, to middle managers, to executives of organizations. The intent here was twofold: 1) to begin with situations that are closer to the students (in terms of what they may have seen or would see in the near future in their early careers), so as to make the cases relatable

and relevant to students; 2) to slowly expand the locus of control and thus the organizational responsibility of the decision-maker, so as to gradually introduce the complexity of ethical decision-making within organizations.

Many of the cases, particularly those used earlier in the semester, were selected because the situations resembled situations that the students may have seen before. For example, the first case focused on a furniture salesperson that overhears a customer telling a friend that she wants a real wood table, yet the table she has picked out and is ready to buy is not real wood. Saying nothing to the customer is the easy approach, and the salesperson will make the sale. While it is unlikely that the students have been in furniture sales, many have worked in sales roles within retail or restaurants, and can relate to the occasional tension of choosing one's own self interest over the customer's interest. Other cases were selected based on a context that would be familiar to the students. In one case, a college president must decide whether to enter into an contract with a pharmaceutical company that offers drugs for treating depression: the company will donate money to the health center, provide free samples for the doctors to distribute at their discretion, and hold educational forums on depression. In return, the company asks that their corporate logo be displayed prominently in the health center, and that the college not enter into a similar contract with any other pharmaceutical company. This case is one of executive-level decision-making, to which the students may not be able to relate. Yet the organizational context is familiar (a college) which helps them identify the various stakeholders that may be impacted. Moreover, the situation is about depression on campus, an issue that students will have heard about previously and likely have had personal experience within their families or peer groups. Using cases that

have such proximity to their own experience (either in terms of past or present context) was intended to engage students in a more personal (rather than abstract) manner (Mencil and May, 2008).

The following cases were used with the students (listed in sequential order by week):

Case 1: A Solid Deal

After a spate of bad luck that included an extended illness by his wife, Dan Henderson is excited to have landed a job as salesman at Quality Furniture, a long-established and respected business in a medium-sized Midwestern city. Quality has an upscale clientele and only sells furniture from well-known manufacturers. It enjoys a reputation for quality products and service: for example, customers can return a product for any reason whatsoever within the first year after purchase. And given the high quality of its product line, there are rarely any customer complaints.

Several weeks after beginning his job, Dan waits on a woman shopping for a dining room set. As she enters the store he overhears her saying to her daughter, "I can't tell you how glad I'll be to get rid of that junk we've had since we were married. This time we're going to get something that will last. It's going to be real wood, not that cheap veneer." As Dan steers the woman toward the sales floor, she tells him that she wants a durable table that won't discolor or warp. She immediately takes a liking to the first table Dan shows her. He tells her it has "a genuine teak finish." She admires the grain and the finish, and listens as Dan points out that the table is one of the finer pieces from a well-respected manufacturer, and it undoubtedly has the qualities of durability and beauty that she values. But he does not tell her that this table, like much contemporary fine furniture, is actually wood veneer over a synthetic compound more warp-resistant than wood.

Just as the woman appears ready to buy, her cell phone rings. Excusing herself to take the call, Dan ponders whether to tell his customer explicitly that the table is not solid wood but a high-grade laminate. Yet he also thinks about how much he could use the commission from this sale to help make the payment on his wife's medical expenses.

Just then, Dan hears the woman again mention "real wood" into her cell phone and then hang up. Walking back to Dan, she proudly says to him, "I'll take the table."

Case 2: Perfect Hire?

Holly Cranston is the human resources manager for a mid-size regional plumbing and supply company. She has been highly involved in the interview process and background checks of three candidates for a management position. All three are competent, but Holly anticipates that they will offer the job to one of two candidates, Walter Flowers or Jennifer Strawson.

One of the company's top priorities over the past five years has been to monitor and control the costs of employee benefits, especially health insurance. Holly has attended several seminars and annually speaks with several insurance companies on plans and rates.

One day after work, Holly stops by the hospital to visit a friend and, by chance, runs into Jennifer. She is on the children's ICU ward, pushing her 7-year old son in a wheelchair. It is obvious that the child was born with a severe physical disability and there are bandages and tubes on the boy's chest and arm. Jennifer sees Holly and briefly explains to her that his son is recovering from an infection as a result of a recent operation. She does not go into many details about her son's condition, but it is obvious that he requires considerable medical attention on a regular basis. Jennifer does share that the boy will require several more operations in the next few years.

Holly is touched by Jennifer's situation, but begins to think about the impact of her son's condition on company medical expenses. The issue did not come up in the interview process and Holly is not allowed to ask direct questions about a potential employee's family. Jennifer is probably the leading candidate for the job, but Holly is concerned about what her son's condition could do to the company's insurance rates over the next few years. Officially, Holly shouldn't even know this information about Jennifer's son.

On the way home, Holly begins to think about the other prime candidate for the job, Walter Flowers. During his interview process, Mr. Flowers happened to mention that he was single. Holly knows he could also be a good employee.

Case 3: Email Trail

Bill is a manager at a medium-sized corporation. Every once and a while he has lunch with his old friend Bud Lane, who is the computer systems administrator for the office. Bud's job is to update the software, to add users to the system, and generally to make sure that the network is running without glitches. On the network system Bud is what is called a "super user" because he is the only one with access to every file. He knows and can change all the passwords that employees use to get into the system and to read their email.

Today Bill joins Bud for lunch. Bud seems a bit agitated. Bill asks him what is wrong and he replies, "I'll tell you if you promise to keep it a secret." Bud then goes on to tell Bill that over half of the office managers and staff are going to be fired and the rest of the operation will be folded into another office. These changes will be announced in one month. Bud mentions one piece of "good news": Bill will have a job in the new arrangement, though no one else in his sub-unit will be retained.

Bill looks at his friend in disbelief. "How do you know this?" Bud recounts that he read it in the email correspondence between two senior managers. Bill is upset by the news and by the way Bud obtained it. "Isn't it unethical or illegal to read other people's email?" Bud says, "Those guys know that email isn't secure. That's why employees shouldn't use the office email for sending any confidential information. We can't protect their privacy; besides, any good hacker can get into the system. My central assignment is to monitor the computer system, and that means that often I come across many emails as a part of my job."

After lunch Bill goes back to his office. Sharon, one of his co-workers, comes over to tell him that she is getting ready to put a deposit on a new house. Bill knows that she is one person who will be let go. As a single parent, Sharon will have a difficult time making mortgage payments without a job. Bill considers Sharon a close friend as well as a trusted colleague. Shocked and saddened, Bill goes back to his office to sort things out.

Case 4: Insider Information or Fortunate Circumstance?

Ivan Rogers is a broker at Monroe Fillmore, a prestigious New York investment bank. One morning as he rode the elevator to his office on the 39th floor, he overheard two other individuals standing in the rear of the elevator. “This could be the first of many for us in food. How far is Wayne?” one asked. “About 90 minutes,” the other replied.

Ivan left the elevator wondering whether they worked for his firm. They had not selected a floor when he got off at 39. They had to be going somewhere at Monroe Fillmore or to the law firm above it.

But Ivan knew that Wayne, New Jersey is 90 minutes south of New York and that Ajax Restaurants is a mid-sized firm headquartered there.

Once at his desk, Ivan opened the previous week’s *Speculator Magazine*. He read a business brief on Ajax that stated, “Ajax Restaurants (AJX) could be a target for a larger firm seeking to enter the East Coast market. The stock has run up recently on rumors that National Foods may be interested in a merger. On this basis, we recommend AJX at its recent price of \$22. A take-over, if it occurs, would likely be in the \$33-35 range.”

Ivan punched up AJX on his computer: it’s trading at \$26, up \$1.50 already today. His mind raced. Although Ivan did not have a great deal of money to invest, he could manage to purchase 100 shares of Ajax—it would be a nice profit if the stock reached \$33-35/share. Then he remembered his Monroe Fillmore employee orientation last year. An excerpt from the company’s “Policy on Confidential Information” in the employee handbook reads as follows:

Employees should note that circulating and trading or making recommendations on the basis of rumors may, in certain circumstances, violate the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Employees should promptly report to Monroe Fillmore’s Information Committee any circumstances where the employee has reason to believe that any rumor or unsubstantiated information might have been originated or circulated with the specific intent of influencing the market in any publicly traded company. No action should be taken on the basis of any rumor, nor should it be communicated further without the express approval of the Information Committee. This stricture applies to a wide variety of rumors, including those regarding the economy as a whole, individual industries, or particular companies. It does not apply to discussions of unsubstantiated information widely circulated in the public media, provided that the source and unsubstantiated nature of the information are disclosed during the discussion.

Ivan now tried to get his thoughts together. Did the individuals in the elevator work for Monroe Fillmore? Were they even talking about Ajax? Was he privy to “insider information” or did he simply have the good luck of overhearing a conversation that was

already widely known in the financial industry via the *Speculator*? Should he call one of his clients regarding Ajax? Should he buy shares in Ajax?

Source: Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Virginia

Case 5: Marketing Credit Cards to College Students

7:30 a.m. Thursday morning, Jerry stands stiffly behind the AllCredit table next to State College's bookstore; he recently read two newspaper articles about the credit card industry that trouble him. Jerry has been with AllCredit since he graduated from college three years ago. All-Credit has sent him to State College, which has 25,000 students, with the goal of signing up 1,250 new accounts during the first week of classes. State College's administration signed a contract with AllCredit two years ago that gives AllCredit access to students through mass mailings and tabling; in exchange, the college receives 0.5% of student spending each year.

The articles Jerry read cited numerous studies showing that, because college students do not fully understand the issues associated with credit and debt, they are an incredible risk for credit card companies; a significant portion of students will never pay off their debt. Many of the students who received credit cards did not even have incomes to report when applying. Jerry has sent many applications to the All-Credit approvers without any source of income mentioned. It's not his job to decide who receives credit; his duty is to sign up as many students as he can. All-Credit has a sophisticated screening process that applicants must go through before being approved. After all, why would a credit card company give cards to people they thought would never repay their debt? According to the articles, credit card companies made an increased level of profit on college student accounts because of excessive spending and payments that were at or below the minimum required each month; students were racking up even more debt because of the interest their unpaid balances accrued. But, it is not up to AllCredit or Jerry to make sure students pay off their balances. They are simply providing a much needed service.

The experiences of a few students who worked numerous jobs, dropped out of college, claimed bankruptcy, asked their parents to bail them out, or even committed suicide in order to escape their staggering debt were sympathetically chronicled in the newspaper articles. Jerry felt for these students and could parallel some of their stories with his friends' experiences. He remembered going out and simply charging the expense, thinking "I'll buckle down next month and pay this card off". But, each month just brought a little more debt. Luckily, Jerry did not go too crazy and found a well-paying job straight out of college. Some of his friends were not so lucky and had to be bailed out by their parents. That was their fault, wasn't it?

The newspaper articles had also criticized universities for making money off their students' debt. Jerry could see why state schools would resort to such a tactic, given the massive budget cuts many are facing. Plus, the money each school made off of a particular student was not very much; a student would have to spend \$1,000 in order for the school to make \$5. But, when the students are all taken together, universities stand to make a lot of money. Last year, State College reported making approximately \$125,000. How could universities pass up the opportunity to make that kind of money for doing practically nothing? In fact, this was one of the methods Jerry used to get students to sign up: they would be helping their school get desperately needed funds simply by using the card.

Along with AllCredit card applications and free State College T-shirts for anyone who filled one out, Jerry had put out a sign-up sheet for the AllCredit “Your Personal Finances” workshop. As a part of its contract with State College, AllCredit agreed to hold trainings for students to increase their understanding of credit and how to manage their finances. Last year Jerry spoke to seven students and this year, so far, only four had signed up. Most students didn’t even seem to notice the sign-up sheet, seeing only the credit card applimajority of space on the table. Jerry had always thought that it was up to students to take the initiative to sign-up for the workshop; just like it was up to them to decide to apply for an AllCredit card. Jerry’s manager, Amanda, had recently reiterated that while Jerry had been given the right to sell AllCredit cards to students by State College, he was not under any obligation to sell the workshop. AllCredit was simply obligated to hold a personal finance workshop on campus.

After all, these students are legally adults; they are responsible for their own actions and for making sure they have enough information to make decisions that are right for them. But the recent articles had shaken Jerry’s faith in that idea. Did students have the capacity to understand they would need further information about credit before getting into debt? Or was the lure of “free money,” as one student had recently described her decision to apply, too intoxicating? Judging by the students’ dates of birth, Jerry had noticed over the years that the majority of people who sign up at the tables are incoming freshman.

Do people have adequate knowledge about credit when they graduate from high school to make an informed decision? Jerry wasn’t sure. One of the recent newspaper articles argued that age and maturity are not the same; therefore, not all students could be described as a “reasonable person” capable for making informed decisions, which parallels marketing to college students with marketing to the elderly or to children. One report even implied that credit card debt was a greater threat to college students than drug addiction and unprotected sex!

While Jerry thought that claim was ludicrous, he thought an easy way to resolve this issue would be to give the “Your Personal Finance” workshop brochure to every student, but Amanda reminded him that while he was at the AllCredit table his only duty was to sign up potential members. The workshop was a perk for students who applied; the information in the brochure was not for the general public, but for potential members.

Jerry finished setting up his table and sat down. Slowly the bookstore filled with people. A youthful man walked up to the table. “Oh man, I could use a credit card!” Jerry rose from his chair and...

hink

Case 6: An Education on Prescription Drugs

It is estimated that one in five college students is under treatment for depression. Many others who suffer from depression have not sought treatment, perhaps because they lack awareness or do not fully understand their condition. Additionally, some college students are afraid to discuss their depression out of fears that peers and potential employers will stigmatize them.

In recent years, pharmaceutical companies have devoted large portions of their marketing efforts toward reaching this college demographic – affluent 18-24 year-olds. Like most others in the industry, Dig-It Pharmaceuticals has used a variety of campaigns in this effort, including direct-mail advertising and television commercials. But market research now suggests that a more effective way of reaching these important consumers is through sponsoring forums about depression on college campuses. These forums would be hosted by a well-known MTV personality who actually suffers from depression. Her condition is well known to viewers, and she openly discusses on her show the prescription drug she uses to treat her condition – which just happens to be a Dig-It Pharmaceuticals product.

Dig-It has recently contacted Steven Simpson, president of Nunly College, about the possibility of hosting a forum at his college. The company claims its motivation is simply to educate college students about depression and the options for treating it. The company has offered to provide free samples of its depression medication to the student health center, as well donate \$50,000 annually to the health center so that it may provide better treatment for Nunly students. All the company asks in return is that the Dig-It logo be displayed prominently in the health center. Dig-It also stipulates that Nunly may not enter into any similar agreement with another pharmaceutical company.

As President Simpson ponders whether to accept this offer, he thinks about the real problem that many Nunly students seem to have with depression. Further, he knows how much the annual \$50,000 would help to ease the cuts imposed on the health center's budget over the past two years. President Simpson doesn't see any real downsides to the proposal, as long as health center personnel are free to prescribe whatever medications they judge medically appropriate.

Case 7: Savanna Smith Bourbon

Mr. Savanna Smith, III, is president of a family-owned company that for generations has produced one of the finest American bourbons. Savanna Smith Bourbon is distinctive liquor appreciated the world over despite its high cost. Savanna's marketing strategy has always been to rely on its reputation as the bourbon preferred by those who know bourbon best.

Over the past few years, company officials have come to realize that aggressive competition may be forcing the company out of business. Other distilleries have greatly cut into Savanna's market share by catering to the tastes of those who don't really know or care about fine bourbon. They have done this by marketing a variety of very sweet, but still highly alcoholic, beverages destined to be "gulped" rather than sipped. Advertising executives in Savanna's marketing department believe that Savanna's target market – the bourbon connoisseur – is disappearing, and without a major change of strategy the company will struggle to survive.

Savanna's vice president of marketing offers Mr. Smith two alternatives for energizing the business. One is to follow the competition and begin producing a sweeter product that lends itself to faster consumption. The second option is to begin a long-term marketing strategy to educate consumers about the joys of appreciating fine bourbon – drinking slowly, savoring the smell, discriminating subtle differences in flavor and quality.

Market research clearly shows that brand loyalty for adult beverages is often established well before some consumers reach the legal drinking age of 21, and so any successful campaign will actually have to target the 15-18 year-old demographic. Savanna's Vice President for Marketing is quite certain that well-placed ads in magazines like *Spin*, *Allure*, and *Rolling Stone* could establish product loyalty before a whole generation of potential customers is lost to the competition. The plan is to create a fictitious, but very hip animal character with a keen sense of smell and taste – he will be called "Discriminating Dog". Ads will show Discriminating Dog using his keen senses in a variety of ways most humans cannot – appreciating and enjoying very subtle differences in tastes and smells.

President Smith clearly prefers the latter strategy – targeted advertising. He thinks it could not only save the company but also encourage more responsible drinking among younger drinkers. However, he's concerned about advertising in magazines that are popular with teenagers. Smith's VP assures him that "these advertisements won't contain a bottle of bourbon anywhere – only our logo. Ads will show this cartoon character explaining the fine points of being a discriminating consumer. We'll actually be doing society a favor. Isn't it better to encourage responsible drinking – slowly sipping fine bourbon – than to encourage wild and dangerous binge drinking? Every young person who adopts our product will likely drink much less alcohol in their lifetime."

Case 8: Imperial Manufacturing

Imperial Manufacturing produces refrigerators, microwave ovens, and other appliances for residential use. Since its inception in the 1940s, Imperial's corporate office and production facilities have resided in Smallsville Nebraska, and it has grown to be one of the area's largest employers with over 1,800 workers. Over the past several years, Imperial has faced increased market pressure from foreign firms who manufacture similar products. Things have gotten so competitive that Imperial's CEO, David Barron, feels that the company must start obtaining some of its component parts from foreign suppliers. Barron thinks such "outsourcing" is the only way he will be able to continue meeting the stockholders' expectations for company earnings.

There are two distinct ways outsourcing could help Imperial. One is cheaper labor. Several components for its microwave are much cheaper when purchased from suppliers in China and Mexico. Labor is much cheaper in this part of the world, allowing Imperial to obtain parts of similar quality but with lower costs.

The second advantage of outsourcing relates to environmental regulations. Imperial can obtain sealed compressors from manufacturers in China and Mexico at a much lower unit cost than for what it can manufacture them in Smallsville. This is because Chinese and Mexican factories are not required to be nearly as diligent about not releasing refrigerants into the atmosphere during production. U.S. regulations about this are so tight that the company will soon need to install expensive monitors and scrubbers, and this would pretty much erase the company's entire profit margin on refrigerators.

While outsourcing will no doubt help Imperial's bottom line, it will also mean that Imperial will likely cut about a third of its manufacturing jobs in Smallsville. While he hates to see long-time employees lose their jobs, he sees no other way for the firm to meet its earnings targets over the next few years.

Case 9: Naivete or Boldness? (A)

Denise Foley was facing the most difficult professional challenge of her life and the irony was, its source was the very same man who had changed her career sixteen months ago – dramatically, forever, and (she had thought then) for the better. After the previous CEO had been fired from the major regional hospital where Foley had worked for several years, a new executive had assumed its leadership and after only a month and half, had plucked Foley from the role of Chief of Nursing to be named Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer.

Foley embraced her new responsibilities with relish and commitment. She felt the hospital has given her so much: career opportunities, the chance to complete her MBA and strong mentors. This was an opportunity to grow and to face new challenges, but also to give back to the institution.

However just over a year since taking on her new role, she found herself in the midst of a professional crisis. After taking a serious look at the situation he inherited from the previous chief, her new CEO had contracted with a consultant who painted a bleak financial picture for the institution. The consultant advised, and the CEO agreed, that the best course of action would be to sell the hospital to a for-profit institution. This was not an entirely surprising proposal; in fact, it was the path that many non-profit hospitals were taking to try to solve their financial difficulties. Foley's CEO was entirely behind the strategy.

The problem was, though, that Foley thought the consultant's assessment was incorrect. She didn't know if he was consciously manipulating the numbers or if, seeing hefty fees coming his way, he actually came to believe his own counsel. Meanwhile, the CEO did not have other sources of good information; lacking confidence in the hospital CFO, he had kept him out of the analysis.

The stakes were high for all involved. The CEO needed to solve his institution's financial problems and felt the sale was his best shot, but he needed unwavering support from his COO to make the strategy work. But Foley had many concerns. First of all, she didn't believe the consultant's numbers and was convinced that if the sale went through, ultimately the new parent would close her hospital. She believed this would hurt the consumer because price and service suffer when hospitals do not face competition and the closing of her institution would leave the community with only one local provider. Even if she was wrong about the eventual fate of the hospital, Foley was concerned that the hospital service array would be cut: for example, her hospital was the only source of mental healthcare in the area but this was traditionally a less profitable offering. And Foley knew that that some of her institution's community service and charitable offerings would be cut as well. Based on the local government's past performance, she was not confident that other funds would be well-spent in making up for this loss.

On the other hand, Foley was acutely aware that the CEO was counting on her support and she feared that he would see her challenge as a defection, or a narrowly motivated

concern about her own job. He had made a big commitment to her when he promoted her, and she felt a strong sense of loyalty and obligation.

The personal stakes were very high for Foley, too. If she had to leave the hospital, she would need to relocate to find another position and such a disruption would take a high toll on her family – especially her high school age son. And this potential loss to her family was compounded by the thought of losing a highly valued colleague in her CEO. She really *wanted* to agree with him.

She knew that some might say that she was being overly scrupulous in her soul searching and needlessly tormenting herself. After all, the CEO was the ultimate arbiter and perhaps he and his consultant had information that she did not. She was still new to the C-Suite and one could argue that the ink on her MBA was still damp. Did she really have to take on the responsibility for this decision? Couldn't she just do her best to make the CEO's preferred course of action work out?

But Foley was convinced the CEO was wrong and knew she could not support a decision in which she herself did not believe. She told herself that if you accept a senior position in an organization, then the organization is counting on you to bring all your best gifts and insights to bear in that position.

What should she say, to whom, when and how?

Naivete or Boldness? (B)

Foley experienced her decision as very stressful and she talked it over with her husband at length. She wanted to get a perspective from someone she trusted but who was outside the organization. They decided not to talk to their son because they didn't want him to feel the burden of her decision or to worry unnecessarily. In the end, she and her husband concluded that she would not be able to live with herself or to continue to take satisfaction in the career she so loved if she didn't act on her best judgment.

Foley looked to a network of past and present colleagues within the hospital. She remembered the example of an early mentor – an executive nurse – whom Foley had observed on numerous occasions taking difficult stands to uphold her high standards in the face of vocal complaints from her peers and reports. She also spent time carefully checking and re-checking her own numbers and analysis. And she turned, in confidence, to a few senior executives whose counsel she valued. Foley garnered strength from these various inputs and confirmations.

She decided to put her arguments in writing before she met with the CEO, in order to clarify her thinking and to insure that he could see and hear her with less emotionality from either of them. Then she took her memo to the CEO and verbally explained her position. After explaining why she felt the consultant's assessment was inaccurate, she concluded by explaining that she would not be able to do her job effectively if the sale proceeded because she was confident that her peers and reports would be able to "read"

her true thoughts, thereby raising their own doubts.

It was a difficult decision but the CEO decided to look into Foley's analysis. He read her memo and then called the consultant, Foley and the CFO into a meeting together where they had a frank discussion. It turned out that the CEO was surprised when he really looked deeply at the numbers; he had taken much of the consultant's argument on faith and had not done the kind of close checking that Foley had done.

Ultimately, the CEO decided not to sell. He and Foley remained good colleagues and managed to turn the hospital around. Eventually he left and a new CEO came in while Foley remained. The hospital is now highly successful.

Reflecting on her decision, Foley does not downplay the toll this conflict took on her, but she says she found confidence in her recognition that she was actually *unable* to support a different decision. This belief that, in this way, she really had no choice, helped her to deal with the fear that her actions might cause pain for her family or others. She simply didn't believe that following the CEO's original directive was something she could convincingly do.

In the end, Foley still wonders about this seeming inability to act counter to her own values. Shortly after the decision not to sell her hospital, Foley was nominated and selected to participate in a prestigious global leadership development program which brought together young business leaders for a series of dialogues and educational experiences. She found herself in a room with twenty or so extremely talented young leaders, deeply immersed in a case discussion about what they would do if their own values were in conflict with the decision their employer or their client wanted them to take.

One by one, the group coalesced around the decision that, when under such pressure, they would not speak out. Although their apparent candor was impressive, Foley found their position staggering. She was stunned that individuals who, by her assessment, were in such privileged positions with little or no financial pressure – after all, it was just a case discussion – would feel that they had no choice to voice or act on their values. Finally, Foley just blurted out that she thought it would be critical to take a stand.

Foley remembers feeling tense as she voiced her position. She believed that in some ways, she was already seen as a bit of an “outsider” by the group, and perhaps by herself. After all, she was from a Nursing background and she worked in a non-profit hospital setting; she thought that she might seem naïve or a bit of a “goody two shoes.” Over the years, she has seen many of her colleagues from that leadership class change and grow and take values-based stands in their own careers. And she has felt wellrespected by the group when they convene for alumni gatherings.

In retrospect, she recognizes that her decision to speak out to her CEO and her ability to do so effectively was far from naïve. Her financial analysis turned out to be correct and her careful strategy for raising the issue enabled her boss to hear her non-defensively. But when asked why she felt she had “no choice” but to voice her values while her

companions in a leadership development class felt they had “no choice” but to silence themselves, she still has to pause.

Was it her status as an “outsider” that allowed her to maintain more perspective? Was it her commitment to a larger professional purpose, linked to serving the healthcare needs of her community, that spurred her to look a second and third time at numbers that were more driven by short term upticks in profit than long term institutional sustainability? Was it her good fortune at having had strong value-driven mentors? A supportive family? Or something else?

What enabled Foley’s voice? How can we create those kind of enablers in our careers?

Journal Assignments for Intervention Group

Students were asked to write a total of six journal reflections throughout the course. In this section, each of the journal assignments are provided, with a brief introduction describing the intent and design of each journal reflection.

Journal one was intended to immediately engage the students in taking the emotional perspective of one of the characters in the case. The instructions specifically asked the students to “see and feel the world through the character’s eyes”. To help stimulate such reflection, they were advised to add more information or background about the character, as well as play the scenario forward and consider the feelings of the character throughout.

Journal 1: In last week’s case discussion, several of you noted that while the team’s presentation had offered a solid ethical analysis of the issues, they had not tapped into the emotional or personal aspects of the case (such as, “What about Dan’s wife? How might that influence his decision?”). One of you made the point that you wanted to both “see and feel” the different perspectives in the case.

At the very end of class, we began exploring the emotional side of the case by using our *imagination* (“What if Dan didn’t make the sale, had to take second job, had no time for coaching Little League, and thus others not even in the case would be impacted”). I mentioned that I would be asking you to choose one of the two main stakeholders (Dan or the customer) and to imagine what the case might “feel” like from their perspective.

So for your journal this week, choose either Dan or the customer, and use your journal to both “see and feel” the case from their perspective. In essence, I want you to *put yourself in that person’s place* and *imagine* how that person would *feel* in the case scenario.

To help you truly tap into the feelings of the character, use your imagination to add more information or background about the character. Consider several possible outcomes of the case (Dan makes the sale, Dan does not make the sale, the customer returns angry, etc...), and imagine how that person would feel each of these events unfolded. Try to be specific, yet realistic – consider some real possibilities that could occur, and the likely feelings that character would have in response.

A rich, descriptive reflection should be about a page in length, but you can exceed this if needed – whatever is needed to both “see and feel” the world through the character eyes.

Journal two was intended to help students’ take a metacognitive perspective on their moral decision-making. Such a metacognitive reflection was originally intended for later in the semester, but was chosen for the second reflection in light of the class discussion after journal one and the class presentation on the second case, “Perfect Hire”. The presenting team had been coached by the instructor to engage the emotions of the class by using role-playing (different students speaking on behalf of different stakeholders) and by adding additional information about the character to spark empathetic concern. The class discussion following this team’s presentation proved controversial. The class widely approved of the team’s recommended course of action (their solution to the ethical dilemma) yet expressed disapproval for emotionally evocative prompts throughout the presentation. Several students specifically referred to not wanting to have their emotions stirred up. Many more expressed that knowing more about the characters made the decision more difficult and more significant, and would have preferred to have not known more personal information about the stakeholders. This discussion offered an important early insight: the students liked the outcome of the empathetic perspective-taking, but found the process of empathetic perspective-taking disturbing when deliberating about a decision. Journal 2 was a follow-up reflection based on this class discussion:

Journal 2: Last week the presenting team effectively tapped into the emotional perspectives of the various stakeholders, while at the same time offering a recommendation that balanced these perspectives and address the ethical, legal and financial issues. Yet in our discussion after their presentation, several of you noted that taking the emotional perspective (trying to feel for each person in the story) made the decision-making process more difficult.

So for your journal this week, I'd like you to reflect on how your emotions influence your own moral decisions, and how they help or hinder your efforts to act ethically. In particular, discuss how you have taken the perspective of others and tried to *see and feel* the situation from their point of view, as they would feel it. Use specific example(s) from your own life (past ethical situations you've experienced) in your reflection.

Also – and this is true for every journal entry – please let me know what insights the articles offer you. Highlight any specific quotes that resonated with you, challenged your thinking, surprised you, etc...

Journal three was an autobiographical exercise, asking students to recount a recent ethical scenario from their own life, and describe their “thinking and feeling”. A primary objective of this journal was for the students to bring their own personal life experience to their reflection. Also, at the end of their journal, they were to note if and how their own approach to moral decision-making had been influenced by the attempts to “see and feel the perspectives” throughout the cases thus far.

Journal 3: Last week we one of the presenting teams took us inside the mind of Ivan, exploring the various influences (feelings and facts, emotional and rational) as the event unfolded. This week, I'd like you to think about a recent ethical dilemma/situation you encountered, and take me inside your decision-making in this situation, describing both your thinking and feeling. A sample outline for your reflection is below:

Paragraph 1: Describe fully the ethical scenario you encountered (you may choose any recent scenario - I will keep all reflections confidential, and will not ask you to share these in class).

Paragraph 2: Describe how you thought and felt as you considered what to do in this situation. What triggered your moral awareness? What were you feeling? Who did you want to help? What did you *want* to do, and was this different from what you felt you *should* do? ("want" self vs. "should" self - last week's article) What would be better short-term - and long-term? What emotions - and what reasons - were swirling around inside you, and how did you decide which one's to pay attention to? Were you conflicted inside, and how did you resolve the mix of feelings and reasons?

Paragraph 3: Based on our class discussions, your team meetings, and our readings thus far, I'd like you describe how the conversations and reflections to

date have (or have not) influenced your approach to ethical decision-making, and how you understand yourself. Ultimately, I'm interested in getting a sense of how your own perspective may be changing as we tried to *see and feel* the perspectives of the various characters in the cases, and as you've shared perspectives in your team. Be sure to cite specific cases, readings, and character perspectives, as well as specific class or team discussions, in your response. Also, you can highlight any open questions you have right now in the course.

Journal four was an exercise intended to help students apply "seeing and feeling" in giving counsel to one of the leaders in the previous two cases. Specifically, they were to offer a framework for taking a leader's perspective, and coach the leader in applying the framework. An important guideline was to be followed in this journal: students were not only to consider *what* advice to give the leader, but consider *how* the leader "sees and feels" when making difficult decisions.

Journal 4: For your journal this week, I'd like you to take a look at our last two cases, and imagine that you are a leadership coach. Choose one of the two executives as your client (either President Simpson of Nunly College or President Smith of Savanna Smith Bourbon), and offer your approach or framework for taking a "leader's perspective" when making ethical decisions for an organization. Walk them through your "leadership perspective" process, and in doing so, apply your approach to your client's case, i.e., how they would use your "leadership perspective" in addressing their ethical situation (either An Education on Prescription Drugs or Savanna Smith Bourbon). Try to give your client specific ideas to follow, and then illustrate these ideas by using their case as an example.

As you develop your process and coach your client in applying your framework, remember our class conversations about the role of emotions and empathy in decision-making and in understanding various stakeholders.

Also, when writing your journal, adopt a style that is sensitive to a leader's concerns (how they *see* and *feel*) when making difficult decisions. In other words, try to see and feel a "leader's perspective" when presenting your "leader's perspective" approach!

You'll need to bring this journal to class (as well as email to me) so we can discuss in class.

Journal five was a further extension of journal four, yet within a negotiation-type conflict. The students were asked to develop a script for a challenging conversation with the character's boss. In doing so, they first were to "immerse" themselves in the role of the boss to understand his reasons and emotions in looking at the scenario. Taking such perspective was to guide developing an effective script for raising ethical concerns with one's superior.

Journal 5 – due Friday, Nov. 14! In this week's case, our main character, Denise Foley, disagrees with her CEO about an important decision for their hospital, and is not certain how to proceed in raising her concerns. The case gives us a sense of her perspective and the various concerns (personal and professional) that are influencing her.

Yet as she considers how to voice her objections, Denise needs to not only consider her perspective, but the CEO's perspective. For your journal this week, you'll need to reflect on the question, "How is the CEO looking at this situation? What are *his* concerns? What's at stake for him?" Also, if Denise is going to challenge his support of the consultant's recommendation, how is he likely to react to such a challenge?

In short, you'll need to immerse yourself in the role of the CEO, attempting to understand both his reasons and emotions. After trying to see and feel the scenario through his eyes, then imagine the scenario of Denise raising her concerns and describe how he'll likely respond.

After you've done this, help Denise develop a preliminary script for the conversation that is sensitive to the CEO's concerns and anticipate his responses so that she is able to effectively prepare for the conversation.

You'll need to bring this journal to class (as well as email to me) so we can discuss in class.

Journal six asked students' to assess how their moral decision-making may have changed throughout the course:

Journal 6. For your final journal, I'd like you reflect on how your ethical decision-making has changed over the semester. Before answering, *please read through each of your journal entries over the course of the semester. After reading, reflect on what changes you recognize in yourself over this time. Reflect*

on any growth or development you may observe in yourself. One substantial paragraph is certainly acceptable, but you are welcome to write more as you explore any changes that have occurred this semester throughout our course.

Here's a few sample questions to get you thinking:

- What is “sticking with you” from the course? What ideas or insights have become part of your decision-making beyond our class discussions (in your everyday life)?
- How has “seeing and feeling” as another’s perspective become part of your decision-making, and do you find it helpful?
- What cases, journals, presentations and discussions were most memorable and influential on your ethical decision-making?

Many of you highlighted examples in our team conversations – you can build on these themes and explore them more fully in your journal.

Please bring to class on Friday and email to me. Thanks for all your hard work – we’ll have some food on Friday to celebrate!

Comparison Group Assignments

Assignment 1

In between our classes, I’ll often ask you to prepare a short written essay that asks you to further explore our class discussion and readings. Three paragraphs, on three different aspects:

1. **Case Question.** *Did you agree or disagree with the recommended course of action provided by the presenting team(s)? Why or why not?* Please evaluate the in-class presentation, not on style (which we did in class) but in content (the quality of their argument and their recommendation). Evaluate their reasoning and ethical principles used, their options (Were they realistic? Helpful? The best possible options?), and their recommendation. Also, please highlight any issues they may have missed, and offer additional suggestions or ideas if you have them.
2. **Connecting Core Question.** This question will help you *explore* a core issue from the last class, and this question will *connect* to our next class discussion. It will also help *connect* the case to the readings.

Here’s the question for this week: “Are we (humans) more inclined to help others or act selfishly?”

As you address this question, please connect your reflection to last week’s readings (Ring of Gyges and “If it feels good…” article) and the case (A Solid Deal) we discussed in class. We began to make these connections at the end of

class; please extend our discussion in your essay.

For example: think of the two questions in light of “A Solid Deal” case. Should Dan (the salesman) help others or act selfishly? Should Dan (the fellow human being) help others or act selfishly? How does his role, in a business context, change his behavior, if at all? How, if at all, does the article on the new findings in neuroscience and moral decision-making shed light on this? Other ideas: was Dan invisible to some extent, the ring in his case being that he overheard the information without the woman knowing? Does getting caught or getting a reward make a difference in driving behavior?

These are just some ideas – you do not have to cover all these issues. I simply want you hear your perspective on this core question as we begin the course.

Also, please know that I do not expect (or want) you to have a simple answer.

This question is complex – and how we behave as human beings may be influenced by a wide variety of conditions (our upbringing, the risk/reward involved in the situation, the urgency of the matter, how personal the situation is, etc...).

But be concise – you can address this in one paragraph if you choose your words and examples carefully.

3. **Key Quote.** I’d like you to choose at least one quote from the readings (not the case) that you found particularly insightful, i.e., passages that resonated with you, challenged your thinking, offered a new way of looking at things. Please provide the quote (note the reading from it comes), and briefly discuss why you chose this quote.

Assignment 2

This week’s assignment is shorter than last week’s – I simply want to get your thoughts on one core question based on the Decision & Desire article, and a brief response on the “Professor is a Headhunter” reading.

Connecting Core Question (& Quotes). *This question will help you explore a core issue from the last class, and this question will connect to our next class discussion. It will also help connect the case to the readings.*

Here’s the question for this week: “What *should* drive your ethical decisions - reasons or emotions or both?”

In answering this question, please focus on the “Decisions & Desires” article, referencing particular examples and research studies highlighted in the article. Also, anchor your argument by using specific quotes that capture your position on this question, and support your argument.

And one more quick question (answer in a few lines): Yes or No – should professors act as headhunters? Why or why not? Be prepared to discuss with your team.

Bring your assignment to class so we can connect your answer to this question to the cases thus far. Be prepared to present your answer to your group and/or to the whole class.

Assignment 3:

Last week we focused on Ivan’s decision-making in the heat of the moment, at the prospect of making money, running the risk of crossing ethical and legal boundaries. This week, Jerry’s not tempted with a potential wrong as much as he’s trying to do right as he markets credit cards to college students. Such challenges - avoiding the wrong and determining the right – can be rather confusing, yet business leaders must find a way to make sense of such situations. Recall the conclusion from the “Ethics in Finance” article:

Ethics is one of the pillars on which stands success in finance—it builds sustainable enterprise, trust, organizational strength, and personal satisfaction. Therefore, the financial decision-maker must learn to identify, analyze, and act on the ethical issues that may arise. Consequences, duties, and virtues stand out as three important benchmarks for ethical analysis. Nevertheless, the results of such analysis are rarely clear-cut. But real business leaders will take the time to sort through the ambiguities and do “the right thing” in the words of Edwin LeFevre. (my italics)

Our cases are getting more complex, and this complexity can be overwhelming. Since most of us don’t like thinking about these difficult issues, it is important we have a simple yet effective way for considering ethical dilemmas. So at this point in the course, I’d like to you to begin developing some guidelines to follow in addressing such ethical challenges.

Here’s what I’d like you to do for this assignment to get you started:

- Define and describe your “most important ethical principle”. You may have more than one, but try to see if you can get it down to one principle, the highest card in your deck of ethical cards, so to speak. In describing your principle, please clarify any terms open to interpretation, and any exceptions or qualifications needed in applying the principle. For example, if your principle is “do no harm”, you need to clarify how you define harm (what kind of harm, to who, etc...).
- In your description, be sure to connect your principle(s) to the articles we’ve read thus far.
- To help illustrate your principle in action, explain how you’ve used this principle in evaluating the cases thus far (apply to 2 cases as a minimum).

One page, single page is sufficient. Typed please.

Assignment 4

Apply Virtue Matrix to Savanna Smith Case. To get you warmed up for this Friday, I'd like you to apply the virtue matrix approach to the Savanna Smith Bourbon case. As described in the article, the virtue matrix offers an "analytical tool that helps executives...understand what generates socially responsible corporate conduct." Each quadrant describes a different type of motivation that might drive a company's decisions.

Here's your task: examine President Smith's situation using the virtue matrix. Assume that he wants to save his company yet at the same time wants to act in a socially responsible manner. Then, develop a solution for President Smith that fits one of the quadrants as assigned below:

- Focus on Quadrant "Compliance" if your last name begins with A-F
- Focus on Quadrant "Choice" if your last name begins with G-L
- Focus on Quadrant "Strategic" if your last name begins with M-R
- Focus on Quadrant "Structural" if your last name begins with S-Z

Assignment 5

Ethics Case - Naivete or Boldness (posted on Blackboard in Ethics folder)

Short Assignment

At this point in the semester, we've looked at several approaches for addressing ethical situations:

- HBS 4-step framework
- Are we (humans) more inclined to help others or act selfishly?
- What *should* drive your ethical decisions - reasons or emotions or both?
- Your "most important ethical principle"
- Virtue Matrix

For your assignment this week, I'd like you to use one or more of these approaches/frames to help advise Denise Foley how to proceed in this week's case. Describe the approach(s) and how you apply them in analyzing the situation, and how it helps Denise come up with an action plan.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESULTS

This study utilized a quasi-experimental non-equivalent pre-test/post-test design involving all four sections of a business ethics course required for junior business majors. One section (section 1 of the course) received the experimental intervention focused on empathetic perspective-taking, and the other three sections (sections 2, 3, and 4 of the course) served as a control/comparison groups. The comparison group received educational instruction focused on moral reasoning (the standard or traditional approach to teaching business ethics). Two instruments were used to assess the participants at both the beginning and end of the course: 1) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), which is a self-assessment measure of several empathy components 2) Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2), which is a skill-based measure of moral reasoning.

There were 181 students enrolled in the course (across all four sections). Two students opted out of participating in the study. Of the remaining 179 students who were willing to participate in the study, useful results were obtained for 153 participants. Data was considered useful if students completed both pre and post-tests. 16 students failed to complete both measures, 5 students were eliminated on their DIT scores due to incomplete and/or meaningless completion of the instrument (a standard check on the DIT-2), 3 students did not fully complete the IRI, and 2 students withdrew from the course (along with their other business courses due to family/personal reasons). The loss of participants was consistent across class sections (section 1: loss of 6 participants; section 2: loss of 7 participants; section 3: loss of 6 participants; section 4: loss of 7 participants).

Demographics of Sample

Background information about the participants was gathered using both an “Individual Background Questionnaire” (see appendix) and information gathered on the DIT-2 (gender, age, level of education, citizenship, English as primary language).

Table 1 shows the gender breakdown for the sample:

Table 1

Gender - Intervention and Comparison Groups

	N	Gender	
		Male	Female
Intervention	44	17	27
%		39	61
Comparison	135	85	50
%		63	37
Total	179	102	77
%	100	57	43

It can be seen in the above table that while there were more men than women in the overall sample, the intervention group had more women than men. A Chi-Square test revealed that these differences were statistically significant (.005) between the intervention and control groups. For this reason, gender will be analyzed further as related to the hypotheses later in this chapter.

Table 2 shows the age breakdown for the sample:

Table 2

Age - Intervention and Comparison Groups

		Intervention		Comparison	
		Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Valid	18.0			1	.74
	19.0	3	6.82	6	4.44
	20.0	27	61.36	78	57.78
	21.0	10	22.73	37	27.41
	22.0			5	3.70
	23.0			1	.74
	25.0			1	.74
	33.0	1	2.27		
	35.0			1	.74
	42.0			1	.74
	Total	41	93.18	131	97.04
Missing		3	6.82	4	2.96
Total		44	100.00	135	100.00

Mean Age of Intervention Group = 20.49
SD = 2.075

Mean Age of Comparison Group = 20.64
SD = 2.412

Mean Age of Entire Sample = 20.60
SD = 2.331

It can be seen in the above table that amidst the range of ages, the mean age of both the intervention and comparison groups was 20. A Chi-square test revealed no significant differences (.662) between the intervention and comparison groups.

Table 3 shows the background information on level of education, citizenship, and English as a primary language for the sample:

Table 3

Education, Citizenship, Language - Intervention and Comparison Groups

	N	Level of Education		Citizenship			English as Primary Language		
		Junior	Senior	US Citizen	Non-US Citizen	No Response	English	Non English	No Response
Intervention	44	43	1	40	3	1	39	4	1
%		98	2	91	7	2	89	9	2
Comparison	135	134	1	119	13	3	120	12	3
%		99	1	88	10	2	89	9	2
Total	179	177	2	159	16	4	159	16	4
%	100	99	1	89	9	2	89	9	2

A review of the above table of demographic information indicates that the intervention and comparison groups are about equal in percentages on level of education, citizenship, and English as primary language.

Findings With Relation to the Hypotheses

The purpose of this study was to examine how an empathy-based approach to teaching business ethics may impact both the moral reasoning and empathetic

perspective-taking of the experimental group in comparison to the groups not receiving the intervention. The study employed two measures (IRI and DIT-2), given as pre-test (week 1) and post-test (week 14) with two different groups (intervention and comparison). Accordingly, 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs were used to examine the differences in scores between the intervention and comparison groups from the pre-test to the post-test. It was predicted that individuals in the intervention group would exhibit statistically significant increases in empathetic perspective-taking and moral reasoning than individuals in the comparison group.

Results from Interpersonal Reactivity Index

Two of the research hypotheses refer specifically to the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) subscales:

- H¹ The intervention group will show significant increases in empathetic perspective-taking from pre-test to post-test scores as measured by the PT scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
- H³ The intervention group will show higher post-test scores on the PT, EC, and FS scales of the IRI than the control group.

The means for the pre-test and post-test scores and standard deviations on the IRI subscales are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Pre-test & Post-test Means on the IRI by subscale

(PT = Perspective-Taking; EC = Empathetic Concern; FS = Fantasy; PD = Personal Distress)

	Group	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Pre-test PT-score	Intervention	2.8092	.62090	38
	Comparison	2.5349	.71129	115
	Total	2.6030	.69816	153
Post-test PT-score	Intervention	2.7779	.57280	38
	Comparison	2.5240	.70019	115
	Total	2.5871	.67816	153
Pre-test EC-score	Intervention	2.8197	.56047	38
	Comparison	2.7117	.59603	115
	Total	2.7385	.58745	153
Post-test EC-score	Intervention	2.7408	.61926	38
	Comparison	2.6872	.65476	115
	Total	2.7005	.64453	153
Pre-test FS-score	Intervention	2.3761	.78981	38
	Comparison	2.3064	.77395	115
	Total	2.3237	.77589	153
Post-test FS-score	Intervention	2.3713	.77167	38
	Comparison	2.3143	.86263	115
	Total	2.3285	.83884	153
Pre-test PD-score	Intervention	1.3905	.71114	38
	Comparison	1.3543	.65567	115
	Total	1.3633	.66767	153
Post-test PD-score	Intervention	1.4179	.68041	38
	Comparison	1.2757	.64955	115
	Total	1.3110	.65797	153

The results of the repeated measures ANOVA for the PT subscale scores can be found in Table 5.

Table 5

Repeated Measures ANOVA (IRI-PT subscale)- Summary of F Statistics

Effect		Value	F	Hyp/df	Error df	Sig.
prepost	Pillai's Trace	.001	.172 ^a	1.000	151.000	.679
	Wilks' Lambda	.999	.172 ^a	1.000	151.000	.679
	Hotelling's Trace	.001	.172 ^a	1.000	151.000	.679
	Roy's Largest Root	.001	.172 ^a	1.000	151.000	.679
prepost * IntOrCmp	Pillai's Trace	.000	.040 ^a	1.000	151.000	.841
	Wilks' Lambda	1.000	.040 ^a	1.000	151.000	.841
	Hotelling's Trace	.000	.040 ^a	1.000	151.000	.841
	Roy's Largest Root	.000	.040 ^a	1.000	151.000	.841

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. Design: Intercept + IntOrCmp
Within Subjects Design: prepost

As can be seen in the above table, there was no significant interaction between the pre-tests and post-tests, or between the treatment and comparison groups (prepost * IntOrCmp [F (1,151) = .841, $p > .05$]). Thus, the results do not support H¹.

In reviewing Table 4 above, it is apparent that the scores on the EC and FS subscales showed very little movement from pre-test to post-test. To examine the statistical significance, results of the repeated measures ANOVAs for the EC subscale and FS subscale scores can be found in Tables 6 and 7 respectively.

Table 6

Repeated Measures ANOVA (IRI-EC subscale)- Summary of F Statistics

Effect		Value	F	Hyp/df	Error df	Sig.
prepost	Pillai's Trace	.010	1.548 ^a	1.000	151.000	.215
	Wilks' Lambda	.990	1.548 ^a	1.000	151.000	.215
	Hotelling's Trace	.010	1.548 ^a	1.000	151.000	.215
	Roy's Largest Root	.010	1.548 ^a	1.000	151.000	.215
prepost * IntOrCmp	Pillai's Trace	.003	.430 ^a	1.000	151.000	.513
	Wilks' Lambda	.997	.430 ^a	1.000	151.000	.513
	Hotelling's Trace	.003	.430 ^a	1.000	151.000	.513
	Roy's Largest Root	.003	.430 ^a	1.000	151.000	.513

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. Design: Intercept + IntOrCmp

Within Subjects Design: prepost

Table 7

Repeated Measures ANOVA (IRI-FS subscale)- Summary of F Statistics

Effect		Value	F	Hyp/df	Error df	Sig.
prepost	Pillai's Trace	.000	.001 ^a	1.000	151.000	.974
	Wilks' Lambda	1.000	.001 ^a	1.000	151.000	.974
	Hotelling's Trace	.000	.001 ^a	1.000	151.000	.974
	Roy's Largest Root	.000	.001 ^a	1.000	151.000	.974
prepost * IntOrCmp	Pillai's Trace	.000	.017 ^a	1.000	151.000	.895
	Wilks' Lambda	1.000	.017 ^a	1.000	151.000	.895
	Hotelling's Trace	.000	.017 ^a	1.000	151.000	.895
	Roy's Largest Root	.000	.017 ^a	1.000	151.000	.895

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. Design: Intercept + IntOrCmp

Within Subjects Design: prepost

As can be seen in the above tables, there were no significant differences between the pre-tests and post-tests, or between the treatment and comparison groups for either the EC subscale (prepost * IntOrCmp [F (1,151) = .513, $p > .05$]) or the FS subscale (prepost * IntOrCmp [F (1,151) = .895, $p > .05$]). Thus, the results do not support H³.

Results from Defining Issues Test-2

Two of the research hypotheses refer specifically to the P and N2 scores from the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2):

- H² The intervention group will show significant moral stage growth from pre-test to post-test scores as measured by both the P and N2 scores of the Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2).
- H⁴ The intervention group will show higher post-test scores on the P and N2 scores of the DIT-2.

The means for the pre-test and post-test P and N2 scores and standard deviations on the DIT-2 are shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Pre-test & Post-test Means on the DIT-2 (P & N2)

	Group	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Pre-test P-score	Intervention	45.0687	11.03789	39
	Comparison	42.3979	15.55310	115
	Total	43.0612	14.57470	153
Post-test P-score	Intervention	42.3626	16.20699	39
	Comparison	43.1426	15.78733	115
	Total	43.7005	15.85761	153
Pre-test N2-score	Intervention	44.3100	11.16018	39
	Comparison	42.5511	13.93355	115
	Total	42.9880	13.28560	153
Post-test N2-score	Intervention	42.0095	15.64081	39
	Comparison	45.1648	14.05672	115
	Total	44.3811	14.47804	153

As indicated in the above table, the means on the pre-on both P and N2 scores decreased for the intervention group (pre-test P score mean = 45.0687; post-test P-score mean = 42.3626; pre-test N2 score mean = 44.3100; post-test N2-score mean = 42.0095) while the means on both P and increased for the comparison group (pre-test P score mean = 42.3979; post-test P-score mean = 43.1426; pre-test N2 score mean = 42.5511; post-test N2-score mean = 45.1648). One should note that the intervention group had higher pre-test means on both P and N2 scores than the comparison group, but such differences were not statistically significant.

The results of the repeated measures ANOVA for the P-scores and N2 scores can be found in Tables 9 and 10, respectively.

Table 9

Repeated Measures ANOVA (DIT-2-P scores)- Summary of F Statistics

Effect		Value	F	Hyp/df	Error df	Sig.
Prepost	Pillai's Trace	.001	.138 ^a	1.000	151.000	.711
	Wilks' Lambda	.999	.138 ^a	1.000	151.000	.711
	Hotelling's Trace	.001	.138 ^a	1.000	151.000	.711
	Roy's Largest Root	.001	.138 ^a	1.000	151.000	.711
prepost * IntOrCmp	Pillai's Trace	.019	2.949 ^a	1.000	151.000	.088
	Wilks' Lambda	.981	2.949 ^a	1.000	151.000	.088
	Hotelling's Trace	.020	2.949 ^a	1.000	151.000	.088
	Roy's Largest Root	.020	2.949 ^a	1.000	151.000	.088

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. Design: Intercept + IntOrCmp
Within Subjects Design: prepost

Table 10

Repeated Measures ANOVA (DIT-2-N2 scores)- Summary of F Statistics

Effect		Value	F	Hyp/df	Error df	Sig.
Prepost	Pillai's Trace	.000	.019 ^a	1.000	151.000	.891
	Wilks' Lambda	1.000	.019 ^a	1.000	151.000	.891
	Hotelling's Trace	.000	.019 ^a	1.000	151.000	.891
	Roy's Largest Root	.000	.019 ^a	1.000	151.000	.891
prepost * IntOrCmp	Pillai's Trace	.030	4.673 ^a	1.000	151.000	.032
	Wilks' Lambda	.970	4.673 ^a	1.000	151.000	.032
	Hotelling's Trace	.031	4.673 ^a	1.000	151.000	.032
	Roy's Largest Root	.031	4.673 ^a	1.000	151.000	.032

a. Exact statistic

b. Computed using alpha = .05

c. Design: Intercept + IntOrCmp
Within Subjects Design: prepost

The repeated measures ANOVA for the P-scores (Table 9) shows no significant interaction between the intervention and comparison groups from the pre-test to the post-test [$F(1, 151) = .088, p > .05$], despite the slight observable increase of the comparison group and the decrease of the intervention group on this measure. However, the repeated measures ANOVA for the N2-scores (Table 10) shows a significant interaction between the intervention and comparison groups from pre-test to post-test [$F(1, 151) = .032, p > .05$].

In regard to the two hypotheses related to the DIT-2 measure, a comparison of the mean scores on both measures as well as the results from the repeated measures ANOVAs do not offer support for either H^2 and H^4 . H^2 predicted that the intervention group would show statistically significant improvement on both P and N2 scores. Statistically significant improvement in moral reasoning did occur, but only for the comparison group along the measure of the N2 score. The N2 indicates both an increase in post-conventional (higher stage) moral reasoning and a decrease in personal interest (lower stage) moral reasoning. H^4 predicted that the intervention group would show higher post-test scores on both P and N2 scores. No statistical difference was found for the intervention group from pre-test to post-test on both P and N2 scores. Statistical significance was found for the comparison group on the N2 score. Thus neither H^2 and H^4 are supported by the results.

Follow up Analyses Related to Gender and Research Hypotheses

As indicated in the earlier section on the demographics of the sample, the intervention group and comparison group were statistically significant $\chi^2(1, N=179) = 8.011, p < .005$ in regard to gender (intervention group: 61% female, 39% male;

comparison group: 37% female, 63% male). To examine how gender may be a factor in the differences between intervention and control groups on the IRI and DIT measures, the means for the groups by gender were calculated for each of the measures, followed by repeated measures ANOVAs examining within-subjects differences on each measure and between-subjects factors Group X Gender.

Gender Differences on IRI

While the intervention and control groups did not show statistically differences on the perspective-taking (PT), empathetic concern (EC), or fantasy (FS) subscales of the IRI, an examination of the means by gender reveals that mean-score of females in the intervention group increased on each of these subscales from pretest to posttest, while the male mean score in the intervention group decreased on each of these subscales from pretest to posttest (see Table 11).

Table 11

Pre-test & Post-test Means on the IRI by subscale and by Gender

	Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Pre-test PT-score	Intervention	Female	2.7638	.59224	26
		Male	2.9075	.69583	12
		Total	2.8092	.62090	38
	Comparison	Female	2.6784	.67148	44
		Male	2.4459	.72526	71
		Total	2.5349	.71129	115
	Total	Female	2.7101	.64016	70
		Male	2.5127	.73529	83
		Total	2.6030	.69816	153

	Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Post-test PT-score	Intervention	Female	2.7962	.51098	26
		Male	2.7383	.71252	12
		Total	2.7779	.57280	38
	Comparison	Female	2.5450	.71453	44
		Male	2.5110	.69596	71
		Total	2.5240	.70019	115
	Total	Female	2.6383	.65400	70
		Male	2.5439	.69861	83
		Total	2.5871	.67800	153
Pre-test EC-score	Intervention	Female	2.8081	.61532	26
		Male	2.8450	.44170	12
		Total	2.8197	.56047	38
	Comparison	Female	2.9098	.56284	44
		Male	2.5889	.58650	71
		Total	2.7117	.59603	115
	Total	Female	2.8720	.58056	70
		Male	2.6259	.57274	83
		Total	2.7385	.58745	153
Post-test EC-score	Intervention	Female	2.8631	.62209	26
		Male	2.4758	.54632	12
		Total	2.7408	.61926	38
	Comparison	Female	2.8891	.67474	44
		Male	2.5621	.61402	71
		Total	2.6872	.65476	115
	Total	Female	2.8794	.65122	70
		Male	2.5496	.60234	83

	Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Pre-test FS-score	Intervention	Female	2.3792	.75640	26
		Male	2.3692	.89321	12
		Total	2.3761	.78981	38
	Comparison	Female	2.4961	.84370	44
		Male	2.1889	.70824	71
		Total	2.3064	.77395	115
		Male	2.2149	.73437	83
		Total	2.3237	.77589	153
Post-test FS-score	Intervention	Female	2.3838	.68176	26
		Male	2.3442	.97232	12
		Total	2.3713	.77167	38
	Comparison	Female	2.5359	.95159	44
		Male	2.1770	.77822	71
		Total	2.3143	.86263	115
	Total	Female	2.4794	.85919	70
		Male	2.2012	.80456	83

The comparison group means by gender also indicated some differences, with the mean score for males increasing slightly and females decreasing on the PT subscale, and the mean score for females increasing slightly and males decreasing on FS subscale. Both male and female mean scores on EC subscale decreased for the comparison group.

Results from repeated measures ANOVAs by group X gender did not reveal statistically significant differences for either the PT or FS subscales. However, the ANOVAs did indicate statistically significant interactions between group and gender on

the EC subscale [$F(1, 149) = .017, p > .05$]. Figures 1 and 2 show the changes made by both groups by gender on the EC subscale found in the ANOVA.

Figure 4

Profile Plots: IRI-EC mean scores by Group X Gender (Female)





Figure 5

Profile Plots: IRI-EC mean scores by Group X Gender (Male)



These profile plots illustrate the significant gender differences within the intervention group and the lack of movement of the comparison group, both male and female, on the EC subscale from pretest to posttest. For the intervention group, the mean score for females in the intervention group increased from 2.8081 to 2.8631, while the males decreased from 2.8450 to 2.4758. While neither of the IRI-related hypotheses (H^1 and H^3) predicted significant growth on the EC subscale, or variations by gender, the impact

of the intervention did vary by gender. Possible reasons for this variance will be explored in Chapter 6.

Gender Differences on DIT

As indicated in the earlier in this chapter, the intervention group showed decreases on their mean scores on both P and N2 scores, but only for the N2 score did the ANOVA results indicate significant differences between the intervention and control groups on moral reasoning from pretest to posttest. An examination the mean scores of each group by gender on the DIT measure (Table 12) indicates that both female and male mean scores in the intervention group decreased on both P and N2 scores, yet the males decreased by a greater margin on each scale. For the comparison group, both female and male mean scores increased on P and N2 scores, yet the female mean scores increased by a greater margin on both scores.

Table 12

Pre-test & Post-test Means on the DIT-P score and N2 score by Gender

	Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Pre-test P-score	Intervention	Female	46.8462	10.942	26
		Male	41.2175	10.679	12
		Total	45.0687	11.038	38
	Comparison	Female	45.2234	12.984	44
		Male	40.6469	16.801	71
		Total	42.3979	15.553	115
	Total	Female	45.8261	12.209	70
		Male	40.7294	16.009	83
		Total	43.0612	14.575	153

Post-test P-score	Intervention	Female	45.6069	14.633	26
		Male	35.3333	17.834	12
		Total	42.3626	16.207	38
	Comparison	Female	47.4405	15.323	44
		Male	42.0989	15.830	71
		Total	44.1426	15.787	115
	Total	Female	46.7594	14.990	70
		Male	41.1207	16.196	83
		Total	43.7005	15.858	153

Pre-test N2-score	Intervention	Female	46.9477	10.45162	26
		Male	38.5950	10.89036	12
		Total	44.3100	11.16018	38
	Comparison	Female	44.8239	12.08580	44
		Male	41.1427	14.87251	71
		Total	42.5511	13.93355	115
	Total	Female	45.6127	11.47492	70
		Male	40.7743	14.33681	83
		Total	42.9880	13.28560	153

	Group	Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Post-test N2-score	Intervention	Female	45.5865	14.13172	26
		Male	34.2592	16.52923	12
		Total	42.0095	15.64081	38
	Comparison	Female	48.1416	13.53265	44
		Male	43.3200	14.15182	71
		Total	45.1648	14.05672	115
	Total	Female	47.1926	13.71238	70
		Male	42.0100	14.76123	83
		Total	44.3811	14.47804	153

As with the IRI analysis above, repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted by group X gender for each subscale, but the results did not indicate that gender contributed to statistical significance on either P and N2 scores. The only statistical significance found was by group on the N2 scale, which was indicated on the ANOVA conducted previously.

Summary

This chapter presented the results of statistical analyses of the data gathered from both pre-test and post-test measures on the two instruments, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the Defining Issues Test. The study had predicted that the intervention group would show more growth in empathetic perspective-taking and moral reasoning than the comparison group as indicated by these two measures. Repeated measures ANOVAs by group were conducted for each instrument by subscale. These results did not indicate significant differences on the PT, EC, or FS subscales on the IRI, nor did the intervention group show higher scores on these measures. Thus, H¹ and H³ on intervention group's growth in empathetic perspective-taking were not supported by the results. In regard to moral reasoning growth as measured by the DIT, the repeated measures ANOVAs did indicate statistical significance for the N2 mean scores, but it was the comparison group, not the intervention group that showed such growth. Thus H² and H⁴ were not supported by the results.

While the statistical analyses did not support the predicted outcomes, the results indicated that within the intervention group, gender was a significant factor on the EC subscale. The empathetic concern (EC) subscale is considered a measure of affective empathy, and the intervention was focused on teaching students to both see and feel the

perspective of others. These results suggest that women responded positively to the intervention's emphasis on feeling, showing slight increases in empathetic concern, while men showed the opposite response, declining in empathetic concern. How gender may impact the effectiveness of teaching empathy will be explored in final chapter of this study.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS & INTERPRETATIONS

Overview

The challenge in teaching ethics, business or otherwise, lies in the complexity of the moral decision-making process. Past approaches to teaching ethics have been rooted primarily within the cognitive developmental tradition, with the focus on the cognitive, rational processes, specifically on developing moral reasoning. Often missing from these rationalist approaches, however, is attention to the emotional nature of moral decision-making. Recent studies in cognitive neuroscience and social psychology not only have highlighted the dual processing (cognitive and affective) involved in decision-making, but the primacy of the emotion in driving moral decision-making. Thus, educational approaches that address both cognitive and affective processes are needed.

This study proposed that empathy may be an appropriate construct for integrating both processes, and that an moral education intervention that focused on empathetic perspective-taking may prove effective in both advancing moral reasoning and empathy. This approach was applied using a quasi-experimental design with undergraduate business students within a semester-long business ethics course. It was predicted that the class section receiving the empathetic perspective-taking intervention would show more growth on both perspective-taking and moral reasoning measures than the comparison groups receiving the moral reasoning only approach.

Is empathy, and specifically empathetic perspective-taking, the missing link in effectively teaching business ethics? The results of this study did not offer empirical evidence for growth in either moral reasoning or in perspective-taking following the

intervention experience. This lack of evidence, however, does not necessarily imply the intervention did not have an impact on empathy and moral development of the students, or that empathetic perspective-taking should not be included in teaching business ethics. In this final chapter, I will examine both the research design and intervention design in search of explanations for the results and suggestions for future research. Particular emphasis will be given to instrumentation issues, the time and foci of the intervention, receptiveness of empathetic role-taking by gender, and the multi-dimensional nature of empathy. Such analyses will offer guidelines for designing future interventions as well as directions for future research.

Discussion of the Findings

As described in Chapter Five, the results from both measures (the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and the Defining Issues Test-2) did not offer empirical support for the four hypotheses related to growth in empathy and moral reasoning. The intervention group did not show increases on the PT, EC, or FS subscales of the IRI, and showed decreases on moral reasoning, though such decreases were not statistically significant. The comparison group scores remained fairly stable on the IRI subscales (slight decreases on the PT and EC subscales, slight increase on FS subscale, with none of these changes statistically significant), yet this group did show increases on the P and N2 scores on the DIT-2. The intervention, however, did have a mixed impact on one of the subscales, Empathetic Concern, when one examines gender as a factor within the intervention group. These two main findings, the comparison group's growth in moral reasoning and the intervention group's mixed response by gender on the empathetic concern subscale,

suggest several important issues related to how perspective-taking is related to moral reasoning and empathy.

Issues in Moral Reasoning & Perspective-Taking

Principled moral reasoning fostered through instruction. While the intervention group did not exhibit growth in principled moral reasoning, the comparison group did exhibit growth. Such growth was not hypothesized based on the importance of perspective-taking in moral development, but in looking back on the teaching approach, class discussions, and written assignments within both intervention and comparison groups, such development in moral reasoning likely is the result of the specific emphasis on principled moral reasoning within the comparison group.

Increasing the moral reasoning of students through moral education interventions has been well documented in the previous literature, particularly when using the DIT as a measure (Rest, 1986; King & Mayhew, 2002). As discussed by King and Mayhew (2002) in their review of 172 studies using the DIT in higher education contexts, the majority of the intervention studies positively influenced moral judgment toward postconventional moral reasoning. Yet in the same study King and Mayhew noted that a wide variety of studies have indicated that positive moral development is an outcome of higher education in general, even when controlling for age. Considering that only the comparison group showed gains in moral reasoning, this study suggests that instruction in principled moral reasoning can be effective in improving moral judgment.

Empathetic perspective-taking not sufficient for fostering moral reasoning. In this study, the intent was to develop perspective-taking, and a specific type of perspective-taking, *empathetic perspective-taking*. Perspective-taking was singled out as

a construct for several reasons. First, throughout his study of cognitive moral development, Kohlberg emphasized that perspective-taking ability was necessary for growth in moral reasoning. Perspective-taking has continued to be a key element within the cognitive-developmental tradition for fostering moral development. Perspective-taking also was advocated by the challenger theories to the rationalist traditions, specifically Haidt's new and controversial Social Intuitionist Model, as a means for changing our first moral intuitions. He suggested that through conversation or in private reflection, seeing another's perspective can trigger new intuitions for ourselves, and thus challenge and perhaps change our first intuition. What was missing from both of these models, however, was the affective aspect of perspective-taking where the individual not only sees as the other, but feels as the other. Hoffman's theory of empathy and moral development suggested that empathy, with its emotional concern for another's well-being, offers such affective influence and motive force to our moral reasoning. In other words, empathy warms up the coolness of moral deliberation as our concern extends beyond ourselves. It brings other subjects into our point of view, into our own subjectivity, and thus expands our subjective dimension. The notion of empathetic perspective-taking intended to add "feeling" to the "seeing" of another, thus offering an approach that integrated both cognitive and affective elements, which in turn could be integrated the reasons and emotions engaged in moral decision-making.

The results of this study do not indicate that empathetic perspective-taking is sufficient for growth in moral reasoning, for it was the comparison group, who received instruction in principled moral reasoning, who grew in moral reasoning, not the intervention group which focused on empathetic perspective-taking. *This does not*

suggest that perspective-taking is not necessary, but it does suggest that perspective-taking is not sufficient for moral reasoning.

Perspective-taking as a single step or strategy in moral decision-making. Both groups received instruction in stakeholder analysis, a type of perspective-taking. For each case under discussion, all students were required to *identify* each of the parties potentially impacted by the decision at hand, and to *consider how* each party would be impacted, for benefit or for harm. The student team (in both intervention and comparison groups) presenting the case each week was required to present the class with a stakeholder map identifying the various stakeholders and attempt to diagram the relationships.

The difference between the intervention and comparison groups, however, was the specific instructions and exercises provided to the intervention group to promote empathizing with the stakeholders. Moreover, the intervention group spent the bulk of the class discussions, presentations, and journal reflections focusing on empathetic perspective-taking with little emphasis and instruction in principled moral reasoning or time spent in moral argumentation. In other words, the comparison group engaged in perspective-taking as a cognitive activity only, and as a minor step in the process of moral reasoning, while the intervention group engaged in perspective-taking as both a cognitive and affective activity, and as a major strategy for ethical decision-making.

Perspective-taking and stages in cognitive moral development. It is noteworthy that while the comparison group's growth in moral reasoning increased (as measured by the N2 scale on the DIT-2), this group did not show increases on the PT subscale of the IRI. One, however, might have expected to see the PT scores increase as the students

increased in post-conventional reasoning and away from personal interest, since Kohlberg had argued that growth in moral reasoning was related to growth in cognitive development and perspective-taking ability (Walker, 1980). This lack of movement on the PT subscale may be due to the students' already relatively-high level of perspective-taking (pre-test PT score = 2.5349/4.0). Walker's (1980) study of perspective-taking with children indicated that perspective-taking was necessary for moving from pre-conventional to conventional moral reasoning; most of the students in this study were already reasoning at the conventional level.

Types of perspective-taking. The lack of improvement in perspective-taking might also be explained by the type of perspective-taking utilized in the study. The Deliberate Psychological Education model (Brendel, Kolbert, & Foster, 2002) advocates role-taking *experiences* to promote interpersonal perspective-taking with adolescents and adults, but this study did not provide such "role-taking experiences" such as an internship or counseling experience as the DPE model recommends. In their study specifically designed to develop empathy with adolescents, Hatcher and colleagues (1994) were effective in promoting growth on the PT subscale with college students, but the intervention was focused on behavioral training through role-playing experiences, group facilitation, and empathetic listening. In the present study under discussion, perspective-taking with the comparison group was not experiential, but approached as stakeholder analysis, and as a step in the moral reasoning process. Thus, the lack of an experience of perspective-taking may explain the lack of movement on the PT subscale.

Variations in definitions and measures of perspective-taking. Another explanation for the discrepancy between the DIT-N2 scores and the IRI-PT scores may

result from how the construct of perspective-taking is defined (and thus measured or assessed). The PT subscale on the IRI is a measure of cognitive empathy, which Davis (1983) defines as “the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others” (pp. 113-114). At first glance, Kohlberg’s understanding of role-taking appears similar: “the tendency to react to others as like the self and to react to the self’s behavior from the other’s point of view” (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 141). Yet for Kohlberg, role-taking in moral reasoning was tied specifically to justice as a balancing of perspectives: “moral judgments involve role-taking, taking the viewpoints of others as *subjects* and coordinating those viewpoints” (p. 194). The act of equitably balancing self and other was an extension of Rawls’ moral philosophy, most specifically the idea of reversibility where one’s own choice of action can be considered just or fair if that action can be considered just from any of the stakeholders’ perspectives (the choice could be reversed, so to speak, and one would agree that the action chosen was just on the receiving end as well). (Kohlberg, 1981) As one can see, role-taking in this sense is a highly cognitive task, requiring the ability to shift back and forth from one’s own viewpoint to the viewpoints of the various stakeholders in the situation. Davis’ definition of perspective-taking does not specify this justice foundation or the importance of explicitly and deliberately balancing perspectives. Rather, perspective-taking is considered broadly (“psychological point of view”) and as a process that occurs “spontaneously” as opposed to a process of careful deliberation and balancing of viewpoints.

The DIT-2, like the original DIT, is rooted within the cognitive developmental stage framework of justice-based moral reasoning, with one scoring higher as one

chooses justice-oriented reasons, indicating that one uses a postconventional justice-oriented schema in moral decision-making (Narvaez & Bock, 2002). Davis' PT subscale, on the other hand, is rooted in the social psychological tradition, assessing an individual's tendency to consider others' points of view. The intent of such perspective-taking is not necessarily moral; rather, perspective-taking in this sense facilitates a higher level of social functioning by being able to understand others and their behaviors, and ideally lead to positive interpersonal relationships (Davis 1980, 1983).

These differing definitions about the nature and purpose of perspective-taking, and in turn their corresponding measures, offer a possible explanation for the differences between the IRI-PT subscale and the DIT-2 P and N2 scores. Accordingly, the comparison group could show increases on the DIT-2 in moving toward postconventional moral reasoning and away from personal interest, while simultaneously not showing improvement in perspective-taking as assessed on the IRI-PT subscale.

Issues in Developing and Measuring Empathy

While empathy development has been reviewed extensively in the research literature, such studies have focused on factors such as age or gender in the developmental progression of empathy over time (Eisenberg et. al., 2005; Hoffman, 2000; Hatcher et. al., 1994). Few studies have specifically attempted to teach empathy and previous educational interventions attempting to educate for empathy have had mixed results (Hatcher et. al., 1994; Eisenberg & Morris, 2001; Stepien & Baernstein, 2006). As described earlier, Hatcher et. al (1994) effectively promoted perspective-taking in college students (as measured by IRI-PT subscale) through Rogerian counseling skills training (including empathetic listening, feedback, and role-taking exercises).

Within the medical profession, several studies have examined how empathy may change over time in medical training or in years of medical practice. Mangione et. al. (2002) assessed internal medicine residents in each year of the three year residency cycle, and did not find statistically significant changes in empathy. Hojat et. al. (2004) assessed medical students on empathy at both the beginning and end of their medical school training, and observed overall declines in empathy from year one to year three. Similar declines were also noted by Bellini et. al. during medical internships (2002). Stepien and Baernstein (2006) reviewed thirteen educational intervention studies that were designed to foster empathy in undergraduate medical students, and found that all thirteen studies reported increases in empathy development. These studies included a variety of interventions, including communication skills training, using narrative and literature courses and exercises, experiential learning exercises, and focusing on self-care as means for fostering empathy.

This snapshot of mixed results from within the medical profession highlights the main challenge in developing empathy: effectively defining and measuring empathy. Stepien and Baernstein (2006) emphasize that despite the positive results reported across studies, the studies lacked a consistent and validated measure of empathy. Different quantitative and qualitative measures were used, with some as self-assess measures while others were behavior-based measures.

Difficulties in measuring empathy. Measuring empathy has been problematic for research for several reasons. First, how one defines empathy determines what one looks to measure. As described in the section above, depending on one's definition, empathy may emphasize more cognitive elements, such as understanding another's situation by

means of role-taking or perspective taking, or more affective elements, such as emotional arousal and sensitivity to others. In this study, Martin Hoffman's definition of empathy was used: "an affective response more appropriate to another's situation than one's own" (Hoffman, 2000, p. 4). As highlighted in Chapter Two, the emphasis on the affective response was intended to address the emotional and motivational aspects of moral decision-making that were missing from the cognitive developmental tradition. At the same time, the exercise of perspective-taking can be deliberately controlled and triggered through cognitive reflection. This educational intervention wanted to address to connect both cognitive and affective elements of empathy by connecting *seeing as another* (perspective-taking) with *feeling as another* (empathetic concern). The proposed construct for integrating these elements was defined as *empathetic perspective-taking*. Measuring the development of this new construct required a measure that addressed both cognitive and affective elements of empathy. With its four subscales, Davis' Interpersonal Reactivity Index offered a measure that captured the multi-dimensional nature of empathy, and that was consistent with both Hoffman's definition and theory of empathy and moral development.

A second challenge in measuring empathy is a challenge found in measuring any psychological construct: are we measuring a behavioral skill, a trait, or a state? If assessing ability or skill in acting empathetically, then the measure would need to be performance-based, with the participant needing to demonstrate the appropriate skills. Often such assessment would need to occur in an experimental setting where the individual might be posed certain situations or challenges, and then asked to make decisions about these scenarios, and illustrate their decision-making process on how they

arrived at such decisions. Observation of the individual also might be used in such experimental settings. Other skill-based measures might include presenting the individual with cases or scenarios on a paper-pencil measure where again the individual is challenged to demonstrate the skill in decisions about the scenarios. The Defining Issues Test is representative of this type of performance-based measure of moral reasoning, presenting the individual with cases where the individual must both choose an action and determine what reasons were significant in their decision-making.

A state-based measure focuses on the response of the individual in a particular moment to particular stimuli. Emphasis on the immediate emotional response often assesses the individual's empathetic sensitivity to various stimuli. Studies in cognitive neuroscience utilizing brain imaging technology could be considered state-based measures in that these studies describe what regions of the brain are activated by various situations, pictures, or interactions. Observations of a participant's facial responses to stimuli might also be considered a state-measure. (Mooradian et. al., 2008)

Trait-based measures assess a construct that is considered part of one's personality or identity. Because personality is considered stable and enduring over time, the assumption of many trait constructs is that they also remain stable in various contexts and over time, and that such constructs are not easily changed through educational interventions. (Mooradian et. al., 2008; Dizeker & Michielutte, 1981).

Interpersonal Reactivity Index as a self-assessment, multidimensional, trait measure of empathy, and limitations of IRI for educational interventions. The IRI is a multidimensional trait measure of empathy. In developing the instrument, Davis (1980; 1983) wanted to address the confusion found in other instruments where cognitive and

affective components of empathy had been mixed; thus he created a measure with four subscales that captured four dimensions of empathy, two cognitive (perspective-taking and fantasy) and two affective (empathetic concern and personal distress). These subscales allow one to simultaneously assess multiple dimensions of empathy with one instrument; for this reason, the IRI is widely used in empathy studies. For this study, the IRI was chosen as the empathy instrument because it facilitated the assessment of both cognitive and affective components of empathetic perspective-taking.

The IRI, however, has two shortcomings when used to assess the effectiveness in educational interventions. First, it is a self-assessment measure, where individuals are asked to review a list of statements about interpersonal situations and rate how well those statements describe themselves. Like any self-assessment measure, the instrument is not necessarily measuring how an individual actually behaves or performs, but measures an individual's self-perception or self-understanding. Accordingly, a student's self-perception may not match their behavior; a student may think that they "put themselves in another's shoes" when making a decision, but they may not actually do so. In the context of current educational intervention, the IRI was measuring how the student's perceived themselves, as opposed to measuring their ability to practice empathetic perspective-taking. The DIT-2 asked students to demonstrate their moral reasoning; the IRI asked students to describe their understanding of their interpersonal sensitivity. Any change found in IRI scores at the end of an intervention does not necessarily describe a change in ability, but a change in self-understanding. At best, one is measuring if the students have internalized empathetic perspective-taking as part of their identity and consciously consider this process as a way they make sense of the world.

Measuring self-understanding is connected to the second shortcoming of the IRI for intervention studies: it is a trait measure. As described above, trait measures assess aspects of personality, and traits are considered to be stable and not easily shaped by educational interventions. As Davis (1980) notes, the IRI has strong test-retest reliability (ranging from .62 to .71) and internal reliabilities (ranging from .71 to .77). Scores tend to remain stable over time, though age changes have been seen in growth from childhood to adolescence as individuals develop the cognitive ability to distinguish between self and other. Also, personal distress tends to decline after adolescence. The stability of IRI has been seen in previous interventions studies. In Stepien and Baernstein's (2006) review of educational interventions for empathy development in the medical professions, IRI scores were stable, and none of the interventions showed increases in empathy along the IRI subscales. The aforementioned Hatcher et. al. (1994) study did show increases on the IRI-PT scale, but only with college students. One must examine if such growth was due to the intervention or age or the college environment.

In summary, the IRI offered a measure that addressed cognitive and affective elements of empathetic perspective-taking, with perspective-taking assessing *seeing* and empathetic concern assessing *feeling*. Yet as a self-assessment, trait-based measure, the IRI was not well-suited for measuring change in ability resulting from an educational intervention.

Gender and Empathetic Perspective-Taking

The intervention did have some measurable impact, by gender, but not on the intended subscale of Perspective-Taking, but on the Empathetic Concern subscale. This finding suggests that the intervention may have been effective in promoting affective

empathy as opposed to cognitive empathy, at least with women. And alternatively, the intervention had a negative impact on the affective empathy of the men in the study.

Gender and empathy. In developing the IRI instrument, Davis noted that females consistently score higher than males on all four of the subscales (Davis, 1980). Using a large sample of undergraduate students (females $N = 582$; males $N = 579$), females showed the greatest difference over men on the fantasy scale (18.75 vs. 15.73); the smallest difference was on the perspective-taking scale (17.96 vs. 16.78). The remaining subscale mean scores by gender were: empathetic concern, 21.67 vs. 19.04 and personal distress, 12.28 vs. 9.46. Davis (1983) highlighted that his findings are the IRI were consistent with the gender differences on other empathy measures, with females consistently scoring higher than males. He also notes that while Hoffman found these same gender differences consistently across empathy studies, studies focusing on role-taking did not reveal gender differences (Hoffman, 1977 in Davis, 1983).

In this study, gender proved to be a factor in finding differences in the intervention group on the empathetic concern scale. Consistent with gender differences described above, women scored higher than men on affective empathy, but only on the post-test. Men scored higher than women on the EC subscale on the pretest (female mean EC pre-test = 2.8081; male mean pre-test EC = 2.8450). And this difference highlights what is particularly noteworthy in this study: not much in that women increased slightly (EC pre-test = 2.8081; EC post-test = 2.8631) but the degree to which men declined (EC pre-test = 2.8450; EC post-test = 2.4631). The intervention produced a mixed effect, with males not responding positively to intervention's emphasis on empathetic perspective-taking.

Imaginative nature of empathetic perspective-taking and internalization by gender. Such a mixed response was not predicted based on previous studies nor based on the instructor's previous experience in teaching ethics and perspective-taking.

Observations throughout the semester, both in class discussions and journal assignments, did not suggest that males were finding empathetic perspective-taking problematic or frustrating. A number of the journal exercises specifically emphasized using one's imagination to tap into the seeing and feeling of the various stakeholders, and some students demonstrated greater detail in these types of journals, but again no differences by gender were observed. At the same time, the females did increase slightly on the FS scale (FS pre-test = 2.3792; FS post-test = 2.3838), and the men declined slightly (FS pre-test = 2.3692; FS post-test = 2.3442). While this difference was not statistically significant, it might offer an explanation for the difference on the EC subscale.

Imagination was the process by which students were instructed to stimulate both seeing and feeling, cognitive and affective empathy. They may not have preferred this process, not because it engaged their imaginations, but because it stimulated their emotions. Such stimulation was the part of the intended effect, i.e., feeling as another feels. Yet such feelings may complicate one's decision-making, and thus may have had the reverse effect. Instead of prompting empathetic concern for the stakeholder as a subject, males may have rejected such affective concern in favor of more objective, less personal understanding of stakeholders.

Another possible explanation lies in the nature of the IRI as a measure of self-understanding. It may be that both males and females learned how to effectively engage in empathetic perspective-taking, but they may not have internalized this way of thinking

and feeling as part of their identity. In other words, empathetic perspective-taking may not yet be part of their self-understanding of how they make sense of the world. It remains uncertain if males did learn empathetic perspective-taking, but even if they did grow in this ability, the IRI, as a stable trait measure, would not likely capture such growth.

Limitations of the Study

As highlighted in the above discussion, instrumentation issues challenged the effectiveness of this research design. In this next section, several additional limitations of the study will be discussed.

Sample of Undergraduate Students

The research sample for this study was a convenience sample; the students were enrolled in a course taught annually by the researcher. The course was a required business ethics course for junior business majors at a top tier undergraduate program on the east coast of the United States. The size of sample was adequate for intervention studies and for statistical generalizability (Gall, Borg, & Gall, 1997).

There were several benefits in using this sample. First, previous research on business ethics education has focused on elective courses, which suggests that the students enrolled have a genuine interest in learning about business ethics (Sims, 2002). In turn, such students may be more predisposed to growth in moral development, i.e., by *choosing* to take the course they are more *receptive* to learning. Required courses, on the other hand, bring together students of various predispositions and motivations, thus offering a variety of backgrounds for exploring the effectiveness of an intervention.

The particular course used in this study was part of the first semester in the business major program. All students had taken the same prerequisites for entry, and were simultaneously taking the same introductory business courses. As such, the level of previous business coursework was approximately even across all students, thus minimizing the variability of prior content knowledge within business settings. They differed on non-business course experiences, of course, having taken different arts and science courses prior to entry, including ethics courses that may have influenced how they approached ethical decision-making. Many of the students were enrolled in at least one non-business courses during the semester under study. Also, they may have had previous work experience that may have influenced how they understood business ethics issues. Such background knowledge and experience likely plays a role in shaping one's intuitive sense of ethical issues and methods for decision-making (Hogarth, 2001). Yet by focusing on undergraduates, with a mean age of 20.6, they likely would have had less experience than graduate students. The use of repeated measures ANOVAs also minimized the influence of personal history, focusing on change of each individual as opposed to group norms.

Conducting the study at a top tier university does limit the generalizability of the findings. Having been accepted both to a prestigious university as well as having been accepted to the selective and competitive business program, these students were already above normal in terms of intelligence. College students in general score higher than the population on the DIT-2, and the mean scores of both intervention and comparison groups were higher than norms for juniors in college (P-score norms: Juniors in College = 34.45; Intervention Group = 45.07; Comparison Group = 42.40; Overall Sample =

43.06; N2-score norms: Juniors in College = 32.65; Intervention Group = 44.31; Comparison Group = 42.55; Overall Sample = 42.99) (Bebeau & Thoma, 2003). Accordingly, an educational intervention must be matched to the ability of the participants, and in this study, the moral reasoning aspects of the intervention may have need to be more complex to promote growth. Alternatively, the emphasis on empathetic perspective-taking may have confused some students. The comparison group, focusing on principled moral reasoning, did show improvement on P and N2 scores, with statistical significance on N2, suggesting that the comparison group's instruction was well matched for promoting post-conventional reasoning and less emphasis on personal interest.

Experimenter Bias and Strength of Intervention

This research study was focused on a class-based educational intervention where the investigator was also the instructor. There were benefits to this approach. First, finding access to students and to a course where a quasi-experimental design could be applied can be difficult; using the investigator's own course made such access available and design issues addressable. Second, the investigator had taught the course for five years, and thus was experienced in delivering the content and with course administration. Such experience helped in choosing cases and course materials and in designing the course intervention in a way that provided different experiences but equal workloads for the students. Another benefit included the support of the academic business program for the research, which included the approval for the study to occur within a required business course.

At the same time, the investigator-instructor approach may have had potential drawbacks, particularly experimenter bias. The instructor taught both intervention and comparison groups. To avoid being influenced by the pre-test scores, the researcher secured the pre-test measures and did not review these measures until after the semester had been completed, with both measures having been completed and grades submitted for the course. Yet knowledge of the intended outcomes for each group could have influenced in-class teaching style so that the comparison groups experience was weakened to produce the desired outcome for the intervention. Aware of this potential for bias, the instructor was careful to emphasize principled moral reasoning with the comparison group through use of moral reasoning frameworks and language used in leading class discussion and written assignments. For the intervention group, the instructor was careful to emphasize empathetic perspective-taking using imaginative exercises and role-taking reflections in both class discussions and journal assignments. In hindsight, it is clear that the intervention received very little emphasis and explicit instruction in principled moral reasoning, and this lack of emphasis likely produced the lack of growth in moral reasoning on the DIT-2.

Contact Time with Students and Intensity of Intervention

One difficulty with this particular intervention was the nature of the course delivery structure of the required “Business Perspectives” course: the pass/fail course only met once a week for an hour and twenty minutes. Meeting only a once a week likely weakened the intensity of the intervention if compared to a standard college course where students would have met at least twice a week. This limited contact, along with the pass/fail nature of the course, contrasted with the three other business courses (each

graded, 3 credit courses) in which the students were enrolled during the semester. The Business Perspectives course likely received less attention and rigor from students, and thus the efforts of the students to engage in class discussions and assignments were likely minimized.

Implications for Practice

This study offers several important implications for design and implementation of moral and empathy education interventions. First, empathy is a multidimensional construct, so any interventions intended to foster empathy must first determine which dimensions of empathy one wants to address, and design the intervention accordingly. Second, if the development of empathy is intended to also foster moral development, one must consider what component of moral development (moral sensitivity, judgment, motivation, action) one wishes empathy to advance. For example, moral sensitivity describes one's perceptiveness to moral issues in situations; such sensitivity might be perceived as cognitive awareness, but often it is empathetic distress at another's condition that triggers our moral sensitivity, and in turn sparks empathetic concern for another. Accordingly, one might seek to connect empathetic concern with promoting moral sensitivity. (Hoffman, 2000) Moral judgment, however, might be best linked with the cognitive empathy component of perspective-taking, for effective moral judgment requires the ability to consider multiple points of view (Kohlberg, 1981; Hoffman, 2000).

Depending on the dimension of empathy one wishes to foster, choosing an appropriate measure that will assess growth in this dimension is essential. The IRI offers a multidimensional measure, yet it is a trait measure and thus scores are more likely to

remain stable from pre-test to post-test. One would be advised to select or develop a performance-based measure of empathy to assess educational interventions.

The mixed results by gender suggest an important implication for future empathy interventions. In developing cases, exercises, and discussions for the educational intervention, one should recognize that attempts to stimulate emotional reactions and integrate such emotions in one's decision-making may not be readily received by all students. This study suggests that males may find such approaches less acceptable, or take longer to internalize such approaches into one's decision-making. Accordingly, one may consider lengthening an intervention, or increasing contact time with students, to provide more instruction and practice in integrating empathetic concern in decision-making. Also, one may wish to measure the students not only at the conclusion of the intervention but several months after to see if internalization may have occurred.

This study attempted to educate business students on a new construct, empathetic perspective-taking. Future studies attempting to foster empathetic perspective-taking should note that if empathetic perspective-taking is both a cognitive and affective activity, then both cognitive and affective measures should be used. In retrospect the hypotheses in the current study should have emphasized growth along both PT and EC subscales for they capture the cognitive and affective components of empathy, respectively. Also, future educational programs attempting to link empathetic perspective-taking (or empathy in general) with moral reasoning are advised to balance empathy instruction with instruction in principled moral reasoning. The present study did not balance such instruction within the intervention group, yet if Hoffman's notion of

empathy bonding to moral principles is to occur, it makes sense that both empathy and moral reasoning should receive equal attention in the intervention.

Suggestions for Future Research

There has been renewed interest amongst researchers in exploring the nature of empathy and its importance in moral decision-making (Haidt, 2001; Hauser, 2006; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Studies in cognitive neuroscience has supported the primacy of affect in decision-making, specifically moral decision-making. Empathy offers a potential construct for harnessing and integrating affect with cognitive processes. As Hoffman suggested, empathy may offer a means for warming up our cooler reasoning processes so that empathetic concern bonds with moral principles. The ideal result is that the spark of affect may increase the likelihood that we not only think morally, but act morally. Empirical research is needed to further establish this link, and to determine exactly how empathy might promote moral decision-making and ultimately moral behavior.

The current study, however, focused on developing empathy within a specific context, business ethics, and with a specific population, undergraduate business students. Accordingly, this closing discussion will suggest several directions related to this educational context and population.

Empathy in Teaching Business Ethics

Within the field of business ethics, empathy has played a minor role in regard to new approaches to teaching business ethics (Rechner & Baucus, 1997; McPhail, 2001). Recently, however, empathy has been considered a key ability within the construct of social intelligence, particularly within the context of effective business

leadership (Goleman & Boyatzis, 2008). Drawing on the cognitive neuroscience studies on mirror neurons, Goleman and Boyatzis highlight that leaders with empathy are much more “attuned” to their employees, their motivations, and their concerns. Such attunement enables a leader to make better decisions about guiding and motivating one’s staff, in building trust, and in giving feedback for better results in employee and organizational performance.

The current research in moral psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggests that moral decision-making is a form of social intelligence, engaging the same brain regions involved in assessing social cues and interpersonal interactions (Lieberman, 2007; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Both social intelligence and ethical decision-making have been considered essential abilities of effective leaders. Empathy, and specifically empathetic perspective-taking, emerges as central skill supporting both of these leadership abilities. Accordingly, developing empathy should be an objective not only in teaching business ethics but in teaching leadership. Researchers and practitioners in business education should be encouraged to develop effective programs for developing empathy in business students.

Need for a Skill-based Measure of Empathy for Business Contexts

As highlighted earlier in this discussion, skill-based measures are needed to assess the effectiveness of educational interventions in fostering empathy. Also, if empathy is a social skill, then the environmental or situational context may influence one’s empathetic sensitivity, as well as one’s tendency to engage in empathetic perspective-taking. The business professional, for example, may seek to employ empathetic perspective-taking at home, with friends, at church, but at work attempt to “bracket out” emotions under the

guise that “It’s not personal, it’s business.” In other words, an individual may choose different types of thinking and decision-making for different environments, and empathy may not be considered acceptable or appropriate for business contexts.

The medical profession has been focused on developing empathy within its training programs, particularly as they discovered that empathy in doctors often declined over time in the profession (Hojat et. al., 2004) Previous studies had used general empathy measures, yet researchers identified the need for context-specific measure for the medical profession. In the last several years, a specific scale has been developed, the Jefferson Scale of Physician Empathy, to address this need for an empathy measure within the context of physician care (Hojat et. al., 2003).

Skill-based, context-specific measures of empathy are needed to both measure empathy in business leaders as well as explore the link between empathy and business ethics. Moreover, creation of such a measure will help define the role of empathy within business leadership. Lastly, a reliable, valid, skill-based measure would facilitate the assessment of leadership and ethics education interventions, and increase the likelihood that business organizations would assess this key skill of social intelligence in their leaders and employees.

Effective Ways for Stimulating Empathetic Concern without Overarousal

As highlighted in Chapter 4, the intervention group exhibited some resistance to empathetic perspective-taking, specifically to emphasis on feeling for each individual in a scenario. This is puzzling to some extent, considering how students acknowledged the importance of tapping into one’s emotions in making ethical decisions in both class discussions and in their journal reflections. Yet this resistance might best described not

as a resistance to their *own emotions*, but a resistance to *imagining the emotions of others*. In other words, attending to one's own feelings may be considered acceptable or helpful, but the exercise of attending to other's feelings may cause discomfort or even conflict, and thus seem to disturb one moral decision-making rather than helping. The mixed results by gender in this study suggest that men may find such other-focused feeling more disturbing than women.

Feeling as another feels certainly adds complexity to one's decision-making. More than one set of feelings is now under consideration, and a wider range of emotions have been activated. In Haidt's (2001) terms, perspective-taking stimulates new intuitions that challenge one's own first intuitions. The decision-making process now has changed from simply applying moral principles or considering possible outcomes to both seeing and feeling multiple points of view. Such inputs may seem overwhelming, both in quantity and in quality. There may be too many parties to think about, or too many feelings to consider. The feelings may be too intense, causing overarousal of empathetic distress which in turn leads to personal distress (Hoffman, 2000). Alternatively, the individual may not be able to hold multiple emotions, or even conflicting or competing emotions, together under one's attention.

Such difficulty in attending to multiple emotions may be the result of a cognitive rather than affective challenge, i.e., one may argue that students with such difficulty lack overall ability in handling cognitive complexity. Within the cognitive developmental literature, higher levels in cognitive complexity have been linked to both more sophisticated and effective approaches in analyzing complex problems as well as empathetic sensitivity and communication (Brendel, Kolbert, & Foster, 2002). Hoffman

(2000) highlighted empathy's potential for overarousal, but such potential might decrease as one's ability to handle cognitive complexity increases. Further empirical research within cognitive neuroscience would help illuminate this relationship, using brain imaging to assess the dynamic between empathetic arousal and cognitive complexity.

Conclusion

Is empathy the missing link in teaching business ethics? The rationale for suggesting that empathy be allowed and even encouraged in moral education was rooted in the psychological research that highlights the primacy of emotion, not reason, in human decision-making. Cognitive neuroscience has supported this primacy, as Greene and his colleagues found in their distinction between personal and impersonal moral situations. Once the situation is more personal, requiring that one act directly to harm another, the emotional circuitry of the brain is highly activated, and most individuals find it difficult to follow the moral reasoning they had followed when the situation was more impersonal.

This intervention in empathetic perspective-taking attempted to make business ethics scenarios more personal by asking that they both *see* and *feel* for the individuals in the cases. The emphasis on *seeing* and *feeling* was intended to bring together both the cognitive and affective dimensions of perspective-taking within the context of moral decision-making.

While the results of this study did not provide empirical support for linking empathy with growth in ethical decision-making, the results did suggest that both empathetic concern and moral reasoning can be influenced. Further research should focus on specific techniques for developing particular dimensions of empathy, and as

well as developing skill-based, context specific measures suited for assessing the effectiveness of educational interventions. The research in cognitive neuroscience may help illuminate more clearly how the particular dimensions of empathy are aligned with particular processes in ethical decision-making. Within the field of business education, empathetic perspective-taking merits further research as a component of social intelligence that links empathy not only with ethical decision-making but effective leadership.

APPENDIX A

Interpersonal Reactivity Index

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate letter on the scale at the top of the page: A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number. **READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING.** Answer as honestly as you can.

ANSWER SCALE:

A	B	C	D	E
Does not describe me well			Describes me very well	

- _____ 1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.
- _____ 2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
- _____ 3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
- _____ 4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
- _____ 5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.
- _____ 6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.
- _____ 7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely caught up in it.
- _____ 8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
- _____ 9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
- _____ 10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.
- _____ 11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
- _____ 12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
- _____ 13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.
- _____ 14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.

- _____ 15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.
- _____ 16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.
- _____ 17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.
- _____ 18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for them.
- _____ 19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.
- _____ 20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.
- _____ 21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
- _____ 22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.
- _____ 23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading character.
- _____ 24. I tend to lose control during emergencies.
- _____ 25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
- _____ 26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to me.
- _____ 27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
- _____ 28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

APPENDIX B

Individual Background Questionnaire.

This information will be used to examine how individual background may be related to moral development. Your responses will be kept confidential. Your name will not in any way be associated with your responses (each student ID # will be given a participant code, afterwards the link to the named individual will be destroyed).

1. Student ID# (your 93#): _____
2. How many semesters have you studied at W&M? ____
3. Please print your major(s) and minor (if applicable):
 Major(s) _____
 Minor (if applicable) _____
4. Your enrollment status this fall semester:
 ___ Full-time (12 or more credits) ___ Less than full-time (less than 12 credits)
5. How many courses on ethics have you taken while in college?
 ___ 0 ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 or more
6. Over the past fall semester, how many hours a week (on average) did you actively volunteer in serving others in need (outreach/service projects or activities that benefited those beyond the college community)?
 ___ 0 ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 or more
7. Are you a member of a social fraternity or sorority? ___ Yes ___ No
8. Over the past fall semester, how many hours a week did you actively participate in activities to enhance your spirituality (worship, meditation, prayer, etc.)?
 ___ 0 ___ 1 ___ 2 ___ 3 or more
9. Your current religious preference (mark one):

___ Baptist	___ Lutheran	___ Other Christian religion
___ Buddhist	___ Methodist	<i>Please specify:</i> _____
___ Eastern Orthodox	___ Presbyterian	
___ Episcopalian	___ Quaker	___ Other religion
___ Hindu	___ Roman Catholic	<i>Please specify:</i> _____
___ Islamic	___ Seventh Day Adventist	
___ Jewish	___ Unitarian/Universalist	___ None
___ LDS (Mormon)	___ United Church of Christ	
10. What is your racial or ethnic identification?
 ___ American Indian or other Native American ___ Other
 ___ Asian, Asian American, or Pacific Islander
 ___ Black or African American
 ___ White (non-Hispanic)
 ___ Mexican or Mexican American
 ___ Puerto Rican
 ___ Other Hispanic or Latino
 ___ Multiracial

11. What is your gender? ___ Male ___ Female
12. In what year were you born? 19 _____
13. What is the highest level of education that your parent(s) completed? (Mark one box per column.)

Mother	Father	
___	___	Attended college but did not complete degree
___	___	Completed an associate's degree (A.A., A.S., etc.)
___	___	Completed a bachelor's degree (B.A., B.S., etc.)
___	___	Completed a master's degree (M.A., M.S., etc.)
___	___	Completed a doctoral degree (Ph.D., J.D., M.D., etc.)

APPENDIX C

Informed Consent Form

I, _____ agree to participate in a research study focusing on the moral development of business school undergraduates. The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of educational interventions on individual moral development as measured by two research instruments.

The researcher is conducting this study in an effort to increase the body of knowledge on moral development and moral education. The teaching strategies and outside of class activities are all recommended practices and do not pose any risks to the students. The researcher is a doctoral student in the Higher Education Program in The School of Education at The College of William and Mary.

As a participant, I understand that my involvement in the study is purposeful in that students were chosen due to their involvement with the this course—BUAD 300 Business Perspectives & Applications. I understand that the research instruments will take me about eighty minutes to complete and I will be taking them at the beginning and end of the semester. I understand that my responses will be kept confidential and will not be viewed by the researcher until after the course has been completed and grades submitted for the course. I also understand that my name will not be linked with the study's results in any way, that any key linking my name to my responses will be destroyed, and that I will have the opportunity to gain access to the study's report. I understand that my participation in the study will in no way affect my evaluation in this course, and that I may choose not to participate in the study (choosing not to participate will not affect my evaluation for the course).

I understand that I may keep a copy of this consent form. If I have any questions or problems that arise in connection with my participating in this study, I should contact Christopher P. Adkins, M.A. at 757- 221- 2046 or cpadki@wm.edu or Dr. Michael Deschenes, the chair of the Protection of Human Subjects Committee at the College of William and Mary at 757-221-2778 or mrdesc@wm.edu.

My acceptance below indicates that I am at least 18 years of age, understand this form, and that I consent to participating in this study.

Signature: _____

Date: _____

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Boston University Boston, MA
 Master of Arts, Philosophy May 2001
 Advisor: Dr. Daniel Dahlstrom

The College of William & Mary Williamsburg, VA
 Bachelor of Arts, Double Majors in Philosophy & Religion May 1995
 Advisors: Dr. James Livingston, Dr. Earl McLane

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

The College of William & Mary Williamsburg, VA
 Mason School of Business 2003-present
Courses Taught:
 BUAD 300: Business Perspectives & Applications (third year business students)
 BUAD 492: Corporate Responsibility and Business Ethics, Seminar & Case Competition
 (third & fourth year business students)
 ENST 250: Seminar Topics in Environmental Studies, Discussion Series on Climate Change
 (third & fourth year students)

PUBLICATIONS, WORKING PAPERS AND PAPERS UNDER REVIEW

Adkins, C. P., Keel, D., & Schmidt, C. D. Phenomenological Understandings of Reflection: Perspectives of Students and Faculty. Revise and resubmit for *Counselor Education & Supervision*.

Adkins, C. P., Matzler, K., & Mooradian, T. Maximizing Moral Intuition in Managerial Decision-Making. Manuscript submitted to *MIT Sloan Management Review*.

Schmidt, C. D. & Adkins, C. P. How one ethics course can make an impact: The cost-effective case for Deliberate Psychological Education with undergraduates. Manuscript in preparation for submission to *Journal of College Student Development*.

Adkins, C. P. Can Hoffman help save Kohlberg? Using empathetic role-taking with adolescent for cognitive and affective moral development. Manuscript in preparation for submission to *Cognitive Development*.

Adkins, C. P. Stimulating Secondary Moral Intuitions: Educational implications of Haidt's social intuitionist model. Manuscript in preparation for submission to *Journal of Moral Education*.

RESEARCH INTERESTS

- Moral decision-making, specifically the role of moral intuition and moral emotions in influencing moral decisions
- Moral hypocrisy and self-deception: the neurological and social psychological processes that facilitate such deception, and techniques for prevention and control
- New ways to foster moral development based on the latest findings in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology, through both educational course-based approaches and student affairs programming
- Empathy development in adolescents and adults
- Perspective-taking as a means to foster higher cognitive and moral development
- Metacognition and its role in fostering intellectual development and identity development in adolescents and adults; developing strategies for teaching metacognition

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Adkins, C. P. Innovations in Sustainability and Social Responsibility. Presented an annual National Undergraduate Business Symposium, University of Arizona (Tucson).

Gentile, M. & Adkins, C. P. An introduction to the Giving Voice to Values Curriculum. Presented at annual AACSB Associate Deans and Innovative Programs Conference, November 2008, Glendale, AZ.

Adkins, C. P. Revisiting Hoffman's theory of empathy & moral development: Resonances in neuropsychology and educational interventions with adolescents. Paper presentation at annual international conference of Jean Piaget Society, June 2008, Quebec City, Canada.

Adkins, C. P. Stimulating secondary moral intuitions: Theoretical and empirical support for role-taking with adolescents and adults. Paper presentation at annual conference of Society for Research in Adult Development, March 2008, New York, NY.

Schmidt, C. D. & Adkins, C. P. Promoting the ethical development of undergraduate business students. Paper Presentation at annual conference of Association for Moral Education, November 2007, New York, NY.

Adkins, C. P., Olver, J., McKnew, R.. What they don't teach you in b-school: Executive coaching in graduate & undergraduate Programs. Presented at annual AACSB Emerging Curriculum Conference, November 2007, Baltimore, MD.

Adkins, C. P. The challenge of curriculum integration: Overcoming obstacles and engaging faculty and students. Presented at annual AACSB Faculty Conference on Learning, June 2007, Orlando, FL.

Schmidt, C. D. & Adkins, C. P. Moral development in an undergraduate business ethics course: A research study utilizing Deliberate Psychological Education. Paper presentation at annual conference of Society for Research in Adult Development, March 2008, Boston, MA.

Adkins, C. P., Keel, D., & Schmidt, C. D. Teaching and learning reflection: Perspectives of students and faculty in a M.Ed. counseling program. Presented at annual conference of American Counseling Association, April 2006, Montreal, Canada.

ACADEMIC & STUDENT AFFAIRS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE

The College of William & Mary	Williamsburg, VA
Mason School of Business	
Director, Undergraduate Business Program	July 2005-present
Associate Director, Undergraduate Business program	November 2002 -July 2005
Assistant Director, Accounting Programs	August 2002-November 2002
 Marymount University	 Arlington, VA
Office of Student Affairs	
Coordinator of Volunteer Services	July 1999-July 2000

AFFILIATIONS / CERTIFICATIONS / SERVICE

Academy of Management
 Association for Moral Education
 Jean Piaget Society
 Kappa Delta Pi Honor Society
 Society for Research in Adult Development