



Counter-terrorism and the repression of Islamic activism: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark

Richard McNeil-Willson

To cite this article: Richard McNeil-Willson (2021): Counter-terrorism and the repression of Islamic activism: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, DOI: [10.1080/14782804.2021.1989387](https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1989387)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2021.1989387>



Published online: 11 Oct 2021.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Counter-terrorism and the repression of Islamic activism: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark

Richard McNeil-Willson 

Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter & European University Institute, Florence, Italy

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how practices of counter-terrorism (CT) have been perceived by legally-operating groups labelled 'extremist'. Taking the cases of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain (HTB) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia (HTS), the paper explores how two branches of the same Islamic activist organisation have experienced CT through interviews with party members and activists. Using existing models of repression, the paper maps how counter-terrorism is perceived by activist groups, revealing new information on Hizb ut-Tahrir and providing a framework for understanding the interaction of security with groups problematised as 'extremist' within a widening 'securitised lens'. The paper finds that, whilst there are similarities in how CT has been articulated in Britain and Denmark, it has impacted on HTB and HTS differently, creating different strategies of response. In tracking these, we highlight the prominent role played by civil society actors in the UK in creating a hostile environment for Islamic activist groups. By using mechanistic models of repression, we conceptualise the impact of counter-terrorism and newer patterns of countering violent extremism (CVE) on contentious activist organisations at a moment when the so-called 'risk' of extremism is increasingly being conceptualised and responded to throughout Europe.

KEYWORDS

Islamic activism; counter-terrorism; extremism; repression; europe; Islamism

1. Introduction

This paper explores counter-terrorism (CT), as well as the rise of 'Preventing or Countering Violent Extremism' (P/CVE), to understand how they are understood by Islamic activists from Hizb ut-Tahrir. It offers a comparative analysis of experiences drawn from two branches of the same activist organisation: *Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain* (HTB) in the UK and *Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia* (HTS) in Denmark. This analysis discusses how security is perceived by groups not directly targeted but nevertheless implicated in the 'securitised lens' of authorities as potential 'extremists'. Using Boykoff's model of repression – which details mechanisms and action modes used by authorities against activism – the paper illuminates how CT and CVE and has been perceived by HT members (Boykoff 2006a, 2006b, 2007).

The approach highlights how experiences of CT have led to innovations in activism, as well as the role played by different facets of society in amplifying counter-terrorism – such as those played by 'counter-extremism organisations'. Within this special issue of 'European transnationalism between successes and shortcomings: Threats, strategies and actors under the microscope', the paper considers how the threat from 'extremism' is conceptualised through national counter-terror action, and

CONTACT Richard McNeil-Willson  richard@mcneilwillson.eu @mcneilwillson  Migration Policy Centre, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Il Convento, Via delle Fontanelle 19, FI-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy

the implications this has for groups labelled as ‘extremist’. Within the context of changing discussions about European perceptions of threats and security responses, including new measures aimed at tackling forms of ‘extremism’ (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021; Martini, Ford, and Jackson 2020; McNeil-Willson 2021), it is critical that we understand the potential impact this has on groups that become implicated within this security paradigm. How these threats become articulated in different contexts, through governmental policy, practice and NGOs or security thinktanks, is highly relevant to current security discussions taking place in European societies.

Significant research exists on the impact that counter-terrorism has on groups such as Islamic State or al Qaeda – those directly targeted by CT – with the intent of assessing their efficacy (Bakker and Graaf 2011; Beutel et al. 2016). Alternative research has been carried out by critical scholars into the negative impacts that CT has on minority communities, societal relations and civil rights groups (Goldberg, Jadhav, and Younis 2017; Jackson et al. 2011; Martini, Ford, and Jackson 2020). Often, this is focussed on so-called ‘red, green and rights activism; or to put it slightly provocatively ... on the kinds of activism scholars sympathise with’ (Olesen 2009, 7). However, limited attention is given to the impact of security measures on groups, networks and individuals that operate legally and are not directly targeted by CT but are nevertheless implicated through their inclusion in a securitised lens – a task made more important by the growing focus in Europe on the labelling of certain activism by authorities as ‘extremist’. This paper aims to address this gap, to explore how such groups actively perceive CT and CVE measures, and how we can theorise this.

The paper addresses the following research question:

1.1 What can a repression-based analysis tell us about the interaction between counter-terrorism practice and Hizb ut-Tahrir activism in Britain and Denmark?

The question is predicated upon the understanding of Islamic activism as highly responsive to its environment – the term ‘Islamic activism’ used here to describe ‘the mobilisation of contention to support Muslim causes’, building on work by previous scholars (Beck 2008; Gunning 2007; Wiktorowicz 2004, 2). From a social movement perspective, claims-making groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir operate in a process of interaction with their political structures, navigating the shifting constellation of threats and opportunities surrounding them (della Porta and Diani 2006; Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2007). To analyse the impact of security on certain groups, a critical site of research becomes instances where there is ‘dynamic and sometimes self-perpetuating interaction between authorities and activists’ (Olesen 2009, 22). As such, this paper explores points of interaction between HT and authorities around instances of counter-terrorism.

In analysing such interactions, the work employs theories of repression to understand the impact of CT on HT activism. Tilly and Tarrow offer a definition of repression, as ‘the attempt by a state or its agents against challengers in order to end their challenge by arresting them, harassing them, or destroying their organisations’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 37). HT has suffered little to no direct arrests or harassment in the UK and Denmark, whilst attempts to proscribe the party have, to date, been deemed unwieldy or counter-productive (Frances 2015).

Yet, activists in both Britain and Denmark report experiencing state repression through alternative means – low-level surveillance, disruption or the deliberate side-lining of political Muslim activity. Goldstein provides us with a conceptualisation of repression that is perhaps more helpful, defining it as:

A technical and neutral term classifying, and not judging, government action. When this action grossly discriminates against the holders of certain beliefs, it is categorised as political repression, whether it succeeds or fails, is ‘justified’ or ‘unjustified’. (Goldstein 1978, p. xxx)

Certainly, practices built to prevent terrorism, radicalisation or extremism in Europe tend to discriminate against the holders of certain beliefs – anti-democratic ideologies, anti-state sentiment or such other contentious beliefs. No normative claims are made in this statement – such a description

rests entirely on the technical basis that significant elements of counter-terrorism consist of an authority attempt to challenge ‘holders of certain beliefs’, as defined in government law (cf ‘The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers’, 2015). Therefore, it seems quite acceptable to deploy the term to describe attempts by authorities to limit or degrade the activism of groups designated as ‘extremist’.

This research paper will explore how articulations of and interactions with counter-terrorism have been perceived by Hizb ut-Tahrir activists, through interviews with activists in the UK and Denmark. Using Boykoff’s four dynamic mechanisms – 1/ Resource Depletion; 2/ Stigmatisation; 3/ Divisive Disruption; and 4/ Intimidation – as well as a fifth mechanism of emulation, the paper considers the impact of CT practice on Hizb ut-Tahrir activism.

This paper finds that we can identify differing practices of repression and response within the context of counter-terrorism using such approaches. In the case study of Hizb ut-Tahrir, we see that CT has impacted more in the British context because UK civil society has greater means of ‘emulating’ and amplifying counter-terrorism strategies. This has led to a more significant decline by Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain – despite more action modes of repression being reported in the Danish context.

2. Case study

The case study of Hizb ut-Tahrir has been chosen because it operates as a legal but problematised organisation – problematised due to not being specifically targeted by counter-terrorism legislation but increasingly falling within widening counter-terror discussions of seeking to tackle ‘extremism’. In discussions on countering extremism in many European countries, governments have increasingly attempted to claim the benchmark of ‘core values’, such as democracy, rule of law, the primacy of the state, the relative separation of church and state and specific formations of equality before the law, including gender equality and/or freedom of expression (McNeil-Willson et al. 2019, 5–6). Groups like HT are often included in this scope of ‘problematisation’ because of their open opposition to key articulations of such values, which are often framed as a marker of extremism or potential radicalisation.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (الْحزب - ‘the Party of Liberation’) was founded in Palestine on 17th November 1952 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani in East Jerusalem (Valentine 2010, 412). The party’s ideology conceptualised socialism and capitalism as external impositions in the region, seeking to unite the *ummah* [global Muslim populations] in Muslim-majority lands within a revived *Khilafah* [Caliphate, or Islamic State] (al-Khilafah 2013). The party has since expanded, with operative branches in at least 45 countries (Orofino 2019). The first European branch was established in West Germany in the 1960s, before more significant branches founded in Britain and Denmark in recent decades.

By the late 1990s, Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain had become a vibrant Islamic activist group, known for provocative political tactics, well-honed doctrinal texts, colourful large-scale conferences and significant presence in higher education institutions. The launch of a Danish branch in 1999 by British members and the huge Birmingham conference of 2003 pointed towards a future of growth and expansion (Evans 1994). However, this turned out to be a high watermark for HT in Europe, with Western branches receding in their membership, influence and scope (Kessler 2018). Whilst the party body in Britain reportedly boasted an active membership of around 8,500 at the turn of the century, this has declined to between 400 and 800 in recent years (McNeil-Willson 2019). As well as losing members, the party has suffered a loss of influence and organisational splintering. In Denmark, Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia has also seen a decline in its membership and activism, with recent estimates setting the current party membership in Denmark at under 150 (Sinclair 2008, 2011).

Whilst attempts have been made to proscribe the party in both the UK and Denmark, it has not yet faced a legal ban – although debate still occasionally erupts on the matter (Sinclair 2011). Research also suggests that perceptions of Hizb ut-Tahrir tend to be relatively similar within media and policy discussion of both case study countries (McNeil-Willson 2019; Sinclair 2010; Volf 2011). However, the specific national discussions around what constitutes ‘extremism’ and the way in which

Table 1. Reported Action Modes of Repression.

Action Mode of Repression	Reported by HTB	Reported by HTS
(1) <i>Direct violence</i>	No	No
(1) <i>Public prosecutions & hearings</i>	Yes	Yes
(1) <i>Employment deprivation</i>	No	Yes
(1) <i>Surveillance & break-ins</i>	No	Yes
(1) <i>Infiltration, blackjacketing & provocateurs</i>	Yes	No
(1) <i>Black propaganda</i>	No	No
(1) <i>Harassment & harassment arrests</i>	Yes	Yes
(1) <i>Extraordinary rules & laws</i>	No	Yes
(1) <i>Mass media manipulation</i>	Yes	Yes
(1) <i>Mass media deprecation</i>	Yes	Yes

counter-extremism is articulated have been found to diverge between the two countries, with Danish CVE more likely to overtly link migration or minority communities with terrorism, in contrast to the UK articulations which has prioritised the role of identity as a factor in violence (McNeil-Willson 2021).

In researching these case study organisations, interviews were held with 43 current and former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir in London, Copenhagen and Aarhus between 2015 and 2018. Research was conducted as part of a doctoral dissertation project, with full ethical approval given by the relevant institute, the University of Exeter, prior to field research. Questions focussed on their perceptions and experiences of counter-terrorism, recording the following perceived instances of Boykoff's ten action modes (see Table 1).

Instances of repression were reported by both members and former members of HT in both country case studies. In some respects, this was a wholly expected finding, with HT having been criticised for exacerbating 'local grievances to foster its propaganda' (Orofino 2019, 44) and 'deliberately manufacturing and inflaming grievances' (Ahmed and Stuart 2010). However, the purpose of this study is not to offer confirmation of such grievances but rather to understand what role these grievances play in their operation, and what this could tell us about how they perceive counter-terrorism.

Such manufacturing of grievances are, perhaps, better understood within a social movement context as form of frame building – stressing elements of reality to diagnose societal problems, offer solutions and encourage action (Entman 1993; Snow and Benford 1988). As such, whether a grievance is 'manufactured' is irrelevant; it is more important to understand *why* certain grievances are being highlighted by a group, and whether they are successful in their aims and usage. The continued focus by HT on counter-terrorism in their discourse and in interviews suggests that this perception of threat is significant enough to warrant its usage in action frames and is legitimate enough to resonate beyond their own networks and communities. Findings that suggest activism has been altered in response to CT would also imply that it is perceived as a threat serious enough to require significant and disruptive innovation.

Hizb ut-Tahrir represents an invaluable case study for assessing the impact of counter-terrorism on an Islamic activist group: often labelled 'extremist' yet avowedly non-violent; legal yet problematised; anti-democratic yet situated within national politics; operating within highly-relevant public debates yet in long-term decline. Both the case study organisations of HTB and HTS have historical links, following the same ideological framing and organisational structure, and represent a low level of starting variance between case study groups (McNeil-Willson 2019; Sinclair 2010).

3. Discussion

To understand the interaction of CT with HT, this paper uses a theoretical approach drawn from Boykoff's typology of repression, which identifies four dynamic mechanisms: 1/ Resource Depletion; 2/ Stigmatisation; 3/ Divisive Disruption; and 4/ Intimidation (Boykoff 2007, 283). When activated,

they are diffused through a fifth mechanism: 5/ Emulation. Emulation and the four other mechanisms are bound together in a two-step movement, the first four forming a framework of 'Isolating Mechanisms' to isolate social movement organisations and activists, the fifth mechanism reinforcing and amplifying the impact.

Within these mechanisms, Boykoff develops a typology of ten actions – or 'Action Modes' – that authorities engage in to suppress dissent: 1/ Direct violence; 2/ Public prosecutions and hearings; 3/ Employment deprivation; 4/ Surveillance and break-ins; 5/ Infiltration, 'badjacketing' and the use of agent provocateurs; 6/ Black propaganda; 7/ Harassment and harassment arrests; 8/ Extraordinary rules and laws; 9/ Mass media manipulation; and 10/ Mass media deprivation (Boykoff 2007, 288). By applying these ten action modes to Boykoff's five mechanisms of repression, we can detail how interplay has occurred between CT authorities and HTB and HTS. This provides us with a better understanding of Hizb ut-Tahrir, counter-terrorism and the role of security in wider society in Britain and Denmark.

3.1 Resource depletion

The first of Boykoff's mechanism of repression is resource depletion, a process designed to invert resource mobilisation processes by social movement organisations, eroding the capacity of social movements, diminishing their ability to engage in activism and ultimately demobilising them (Boykoff 2007, 294). Boykoff describes this as an 'internal-external' dimension of resource depletion: internally, social movements use up resources in adjusting to the depletion, cutting recruitment efforts and lowering group morale; externally, support dries up as fewer supporters from outside the movement offer support of a failing movement organisation (Boykoff 2007, 295).

Recent years have seen attempts by authorities to degrade resources which Hizb ut-Tahrir had previously used to conduct activism and develop support, including access to mosques, public halls and other spaces, and the limiting of *da'wah* [acts of 'invitation' to Islam] stalls, demonstrations and other public formations of activism (Khan 2010; Tatchell 2011). The limiting of public and private sites for engaging in Islamic activism has taken place in both the UK and Denmark, constricting the repertoire of activism available to the party. These relate to action modes 4/ *surveillance and break-ins* and 8/ *extraordinary rules and laws*.

In Britain, we can see a long-term closing down of civic sites to the party, such as public places of worship, community halls and other public buildings, with space previously utilised by the party becoming inaccessible. Leading institutions have become closed-off to HT, including the *Friends' Quaker House*, Euston, and most major Islamic centres, such as the East London, Regent's Park and Finsbury Park mosques.

According to HTB activities, this involved authorities combining actions of resource depletion with intimidation, to discourage individuals from allowing HT to access community resources.

... I can't name you a single venue in East London that hasn't been approached by [SO15] and what they do is they approach the manager ... they'd just come in with a scare tactic, to just frighten the guy into submission basically. An ordinary person running a business, if someone comes along and threatens his family, threatens his livelihood, threatens to depart him, it doesn't matter if it has any chance of success, he's afraid of them. (HTB member, interview 'HF' 2016)

The closing down of such sites has contributed to a decline in the ability of HTB to conduct activism in traditional regional bases such as East London. Additional updates to UK CT legislation (HM Government 2011, 2015) have led to further problems for HTB – particularly the 2015 PREVENT Duty, which requires public spaces to prevent 'extremist' speakers from holding or participating in events.

We've really had a problem in Tower Hamlets. We traditionally have a good support base here, but that really took a hit when we started getting shut out of public spaces. We've had to reconsider how to do activism. (HTB member, interview 'HE', 2015)

Increased securitisation led to HTB regularly changing event venues in the run up to an event or cancelling altogether, following police contacting venue owners or controllers. Members reported numerous instances of last-minute cancellations of events or being forced to hold meetings at alternative settings. As one former member stated, ‘some youth societies are quite resilient against those sorts of approaches, but it’s impacted the Hizb a lot in being able to participate in activism’ (HTB former member, interview ‘XC’, 2017).

We found that it’s difficult to go to mosques, but there’s still loads of venues in East London - wedding venues, different places like this, community centres, and we had no problem booking them. But then, one by one, they started going too. We were being rejected from every venue we approached. (HTB Member, interview ‘HC’, 2016)

Degradation of spatial resources has led to the party becoming less reliant on public buildings, where barriers to access have been erected (Joshi 2016). It has also led to a declining presence in mosques and cultural centres – traditional sites of recruitment and interaction with activists – with mosque committees increasingly aware of potential security implications from police, security services or the media in response to hosting certain speakers. HTB has also shifted large sections of public events online, events increasingly consisting of a live-streamed talk without mention of the place in which it is being filmed. Those that are open to the public are arranged in short notice and with limited advertising, to avoid the risk of disruption.

In Denmark, a similar degradation of access to public space has occurred, especially following the introduction of the 2016 *Lov om ændring af folkeoplysningsloven og ligningsloven* [Act amending the Public Education Act and the Tax Act, Public Information Law]. The Act – often referred to simply as the Public Information Law – targets ‘[a]ssociations whose purpose or behaviour opposes or undermines democracy or fundamental freedoms and human rights’, to prevent them from bring ‘granted grants or assigned [public] premises’ (Folketinget, 2016). This particularly focused on Hizb ut-Tahrir, with one national newspaper stating that:

The law change – which gained the support of Venstre, Socialdemokraterne, Dansk Folkeparti, Liberal Alliance, Socialistisk Folkeparti and Konservative – means that organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir won’t be able to receive public support or rent/loan state-owned premises in the future. (Christian 2016)

As a result, the previous space favoured by Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia in the Copenhagen district of Nørrebro became inaccessible, and HTS activists were forced to find private halls – often resulting in a backlash from the media (HTS member, 2017). This led to Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia investing in their own permanent home – Masjid al-Faruq, at Heimdalsgade 39, København N. – leased by the ‘Foreningen for Islamisk Kultur og Viden’ [Association for Islamic Culture and Knowledge], to provide a space unaffected by government bans. The establishment of a mosque by HTS is remarkable as it represents an innovation in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activism unseen elsewhere (Former HTS member, 2017).

As with HTB, the Danish branch has come to rely on the live-streaming of talks and events, a move which simultaneously enables engagement with a wider audience whilst negotiating the increasingly limited public sites available. As a representative stated: ‘the shifting of work to an online platform means that we can achieve a lot more, and it means a lot less risk of disruption’ (HTS member, 2016). However, with increasing discussions taking place in the UK and EU level about the risk of online extremism and social media organisations facing criticism about their role in enabling ‘extremist’ content, this looks to be the next site to be contested (Microsoft 2017).

Resource depletion has been shown here in direct response to authority actions against Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Denmark, civic sites have been blocked from hosting Hizb ut-Tahrir, pushing the party into utilising new, private spaces differently – particularly through the centralisation of activism in al-Faruq Mosque. In the UK, meanwhile, the change has been less direct, with authorities acting to discourage – but not always legally block – sites managers from enabling HT activism (CT Police,

interview 'AB', 2016). This suggests a slower, less overt degradation of sites of activism in the UK, through a process which encourages stigmatisation rather than specific targeting – as outlined in the next section.

3.2 Stigmatisation

The second mechanism, stigmatisation, explores the discursive basis of power differences and the language behind repression (Boykoff 2007, pp. 295–296). It is described as 'a relational mechanism whereby discrediting attributes are attached to the character, nature or reputation of an individual or group' (296), leading to what Ferree calls 'an impaired collective identity, where connection with the group is a source of discredit and devaluation' (Ferree 2005, 144). This mechanism impacts the capacity of social movements to promote social change, through the action modes of: 3/ *Employment deprivation*; 9/ *Mass media manipulation*; and 10/ *Mass media deprecation* (Boykoff 2007, 296). In this context, there is shown to be growing levels of stigmatisation against HT, which is articulated differently in Britain and Denmark.

On a national level, this is seen in the growing problematisation of Hizb ut-Tahrir within governmental and media discourse (Hussain and Bagguley 2012). On an individual and organisational level, members have faced difficulties due to the stigma of being publicly associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir. The al-Faruq Mosque, for instance, has faced calls for its closure from Danish public officials and national newspapers as a 'hate mosque' [*had-moské*], home to 'hate preachers' (Weile 2017). In Britain, public places have blacklisted individuals associated with the organisation.

One of the most notable action modes of this mechanism is that of employment deprivation. In Denmark, several members have reportedly lost jobs following public reports of their membership, such as Naji Dyndgaard and his wife, who were dismissed from public employment in controversies linked to HTS (Agger 2016; Friberg and Karker 2017; Odde and Larsen 2017; Svensson and Kornø 2016). Other instances include two members who reported losing their positions working with a refugee charity in Copenhagen; one who reported losing his restaurant because of discrimination from the landlord after being linked to HT; and another who stated his pay was suspended as caretaker in a school, before being replaced, after being 'outed' as a member to the school board.

Whilst such accounts represent the aggrieved party's account of events, there have been high-profile attempts to block or prevent members from accessing professional roles in Denmark because of their involvement with HTS. In 2016, Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet* published an article arguing that then-HTS spokesperson Junes Kock and fellow member Govahram Kadkhodaie should be removed from their role as IT engineers for the National Health Platform, owing to it containing 'sensitive' healthcare data (Svensson and Kornø 2016). Frank Jensen, former Operating Director of PET, later confirmed this was 'dangerous' due to HT ideology favouring a different system of governance, claiming that questions should be raised over whether information accessed during their employment is now in the hands of those that would wish harm on the Danish state (Agger 2016).

In the UK, we see relatively few examples of employment deprivation due to the stigmatisation of membership, largely occurring in response to additional factors. The termination of member Dilpazier Aslam's traineeship with *The Guardian* newspaper occurred following the publication of an incendiary article in the immediate aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, whilst Abid Javaid's position as senior executive officer at the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in the Home Office was reviewed due to sensitive asylum claims (BBC 2006). As such, we can observe instances greater instances of stigmatisation processes occurring in Denmark, and few in the UK.

3.3 Divisive disruption

The third repression mechanism is divisive disruption. This mechanism aims to create splits within or amongst social movement organisations by using action modes such as 4/ *surveillance*, 6/ *'black propaganda'*, and 5/ *infiltration, 'badjacketing' and the use of agent provocateurs*. It changes the nature of interaction between social movement organisations and the state, representing the opposite of 'frame bridging' to instigate a process which 'burns frame bridges' (McAdam 2003).

Divisive disruption by authorities appeared in both the UK and Denmark, from interviews with members of HT and with authorities/counter-terror practitioners. In Britain, disruption of the party was largely focussed on those who have been reported as either linked to *al Muhajiroun* or engaging in hate speech – although the wide scope of the charge has led to a significant level of internal policing of language by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, to avoid disruption (White 2016). Concern over disruption tactics by UK authorities was raised by several HTB members, some citing specific instances of this in their personal networks, increasing the cost of activism within the party. It has caused disruption of community and activist networks through which Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain and similar groups operate, as the arrest of one individual can result in a series of investigations against their close contacts.

The most significant tactic of disruption in both the UK and Danish case studies is what was referred to as 'Al Capone' style arrests, whereby activism was disrupted by security services using minor charges and legal means unrelated to counter-terrorism. One authority interviewee detailed their time as a member of a 'Disruption Unit' in the UK:

I worked on a Disruption Unit, so that was non-TACT [Terrorism Act 2000] offences, committed by people who we would consider extremist . . . So, if people who were affiliated [to an 'Islamist' group] were demonstrating, we would – a bit like the old 'Al Capone' model - proactively go after them for things like car insurance, or whatever, to disrupt their activity. And if someone was convicted for a minor fraud, we could implement bail conditions, or curtail their right to conduct street activism or attend demonstrations . . . (CT practitioner, interview 'AB', 2016)

This was corroborated through interviews with members and legal practitioners, who reported a wide range of laws being used to target Islamic activists promoting extremism or who were otherwise connected.

I mean fraud, benefit fraud, insurance issues - those were the favourites . . . Generally, it's targeting Hizb ut-Tahrir people who may have family members who are al Muhajiroun, or they've been flirting with one side or another. (Former HTB member, interview 'XC', 2016)

This has led to increased costs for engaging in activism for HTB members, with additional limitations being attached to bail conditions to severely limit the freedom for members legally engage in activism, such as proscription against *dawah* in groups of more than one or two people, and limits on forms of protest.

In Denmark, there were also instances of harassment and disruption through such 'Al Capone' strategies, with activists citing specific public statements by politicians which encouraged and outlined the use of non-terrorism related offences:

Last year, the Danish Justice Minister, he said 'we have to use Al Capone methods' - that's the words he used - 'against Islamists'. You know, tax issues and these things. You just had to look at everything, to survey them in detail, and find any breach of the law. (HTS member, interview 'HJ', 2017)

In Denmark, disruption approaches have also involved the organisational and financial support of new civil society actors to compete with Hizb ut-Tahrir within Muslim communities. This involves the channelling of support, networking opportunities and – in many cases – government funding through *Politiets Efterretningstjeneste* [the Danish 'Police Intelligence Service', or the PET] operatives to targeted organisational 'partners', which work with state services to enhance narratives which promote anti-HT concepts. This disrupts Hizb ut-Tahrir's networks by removing elements of their support base and encouraging them into alternative programmes.

We therefore observe disruption impacting on Hizb ut-Tahrir members differently in the case studies. In the UK, disruption focusses on more 'radical' elements, individuals who have drifted beyond the confines of the party and are deemed more likely to engage with more bombastic groups such as *al Muhajiroun* [المن, 'the Emigrants'] or its subsequent front groups. In Denmark, however, this is focussed on HTS itself, because of its anti-democratic messaging and activism, and acts to actively dissuade potential members from engaging with HTS.

3.4 Intimidation

The fourth repression mechanism of intimidation was seen in authority efforts to discourage early recruits to HT from attending meetings, although this is seen in only limited reports by members of HTB and HTS. In Britain, this has largely been seen by activists as directed towards owners and/or committees of mosques or civic sites.

We found that one by one you just go to a hall, you've had ten events in a row, and suddenly they'll say 'I've been approached, this policeman came and he started threatening my family, he said that we're going to - your uncle such and such we realised his immigration status is unclear, we're going to investigate him'. So, it is using that fear against individuals. (HTB member, interview 'HE', 2017)

In Denmark, reports of intimidation have centred around PET interaction with individuals, discouraging current or potential activists from engaging with the party.

... if a young person has started to go to Hizb ut-Tahrir meetings, then the PET will pay his family a visit ... when the Danish intelligence come to family, the family thinks 'woah, what's going on? This is dangerous!'. And they're trying to pressure the youth from not going with Hizb ut-Tahrir ... (HTS member, interview 'HL', 2016)

This perception of intimidation has been interwoven with the other repression mechanisms to support the creation of a context that is generally hostile to Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark. These form a section of the political opportunity structures and are combined with the final mechanism of emulation.

3.5 Emulation

The final repression mechanism is that of emulation. This mechanism interacts with the other four mechanisms, diffusing and proliferating their effects. It is labelled as a 'decisional' mechanism – in contrast to the 'isolating' other four mechanisms – and acts to alter social relations to explain to dissident or potentially dissident citizens why they should not engage in contentious forms of politics (Boykoff 2007, 287). This section will suggest that, in the context of the case study organisations, the key means by which emulation has been established has been with the establishment of counter-extremist organisations. The impact of these have been to ensure that messages of counter-extremism – many specifically or implicitly hostile to HT activism – have been given greater weight or amplification.

During interviews with members and former members in Britain and Denmark, it became clear that – despite significantly more action modes of repression being perceived in the Danish context than in the British context – concern about counter-terrorism was having a more significant impact on HT in Britain. As one HTS council member stated:

HT Scandinavia Committee Member: There's always threats about banning us [in Denmark], as there are in the UK. And it's affected the British branch a lot; it's made them withdraw and be very careful about what they say. It hasn't happened here though. Researcher Why do you think that is? HTS Committee Member Because the [Danish] Brothers don't care [about being banned]. We just don't care ... (HTS member, interview 'HL', 2017)

Further interviews corroborated this concern within HTB, with one former UK member stating:

The threat to ban the organisation was by far the biggest problem, the biggest event to hit HTB. And they still haven't recovered from this (HTB former member, interview 'XD', 2017)

As such, despite more visible repression mechanisms occurring through counter-terrorism practices in Denmark than in Britain, a greater threat was perceived from counter-terror practices in Britain by HTB. This can possibly be understood as the result of a more hostile environment towards HTB activism created through the fifth mechanism of Emulation.

In the UK context, the proliferation of counter-extremism NGOs has ensured that repression of HT (direct or indirect) has been emulated far more effectively than is the case in Denmark. Non-authority organisations, think-tanks and security research centres act as key emulating sites due to their reciprocal relationship with authorities, often highlighting Hizb ut-Tahrir as an organisation that requires greater levels of securitisation (Ahmed and Stuart 2009, 2010; *Counter Extremism Project: Hizb ut-Tahrir; Narratives of Division: The Spectrum of Islamist Worldviews in the UK*, 2019). Such organisations have acted as legitimisers and amplifiers for UK Government CT approaches, giving policy the legitimacy of a research-based veneer. Such organisations have included *Quilliam* (now defunct), *the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, *the Henry Jackson Society*, *the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD)* and *Policy Exchange*, amongst others. These organisations have been criticised as operating as part of the strategic communication component of counter-terror policies (Miller and Sabir 2012). By developing recommendations and reports positioned in line with government policy (Dodd 2009, 2010), some of these organisations help in the construction of an ideological approach to terrorism that may encourage 'necessary' coercive counter-terror tactics.

Often, it's quite common for organisations or charities, which are private sector based, to be utilised by CT police. So, Quilliam, the ISD, - you see a big move towards other private sector groups, which again I think is helpful. It moves away from being heavily police-delivered, because we accept that we are not necessarily the right people to be at the forefront of this work. (CT Practitioner, interview 'AB', 2016)

Many such NGOs in the UK have had significant high-level input from former Hizb ut-Tahrir members, who derive credibility or prestige from being self-confessed 'former radicals' – such as Maajid Nawaz, Ed Husain or Shiraz Maher, as some examples. These individuals and groups have mounted particularly strong criticisms of Hizb ut-Tahrir's political ideology, tending to link Hizb ut-Tahrir ideology to radicalisation, and even piloting counter-radicalisation and counter-extremism projects with remaining HT contacts (Birt 2007).

As well as amplifying and emulating government counter-terrorism mechanisms of repression, such civil society organisations have helped shape the ideological basis of the UK Government's approach to terrorism and extremism – in ways which partly mirror the drive for ideological purity found within HT texts and study. The focus on ideology in countering violence extremism (CVE) approaches – suggestive of an inversion of HT doctrine – has been shored up by prominent CVE actors, who claim that the 'true problem' of terrorism is 'the rise of this theocratic, fascist ideology', which must be challenged 'head on ... [to] reassert, classical small-"L" liberal values in the face of this rising theocratic fascism' (Nawaz 2015). As radicalisation and extremism has been invariably framed by such former members: 'the problem was not in necessarily the associations we made with people who were naturally inclined to violence, but the problem was in the very ideas themselves' (Nawaz, 2008).

Doubts have been raised by commentators over the effectiveness of counter-extremism groups in challenging terrorism or the negative impacts such organisations have had in enabling Islamophobia (Cockbain and Tufail 2020; Githens-Mazer 2012). However, by conceptualising much CT and counter-extremism as antithetical to HT activism and ideology, it is likely they have contributed to the development of an environment in the UK that is particularly hostile towards HTB activism – even whilst CVE has not overtly targeted the party. With former members publicly referring to HTB as 'the group that seeded, from its offshoots, all of the jihadist groups', HTB has found it increasingly hard to operate (Nawaz 2015). This has perhaps led to the setting in play of actions of emulation against HT, leading to organisational collapse as solidarity nosedives, recruitment slumps and alliance building wanes in the face of stronger mechanisms of emulation (Boykoff 2007, 303).

In terms of Quilliam and these guys, there was a disingenuousness there, and I think their literature on ideology was ideologically driven rather than academically rigorous in any way. And they had a personal axe to grind with HT which came through I think in their writings and positions, which inevitably filtered through to policy. (Former HTB member, interview 'XC', 2016)

In Denmark, there has not been the same development of such NGOs. Whilst there is a strong tradition of associations in Denmark, these have largely been depoliticised and, as such, there are very few mobilising actors dealing with Islamic issues. This, combined with a large state structure in Denmark, limits aspects of civil society space, creating a very different terrain to the plethora of Islamic activist organisations, charities and associations that have sprung up in the UK. Limited financial ability also impacts the growth of activism as few Danish charities have an overtly religious focus, and it is difficult to get financial support as a religious or religiously-focused organisation, other than through application to the Church Council of Denmark. Finally, there is a very small pool of self-professed 'ex-radicals' to drive response. However, the internationalising of 'counter-extremism' NGOs and the increased marketisation of counter-terrorism programmes has had some impact in Denmark (Aarhus 2017). There has also been some proliferation of organisations or individuals willing to challenge Hizb ut-Tahrir from within Danish Muslim communities – although on a much smaller scale.

We need to catch up [with the UK]. [In Denmark] We don't have many critical voices and intellectuals who are not afraid of criticising Islamists ... [However], I think now we have a number of debaters who are secular and democratic and freedom-orientated, and they're sort of able to steal the limelight from the party. (Former HTS member, interview 'XI', 2017)

Initiatives have been created to counter Hizb ut-Tahrir Scandinavia, such as the association 'People Against Fundamentalism', designed to steer young people away from engagement with the party (Kühle 2018). However, this emulation is not as overtly hostile to HT recruitment and activism processes as is the case in the UK, where former HTB members will draw on HT-style methodology in CVE work, as well as target cells and networks developed from their former party activism.

4. Results

This paper looks to determine whether and how theories of repression can illuminate processes of interaction between counter-terror practices and Hizb ut-Tahrir activists in Britain and Denmark. To do so, it has applied Boykoff's matrix of repression mechanisms and action modes to the case study organisations, matching mechanisms with experiences from Hizb ut-Tahrir activists. This has created three findings: firstly, that counter-terrorism has been experienced by activists as negatively impacting and repressing their activism, with variations between Britain and Denmark; secondly, that this repression was felt to such an extent that it altered the tactics of activism used by each party branch; and thirdly, that this method illuminated, to some extent, possible reasons why similar counter-terrorism mechanisms have impacted more against HTB than HTS, due to stronger patterns of emulation.

This process suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir activists in both Britain and Denmark have experienced counter-terrorism as a form of repression – even in instances when they were not specifically targeted by counter-terrorism. Parties in both countries reported experiences of Resource Depletion, Stigmatisation, Divisive Disruption and Intimidation (Boykoff 2007), although there was variation in how these isolating mechanisms were experienced in different national contexts. We can confirm that these experiences were interpreted as repressive due to negative impacts on how the party conducted activism, forcing new innovations. This included the procurement of a mosque and a permanent place for activism in Denmark, the shifting of events online and new patterns of community engagement and recruitment. Thus, this model not only shows us how activists have

perceived counter-terrorism but how the party has attempted to respond to this perceived repression of their activism. Despite more action modes being reported in Denmark, however, more concern was felt by HTB activists in the UK, resulting in a greater withdrawal of their activism.

Finally, the model helps us to surmise that the fifth mechanism of 'Emulation' may be key in certain instances of claims-making groups withdrawing from contentious activism. Reports by members, former members and CT practitioners suggested that the greater prevalence of counter-extremism organisations – many of which initially drew their legitimacy and approach from being former members of HTB – may have created a set of conditions particularly hostile to HT activism in the UK. The limited civil society in Denmark, meanwhile, and the low number of former members engaged in counter-terrorism and P/CVE, suggests that mechanisms of emulations are low, limiting the impact of such measure of HTS.

Whilst the existence of such mechanisms is surmised here, the precise cause of certain adaptations cannot be truly ascertained, and this could be understood as a limitation in some respects. A mechanistic approach has been likened to Darwin's evolutionary theory: the context within which species are operating, the kind of threats they face and the decisions that species make in response, are interpreted as acting in concert to create the preferencing of certain adaptations over others (Hedstrom 2006). A certain level of interpretation from the researcher is required and it must be treated as an informed interpretation, based upon interviews with several relevant communities – members, former member and counter-terror practitioners.

Another limitation is that activists certainly may have over-emphasised the threat of CT in their interviews. However, as was detailed at the start of the paper, the potential for interviewees to manufacture grievances regarding CT is of limited importance in this paper; rather, the research seeks to understand why such framing is used by activists, as well as to highlight that activism has clearly adapted in relation to the perception of such threats. This paper has also avoided any discussion on more open questions as to whether and how the state should regulate the behaviour of a legal organisation problematised under counter-extremism practice. This is partly due to the space constraints of such an article, but also to avoid slipping into approaches which assess efficacy of policy and thereby place the paper within the logic of the state. This follows in the footsteps of scholars such as Schmid and Jongman, who argue the researcher – when exploring issues related to terrorism – should consider themselves a 'student of combustion' rather than a 'fireman', to ensure sufficient critical enquiry towards all actors (Schmid and Jongman 1988; Silke 2004)

The findings here strongly suggest that research which centres theories of repression are useful in understanding both the development of approaches to extremism within the logic of counter-terrorism, as well as those groups it directly or indirectly targets. Further research is suggested which goes beyond the singular theoretical approach detailed here – Boykoff's mechanisms of repression – to further understand such covert articulations of repression against social movement organisations as seen in CT and CVE (Earl 2011).

5. Concluding remarks

This paper has shown that mechanistic models of repression – in this case, Boykoff's five repression mechanisms – are useful in unearthing patterns of interplay between authorities and Islamic activist organisations in the context of counter-terrorism. We have discerned differences in national security trends, in activist response, and in the role that civil society groups play. Whilst this approach only reveals so much, it demonstrates that repression of certain kinds of activism occurs towards groups not directly targeted by CT but implicated within the widening 'securitised lens' in Europe. It provides a tested framework for future work into understanding the interplay between Islamic activist groups and new articulations of counter-terrorism, hinged around the concept of repression.

Within this special issue, the paper considers how the threat of extremism is constructed in different national contexts and the various impacts this has on groups labelled as 'extremist'. The more explicit linking of Hizb ut-Tahrir to terrorism by those civil society organisations driving

deradicalisation and counter-terrorism policy in the UK, seem to have resulted in a particularly hostile environment for HTB. This is despite a more limited and focussed use of repressive counter-terrorism measures by UK authorities against HTB than by Denmark against HTS.

The findings have implications for this special issue on European transnationalism: threats, strategies and actors. By offering a comparative analysis of the impacts of CT on groups labelled 'extremist' by two European states, we offer a critical explanation of how such groups may change in response to this designation as well as offering insight into the workings of CVE. In a period marked by growing concern within European states about extremism, it is prudent to consider the impact that such discussions and subsequent policy may have on activism that is directly and indirectly targeted, and to consider that counter-extremism may have a range of desirable and undesirable impacts on a range of different actors.

Findings suggest that current counter-terror approaches are having such unintentional impacts on groups labelled 'extremist', partly because of traceable links between core HT ideological tenets and foundational concepts of deradicalisation – a link which questions the fallibility of current CT and CVE practice. For practitioners and researchers, it hints at a need to reconsider the malleability of Islamic activist groups such as HT, to reassess the possible implications that security approaches are having in altering or innovating activism by groups labelled 'extremist' and to question the assumptions and processes that CT and CVE may rest upon in different national contexts. The current construction of the 'threat' of extremism in Europe has several implications for a variety of forms of activism, and it is critical work is carried out to further understand these.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was supported by the South West Doctoral Training Programme, UK Economic and Social Research Council; (ESRC) and European Commission Horizon 2020 under Grant [822189].

ORCID

Richard McNeil-Willson  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8036-1698>

References

- Aarhus, M., o. (2017). *International Radicalisation Conference*. Paper presented at the Buidling Resilience to Radicalisation and Violence Extremism II, May 17th-19th. Aarhus.
- Agger, S. 2016. "Tidligere PET-chef om ansættelse af Hizb-ut-Tahrir-topfolk: Noget er gået helt galt." TV2, December 18th <http://nyheder.tv2.dk/2016-12-18-tidligere-pet-chef-om-ansættelse-af-hizb-ut-tahrir-topfolk-noget-er-gaaet-helt-galt> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Ahmed, H., and H. Stuart (2009). "Hizb ut-Tahrir: Ideology and strategy." London: <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/HIZB.pdf> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Ahmed, H., and H. Stuart. 2010. "Profile: Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK." Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, August 17th <https://www.hudson.org/research/9827-profile-hizb-ut-tahrir-in-the-uk> Accessed 6th October 2021
- al-Khilafah. (2013). "The departure of the Caravan of Hizb Ut Tahrir: 'The blessed light that originated from Masjid Al Aqsa'." June 23rd. <http://www.khilafah.com/the-departure-of-the-caravan-of-hizb-ut-tahrir-qthe-blessed-light-that-originated-from-masjid-al-aqsa/> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Bakker, E., and B. Graaf d. 2011. "Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism Some CT Approaches Address." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5 (5/6): 43–50.
- BBC. (2006). "Reid to Examine Extremist Claims." *BBC*, November 15th. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6151786.stm> Accessed 6th October 2021

- Beck, C. J. 2008. "The contribution of social movement theory to understanding terrorism." *Sociology Compass* 2 (5): 1565–1581. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9020.2008.00148.x.
- Beutel, A., S. Weine, A. Saeed, A. Mihajlovic, A. Stone, J. Beahrs, and S. Shanfield. 2016. "Guiding Principles for Countering and Displacing Extremist Narratives." *Contemporary Voices: St Andrews Journal of International Relations*, 7 3.
- Birt, Y. (2007). Dirty tricks? Hizb ut-Tahrir and its critics." <https://yahyabirt1.wordpress.com/2007/10/23/dirty-tricks-hizb-ut-tahrir-and-its-critics/> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Boykoff, J. 2006a. "Framing dissent: Mass-Media coverage of the global justice movement." *New Political Science* 28 (2): 201–228. doi:10.1080/07393140600679967.
- Boykoff, J. 2006b. *The Suppression of Dissent: How the State and Mass Media Squelch US American Social Movements*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Boykoff, J. 2007. "Limiting Dissent: The Mechanisms of State Repression in the USA." *Social Movement Studies* 6 (3): 281–310. doi:10.1080/14742830701666988.
- Christian, W. (2016). "Copenhagen Evicts Notorious Islamic Organisation." *Copenhagen Post*, May 12. <http://cphpost.dk/news/copenhagen-evicts-notorious-islamic-organisation.html> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Cockbain, E., and W. Tufail. 2020. "Failing Victims, Fuelling Hate: Challenging the Harms of the 'Muslim Grooming Gangs' Narrative." *Race & Class* 61 (3): 3–32. doi:10.1177/0306396819895727.
- Commission for Countering Extremism. (2021). "Commission for countering extremism publishes legal review." London. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/commission-for-countering-extremism-publishes-legal-review> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Counter Extremism Project: Hizb ut-Tahrir. <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/hizb-ut-tahrir> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Dodd, V. (2009). "Spying Morally Right, Says Thinktank." *The Guardian*, October 16th. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/oct/16/spying-morally-right-says-thinktank> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Dodd, V. (2010). "List sent to terror chief aligns peaceful muslim groups with terrorist ideology." *The Guardian*, August 4th. <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/aug/04/quilliam-foundation-list-alleged-extremism> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Earl, J. 2011. "Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves and Diffuse Control." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37: 261–284. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102609.
- Entman, R. M. 1993. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication* 43 (4): 51–58. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x.
- Evans, K. (1994). "Radical Time-bomb under British Islam." *The Guardian*, February 7th.
- Freese, M. M. 2005. "Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma and Silencing in Gender-Based Movements." In *Repression and Mobilisation*, edited by C. Davenport and H. Johnston. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 85-101
- Folketinget (2016). Forslag Til Lov Om Ændring Af Folkeoplysningsloven Og Ligningsloven. Copenhagen: Kulturministeriet. <https://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/lovforslag/113/index.htm> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Frances, W. S. (2015). "Why Ban Hizb ut-Tahrir? They're Not ISIS - They're ISIS's Whipping Boys." *The Guardian*, February 12th.
- Friberg, J., and A. Karker (2017). "Lærer På Dansk Friskole: Jøder Opfører Sig Som Dyr." *BT*, August 8th. <https://www.bt.dk/nyheder/laerer-paa-dansk-friskole-joeder-opfoerer-sig-som-dyr> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Githens-Mazer, J. 2012. "The Rhetoric and Reality: Radicalisation and Political Discourse." *International Political Science Review* 33 (5): 556–567. doi:10.1177/0192512112454416.
- Goldberg, D., S. Jadhav, and T. Younis. 2017. "Prevent: What Is Pre-criminal Space?" *BJPsych Bulletin* 41 (4): 208–211. doi:10.1192/pb.bp.116.054585.
- Goldstein, R. J. 1978. *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to 1976*. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Government, 2011. *Prevent Strategy*. UK: UK Government. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Government, 2015. *Counter-Extremism Strategy*. UK: HM Government. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-strategy-2011> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Gunning, J. 2007. *Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
- Hedstrom, P. 2006. "Explaining the Growth Patterns of Social Movements." In *Understanding Choice, Explaining Behaviour: Essays in Honour of Ole Jorgen Skog*, edited by J. Elster, O. Gjelsvik, A. Holland, and K. O. Moene, 111–126. Oslo: Oslo University Press.
- Hussain, Y., and P. Bagguley. 2012. "Securitized Citizens: Islamophobia, Racism and the 7/7 London Bombings." *The Sociological Review* 60 (4): 715–734. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.2012.02130.x.
- Interview with HTB member 'HF', by R McNeil-Willson. 2016, London.
- Interview with HTB member. 'HF', by R McNeil-Willson. 2015, London.
- Interview with former HTB member 'XC', by R McNeil-Willson. 2017, London.
- Interview with HTB member 'HC', by R McNeil-Willson. 2016, London.
- Interview with CT Police 'AB', by R McNeil-Willson. 2016, London.
- Interview with HTS member 'HJ', by R McNeil-Willson. 2017, Copenhagen.

- Interview with HTB member 'HL', by R McNeil-Willson. 2016, Copenhagen.
- Interview with HTB member 'XD', by R McNeil-Willson. 2017, London.
- Interview with HTB member 'XI', by R McNeil-Willson. 2017, Copenhagen.
- Jackson, R., L. Jarvis, J. Gunning, and M. B. Smyth. 2011. *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Joshi, P. (2016). "East London Mosque in hate crime probe over booklets urging worshippers to 'assassinate apostates'." *IB Times*, October 7th. <https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/east-london-mosque-hate-crime-probe-over-booklets-urging-worshippers-assassinate-apostates-1585376> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Kessler, E. (2018). "If I Am Right, Must You Be Wrong?" *Independent*, September 2nd. <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/conversion-definition-meaning-az-of-believing-religion-ed-kessler-woolf-institute-podcast-a8489611.html> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Khan, A. (2010). Hizb ut-Tahrir's Few Remaining Friends. June 30th. <http://hurryupharry.org/2010/06/30/hizb-ut-tahrirs-few-remaining-friends/> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Kühle, L. 2018. "Policies of Radicalisation as Anti- and Countercult Ideologies." *Journal of Muslims in Europe* 7 (2): 211–236. doi:10.1163/22117954-12341367.
- Martini, A., K. Ford, and R. Jackson. 2020. *Encountering Extremism: Theoretical Issues and Local Challenges*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- McAdam, D. 2003. "Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social Movements." In *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam, 281–298. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McNeil-Willson, R. (2019). *Islamic Activism and the Counterterror State: The Impact of the Securitised Lens on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain and Denmark*. (PhD), University of Exeter, Exeter, UK.
- McNeil-Willson, R. 2021. "Understanding the Interplay of Counter-extremism Trends and Muslim Communities in Europe." In *Islam and Security in the West*, edited by S. Bonino and R. Ricucci. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 163-196
- McNeil-Willson, R., V. Gerrand, F. Scrinzi, and A. Triandafyllidou. 2019. *Polarisation, Violent Extremism and Resilience in Europe Today: An Analytical Framework for the BRAVE Project (Concept Paper)*. Florence: Global Governance, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies. European University Institute.
- Microsoft. (2017). Microsoft partners with institute for strategic dialogue and NGOs to discourage online radicalization to violence [Press Release]. <https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/04/18/microsoft-partners-institute-strategic-dialogue-ngos-discourage-online-radicalization-violence/> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Miller, D., and R. Sabir. 2012. "Counter-terrorism as Counterinsurgency in the UK "War on Terror"." In *Counter-terrorism and State Political Violence*, edited by S. Poynting and D. Whyte, 12–32. London and New York: Routledge.
- (2019). Narratives of division: The spectrum of Islamist Worldviews in the UK. London. <https://institute.global/policy/narratives-division-spectrum-islamist-worldviews-uk>
- Nawaz, M. 2008. The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Government: United States Senate 110th Congress, 10th July. Available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2008_hr/roots.pdf Accessed 6th October 2021
- Nawaz, M. 2015. *Radical: My Journey Out of Islamist Extremism*. Washington DC: Aspen Institute.
- Odde, U. J., and J. V. Larsen (2017). Dansk Lærer Bag Had-moské. *BT*, February 24th. <https://www.bt.dk/danmark/dansk-laerer-bag-had-moske> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Olesen, T. 2009. "Social Movement Theory and Radical Islamic Activism." In *Islamism as Social Movement*, edited by T. Olesen and F. Khosrokhavar. Aarhus: Aarhus University Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR). 7-33
- Orofino, E. 2019. *Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Caliphate: Why the Groups Is Still Appealing to Muslims in the West*. London: Routledge.
- Porta, D., d., and M. Diani. 2006. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. second ed. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- (2015). The Prevent Duty: Departmental Advice for Schools and Childcare Providers.
- Schmid, A. P., and A. Jongman. 1988. *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature*. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company.
- Silke, A. 2004. "The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism." In *Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures*, edited by A. Silke. London: Routledge. 1-14
- Sinclair, K. 2008. "Islam in Britain and Denmark: Deterritorialised Identity and Reterritorialised Agendas." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 28 1.
- Sinclair, K. (2010). *The Caliphate as Homeland: Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark and Britain*. (PhD), University of Southern Denmark. Retrieved from <https://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/0/D/1/%7B0D1B4B59-9755-44EB-887E-90595D8D461D%7DKirstine%20Sinclair%20ph%20d%20afhandling.pdf> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Sinclair, K. 2011. *Same Old Message, New Wrapping: Hizb ut-Tahrir's Activities in Denmark*. Denmark: Syddansk Universitet.
- Snow, D. A., and R. D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilisation." *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197–217.
- Snow, D. A., S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. 2007. *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Svensson, T. G., and K. Kornø (2016). Region Hovedstaden Hyrer Hizb ut-Tahrir Topfolk. *Ekstrabladet*. December 18th. <https://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/samfund/region-hovedstaden-hyrer-hizb-ut-tahrir-topfolk/6456040> Accessed 6th October 2021

- Tatchell, P. (2011). Protest against Hizb ut-Tahrir Conference in East London. July 6th. <http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/protest-against-hizb-ut-tahrir-conference-in-east-london/> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Tilly, C., and S. Tarrow. 2015. *Contentious Politics*. Second ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Valentine, S. R. 2010. "Monitoring Islamic Militancy: Hizb ut-Tahrir, 'The Party of Liberation'." *Policing* 4 (4): 411–420. doi:10.1093/police/paq015.
- Volf, I. (2011). *Comparative Quantitative and Qualitative Content Analyses of Coverage of Hizb ut-Tahrir in German, British and Kyrgyz Quality Newspapers in 2002-2007*. (PhD), Universität Konstanz. Retrieved from http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/handle/123456789/14067/Dissertation_Volf.pdf?sequence=1 Accessed 6th October 2021
- Weile, B. N. (2017). Politikere Raser over Nye Had-udtalelser: 'Luk Nu Den Moské'. *BT*, May 13th. <https://www.bt.dk/politik/politikere-raser-over-nye-had-udtalelser-luk-nu-den-moske> Accessed 6th October 2021
- White, B. (2016). "By Limiting Criticism of Israel, Theresa May's New Definition of anti-Semitism Will Do More Harm than Good." *The Independent*, December 12th. <https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/anti-semitism-theresa-may-new-definition-jewish-council-holocaust-society-israel-criticism-palestine-a7470166.html> Accessed 6th October 2021
- Wiktorowicz, Q. 2004. *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.