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**BOSTON UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION**

**A STUDY OF INTRAPSYCHIC STRUCTURE AND DEHUMANIZATION  
IN SUBGROUPS OF MEN WHO MURDER**

**by**

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**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Education**

**1995**

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# **A STUDY OF INTRAPSYCHIC STRUCTURE AND DEHUMANIZATION IN SUBGROUPS OF MEN WHO MURDER**

(Order No.                    )

**RENEAU CHARLENE UFFORD KENNEDY**  
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## **ABSTRACT**

The aim of this study was to provide enhanced understanding of male murderers through analysis of their intrapsychic structure and interpersonal functioning. Specific focus was placed upon the offenders' perception of self and others, and upon their human relationship capacity.

To study these components of personality, three parallel intimately related components of intrapsychic functioning were measured: object representation, defensive configuration, and the degree of psychopathy. An experimental measure of dehumanization, developed by the author for this project, was used to determine whether there was a relationship between rater observed dehumanization and the dependent variables.

A sample of 25 men accused or convicted of murder and 10 nonassaultive controls were contrasted using four independent classification methods: criminal charge, legal status, the relationship of the subject to the victim(s), the gender of the victim(s), and circumstances of the offense. Outcomes were analyzed in aggregate according to membership in each of the four subgroupings. One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine group differences on each of the four dependent variables. A correlation matrix of the major dependent variables was constructed for examination of variable intercorrelations.

This study has provided two types of meaningful findings. First, outcome data demonstrated the significance and utility of subgroup classification of murderers for study of intrapsychic measures. As expected, the results demonstrated that the gross classification by offense or trial status showed no

meaningful distinctions. Meaningful differences were observed when murderers were subgrouped according to: the victim and offender relationship, crime circumstance, and victim gender. These findings point away from using heterogeneous cluster criteria to using more refined intra-group comparisons.

Second, the findings have provided construct validation for dehumanization as a measurable dimension of intrapsychic structure. Dehumanization is a valid multidimensional intrapsychic construct which encompasses several components of intrapsychic structure that spans a range of intensity and severity. It was shown to relate to other components of personality functioning in meaningful ways. Results demonstrated that dehumanization is so significant that it pervades all the other dependent measures, thereby suggesting a completely new approach to understanding how and why people murder.

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# **CHAPTER I**

## **PROBLEM FORMULATION AND DEFINITION**

These bloody thoughts, from what are they born?

(Piave, from Verdi's Macbeth)

### Introduction

The human race continues to exist because of its' ability to use adaptive intelligence and live communally. Murder, a longstanding problem for society, vividly testifies to disordered pathological behavior, which is contrary to accepted societal values. Though individuals are severely punished for killing, murder continues to occur at the rate of over 20,000 per year in the United States (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1993) and it is considered to be a growing sociocultural phenomenon (Lesser, 1993; Leyton, 1986; Lunde, 1975; Meloy, 1988a; Ridel, Zahn, & Mock, 1985; Rosenberg & Mercy, 1986; Tardiff, 1985).

Though the perpetrators of these irreversible tragedies are usually identified, arrested, and incarcerated, researchers still have not thoroughly investigated the causes of how and why these individuals have acted in such ways. A tremendous amount is yet to be understood about the structural and psychodynamic aspects of murder and the individuals who commit them.

### Statement of the Problem

For a problem to be solved, it must first be clear what the nature of the problem is. The solution, and the means used toward the solution, depend on how the problem is defined at the outset (Moberly, 1983, p. 67).

Murder<sup>1</sup> is a legal construct which describes the illegal taking of one person's life by another.

There is no direct translation of the term to a psychological meaning. Murder describes the outcome of an interpersonal action, rather than the activity itself. Although the act is interpersonal, it may however, only have intrapersonal meaning for the offender for whom the act is logical. The underlying meaning of murder cannot be clearly understood without study of the agent who commits the act. Such behavior appears to reflect a profound disturbance in the perception of human relationships on the part of the offender and is suggestive of a "fundamental disidentification with humanity" (Meloy, 1988a, p. 5) with disturbances in attachment to others.

Psychological study of an offender's perception and quality of human relationships is warranted to improve understanding of the structural and affective components involved, a prerequisite for the ultimate goal--prevention (Langevin, 1987). Enhanced knowledge of those who have undergone such an experience will provide clearer understanding of how and why this extreme form of violence occurs.

### Background of the Problem

Murder is a complex and challenging area in which to conduct empirical research (Arboleda-Florez & Holley, 1987; Lester, 1986; Megargee, 1982; Revitch & Schlesinger, 1981) since biological, psychological, and environmental conditions funnel into the final endpoint (Bluestone & Travin, 1984; Meloy 1988b; Yarvis, 1990). The act differs in meaning between perpetrators, and it occurs in a variety of circumstances, by a variety of means, with victims ranging from strangers to a parent or spouse (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Megargee, 1969, 1982; Wolfgang, 1958).

Presently, the research-based literature on components of personality functioning in murderers is fragmentary (Busch & Cavanaugh, 1986; Cornell, 1989; Cornell, E. Benedek, & D. Benedek, 1987a, 1987b; Greco, 1989; Meloy, Gacono, & Kenney, 1994; Langevin, 1987; Lester,

1986; Yarvis, 1990). Mainstream theoretical measures have generally not been used on criminal populations, and on murderers in particular. Empirical application of psychoanalytic developmental constructs to the population of murderers has significant potential to improve our understanding of the intrapsychic structure and interpersonal functioning of these individuals. Since psychoanalytic theory is developmentally based<sup>2</sup> (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Stern, 1985), differences between individuals may be delineated by using measures to quantify the murderer's capacity to relate to others.

#### Theoretical Framework

The feelings, the ideas, the choices, the actions of man attain their highest development in the state of social mutuality but begin and end in the intimacy of the sentient self. If the clearest forms of mental health and mental illness are to be found in the great dialogue of the interpersonal world, it is within the individual that the long journey leading to the dialogue is initiated. It is in the inner self that the dialogue is reflected as a mental representation. (Arieti, 1967, p. 3).

#### Depth Psychology

Depth psychologists<sup>3</sup> have described a world of inner psychic experience which is set apart from and yet connected to the external world of reality. Arieti (1967) indicated that the interpersonal realm of human behavior presupposes an intrapsychic core. Interpersonal and intrapsychic aspects of humans are intermingled, where interpersonal actions are triggered by basic intrapsychic functions.

If one accepts the epistemological tenet that the conception of reality is influenced by the assumptions of the observer, then analysis of how each person organizes his perception and meaning of the world according to his individual world view is important, for the intrapsychic world motivates



an individual's responses to the external world (Arieti, 1967; Novey, 1958; Wilson, 1972).

### Intrapsychic Structure

Psychodynamic theories of personality assume that each individual possesses an intrapsychic structure which serves as a predispositional base for behavior with others; the term intrapsychic structure is also used to describe personality configuration (G. Blanck & R. Blanck, 1974; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Intrapsychic structure is composed of enduring functions and patterns which organize experience and mediate between experience and subsequent behavioral responses<sup>4</sup> (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Intrapsychic structure is built upon objective reality and its manifestations, as well as one's own subjective view of experience.

### Psychoanalytic Relational/Structural Theory

The theoretical position from which the intrapsychic structure of homicide offenders will be evaluated is psychoanalytic relational/structural theory which includes the schools of Object Relations, Self Psychology, and Attachment Theory (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). This branch of psychology places primary emphasis on interpersonal relationships. The drive reduction tenet is moved to a secondary position, whereby the primary human condition is to seek persons, not pleasures.

In the psychoanalytic literature, the term "object" has been used to describe "real people" in the external world and the images of them that are internally established. To paraphrase Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), this dual connotation usefully describes the interchange between "inside" and "outside" (p. 14). The "object" of an individual's experience is an "amended version of the actual other." Humans react to both actual others and to internalized others, called intrapsychic or object representations. Such images have the power to influence structural development, an individual's affective states, and overt behavioral reactions. These mental representations of others share some of

the characteristics of "real" people and they possess the capacity to trigger behavioral responses. Intrapsychic object representations are felt and remembered residues of important people in the individual's life. Crucial exchanges with others leave their mark and become "internalized," shaping subsequent perceptions and reactions.

Psychoanalytic relational/structural investigators have advanced the theoretical and empirical study of healthy and psychopathological development. Focus is placed on the relationship between real people and internal images and residues of relations with them.

#### Basic Assumptions of the Study

A basic assumption of this study is that murder is an interpersonal interaction involving at least two people, which reflects a distorted perception of human interactions on the part of the offender. The way a murderer perceives his victim and his relationship to the victim is of paramount importance to the act. The murderer and victim relationship is not reciprocal; rather, it is an attempt on the offender's part to express a wish or to satisfy a need through the relationship but against the wishes of the other person. Therefore, murder can be theoretically conceptualized as an object related outcome: without another person (object), it cannot take place. It is assumed that a murderer's object relations of self and other are distorted by cognitive and affective disturbances, and that murder is a manifestation of these internal self and object distortions.

The DSM IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) characterizes individuals with personality disorders as having inflexible maladaptive traits which usually originate in childhood or adolescence and which compromise social and occupational functioning. Given the emotionally charged nature of murder, it would appear that most murderers suffer from some form of personality disturbance which seriously distorts perceptions of themselves, others, and their situations, and which manifests itself most strongly when attachment needs<sup>5</sup> or wishes are heightened (Bowlby,

1988a, 1988b; Mawson, 1980; Moberly, 1983, 1985). It would appear that murder is a reflection of a distorted perception of human relationships on the part of the murderer.

### Purpose of the Study

Generally we cannot treat, except empirically what we do not understand and we cannot prevent, except fortuitously, what we do not comprehend. A study of causation is therefore of primary importance. Because of our lack of knowledge people are cruelly murdered, their relatives suffer, and the murderers become a burden to society and to themselves (Brittain, 1970, p. 206).

To understand murderers, it appears useful to more clearly understand the nature of their disturbed inner perception of themselves, others, and relationships. Based upon the above described foundations, it appears that certain components of a murderer's intrapsychic functioning give permission to harm the victim and, at times, to intentionally terminate a relationship and a life.

Dehumanization of one's self and of others has been used by theorists to explain how one can murder and to differentiate the murderous from the violent (Gault, 1971; Miller & Looney, 1974). Until this study, dehumanization has not been empirically quantified or measured. The two goals of this study were to: (a) provide construct validation for the concept of dehumanization by using three parallel, yet intimately interrelated structural components--object representation<sup>6</sup>, defensive configuration<sup>7</sup>, and level of psychopathy<sup>8</sup>, and (b) to classify murderers according to their degree of dehumanization. This study has aimed to demonstrate that murderers dehumanize, and that differing levels of object relations, defensive configurations, degrees of psychopathy, and dehumanization can be measured in subgroups of murderers classified by murderer-victim relationship, by circumstance of the offense, and by the gender of the victim.

### Importance of the Study

Understanding the causes and dynamics of such behavior could be a first step toward stopping it--and stopping it surely ranks among the world's most urgent political tasks (Altemeyer, 1988, p.32).

If one of our goals as a society is to minimize human suffering and tragedy, then any effort made toward a more scientific understanding of murder is worthwhile. For humanitarian and economic reasons, it is essential to refine our knowledge of murderers in a way that aids future strategies for intervention in clinical and forensic areas, as well as after the fact disposition, management, and treatment within correctional and hospital settings. Presently we are a long way from the ultimate goal of accurately predicting who will murder. However, steps which help us move further in that direction or provide insight into preventative strategies are needed. A more comprehensive account of the intrapsychic structure of the murderer is needed (Heilbrun, 1990).

This study is relevant because it has sought to specify the psychodynamic factors of individuals who kill, as well as to provide a theoretical understanding from a psychoanalytic perspective of how and why a perpetrator can view a fellow human in a way that results in homicide. Focus upon interrelated aspects of intrapsychic functioning may separate rehabilitation potential in two individuals whose crimes may have been similar, but whose ability to adaptively function upon release may be quite different. This approach allows for the recognition of the continuity of "normal" behavior with that of the murderer, thus emphasizing that no specific diagnosis is necessarily responsible for murder. Rather, empirical indices of intrapsychic structure can differentiate subgroups of offenders. This places murder in a larger and more general theoretical framework of human behavior and of psychological phenomena.

This study has provided a clearer understanding of men who have murdered. It is anticipated

that these research findings may assist in future development of more effective therapeutic interventions by helping us understand as well as assess the internal picture of relationships that influence the thinking and actions of murderers. When distinctions in intrapsychic structure are identified in certain subgroups, then more specific designs for therapeutic interventions may be possible. Many experts have stated the need for further clarification of the differences between murderous individuals (Cormier, Anglikier, Boyer, & Mersereau, 1971; Cornell, 1990; Greco, 1989; Heilbrun, 1990; Langevin, 1987; Loftin, Kindley, Norris, & Wiersema, 1987; Megargee, 1982; Meloy, 1988a; O'Meara, 1985; Perdue, 1960; Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1988; Revitch & Schlesinger, 1981; Tanay, 1981; Yarvis, 1990).

Research on the variables contributing to murder could also humanize sentencing, treatment dispositions, and parole decisions. In order to determine appropriate dispositions for parole, a sound understanding of the factors contributing to murder must be established in order to assess psychological change in those convicted and their risk of reoffense. While murderers may adapt within a confined setting, there is no certainty how they will react to emotional difficulties when returned to society. Finally, this study may be useful to those clinicians who use psychological testing for pretrial evaluations, treatment determinations, and penalty phase hearings for sentencing.

#### Overview of the Remaining Chapters

Following these introductory remarks, a conceptual explanation of how dehumanization enables one to murder is presented in chapter II. In chapter III, the relationship between psychoanalytic theory and murder is discussed with specific focus on diminished empathy and dehumanization. This is followed by a discussion of the relevance and derivation of the instrumentation used in the study. The derivation of the hypotheses is covered in chapter IV. The research design and methods are presented in chapter V. Results are presented in chapter VI.

followed by a discussion of the findings and conclusions of the study in chapter VII.

## CHAPTER II

### EMPATHY, DEHUMANIZATION, AND MURDER

No matter what disrupts the ego's normal functioning or causes a precipitous break with the individual's perception of reality, it is still the complex psychodynamic arrangements with their own peculiar symbolic meanings that are played out on the ultimate behavior (Bluestone & Travin, 1984, p. 160).

#### Empathy: A Distance Reducer

Empathy is a complex psychological process which is central to the development and maintenance of a sense of self and of relational capacities (Jordan, 1984). Schreiber (1988) defined empathy as the most advanced form of emotional development which enables one to psychologically put oneself in the place of another. Empathy involves both cognition and affect, is embedded in the biological substrate of the individual, and appears to be a product of species evolution and individual history (Brothers, 1989). Although it is unknown how empathic processes are carried out by the central nervous system, the amygdala and its interaction with the sensory cortex and brainstem structures is now an area of neurophysiological study. Brothers's (1989) review of the biological perspective of empathy is recommended.

Empathy is a construct of theoretical importance in contemporary theories of human development and of psychopathology (Ansbacher, H. & R. Ansbacher, 1956; Bachara, 1977; Basch, 1983; Blanck, R. & G. Blanck, 1979; Bowlby 1973, 1988a, 1988b; Greenson, 1960; Jordan, 1984; Kalliopuska 1982, 1986; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut 1959, 1971, 1977, 1978, 1987; H. Lerner, 1988; Meloy, 1988a, 1988b, 1992; Moberly, 1983, 1985; Winnicott 1958/1975, 1963, 1965, 1988).

Empathy is the mechanism used to reduce psychological distance between individuals (LaRusso, 1977), and it is regarded by psychoanalytic theorists as an essential element in the formation and maintenance of mature interpersonal relationships (Mayman, 1967, 1968, 1977). It emerges developmentally through one's life experiences and perceptions of oneself and others.

According to Kalliopuska (1986), mature empathy is the ability to regard another person with affection without the "threat or fear of losing one's identity or of breaking the boundaries of the self" (p. 10). Jordan (1984) maintains that empathy cannot occur unless one has flexible boundaries which can tolerate feelings of affective joining without fearing self-endangerment. One whose boundaries are too easily permeated cannot retain a sense of self, cannot differentiate self from other, and cannot tolerate affect in others. Similarly, one whose boundaries are overly rigid cannot tolerate experiencing a range of emotions, and cannot be empathically responsive.

#### Diminished Empathy and Defense

Individuals who defensively detach<sup>9</sup> from others are believed to be protecting themselves from perceived hurtful love objects (Bowlby, 1973, 1979; Moberly, 1983, 1985, 1986) or from narcissistic injury (Kohut, 1971). They employ distance enhancing defense mechanisms (LaRusso, 1977) which repress the attachment need (Moberly 1983, 1985) and enable one to detach and disidentify from others.

Hogan (1973) and Megargee (1982) maintained that empathy for another inhibits aggression and violence. When disturbances in the ability to be empathic occur, the greater the likelihood for harm. Diminished capacity for empathic understanding of others allows one to be exploitive and ruthless (Kernberg, 1975; Meloy 1988a). Revitch and Schlesinger (1981) asserted that psychological investigation of the ability to murder necessitates study of the intrapsychic structural components which diminish or inhibit empathic concern.



### Dehumanization: The Psychological Wedge

Dehumanization is a construct which provides theoretical understanding of how empathic inhibition and interpersonal detachment occur. Dehumanization enables an individual to avoid or to lessen the emotional significance of others; in psychoanalytic terms, to libidinally decaject, which is a subconscious protective maneuver. It can be conceptualized as a component of intrapsychic structure which creates a powerful psychological wedge that separates the intrapsychic and socialized inhibitions to kill from the physical act. A. Freud (Sandler & A. Freud, 1985, p. 139) suggested that dehumanization precedes the commission of atrocities: "Without this preliminary withdrawal or boundary setting, what happens afterward could not happen, because...the feeling of sympathy and empathy, of sameness...has to be done away with."

Evidence to support the theoretical assumption that dehumanization is a critical component behind murder is qualitative. These theories are described below and linked to the forensic, psychoanalytic, and psychometric literatures.

### Definitions of Dehumanization

In a seminal study of the subject, Bernard, Ottenberg, and Redl (1965) defined dehumanization as "a composite psychological defense which results in a diminished perception of and feeling for humanness in oneself and in others" (p. 64). They identified the cluster of defenses used in this incorporative concept as: unconscious denial, repression, depersonalization, isolation of affect, and compartmentalization (the elimination of meaning by disconnecting related mental elements and walling them off from each other).

Subsequent researchers have made significant contributions in the identification and measurement of these and other defenses. Additional defenses which may be selectively drawn upon include: dissociation and its subsidiaries, depersonalization and derealization; splitting (prestige and

defensive) and its derivatives--projection, projective identification, omnipotence, idealization, and devaluation; and rationalization (Campo & Jubert, 1969; Cooper, 1989; Cooper & Arnow, 1984, 1986; Cooper, Perry, & Arnow, 1988a, 1988b; Cramer, 1983, 1987, 1991; Cramer, Ford, & Blatt, 1988; Cramer & Gaul, 1988; Gacono, 1988, 1990, 1992; Gacono & Meloy, 1988, 1991, 1992; Grotstein, 1981; Kernberg, 1984, 1986, 1989; H. Lerner & P. Lerner, 1980; Meloy, 1985, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Meloy & Gacono, 1994; Moberly 1983, 1985, 1986; Ramchandani, 1989; G. Vaillant, 1971; G. Vaillant & Drake, 1985; G. Vaillant, Bond, & C. Vaillant, 1986; Waldinger, 1984).

Like all defensive maneuvers, dehumanization has both adaptive and maladaptive properties. It is used by both normal and character disordered individuals in a variety of circumstances. The configuration of defenses employed to construct this psychological wedge, the context, and the extent to which it is used, determine whether dehumanization is adaptive or dysfunctional. (For analysis of the adaptive properties of dehumanization see Bernard et al., 1965). This discussion will focus on maladaptive dehumanization.

Maladaptive dehumanization disrupts healthy ego organization, results in an altered perceptual-affective view of others, limits the capacity for interpersonal relating, works to prevent intrapsychic integration, and induces regression to part-object relationships<sup>10</sup> (Bernard et al., 1965; Sanford & Comstock, 1971; Miller & Looney, 1974; Volkan, 1988). A defensive emotional numbing results from this massive blocking of all forms of attachment. The more dehumanization is used, the less empathic one becomes.

Miller and Looney (1974) described dehumanization as the affective state where a victim is viewed as "a nonperson, merely a thwarting object" (p. 191). They regarded dehumanization as: (a) a structural configuration of personality, or (b) a behavior produced during extreme distress. Miller

and Looney maintained the degree to which one dehumanizes differentiates murderous from violent persons.

Miller and Looney, describing the psychodynamics of dehumanization in terms of object relations theory, suggested that when intense negative components are split and defensively projected from the self onto the victim, who is perceived as a part-object<sup>10</sup>, dehumanization occurs. "When individuals dehumanize, assault is irrelevant and death is inconsequential" (1974, p. 194). When dehumanization is structurally embedded, character structure has not advanced beyond "primitive" levels of development<sup>11</sup> (M. Robbins, 1989; Volkan 1976), where personality diagnosis would be classified as narcissistic, borderline, paranoid, antisocial, or schizoid. With primitive personality organization, only part-object identifications have been achieved prior to separation-individuation<sup>12</sup> (Fairbairn, 1952d; Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1966, 1967, 1980; Klein, 1946; Kohut, 1971, 1977; Mahler, 1968; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975; Moberly, 1985). Consequently, part-object relations persist throughout life, the personality lacks integration, and splitting and its derivatives continue to be used as primary defenses. Integration of "good" and "bad" affective components of oneself and others is not accomplished. Others continue to be viewed in terms of "either/or" rather than "and." Identifications at this level of ego development are extreme, they are either idealized or are devalued and dehumanized. Devalued objects become worthless, to be used and destroyed.

Volkan (1988) described dehumanization as a protective maneuver used to detach and then distance individuals from others to create an "enemy status," a stereotype of negative qualities, a part-object which is "all bad." He emphasized that both external and internal part-object splitting occurs when dehumanization is defensively used. Neither external objects nor the internal self are perceived as three dimensional with both positive and negative attributes. These primitive part-object perceptions are reinforced by the rhetoric and acts of others. Like A. Freud (Sandler & A.

Freud, 1985), Bernard et al. (1965), Gault (1971), and Kelman (1973), Volkan claimed that a stereotyped enemy may be so despised that human qualities are removed and the "enemy" becomes subhuman, bad human, or nonhuman. By making one's enemies less than human, guilt for killing them is avoided and one's sense of morality is protected. Internalized anxiety and/or guilt are temporarily, or in some cases, permanently avoided. Given such feelings, the perpetrators implicitly assume permission to enact the violence (Sanford & Comstock, 1971). By making "the enemy" less than human, the ego dystonic becomes ego syntonic<sup>13</sup>, if only for a few murderous seconds. Such constriction reawakens a "reservoir for shared all-bad parts and their accompanying affect" (p. 120), which is one propellant for violent action.

#### Dehumanization: A Propellant of Violence

When humans are viewed as part-objects, the intrapsychic inhibitions structured to prevent aggression, "cannot be called into play when those who are to be destroyed have been divested of their humanness" (Bernard et al. 1965, p. 65). Dehumanization: (a) inhibits the intrapsychic forces restraining one from being violent; (b) produces rigid attitudes; and (c) distorts the murderer's capacity to view relationships in moral terms or to act morally; the murderer has lost both a sense of personal identity and a sense of community (Mitscherlich & Mielke, 1949; Kelman, 1973).

Dehumanization facilitates both predatory and affective forms of aggression<sup>14</sup> (Meloy, 1988a, 1988b). The dehumanizer develops a defensive state of psychic numbing (Bowlby, 1988a; Lifton, 1971, 1982, 1986; Lifton & Markhusen, 1990), a sense of detachment (Opton, 1971) which blocks positive feelings, and excludes the dehumanized from his network of shared empathy. As his community becomes constricted, his sense of involvement in humankind declines.

### Self and Object Dehumanization

Bernard et al. (1965) emphasized that dehumanization includes two distinct but interrelated processes which are self and other directed. Self directed dehumanization occurs when the individual fails to experience his own humanness and sees himself as a part-object. When the defense is object directed, the perception of others is altered to diminish those attributes considered most human. Both forms are mutually reinforcing, and are used for the same purpose, emotional self protection.

### Self Dehumanization

There is a complex dynamic relationship between self dehumanizing, personality disorder, a depressive episode, and murder. Reinhardt (1970, 1973), described the "dismal tunnel" syndrome in some murderers, where for periods of varying lengths of time before the murder, offenders experience an apparent loss of the need for a warming, give and take attachment to any human being: these individuals's "personalities had settled down below the level where commitment to any issue or living being still existed" (1973, p. 246). Essentially they have become self-dehumanized. In acute moments, dissociation from the self occurs and the person no longer experiences his body or emotional responses as part of himself. Murder then occurs during a dystonic dissociative episode<sup>15</sup> in which the offender experiences an unreality during the killing.

Kohut (1977) described "depletion depression" as involving unbearable feelings of nonexistence, emptiness, and deadness, and suggested that this state occurs in reaction to selfobject<sup>16</sup> loss. Emptiness is a frequent, if not universal, aspect of the subjective self experience of the primitive type of character disorder. The withdrawal of the selfobjects, used to sustain the primitive intrapsychic structure leads to a self fragmentation which is described as an "empty depression, i.e., the world of unmirrored ambitions, the world devoid of ideals" (Kohut 1972, p. 243). This may be interpreted as a form of self dehumanization. Several writers have employed Kohut's work to explain

the character pathology of narcissistically disordered murderers who become violent to offset inner feelings of worthlessness and self devaluation (McCarthy, 1978), and where violence makes them "feel real" (Feldman, Johnson and Bell, 1990).

From a forensic psychoanalytically oriented object relations perspective, Meloy (1988a), Gacono (1988, 1990), Gacono and Meloy (1988, 1994), Gacono, Meloy, and Heaven (1990), Gacono, Meloy and Berg (1992), and Weber, Meloy and Gacono (1991) evaluated the cognitive-affective complex of psychopathic personalities and suggested that these individuals experience an internal dividedness where feelings of inner emptiness and worthlessness exist simultaneously with highly unrealistic and overvalued self representations. Their self perceptions contain three beliefs: (a) they are totally worthless, a "nothing," all bad; (b) everyone else shares this dim view; and (c) this state of being a nothing will last forever (Gacono et al. 1990, p. 476). Other writers have described the internal state of psychopaths as: an inner emptiness (Cleckley, 1941/1976), hollow man (Chodorkoff, 1964), an inner state of anxiety (Wishnie, 1977), and the zero state (Yochelson and Samenow, 1977). One antisocial individual described his internal self disturbance as a chronic physical sensation of emptiness in the middle of his body, as if he were hollow and on the verge of imploding (Hofer, 1989).

Summarily, it appears that dehumanization of the self occurs when there is a halting or an absence of identification with feelings of humanness. Such an experience can temporarily occur during an episodic depression (Reinhardt, 1973), or it may be chronic, such as in individuals with primitive character disorder (Meloy 1988a). Self dehumanization appears to be most severe and prolonged in character disordered persons who are severely psychopathic.

#### Object Dehumanization

Bernard et al. (1965), Chordorkoff and Baxter (1969), and Miller and Looney (1974)

postulated that object directed dehumanization may be situationally or developmentally induced. The extent to which one dehumanizes ranges from temporary, recurrent episodes, which can be situation or person dependent, to partial or permanent conditions, which are characterologically embedded. The three gradations of dehumanization are: temporary, partial and permanent.

Transient, temporary dehumanization of others is situation or person dependent and may occur across all diagnostic categories and levels of personality organization. It requires external validation and reinforcement and is experienced as ego syntonic for only a limited time period. Dissociation is likely to have been experienced during the murder (Armstrong & Loewenstein, 1990; Malmquist, 1980; Miller & Looney, 1974; Tanay 1969, 1972). After killing, when the individual is removed from the situation and from others with whom the murder was committed, the murderous behavior is experienced as ego dystonic.

Partial dehumanization is more internally motivated than temporary dehumanization. Individuals or groups are ego syntonically viewed in extremes, such as superhuman and bad human. This split of the object representation endures over time and across contexts. Partial dehumanizers characterologically make their identifications selectively with only a few members of the human race, and negative attributes are associated with outsiders. Like the temporary condition, dissociation may have been experienced during the murder, but after a killing, the individual continues to experience having killed as ego syntonic.

With permanent or total dehumanization, others are not individualized and are considered interchangeable commodities, to be used and discarded without concern for their welfare. This stance is characterologically embedded, ego syntonic, and not dependent upon the behavior of others. Libidinal identification and affect, positive and negative, for others is consciously absent and is replaced with indifference (Bernard et al., 1965; Miller & Looney 1974). Murder is subsequently

experienced as ego syntonic and of minimal consequence.

### The Role of Dehumanization in Murder

#### Temporary Dehumanization and Murder

Dissociation, intellectualization, rationalization, and in some instances, splitting appear to be associated with temporary dehumanization (Armstrong & Loewenstein, 1990; Miller & Looney, 1974; Tanay 1969, 1972). External psychological support is necessary for killing to occur. Superego sanction of otherwise forbidden behavior is justified by ideological sanctions offered by the group (Alexander, 1949; Altemeyer, 1988; Tanay, 1987).

Feldman et al. (1990) elaborated on murders involving groups from a self psychological framework and suggested that the murderer depends upon others in the group for selfobject support. The selfobject provides the individual with temporary cohesion, which bolsters a stressed or damaged personality structure. The murderer gains support from the collective dehumanized perceptions of victims, and is given permission, explicitly or implicitly, to aggress upon these negatively perceived part-objects. Feldman et al. suggested that the fear of rejection or disapproval from the group, coupled with pressure to act, influence individuals who would not otherwise kill. Murder satisfies the self-object so that the individual can maintain it as a source of admiration or support.

Gault (1971) described the psychology of slaughter during military combat based upon two years of psychiatric work with Vietnam veterans. He made the crucial observation that relatively ordinary men have the psychological capacity to temporarily dehumanize and brutally kill when affective significance for others is circumvented. Gault identified dehumanization of the victim as the chief intrapsychic mechanism responsible for killing. He further suggested that perpetrators unrealistically view their victim as the enemy who is not individualized and viewed as human, but rather a caricature. The enemy is everywhere, and trust is only given to one's own group. Gault



noted: (a) that the pressure to act aggressively is enhanced by the sight of wounded or dead peers; (b) that self-appraisal and responsibility for action is disowned; and (c) that identification with the humanness of the victim is numbed or absent. The ability to imagine the experience of the other is unavailable.

He further commented that subsequent feelings of guilt for killing differ between individuals and range from none to profound and enduring. Upon return to civilian life, soldiers reintegrate and readdress societal values, and sometimes reexperience their ego syntonic wartime killing as ego dystonic (Langer, 1971; Revitch & Schlesinger 1981; Sim & Bilton, 1991; Van Putten & Emory, 1974; Yager, 1975). This can result in extreme despair, decreased self esteem, depression, and at times suicidal behavior.

The most dramatic example of situation induced dehumanization is that of members of the Third Reich who implemented what they called the Final Solution of European Jews during World War II (Dicks, 1972; Kelman, 1973; Kennedy & Rosenberg, 1994; Lifton & Markusen, 1990), and of the Nazi doctors who used imprisoned individuals to practice the medical science of "ktenology" (Mitscherlich & Mielke, 1949). Their capacity to isolate affect, project responsibility, rationalize behavior, idealize Hitler, and devalue their victims as "vermin" and "numbers," enabled them to silence their conscience and conduct genocide, yet retain access to empathic feelings for their families (Kelman, 1973). Such extreme and contradictory emotional qualities existed through the use of powerful and effective dehumanizing defenses. Mitscherlich and Mielke suggested that the change of subject to object, of person to thing, was the basis for the ability of the doctors to conduct such heinous experiments.

To paraphrase Gault (1971), when standard civilized prohibitions are suspended and killing is sanctioned, the psychopathic characteristics of the individual are accepted. Trust, decency, and

restraint are set aside in such an atmosphere, and insensitive violent persons, unburdened by empathy or compassion, see others as mere objects and find themselves at last in a world suited to their intrapsychic structure (p. 452). Tanay (1987) suggested that character disordered individuals may join racial, political, and paramilitary organizations, since the group's beliefs create conditions favorable for the expression of individual pathology under a political banner. These individuals would more likely be partial or total dehumanizers, since their feelings for murders would remain ego syntonic.

#### Partial Dehumanization and Murder

Partial dehumanization involves the muting of positive affective qualities in others, while negative emotional components remain. In interviews and on projective tests, partial dehumanizers show alternations of apparent human friendliness and cold self-reference (Miller & Looney, 1974). Defenses involved in this configuration appear to include: splitting, projection, projective identification, devaluation, displacement, rationalization, and in some cases, dissociation. Feelings of inadequacy, anger, or rage are placed onto another and then destroyed (A. Freud, 1966; Meloy 1988a). Justification for murder is by rationalization that the victim's defects are his own fault.

Partial dehumanization appears to be associated with one group of predatory murderers (Meloy, 1988a) who kill as part of the job or as the successful fulfillment of duty, which is consistent with the values of the subculture they affiliate with. Motivation for killing can be for material gain, or protection of territory, such as in organized crime syndicates or gangs.

Partial dehumanization appears to be associated with two groups of affective murderers (Meloy, 1988a) who experience lapsed integrated ego functioning and depersonalization during the murder, but who reconstitute afterward (Revitch, 1977; Revitch & Schlesinger, 1978, 1981). One cluster is the sudden, unprovoked, seemingly motiveless non-crime related murders usually of

acquaintances or strangers, described as sudden (Blackman, Weiss, & Lamberti 1963; Lamberti, Blackman and Weiss, 1962; Weiss, Lamberti & Blackman, 1960), acute catathymic<sup>17</sup> (Revitch & Schlesinger, 1981), injured neurotic pride (Rose, 1960; Rutolo, 1968, 1975), or episodic dyscontrol murderers (Menninger & Mayman, 1956; Miller & Looney 1974; Satten, Menninger, Rosen, & Mayman, 1960; Smith, 1965).

The second cluster are murders, described as catathymic (Satten et al. 1960; Wertham 1937, 1978), chronic catathymic<sup>17</sup> (Revitch, 1965; Revitch & Schlesinger 1978, 1981), lockage phenomenon (Duncan & Duncan 1978; Rasch, 1967); depressive (Reinhardt, 1970, 1973); narcissistic rage (McCarthy, 1978; Stark, 1990). These killings occur within a protracted ego threatening relationship containing chronic tension, frustration, jealousy or hatred, helplessness and depression. When a victim no longer serves a mirroring function for the murderer's omnipotence, the murderer may punish and force the victim to continue mirroring.

As suggested by Stark (1990) a pervasive form of socially sanctioned partial dehumanization is the battering of spouses. When battered women finally end abusive relationships and decide to no longer serve mirroring functions, the rage the batterer has associated with the devalued self may erupt. Feldman et al. (1990) explained that empathic failures trigger narcissistic rage with fantasies of revenge. Unempathic responses are thought to intensify and accelerate internal fragmentation. "When a selfobject no longer fulfills its functions of maintaining the self, it must be eliminated" (p. 177) to restore some cohesion to the fragmenting self.

In other intrafamilial murderers, partial dehumanization may also be present. Tanay (1973, 1976a) described a form of parricide which is ego syntonic and occurs in cases where the killed parent was sadistic and where other family members lived in dread of the victim. In such cases, the murderer experiences chronic fear and hatred of the sadistic parent and kills in response to the

parental attacks, physical or verbal. Such killings are usually described as deliberate, goal directed, and in a certain sense adaptive. Sargent (1962) suggested that the tacit approval from other family members helps sustain the ego syntonic stance subsequent to the killing.

Malmquist (1980) discussed object relations and defenses in those who kill their entire family. Object relationships move to dichotomized extremes when family members are perceived as pain inducers who are all bad. Malmquist theorized that part-object dichotomizing of the victims also applies to the self where dissociation allows the murder to be conducted as though someone else was performing it and "in essence, the bad part of the perpetrator carries out an act against the bad parts of others" (p. 303). Volkan (1981) described the way external objects (inanimate articles or people) can serve as links to internalized objects when affect from a previous relationship has not been adequately resolved, and which has resulted in complicated mourning. In substitution or displacement murders, the victim symbolically represents a previously known person, or the victim's behavior revives from the murderer's memory unresolved conflicts. These evoked affective disturbances can result in the murderer using the victim to reenact an earlier unresolved drama (Rose, 1960; Ressler et al., 1988).

Greenacre (1950) described displacement and rationalization as two ego syntonic defenses that allow old memory to be re-enacted. This behavior is not a clearly conscious visual or verbal recollection, nor is there any awareness that the activity is motivated by memory. To the individual, the behavior seems plausible and appropriate, although to others it is extremely disproportionate to its context. Displacement or substitution have more to do with what the victim intrapsychically represents to the murderer, rather than who he actually is (Satten et al. 1960; Smith, 1965).

Displacement murders also occur during dissociated episodes which are experienced as ego dystonic. In these offenses the offenders were aware of their actions but felt as though they were not

participating (Bluestone & Travin, 1984).

Satten et al. (1960) described episodic dyscontrol murderers as people whose relationships with others were characteristically shallow and aloof. Others were scarcely real to them in the sense of being warmly or positively (or even angrily) felt about. In their early memories and psychological test material, the offenders described an idealized, all-giving mother figure, but always in the context of loss or rejection; this left them feeling bleak and empty (p. 51). This group bears similarity to the overburdened self of Kohut and Wolf (1978) and Cooper and Arnow (1988), and to the schizoid personality of Fairbairn (1940/1952a, 1952d) and Guntrip (1969). Rather than turn to others, the characterological stance is one of withdrawal for self protection. Empathic failure of soothing caregivers prevents the development of the self soothing capacity needed to protect the individual from trauma that is produced by spreading emotions, especially anxiety. These individuals' interpersonal relationships are avoidant; they fear exposure to situations that threaten the capacity to modulate affect (Cooper & Arnow, 1988). The fear of losing emotional control colors how the overburdened self perceives others. It reinforces characteristics of guarded aloofness and obsessional preoccupations with control. When this defensive structure breaks down, the individual becomes increasingly paranoid in the struggle to maintain self control.

Modell (1968) and Meloy (1988a) emphasized that there is not a complete loss of reality testing during these altered states. Although victims are perceived as physically in the environment; psychologically they represent a bad internal object.

In all the above described situations, victims are killed because of their conceptual representation to the murderer (Meloy, 1988a). A victim's real meaning is cloaked in an identity from intrapsychic configurations. The victim becomes the negative depository of a split and represents a bad, frustrating, depriving, pain inducing object, who induces rage sufficient to stifle

accurate perception of the real person.

### Permanent Dehumanization and Murder

Complete object directed dehumanization results in the perception of others as nonhuman; as objects to be used, discarded or destroyed. Total dehumanizers are identified by a pervasive inability to make genuine human attachments, and although the individual may simulate warmth, it is without depth. Individuals react through imitation with accompanying feelings of unreality. This description bears similarity to the schizoid as-if personality (Deutsch, 1942); the fictive personality (Martin, 1988); and the idiopathic or severe psychopath (Arieti, 1967; Gacono, 1988; Gaddini, 1969; Greenacre, 1958; Meloy, 1988a).

With permanent dehumanizers murder is ego syntonic, and subsequently considered inconsequential. Killing occurs when a murderer's wishes are actually or potentially thwarted. Permanent dehumanizers's defensive configurations appear to include: extreme forms of splitting, denial, idealization, devaluation, projective identification, introjection, and omnipotent control. These defenses prevent any conscious feelings of empathy for others since they are related to as conceptual extensions of the self. Miller and Looney (1974) described these individuals as primitive, narcissistic and omnipotent personalities.

Permanent dehumanization also appears to be characteristic of the defensive style of schizoid psychopaths (Fairbairn, 1940/1952a). Meloy (1988a) described these individuals as having profound detachment from affective experience which manifests in indifference to inflicting pain, a lack of any expressed emotion, and absence of empathy for the victim. The pervasive sense of emptiness shows an absence of internal distress over the trauma their behavior has caused in the external environment; after the sudden violence the individual quietly returns to a passive existence.

Severe psychopaths who are profoundly detached seek interpersonal contact to use others and

to strengthen a grandiose intrapsychic self (Meloy, 1988a). Such devaluation has been associated with the capacity to inflict pain on others for pleasure. Severe psychopathic personalities are extremely distanced and disidentified; they do not appear to have empathic capacity, rather an "exquisite capacity for simulation and imitation" (p. 140). Meloy called this ability "pseudoidentification." Krohn (1974) described a similar process, called "borderline empathy."

The infamous serial sexual murderer, Theodore Bundy, is an example of a permanent dehumanizer (Bailey, 1985). Some considered him a "sensitive, empathic, caring, and gallant man who seemed to understand women so well" (p. 44). He also stalked, raped, tortured, killed, and mutilated women. While Bundy appeared to have high level humanistic qualities, forensic evidence unquestionably demonstrated his capacity to place a wedge between these qualities, whether pseudo or genuine, and the desire to kill. This case study illustrates how characterologically embedded perceptual and affective blocking of humanness in others makes it possible to act in direct opposition to what is taught by culture and humanity.

In a study of nineteen juvenile murderers, Zenoff and Zients (1979) described a subgroup they called "non-empathic murderers" who are similar to Bernard et al. (1965) and Miller and Looney's (1974) total dehumanizers, and to Meloy (1988a) and Gacono and Meloy's (1988) severe psychopathic personalities. These youths killed strangers, during robbery or for no apparent reason, and had histories of assaultive behavior. They were diagnosed as "borderline, sociopathic personalities." Zenoff and Zients described the non-empathic murderers as primitive in their psychological functioning, narcissistic in their orientation to the world, and lacking the ability to differentiate themselves from others. They were fiercely protective of those who satisfied their narcissistic needs, usually their mothers, but were otherwise oblivious to others. They had no capacity for empathy and did not recognize they had murdered another human being. They were

incapable of vicariously assuming the role of another.

#### Dehumanization and Empathy: Assessment Tools for Recidivism

Burgess, Hartman, Howe, Shaw, and McFarland (1990), Miller and Looney (1974), and Zenoff and Zients (1979) claim that the prognosis for successful treatment of murderers and the likelihood for recidivism can be assessed by examination of the murderer's capacity to form and maintain emotional attachments and to empathize with others. Miller and Looney, further maintained that the extent to which dehumanization is used is a prognostic indicator of the benefit of treatment and the more ego syntonic dehumanization is, the greater the likelihood of recidivism. Miller and Looney (1974), Schreiber (1988) and Tanay (1973, 1976a) maintain that if the murderer can form one-to-one relationships or multiple temporary attachments, then treatment is possible. Burgess et al. (1990) caution however, that until murderers's address their capacity to use others as commodities, to displace rage onto vulnerable victims, and recognize their reluctance to alter their defensive stance, treatment cannot succeed.

#### Dehumanization and Impaired Empathy in a Psychoanalytic Context

Different psychoanalytic schools have examined characterological impairment of interpersonal relations. One group emphasized cognitive limitations, a second emphasized attachment needs, and the third self-object configurations. All use the interrelated concepts of object relations and defensive functioning and consider empathy essential for the development and maintenance of healthy interpersonal relationships.

#### Psychoanalytic Cognitive Developmental Theorists

The literature relating cognitive deficits to structural formation, personality development, and emotion has been assessed both theoretically and quantitatively (Blos, 1971; A. Freud, 1949; Gardner, 1971; Greenacre, 1950; Joseph, 1988; King, 1975; McCarthy, 1978; Meloy 1985, 1986;



Patterson, DeBaryshe, & Ramsey, 1989; Rank, 1949; Rapaport, 1967; M. Robbins 1981, 1983, 1989; Rutter, 1987, 1989; Santostefano 1977, 1980, 1984/1985, 1985; Schmid-Kitsikis, 1987).

These authors examined the relationship between action, language, and fantasy and found that character disordered individuals have not internalized the capacity for symbolic thinking and are consequently unable to maintain a stable and realistic sense of self and others. They are not able to transfer experienced emotion into words; thus, higher order defenses that transfer sensation and affect from acting out to language or fantasy are underdeveloped. Actions rather than words become the language of communication (King, 1975).

M. Robbins (1989) maintained that people with primitive personality structures lack the capacity to form and sustain affect representations. The reward value of usually reinforcing stimuli appears to be blocked. As a consequence there is a developmental deficiency in affect-dependent mental processes which are necessary for the development of object constancy<sup>18</sup>, fantasy, and empathy. This makes them unable to maintain relationships which are realistically responsive to their emotional needs.

Bucholtz (1987) suggested that the lack of early emotional connection impairs cognitive structure, produces superego deficits, and results in an over reliance on acting-out to solve frustration. The environment becomes the only medium for tension regulation and other people are merely sources of satisfaction. In object relations terms, there is a primitive continuation of partial objects with the prelogical integration of experience and a tendency to act rather than reflect, assimilate, and respond (McCarthy, 1978).

If cognitive structures are not equipped to accurately process emotional information, then the intentions of others and social cues will be inaccurately appraised and responded to by strong urges to act out in a possessive, controlling, destructive or distancing manner (King, 1975; M. Robbins,

1989; Rutter, 1989). When no positive interest is perceived in another, this attitude can easily be reciprocated, and harm is more likely to occur (Hepburn, 1973).

### Self Psychology Theorists

Self psychology theorists, and Kohut in particular, have provided a valuable theoretical framework for investigating empathic failure, dehumanization, and character pathology in murderers (1971, 1977, 1987). Kohut maintained that psychological survival and healthy development depends upon an empathic, responsive human milieu. Initially, caregivers, whom he labelled "selfobjects", are needed to provide functions for the undifferentiated self. With development, these functions are transmuted into a self function.

From Kohut's perspective, psychopathology stems from "environmental deficiency diseases" where caregivers chronically fail to be empathic. As a result, the developing self has not been allowed to adequately incorporate and internalize the narcissistic selfobject configurations to generate healthy intrapsychic structures. Unless the environment can provide compensatory selfobjects to help the individual recover from the lost or blocked attachment bonds, the developing individual will seek and use selfobjects for pure pleasure or destructive aggression. Without repair, character pathology becomes further embedded in a dysfunctional mode where others are only viewed as objects to use. When they no longer serve mirroring or idealizing functions, they are devalued and rejected. If narcissistic injury is felt, the selfobject may be physically harmed in vengeful retaliation.

In primitive personalities, selfobjects continue to be depended upon to regulate intrapsychic functioning and prevent fragmentation. These objects are perceived as extensions of the self, over whom one has a degree of control, but also whom one depends upon for survival. Selfobjects are valued because they provide stability. Those needing selfobject support are more concerned with having their needs met than they are with who the selfobject provider is. When emotional injury

occurs from the environment, they also experience "disintegration anxiety" which warns of psychological death. Two reactions to disintegration anxiety that Kohut identified were "depletion depression" and "narcissistic rage."

In compensatory attempts to ward off the disintegrating experience of selfobject loss, "narcissistic rage" is mobilized, the abandoning object takes an enemy status and is dehumanized. Such aggression is not integrated with mature ego functioning, rather it is mobilized in the service of archaic perceptions of reality. The potential victim is not perceived as a separate entity but as a recalcitrant part of an expanded self over which one expects to exercise full control (Kohut, 1972).

Kohut (1972) described the experiential content of narcissistic rage as a "catastrophic reaction" aimed at achieving absolute control over the unconditional availability of the approving-mirroring selfobject. Aggression is directed toward selfobjects to halt or remove the obstruction which prevents gratification of object related drives. Narcissistic rage serves to avenge disruption of vital selfobject ties or to seek redress for narcissistic insult. The frustrating object is harmed or destroyed, often without the offender initially caring about the damage that results (Schreiber, 1988). Satisfaction is gained through revenge and self esteem is temporarily enhanced by the direct inflicting of pain on others (H. Lerner, 1988).

Narcissistic rage responses may be directed at the object or displaced onto someone else. The associated violence may be either ego syntonic or dystonic. Ego syntonic attacks may be predatory, affective, or mixed, while ego dystonic murders are more likely to be affective, though they may also be mixed (Meloy, 1988a; Tanay, 1969, 1972). Kohut's concept of narcissistic rage has been used to explain murder by Bluestone and Travin (1984), McCarthy (1978), Feldmann et al. (1990) and Schreiber (1988).

McCarthy (1978) drew on the psychoanalytic theories of both Bowlby and Kohut to illustrate

the correspondence between murder, dehumanization, and early partial object relations phenomena, where deprivation and rejection by caregivers result in narcissistic character disturbances. McCarthy hypothesized that murder serves a narcissistic function to discharge rage toward a fused selfobject image, with separation and restoration of infantile omnipotence achieved, albeit concretely. He argued that murder represents a defensive response to lowered self esteem and an attempt to repair the self. Projection and splitting, two major defenses used to dehumanize, distort one's conceptual reality. A pathological projection of a split-off unacceptable part of the self is placed onto the victim, who is viewed only as a part-object representation. A lack of concern for the victim, together with a fear of punishment or retaliation, rather than remorse or guilt, are salient features of narcissistic murderers.

Feldmann et al. (1990) examined the role of personality functioning in severe borderline or narcissistic murderers and suggested that an absence of empathy or the presence of unempathic responses from caregivers interferes with normal development of the self. When this consistently happens to a young person, disordered personality develops. Feldman et al. theorized that caregivers empathic failures trigger the emotions of narcissistic rage and fantasies of revenge. Unempathic rejections are experienced as narcissistic injuries. Feldman et al. concluded, "the narcissistic rage generated thus led to violence as a disintegration product of the self." (p. 178).

#### Object Relations and Attachment Theorists

A third theoretical group has focused upon investigating the relationship between preoedipal child-caregiver interactions and adult personality disorders. When the original attachment need is not provided as a base for successive relationships, the capacity to form and maintain relationships will be impaired.

Attachment theorists argue that early attachment disruptions make separations terrifying

where perceived abandonment creates intense anxiety. Prolonged separations arouse anger, termed abandonment rage, that functions to dissuade the object of attachment from leaving. Thus, Bowlby argued:

It is in this light, I believe, that we can understand such absurdly paradoxical behavior as the adolescent...who, having murdered his mother, exclaimed, "I couldn't stand to have her leave me." (1988a, p. 31).

Bowlby and his colleagues maintain that character pathology results when the attachment need continues to be unrepaired. Character disordered individuals over use primitive defenses to emotionally isolate, protect, and defensively numb themselves from further abandonments. Avoidant or aggressive compensatory defenses protect the self from reawakening the attachment need (Moberly, 1985). The avoidant extreme is best characterized by the schizoid personality (Fairbairn, 1940/1952a; Guntrip 1969, 1971; Waldinger, 1984) and the aggressive extreme by the idiopathic (Arieti, 1967) or severe psychopath (Meloy, 1988a). Though different defensive configurations are used to maintain distance and shield the self from emotional hurt, empathy is still diminished and others dehumanized. When the attachment need is reawakened, current emotions, coupled with pathological mourning from original abandoning objects, can regenerate abandonment rage.

Miller and Looney (1974) found that those capable of murderous and dehumanizing behavior usually had experienced an inexplicably violent parent with the other parent being absent or passively collusive. They theorized that characterologically embedded dehumanization arises when children are treated in exploitive, violent ways by initial caregivers, where emotional deprivation or aggression are not balanced by pleasurable and supportive actions. When a developing personality is repeatedly exposed to absence of affection, derision, or abuses, the developing self structure is overwhelmed and transiently dehumanized. The extent one perceives himself as dehumanized is a

measure of the likelihood of dehumanization becoming an embedded component of the personality structure. When a young person does not believe he is recognized as someone with feelings, he is likely to treat others in similar ways (Straus, Gelles, & Stemmetz, 1980; Tanay, 1976a, 1976b).

Liebert (1985) analyzed the structural organization and interactive style of these murderers using contemporary psychoanalytic terminology and found that most serial murderers would be considered borderline or persons with narcissistic personality disorder. He commented that current research on these primitive personalities provides an explanation for the link between aggressive behavior and bonding abnormalities. In these disorders there is developmental impairment of the ability to empathize, and this renders them incapable of normal intimacy.

Liebert (1985) described lust murderers, one subgroup of serial killers, as individuals at the extreme sadomasochistic and sociopathic end of the Borderline-Narcissistic Personality Disorder spectrum. He described the acts of mutilation and disembowelment as a concrete form of further dehumanization of the victim. With regard to object relations and defensive functions, Liebert concluded a person with a narcissistic or borderline personality disorder has incorporated too much of the bad from the maternal relationship, and splits this introjected badness from his own personality and perceives it as originating externally. The individual no longer possesses the badness--it is in the other person, the victim has it. He may either project his introjected, dissociated badness directly onto the mother, or displace his violence toward his bad mother onto a substitute and destroy the mother's badness (p. 192). Liebert described aggression as being recycled through projection or displacement. The victims are dehumanized so it is unlikely that the offenders see their victim as an actual human being.

Bender described aggressiveness as a reaction to perceived aggression or deprivation from loved objects (1953). Her theoretical conclusions are similar to those of the British school of object

relations, including the attachment theorists, who consider the interactive factors of relationships as the main influence on emotional and moral development and behavior (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Based upon a lifetime career clinically observing homicidal children, adolescents, and other violent juveniles, Bender believed that psychopathic character structure, most frequently seen in homicidal youth, occurs when the capacity to identify with any internal or external object fails to develop. There is consequent retardation or fixation in all aspects of personality functioning, including the ego and superego structures and the ego instincts. Bender (1953) stated there is an inability to identify with others because they did not experience continuous identification during infancy when language, social concepts, and psychosexual and personality development occur. The inability to feel guilt, lack of anxiety, and failure to develop neurotic defenses can also be related to a lack of empathic identification (p. 156).

Along similar lines to Bender's theoretical perspective, Scherl and Mack (1966) suggested that severe early maternal restrictiveness, alternating with deprivation, harshness, and provocation are the dynamic characteristics of longstanding conflict laden relationships between assailant and victim. Other investigators (Gelles, 1974; Gelles & Straus, 1988; Straus et al., 1980) have observed that in violent couples, many were exposed to domestic violence as children. Bolman (1974) studied violence in children and concluded that such behavior is a symptom of problems in relationships, and violence is the child's solution to the problems. Hoover (1976) found a relationship between the absence of physical affection in infancy and violence in adulthood. Others have maintained that children who do not incorporate consolation and comfort from caregivers will not develop self control over their own rage (A. Freud, 1949; Gardner, 1971; Lichenberg, 1988; Nucci, 1989; Schafer, 1968). This primitive rage is ego disruptive and there is loss of ego-object differentiation. Eveseeff and Wisniewski (1972) suggested that when children experience traumatic treatment, such

as emotional neglect, sexual, or physical abuse, they experience dehumanization of the self.

Object relations, Defenses, and Dehumanization. Translated into the developmental language of object relations terms, dehumanization of victims occurs when others are not perceived as whole object representations with corresponding affective connections. Rather victims are seen as part-object representations, where affect is either compartmentalized to "bad" connotations or is removed altogether. Extreme forms of splitting, denial, dissociation, and isolation of affect are used to keep opposing affects apart, and this enables rationalization for killing.

Distorted Object Conception. Meloy distinguished between a perpetrator's object percept and object concept of victims (1988a, 1988b). Object perception is the isomorphic connection<sup>19</sup> a perpetrator makes between an internalized object and an external person. Meloy noted that victims either visually resemble or act similar to the internalized object percept, which is both longed for and yet hated. Object conception occurs at a more abstract level with condensation of values, attitudes, and judgements from past experience, which form a distorted, and perhaps delusional, concept of the victim. This may be conceived as dehumanization of the victim. Although the perpetrator's perceptual reality testing functions are accurate, it is his conceptualization of the victim which is distorted.

Meloy hypothesized that conceptual object distortion of others is typical of psychopathic personalities. Their structural development has not advanced beyond a narcissistic level and therefore they do not conceptualize others as three-dimensional, whole, and separate individuals deserving empathy or having separate worth, but as a psychodynamic extension of the grandiose conceptual self representation.

Displaced Homicide. Other psychoanalytic writers have similarly described what Meloy clearly delineated as distorted object conception (Horner, 1979; B. Klopfer, Ainsworth, W. Klopfer,



& Holt, 1954; Modell, 1968). Those in the forensic field have described object conceptual distortion as displaced homicide (Comstock, 1971; DeVault & Long, 1989; Lidner, 1950; Meyer, Apfelberg, & Sugar, 1947; Revitch, 1965; Revitch & Schlesinger, 1981). The victim either reawakens or heightens an internal emotional disturbance within the perpetrator that is not adequately defended, and this results in a condensed transference of "all bad" emotion. When empathic constraint is absent, or when it is blocked by dehumanization, and/or by dissociation, murder can result.

Hofer (1989) described how unrealistic idealization of the mother image is a psychological defense which protects conscious reexperience of emotional abandonment and aloneness in childhood. In order to maintain a split of hatred and idealization, abandonment rage is redirected from its original target to symbolic representations (1988, 1989). In such cases, the displaced violence onto the victim continues to be ego syntonic and rationalized as "they had it coming."

People who have been historically stigmatized may be targeted for displaced homicide because of their conceptual representation. Among those may be religious, racial and gay minorities, and women who work in prostitution. Krohn (1974) suggested that constricted, unidimensional internal definitions of others aids in the projective process, where diffuse and primitive aggression can be externalized onto legitimized targets.

Miller (1986), Tanay (1966), and Weinstein and Lysterly (1969) described killing of prominent figures (celebrities and elected officials) who symbolically represent the archetypal mother and father figures. Such actions are usually coupled with primitive personality disturbances, which may or may not be of psychotic proportion.

Meloy (1989) described the psychodynamics of murderers with borderline erotomania who kill relative strangers were initially idealized objects and then ragefully devalued over time. Intense love and hate exist concurrently, but are only experienced in alternate affect states. When the intense

emotional attachment to the idealized object is not reciprocated, the offender is fundamentally unable to tolerate a perceived rejection and reacts in abandonment rage, which recapitulates the past abandonments onto a present part-object representation. These extreme expressions of feeling are the expression of defensive splitting. The final defensive maneuver of projective identification works in conjunction with omnipotent control and devaluation of the victim during the murder (1989, p. 482).

#### Summary of the Psychoanalytic Theory of Empathy and Dehumanization

As described in this chapter, diminished empathy and the ability to dehumanize provide anchoring points for understanding how an individual can kill. Empathic identification with others is a developmental component of the intrapsychic structure which matures in direct proportion to the stability and depth of interpersonal relationships. Without early provisions of empathy, the capacity to identify with the emotions of others is under developed and others are perceived as suppliers; they do not possess libidinal investment. When attachments are nullified, others are considered expendable. They are no longer perceived as fellow humans, but as representations of use, possession, threat, and harm. How one perceives others is intricately enmeshed with what one decides to do to them.

While persons from a variety of diagnostic categories experience failures in empathic identification, such failures are the hallmark of a psychopathic personality. These individuals lack observational capacity and are the most prone to characterologically embedded dehumanization. Consequently, compassion, along with ethical and moral values intrinsic to a mature object relationship, are undeveloped.

As thus reviewed, investigators have clinically identified dehumanization in individuals who murder and they have attributed its development to cognitive limitations, attachment disturbances,

inadequate selfobject internalization, or to extreme environmental stress. Dehumanization is temporarily, partially or permanently ego syntonic, and assessment of the extent to which it is used is prognostic of treatment capacity and recidivism.

The reviewed literature provides a sound theoretical base and sufficient qualitative support for considering impaired empathy and dehumanization as important elements of the intrapsychic structure of murderers. This hypothesis awaits operationalization and empirical validation. These constructs deserve attention in murderers and can be examined by measuring the level of object representation and defensive configuration, and an experimental criterion developed attempting to assess dehumanization. In the next chapter a means of measuring the four dependent variables will be reviewed, followed by the methodology used in the study.

### CHAPTER III

#### MEASUREMENT OF EMPATHIC AND DEHUMANIZING CAPACITIES

There is a great deal of unmapped country within us which would have to be taken into account in an explanation of our gusts and storms (Eliot, Daniel Deronda, 1876/1966, p. 206).

#### Introduction

The preceding chapter reviewed empathy and dehumanization, and linked these constructs to murderers and to psychoanalytic theory. As was discussed, empathic capacity is an essential factor in the ability to form and maintain mature human relationships. Empathy's inverse--object dehumanization, annuls the true human characteristics of another; it is believed to be a factor enabling one to murder. While empathy has been measured, dehumanization has yet to receive the same attention. However, I believe that within a psychoanalytic framework, both empathic and dehumanizing capacities can be assessed by measuring: (a) the level of object representation, (b) defensive configuration, and (c) degree of psychopathy. Object representation and defensive configurations are major components of empathy and dehumanization. The degree of psychopathy, as measured by self reported perceptions and external behavior, reflects the extent of impairment in object representation and defensive configuration, and therefore can also be used assess the degree to which one empathizes and dehumanizes.

This chapter examines: (a) conceptual and empirical constructs involved in the capacity for human relationship capacity; (b) Rorschach measurement of empathy and dehumanization; (c) specific categories of Rorschach responses; (d) scales for measurement of object representation, defenses, and psychopathy; and (e) experimental criteria for classifying the degree of

dehumanization.

### Conceptual and Empirical Constructs of Human Relationship Capacity

It is impossible to gain any adequate conception of the nature of an individual organism if it is considered apart from its relationships to its natural objects; for it is only in its relationships to these objects that its true nature is displayed (Fairbairn, 1946/1952c, p. 139).

The concept of intrapsychic structure is an important construct in psychoanalytic theory and research (G. Blanck & R. Blanck, 1974, 1979, 1986; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Two inextricably linked aspects of intrapsychic structure which are currently receiving research attention are object representation and defensive configuration (H. Lerner, 1991). Operationally defined, object representation refers to conscious and unconscious complex mental schemata (including cognitive, affective, and experiential components) of objects encountered in reality, which organize a person's understanding of self and others, that become less diffuse and variable and more symbolic, conceptual, and constant with development (Blatt & H. Lerner, 1983; H. Lerner, 1991). Defensive configuration, which is the specific combination of defense mechanisms used to protect the ego or self from emotionally unpleasant or anxiety arousing event, is considered to correlate with the degree of structural development (Beland, 1988; Lichtenberg, 1983; Lichtenberg & Slap, 1971; Leeuw, 1971; Moberly, 1985).

### Object Representation

Investigators who have designed methods to quantify the quality of an individual's relationship capacity have used the level of object representation construct to measure object relational development and a person's capacity to form and maintain relationships with others. Object representation has been found to be a stable and enduring aspect of personality (Blatt & H.

Lerner, 1983; Greif, 1986; Procidano & Guinta, 1989). Several researchers have developed instruments to measure object representation. It has been examined through the study of: manifest dream content (Mayman, 1967; Brenneis, 1971; Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974; Greif, 1986); early memories and spontaneous open-ended descriptions of parents or significant figures (Blatt, Wein, Chevron, & Quinlan, 1979; Marziali & Oleniuk, 1990; Mayman, 1968; Procidano & Guinta, 1989; Ryan, 1973; Krohn, 1972; P. Robbins, 1981; Frost, 1983); the Rorschach human response (Blatt & Ritzler, 1974; Blatt, Brenneis, Schimek, & Glick, 1976; Blatt Schimek, & Brenneis, 1980; Greco, 1989; Spear & Lapidus, 1981); both human and animal responses on the Rorschach (Frost, 1983); human, animal, object and natural phenomena Rorschach responses (Gacono, 1988; Krohn, 1972; Kwawer 1980; Mayman, 1967, 1968; Urist, 1973, 1977); and responses on the Thematic Apperception Test (Frost, 1983). These studies have demonstrated the construct validity of object representation as providing information about the developmental level and quality of interpersonal relationships (Blatt & H. Lerner, 1983; Hatcher & Krohn, 1980; H. Lerner & P. Lerner, 1988).

#### Object Representation and Rorschach Content

Hertzman and Pearce (1947) were the first researchers to shift pathways from formal Rorschach scores to content responses for measurement of a subject's unique experience of human relationships. Their results revealed content responses, particularly human responses, were direct indicators of internal object relational capacity.

Based on Hertzman and Pearce's findings that a person's Rorschach images comprise a representative sample of a one's internalized objects, Mayman (1967, 1968), having integrated psychoanalytic and Rorschach theories, maintained that a person's relationship potential can be inferred from the Rorschach. This conclusion was based upon the theoretical assumption that

character structure is organized around object relational themes and that object representations are enduring preformed images, "templates" or expectancies of self and others into which experiences are assimilated, and upon which the perceived world is built (Greif, 1986). Mayman's rationale is captured in the following:

When a person is asked to spend an hour immersing himself in a field of impressions where amorphousness prevails and where strange or even alien forms may appear, he will set in motion a reparative process, the aim of which is to replace formlessness with reminders of the palpably real world. He primes himself to recall, recapture, reconstitute his world as he knows it, with people, animals and things which fit most naturally into the ingrained expectancies around which he has learned to structure his phenomenal world. The kind of world that he recreates for himself will call forth core dispositions which enliven (or deaden) his sense of self and which shape the world he finds himself in (1977, p. 248).

Considerable psychoanalytic research in the past twenty-five years has used Rorschach imagery to study self and object representations. The Rorschach is particularly useful for such assessment since any image attributed to a percept must be shaped by the organizing characteristics of the perceiver's representational world (Blatt & H. Lerner, 1983; Mayman, 1967; Novey, 1958).

#### Object Representation, Descriptions and Early Recollections

Like Rorschach content, autobiographical descriptions and early recollections of the self and significant others constitute a sample of an individual's object representational world. Among all psychic expressions, some of the most revealing are the individual's memories. His memories are the reminders he carries about with him of his own limits and of the meaning of circumstances. There are no "chance memories": out of the incalculable number of impressions which meet an individual,

he chooses to remember only those which he feels, however darkly, to have a bearing on his situation. Thus his memories represent his "Story of My Life"; a story he repeats to himself to warn him or comfort him, to keep him concentrated on his goal, to prepare him, by means of past experiences, to meet the future with an already tested style of action. (Adler, 1931/1958, p. 73).

Descriptions and early recollections of parents are believed to reflect an individual's fundamental view of interpersonal relatedness with others (Adler 1931/1958). This is consistent with psychoanalytic relational/structural theories of personality development, where the primary caregiver relationship is of considerable etiologic importance in the formation and development of personality. Disturbed interpersonal relations with primary caregivers are believed to pave the way for later repetition of difficulties. Psychodiagnostic utilization of a patient's parental descriptions and early memories is well established and widely used in several psychoanalytic treatment approaches (Arnold & Harrison, 1991; Bruhn & Last, 1982). Like Adler (H. Ansbacher & R. Ansbacher, 1956), Bruhn (1990) maintains that the "royal road" to one's internal organizational scheme is through autobiographical recollections.

Significant person descriptions have been used as a quantitative data source for the analysis of the developmental level of object representations (Arnold & Harrison, 1991; Blatt, 1974; Blatt et al., 1979; Bonstein, Galley, & Leone, 1986; Frost, 1983; Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974; Marziali & Oleniuk, 1990; P. Robbins, 1981). Thematic content groupings of early recollections have also been successfully used to differentiate delinquents and nondelinquents (Bruhn & Davidow, 1983; Davidow & Bruhn, 1990). Consistent with Adler's predictions that delinquent memories mirror antisocial behavior (1937), Davidow and Bruhn (1990) found the vast majority of delinquent subjects recalled rule-breaking incidents where appropriate parental sanctions for the behavior were absent. They suggested a sense of omnipotence and invulnerability countered dysphoric affect



experienced from the absence of reliable supportive and internalized object ties.

Autobiographical descriptions and recollections of an individual's parents and self, may lend insight to the level and pattern of object representation. In the case of those who have murdered, the additional description of the victim(s) may enhance understanding of how the victim was perceived. Further, the utility of using spontaneous descriptions and recollections of parents and of one's victim(s) appears particularly noteworthy in context of the previously described theoretical notion of displaced homicide.

#### Defensive Configuration

The concept of defense is a cornerstone of the psychoanalytic theory of personality. Freud (1896/1961b) considered defense "the nuclear point in the psychical mechanism of the neuroses in question" (p. 162). A defense mechanism is an enduring intrapsychic structure which serves as a protective function and enables an individual to avoid awareness of the unpleasant or anxiety arousing (Cramer, 1987; Moberly, 1985). As defined by Campbell (1989), character defenses are clusters of defenses that have been developed by an individual as a routine means of coping with reality. Defenses are believed to advance along a developmental continuum from primitive to advanced (Cramer, 1987; Waldinger, 1984). Many psychoanalytic theorists and researchers have placed emphasis upon defensive configurations as a means to understand the structure of neurotic, personality disordered and psychotic individuals (Beland, 1988; Bowlby, 1988b; Cooper, 1989; Cramer, 1987, 1988, 1991; Cramer, Ford, & Blatt, 1988; Cramer & Gaul, 1988; Leeuw, 1971; P. Lerner, 1988, 1990; Lichtenberg & Slap, 1971; Moberly, 1985). The development of defensive functions appears to be intimately connected to the integration and differentiation of self and object representations and the integration of opposite affects.

### Primitive Defenses

The study of defensive configurations in primitive personality structures (M. Robbins, 1989) has received increased attention in recent years. Splitting, and its subsidiary defenses of projective identification, primitive idealization, devaluation and omnipotence, have received particular focus (Arnow & Cooper, 1984, 1988; Cooper & Arnow, 1984, 1986; Cooper & Perry, 1983; Cooper, Perry, & Arnow, 1988a; Cooper, Perry, Hoke, & Richman, 1985; Gacono, 1988, 1990, 1992; Goldstein, 1991; Grala, 1980; Grotstein, 1981; Kernberg, 1967, 1976; Kohut, 1978; Lichenberg & Slap, 1973; Meloy, 1988a; Moberly, 1983, 1985; Modell, 1975, 1984; Ogden, 1983; H. Lerner, 1988; P. Lerner, 1988; P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980; M. Robbins, 1989; Volkan, 1973, 1976, 1981, 1988).

In a theoretical reformulation of Fairbairn (1952d) and Klein's (1946) concepts of splitting, Kernberg (1967) theoretically described borderline personality organization. Kernberg believed primitive personalities cannot integrate libidinal and aggressive self and object images. Splitting and its derivatives form the major facet of the primitive defensive structure, and this prevents synthesis of negative and positive part-object images to give object constancy. This prevents a shift to higher order defensive strategies. Therefore, splitting and its derivatives continue to be used to separate opposite object representations and reduce painful ambivalence toward others (Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Kernberg, 1980).

Recently, Kernberg (1984, 1989) theorized narcissism and the antisocial personality disorder are related, and formulated the malignant narcissism syndrome to explain the psychodynamics and structure of those who fall between these two classifications. This formulation has generated important psychoanalytic discussions and reformulations of the spectra of non-psychotic character disordered personalities, whose weak or absent attachments for others, enables an ego syntonic

commission of violence (Bursten, 1989; Hofer 1988, 1989; Horowitz, 1989; Meloy 1988a; Stone 1989). While borderline defenses continue to be employed, it appears that manipulative, sadistic, and malevolent behaviors, which appear to provide self gratification, are components of this aspect of character structure. An understanding of how the defensive character structure is formed and operates helps those responsible for after-the-fact disposition and treatment.

Kalliopuska (1982, 1986) stated that projection is an opposite process to empathy, since negative affects are transferred onto another to avoid ownership of the painful experience. Similarly, projective identification can also be conceptualized at the opposite end of the continuum to empathy, in that a split self-representation is placed onto an external object which is attributed with negative affects (Goldstein, 1991). In both cases the effects of the perception of others, when using projection and projective identification, is the annullment or dehumanization of the actual characteristics of the other person.

#### Empathy, Identification, and Dehumanization on the Rorschach

##### Empathy and the Rorschach

Mayman considered empathy a higher level psychological function than introjection or identification<sup>20</sup>, and suggested it is a facet of a two-way relationship which draws upon a sympathetic concern for the needs of another, even needs that are opposite to one's own. Mayman maintained that useful inferences can be drawn about personality functioning and one's interpersonal relationship capacity, by the portrayal of empathy, or its absence, in Rorschach responses. These disclosures give form and emotional tone to one's object world and reveal considerable knowledge about the characterologically based interpersonal posture assumed (Mayman, 1967, 1977). He emphasized that certain character disordered individuals may appear to empathize, but are probably exhibiting identification, a self serving behavior which superficially simulates empathy.

### Empathy versus Identification

H. Lerner (1991) suggested Mayman's distinctions between empathic and identificatory relationships is similar to Freud's (1914/1961d) distinction between true object relations and narcissistic object relations. In true object relationships, the other is viewed as separate, having motives and feelings distinct from one's own. In contrast, in narcissistic object relations, which are based on identification, the object is not considered separate and distinct, but rather an extension of the self and necessary for the fulfillment of functions that cannot be managed intrapsychically.

Mayman (1977) outlined empathic responses on the Rorschach as including objective descriptions of varied content where expressions of warmth, interest, pleasure and amusement at the actions of the object indicate the perceiver views the object as distinctly separate from himself. Empathic Rorschach responses appear to be realistic, objectively described and well formed. In contrast, identification responses, although appearing similar to empathic responses, reflect less mature development. They appear unduly vivid, the action is largely fabulized and not inherent to the percept, and the subject appears to have fused himself with the percept.

### Dehumanization and the Rorschach

Mayman (1977, p. 248) suggested that persons who withdraw from being involved with others may feel alienated. Their descriptions of Rorschach figures are likely to be dehumanized and not experienced as friendly, supportive and safe, "but rather as impersonal, even inhuman objects who are threatening or unreachable or ungiving." He suggested:

Such responses are usually prototypes of a corresponding coldness and/or estrangement in the way people are experienced in reality, and are associated with a reciprocal stunting of that person's capacity for making sympathetic contact with others. This form of withdrawal from interpersonal mutuality is

perhaps most ominous of all, implying as it does a warping of relationships, a depersonalization of others and a corresponding estrangement of the patient's sense of self (1967, p. 19).

Krohn and Mayman (1974), like Bernard et al. (1965) and Volkan (1988), discussed the dual role of self and object dehumanization suggesting that dehumanized Rorschach responses indicate both disturbed relationships and severe pathology of the sense of self; a stunting or blocking of one's own humanness.

Dehumanization in Rorschach responses has been clinically described by Bergman (1945), Due and Wright (1945), Mayman (1967, 1977), Miale (1977), Miller and Looney (1974), L. Phillips and Smith (1953), Revitch and Schlesinger (1981), and Wheeler (1949). Due and Wright (1945) maintained that "de-realization" is most frequently found in human figures, which could be considered as expression of the inability to clearly formulate a perception of the self, or an inability to identify with others. They interpreted "derealization of the projection" (pp. 169-170) where substitutions of idealized good (Ghandi) and bad (Hitler) humans, devalued humans (butler, cannibal, savages, old maid), mythical humans (Satan, the devil, angel, Daedalus, Icarus), humanlike diminutives (elf, gnome, pixie) or huge figures (giant, ogre, monster), cartoonized humans (Pinocchio), animals (Bugs Bunny), human-like or animal-like objects (statues, gargoyles, puppets, marionettes), and human details (limbs, anatomy) are given, rather than well articulated human figures. The kinesthesia<sup>21</sup> of these figures (such as aggressive or sadistic action, damage, death, decay) and the affective elaborations of how the figures are experienced (frightening, menacing, weird, eerie, strange) reflect the perceiver's relationship attitudes, whether they be empathic, identificatory, or dehumanizing.

Others who have qualitatively studied murderers' diminished capacity to form relationships

and empathize, resulting in dissociation and dehumanization, have considered Rorschach content an important source of information. These writers include Gacono (1992), Kahn (1960), Lewis and Arsenian (1982), Lindner (1946), McCully (1978, 1980a, 1980b), Meloy (1988a); Miale and Selzer (1976), Morrison (1979), Piotrowski (1977); Piotrowski and Abrahamsen (1952), and Salley and Teiling (1984). McCully (1980a, 1980b) noted an unexpected frequency of botanic images which stood in stark contrast to ego syntonic supernatural-evil images, which he suggested represent the struggle between inner opposites. Salley and Teiling (1984), discussed the dehumanizing and dissociative themes of distanced anatomy, tunnel vision, masked figures and divisions of percepts. Morrison (1979) discussed part-object figure identification with a prevalence of oral-sadistic devouring percepts, such as teeth, mouth parts, beaks, hooks and claws. Piotrowski (1977) suggested that murderers who stalk their victims give Rorschach human movement responses that are, "...permeated with physical violence, bloody scenes, and an obsession with aggression" (p. 218). Gacono (1992) adeptly illustrated content and movement descriptors of defensive detachment, pregenital aggression, sadism and narcissistic rage in a sadistic sexual murderer.

Miller and Looney (1974) interpreted Rorschach data from murderers who dehumanize, using Mayman's object relations perspective, and indicated that dehumanizers have a paucity of whole, warm and alive human percepts in their protocols. Further, these murderers have difficulty in distinguishing whether percepts are alive or dead; those who are considered alive are idealized and given godlike and immortal descriptors.

McCarthy (1978) found a lack of internal cohesion, primitive object relations, and low level defenses on dehumanizing murderers' projective test data. Splitting was a primary defense these offenders used, which McCarthy felt demonstrated vacillation in the sense of self-worth, ranging from infantile omnipotence to profound feelings of inadequacy.

Based on the above descriptions, manifestation of dehumanization on the Rorschach appears to include: an absence of well formed three dimensional human and animal figures in mutual interaction: those which exist are distanced, idealized or devalued, and are frequently lifeless, dead or in sadistic or aggressive action. Quasi-human, animal, quasi-animal, object or part-object representations, with unusual or poor form are more frequent.

#### Specific Categories of Rorschach Responses Examined in the Study

Pertinent Rorschach content and movement theory and research is reviewed below to aid the reader in understanding the specific components used to assess object representation and defenses.

#### Rorschach Content

The analysis of Rorschach content as an important data source for understanding personality dynamics and interpersonal functioning is well established (P. Lerner, 1991; L. Phillips & Smith, 1953). Robert Lindner, known for his clinical and theoretical work with murderers and psychopathic personalities (1944a, 1955/1966), was an early advocate of studying personality structure and psychodynamics using Rorschach content (1943, 1944b, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950, 1955). Contemporary investigators have realigned themselves with this approach of using Rorschach imagery to study aspects of a perceiver's attitudes toward himself, others, and how he views the world (Aronow & Reznikoff, 1976; Cassell, 1977, 1979; Cooper & Arnow, 1984, 1986; DeVos, 1972; Gacono & Meloy, 1992; Kernberg-Bardestein, 1985; H. Lerner & P. Lerner, 1988; P. Lerner, 1991; Mayman, 1977; Meloy & Gacono, 1991; Miale, 1977; Miale & Selzer, 1976).

The Human (H) response. The Human response (H) provides important information about an individual's conception of and interest in others (Exner, 1986). The response is used in research to evaluate the level and quality of internal object representation. Full human figures, denoted as H, are theoretically the most advanced form of object development, followed respectively by full

quasi-human figures (H), human detail Hd, and quasi-human detail (Hd). Pure H responses are expected to range from one-fourth to two-thirds of all human content responses in an adult normal population, with the mean for all forms of human content, 5.12, and the mean of pure H, 3.07 (Exner, 1986). Low H has been found in individuals with identity or self image difficulties who are not skilled in routine interactions (Exner, 1986; Wilson, 1991). Several studies have found positive relationships between the frequency of human contents and treatment effectiveness (Exner, 1986). Although the total absence of human content responses is unusual, according to Meloy (1988a), it is indicative of psychopathy. Lower frequencies of human content (<4) and pure H (<2), are to be expected in psychopathic protocols due to narcissistic detachment and the absence of affectional bonding (1988a, p. 401).

Research has shown that the number of H responses is not an exclusive index of mature interpersonal functioning: both over and under production of H responses have been exhibited by pathological populations. Borderlines, paranoids, individuals with compulsion neurosis and anxieties in human relationships have been found to overproduce H responses (Kalliopuska, 1982; Piotrowski, & Bricklin, 1958). Underproduction of H has been shown in convicted criminals (Gacono, 1988, 1990; Perdue, 1960; Walters, 1953), conduct disordered (Weber, Meloy & Gacono, in press), and antisocial personality disordered individuals (Gacono, Meloy, & Heaven, 1990; Meloy & Gacono, 1991, 1994).

The quality of the human response (H), whole and part-object, relates to one's empathic and dehumanizing capacities. Well formed whole human responses reflect courage, self-approval and the desire to deal with one's problems, while poorly formed whole and passive H responses reveal anxiety, fear and difficulty in human relationships (Kalliopuska, 1982). Awkward H responses, such as gnomes, trolls, fairies, and clowns, have been found in protocols of persons unable to establish



safe relationships (Kernberg-Bardenstein, 1985). Malevolent H responses, such as infamous humans (Hitler), mythical or quasi humans (the devil, the grim reaper, Satan) which are ego syntonicly presented represent the externalization of sadistic superego components of the personality.

Differences in frequency and accuracy (+ or -) of H responses have been found in neurotics, outpatient borderlines, inpatient borderlines and schizophrenics; the least disturbed individuals offer the most differentiated human figures, while those with the greatest impairment, the schizophrenics, offer the fewest (H. Lerner & St. Peter, 1984). Interestingly, Blatt et al. (1976) found that seriously disturbed individuals can give developmentally advanced human responses, but they are of inaccurate or idiosyncratic form quality. They suggested that stereotyped responses (such as Napoleon or Lincoln) are "preformed images," rather than images based upon the form of the percept. Although well articulated, organized, and integrated, they are given a minus form quality score since they do not relate to the conventional reality of the blot. Similar findings were obtained in a replication study using psychotic and nonpsychotic patients (Ritzler, Zambianco, Harder, & Kaskey, 1980). Kernberg-Bardenstein (1985) found highly significant differences between categories of human content and their form quality in groups of anorexic, bulimic and normal females. Citing the works of Blatt et al. (1976) and H. Lerner and St. Peter (1984), she commented:

the distortion of the human image has implications for relatedness, empathy, and experience of others as integrated personalities. Not only the number of human responses is critical, but also the quality of the human content (1985, p. 77).

Animal (A) Responses. Animal responses are offered by well adjusted and the character disordered. Exner (1986) reported an average animal percent of .45 in the records of a normal adult population. High A% has been interpreted as an index of guardedness and stereotypy, and low A% with impaired social adjustment or immaturity. L. Phillips and Smith (1953) provided normative

symbolic animal content interpretations which align with psychoanalytic theory. They subclassified animal responses into five groups which reflect: relations with mother, relations with father, immaturity, hostility, and passivity. Miale and Selzer (1976) commented that animals are creatures guided by instinct and impulse, thus images employing animals may be interpreted as referring to this realm of psychic existence. Particular motives and attitudes implicit in the content is reflective of object relational and defensive qualities. Referents to predatory creatures (alligator, tiger, scorpion) differ in descriptive quality to those more passive, and generally considered benevolent and friendly (deer, cow, dog) and can be informative of a person's view of self in relation to others, whether it be a stance of mutuality, or one of predators and prey.

Object and Natural Phenomena Responses. Articulation of specific object and natural phenomena can also be revealing of a person's intrapsychic functioning (Cooper & Arnow, 1986; L. Phillips & Smith, 1953). Examples of objects which previous investigators have found meaningful for study of object relations and defensive structure include: food, botanic images, broken objects, war and hunting implements, man-made items (submarine, chandelier), apparel or tools of figures of adoration or devaluation (crown, knight's armor, swastika). Examples of natural phenomena which have interpersonal significance include: landscapes (boulder, cliff, water, volcano), weather (storms, floods, icicles), and fire (Cooper & Arnow, 1986; A. S. Krohn, personal communication April, 1991; L. Phillips & Smith, 1953).

Human (Hd), Animal (Ad), and Object (Objd) Detail Responses. As described in chapter II, psychoanalytic theorists have highlighted the predominance of part-object relations in character disordered persons (Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Fairbairn, 1952d; Grala, 1980; Grotstein, 1981; Guntrip, 1969, 1971; Klein, 1946; Kernberg, 1967, 1975, 1980, 1984, 1989; Kohut, 1978; M. Robbins, 1989; Volkan, 1976, 1981, 1988). Rorschach investigators also have found important

developmental differences between those who describe whole objects and details of objects (H. Lerner & St. Peter 1984; Kernberg-Bardenstein, 1985; Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Gacono et al. 1990). Gacono, et al. (1990) and Gacono and Meloy (1992) have found under production of human responses and over production of human detail responses in severely psychopathic criminals; they interpreted this as an impaired empathic capacity where others are related to as part-objects. These findings are congruent with the theoretical rationale Cooper and Arnow presented for Rorschach scoring part-object representations:

the more the patient experiences various levels of integrative failure, the more emergent is a pattern of fluid, disjointed percepts on the Rorschach that requires attention toward all responses in the interpretation of defenses and object relations. Thus Rorschach responses of animal percepts and percepts consisting of parts of objects, animate and inanimate, may contribute vital information to the understanding of an individuals' object relations (1986, p. 145).

### Rorschach Movement

Percept movement is a major determinant of Rorschach scoring and interpretation. Movement responses have multidimensional properties (Klopfer et al., 1954; P. Lerner, 1991; Mayman, 1977; Piotrowski, 1957/1974, 1977; Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1946; Rorschach, 1921/1951; Schachtel, 1966), and their interpretation can be approached by form dominance, relationship to color, ratio to other determinants, or to content. In the current study, the relationship of movement to content and form quality is focused upon. The meaning of movement responses must be considered in the context of the ascribed percept who is the actor. Three types of movement responses were considered: human (M), animal (FM), and inanimate (m).

Human Movement Responses (M). Like the H response, the type (content) and quality

(form) of the M response are an important determinant in the analysis of personality. It is a complex and well researched component of the Rorschach (Exner, 1986). Rorschach (1921/1951) ascribed the human movement response to basic character attitudes and the capacity for inner creation. Human movement (M) is considered the operational index of empathy and identification (Dana, 1968; Frankle, 1953; Kalliopuska, 1982, 1986; Klopfer et al., 1954; Mayman, 1967, 1968, 1977; L. Phillips & Smith, 1953; Piotrowski, 1950; Schachtel, 1966; Meloy, 1988a). L. Phillips and Smith (1953) described M as "the sign of empathy" since it demonstrates the ability to adopt another's role. M responses reflect one's basic approach to life, their relation to themselves, to others and to the surrounding world (Schachtel, 1966). Piotrowski (1957/1974) described the M response as a reflection of a steering mechanism which adjusts and stabilizes relations with others and the environment. Movement responses are considered to reveal attitudes, feelings and sensitivity to others as individuals, rather than objects used only to gratify needs. Well formed M responses imply sublimation of instinctual drives and object relations rather than identifications, while poorly formed M responses represent disturbed object relationships, inadequate sublimated pregenital strivings, unresolved infantile conflicts, disturbed interpersonal relations (L. Phillips & Smith, 1953), and psychopathology (Exner, 1974). An absence of M suggests a lack in the ability to appreciate human values (Meloy, 1988a; Piotrowski, 1957/1974). The human movement (M) response is a stable empirical measure, resistant to change over time. Therefore, it has been found a useful determinant in assessing change of internalized cognitive structures of interpersonal relationships (Blatt & Lerner, 1983; Piotrowski, 1957/1974; Frost, 1983; Greif, 1986).

Urist (1976) found numerous M responses in borderline and narcissistic personality disordered individuals who use projective identification as a major defense. Mayman stated that high numbers of M may only reflect the extent of fantasied involvement with others where social

intercourse is on a "private stage of fantasy" (p. 244). Meloy (1988a) noted fewer M responses in psychopathic individuals, and suggested that an absence of the capacity to emotionally bond with others limits the ability to offer human content responses.

Kalliopuska (1982), Mayman (1967, 1977), and Meloy (1988a), emphasized the need to evaluate empathic potential by the nature and quality of each M response, rather than the number of M's in a protocol. Healthy empathic representations are: objectively described, varied in content, express warmth, interest, pleasure and amusement with others and clearly separate the observer and object described. In contrast, identification M responses have poor form, with arbitrary actions and reflect a misinterpretation of perceptual data (Wilson, 1991). The response is usually described with vividness and conviction where the subject appears to lose distance between himself and the percept and temporarily fuses "as if" he were the object (Mayman, 1967, 1977). Expanding on Mayman's conceptualization, Meloy (1988a) stated that identification M is characteristic of a psychopathic individual's movement responses, an empirical measure of "psychopathic pseudoidentification", the capacity to exploit the narcissistic vulnerabilities of others to manipulate their behavior. This aligns with the works of Miale and Selzer (1976) and with Exner (1986), who suggest a psychopathic protocol contains sexual or aggressive action, and reflects the view that interpersonal relationships are aggressive. The form quality of psychopathic identification M responses are likely to be scored unusual (u) or minus (-).

Libidinal and aggressive responses have been considered to reflect: the extent and control of primary process material (Holt, 1977), object relational quality, affective attitude and defensive style (Gacono, 1988, 1990, 1992; Gacono & Meloy, 1988; Meloy, 1988a; Meloy & Gacono, 1991, 1994). Holt (1977) divided content variables into libidinal and aggressive subgroups. He further delineated aggressive content into two levels of attack (murderous or sadistic aggression), victim of

aggression (masochistic) and results of aggression. Aggressive content and movement, particularly sadomasochistic actions, are currently an important area of Rorschach study in psychopathic personalities (Meloy 1988a; Gacono, 1988, 1990; Greco, 1989; Meloy & Gacono, 1991, 1994). In a study comparing juvenile murderers to nonviolent controls, Greco (1989) found the murderers to offer a significantly greater number of victim of aggression responses. Meloy and Gacono (1994) have researched four aggressive Rorschach indices (aggressive content, aggressive potential, aggressive past, and sado-masochism), where preliminary findings have shown that the quality, intensity and directionality of intrapsychic aggression differentiates severe and moderate psychopaths. Scoring of these aggressive indices may be particularly useful in the current study with regard to the degrees of dehumanization.

Animal Movement Responses (M and FM). Animal movement responses are also believed to reflect interpersonal functioning, but at earlier developmental levels of delay, degree of identification, repression, and defensiveness (Frost, 1983; Goldfarb, 1945; L. Phillips & Smith, 1953; Mayman, 1967; Santostefano, Reider, & Burke, 1984; Schachtel, 1966; Urist, 1973). Animals described in human activity ("turkeys doing a ballet dance") are scored as M responses since the activity is human like (Exner, 1985). Animal movements which are congruent with the species are scored FM.

Since criminally involved character disordered individuals have been found to offer fewer H and M responses (Frost, 1983; Exner, 1986; Gacono, 1988, 1990; Meloy, 1988a; Gacono et al., 1990), Frost (1983) extended the scoring of object representation to include FM responses in his study of subgroups of sexual offenders. Factor analysis of seventy-five subjects' Rorschach protocols validated this assumption and showed the M, FM, M-, and FM- responses to be distinct, yet complementary measures.

Inanimate Movement Responses (m). Inanimate object movement, (a volcano erupting, a top spinning, explosions) is considered the least syntonic of all movement responses and denotes affect not subject to conscious control. Mayman believed these forces intrude on the self, are experienced as random and external, and suggest failure to repress impulses which spill over into subjective awareness in an ego alien form (1977). Lindner (1947) interpreted the m as reflecting both wish and fear. Klopfer et al. (1954) interpreted m responses as expressions of conflict, which exists either: (a) between different impulses within, or (b) between the personality and frustrating forces in the environment. They interpreted overproduction of m as a "warning system" for seeking immediate gratification for impulses. Inanimate movement responses are more frequently offered by poorly integrated personalities, who have low awareness of inconsistencies in their relating, or who use splitting or isolative defenses (Piotrowski, 1977; Exner, 1978).

#### Research Instruments

As was previously noted, object representation and defensive structure are multidimensional constructs and both have been measured by different methods, which appear to tap varied components of the constructs (Grief, 1986; Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974). Current researchers recommend that multiple measures of object relations and defenses be used in the methodological design of a study, particularly in character disordered populations (Krohn, 1972; P. Robbins, 1981; Frost, 1983; Kernberg-Bardenstein, 1985). A complementary combination of measures and a careful compilation of results has been found to yield more conclusive findings about varied dimensions of these two forms of intrapsychic structure. Based upon such recommendations, two measures of object representation and two of defensive structure were used in this study.

Krohn's Object Representation Scale (Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974) was used to score the developmental level and quality of object relations on the Rorschach and on Early Memory

Recollections and Descriptions of Parents-Self and Victim(s). The Krohn scale is used to assess the experience and representation of interpersonal relationships based upon developmental levels. The measure has been validated and reliably used for assessment of object representation (Greif, 1986; Hatcher & Krohn, 1980).

The Lerner Defense Scales (P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980) and the Rorschach Defense Scales (Cooper & Arnow 1986; Cooper et al., 1988a, 1988b) were used to assess subjects' defensive configuration on the Rorschach. These scales have been researched with several populations, have been used independently and in conjunction with each other.

### Projective Measures

#### Rationale for the Use of Projectives

Projective measures have been widely used in clinical settings to study inner life functioning (H. Lerner & P. Lerner, 1988). An individual's response to a projective stimulus is considered a symbolic representation of the nature and process of intrapsychic structure (Cooper & Arnow, 1984).

The study of the level of object representation in conjunction with defensive configurations enables empirical examination of the dynamic interplay among structural factors of human personality (H. Lerner & P. Lerner, 1982; Gacono 1988). In the past decade psychoanalytically oriented researchers have focused on the inner aspects of personality dysfunction, specifically the level and quality of object relations (Coonerty, 1986; Hatcher & Krohn, 1980; Kwawer, 1980; Meloy, 1988a; Gacono, 1988; P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1988) and defensive configuration in borderline, narcissistic and antisocial personalities (Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al., 1988a; Gacono et al. 1990; Gacono, Meloy & Berg, 1992; P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980; Meloy, 1988a; Meloy & Gacono, 1988, 1990, 1991).

Although Rorschach case studies have analyzed intrapsychic structure and functioning of



murderers from a psychoanalytic perspective, no multi-subject studies have intercorrelated the level of object representation to defensive configuration using the quality of Rorschach content and movement imagery. Additionally, no studies have examined the relationship between these qualities and the degree of psychopathy, or all of these components in subgroups of murderers. The works of Perdue (1960), Krohn (1972), Miller and Looney (1974), Frost (1983), O'Meara (1985), Kernberg-Bardenstein (1985), Gacono (1988), Meloy (1988a), and Greco (1989) have provided inspiration for the design of the proposed study. Each of these investigators used components of the Rorschach to thoughtfully assess and integrate aspects of intrapsychic structure and interpersonal functioning with important aspects of human behavior.

### Object Representation

#### Krohn's Object Representation Scale: Composition, Validity, and Reliability

Mayman (1967, 1968) outlined a systematic method for analysis of content and movement responses, and developed a rating scale of object representation by evaluating the developmental quality of clusters of human, animal, and inanimate responses, both static and in movement. While all responses were considered meaningful, human responses, and particularly movement responses, were considered most informative about a person's capacity to empathize. Mayman maintained that the total number of human responses is not sufficient to measure empathic capacity; the indications of responsiveness and warmth, or its absence, must also be considered. Those who followed Mayman have quantitatively measured object relational capacity, considering the number, sequence, and quality of human, animal and object responses, static or in movement (Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974; Kwawer, 1979; Pruitt & Spilka, 1964; Urist, 1973, 1977).

One of Mayman's students, Alan Krohn, applied Mayman's concept of object representation to manifest dream content, early experiences, memories of parents, and to Rorschach content in a

construct validation and interjudge reliability study. Krohn's formulations were congruent with Kernberg's (1966, 1967) developmental theory of personality structuralization. From this perspective, self and object representations are enduring and consistent dimensions of a personality, which are important indicators of the level of personality organization and functioning.

Krohn developed the Object Representation Scale to assess maturity and the capacity to form and maintain interpersonal relatedness. The scale is based on the theoretical principle that an individual develops an intrapsychic structure which organizes thoughts and feelings and experiences of the self and of others, and, that one's object representational capacity determines the limits of experience of self and others. The content of object descriptions (i.e. inanimate, destructive, decaying, malformed, weak, warm, friendly or mutually cooperative figures) are considered a way to understand the quality of interpersonal relationships. Krohn identified differentiation, intactness, definition and wholeness as important components that reflect regulation of affect, the capacity to be empathic, and the ability to integrate cognition and affect.

His eight point ordinal scale spans gradations in emotional mutuality. The scale progresses from the lowest level of object relations (1) associated with poorly integrated, vague and diffuse part object perceptions of figures (primitive, shadowy, malevolent, anonymous and one-dimensional percepts), to the highest level of emotional mutuality (8), full, defined, complete and feeling percepts which are highly integrated percepts of good form. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the Krohn scale and the empathy, identification, dehumanization continuum. Please refer to Appendix A for a complete description of Krohn's Object Representation Scale.

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Insert Figure 1 about here

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**Figure 1**

**Dehumanization in Relation to Gradations of Object Representation**

<u>Levels of Emotional Mutuality on the Krohn Object Representation Scale (Krohn, 1972)</u>		<u>Degree of Intrapsychic Internalization (Kemberg, 1967; Krohn, 1974)</u>	<u>Degree of Dehumanization (Bernard et al., 1965; Miller &amp; Looney, 1974)</u>
Others are fully human; emotional mutuality; awareness and appropriate response to others' needs; intimacy is nondistorted.	8	<u>Mature Empathy</u> The ability to psychologically put oneself in the place of another and have empathic concern for another's needs. Others are perceived and related to as whole object representations who are 3-dimensional & having a separate worth.	
Sensitivity and acuity to the sense of others, although affective relatedness is with childlike transference distortions.	7	<u>Identification/Borderline Empathy</u> Shrewd, adroit to other person's behavior. Able to guide own actions by these cues, but separated by an emotional gulf preventing intimacy found in a mature empathic interaction. The roles and functions of others is recognized.	<u>Temporary Dehumanization</u> Situation or person dependent requiring exogenous validation & reinforcement. Ego syntonic for a limited time period.
Awareness of unique others, but one does not try to understand their experience. Subject deals with others at an arm's length. Subject has a vague sense that life is not as full as he would like it to be.	6		
Stereotypical relationships with interchangeable people-- "passers-by". Others are experienced as stereotypes who differ little from one another.	5		<u>Partial Dehumanization</u> A halting or absence of + affective qualities while - emotions remain. Self & others are viewed in extremes (enemies or allies). Alternations of apparent warmth/friendliness with cold self reference. An inability to form and sustain a consistently integrated picture of the humanness in others.
Others are incomplete, partial and experienced as need gratifiers.	4		
Others are interchangeable, vague, fluid, confusing and without enduring characteristics, but are not pervasively malevolent or weird.	3		
Others are insubstantial--they seem malevolent, brutal, murderous, extremely cold, mechanical, distorted, less than human. Lack of interaction among people; others are experienced as little more than primitive self impulses.	2	<u>Introjection</u> Self and object images are unclearly distinguished where the internalization of the object image is made up of very simple cog- nitions corresponding to a highly libidinal or aggressive motivation state.	<u>Total Dehumanization</u> Others are not individualized & are considered interchangeable commodities, to be used & discarded without concern for their welfare. Libidinal identification for others is replaced with indifference.
Lifeless, vacant, alien, bizarre; a world without people; stark, desolate, fluid or formless world which is experienced in isolation.	1		

Krohn used the Kendall Tau for partial and multiple correlation analysis. The Object Representational Scale ratings of the Rorschach, early memories, and dreams all correlated highly with one another, supporting the validity of object representation as a construct. Of the twenty-two correlations computed, all but two correlations were significant at least at the .05 level, and many correlations attained significance at the .01 and .001 levels.

Krohn and Mayman (1974) later conducted a second validation study of the scale and found high intercorrelations between self and object representations in manifest dream content, early memories, therapist-supervisor ratings, and Rorschach responses. They concluded that the consistency of findings across the projectives demonstrated the scale's internal consistency, and provided further construct validation for using Rorschach responses and Early Memories to measure quality and level of object representation. Krohn and Mayman concluded that the level of object representation is a "salient, consistent, researchable personality dimension that expresses itself through a relatively diverse set of psychological avenues" (1974, p. 404).

Several researchers have since utilized the Object Representation Scale and have contributed to construct and criterion-related validity of the measure (Davies, 1978; Frieswyck & Colson, 1981; Frost, 1983; Gray & Davies, 1981; Grief, 1986; Hatcher & Krohn, 1980; Losardo, 1983; Snyder, 1981; Spear, 1978). These studies have shown the quality of object relations to fit a developmental continuum, that they can be assessed by projective methods, that scores from these assessments correlate with one another, and with independent clinical assessments of interpersonal functioning.

Inter-rater reliability has varied between studies. In his doctoral study, Krohn (1972) reported the following inter-rater reliabilities: .75 exact and .88 agreement within 1 scale point for the Rorschach; .67 exact and .74 within 1 scale point for Early Memories; .58 exact and .83 within 1 scale point for Dreams. Krohn recommended that training raters before scoring, especially in the

differences between levels 4, 5, and 6 on the scale would raise reliability.

Following this advice, Davies (1978) achieved an .83 exact agreement and .93 within one scale point between raters, with a Pearson  $r$  of .91 ( $p < .001$ ). In Frost's sample of 75 sexual offenders, inter-rater agreement between two judges was reported by specific subsections of measurement (1983). On the Rorschach, Pearson correlations were .71 for M and .60 for FM. Parental descriptions were .74 for descriptions of mother, and .77 for descriptions of father. Grief (1986) reported an inter-rater reliability of  $r$  .90, ( $p < .001$ ) on 20 cases of psychotherapy patients.

#### Scoring of Object Representation Data

Krohn (1972) provided general guidelines and a training manual for differentiation of object representation using an eight point scale (Appendix A). For both Rorschach and Parent-Victim-Self descriptions data, each of the scored responses are assigned a weight from 1-8. All weights are summed for total overall scores. Three summary scores are calculated for each Rorschach protocol and for the P-V-S descriptions: the highest, lowest and mode scores. Since these scores theoretically provide a range of object representation, both Krohn (1972) and Frost (1983) recommend use of the mode rather than mean or median to report summary scores. One may theorize that in periods of extreme stress, substance intoxication or psychological decompensation, that more regressed object representational modes are used, and when personality functioning is homeostatic the range would be at the higher end.

Based upon the previously described theoretical and empirical studies, the components of the Rorschach assessed in this study for object representation included: content, movement and form quality. Whole and part figures of humans and animals static or in motion and objects in motion were scored (Figures 2 & 3). This includes human (H), mythical and quasi human ([H]), human detail (Hd), animal (A), mythical and quasi animal ([A]), animal detail (Ad), object (Obj), object

detail (objd), human movement (M), animal movement (FM), and inanimate movement (m) responses.

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Insert Figures 2 & 3 about here

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The Krohn system was also used on the Parent-Victim-Self descriptions and recollections (Appendix D). Each description and memory was assigned a modal score based on the offender's description and memories of mother, father, self, and victim using the Krohn system. The overall mode of all description scores was used as the final early memory object representation measure (Appendix E). Verbatim Parent-Victim-Self descriptions and early memory recollections data was transcribed for rater scoring.

Colson and his colleagues at The Menninger Foundation use the Krohn scale on Rorschach data in treatment outcome studies of long-term psychiatric patients. With Dr. Colson's permission (personal communication, September 1987), his abbreviated instruction guide was used by raters for scoring (Appendix B). In an attempt to enhance inter-rater reliability for rating object representation using Rorschach responses, Frost (1983) developed a training aid of M and FM response samples for each of the eight scale points. With Dr. Frost's permission (personal communication, 1987), this manual (Appendix C) was also provided to raters for additional guidelines for scoring Rorschach responses.

In addition to the author, two raters were trained to use the scale and scoring forms. Raters practiced scoring the Rorschach and Parent-Victim-Self descriptions until inter-rater reliability of a value greater than .90 was established. On the subject data, when rater discrepancy occurred, a consensus result was achieved by discussion.

**FIGURE 2**  
**SYMBOLS AND CRITERIA USED FOR CODING RORSCHACH DATA**

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>CRITERION</u>
Whole Human	H	Involving the percept of a whole human form.
Human Detail	Hd	Involving the percept of an incomplete human form, such as a foot, teeth, hair or lower part of the person.
Whole Human - Fictional or Mythological	(H)	Involving the percept of a whole human form that is fictional or mythological, such as gnomes, fairies, giants, witches, fairytale characters, ghosts, dwarfs, devils, angels, science fiction creatures that are humanoid, human-like monsters.
Human Detail- Fictional or Mythological	(Hd)	Involving the percept of an incomplete human form, fictional or mythological such as, the head of the devil, the arm of a witch, the eyes of an angel, parts of science fiction creatures that are humanoid.
Distanced human or quasi-human	DH	Involving the percept of quasi-human distanced human details, such as X-rays, skeletons, brain tissues, pelvises.
Whole Animal	A	Involving the percept of a whole animal form.
Whole Animal - Fictional or Mythological	(A)	Involving the percept of a whole animal form that is fictional or mythological, such as a unicorn, dragon, magic frog, flying horse, Black Beauty.
Animal Detail - Fictional or Mythological	(Ad)	Involving the percept of an incomplete animal form that is fictional or mythological such as, the wing of Pegasus, the head of Peter Rabbit, the legs of Pooh Bear.
Whole Object	(Obj)	Involving the percept of any natural or man made object, such as components of nature (rocks, trees, water), landscapes, botany, clothing, art.
Object Detail	(Objd)	Involving the partial percept of an object form, such as the smoke stack of a submarine.

**FIGURE 3****SYMBOLS AND CRITERIA FOR MOVEMENT AND FORM LEVEL CODING**

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>CRITERION</u>
Human Movement	M	Responses involving the kinesthetic activity of a human, animal, or fictional character in human-like activity.
Animal Movement	FM	Responses involving a kinesthetic activity of an animal. The movement perceived must be congruent to the species identified in the content. Animals reported in movement not common to their species should be coded as M.
Inanimate Movement	m	Responses involving the movement of inanimate, inorganic, or insensate objects.
Active-Passive Superscripts	a-p	A second coding assigned to all movement responses denoting an active or passive state.
Cooperative Movement	COP	Responses involving two or more objects in which the interaction is clearly positive or cooperative.
Aggressive Movement	Ag	Any movement response in which the action is clearly aggressive and is occurring in the present, such as "Two men dueling."
Aggressive Content	AgC	Any content popularly perceived as predatory, dangerous, malevolent, injurious, or harmful, such as a gun or knife.
Aggressive Potential	AgPot	Any response in which an aggressive act is about to occur, such as "An intimidating demon about to attack".
Aggressive Past	AgPast	Any response in which an aggressive act has occurred or the object has been the target of aggression.
Sado-masochism	SM	Any response in which devalued, aggressive, or morbid content is accompanied by pleasurable affect expressed by the subject, i.e., "A lady dancing and she got her head blown off (laughs)"
Good Form	+/o/u	Articulation of form features which do not distort or violate basic contours of the percept.
Poor Form	-	Distorted, arbitrary, or unrealistic use of form in creating a response. The answer is imposed on the blot structure with total, or near total disregard for the contours of the area used. Often arbitrary contours will be created where none exist.



## Defense Scales

### Defensive Structure on the Rorschach

In the past decade two Rorschach scales have been constructed to examine defensive structure and to validate theoretical assumptions. These measures are the Lerner Defense Scales (LDS), constructed by P. Lerner and H. Lerner (1980) and the Rorschach Defense Scales (RDS) constructed by Cooper, Perry and Arnou (1988).

### Lerner Defense Scales: Composition, Validity, and Reliability

P. Lerner and H. Lerner (1980) integrated current developments in psychoanalytic object relations theory (Kernberg, 1975) with Rorschach defense research (Mayman, 1967; Pruitt & Spilka, 1975; Holt, 1977; and Peebles, 1975) to construct a content based defense scale which assesses lower developmental levels of defensive functioning. Splitting, projective identification, devaluation, idealization and denial are evaluated by their presence in Rorschach human percepts, both static and moving. In the cases of devaluation, idealization and denial, these defenses are ranked on a continuum of low to high (Figure 4). The Lerner's system uses a systematic appraisal of the human figure response, the type of figure seen (i.e., clowns, warriors, magicians, etc.), how the figure is described, and the action of the figure.

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Insert Figure 4 about here

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The percepts for measurement have been extended from the original whole human response to include the scoring of whole quasi-human ([H]), and whole animals in human action (M) (Kernberg-Bardenstein, 1985). Kernberg-Bardenstein provided conceptual and methodological clarification and modification of some ambiguities in the scoring of the scale (1985). This extension

**FIGURE 4****LERNER DEFENSE SCALES**  
(P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980)**Borderline Defenses**

Splitting

Projective Identification

Devaluation

- Level 1
- Level 2
- Level 3
- Level 4
- Level 5

Idealization

- Level 1
- Level 2
- Level 3
- Level 4
- Level 5

Denial

- Level 1
- Level 2
- Level 3

has been useful in the study of character disordered populations, since these individuals' protocols are known to be meager and with few human responses. H. Lerner (personal communication, March, 1991) is confident that Kernberg-Bardenstein's additions to the scale are acceptable and a potentially useful extension of the system for the current study. With Dr. Kernberg-Bardenstein's permission (personal communication, June, 1991) these additions (1985) have been incorporated into the scoring manual (Appendix F).

Initial construct validity of the scoring system involved the comparison of thirty Rorschach protocols, fifteen from borderline patients and fifteen from patients falling within the neurotic range (P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980). Chi-square comparison of the two groups demonstrated significance at the .01 level on four of the five defenses. The borderline patients employed splitting, low-level devaluation, projective identification and low-level denial significantly more often than the neurotic group. This outcome supported the contention that different forms of psychopathology are related to specific levels of defensive organization.

A second construct validity study (H. Lerner et al., 1981) involved comparison of 21 Rorschach records from a hospitalized borderline group to 19 records from a schizophrenic group. The two groups differed significantly in their use of splitting, devaluation, projective identification and denial.

Several studies have since been conducted using the LDS and have further substantiated its' construct and criterion validity (Lerner, 1990). In brief, the LDS has demonstrated efficacy in distinguishing borderline patients from other diagnostic groups, and it has been used to evaluate the defensive structure among other clinical groups who function at borderline levels.

In the initial LDS study (P. Lerner and H. Lerner, 1980), inter-rater reliability for the five defense categories was as follows: splitting 100%, projective identification 100%, devaluation 91%,

idealization 87%, and denial 83% (P. Lerner, 1990). Kernberg-Bardenstein (1985) reported inter-rater agreement for patients at the following percentages: splitting 100%, projective identification 100%, devaluation 89%, idealization 82%, and denial 95%. Gacono (1988, 1990) reported 93% inter-rater agreement on scorable defense categories with individual categories as follows: projective identification 100%, devaluation 88%, idealization 100%, and denial 100%. P. Lerner (1990) reviewed the studies which have used the LDS and concluded that inter-rater reliability reported by various investigators and summarily indicated that inter-rater agreement for this scale is high.

#### Rorschach Defense Scales: Composition, Validity, and Reliability

Schafer (1954) used Rorschach content to investigate the reciprocal nature of object relations and defensive configurations in primitive personality structures. Based upon Schafer's theoretical rationale, and upon the theoretical conceptualizations of Winnicott (1953), Mayman (1967), Kohut (1977) and Stolorow and Lachman (1980), Cooper et al. (1988) constructed an operationalized rating system to assess fifteen defense mechanisms on the Rorschach (Figure 5). These mechanisms range from the most primitive to higher levels.

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Insert Figure 5 about here

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Cooper et al. (1988a, 1988b) identified three levels of functioning in which they subgrouped the defenses. The neurotic defenses include: higher level or neurotic denial, intellectualization, reaction formation, rationalization, pollyannish denial, repression and isolation. The borderline defenses include: splitting, projective identification, devaluation, primitive idealization, projection and omnipotence. This borderline portion of the scale represents overlapping conceptualizations

**FIGURE 5****RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al., 1988)**Defenses Organized by Level of Personality Organization****Neurotic**

Neurotic or Higher Level Denial

Intellectualization

Isolation

Reaction Formation

Repression

Rationalization

Pollyanish Denial

**Borderline**

Splitting

Projective Identification

Devaluation

Primitive Idealization

Projection

Omnipotence

**Psychotic Defenses**

Massive denial

Hypomanic denial

with the continuum of defenses of the LDS. Two defenses have been identified as psychotic or major disturbance defenses. They are hypomanic denial, and massive or bland denial.

Cooper et al. (1988a) assessed discriminant validity of the defenses by correlating diagnosis, (borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder or bipolar Type II) to the defense mechanisms. The Spearman Rho nonparametric rank order statistic was used for the calculation of two correlational matrices. The first correlated subjects' ranks on each defense with their diagnosis; the second analysis correlated the percentage that each defense was scored relative to the total number of times all defenses were scored for each subject. In both cases only the borderline personality disorder correlated significantly with the defenses but not with the other two closely related disorders.

The initial reliability study of the RDS was based on scores derived from 199 responses from approximately sixty protocols (Arnold, 1983). For each of the fifteen defenses Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated for pairs of raters. Pearson R coefficients for two raters ranged from .44 to .88 on the individual defenses; higher level, middle level, and primitive level composite reliabilities were reported at .76, .88 and .75 respectively. Interclass R was used to evaluate a group agreement (four raters) ranged from .42 to .80 on individual defenses; higher level, middle level and primitive level composite reliabilities were .63, .79 and .68.

In a subsequent study, Cooper et al. (1988a) reported inter-rater reliability of the three defense categories at .71 for the neurotic defenses, .82 for the borderline defenses, and .71 for the psychotic defenses. They also reported on reliability for each defense. Please refer to their review for specific detail. In contrast to the LDS, the RDS system evaluates all human, animal and

inanimate object thematic content as well as a subject's comments about the testing situation.

Cooper et al. argue it is necessary to examine all Rorschach percepts and all content in the interpretation of defensive operations since individuals with psychopathology experience a variety of levels of integrative failure on the Rorschach. Criteria for scoring are described in the manual in Appendix G.

#### Comparison of the Defense Scales

P. Lerner (1990) summarized the difference between the original Cooper and Arnow (1986) and the P. Lerner and H. Lerner (1980) defense scales:

Broadening the unit of analysis permitted Cooper to better operationalize cornerstone concepts such as prestages of defense, part-object relations, and levels of integrative failure. The core for the Lerner is the theoretical proposition that defenses and object relations are inextricably related. Thus, restricting the unit of analysis permits them to infer not only defensive structure, but level of object representational capacity as well (p. 43).

H. Lerner, Albert, and Walsh (1987) conducted an intercorrelational study to assess the overlap and distinctive features of the LDS to the borderline defenses of the RDS, which Cooper and Arnow first outlined in 1986. Four psychiatric groups (neurotics, outpatient borderlines, inpatient borderlines, and schizophrenics) were measured with the two defense scales. Although the scales employ different methods of analysis, they both validly discriminated between groups. P. Lerner (1990) suggested that the RDS may be more effective in distinguishing among higher functioning borderlines, while the LDS appears more effective in differentiating those who are developmentally lower functioning.

### Nonprojective Measures

#### Hare's Psychopathy Checklist--Revised: Composition, Validity, and Reliability

The relationships between psychopathy, violent crime, and recidivism have long been discussed, however only recent empirical methods have enabled investigators to examine the strength and extent of these associations. Presently the best validated procedure for assessing psychopathy in criminal populations is Hare's Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991).

The PCL-R is a 20 item, 40 point symptom construct rating scale which is based upon Cleckley's (1941/1976) criteria of psychopathy. This checklist provides a dimensional measure of psychopathy with scores ranging from low to high, and a score of 30 or above is considered to be indicative of psychopathy.

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Insert Figure 6 about here

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There is extensive research demonstrating the validity and reliability of both the PCL (Hare, 1980, 1985) and the PCL-R (Hare, Harpur, Hakstian, Forth, Hart, & Newman, 1990; Hare, McPherson, & Forth, 1988, H; Hart, Hare, & Harpur, 1991).

Gacono and Hutton (1994) reported previous investigators' inter-rater reliabilities ranging from .88 to .92 with test-retest reliabilities ranging from .85 to .90. In Gacono's study of 33 incarcerated offenders (1988), inter-rater reliability was .89. In a subsequent study, Gacono and Meloy reported reliability ratings of .94 in a study of 43 offenders (Gacono & Meloy, 1991). Hart et al. (1988) reported that the internal consistency (alpha) for the scale aggregated from seven samples of male prisoners (N = 1192) from the United States, Canada and England at .86.



**FIGURE 6**

Scoring Items on the  
**HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED**  
(Hare, 1991)

1. Glibness/superficial charm
2. Grandiose sense of self-worth
3. Need for stimulation/proneness to boredom
4. Pathological Lying
5. Conning/Manipulation
6. Lack of remorse or guilt
7. Shallow affect
8. Callous/lack of empathy
9. Parasitic life-style
10. Poor behavioral controls
11. Promiscuous sexual behavior
12. Early behavior problems
13. Lack of realistic, long-term goals
14. Impulsivity
15. Irresponsibility
16. Failure to accept responsibility for own actions
17. Many short-term marital relationships
18. Juvenile delinquency
19. Revocation of conditional release
20. Criminal versatility

### PCL-R Administration and Scoring

In preparation for correct administration and scoring the PCL-R, Carl Gacono, a licensed clinical psychologist with substantial research use of the scale, trained the current investigator in administration. Training followed the guidelines outlined by Gacono and Hutton (1994). Inter-rater reliability within one scale point for seven PCL-R interviews of male murderers was 95%.

For the current study the PCL-R semi-structured interview was administered and scored by the current investigator. It was observed and scored by a second independent rater, as suggested by Hare (1985, 1991). Independent PCL-R ratings were compared between raters, and the average of the scores represented the final score.

The psychopathy score used to place subjects on a psychopathy continuum, ranged from the potential low of 0 to a high of 40. Based upon the works of Gacono (1988) and Gacono et al. (1990), the subjects were divided into one of three groupings for analysis. Those obtaining a score of 30 or greater were placed into the high psychopathy group; those with a score of 20 to 29 were placed into the moderate psychopathy group; those with a score of 10-19 in the low group.

The PCL-R has been shown to contain two factors (Harpur, Hakstian, & Hare, 1988). Factor 1 represents core personality traits and factor 2 represents a chronically unstable and antisocial lifestyle. Both factor scores were also considered in the data analysis.

### Structured Interview Protocol

A Structured Interview Protocol (SIP) was constructed by the examiner, based upon the works of Hebben (1987), O'Meara (1985), Cornell (1990), Cornell et al. (1987a, 1987b), Langevin, Paitich, Orchard, Handy and Russon (1982), MacKinnon and Michels (1971), Ressler et al. (1988), and Waldinger (1984). The purpose of the protocol was to obtain as much information about each individual as possible through a semistructured means. Subjects were asked a series of questions,

which previous investigators have considered pertinent in understanding an offender's life history, prior adjustment, and ethnographics. Similar material has been used in conjunction with Rorschach studies for additional analysis (O'Meara, 1985; Greco, 1989). Additionally, each patient's hospital record was reviewed for validation of the self report data. As recommended by Cornell (1990) direct assessment of the offenders, coupled with case analysis corrects the methodological vulnerabilities of missing information and potential recorder bias.

Data were organized using the protocol in Appendix I. Protocol information was grouped into seven major clusters: identifying data; demographic, developmental, medical, violence and criminal histories; cognitive; and interpersonal functioning (Figure 7).

---

Insert Figure 7 about here

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#### Experimental Criteria: Dehumanization

##### Operationalizing Dehumanization

According to prevailing methodological standards, a construct is defined by the operations used to measure it. Based upon the theoretical discussion of dehumanization as a putative construct, an experimental rating scale was constructed for assessment of the degree of dehumanization. In the present study dehumanization was first formulated in three separate stages:

1. A literature survey was undertaken of dehumanization as conceptualized by researchers who have largely used this construct in the model of psychoanalytic theory with application across a variety of topics. This material was reviewed for the reader in the previous sections of the manuscript.

2. Next, a synthesis of the material was forged into a general working definition of

**FIGURE 7****STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL DATA CLUSTER CATEGORIES**

**Identifying Data**  
**Demographic History**  
**Developmental History**  
     Early Childhood History  
     Family Constellation and Atmosphere  
         Parents  
         Siblings  
         Family Activities  
         Discipline  
**Medical History**  
     Physical and psychosomatic disorders  
     Neurological History  
     Substance Use History  
     Psychiatric History  
**Violence History**  
     Exposure to Violence  
     History of injury to self  
     History of injurious behavior to others  
**Cognitive and Interpersonal Functioning**  
     School adjustment/performance  
     Friendships  
     Vocation  
     Avocation/Fantasy  
**Criminal History**  
     Delinquent Behavior  
     Adult Criminal History  
     Current Offense Data  
     Mental Status at Offense

dehumanization that was descriptive of a complex of defenses, perceptions, traits and behaviors.

3. Finally, a list of criteria were established along the guidelines of Miller and Looney (1974) differentiating dehumanization by degrees--temporary, partial, and permanent. The presence or absence of dehumanization was ascertained according to the general definition. If absent, the score was 0; if present the severity of dehumanization was assessed by degree with a weight of (1) for temporary, (2) for partial, and (3) for permanent. The operationalized measure is provided in Appendix J.

The author, and a second rater trained to use the scale, independently applied the experimental dehumanization measure (Appendix J) across four sets of information for each subject: (a) the Structured Interview Protocol; (b) Rorschach content responses; (c) Parent-Victim-Self descriptions and early memories; and (d) the Hare Psychopathy Checklist. A description of each application is described in further detail below.

Structured Interviews and Records Analysis. Subjects were scored by each rater using the previously established experimental definition of dehumanization (Appendix J) on the overall content of the Structured Interview Protocol and the offender's hospital record. Each researcher evaluated whether dehumanization was present or absent. Each time the condition was recognized, a degree of dehumanization score was issued. The mode value of these incidents was used as the single index to represent the total picture of the individual from this information set. Interrater agreement through consensus was used to determine the subject's final score.

Rorschach. Each subject's Rorschach human or animal content responses were evaluated for absence or presence and the degree of dehumanization. The mode of the total number of incidents was calculated by each rater to determine the degree dehumanization that was identified. The raters' final mode scores were then compared and consensus was reached in cases of

disagreement for a total Rorschach dehumanization score.

Parent-Victim-Self Descriptions and Early Memories. Every subject was asked for four responses each on the topics of Mother, Father, Victim and Self. Subjects were first asked for their earliest three memories of each person plus they were asked to describe the person as they thought of them at the moment of interview. The raters independently evaluated the sixteen responses using the established dehumanization criteria (Appendix J). These sixteen responses were collapsed into a single mode score over each of the four topics. The four mode scores were further collapsed into a final mode score for this information set. The raters final scores were compared. In cases of rater discrepancy, consensus was reached for the final rating.

Hare Psychopathy Checklist--Revised. Each subject was given a 60 to 90 minute interview, during which time they were asked questions to twenty items from the PCL-R. The overall content of the PCL-R interview and the collateral background review was evaluated by each rater in the determination of presence or absence and degree of dehumanization as outlined by Hare. Each rater gave a global dehumanization score for the subject. The global scores of the raters were then compared to determine a subject's final score.

#### Composite Dehumanization Score.

As previously described, subjects' data were scored by two independent raters on four information sets. Final assessment ratings for each set of material ranged from 0 to 3, corresponding to the potential dehumanization spectrum. A given subject's total dehumanization score was computed by summing the scores across the four different measures. This score was used as the total dehumanization rating. A score of 0 would be the lowest rating a subject could receive with 12 being the highest. It was then possible to intercorrelate the total dehumanization score with the level of object representation, defensive structure, level of psychopathy and dehumanization.

### Summary of Measures


In summary, four dependent variables were assessed in this study: level of object representation, defensive configuration, level of psychopathy and degree of dehumanization. Figure 8 illustrates how the measures of the study were conceived to be linked to the theoretical conceptualizations of personality.

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Insert Figure 8 about here

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Figure 8





## CHAPTER IV

### HYPOTHESES

The more closely one studies any phenomenon, the more complex it becomes and the more refined are the questions posed. (Megargee, 1982, p. 90)

It is known that murder is a multidimensional phenomenon with heterogeneity between individuals responsible for the act. Previous empirical studies have met with limited success when murderers have been classed as a heterogeneous group and then compared to other types of criminals. Although few controlled studies have been conducted whereby murderers have been placed in more homogeneous subgroups for study, these outcomes have shown promise in successfully identifying significant convergent criteria within groups and divergent criteria between groups (Cornell, 1990; Cornell et al. 1987a, 1987b, Greco, 1989; O'Meara, 1985; Meloy, Gacono and Kenney, 1994; Perdue, 1960). This limited empirical database has shown that there are several methods that can be used to subclassify murderers for research, and that outcomes to the same questions will differ depending upon how groupings are formed (Cornell 1989, 1990; Cornell et al. 1987a, 1987b). Consequently, generalizations across studies are difficult to make.

This study investigated a single sample of men accused or convicted of murder and a nonassaultive control group using four independent classification methods: criminal charge, legal status, the relationship of the subject to the victim(s), the gender of the victim(s), and the offense circumstance. As described in the earlier chapters, it was expected that differing levels of intrapsychic structure and interpersonal functioning would be found within the sample of murderers, and that differences could be quantified for analysis based upon subgroup membership.

The dependent measures of object representation, defensive configuration, level of psychopathy, and degree of dehumanization were assessed in all subjects. Outcomes were analyzed in aggregate according to membership in each of the four subgroupings. One way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine group differences on each of the four dependent variables. A correlation matrix of the major dependent variables was constructed for examination of variable intercorrelations. Table 1 summarizes the dissertation's objectives and hypotheses.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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The specific objectives of this study were to test the assumptions: there are no significant differences between the murder sample and the controls; there are no significant differences between pre-trial and post-trial subjects; there are differences between subgroupings of murderers when compared by relationship, gender of the victim, and circumstances of the offense; and that the experimental criterion of dehumanization has construct validity. The specific hypotheses of the study are listed below.

#### Hypothesis 1: Comparison of Murderers to Controls

The murder sample will not exhibit significant differences to the non-assaultive controls on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration, (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization.

#### Hypotheses 2: Pre-trial and Post-trial Comparisons

No significant differences will be found between pre-trial and post-trial subjects on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration; (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization.

**TABLE 1**  
**OVERVIEW OF STUDY OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES**

Objective	Hypothesis	Statistic
Comparison of murderers to controls on dependent measures.	H1	One way ANOVA
Comparison of pre-trial to post-trial offenders on dependent measures.	H2	One way ANOVA
Comparison of murderers by subgroups.		
Intimate to Nonintimate	H3	One way ANOVA
Victim Gender	H4	One way ANOVA
Offense Circumstance	H5	One way ANOVA
Blood Kin to Nonblood Kin	H6	One way ANOVA
Acquaintance to Stranger	H7	One way ANOVA
Construct validation of dehumanization.	H8	Pearson Correlation matrix

Hypothesis 3: Comparison of Intimate to Nonintimate Murderers

Men accused or tried for murdering intimates will exhibit differences to men accused of or tried for murdering nonintimates on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration; (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization.

Hypothesis 4: Victim Gender Comparisons

Men accused or tried for murder will exhibit differences on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration; (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization when compared by the gender of the victim(s).

Hypothesis 5: Offense Circumstance Comparisons

Men accused or tried for murder will exhibit differences on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration; (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization when compared by the offense circumstance.

Hypothesis 6: Blood Kin to Non-blood Kin Murder Comparisons

Men accused or tried for murdering genealogical relatives (blood kin) will exhibit differences to men accused or tried for murdering affinal relatives (nonblood kin) on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation, (b) defensive configuration, (c) level of psychopathy, and (d) degree of dehumanization.

Hypothesis 7: Acquaintance to Stranger Murder Comparisons

Men accused or tried for murdering acquaintances will exhibit differences to the men accused or tried for murdering strangers on the dependent measures of: (a) object representation; (b) defensive configuration; (c) level of psychopathy; and (d) degree of dehumanization.

Hypothesis 8: Construct Validation of Dehumanization to Standardized Intrapsychic Measures

The measures of object representation, defense, and psychopathy will show significant intercorrelations with the experimental criteria of dehumanization.

Summary

Experimental studies of murder have found few significant differences between murderers when compared to controls. The position of this study is that such outcomes are due to the extreme heterogeneity within each group, thereby invalidating between group comparisons.

However, when one uses more homogeneous subgroups of murderers for statistical comparison, there is less variance within groups. This increases the probability of observing significant differences between subgroups.

Having established this sampling criterion it was hypothesized that legal charge and trial status would be of no consequence in understanding murderers. Meaningful distinctions can be established however, by analyzing the specific nature of the relationship between the victim and the offender, the circumstances of the crime, and the gender of the victim.

Finally, the most important component of this study was establishment of construct validity for the variable of dehumanization, the one factor missing from all normative dependent measures of personality. The hypothesis testing was constructed to show that dehumanization is so significant that it pervades all the other dependent measures, thereby suggesting a completely new approach to understanding how and why people murder.

## CHAPTER V

### METHODOLOGY

#### Participants

##### Target Population

The incidence of murder in the United States in 1992 was 23,760 (FBI, 1993); 214 of this total were murders that occurred in Massachusetts. The murder rate in the Commonwealth held relatively constant from the 1970's through the latter part of the 1980's, with an annual average of 200 reported homicides. Unfortunately, the state murder rate has increased in the 1990's. Analysis of the FBI data showed that the area of growth was with juvenile offenders (Kennedy & Grisso, 1994).

A study of the Massachusetts homicides using the FBI Supplementary Homicide Report (FBI-SHR) for the years 1980-1988, revealed that three quarters of Massachusetts offenders were male (Tsai, 1990). During this eight year period males were responsible for 93 to 100% of the stranger murders, 89 to 96% of the acquaintance murders, 64 to 85% of the spousal murders, and for almost every blood kin killing. This configuration was comparable to the FBI-SHR data set for the entire United States during the same eight year period.

##### Sample Selection

The appropriate sampling for research of murderers has been, and continues to be, a universal concern and a common methodological weakness in most of the homicide research (Cathy Widom, personal communication, January 1991). Kerlinger (1973), Langevin et al. (1982), Langevin, Ben-Aron, Wortzman, Dickey and Handy (1987), and Widom (1989) have stated that inadequate sampling is a serious flaw in the validity and reliability of previous research findings. The setting from which a homicide sample is drawn (Cornell et al., 1987a, 1987b; Langevin et al.,

1982; Langevin et al., 1987) and the criteria used to divide subjects into research groupings (Holcomb & Daniel, 1988) are important factors in the significance of particular variables. Given the fact that homicide has a low unpredictable base rate, with a 70% clearance, and with fewer convictions, this difficulty is not surprising. Access for direct research of those charged or convicted of murder is limited due to legal and institutional considerations. Finally, one comes to the voluntary consent of the participants and their ability and willingness to participate in a study.

Flawed sampling methods have introduced considerable bias in the literature and this has produced confusion and disagreement about central issues (Yarvis, 1990). Most homicide studies have "accidental" sample groups (Kerlinger, 1973), which Widom describes as those "involving opportunity or convenience" where the data are collected "from cases that medical or psychiatric practitioners have at hand" (1989, p. 5). Much of the data previously used in homicide offender studies have been retrieved from archival records from hospital, prison, or private practitioners, rather than from direct contact with the offenders. These types of data suffer from lost information, incomplete files, inaccuracy in recordings, and recorder bias (Greco, 1989; Widom, 1989; Yarrow, Campbell, & Burton, 1970). Such studies pose issue with the reliability and validity of the data.

According to Kerlinger (1973), in cases where random sampling is prohibitive, "purposive sampling" can be used as a means to gather and organize subjects meaningfully. This method of sampling uses judgment to obtain representative samples by including typical areas or groups.

#### Accessible Population--Men of Bridgewater State Hospital

Bridgewater State Hospital (BSH) is the Massachusetts maximum security psychiatric facility operated by the Department of Correction. It admits males 17 years and older from the court system for the purpose of forensic evaluation or treatment. Approximately 40% are pretrial admissions who are remanded under Section 15B of Chapter 123 for evaluation of competence to

stand trial, or criminal responsibility for an alleged crime. Approximately 10% are admissions under Section 15E who are evaluated as an aid to sentencing. Approximately 40% came from the correctional system under Section 18A and are prisoners either awaiting trial, or who have been sentenced. The remaining population are individuals committed to the hospital for treatment, having been determined by the court to be currently mentally ill (Bridgewater State Hospital, 1986). Males court ordered to the hospital for pretrial evaluation have charges ranging from trespassing to murder. There is a wide variation of psychopathology at the hospital, with many patients carrying several diagnoses (Fein, 1980). The population at Bridgewater has held constant over the study period. On April 14, 1992 the census was 317; 96 of these men were observation patients, 221 were committed for treatment. October 5, 1994 the census total was 307; 103 were observation patients and 204 were committed patients.

Because murder is such a serious offense, court officials exercise caution prior to a trial to maximize the information accumulated on the alleged perpetrator. Higher proportions of homicide offenders are routinely referred for forensic evaluation in Massachusetts than any other criminal offense (B. Phillips & Hornik, 1984). In contrast, however, on an average only 4.8% of the individuals facing charges of homicide in Massachusetts receive a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) verdict annually (B. Phillips & Hornik, 1984). This is similar to data collected by Packer (1987) on a Michigan sample, and to the National Criminal Justice data set. Men charged with murder sent to BSH appear similar to those reported in other populations.

No empirical data are available from the state or the research literature to descriptively illuminate differences between murderers who receive pretrial evaluations and those who do not (Wesley Profit, personal communication, September, 1987). Clinical observation of these males suggests that when there is no clear "motive", or when the violence of the murder is exceedingly



brutal, there is a greater likelihood that the court will remand individuals to Bridgewater State Hospital for evaluation (Dr. Shervert Frazier, personal communication, October 1987). It may be that individuals who kill during the course of another crime, such as robbery, are under represented in the BSH population. Sample bias may exist in admissions to the hospital, however, it is not a variable easily controlled for.

#### Study Participants

All participants in this study were drawn from consecutive admissions to Bridgewater State Hospital, Massachusetts' maximum security psychiatric facility, over an eight month period. They were unpaid volunteers who were determined by the hospital's clinical director as competent to give their permission to participate in the research, and who subsequently did so. All had English speaking skills.

Widom (1978; personal communication, January 1991) stressed the need for criminals to be studied at various stages of the judicial process: pretrial, immediately after incarceration, and after lengthy intervals of incarceration. In this study, subjects were selected from two of Widom's proposed areas: pre-trial and immediate post conviction.

The study sample included all adult males who were accused or tried for murder. The comparison group included all adult males who entered the hospital during the same eight month period who were accused of or tried for nonassaultive offenses. The first group has been labeled as the murder sample and the second group the nonassaultive controls.

The two groups were compared on 21 continuous and discrete variables from categories including: demographics (race, nationality, age, socioeconomic status); medical and psychiatric history; violence and criminal history; and interpersonal functioning (child abuse, animal abuse, marital status) using t-test and chi-square analyses. There were no significant differences between

the groups at significance levels of .05 or less, thus minimizing the possibility of confounds on planned data analyses.

Murder Sample. In quantitative research is important to obtain the largest population sample numbers possible to determine subgroup commonalities. Since the occurrence of murder is a rare event, and one where individuals who commit such acts do not readily disclose they have done so, accurate subject selection is made even more difficult. Therefore, the criterion from which this sample was defined and drawn is that based upon the State of Massachusetts' criminal standards, in which there must be sufficient legal evidence to justify probable cause for indictment of the offense. The standard of probable cause is that the facts and circumstances of knowledge are enough to legally warrant the belief of guilt.

Using this legal standard as definition for the homicide subject population, the homicide target sample included: (a) all adult males indicted for first and second degree murder and willful manslaughter, and who were referred to the hospital for pretrial psychiatric evaluation and/or treatment (Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 123 Section 15B and 15B remand); (b) all adult males convicted of murder who were admitted to the hospital for an aid to sentencing (Section 15E); (c) all adult males referred through the prison system who were awaiting trial or who had been recently sentenced for murder (Section 18A), and (d) all men acquitted of homicide by reason of insanity during the time period of the study (Section 16).

The target population during the eight month sampling period (mid-May 1992 through mid-January 1993) totalled 40 murderers. Ten cases were excluded by the hospital's clinical director due to either the potential subject's accelerated evaluation period or to potential legal complications such as the age of the perpetrator, or the political nature of the case. Three cases were excluded due to the potential subject's mental status for competency to participate. The remaining two cases were

excluded due to the potential subject's lack of English speaking abilities.

The actual murder sample included twenty-five subjects who gave consent and completed participation in the study. All who were asked to participate in the study willingly did so. All but three of the participants acknowledged the murder offense. Two of the three individuals were found guilty at trial and the third committed suicide prior to his trial. It is believed the study sample represents a "true" representation of individuals who have murdered.

Nonassaultive Controls. Comparison groups are used in studies to maintain the internal validity of an experiment and to assess the independent effects on variables measured. It is essential that subjects in the control group match those in the experimental group in all ways likely to systematically affect the dependent variable (Parlee, 1981). Parlee further added that the choice of the comparison group may determine the conclusions reached.

Langevin et al. (1987) suggested that control groups of nonassaultive offenders or patients from the same facility would be helpful in overcoming previous homicide research sampling difficulties. Few control group studies have been conducted in homicide research (Cornell, 1990; Cornell et al., 1987a, 1987b, 1989; Cornell, Miller, & E. Benedek, 1988; Greco, 1989; MacDonald & Paitich, 1981; Sendi & Blomgren, 1975). Although Cornell et al. (1987a, 1987b) have used nonassaultive patients as controls, they caution that important differences in referral practices may exist for defendants with different charges. For instance, individuals charged with homicide may be routinely referred for evaluation because of the seriousness of a charge, while those charged with lesser offenses may have been referred for more specific reasons, such as clear psychiatric symptoms or a history of mental health treatment. Such referral may introduce group bias and distortions.

Based upon the rationale and methodology of Cornell (1990), Cornell et al. (1987a, 1987b, 1988), and Greco (1989), individuals with nonperson assault charges or convictions who entered

Bridgewater State Hospital during the same time period and under the same legal sections as the murder group) 15B, 15B remand, 15E, 18A and 16), were chosen as the control group.

To enhance the internal validity of the study, several additional checks were implemented with the comparison group. To minimize contamination, arrest and conviction histories were scrutinized for previous instances of interpersonal violence. Anyone with this prior history was excluded from the study.

The nonassaultive controls were much more difficult to obtain than expected. Consequently there was a smaller number than the murderers. The majority of individuals admitted to the facility during the study had prior or instant offense histories of violence toward others on their criminal records which automatically eliminated them from consideration. Seven of the nonviolent potential subjects were eliminated due to their mental status or their English language speaking abilities. Ten individuals who had no prior official or self reported histories of hurting another person made up the control group.

#### Demographic Comparisons of the Study Sample

The study sample totalled thirty five subjects who were selected according to the inclusion criteria outlined previously; 25 individuals were classified for the murder group and 10 were nonassaultive controls. Eighty-five percent (N=32) of the entire sample held United States citizenship. The remaining three individuals were from Vietnam, Haiti and the British Virgin Islands. Racial origin was predominately caucasian (68%, N=24) with minority representation consisting of black (11% N=4), Hispanic (11%, N=4), and Asian (8%, N=3). Sixty-five percent (N=23) had either current or previous marital/live-in relationships. The subjects' ages ranged from 18 to 59 and 32 was the mean age of group.

### Homicide Characteristics

#### Means of Killing

Stabbing, the most frequent means of victim death (N=10, 38%), was most prevalent in intimate nonblood partner killings; only three victims were nonintimates. All the stabbing victims were female with the exception of two cases, one of these was a homosexual relationship.

The second most frequent means of victim death was shooting, applying to 23% of the homicides (N=6). All of the shooting victims were Nonintimate males. Four were acquaintances and two were strangers. In both of the stranger cases, the crime circumstance was classified by the Cornell et al. (1987a) model as psychotic.

The third and fourth methods of killing were by personal means. 19% of the cases were from strangulation (N=5) and 11% were from bludgeoning (N=3). All of the strangulation and bludgeoning victims were female, with the exception of a male toddler, whose death resulted from battering. The circumstance in three cases was domestic conflict. The remaining four cases were crime circumstance rape-murders. Three of the four rape-murder strangulations were of stranger victims and the fourth was a sister-in-law.

Of the two remaining cases, one death occurred during a robbery episode where a male nonintimate acquaintance died from being run over with his own vehicle. The second death was an intimate toddler male who died in a fire set by his father during a relationship conflict with the child's mother.

#### Type of Force Used

The type of force used in the victims' deaths was classified, using M. Cooper's (1994) classification system. In 48% of the cases (N=12) death resulted from "minimum force", such as a single stab wound, shot, or blow. "Excessive force", such as numerous stab or shooting wounds, or

multiple methods for death, was identified in 32% of the cases (N=8). Seven of the eight excessive force victims were adult females; five of the situations involved intimate domestic disputes, the other two were rape-murders of female strangers. The remaining 20% of the cases (N=5) were classified as involving "moderate force", which was defined by default by not fitting either the minimum or excessive categories.

#### Location of the Homicide

Fifty-six percent (N=14) of the victims were killed in their own home. Sixteen percent of the perpetrators were residing with their victims on the day of the murder (N=4). Thirty-two percent of the victims (N=8) had prior or current court protection orders from their perpetrators. Another 36% (N=9) took place in a public location. The remaining 8% (N=2) took occurred indoors at a workplace.

#### Classification of Murder Subjects into Research Groups

As discussed earlier, there is a significant need to make empirical distinctions among murderers for both research and clinical purposes. Loftin et al. classified murderers by relationship (Figure 9), and Cornell et al. (Figure 10) by the circumstances of the offense. Both methods were employed in this study. Murderers were also classified and analyzed according to the gender of the victim (Figure 11).


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Insert Figures 9, 10 & 11 about here


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Murder Relationship Classification. The method of classification most frequently reported in the literature, which has also shown significance in both small and large scale studies, is the division of offenders by the murder relationship. In the interest of enhancing comparison of data

**FIGURE 9**  
Classification of Subjects into Research Groups  
Comparison of Murders by Relationships




**FIGURE 10**  
Classification of Subjects into Research Groups  
Offense Circumstance Comparison





**FIGURE 11**  
**Classification of Subjects into Research Groups**  
**Murderers Compared by Victim Gender**



between studies, and in using well established and widely used referents (Morris, 1965), the murder relationship classification was chosen and one of the independent methods for dividing subjects into subgroupings for analysis.


In a discussion of the importance and complexity of systematically measuring victim and offender relationships, Loftin et al. (1987) indicated that almost no methodological research has been conducted to operationalize the criterion for such classification. In an attempt to strengthen this aspect of study, Loftin and his colleagues devised a coding instrument to increase the reliability and validity of relationship classification (Appendix K). They described their instrument as an attribute coding form since the classification is based on a sequential series of binary decisions about the presence or absence of attributes. Figure 12 presents a diagrammatic representation of how subjects are assigned to relationship groups. Subjects are classed under two major headings: (1) intimate, which includes two clusters, (a) blood kin (genealogical relative) and (b) nonblood kin (affinial relative), and (2) nonintimate, which includes two clusters: (c) acquaintance, and (d) stranger.

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Insert Figure 12 about here

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In Loftin's pilot reliability study, two raters reached agreement on 85% (220 of 260) of the items with discordance occurring mainly from ambiguous or contradictory information in the case files. For the current study the author and a second rater used Loftin's attribute coding form to classify the murderers into subgroups by relationship with exact agreement on all 35 cases. This high reliability is attributed to the author's extensive review of each participant's case files and direct interviews. Consequently all data were made available for the second rater to employ the necessary information for coding. Of the 25 murderers, 11 killed intimates and 14 killed nonintimates.

**FIGURE 12****Decision Tree for Classification of Murderers by Relationship**

Within the intimate grouping, two individuals were blood kin and 9 were non-blood kin. The nonintimate grouping had 8 acquaintance and 6 stranger murders.

Offense Circumstance Classification. Cornell et al. (1987c) derived a typology of murderers based upon the circumstances of the offense (interpersonal conflict, crime related, psychotic). All offenders are examined by a sequential analysis (Appendix L). First, the individual's case is reviewed to differentiate psychotic from nonpsychotic. Individuals who meet the criteria for the psychotic group are classified in this cluster even if they meet criteria for the other groups. Nonpsychotic offenders are placed in either the crime or conflict group. The crime group have committed homicide in the course of another crime, such as robbery or rape. Those in the conflict group have killed in an interpersonal altercation. Figure 13 presents a graphic representation of how subjects are classified into circumstance groups.

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
Insert Figure 13 about here

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Inter-rater agreement of the classification typology was reported at 89% (kappa .80) for 72 cases (Cornell et al., 1987a, 1987b), and 98.5% (kappa .97) for 55 cases. In the present study the author and a second rater reached agreement in all but one case. Of the 25 murder cases, 4 cases were classified as psychotic, 8 were crime related, and 13 involved interpersonal conflict.

Victim Gender Classification. Although previous research has suggested that men who kill other men are different than men who kill women (Daly & Wilson, 1988), this has not been analyzed using intrapsychic measures. Offenders were classified by the sex of their victim for a their statistical analysis. Of the 25 murder cases, 12 of the victims were male and 13 were female.

**FIGURE 13**  
**Decision Tree for Classification of Murderers**  
**by Circumstance of the Crime**



### Approval for the Study

Permission to conduct research at the hospital was granted by the Criminal History Systems Board of Massachusetts (CORI), by the Bridgewater State Hospital legal department, hospital superintendent, and by the director of clinical treatment (Appendix M). Human subjects approval was granted by the Boston University Charles River Institutional Review Board under an Exempt Status. The data collection procedure was noninvasive and did not involve stress or manipulation of a subject's behavior (Appendix M).

### Procedures for Testing and Treatment of the Data

The researcher checked the daily admissions list of individuals to the hospital. Those whose charges matched the criteria for either the murder or the nonassaultive population were identified as potential study participants. The potential participant's criminal record was hospital chart was then reviewed to assess whether they met sample criteria. The names of those identified as potential subjects were presented to the hospital's clinical director for a determination as to whether they could be approached and asked to participate in the study. The study consisted of three phases, which totaled from 12 to 15 hours per individual to complete.

### Phase 1--Informed Consent

Once a potential subject was cleared by the BSH clinical director, an initial meeting was scheduled. This first meeting was in the presence of a member(s) of the subject's clinical treatment team. The study was verbally introduced to the patient by the clinician, then the author provided a more detailed explanation. Once this information session was completed, the patient was asked to consider participating in the project. All subjects were informed that the project was concerned with learning about different personality characteristics of patients, and those volunteering to participate would be asked for their opinions on a variety of subjects relating to themselves. Potential

participants were verbally assured that the study was noninvasive, that all information pertaining to them would be coded by number for the protection of confidentiality, that it would be used solely for the purposes of research, and not for their forensic evaluations. They were told the estimated time commitment would be about ten hours, that meetings would be scheduled in blocks of time that coordinated with the participant's work schedule or therapy appointments. Further, potential participants were informed that all results of the study would be offered upon its' completion.

Once the explanation of the study was provided, the individuals had opportunity to discuss their concerns. Everyone who was approached agreed to participate. An informed consent form (Appendix N), was reviewed verbally in its entirety to assure that each point was understood. The consent form was signed by both the participant and the researcher and witnessed by a member of the treatment team. The researcher and the subject each retained a signed copy of the informed consent agreement.

#### Phase 2--Data Collection

Prior to each scheduled meeting, the research reviewed a subject's hospital chart and discussed the person's hospital status with a member of the clinical staff in order to assess mental status and determine whether the subject was able to proceed with the interview and testing. All participants were administered a standardized protocol on an individual basis where the procedure, environment, and the administrator of the experiment were held constant. The order of the protocol was as follows: Structured Interview Protocol (SIP); Parent-Victim-Self Descriptions and Early Recollections (PIV); Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R); and the Rorschach Inkblot Test.

#### Phase 3--Post-Ventio Assessment and Disposition

It is this researcher's belief, which was endorsed by the Bridgewater State Hospital Supervising Counsel, BSH Research Committee, Massachusetts CORI and the Boston University

Charles River Institutional Review Board, that there were no foreseeable legal, physical, social or economic risks or discomforts for the participants of this study. It was anticipated that the only potential foreseeable risk of participation was psychological, whereby an individual might become emotionally upset from the psychological residue from the questions asked during data collection.

To minimize the potential of psychological risks or discomforts to subjects, a post-vention assessment and disposition protocol was prepared, in which the researcher worked with the treatment unit to provide an adequate safety net in the event of emotional discomfort or distress.

Upon completion of each data collection session, the researcher asked the subject about his experience during the interview, with particular focus upon whether any questions or subject matter had left him with any disturbing thoughts or feelings that were in need of further discussion. Based upon this immediate feedback from the debriefing, the investigator formed an assessment of whether therapeutic follow up to the interview should be taken. In the cases where it was felt that further discussion was warranted, the researcher notified the treatment staff of the subject's return to the unit and of the post-vention assessment of mental status.

#### Procedure for Scoring Data

The Rorschach was administered using standard administration procedures as outlined by Exner (1990). As described in chapter III, three scoring scales: Krohn's Object Representation Scale (Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974), the Lerner Defense Scales (P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980), and the Rorschach Defense Scales (Cooper & Arnou, 1986; Cooper et al, 1988), and the experimental criteria for assessment of dehumanization were used for assessment purposes. All of the Rorschach and the early memories and descriptions were transcribed shortly after administration.

The author and a second rater blind to the hypotheses of the study independently scored the Rorschach and PVS data. To minimize researcher bias, all material was scored six months after



administration. All identifying information was removed from the data before responses were scored.

A second rater was first trained in the conceptual methodology of each measure. This was followed by practice use of the materials. Scoring was done independently. Inter-rater reliability was assessed by for all three measures by comparing ratings on all of the Rorschach protocols and on the PVS early memories and descriptions. Disagreements in scoring for all scales was resolved by the author and a senior researcher versed in the scales after reliability had been assessed.

#### Inter-rater Reliability

Establishing reliability was an important component of the study. The reliability ratings of the data were all respectable. Overall inter-rater reliability outcomes were all 90 percent or above for all measures. With the exception of the PCL-R ratings, the data were disguised and rated independently by the author and an independent judge.

Object Representation ratings yielded high reliabilities on both the Rorschach and the PVS descriptions and early memories. For the Rorschach responses, the two raters agreed perfectly on the mean outcome object representation score for thirty-three of thirty-five cases, which is equal to 94% exact agreement. On the other two cases, agreement was within one scale point. For the PVS descriptions and early memories, the two raters agreed perfectly on thirty-one cases, which is equal to 88.5%. For the other four cases, agreement was within one scale point. Reliability ratings for this study were slightly higher than reliability data reported by previous researchers who used Krohn's scale. It is felt this outcome has occurred in part because there was not a wide range of variation in object representation with the subject sample. Unlike, Krohn (1972) and Greif's (1986) studies in which several dreams were used to assess object representation and a range of scores occurred for the same individuals, the Rorschach and PVS descriptions and early memory recollections were more

constricted and thus easier to score.

The defensive configuration scores had the lowest reliabilities, though overall findings were still high. Overall inter-rater agreement on the Lerner Defense Scales was 96 percent, with a range from 93 to 100 percent for the five categories. For the Rorschach Defense Scale, overall inter-rater agreement was 94 percent with a range from 87 to 100 percent. Inter-rater agreement for specific categories on the defense scale is presented in Tables 2 and 3.

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Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here

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Due to a number of extenuating circumstances, it was not possible to have a second individual conduct independent PCL-R ratings with the investigator on all of the subjects. A second rater experienced with the scale reviewed five protocols at random and sat with the investigator during two interviews. Independent ratings for seven subjects demonstrated exact agreement on five (74%), with one hundred percent agreement at 1 point or less difference. These findings are consistent with those reported by Gacono and Hutton (1994) and sufficiently sound for research purposes.

Rorschach protocols and PVS descriptions and early recollections were rated independently for dehumanization using the experimental criteria in Appendix J. Inter-rater reliability was assessed by comparing ratings for all scorable responses on the Rorschach and for each early memory or description. Inter-rater reliabilities on the scored responses were 97% for exact hits and 100% for outcomes within one scale point. In the cases of rater discrepancy, the percepts had elements of both ratings, and the two raters had independently deliberated between the same two scores.

**TABLE 2**  
**INTER-RATER AGREEMENT FOR LERNER DEFENSE SCALES**

Defense	Times Rated	Agreement Percentage
Splitting	20	95
Devaluation	79	93.6
Idealization	38	94.7
Projective Identification	30	93.3
Denial	18	100
Total	185	96.5

Note:  $N = 35$ , agreement percentages based on two raters

**TABLE 3**  
**INTER-RATER AGREEMENT FOR RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**

Defense	Times Rated	Agreement Percentage
Neurotic	673	94
Neurotic Denial	38	92
Intellectualization	82	96
Isolation	84	94
Reaction Formation	12	91
Repression	347	96
Rationalization	66	94
Pollyanish Denial	44	95
Borderline	539	93.5
Splitting	106	94
Projective Identification	108	92
Devaluation	179	93
Primitive Idealization	23	87
Projection	115	95
Omnipotence	8	100
Psychotic	120	95
Massive Denial	85	96
Hypomanic Denial	35	94
Total	1332	94

Note:  $N = 35$ , agreement percentages based on two raters

Classification of subjects into groups based on motivational circumstances of the offense required training of raters as well. Two raters studied the classification criteria developed by Cornell et al. (1987a) and separately coded 10 sample cases. Following this training, the raters independently classified the 35 subjects using offense descriptions contained in the official hospital records and obtained 100 percent exact agreement. Coder classification of the subjects using Loftin et al.'s relationship criteria yielded ninety-seven percent exact agreement.

## CHAPTER VI

### RESULTS

#### Research Hypotheses

The hypotheses of the study were tested for significance of differences among means using analysis of variance. Seven study predictions were examined along four dimensions: object representation, defensive configuration, degree of psychopathy, and degree of dehumanization. The eighth planned comparison examined the intercorrelations between the dependent measures. The results from these analyses are presented below.

#### Hypothesis 1: Comparison of Murderers to Controls

Hypothesis 1 investigated whether the two groups, by nature of the offense which brought them to court, would be different from one another on the four dimensions of intrapsychic structure. (see Figure 14)

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Insert Figure 14 about here

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A one way analysis of variance was computed between group differences on each variable. No significant findings were observed. Table 4 summarizes the results of these analyses. This outcome is notable in that it points to an important theoretical consideration when research on murderers is conducted. It demonstrates that murderers represent a heterogeneous population with a


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Insert Table 4 about here

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**FIGURE 14**

Hypothesis 1 -- Murderers to Controls



**TABLE 4**  
**ANOVA COMPARISON OF CONTROLS TO MURDERERS**

	Controls		Murderers			
	<u>(n = 10)</u>		<u>(n = 25)</u>			
Variable	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	ANOVA F RATIO	Significance
<hr/>						
Object Representation						
RoObjrep	2.497	(.359)	2.451	(.321)	.138	n.s.
PVSObjrep	2.750	(.677)	3.140	(1.381)	.719	n.s.
Defensive Configuration						
RDS	41.50	(12.067)	44.08	(15.84)	.479	n.s.
LDS	5.80	(3.910)	5.120	(4.558)	.171	n.s.
Level of Psychopathy						
PCL-R Total	27.130	(8.012)	24.956	(8.810)	.456	n.s.
Factor 1	10.600	(3.748)	9.840	(4.007)	.266	n.s.
Factor 2	13.600	(3.502)	11.960	(4.238)	.171	n.s.
Degree of Dehumanization						
Dehum. Total	8.300	(2.003)	7.800	(2.769)	.268	n.s.

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach object representation mean; PVS = Parent-Victim-Self Object representation mean; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales total; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales total



wide within group variance. As will be demonstrated from the outcomes in hypotheses 3, 5, and 7, investigation of murderers requires more defined subgroup parameters for meaningful statistical distinctions to be observed.

#### Hypotheses 2: Pre-trial and Post-trial Comparisons

Hypothesis two evaluated whether trial status would differentiate the subjects, both intra- and inter-group. As expected, no significant differences were observed between those who were pretrial compared to those who were post-trial. This finding lends support to the assumption that the dependent variables of the study were measuring subjects' intrapsychic traits rather than state dependent features. The findings from hypothesis two are also potentially useful for those considering future personality studies, for it suggests that researchers may be able to increase sample sizes by using both pre-trial and post-trial individuals without confounding outcomes.

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Insert Figure 15 and Table 5 about here

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Hypotheses 3 through 7 defined murderers in more discrete terms for intra-group comparisons. In the following discussion of the hypotheses, unless specifically noted, the reader should assume that comparative analyses revealed no differences.

#### Hypothesis 3: Comparison of Intimate to Nonintimate Murderers


Analyses of this hypothesis was conducted according to the nature of the relationship between the victim(s) and the perpetrator, using Loftin et al. (1987) classification criteria

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Insert Figure 16 and Table 6 about here

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**FIGURE 15**  
Hypothesis 2 -- Pre and Post Trial Murders to  
Pre and Post Trial Controls




**TABLE 5**  
**PRETRIAL TO POST TRIAL ANOVA COMPARISONS**

Variable	Controls		Murderers		Significance	
	Pretrial	Post Trial	Pretrial	Post Trial		
	(n = 8)	(n = 2)	(n = 18)	(n = 7)	F Ratio	Level
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)		
<b>Object Representation</b>						
RoObjrep	8.75 (1.48)	6.50 (3.53)	7.88 (2.63)	7.57 (3.30)	.683	n.s.
PVSObjrep	2.48 (.39)	2.54 (.271)	2.46 (.349)	2.40 (.25)	.070	n.s.
<b>Defensive Configuration</b>						
RDS	42.87 (13.10)	36. (5.65)	45.50 (16.32)	40.42 (15.08)	.873	n.s.
LDS	6.125 (4.29)	4.5 (2.12)	5.22 (4.747)	4.857 (4.375)	.181	n.s.
<b>Level of Psychopathy</b>						
PCL-R Tot.	28.28 (7.364)	22.50 (12.02)	24.21 (9.00)	26.86 (8.66)	.456	n.s.
Factor 1	11. (4.)	9. (2.82)	9.94 (4.16)	9.57 (3.86)	.266	n.s.
Factor 2	14.37 (2.97)	10.50 (4.95)	11.33 (4.43)	13.57 (3.45)	1.71	n.s.
<b>Degree of Dehumanization</b>						
Dehum. Tot.	8.75 (1.48)	6.50 (3.53)	7.88 (2.63)	7.57 (3.30)	.683	n.s.

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach Object Representation; PVSObjrep = Parent-Victim-Self Object representation; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales; PCL-R Tot. = Hare Psychopathy Checklist total score; Factor 1 = PCL-R Factor 1; Factor 2 = PCL-R Factor 2; Dehum. Tot = Dehumanization Total

**FIGURE 16**

Hypothesis 3 -- Intimate to Non-Intimate Murders  
 Hypothesis 6 -- Blood Kin to Non-Blood Kin Murders  
 Hypothesis 7 -- Acquaintance to Stranger Murders



**TABLE 6**  
**ANOVA COMPARISONS OF INTIMATE TO NONINTIMATE MURDERERS**

	Intimate	Nonintimate		
	(n = 11)	(n = 14)		
Variable	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	ANOVA F RATIO	Significance
Object Representation				
RoObjrep	2.417 (.310)	2.477 (.339)	.203	n.s.
PVSObjrep	3.818 (1.601)	2.607 (.924)	5.658	p < .05
Defensive Configuration				
RDS	45.63 (18.51)	42.85 (14.01)	.420	n.s.
LDS	4.636 (4.34)	5.500 (4.84)	.214	n.s.
Level of Psychopathy				
PCL-R Total	21.06 (8.302)	28.01 (8.20)	4.373	p < .05
Factor 1	8.182 (3.157)	11.143 (4.22)	3.749	n.s.
Factor 2	10.09 (4.085)	13.429 (3.87)	4.356	p < .05
Degree of Dehumanization				
Dehum. Total	6.455 (2.876)	8.857 (2.248)	5.510	p < .05

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach object representation mean; PVS = Parent-Victim-Self object representation mean; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales total; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales total

When the sample of 25 murderers was divided into intimate ( $N = 11$ ) or non-intimate ( $N = 14$ ) groupings, and then compared on the four intrapsychic components, three significant findings were observed. These findings are discussed below.

Men who killed intimates (mean = 3.818, SD 1.601) exhibited higher levels of object representation than those who killed nonintimates (mean = 2.607, SD 0.924) when they were asked to offer descriptions and early memory recollections. The one-way ANOVA actual, ( $F\ 1, 23$ ) = 5.658, was significant at 0.026. In both cases the object representation mean scores were at the lower end of the spectrum. Intimate murderers described others in need gratifying ways while the nonintimate murderers offered descriptions that were more distorted and malevolently tinged. This outcome corresponds with scores on the psychopathy and dehumanization measures.

Men who killed intimates exhibit less psychopathy than those who killed nonintimates as demonstrated by comparison of group means on the one-way ANOVA using Bonferroni analysis ( $F\ (1, 23) = 4.373$ ,  $p < .05$  (0.048). While both groups average in the moderate range of psychopathy, the intimate group's mean score was at the low end of the moderate range (mean = 21.064, SD 8.302) while the nonintimate group's mean score was at the upper end of the moderate psychopathy range (mean = 28.014, SD 8.209). When analysis of the psychopathy outcome was considered by factor components, the items on factor 2 describing chronic antisocial behaviors were less prominent with the intimate group (mean = 10.091, SD 4.085) than with those who killed nonintimates (mean = 13.429, SD 3.877). This finding supports a widely held assumption about the general population of murderers which is that individuals who kill nonintimates are characteristically more antisocial than those who kill family members.

When dehumanization mean scores were compared between the intimate and nonintimate murder groups, there was a significant between-groups difference on this factor,  $F\ (1,23) = 5.510$ ,  $p$

$p < .05$ . The intimate murderers (mean = 6.455, SD 2.876) demonstrated less dehumanization than nonintimate murderers (mean = 8.857, SD 2.248). This finding shows support for the theoretical conceptualization of dehumanization (see Figure 8) as well as support for the assumption that murderers can be differentiated by this component of their intrapsychic functioning.

Overall, findings from testing of hypothesis three have supported the assumption that there are intrapsychic differences which are measurable between groups of intimate and nonintimate murderers. The intimate murderers have higher levels of object representation, demonstrate fewer psychopathic features, and they dehumanize others at significantly lower rates than those who kill nonintimates. These findings also lend support for the assumption that murderers are a heterogeneous set, and when classified into more homogeneous groupings, such as by nature of the victim and offender relationship, meaningful personality distinctions can be observed.

#### Hypothesis 4: Victim Gender Comparisons

In the study sample of 25 murderers, 13 of the cases involved female victims and 12 cases involved male victims (see Figure 17). In an effort to determine whether there was a relationship between the gender of the victim killed to any of the intrapsychic measures, a one way analysis of variance was computed.


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Insert Figure 17 and Table 7 about here

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Only one item of significance was observed ( $F(1,23)=0.379$ ,  $p<.05$ ). Males who killed other males (mean = 2.583, SD 0.996), exhibited lower levels of object representation than males who killed females (mean = 3.654, SD 1.519). When the victim and offender relationship and crime circumstances of the female victim cases was considered, nine of the females were

**FIGURE 17**  
Hypothesis 4 -- Victim Gender Comparison





**TABLE 7**  
**ANOVA COMPARISONS OF VICTIM GENDER MURDER GROUPS**

Variable	Male Victim ( <u>n = 12</u> )	Female Victim ( <u>n = 13</u> )	ANOVA	
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	F RATIO	Significance
<b>Object Representation</b>				
RoObjrep	2.44 (.34)	2.45 (.314)	.006	n.s.
PVSObjrep	2.58 (.99)	3.65 (1.51)	4.26	p < .05
<b>Defensive Configuration</b>				
RDS	41.83 (11.96)	46.15 (19.00)	.947	n.s.
LDS	5.66 (5.08)	4.61 (4.15)	.323	n.s.
<b>Level of Psychopathy</b>				
PCL-R Total	27.08 (7.83)	22.99 (9.50)	1.36	n.s.
Factor 1	10.50 (3.89)	9.23 (4.16)	.61	n.s.
Factor 2	13.33 (4.03)	10.69 (4.17)	2.58	n.s.
<b>Degree of Dehumanization</b>				
Dehum. Total	8.250 (2.09)	7.38 (3.30)	.59	n.s.

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach object representation mean; PVS = Parent-Victim-Self object representation mean; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales total; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales total

nonblood family members who died under conflict related circumstances. The other four women killed did not have a prior relationship with their offenders. Their deaths were sexual homicides and would be classified as crime related circumstances. The relationship composition for the male victim cases was quite different. In this grouping, ten of the twelve cases involved nonintimate victims who were either acquaintances ( $n = 7$ ) or strangers ( $n = 3$ ). Only two cases involved intimates (1 blood kin and 1 nonblood kin), both of whom were children. The crime circumstances in the male victim cases also differed from the female victim group. Only four of the male victims died under conflict related circumstances, the three strangers died in circumstances classified as psychotic, and the other five male victims died under conflict related circumstances.

The single item of significance concerning the level of object representation to victim gender comparisons is not convincing in and of itself to the author. Victim gender appears to be interrelated with victim-offender relationships and with crime circumstance. Findings from this hypothesis testing suggest that gender classification does not stand well on its own as a useful independent classification means when intrapsychic dependent measures are studied. Further study of gender classification in other sample groups is warranted before conclusive distinctions can be offered.

#### Hypothesis 5: Offense Circumstance Comparisons


The third series of offender classification analysis involved groupings based upon the circumstances of the offense. When Cornell et al.'s (1987c) classification criterion was used to divide the sample, there were eight crime, thirteen conflict, and four psychotic cases ( see Figure 18).

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Insert Figure 18 and Table 8 about here

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**FIGURE 18**  
Hypothesis 5 -- Offense Circumstance Comparison



**TABLE 8**  
**ANOVA COMPARISONS OF MURDERERS BY CRIME CIRCUMSTANCE**

	Crime (n = 8)	Conflict (n = 13)	Psychotic (n = 4)	ANOVA	
Variable	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	F Ratio	Significance
<b>Object Representation</b>					
RoObjrep	2.63 (.277)	2.48 (.233)	1.97 (.227)	10.149	p < .001
PVSObjrep	2.31 (.458)	3.76 (1.48)	2.75 (1.50)	3.579	p < .05
<b>Defensive Configuration</b>					
RDS	43.25 (13.78)	43.15 (16.43)	42.25 (21.77)	.45	n.s.
LDS	4.37 (2.56)	4.46 (4.03)	8.75 (8.05)	1.585	n.s.
<b>Level of Psychopathy</b>					
PCL-R Tot.	29.90 (7.40)	24.20 (8.32)	17.50 (8.58)	3.253	n.s.
Factor 1	11.37 (4.20)	9.30 (2.98)	8.50 (6.45)	.55	n.s.
Factor 2	14.62 (2.50)	11.53 (4.17)	8. (4.32)	4.336	p < .05
<b>Degree of Dehumanization</b>					
Dehum. Tot.	9.87 (1.88)	6.53 (2.75)	7.75 (2.06)	3.93	p < .05

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach object representation mean; PVSObjrep = Parent-Victim-Self object representation mean; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales total; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales total  
PCL-R Tot. = PCL-R Total; Dehum. Tot. = Dehumanization Total

As indicated in Table 8, several significant differences were observed. Different levels of object representation were exhibited by each of the offense circumstance subgroups. Analysis of variance of the Rorschach object representation means was highly significant, ( $F_{2,22} = 10.149, p < .001$ ). Group contrasts were subsequently conducted using the Bonferroni unrelated t-test and showed highly reliable differences ( $p < .004$ ) between the groups. The psychotic group had lower levels of object representation (mean = 1.974, SD .227) than the conflict (mean = 2.485, SD .223) and crime (mean = 2.632, SD .277) groups.

When object representation was measured on PVS descriptions and early memories significance was observed between group means on analysis of variance, ( $F_{2,22} = 3.579, p < 0.05$ ). Those who murdered during the commission of another crime (mean = 2.312, SD .458) had the lowest PVS object representation scores, followed by those whose murders were classified as psychotic (mean = 2.75, SD 1.50). Individuals whose murders occurred in the context of an interpersonal conflict (mean = 3.76, SD 1.48) had the most mature perceptions of others.

A trend in psychopathy total scores ( $p = .058$ ) was observed on a one-way analysis of variance for the three offense circumstance groups. When the PCL-R factor scores were analyzed, the groups had significantly different means on the PCL-R factor 2, which represents chronic antisocial behaviors ( $DF(2,22) = 0.26, p < .05$ ). Post hoc testing on this factor using the Bonferroni t-test showed the conflict and psychotic groups to be most dissimilar and the conflict and psychic groups most alike.

A one-way ANOVA of the dehumanization total scores among the offense circumstances revealed significant differences across groups,  $DF(2,22) = 3.93, p < .05$ . The conflict group showed the least evidence of dehumanization, with the psychotic group at midrange, and the crime group showing the most dehumanization (see Table 8).

Overall, variables which most strongly differentiated the offense circumstance groups of murderers were the two measures of object representation, factor 2 of the Hare PCL-R, and the degree of dehumanization. Those murdering in the context of an interpersonal conflict evidenced higher levels of personality functioning. The psychotic group fell in the mid-range. Individuals charged with murder during the commission of another crime had the lowest levels of PVS object representation, the highest psychopathy scores, particularly factor 2 (chronic antisocial behavior), and they demonstrated the highest degree of dehumanization. These findings suggest that conflict murderers, whose serious deficits appear more characterologically entrenched in patterned violence, and who are less able to empathize with others and behave in socially appropriate ways.

#### Hypothesis 6: Blood Kin to Non-blood Kin Murder Comparisons.

Only two of the 25 murder cases involved victims who were blood kin. In one of those cases, the perpetrator killed both a blood kin and a nonblood kin relative in the same incident. Consequently, only one offender fit the blood kin grouping. This number was not sufficient to conduct a meaningful analysis for hypothesis testing.

#### Hypothesis 7: Acquaintance to Stranger Murder Comparisons

Hypothesis seven predicted that there would be differences between nonintimate murderers when they were grouped according to Loftin et al.'s relationship classification scheme. This subset was composed of 8 acquaintance murderers and 6 stranger murderers. (see Figure 16). The only item to reach significance was factor 2 of the PCL-R  $IDF(1,12) = 5.56, p < .05$ .

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Insert Table 9 about here

---

The individuals who killed acquaintances had higher factor 2 psychopathy scores than those who

**TABLE 9**  
**ANOVA COMPARISONS OF ACQUAINTANCE TO STRANGER MURDERERS**

	Acquaintance	Stranger		
	(n = 8)	(n = 6)		
Variable	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	F Ratio	Significance
Object Representation				
Ro Objrep	2.57 (.26)	2.34 (.40)	1.74	n.s.
PVSObjrep	2.56 (.72)	2.66 (1.21)	.040	n.s.
Defensive Configuration				
RDS	40.62 (12.92)	45.83 (16.05)	.165	n.s.
LDS	4.37 (2.50)	7.0 (6.89)	1.00	n.s.
Level of Psychopathy				
PCL-R Tot.	30.62 (7.74)	24.53 (8.11)	2.03	n.s.
Factor 1	11.25 (3.49)	11.00 (5.40)	.011	n.s.
Factor 2	15.25 (2.60)	11.00 (4.14)	5.56	p < .05
Degree of Dehumanization				
Dehum Tot.	9.00 (2.33)	8.66 (2.33)	.070	n.s.

Note: RoObjrep = Rorschach object representation mean; PVSObjrep = Parent-Victim-Self object representation mean; RDS = Rorschach Defense Scales total; LDS = Lerner Defense Scales total; PCL-R Tot. = PCL-R Total; Deh Tot. = Dehumanization Total

killed strangers. In this sample, the acquaintance group had higher mean scores representing lifestyle characteristics based on chronic antisocial behaviors. The stranger subset contained three individuals who killed in the context of a psychotic episode. Two of these cases involved killing during random shooting sprees. The third case involved the stabbing of a stranger who sat down on a park bench next to the offender. The other three stranger killings were sexual homicides. The composition of acquaintance killings involved three conflict related incidents, three sexual homicides, and two cases related to illegal financial dealings. No other analyses were significant between the two groups.

#### Hypothesis 8: Construct Validation of Dehumanization.

One of the primary objectives of this study was to determine whether the degree of dehumanization could be measured, and if so, how this construct corresponded with established measures of object representation, defensive configuration, and psychopathy. In order to evaluate the convergence and discriminability of the dependent measures, intercorrelations and their level of significance were computed between all variables and are presented in Table 10. This constellation of results yielded some meaningful findings.

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Insert Table 10 about here

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The dehumanization total for all subjects ( $N = 35$ ) negatively correlated ( $p < .001$ ) with object representation as measured by parent-victim-self descriptions and early recollections. Low object representation scores strongly correlated with a high dehumanization total. The PCL-R total ( $p < .001$ ) and the two PCL-R factor scores positively correlated with dehumanization. The PCL-R factor 2 was more strongly associated ( $p < .001$ ) with dehumanization than factor 1 ( $p < .005$ ).



**TABLE 10**  
**Pearson Correlation for Dependent Measures of the Study**

	DEHUM	OBJREP	EMOBJREP	HAREFAC1	HAREFAC2	HARETOT	CTOTAL	LTOTAL
DEHUM	-----							
OBJREP	-0.026	-----						
EMOBJREP	-0.582***	-0.046	-----					
HAREFAC1	0.509**	0.068	-0.478**	-----				
HAREFAC2	0.609***	0.329	-0.467**	0.588***	-----			
HARETOT	0.624***	0.211	-0.492**	0.862***	0.894***	-----		
CTOTAL	0.122	-0.195	0.143	0.169	0.017	0.078	-----	
LTOTAL	0.118	-0.439*	-0.088	0.293	-0.076	0.092	0.624***	-----

NOTE:

DEHUM = Dehumanization


OBJREP = Object Representation; EMOBJREP = Early Memory Object Representation

HAREFAC1 = Hare Factor 1; HAREFAC2 = Hare Factor 2; HARETOT = Hare Total,

CTOTAL = Cooper Total, LTOTAL = Lerner Total

N = 35

\* $p \leq .01$ , \*\* $p \leq .005$ , \*\*\* $p \leq .001$



Shading depicts significant values

Among the other personality variables, the salient results were: the negative correlation of Rorschach object representation and the Leaner Defense scales Total ( $p < .01$ ); the negative correlations between PVS early memories and descriptions and the three PCL-R scores ( $p < .005$ ); the positive correlation between factors 1 and 2 on the PCL-R ( $p < .001$ ); and the positive correlation between the two defense measures, the RDS and LDS at ( $p < .001$ ).

In sum, based upon the findings from this sample, it may be concluded that dehumanization is a valid multidimensional intrapsychic construct which encompasses several components of intrapsychic structure, and that it spans a range of intensity and severity. It has been shown to relate to the other components of personality functioning in meaningful ways which correspond well to the theoretical assumptions previously presented.

## CHAPTER VII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There is widespread social consensus which transcends political, racial and economic groupings that certain activities tear at the already frayed social bonds holding society together. It seems to me that when we lend professional assistance, however marginal, to improve society's control of those who will murder...provided that we do not let the nature of that assistance be overstated or distorted--we have nothing for which to apologize. (Monahan, 1984, p. 14).

#### Summary of Major Results

This study has provided two types of meaningful findings which may be useful to mental health and criminal justice providers, and to future investigators. First, these data have demonstrated the significance and utility of subgroup classification of murderers for study of intrapsychic measures. Adjunct to this outcome is provision of convergent validity for Lotfin et al.'s relationship classification scheme (1987) and for Cornell et al.'s (1987c) crime circumstance system. Second, the findings from hypotheses testing have provided construct validation for dehumanization as a measurable dimension of intrapsychic structure. Discussion of both findings are provided below.

#### Classification

Many previous studies of murderers have suffered from a chronic methodological weakness of appropriate classification. Given the limited scholarly attention to meaningful between groups distinction, this study aimed to clarify what methods are most useful.

As expected, the results from the first two hypotheses demonstrated that meaningful differentiations could not be made on the four measures of personality when the gross classification of offense or trial status was used as the independent variables for subgroup differentiation.

Meaningful differences were observed however, when the murderers were subgrouped by victim-offender relationship, offense circumstance, and to a lesser degree by victim gender. These classification findings are meaningful in that they point away from using heterogeneous cluster criteria to using more refined intra-group comparisons.

Since individuals who murder represent a diverse group, and should not be characterized from a single perspective, it may be useful for future investigators to continue using both means; this would allow for comparative analysis with previous studies and would provide further convergent validity for the two empirical methods now available. While one item of significance was observed between perpetrators when classified by victim gender, this means of categorization appears less effective than by relationship or offense circumstance.

#### Dehumanization

The construct of dehumanization contributes in a significant way to conceptually understanding how and why one can murder. This study has considered dehumanization in-depth in the attempt to determine whether it was measurable and could be used to assess differences between murderers. This portion of the study was exploratory and provided a successful first step in construct validation.

Concurrent validity is the extent to which an experimental measure correlates highly with an accepted measure. The findings from data analysis demonstrated dehumanization to have concurrent validity with object representation and psychopathy. These findings offer promise, and with further refinement, measurement of dehumanization may be helpful in articulation of how the "psychological wedge" is created that inhibits the capacity to empathize and which enables disinhibition for acts of violence to occur.

### Discussion of the Dependent Measures

#### Object Representation

Krohn's scale of object representation was used to assess each subject's Rorschach responses and PVS early memories and descriptions. Paradoxically, the two methods of object representation assessment did not parallel one another on outcome findings. In this study, the PVS descriptions and recollections of specific individuals were more salient means for differentiating the groups than analysis of the Rorschach content responses. One explanation for the discrepant findings from use of the two approaches of object representation assessment, is that when an individual with limited object relational capacity is confronted with responding to the nonstructured inkblot task, there may be less relational material stimulated from within the person for formulation. An alternate explanation is that it may be easier for a person to offer object representation descriptions when real people are described. Nonetheless, in both assessment methods, the levels of object representation were low. On a scale ranging from one to eight, the entire group's Rorschach object relational score was at level two. Few images were offered, and when they were, they were of poor quality. With the PVS descriptions and early memories, there was more of a range, with two being the lowest and six the highest. The early memories of the murderers were dominated by themes of deprivation and hurt. There were few happy memories. Krohn (1972) suggested that the Object Representation Scale, when applied to Early Memories as compared to the Rorschach content, yields richer data since the task draws fuller accounts of relationship patterns, feeling about the individuals, and expectations of them than a Rorschach response, where a more skeletal picture of the object is described. On the Rorschach, subjects offered few responses where there were interactions among characters. When interactions were described, the connections were more often aggressive rather than cooperative.

#### Defensive Configuration

Contrary to expectations, the repertoire of defenses used by the subjects on the Rorschach did not differentiate groups, nor did the findings align with the theoretical model of developmental stages of defense. Rather, what appeared was the use of individualized defense constellations that incorporated defenses across the entire developmental spectrum. A particular defense's level and frequency appears most meaningful when considered in context of the composite of other defenses. This finding suggests that frequency counts of the defenses and their hypothesized developmental levels may be of less predictive use than an atheoretical cluster analysis. It is believed the results concerning defenses would have been more useful had they been analyzed in clusters where considerations would be placed on character styles as opposed to developmental lines. This aspect of the study warrants a more careful investigation at some further date, for the data are rich and are deserving of more through analysis.

#### Psychopathy

Assessment of the level of psychopathy revealed important distinctions between the various groupings. In the murder sample, individuals were almost evenly distributed across the low (N=8), moderate (N=8) and high (N=9) psychopathy ranges. In the control sample, there was less distribution across the range from low (N=2), moderate (N=3) to high (N=5). When a more detailed analysis of the PCL-R data was conducted, factor 2, the component of the Hare considered to represent those components most closely aligned with the DSM III-R definition of antisocial personality disorder, accounted for most of the variance in the comparisons.

#### Limitations of the Study

The limitations of this study are evident in several ways. In the areas of methodology, practical considerations dictated departure from ideal research procedures. Since this study involved extensive interviewing and testing of the subject, each person had to be approved by the facility head

whose concerns focused upon political and forensic issues. In several cases, the high profile status of a murderer's case required careful administrative handling of the person and obviously took precedence over allowing the person to be participant in the research. In other situations, a person's stay was expedited to only a few days which precluded access for participation in the study.

A second compromise involved the sample size. The study was targeted to sample 40 murderers and 40 non-assaultive controls but ended with 25 murderers and 10 non-assaultive controls. A number of the non-significant findings were in the predicted direction, and it is possible that use of a larger sample would have revealed the expected group differences that were not found in this investigation. Replication of this work with a larger sample is certainly warranted.

A further problem with the study was with the low number of blood kin subjects. Because of the low numbers of these individuals in the naturally occurring population of murderers (Daly & Wilson, 1988) it was not altogether surprising that the numbers were not sufficiently high during the sampling period to obtain a large enough set for study. In the face of pressing practical considerations, it was decided to drop out this portion of the analysis, as assembling a blood kin group would have required either waiting until such patients appeared at the hospital, or attempting to obtain access to a blood kin sample which extended beyond the parameters of the sampling definition. Both alternatives were likely to have required a new infinite amount of time.

A third compromise involved the ideal practice of having tests administered and scored by an individual blind to the nature of the study. The author tested the subjects and did the scoring of all data.

Despite the limitations discussed with respect to what could not be completely controlled for variables in the subject selection and sampling, as well as the problems with the analysis in the scales themselves, the results permit speculation about considerations of human behavior. While the

research findings did not completely align with the theoretical model outlined in chapter three, there was enough significance to suggest that such empirically based intrapsychic research of murderers may be useful.

#### Implications of the Research

The instruments used in this study do not readily lend themselves to conclusive tests in the practical world. Nonetheless it can be pointed out that when the intrapsychic components of the murderers were considered, they could be differentiated. More research directed toward empirical discrimination between violent individuals is warranted in order for deeper insights to be developed about man's cruelty to his fellow man. Such inquiries may aid in enhanced prediction of future violence for the prevention of unnecessary loss of life.



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Murder is a subcategory of homicide, which is classified as either criminal or noncriminal.

Criminal homicide includes death by murder, those resulting from criminal and noncriminal negligence, and unpremeditated vehicular deaths. Noncriminal homicide includes justifiable and excusable homicide, acts of self-defense, and killings committed in the line of duty by military personnel or of felons by law enforcement officers (Megargee, 1982). For an important discussion of legally sanctioned homicide see Archer and Gartner (1978, 1984).

For the purposes of this study, murder has been defined as: the illegal willful killing of one human being by another. Individuals who have committed murder were identified as those carrying a criminal charge of first or second degree murder. Deaths caused by negligence, suicide, accident, legal justification, and attempts to murder were excluded. While the subject sample was composed of convicted felons, defendants awaiting trial, and persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, for simplicity of language all were referred to as murderers.

<sup>2</sup>From this perspective, the course of human development is conceptualized as moving from an initial position of symbiotic fusion with primary caregivers to one of separate and autonomous functioning with the capacity for cooperative relationships with differentiated objects (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Kernberg, 1970). Mental and emotional illness is classified by dysfunction in patterns of relatedness rather than by a more phenomenologic approach of general psychiatry.

<sup>3</sup>Depth psychology includes all schools derived from mainstream psychoanalysis in which dynamic models of intrapsychic unconscious activities are used to explain aspects of normal and psychopathological personality development. These schools include traditional psychoanalytic,

Individual, Jungian, and Self psychology, American and British Object Relations, and Attachment Theory.

<sup>4</sup>The three fundamental components of intrapsychic structure are: self representation, object representation and affect disposition (Kernberg, 1980). The medium for intrapsychic structuralization is object libidinal fulfilment. Arrest of structural development occurs from repression of the attachment need (Moberly, 1985).

<sup>5</sup>Attachment behavior refers to a biologically rooted and species characteristic form of behavior believed to have evolved through a process of natural selection since it yielded survival advantage. Bowlby defined attachment behavior as responses designed to contact or maintain proximity to a particular individual (1969, pp. 198-209). This motivation to seek contact is not necessarily conscious; nor is the accompanying emotional state necessarily one of love or affection. An attachment need can be activated by any condition which upsets the homeostatic state of the individual. Examples include: pain, fatigue, emotional stress, loneliness and anger. Initially signalling behaviors are simply emitted, rather than specifically directed; with development the attachment need is directed selectively.

<sup>6</sup>"Object representations express the nature and level of object relations, the processes of internalization, and the degree of organization of intrapsychic structures" (Blatt, 1974 p. 138). The level of object representation reflects an individual's global capacity to maintain accurate perceptions of oneself and of others (Procidcano & Guinta, 1989). Assessment of object representation was measured by the Krohn Object Representation Scale (Krohn, 1972; Krohn & Mayman, 1974) using Rorschach data and Parent-Victim-Self early memory recollections and descriptions.

<sup>7</sup>Defense mechanisms are the "regular modes of reaction of [the] character" (S. Freud, 1937/1961a, pp. 237). A person's defensive configuration is the particular cluster of psychological

defenses used to protectively maneuver the self from the experience of intrapsychic discomfort, or narcissistic injury. Defensive functions are believed to be inextricably linked to one's object representations. Both are considered to be developmentally organized, ranging from primitive to mature (Beland, 1988; Cooper & Arnou, 1986; Waldinger, 1984). Assessment of defensive configuration was assessed from Rorschach responses, which were scored using the Lerner Defense Scales (P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980) and Rorschach Defense Scales (Cooper & Arnou, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988).

<sup>8</sup>"Psychopathy is a deviant developmental disturbance characterized by an inordinate amount of instinctual aggression and the absence of an object relational capacity to bond" (Meloy, 1988a p. 5). Salient characteristics of psychopathy include: an inability to experience empathy or concern for others, or to maintain warm, affectional attachments; unreliability, insincerity, pathological lying, egocentricity; poor judgment and impulsivity; an absence of remorse, guilt, or shame; an impersonal and poorly integrated sex life; and an unstable life-style with no long-term plans or commitments (Hare & McPherson, 1984). Assessment of the degree of psychopathy is based upon an outcome score on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist--Revised (Hare, 1990).

<sup>9</sup>When the attachment bond between child and caregiver is disrupted and the child experiences an attachment need, the child will elicit attachment behavior of low to high levels of intensity to quell the need and return the person to a homeostatic state. If the attachment need is not responded to, the child will respond to the absence or loss of the love object with: (a) initial protest, which gives way to (b) despair and finally to (c) detachment. Defensive detachment represses the attachment need and checks the process of intrapsychic structuralization, which as a dynamic force, remains in the unconscious throughout life. In some cases this mourning reaction may not be resolved and ambivalence or hatred toward the love-object (experienced as hurtful) is never worked

through, and interpersonal character pathology develops (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1988a, 1988b; Mawson, 1980; Moberly, 1983, 1985, 1986; Volkan, 1981).

<sup>10</sup>According to Klein (1946), and later Kernberg, the neonate first conceives others to be part objects (the paranoid-schizoid position) where only portions of the individual are experienced. In adulthood a part object is a nonmetabolized dissociated aspect of a total object that is defensively split into opposing components. In part object relationships the individual experiences self and others in alternating, and sometimes chaotic interchanges of good or bad (Kernberg, 1980).

<sup>11</sup>The diagnoses of borderline, narcissistic, paranoid, schizoid and antisocial personalities have been classified under the rubric of primitive personality where three basic clinical characteristics exist: (a) an absence of personality integration, (b) undifferentiated sensorimotor-affective thinking, and (c) an inability to identify and sustain core emotions (M. Robbins, 1989).

<sup>12</sup>Separation-individuation is the third phase of intrapsychic development where the individual forms a discrete identity, separateness and individuality (Mahler, 1968). The subphases of separation-individuation are: differentiation, practicing, rapprochement and separation-individuation proper. Phase specific difficulties are theorized as the source of particular forms character pathology that extend into adulthood.

<sup>13</sup>Ego syntonic is a state where thoughts, feelings and behavior are in conformity with the ego and superego. Thus, behavior is considered as adaptive, acceptable, justifiable and non ego disruptive (Freud, 1933/1961c). Ego dystonic, the converse of ego syntonic, is that which is unacceptable to the ego.

<sup>14</sup>Meloy classified aggressive behavior into two general modes called predatory or affective (1988a, 1988b). Distinctive neuroanatomical pathways and different sets of neurotransmitters have been identified with these behaviors (Eichelman, Elliott, & Barchas, 1981). Affective aggression

results when external or internal threatening stimuli evokes an intense and patterned activation of the autonomic nervous system, which is accompanied by threatening vocalizations and attacking or defending postures. In contrast, predatory aggression is purposeful, planned and emotionless. The individual suspends empathic regard and plans to carry out an act that inflicts suffering on another human being. Predatory aggression, is the hallmark of the violent psychopathic personality.

<sup>15</sup>Campbell (1989, p. 211) defined dissociation as: Segregation of any group of mental processes from the rest of the psychic apparatus; dissociation generally means a loss of the usual interrelationships between various groups of mental processes with resultant almost independent functioning of the one group that has been separated from the rest. As so defined, dissociation and splitting are approximately equivalent. The mental mechanism of isolation can also be considered a type of dissociation. Dissociative episodes may be caused by psychological, physiological or pharmacological factors. The outcome, however is the same, it is a state of ego rupture and ego disorganization where temporary but drastic modification of a person's character or sense of self occurs to avoid emotional distress. Dissociative reactions allow for the expression of violence that would otherwise be unacceptable (Waldinger, 1984). Tanay (1969, 1976b) indicated that dissociative states are utilized as defense mechanisms to avoid experiencing awareness of unacceptable impulses. Both depersonalization, the change in the awareness of the self in which the individual feels as if he is unreal, and derealization, the change in awareness where the external world appears altered, have been identified with dissociative episodes (Sedman, 1970).

<sup>16</sup>Kohut (1971) defined selfobjects as other persons who are experienced as extensions of the self, whom one perceives to have a degree of control, and who are utilized to restore cohesion when intrapsychic discomfort is experienced.

<sup>17</sup>Catathymia has been described as an unconscious psychological process or reaction which

is activated by charged affects connected to an individual or complex of ideas. The affect, when stimulated, overwhelms the psychic equilibrium of the individual and disrupts logical thinking. This concept has been used by various theorists to explain why sudden unprovoked violence occurs.

Acute catathymic homicides are those which are triggered by a sudden overwhelming affect attached to ideas of symbolic significance. With these episodes the victim is usually a stranger and the memory of the event is poor. In chronic catathymic homicides, the emotion is triggered by a build up of tension, a feeling of frustration, depression and helplessness. Usually individuals in close relationships and family members are killed and the memory for the event is preserved.

<sup>18</sup>Object constancy is a developmental stage of personality integration which involves the internalization of equilibrium maintaining maternal functions that leads to a separate self-regulating self. When one has achieved object constancy there is a capacity to: differentiate between individuals, value others for attributes other than need satisfaction, and tolerate loving and hostile feelings toward the same person. A. Freud defined object constancy as the ability "to retain attachment even when the person is unsatisfying" (in Horner 1979, pp. 34-35).

<sup>19</sup>Isomorphic Connection is the association one makes to another who is like in structure, form or in spirit.

<sup>20</sup>Introjection is an unconscious process of investing affect into the image of another rather than the real person. Primary identification is an unconscious process of considering one to be identical with another.

<sup>21</sup>Kinesthesia is the projection of some kind of action or life into the inkblot (H. English & A. English, 1958/1962, p. 284).

**APPENDIX A**

**KROHN OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCALE**

A. S. Krohn (1972, pp. 177-186)

For use with Rorschach content and movement responses,  
and with Parent-Victim Descriptions and Recollections

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Krohn (personal communication, May 1991)

### **KROHN OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCALE\***

#### GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

First, read over the scale.

This scale attempts to register the sense the subject has of objects in his world--how primitive, shadowy, malevolent, anonymous, stereotyped, or one-dimensional they are on the one hand, or how full, defined, feeling and in general human and complete they are on the other. Your task is to infer this overall quality of the patient's inner object world from his dreams. Let the dream wash over you, let your clinical "feel" tell you how human, how real, how whole, and how mature are the people as the dreamer experiences them. The scale rests on your global sense of the dream and therefore I would like to encourage you to use your intuition and empathy in any way you can.

Each point on the scale is defined in three ways: (a) a global description of the nature of the object world, (b) some typical characteristics to look for in the dream, and (c) a sample dream. I would like you to rely most heavily on the global description of the scale points and the sample dream that illustrates that description. The typical characteristics are features of the dreams that tended to correlate with each of the global descriptions. The criteria should be used as aids to your intuition and are not intended to be used instead of your overall sense of the dream. Indeed, if you have a clear sense of the dream's location on the scale and the dream does not contain any of the characteristics, simply ignore the typical characteristics. These characteristics are intended to be signposts to supplement your intuition, not constrict it.

#### SPECIAL SCORING NOTES:

1. Many dreams contain several characters. If a dream contains even one character that clearly meets the criteria in categories 2, 3 or 4, give particular weight to that.
2. If the dream seems to have two almost equally important portions with very different kinds of characters in each, give a score for what seems to be the more salient quality of the dream and then a supplementary code for the quality of the object in the secondary portion of the dream.

\*As well, the scale has been applied to the Early Memories Test and Rorschach Test productions and by therapists to their long-term psychotherapy patients (Krohn, A. and Mayman, M., Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, 1974)



3. Dreams that contain no people (other than dreamer) in them present some special difficulties. Handle them as follows: first, indicate that there are no objects explicitly represented in them by the code NO, then try to code on the object representation scale by asking yourself if some inanimate object or animal in the dream seems to have human qualities. If something seems to represent, with some subtlety, a person, then score the dream in category 6. The final code would then be NO 6. These non-human elements which stand for objects may be buildings, the overall setting, animals or even place names. If nothing in the dream seems to represent an object, try to capture the overall object quality of the subject from the global descriptions in the scale and assign a code from categories 1-5.

### **SCALE POINTS:**

**I.** The subject's world seems to be completely lifeless, vacant, alien, strange; it is a world essentially without people; he experiences the world as very stark and static or very fluid and formless; in short, the world for him is an unpredictable, desolate, often strange and bizarre place that he only rarely understands.

#### **For Example:**

1. The dream is virtually devoid of people or human-like figures; if people are present as dream figures at all, they are unnamed, extremely vague, and incidental to the action of the dream.
2. The dream setting is either very fluid or almost frozen (or both).
3. As the dream is read it may give you a distinctly "other-worldly", unsettling feeling.

#### **Sample Dreams:**

I dreamt that I was walking into a forest, the birds were singing and the sun was out, then all of a sudden the trees, rocks and bushes began to melt, all run together with the ground, just everything all combining. Then the animals came running out of different places and coming after me and they too sort of started to dissolve into each other, to melt together.

I'm walking underwater and kind of half-swimming and half-walking through the water, it's all around me, this fluid is maybe a little thicker than water, and there are large, whale-like things, but smaller than whales -- someone I told the dream to said they seemed like they were like sperm, and as I walked through the water they part, just ahead of me. There may be more but that's all I remember of the dream.

**II.** The subject's internal world includes people, but not really alive, human, benevolent. People are insubstantial figures, prone to seem malevolent, brutal, murderous, extremely cold, mechanical, less than human. The subject's sense of people seems bizarre and distorted. More specifically, it seems that under the pressure of morbid, sadistic, murderous impulses and fantasies, people become transformed into malevolent, animalistic figures. There is no internal experience of real interaction

among people, for others are experienced as little more than the subject's own primitive impulses incarnate.

For Example:

1. A figure in the dream is half-animal, half-human; animal turns into a person, or vice versa.
2. A dream character is dead, dying, or about to die, or killed each in either a bizarre, brutal, very explicit or morbid fashion.
3. A dream character or the dreamer is doing something which is bizarre, morbid or terribly brutal.
4. A person appears in the dream who is labeled a witch, devil, robot (a malevolent, cold, though not necessarily bizarre, humanoid figure).

Sample Dreams:

I was living in a big old house; with other people in it. B. from the library was there. Others came over, they were sloppy and asked if they could use the living room to study in. I didn't want them to but for some reason I consented. They were ugly people. One girl looked like a man. She had a mustache and short blond hair. They just took over the place, assuming they could stay. I said no. N. came; I was afraid she would say they could stay. They were just about leaving. Then G. came--beautiful G. She was a little girl. I knew she was dead already. Her body was simply warmed--being taken to her grave. She kissed me goodbye and trotted out in a little gray coat. She didn't know it but she was going to her grave. I remember thinking whether they would make her lie down in the casket and just close it or would somehow put her to sleep first.

I was with a group of people in the front yard of a big white house. We were just sitting around talking about how nice the weather was. I don't remember how, but all of the people began to look like animals. My friends were some of the animals, I could tell by their voices who they were, there was a gorilla, (my boyfriend), a zebra (a good girlfriend of mine) and various other people that I know. I didn't know all of them though, but they were all animals. I remember thinking that they were going to kill me, but they hadn't made any attempts or anything. I ran away into a child's playground and was playing on things there and I was coming down a slide and when I reached the bottom there were two animals whom I thought were waiting to "get" me, so I ran and I saw a construction site on the side of the road so I jumped into this big hole which had a big pile of dirt right next to it. I remember right after I jumped into the hole I thought that if I stayed in the hole and "if they" found me they would bury me alive. I climbed out of the hole and ran again; this time I ran back to the house where it all began. I rushed upstairs into a bedroom and sat frozen on the bed. I remember hearing some voices coming from downstairs so I opened the door when I heard "them" coming up the stairs. I ran to the stairway leading to the part of the house where they were at and the animals were people again. They had long knives in each hand and my boyfriend was leading the group. I ran back to the door and ran outside. It was raining, the sun was shining brilliantly and

these little animals were climbing all over me, clawing at my face and scratching my arms and I tried to get them off me, but every time I knocked one off there was another to take its place.

**III.** People are experienced as insubstantial, fluid, more or less interchangeable, but are not experienced as malevolent as in II. Though people do not seem bizarre or aggress against one another as in previous categories, the subject experiences others in a vague, fluid and undefined fashion. The subject cannot really articulate what someone means to him, because he has such an undifferentiated concept of what other people want, feel or do. Such subjects may be unsure who did what to whom, for his internal representations of other people are so unstable, diminished and distorted and because his sense of his own boundaries and the boundaries of other people is so poor. This category is very similar to II but different in important ways too: the subject experiences others as confusing, fluid and without any enduring characteristics he can bank on, but not pervasively malevolent, weird, mysterious or strange. Listening to this kind of subject describe an interaction, one would continually hear rather flagrant contradictions in the way other people are depicted. This arises out of the subject's limited capacity to form a meaningful "gestalt" of another person, leaving him with a set of moment-to-moment impressions that fail to capture what is enduring and salient about other people.

For Example:

1. A person changes into another person, comes to resemble another, is a combination of two people.
2. Some aspect of a dream character changes in an unreal way in the dream.
3. A dream character is a combination of two innocuous, stereotyped, fictional or distant public figures--elves, gremlins, actors.
4. An animal metamorphoses in some way.
5. A person is dead or killed, but in non-bizarre ways, in inexplicit ways--usually not in front of the dreamer, usually not including gory details.

Sample Dream:

I dreamed I was coming here to see my therapist and I walked in and he was sitting there as he usually does, but he was different because he was just like he usually is up to his shoulders and neck, but from his neck up he looked like a dwarf, as if his head were very small.

**IV.** The subject's experience of people is to a very great extent fashioned around the need they can quite directly gratify in the subject and/or around the needs the subject can directly gratify in the other. In this sense people are experienced in a very incomplete way: aspects of the other that do not bear directly on the exchange of gratification are only partially perceived and understood. Put another way, the tremendous importance of other people as gratifiers leads the subject to be only vaguely aware of qualities of the other that exist apart from its need gratifying function.

For Example:

1. Very minimal interaction of a dream character with the dreamer, and what interaction there is involves the dream character satisfying emotional (instinctual) needs of the dreamer and/or the converse situation.
2. People interact predominantly on a feeling level with the dreamer, without much explicit interaction.
3. Dreamer is involved in self-directed activity exclusively preening, admiring own body, practising something--with others watching or absent.

Sample Dreams:

My girlfriend B. and I are at the carnival at night with another couple. We are walking down this dark alley and I now notice how really sexy this other girl is. As if by my silent command she walks over to me and embraces me. She is rubbing her beautiful legs up and down on mine as we stood there in the dark. I looked up to see what Becky would do and this other guy came over to her and started to seduce her Bob, Ted, Carol and Alice-style. I got very mad and started punching this other girl; the dream ended there.

The second dream was about a young girl in the hospital. The hospital beds were very comfortable and the food was good. The girl did not seem to be suffering much. The girl's mother was very kind and very concerned while the girl was in the hospital. When she left the hospital the warm feelings faded. The mother and daughter went to the pier and there was a lot of noise and confusion. The mother was being "tempted" by a man offering her perfume. The girl kept thinking how happy she was at the hospital with the clean covers and the pretty, colorful bedspreads.

V. The subject's world is experienced as populated with other people who are neither fluid nor massively distorted by poorly integrated affects, but who do not have real identity. There is a sense that people are more or less interchangeable for the subject. People either seem very shadowy and their motives are unclear to the dreamer, or else they are experienced in stereotyped ways. People do not really make sense to the subject: for example, he hears them but is often unsure of how they are meaning what they are saying; he is either deaf to what is implicit in what they are saying or reads a great deal of implication and hidden messages into what they are saying. There is no real depth, specificity or uniqueness to the people in the subject's world. His world seems to be populated with "passers-by," so to speak, who either differ little from one another or who fall into one of several rigid, superficial categories. These subjects may try to use highly intellectualized, at times "symbolic" notions of people.

For Example:

1. If people known to the dreamer appear in the dream, they are involved in no thought, feeling or intention; they may be doing things, but with no sense of goal or intent; there is no explicit interaction with the dreamer; people may even talk to the dreamer or minimally

interact with him, but the interaction or conversation is really only part of some action in the dream.

2. All the people in the dream are anonymous or nearly so.
3. Much said and done by others in the dream seems unclear, vague, nonsensical, "implicit" to the dreamer or highly symbolic.
4. People in the dream are described as innocuous stereotypes ("lazy men," "lumberjack types").

#### Sample Dreams:

I was walking or driving down a street that seemed like C. road (near where I grew up). The houses were very ordinary. I especially noticed many men standing around (I was alone). The men all seemed to be wearing blue denim pants and shirts and cowboy hats. They all seemed like truck driver types. Soon I was with someone (I think), probably my friend E. (female), and we were driving away from them, but we still saw some along the way. We drove on a winding country road--sunset. It was hilly and green. Although the guys didn't bother us we were fearful (or I was) of them.

A male person (I think it's me) is captive by a group of other males, all wearing white coats. There is a discussion of when to ask for ransom. Someone said at night, because newspapers work faster at night. Then they decide to execute. Someone says it would be too obvious if the whole group did, because everyone could tell who did it by the white coats, so one person is chosen to do it on his own. Someone says to do it in the day because "at the newspapers, the work lights shine, brightest at midnight." Then someone else said, "But it's only 4:30 in Algeria."

In the categories that follow the subject has a much richer experience of people, is more tuned into their needs, motives and individual differences. People become more defined and therefore more unique and individual for the subject. Fantasies, fears, needs, guilts and conflicts among them all have an impact on the subject's feelings towards others, but others always maintain a basic humanness and wholeness within the subject. Categories 6-8 try to tap differences in the amount and quality of internal commerce with objects. Beyond feeling whole and human, how much range does there seem to be in the subject's inner repertoire of objects? How much and how readily does the subject consider the feelings and implicit aims of those around him? In general, how subtle and differentiated is his experience of others?

**VI.** The subject has a firm hold on objects and generally conforms to the description above. However, he does not readily, whether for defensive or characterological reasons, try to understand the inner experience of other people, their feelings, thoughts, wishes, etc. Due to neurotic preconceptions and preoccupations, people do not feel to the subject to be able to interact in an easy, mutual fashion. Neurotic conflicts lead the subject to want to be with people, but in a parallel activity or at a safe distance from others. This type of subject is dealing with his conflicts by steering clear of others, avoiding the more intense involvements particularly, that bring his conflicts to the fore and cause him discomfort. This subject might be little aware of any intense conflicts, being only

in touch with an overall sense that his life is not as full as he wants it to be.

For Example:

1. As you read the dream you get a sense that someone specific is being represented in the dream, far less interchangeable than in lower categories. The dream characters are, in a global sense, believable. There is, however, very little explicit interaction of the characters in the dream and virtually no account of the thoughts, feelings or wishes of the dream characters.
2. When people do interact in the dream, it is fundamentally a parallel activity (everyone painting, walking, etc.) rather than much mutual, complementary interaction.
3. There will be some dreams in this category in which no people appear, but in which some inanimate object will have object-like properties. Or, something about the setting (its detail, degree of differentiation, the presence of things done by people or made by them, etc.) which contains or implies this level of object representation capacity.

Sample Dreams:

I was in an apartment where apparently I lived. I lived there with several people but J. is the only one I can remember. We had a fight. He decided that he would move out. He took all of his stuff, and all of his books, many of which were mine. I was so relieved that I didn't even notice about the books, till later. He had a small electric saber saw that he was cutting up the bookshelves with. Then he left; and I got an electric skillsaw, a considerably bigger one, and did the same thing. Someone asked me why I did this, and I said that it was because the saw J. had used was not big enough.

(The following dream is particularly illustrative of Criteria 3.) The dream concerns the nursery school I went to when I was 3 and 4 years old. I am coming back to it as an adult. In real life I have a violin and a classical guitar. Dream scene is at the nursery school and I am trading my violin with someone for a better one. I then play the instrument--much better than in real life. I then pick up my guitar and play it beautifully, though I don't know how to play it in real life and am afraid to try. Then I see myself in the house of the nursery school. I note the nice children's toys on the shelves. The house has many connecting rooms (as in real life) and the wood of the walls and floors is very interesting because it forms patterns. Very thin planks of wood. There are objects covered with tarpolin. Someone says the school is closed up now. The little children don't come there anymore. I think about the planks--how beautifully they decorate the place.

**VII.** The subject experiences people with a good deal of sensitivity and acuity. They are unique, varied and rather well defined for him. He is aware of important, subtle differences among people, both in terms of changes in moment-to-moment and day-to-day moods and attitudes, as well as overall differences in character of those around him. People seem to be central to the subject's inner life, even if neurotic conflicts lead him to experience them in childish, transference-dominated ways. He seems to be "in touch" with people affectively.

For Example:

1. Dream characters explicitly interact with each other or with the dreamer. The thoughts and feelings of at least one character besides the dreamer are noted.
2. You get the sense that the dream characters are defined sufficiently well that you might recognize one or more of them in another dream (besides than by their names).
3. The dreams in this category as well as those in 8 are very vivid, and the relationships among the dream characters, though peppered with the absurdity of dream consciousness, is generally cogent and believable.

Sample Dreams:

I was in a large department store with my father, mother and youngest daughter. My daughter and mother had separated from dad and I, and we were just walking around, talking, and looking at various items in the store. We must have been in the hardware section, because I remember looking at certain tools, etc. My dad looked over a wheelbarrow which he felt he needed. I remember thinking that he was too old to be purchasing a wheelbarrow, as well as the fact that he probably wouldn't be using it that much. We also looked and priced bathroom facilities, because he was thinking of adding another bathroom to his house. For some reason we did not meet my mother and daughter until we returned home (my parents'). I remember coming into the house and looking for them. My mother was in bed complaining of a backache or something, and my daughter was standing nearby. I felt that this was a way of telling me that she did not enjoy looking after my daughter in the store and that it had "got her down."

I dreamed I was getting married to a guy I know (but not all that well) named A. I know we went through the ceremony, which is rather vague to me now. What is vivid is the wedding celebration. It was a sit down dinner held in a large room of some building (probably a hotel). There were a lot of people. Before the dinner I remember throwing my bouquet to the single girls over my shoulder and yelling "byork." My sister Debbie caught it. It didn't fly far, only to her. She was in front of the group. It was a white bouquet of flowers and I was wearing a beautiful white wedding gown that made me feel beautiful and happy. I threw the flowers to the girls who were surrounded by other people and also the orchestra...The next part was dancing (the next item on the agenda of a wedding reception). A. and I were to go in and "start the dancing." I picked my skirt up, gathered it together and we started walking towards the room. I then looked at A. in a quizzical fashion, asking him if I ever danced with him before, and then he said, "Oh, yes, that one time at Margie's wedding" (a real incident that did occur). I remember feeling sort of shy about the whole thing. Then we were at the entrance of the social hall and my parents were at the other side of the long hall that you had to come down before you got to the room. They were telling us to first wait for them before we began dancing. It was exciting and typically Jewish. I woke up somewhere around here...also I didn't know anyone at the reception. Not that they were strangers, just that they were "people."

**VIII.** The subject lives in a lively world of fully human objects. There is a sense of rapport with people and a well-developed understanding of their thoughts, feelings and conflicts. There is a

well-articulated internal model of people being involved with each other, including an understanding of why they form relationships, why they get out of them, and what interferes with them. Others' behavior and personal characteristics are considered in perspective, remain open to reinterpretation, etc. There is a good deal of self and interpersonal awareness, indeed, a psychological-mindedness. Relationships are, for the most part, not neurotically conceived.

For Example:

1. A reflective comment is made in the dream report about what the dream is saying, or the self in the dream reflects during the dream on some aspect of his feelings toward another dream character, or on some aspect of that character's conflicts. More than reporting the feelings or wishes of a dream character, the subject spells out an awareness of some conflict(s) in the character, himself or their relationship.
2. There is a creative use of humor in the dream centering around the human characters.
3. There is something particularly distinctive and subtle about a dream character noted by the subject.
4. The dream characters and their interactions seem only minimally directed by neurotic concerns. There is a maturity about the dream characters.

Sample Dream:

I dreamt I was with L., my teacher in the math section I'm in. In the dream he had this rather absurd hat on, it reminded me in the dream of something I'd seen in the circus. He came up to me and someone else who was with me, but who isn't clear, and suddenly started to deliver this serious speech about the terrible state of the economy, and then about the importance of ecology and threw in, for some reason, something about the price of clover in Britain. I asked him why he was telling me all this and he asked me if I wasn't interested and I said, "No, I'm not", and that he seemed not to be either, that he seemed to be trying to be a clown and serious at the same time, like he wants to clown around but is always pulling himself back to being so serious, as if he thinks it isn't right to clown around (this is something I've begun to think about this guy in real life). He seemed to hear me in the dream, but changed the subject, as if he didn't like what I'd said to him.



**APPENDIX B**  
**MODIFIED OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCORING GUIDELINES**

(D. Colson, 1985\*)

For use with Rorschach content and movement responses

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Colson  
(personal communication, September, 1987)

**MODIFIED\***  
**OBJECT-REPRESENTATION SCALE FOR DREAMS**  
 (Krohn, 1972) (D. Colson, 1985\*)

**GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:**

This scale attempts to register the sense the subject has of objects in his world--how primitive, shadowy, malevolent, anonymous, stereotyped, or one dimensional they are on the one hand, or how full, defined, feeling, and in general, human and complete they are on the other. Let your clinical "feel" tell you how human, how real, how whole, and how mature are the people.

The criteria should be used as aids to your intuition and are not intended to be used instead of your over all sense of the protocol. Indeed, if you have a clear sense of the location on the scale, and the protocol does not contain any of the characteristics, simply ignore the typical characteristics. These characteristics are intended to be signposts to supplement your intuition, not constrict it.

**SCALE POINTS:**

1. The subject's world seems to be completely lifeless, vacant, alien, strange; it is a world essentially without people; he experiences the world as very stark and static or very fluid and formless; in short, the world for him is an unpredictable, desolate, often strange and bizarre place that he only rarely understands.

Example:

- A. Virtually devoid of people or human-like figures; figures unnamed, extremely vague, and incidental.
- B. Fluid or almost frozen.
- C. "Other-worldly"

2. The subject's internal world includes people, but not really alive, human, benevolent. People are insubstantial figures, prone to seem malevolent, brutal, murderous, extremely cold, mechanical, less than human. The subject's sense of people seems bizarre and distorted. More specifically, it seems that under the pressure of morbid, sadistic, murderous impulses and fantasies, people become transformed into malevolent, animalistic figures. There is no internal experience of real interaction among people, for others are experienced as little more than the subject's own primitive impulses incarnate.

Example:

- A. Figures are half animal, half human.

- B. Dead, dying, about to die, or killed in a bizarre, brutal, very explicit or morbid fashion.
  - C. Doing something which is bizarre, morbid, or terribly brutal.
  - D. A witch, devil, robot (a malevolent, cold, though not necessarily bizarre, humanoid figure).
3. People are experienced as insubstantial, fluid, more or less interchangeable, but are not experienced as malevolent as in #2. Though people do not seem bizarre or aggress against one another as the previous category, the subject experiences others in a vague, fluid, and undefined fashion. The subject cannot really articulate what someone means to him, because he has such an undifferentiated concept of what other people want, feel, or do. Such subjects may be unsure of who did what to whom, for his internal representation of other people is so unstable, diminished and distorted and because his sense of his own boundaries and the boundaries of other people is so poor. This category is very similar to #2, but different in important ways too: the subject experiences others as confusing, fluid, and without any enduring characteristics he can bank on, but not pervasively malevolent, weird, mysterious, strange. Listening to this kind of subject describe an interaction, one would continually hear rather flagrant contradictions in the way other people are depicted. This arises out of the subject's limited capacity to form a meaningful "gestalt" of another person, leaving him with a set of moment-to-moment impressions that fail to capture what is enduring and salient about other people.
  4. The subject's experience of people is to a very great extent fashioned around the need they can quite directly gratify in the subject and/or around the needs the subject can directly gratify in the other. In this sense people are experienced in a very incomplete way: aspects of the other that do not bear directly on the exchange of gratification are only partially perceived and understood. Put another way, the tremendous importance of other people as gratifiers leads the subject to be only vaguely aware of qualities of the other that exist apart from its need gratifying function.
  5. The subject's world is experienced as populated with other people who are neither fluid nor massively distorted by poorly integrated affects, but who do not have real identity. There is a sense that people are more or less interchangeable for the subject. People either seem very shadowy and their motives are unclear, or else they are experienced in stereotyped ways. People do not really make sense to the subject: for example, he hears them, but is often unsure of how they are meaning what they are saying; he is either deaf to what is implicit in what they are saying, or reads a great deal of implication and hidden messages into what they are saying. There is no real depth, specificity, or uniqueness to the people in the subject's world. His world seems to be populated with "Passers-by," so to speak, who either differ little from one another, or who fall into one of several rigid, superficial categories. These subjects may try to use highly intellectualized, at times "symbolic," notions of people.

In the categories that follow, the subject has a much richer experience of people; tuned into their

needs, motives, and individual differences. People become more defined, others always maintain a basic humanness and wholeness within the subject.

6. The subject has a firm hold on objects and generally conforms to the description above. However, he does not readily, whether for defensive or characterological reasons, try to understand the inner experience of other people--their feelings, thoughts, wishes, etc. Due to neurotic preconceptions and preoccupations, people do not feel to the subject to be able to interact in an easy, mutual fashion. Neurotic conflicts lead the subject to want to be with people, but in a parallel activity or at a safe distance from others. This type of subject is dealing with his conflicts by steering clear of others, avoiding the more intense involvements, particularly that bring his conflicts to the fore and cause him discomfort. This subject might be little aware of any intense conflicts, being only in touch with an overall sense that his life is not as full as he wants it to be.
7. The subject experiences people with a good deal of sensitivity and acuity. They are unique, varied and rather well-defined for him. He is aware of important, subtle differences among people, both in terms of changes in moment-to-moment and day-to-day moods and attitudes, as well as overall differences in character of those around him. People seem to be central to the subject's inner life, even if neurotic conflicts lead him to experience them in childish, transference-dominated ways. He seems to be "in touch" with people affectively.
8. The subject lives in a lively world of fully human objects. There is a sense of rapport with people and a well-developed understanding of their thoughts, feelings, and conflicts. There is a well-articulated internal model of people being involved with each other, including an understanding of why they form relationships, why they get out of them, and what interferes with them. Others' behavior and personal characteristics are considered in perspective, remain open to reinterpretation, etc. There is a good deal of self and interpersonal awareness; indeed, a psychological mindedness. Relationships are, for the most part, not neurotically conceived.

**APPENDIX C**

**SAMPLE OBJECT REPRESENTATION RORSCHACH RESPONSES**

(J. C. Frost, 1983, pp. 192-199)

For use with the Krohn Object Representation Scale

(A. S. Krohn, 1972)

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Frost (personal communication, 1987)

**Sample Rorschach Responses for Krohn's Eight Levels of Object Representation**

**Level 1:     M response**

Card I    It's like a person in the middle, with their hands up; but everything is melting around them. Everything is dissolving.

E:    Repeats response  
 S:    Yes  
 E:    How do you mean, like a person?  
 S:    There is sort of a form like a body, with hips and chest and arms. The head has already melted.  
 E:    Melted?  
 S:    Yes, the smoke all around the fires, the body is melting into a blob. The world is melting and burning into nothing.  
 E:    Smoke?  
 S:    Yes, the blackness all around; there is no real shape, just melting.

Scoring: W<sub>v</sub> M<sup>P</sup>.m<sup>a</sup>.C<sup>1</sup>F<sub>w</sub> Hd P 1.0

**Level 1:     FM response**

Card III    It's the face of some kind of animal. I can't make out what it is. It has an open mouth and there doesn't seem to be a body. It's all alone.

E:    Repeats response  
 S:    Yes  
 E:    What makes it look like a face?  
 S:    I don't know, it's all vague. Sort of eyes here and a nose; some kind of animal, and it is just looking, all alone.  
 E:    All alone?  
 S:    Yes, there is nothing else. It is just looking.

Scoring: W<sub>-</sub> FM<sup>P</sup>-    Ad 5.5

**Level 2: M response**

Card II It looks like a face and a wide open mouth of a person and two animal/people up here on top.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Here are the eyes and there are the eyebrows. The mouth is here and leads into the person's nose.  
 E: You mentioned a face?  
 S: Like someone is screaming and spitting up blood and drooling down out here. These two animal/people are leaving and driving stakes into its head. It is just screaming and spitting up blood, that's all.  
 E: Animal/people?  
 S: Yes, half animal and half people, just leaving and driving in those stakes.  
 E: Blood?  
 S: The red, running.

Scoring: WS\_ M<sup>a</sup>.M/FM<sup>a</sup>.m<sup>a</sup>.CF- (2) Hd, (H/A), Bl 4.5 FabCom

**Level 2: FM response**

Card III A skull lying in the desert with two vultures flying around it.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, here is the skull lying with all the meat picked off of it by vultures.  
 E: What makes it look like vultures?  
 S: They are red, bloody, and they are flying around it.

Scoring: W\_ FM<sup>a.p</sup>. CF\_ (2) A,Ad,Bl 5.5

**Level 3: M response**

Card II It's a person's face,  
just looking, or maybe  
two people, it could  
be two people, or just  
one looking in a mirror

E: Repeats response  
S: Yes, it could be one person,  
just his face here, like it  
it is looking .... or it could  
be two people facing each  
other...or it could be one  
person looking in a mirror.  
E: Which one do you choose?  
S: I don't know, it's sort of  
all of them; it's one, or it  
could be two ... it doesn't  
matter.

Scoring: W\_ MP.Fr\_ (2) H 4.5

**Level 3: FM response**

Card IX It's a butterfly when  
it is changing from a  
caterpillar to a but-  
terfly.

E: Repeats response  
S: Yes, all the colors like  
a butterfly has  
E: Changing from a caterpillar  
to a butterfly?  
S: Yes, the caterpillar here in  
the middle, and it is chang-  
ing into a butterfly.

Scoring: W\_ FM<sup>P</sup>.CF\_ A 5.5



**Level 4: M response**

Card VII A girl looking at herself in this mirror.  
She is looking at her hairstyle.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, here is her face and upper body, and then on the side is her reflection in the mirror. She is looking at herself, checking herself out.  
 E: Checking herself out?  
 S: Yes, she is looking at a new hairstyle, her hair goes straight up, and she is looking at it, looking at herself.

Scoring: Wo M<sup>p</sup>.Fr<sub>o</sub> Hd 2.5

**Level 4: FM response**

Card VIII Here is an animal looking for food. He is walking along these rocks and tree branches looking for something to eat. It is by the water and it is reflected in the other side.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, four legs, head, eyes, nose, mouth, looking for food.  
 E: What makes it look like rocks and trees?  
 S: The shape.  
 E: Reflection?  
 S: Same on the other side.

Scoring: W<sub>o</sub> FM<sup>a</sup>.Fr<sub>o</sub> A<sub>i</sub>Na 4.5

**Level 5: M response**

Card III Two African women washing clothes.

- E: Repeats response.  
 S: Yes, here and here. You can see their legs, hips, boobs, heads. They have long necks like those African women do, and they are washing clothes.  
 E: What about them makes them look like African women?  
 S: They all have those long necks 'cause they all wear those rings around their necks. They are black and they are women 'cause they are washing clothes.

Scoring: D<sub>0</sub> M<sup>a</sup>.FC' (2) H P 3.0

**Level 5: FM response**

Card II Two bears just playing with each other.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yeah, you know, they are just playing together like bears in a circus do. They have goofy hats on and their paws are together.  
 E: What makes it look like bears?  
 S: The shape.

Scoring: W<sub>0</sub> FM<sup>a</sup> (2) A P 4.5

**Level 6: M response**

Card VII Two girls are facing each other, they are standing on rocks and looking at each other, like two girls on-either side of a street.

E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, they are looking at each other, just standing on these rocks here.  
 E: Like on either side of a street?  
 S: Yeah, like they don't know each other, just looking.

Scoring: W<sub>0</sub> M<sub>P</sub> (2) H P 2.5

**Level 6: FM response**

Card VIII Two mountain lions climbing this mountain, stepping on the branches of this tree.

E: Repeats response.  
 S: Yes, legs, body, head, and it looks like hair. It looks like two mountain lions and they are climbing this mountain.  
 E: Hair?  
 S: Yes, like you could touch it.  
 E: Mountain and tree?  
 S: Yes, the shape, and green like a tree.

Scoring: W<sub>0</sub> FM<sup>a</sup>.FT.FC<sub>0</sub> (2) A,Na 4.5

**Level 7: M response**

Card I A woman with her arms up and dancing, with her skirts blowing up around her.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, in the middle, her hips and chest and her arms up. Her head is back so you can't see it, and she looks like she is dancing in the night with her skirts billowing up.  
 E: In the night?  
 S: Yes, everything is black and dark shaded like it is night, and she is dancing so that no one can see her.  
 E: So no one can see her?  
 S: She feels funny if someone sees her dancing alone.

Scoring: W<sub>0</sub> M<sup>a</sup>.FC'.FY<sub>0</sub> H,CI P 4.0

**Level 7: FM response**

Card IV A daddy gorilla talking to a little animal in front of him.

- E: Repeats response  
 S: Yes, the daddy is tall and hairy and he is talking to the little animal.  
 E: What makes it look little?  
 S: The big feet and the little head makes it look like it is tall, the head is much higher than the feet and the other animal is much smaller, so he is a baby.  
 E: Hairy?  
 S: Yes, it looks like it has a feel to it.

Scoring: W<sub>0</sub> FM<sup>a</sup>.FT.FVo (2) A 4.0

**Level 8: M response**

Card III This looks like a party  
of some sort.

- E: Repeats response.  
 S: Yes, I can see two people,  
 apparently men, they are  
 bowing to each other. It  
 is very formal and these  
 red things are decorations  
 at the party. The men seem  
 to be wearing formal clothing,  
 like tuxedos.  
 E: What makes it look like  
 tuxedos?  
 S: The white tie and the black  
 tails like a tuxedo has.

Scoring: W<sub>+</sub>M<sup>a</sup>.FC.FY<sub>+</sub> (2) H,Cl P 5.5

**Level 8: FM response**

< Card I This looks like a donkey,  
 like the one in, well it's  
 a Christmas story, but I  
 don't remember the name of  
 it. Anyhow, the donkey is  
 struggling with a heavy  
 load, and that is what I  
 am impressed by here.

- E: Repeats response.  
 S: You can see the arched  
 back as if he were carrying  
 a load of wood or something,  
 and the ear is raised up-  
 ward as if he is listening  
 for something, and the little  
 tail is tucked in, as if the  
 load is really causing him to  
 strain his muscles. But he  
 is determined to go on, to  
 succeed at it even though  
 it is a lot of work.

Scoring: D<sub>+</sub> FM<sup>a</sup><sub>+</sub> A

**APPENDIX D**  
**PARENT-VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS**  
**DATA COLLECTION FORM**

For use with the Krohn Object Representation Scale  
(A. S. Krohn, 1972)

## PARENT-VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS

### Instructions for Administration\*

Subjects are asked to describe their biological parents. In cases where the subject has no knowledge of biological parents, ask the subject to describe the person(s) who assumed the parenting role (e.g. stepparent(s), grandparent(s), older siblings, other relatives, foster parent(s), guardian(s)).

Subjects are also asked to describe their victim(s). In cases where the subject had no prior relationship to the victim but admits killing, then draw on the geographical location of the crime and on your knowledge about the incident to see if you can help the subject identify how he generally knew the victim (i.e. a stranger killed in a bar which was frequented, a stranger who was romantically involved with an ex-lover). If the subject denies any involvement in the murder, ask the subject to describe what he knows about the person(s) he is charged with murdering.

Three components of data will comprise the description: a general description of the person and two recollections. When drawing out recollections, urge the subject to recall specific incidents. Try to draw visual and emotional details for the event. Ask what feeling comes back with the memory. Does the subject actually remember what he felt then? Ask the subject to clarify how he sees himself in this recollection.

\*General instructions adapted from Krohn (1972), Lowe (1981), Michaud and Aynesworth (1983, 1989), and Powers and Griffith (1987).

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**MOTHER**

1. Mother's name \_\_\_\_\_ Vocation \_\_\_\_\_  
 Age, if living \_\_\_\_\_ Or at death \_\_\_\_\_  
 Age at subject's birth \_\_\_\_\_ Subject's age at of Mo's death \_\_\_\_\_

I'd like you to think as far back in your childhood as you can and tell me the first thing you can remember about your mother.

- A. First early recollection** (Subject's age \_\_\_\_)  
Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)

- B. Second early recollection** (Subject's age \_\_\_\_)  
Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)

I'd like for you to think of your mother when you were a child, and as she is now, and describe her to me.

- C. Description**

What was your relationship with your mother like when you were small; a teen-ager; now as an adult?



Subject's # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**FATHER**

2. Father's name \_\_\_\_\_ Vocation \_\_\_\_\_  
 Age, if living \_\_\_\_\_ Or at death \_\_\_\_\_  
 Age at Subject's birth \_\_\_\_\_ Subject's age at of Fa's death \_\_\_\_\_

I'd like you to think as far back in your childhood as you can and tell me the first thing you can remember about your father.

**A. First early recollection** (Subject's age \_\_\_\_\_)Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)**B. Second early recollection** (Subject's age \_\_\_\_\_)Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)

I'd like for you to think of your father when you were a child, and as he is now, and describe him to me.

**C. Description**

What was your relationship with your father like when you were small; a teen-ager; now as an adult?

Subject's # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**VICTIM**

2. Victim's name \_\_\_\_\_ Vocation \_\_\_\_\_  
 Age at death \_\_\_\_\_ Relationship to subject \_\_\_\_\_  
 How long have you known (victim's name)? \_\_\_\_\_

I'd like you to think back to the first time you saw/met (victim's name) and tell me what you remember about this person.

- A. First recollection** (Subject's age\_\_\_\_ )  
Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)

- B. Second recollection** (Subject's age\_\_\_\_ )  
Feeling (Which details are recalled most vividly?)

I'd like for you to think of (victim's name) and describe him/her to me.

- C. Description**

What was your relationship with (victim's name) like?

**APPENDIX E**

**OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCORING FORMS**

For use with Rorschach Responses and Parent-Victim Descriptions

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

**KROHN OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCALE**Rorschach Scores and Form Level

<u>Response #</u>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
-------------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----

Object Rep. on Ro

Human Content

(H.[H].DH.Hd.[Hd]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Content

(A.[A].Ad.[Ad]) \_\_\_\_\_

Object Content

Obj.Objd \_\_\_\_\_

Human Movement

(M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal in Human

Movement (M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Movement

(FM.[FM]) \_\_\_\_\_

Inanimate Movement

(m) \_\_\_\_\_

<u>Response #</u>	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
-------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Object Rep. on Ro

Human Content

(H.[H].DH.Hd.[Hd]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Content

(A.[A].Ad.[Ad]) \_\_\_\_\_

Object Content

Obj.Objd \_\_\_\_\_

Human Movement

(M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal in Human

Movement (M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Movement

(FM.[FM]) \_\_\_\_\_

Inanimate Movement

(m) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

**KROHN OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCALE**Rorschach Scores and Form Level

<u>Response #</u>	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33
-------------------	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----

Object Rep. on Ro

Human Content

(H.[H].DH.Hd.[Hd]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Content

(A.[A].Ad.[Ad]) \_\_\_\_\_

Object Content

Obj.Objd \_\_\_\_\_

Human Movement

(M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal in Human

Movement (M.[M]) \_\_\_\_\_

Animal Movement

(FM.[FM]) \_\_\_\_\_

Inanimate Movement

(m) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

RORSCHACH OBJECT REPRESENTATION

Rorschach Card#    1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10

Human ContentHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_Animal contentHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_Object ContentHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_Human MovementHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_Animal inHuman MovementHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_Animal MovementHighest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_

## SUBJECT TOTALS

Highest \_\_\_\_\_Lowest \_\_\_\_\_Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

**PARENT-VICTIM DESCRIPTIONS AND RECOLLECTIONS**MOTHER:

1st Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

2nd Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

Description \_\_\_\_\_

Mother \_\_\_\_\_

FATHER:

1st Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

2nd Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

Description \_\_\_\_\_

Father \_\_\_\_\_

VICTIM:

1st Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

2nd Recollection \_\_\_\_\_

Description \_\_\_\_\_

Victim \_\_\_\_\_

P-V Mode \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**OBJECT REPRESENTATION**

<u>RORSCHACH</u>	<u>Good Form</u>	<u>Poor Form</u>
<u>Highest</u>	_____	_____
<u>Lowest</u>	_____	_____
<u>Mode</u>	_____	_____

DESCRIPTIONS

<u>Highest</u>	_____
<u>Lowest</u>	_____
<u>Mode</u>	_____

TOTAL OBJECT REPRESENTATION SCORE

<u>Highest</u>	_____
<u>Lowest</u>	_____
<u>Mode</u>	_____



**APPENDIX F**  
**REVISED\***  
**RORSCHACH MANUAL FOR THE ASSESSMENT**  
**OF DEFENSE IN BORDERLINE PATIENTS (LDS)**

(P. Lerner & H. Lerner, 1980; K. Kernberg-Bardenstein, 1985\*)

Note. Reprinted by permission of Drs. H. Lerner (personal communication, March 1991)  
and Kernberg-Bardenstein (personal communication, June 1991)

## REVISED MANUAL FOR ASSESSING OBJECT RELATIONS IN BORDERLINE PATIENTS<sup>1</sup>

### General Scoring Considerations

1. In general, the basic units to be scored are those responses containing an entire human figure, either static or in movement (H response). There are two exceptions to this principle. Several of the indices for splitting involve two responses. In these instances only one score is awarded. Also, one of the scores for projective identification involves the scoring of human detail responses.

\*The scale has been extended from solely examining human and quasi-human whole responses to animals in human movement such as "turkeys doing a ballet dance" or "two rabbits smoking cigars." Also included are cartoon characters engaged in human movement (i. e. "Bullwinkle laughing") as quasi-humans. Monsters are not considered quasi-human unless indicated by human movement, expression, or clothing. The response "A big furry monster", for example, would not be scored quasi-human, whereas a "furry monster with a sinister grin" would be scored. The scale also scores clowns as quasi-human, while a person dressed in a costume would not be scored quasi-human.

2. Before applying the system, all responses should be scored for form level using Exner's Comprehensive System.

3. The sections on devaluation, idealization and denial call for an identification of these defenses as well as a ranking of the defense on a continuum of high versus low order.

4. Any one response may receive more than one score.

5. In assessing the human percept, attention should be paid to the following aspects of the response: the action ascribed to the figure, the way in which the figure is described, and the exact figure seen.

### Specific Defenses

#### Splitting

Splitting refers to what a person does to and with his inner and outer objects. Specifically, it involves a division of internal and external into parts as distinct from wholes and good and bad objects. Splitting is manifest in a tendency to perceive and describe objects in terms of overruling polarities. To denote splitting use the letter (S).

A. In a sequence of responses a human percept described in terms of a specific, non-ambivalent, non-ambiguous affective dimension is immediately followed by another human response in which the affective description is opposite to that used to describe the preceding responses.

- i. "Looks like an ugly criminal with a gun" immediately followed by "Couples sitting together cheek to cheek."

B. In the description of one total human figure a clear distinction is made so that part of the figure is seen as opposite to another part.

- i. "A giant. His lower part here conveys danger but his top half looks benign."

C. Included in one response are two clearly distinguished figures and each figure is described in a way opposite to the other.

- i. "Two figures, a man and a woman. He is mean and shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there and taking it."

### Devaluation

Devaluation refers to a tendency to depreciate, tarnish and lessen the importance on one's inner and outer objects. It is thought of as a muted form of spoiling. In addition to identifying this defense, devaluation is also rated on a 5 point continuum. Underlying the continuum are the following three dimensions: (a) the degree to which the humanness of the figure is retained, (b) a temporal-spatial consideration, and (c) the severity of depreciation as conveyed in the affective description. For scoring, to denote devaluation use the symbol (DV). Add to this score the number below corresponding with the appropriate level of devaluation. For example, "An angry man" would be scored DVI.

1. The humanness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in negatively tinged but socially acceptable terms.

- i. "Two people fighting."
- ii. "A girl in a funny costume."

2. The humanness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in blatantly negative and socially unacceptable negative terms. This score would also include human figures with parts missing.

- i. "A diseased African child."
- ii. "A woman defecating."
- iii. "Sinister looking male figure."
- iv. "A disjointed figure with the head missing."

3. The humanness dimension is retained, however, involved in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and if the figure is described negatively it is in socially acceptable terms. This rating would include figures such as clowns, elves, savages, witches, devils and figures of the occult.

- i. "Sad looking clowns."

- ii. "Cannibal standing over a pot."
- iii. "The bad witch."

4. The humanness dimension is retained however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and the figure is described in blatantly negative and socially unacceptable terms. This rating would involve the same types of figures as in 3; however, the negative description is more severe.

- i. "A couple of evil witches."
- ii. "Two people from Mars who look very scary."
- iii. "A sinister Klu Klux Klansman."

5. The humanness dimension is lost, there may or may not be distancing of the distorted form in time or space, and the figure is described in either neutral or negative terms. This rating would include puppets, mannequins, robots, creatures with some human characteristics (this rating does not include monsters with or without human characteristics, part-human, part-animal responses, and human responses with one or more animal features).

- i. "Mannequins with the dresses but missing a head."
- ii. "Two people but half male and half animal. From outer space."
- iii. "A woman with breasts, high heeled shoes and a bird's beak for a mouth."

\*As the scale currently reads, the first two categories are limited to human percepts. The first category involves humans seen in slightly negative but socially acceptable ways (i.d., "two people fighting"). The second category involves humans in clearly negative and socially unacceptable terms (i.e., a woman with no head). The last three categories are limited to quasi-humans. Category three involves quasi-humans seen in neutral or negative but socially acceptable terms. Elves, witches, clowns and figures of the occult as well as savages and cannibals are included in this category. Monsters are also included if no further negative description is included. The fourth category involves quasi-humans with blatantly negative descriptions ("evil witches", "a crippled Martian"). The last category includes percepts in which the human aspect is lost such as robots, part-human, part-animal responses, creatures with some human characteristics, puppets and mannequins.

\*In the [Kernberg-Bardenstein (1985)] study, the following modifications were introduced. Savages and klansmen, considered as distorted humans (and therefore scored in the last three categories) were scored as humans to differentiate them from devils, elves and monsters, which seem more quasi-human in comparison. While left unchanged, the juxtaposition of clowns as more devalued than "a disjointed figure with the head missing" seems to lack face validity. Other problematic scoring (which was maintained for consistency), however, included 1) the consideration of puppets as more devalued than an evil witch, 2) [the] scoring [of] falling figures or figures in precarious positions as devalued. The general issue of the lack of distinction between aggressive imagery and spoiled imagery pervades the entire scale. Aggressive imagery does not seem inherently devalued. For example, "a dashing soldier fighting" would be scored as devalued (first level) and idealized (second level). One might argue that such a response does not represent devaluation

compared to "a funny-looking soldier" (also first level devaluation). The scale would benefit from further conceptual clarification of these various issues.

### **Idealization**

Idealization involves a denial of the unwanted characteristics of an object and then enhancing the object by projecting one's own libido onto it. It aims at keeping an object completely separate from persecutory objects, and thus, preserves the object from harm and destruction. As in the case of devaluation, idealization is also rated on a 5 point continuum. Underlying the continuum are the same three dimensions. For scoring, denote idealization with the letter (I). Add to this score the number below corresponding with the appropriate level of idealization. Thus, "A person with a big smile" is scored I1.

1. The humanness dimension is retained, there is no distancing of the figure in time or space, and the figure is described in a positive but not excessively flattering way.

- i. "Two nice people looking over a fence."
- ii. "A person with a happy smile."

2. The humanness dimension is retained, there may or may not be distancing of the person in time or space, and the figure is described in blatant and excessively positive terms.

- i. "Two handsome, muscular Russians doing that famous dance."
- ii. "What an angelic figure. Long hair, a flowing gown and a look of complete serenity."

3. The humanness dimension is retained; however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time or space; and if the figure is described positively, it is in moderate terms. This rating would include objects of fame, adoration, or strength such as civic leaders, officials and famous people.

- i. "Charles De Gaulle."
- ii. "An astronaut, one of those fellows who landed on the moon."

4. The humanness dimension is retained; however, implied in the percept is a distortion of human form; there may or may not be distancing of the figure in time and/or space; and the figure is described in blatant and excessively positive terms. This rating would include the same types of figures as in 3; however, the positive description is more excessive.

- i. "A warrior. Not just any warrior but the tallest, strongest and bravest."
- ii. "Attila the Hun but with the largest genitals I have ever seen."

5. The humanness dimension is lost; however, implied in the distortion is an enhancement of identity; there may or may not be distancing of the distorted form in time or space; and the figure is described in either neutral or positive terms. This rating would include statues of famous figures, giants, supermen or superwomen, space figures with

supernatural powers, angels and idols. Also included would be half humans in which the non human half added to the figure's appearance or power.

- i. "A bust of Queen Victoria."
- ii. "Powerful beings from another planet ruling over these softer creatures."

\*The idealization scale was modified [by Kernberg-Bardenstein] to distinguish between mildly positively described quasi-humans and extremely idealized quasi-humans or part-human part, non-humans. The scale's first four levels are limited to humans in progressively idealized terms, ranging from "a person with a nice smile" to "handsome muscular Russians" to people of fame or adoration to excessively positively described figures with the "best" or "largest" or "most beautiful" attributes one could imagine. The last category is the only category for quasi-humans. Consequently "angels" or "superheroes" would be placed on par with "Pippi Longstocking with a cute pony tail" or a "smiling" Snoopy. In the [Kernberg-Bardenstein] study, these latter type of responses [were] relegated to the fourth level.

### **Projective Identification**

This refers to a process in which part of the self are split off and projected into an external object or part object. It differs from projection proper in that what is projected onto the object is not experienced as ego alien. As part of this process real characteristics of the external object are disregarded, there is a blurring of boundaries between self and other, and one purpose is to control the object. Two indices of projective identification have been developed. To denote this score use the symbol (PI).

1. Confabulatory responses involving human figures in which the form level is Fx- or F-<sup>2</sup> and the percept is overly embellished with associative elaboration to the point that real properties of the blot are disregarded and replaced by fantasies and affects. Most typically, the associative elaboration involves material with aggressive or sexual meaning.

- i. "A huge man coming to get me. I can see his huge teeth. He's staring straight at me. His hands are up as if he will strike me."

2. Those human or human detail responses in which the location is Dr<sup>3</sup>, the determinant is F(C)<sup>4</sup>, and the figure is described as either aggressive or having been aggressed against.

- i. "An ugly face." (With forehead and features seen in reference to the inner portion of Card IV).
- ii. "An injured man." (Card VI upper, center area).

### **Denial**

Denial in this system refers to a broad group of defenses arranged on a continuum based on the degree of reality distortion involved in the response. Higher level forms of denial involve a minimum of reality distortion, whereas middle and lower level manifestations of denial include increasingly greater degrees of reality distortion.

Indices of denial at the highest level include several mechanisms devised by Holt (1976) and presented in his manual for the scoring of manifestations of primary process thinking. Middle level denial includes responses in which there is a major contradiction between the human figure perceived and the actions or characteristics ascribed to that figure. Lower level manifestations of denial involve significant distortions of reality to the point that a segment of subjective experience or of the external world is not integrated with the rest of the experience. There is a striking loss of reality testing and the individual acts as if he were unaware of an urgent, pressing aspect of reality.

To score denial use the symbol (DN). Add to this score the number below corresponding to the level of denial. Thus, the response "I know they are not fighting" would be scored DN1.

1. **Higher level denial.** Denial at this level consists of several subsidiary defenses manifest in responses in which the form level of the percept is F+, Fo, or Fw+.

a. **Negation.** Negation involves a disavowal of impulse. The disavowal may be manifest in two ways. In one instance the disavowal is smoothly blended into the response itself, whereas in the other instance the response, or aspects of the response are couched in negative terms.

- i. "virgin."
- ii. "angel."
- iii. "These figures are not angry."

b. **Intellectualization.** In this process the response is stripped of its drive and affective charge by its being presented in an overly technical, scientific, literate or intellectual way.

- i. "Two homo sapiens."
- ii. "Two Kafkaesque figures."

c. **Minimization.** With minimization, drive laden material is included in the response but in a reduced and/or non threatening way. This would include changing a human figure into a caricature or cartoon figure.

- i. "A shadow cast by an evil person."
- ii. "A child with his hand clenched in a fist."
- iii. "A funny man, more like a caricature."

d. **Repudiation.** With repudiation, a response is retracted or the individual denies having even given the response.

- i. "No, not a person, but a gorilla."
- ii. "I never said that."

2. **Middle level denial.** Denial at this level involves responses in which the form level is F+, Fo, or Fw+ and involved in the response is a basic contradiction. The

contradiction may be on affective, logical or reality grounds.

- i. "A sexy Santa Claus."
- ii. "Two nuns fighting."
- iii. "A man reading while asleep."

3. **Lower level denial**. At this level reality adherence is abrogated but in a particular way. Specifically, an acceptable response is rendered unacceptable either by adding something that is not there or by failing to take into account an aspect of the blot that is clearly to be seen. This would correspond to Mayman's (1962) form spoil (Fs) response. In addition, this level would also include responses in which incompatible descriptions are ascribed to the percept.

- i. "Two people but their top half are female and bottom half male. Each has breast and a penis."
- ii. "A person but instead of a mouth there is a bird's beak."
- iii. "Person sitting on their huge tail."



### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup> Kernberg-Bardenstein (1985, pp. 105-111) clarified and amended several problems of the original LDS. Her additions have been incorporated into the instructions of the original scale and are denoted by an \* prior to text.

<sup>2</sup> These scores are taken from Mayman's (1962) manual for form level scoring. The Fw-score is assigned to unconvincing, weak form responses in which only one blot detail is accurately perceived. The F- score refers to arbitrary form responses in which there is little resemblance between the percept and the area of the blot being responded to.

<sup>3</sup> Dr is a location score used when the area chosen is small, rarely used and arbitrarily delimited (Holt, 1968).

<sup>4</sup> F(C) is a determinant used when the subject makes out forms within a heavily shaded area without using shading as shading or uses the nuances of shading within a colored area (Holt, 1968).

<sup>5</sup> The form spoil response differs from the F- response in that a basically acceptable response is spoiled by a perceptual oversight or distortion. In the F- response the percept is totally unacceptable.

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

## LERNER DEFENSE SCALES (1980)

Rorschach Responses

Response #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
------------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----

Splitting \_\_\_\_\_Proj. Ident. \_\_\_\_\_Devaluation \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_

Idealization \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_

Denial \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

## LERNER DEFENSE SCALES (1980)

Rorschach Responses

Response # 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 \_\_\_\_\_

Splitting \_\_\_\_\_Proj. Ident. \_\_\_\_\_Devaluation \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_

Idealization \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_

Denial \_\_\_\_\_

Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

## LERNER DEFENSE SCALES (1980)

Rorschach Responses

Response #    21    22    23    24    25    26    27    28    29    30 \_\_\_\_\_

Splitting \_\_\_\_\_Proj. Ident. \_\_\_\_\_Devaluation \_\_\_\_\_    Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_Idealization \_\_\_\_\_    Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 4 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 5 \_\_\_\_\_Denial \_\_\_\_\_    Level 1 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 2 \_\_\_\_\_    Level 3 \_\_\_\_\_

Subject #DateJudge

## LERNER DEFENSE SCALES (1980)

Total Defense Responses

Card #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
<u>Splitting</u>										
<u>Proj. Ident</u>										
<u>Devaluation</u>										
	<u>Level 1</u>									
	<u>Level 2</u>									
	<u>Level 3</u>									
	<u>Level 4</u>									
	<u>Level 5</u>									
<u>Idealization</u>										
	<u>Level 1</u>									
	<u>Level 2</u>									
	<u>Level 3</u>									
	<u>Level 4</u>									
	<u>Level 5</u>									
<u>Denial</u>										
	<u>Level 1</u>									
	<u>Level 2</u>									
	<u>Level 3</u>									

Subject #DateJudge

## LERNER DEFENSE SCALES (1980)

Total Borderline Defense ResponsesFrequencySplittingProj. Ident.DevaluationLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5IdealizationLevel 1Level 2Level 3Level 4Level 5DenialLevel 1Level 2Level 3Total Scored

## **APPENDIX G**

### **RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES (RDS)**

(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper, Perry & Arnow 1988)

For use with Rorschach content and determinant scores

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Cooper (personal communication, 1988).

## **SPLITTING**

Splitting refers to those instances in which oppositely toned feelings and urges toward the object or the self are kept separate because if these feelings were experienced simultaneously toward the object or the self, unbearable affects such as guilt or anxiety would result. Splitting functions to resolve intense ambivalence conflicts by creating one set of emotions toward one object with a contrasting emotional set attached to another object. Prestages of splitting are more "passive" stages of defense activity that result from the ego's inability to both perceive objects as a totality and to register whole object images in the context of various affective experiences.

### **Indications for Scoring**

**A. Prestage Splitting:** In a description of one total human figure, a clear distinction is made so that part of the figure is seen as opposite to another part. (Lerner and Lerner, 1980).

1. "A person being torn between two sides, one good and one evil, and they're both pulling against each other."
2. "A giant man. His lower part here conveys danger, but his top half looks benign." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980)

**B. Prestage Splitting:** Animals or inanimate objects or phenomena of nature are described in their totality, but a clear distinction is made so that one part of the object is seen as opposite to another part.

1. "That looks like a river with the upper half being majestic and divine and the other half as being evil and sinister."

**C. Prestage Splitting:** Rapidly alternating objects or themes representing shifts from libidinal to aggressive (or vice versa) drive material (Holt scoring) are presented in extraordinarily fluid fashion.

1. (Card III) "Those are two big Boston women at an all female disco, still carrying their bags, wearing high heels, and in love with each other because they're so identical. Uh. between their breasts is not white, its red, so that would mean that they're not capable of giving milk to each other, but their hearts have only rage or something. But they have reproduction on their mind, because this is somewhat of a fetus (upper corner details), sort of gangling, etc."

**D. Prestage Splitting:** Percepts supplied during free association which are described in drive-laden (Holt) terms become transformed into objects with opposite drive-laden qualities, affect, or intentions.

1. Free Association (Card IV) "It looks like a friendly man."  
Inquiry: "Now he looks angry, like he's coming at me; first he's friendly, then he's murderous, I can't tell."



E. In a sequence of responses a human percept described in terms of a specific non-ambivalent, non-ambiguous affective description is opposite to that used to describe the preceding responses. (Lerner and Lerner, 1980)

1. "Looks like an ugly criminal with a gun," immediately followed by, "Couples sitting together cheek to cheek." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980)

F. In a sequence of responses an animal percept or natural phenomena described in terms of specific, non-ambivalent affective dimension is immediately followed by another animal or human response in which the affective description is opposite to that used to describe the preceding responses.

1. "A bat, an ugly, vicious bat."
2. "A beautiful butterfly in flight. It's harmless, just flying from flower to flower."

G. Included in one response are two clearly distinguished figures and each figure is described at opposite ends of a psychologically significant qualitative dimension.

1. "Two figures, a man and a woman. He is mean and shouting at her. Being rather angelic, she's standing there and taking it." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980)

I. A sequence of responses (inter- or intracard) are clearly at opposite ends of a psychologically significant qualitative dimension. This can be scored on the basis of spontaneous verbal elaboration, but often involves a comparison of the images in both percepts. Examples of relatively unambiguous, psychologically significant qualitative opposites are: strong/weak, powerful/helpless, attractive/repulsive, immaculate/filthy, virtuous/perverse, war/peace, etc.

1. a. (Card VIII) "A crest of royalty."
- b. (Card VIII) "Two animals climbing up a pile of garbage."
2. a. (Card II) "Two policemen fighting; they're bloody from a battle with each other."
- b. (Card II) "Top of steeple...represents the House of Parliament or the Vatican even."

Note: No two response sequences can receive more than one score for splitting. However, the same response can be a part of two sequences which are both scorable for splitting.

- a. (Card II) "Screaming birds."
- b. (Card II) "Affectionate elephants touching trunks."
- c. (Card II) "Blood."

This sequence receives two scores for splitting, one for the shift from aggressive libidinal to aggressive drive material (responses one and two) and one for the shift back to the libidinal material (responses two and three).

Note: Only score when shifts along a qualitative dimension are striking and involve little inference as to degree or to psychological significance.

- Do Not Score:
1. a. (Card IX) "A witch."  
b. (Card IX) "Two little babies."
  2. a. (Card VII) "An ugly sort of animal."  
b. (Card VII) "Two puppy dogs."
  3. a. (Card IX) "An old man's face."  
b. (Card IX) "An infant or maybe they are twins."

A sequence of responses (inter- or intracard) includes a shift from libidinal to aggressive (or vice versa) drive material. For research purposes, drive manifestations should be assessed and scored according to Holt Primary Process Scoring System. Holt's distinction between drive level is not used in scoring or splitting. Oral aggressive drive manifestations are scored as aggressive rather than libidinal. Scorable sequences can include a wide variety of content.

1. a. (Card II) "Some kind of birds screaming at each other in a violent argument."  
b. (Card II) "Right underneath it looks like two baby elephants touching trunks in an affectionate manner."
2. a. (Card III) "A woman with large breasts."  
b. (Card III) "Looks like a mushroom cloud from an atom bomb."
3. a. (Card IX) "A flower with the stamen and pistol right here."  
b. (Card IX) "It looks like a bull with steam coming out of its mouth or nose...ready-to attack."
4. a. (Card II) "Smears of blood."  
b. (Card III) "The shape of a valentine."

## **REPRESSION**

Repression involves an unconsciously motivated effort to remain unaware of particular libidinal or aggressive impulses. To a greater extent than with most other defenses, repression contributes to certain aspects of normal development and healthy functioning.

In an adaptive context, repression is indirectly manifested by the simple absence of a host of potentially disturbing thoughts or feelings. Repression becomes pathological when it becomes too widespread and leads to cutting off "significant parts of the human personality from growth toward maturity" (Schafer, 1954). In this setting, repression may not only involve the absence of particular drive-laden thoughts, but may also require and be reinforced by a cognitive and affective style which is highly impressionistic, non-reflective, global, and naive. On the Rorschach, this defense can be manifested (in its more or less pathological forms) by the absence of particular kinds of context or by evidence of the kind of cognitive or affective style associated with overly extensive reliance on repression.

### **Indications for Scoring**

Only score repression for responses which are F+ form level and contain no evidence of other defenses, contamination, fabulized combination, confabulation, or peculiar verbalization.

**A. Non-reflectiveness as evidenced by complete use of subjective experience or actual past personal experience in justifying percepts during inquiry.** This may also include extremely vague justifications that primarily do nothing more than just repeat the context of the percept (Schafer). If the use of subjective experience becomes extreme or bizarre, consider scoring for hypomanic denial:

1. "I said it looks like a bat because it just does."
2. "I don't know, it just has the feel of a landscape, that's all."
3. "I've got squirrels like that in my back yard."

**B. Dramatic Expressive Reactions (Schafer).** These are strong emotional reactions to a blot or to particular responses which are scored regardless of where they occur in the response process. These exclamations should convey a sense that the individual is dealing with a stimulus of high intensity. Examples of expressive reactions include: wow, heavens, my goodness, gracious, oh boy, incredible, egads, holy cow, etc.

Note: Do not score mild expressive reactions such as boy, gee, gosh, golly.

**C. Phobic Verbalizations.** These include descriptions of an entire blot or of individual percepts which convey a sense of fear or of painful emotional involvement. Examples of phobic verbalizations include: weird, strange, eerie, scary, etc.

Note: To score for devaluation, these exclamations must include during free association or inquiry specific attributes of the object which contributes to a rejective perception. These are superficially similar to paranoid projections and hostility but differ in terms of intensity and content. Phobic verbalizations convey a global sense of unpleasantness or fear usually based on the physical physiognomic qualities of an object. Paranoid projections convey an articulated belief in the malevolent intentions of others (Schafer 211, 288).

**D. Immature forms of humans or animals such as children, bear cubs, lion cubs, puppies, and kittens (Schafer).** Do not score baby, embryo, or fetus, as these seem to involve primarily separation issues or feelings of helplessness.

**E. Adaptive repression is scored for those responses meeting the following criteria:**

1. Relatively global cognitive approach as manifested in W or D location--exclude Dr., S, W, dd, etc.
2. Tendency away from ideational cognitive approach--absence of human movement.

3. Tendency to avoid highly articulated perception--absence of determinant blends other than those combining animal movement with another determinant.
4. Absence of libidinal or aggressive drive material and no evidence of thought disorder (contamination, fabulized combination, peculiar verbalization, or confabulation).
5. Absence of objects with highly articulated personal attributes.
6. Absence of other scorable defense manifestations.
  1. "This looks like a red butterfly."
  2. "A bat--it looks like its flying."
  3. "A person--arm, legs, and head."

Note: Do not score articulation including personal attributes of objects such as:

1. "Irish women."
2. "Two African natives."

F. Relatively obvious elaborated genital level sexual symbolism that is described without indication of awareness of what is being symbolized. Evidence of this kind of awareness may be indicated by laughter, blushing, notable anxiety, embarrassment, or by direct verbal comments.

1. "The entrance to an inviting cave that is surrounded by mossy shrubbery."
2. "A swollen-looking root pushing its way through the earth."

Note: Do not score unelaborated objects which are merely symbolic of male or female genitalia--e.g., a banana, a hole in the ground.

## **ISOLATION**

In the defense of isolation, the individual is unaware of and removed from the feelings associated with a given idea while remaining aware of various cognitive aspects of the idea. Thus, isolation operates to separate affect from idea, so that potentially unpleasant ideas become easier to bear for the individual.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Ideas of percepts that the individual would ordinarily experience as related are seen as separated. Here the individual calls attention to the lack of connectedness. (Holt) Included here is an attentiveness to spaces between objects.

1. "Two people--unrelated, no connection between them." (Holt)
2. "The head is disconnected from the body." (Holt)
3. (Card VII) "It looks like two rock-formations; they are separated by a small space or figure."

**B.** Human or animal content which is highly controlled, regulated, structured, stiff, or stilted. Activity that is stylized or mannered. Formal expressions, gestures, or postures and stylized dancing such as ballet are included here.

1. "Two people in a very stylized, formalized sort of...could be a dance."
2. "Two people saying hello in a stilted way."
3. "A dance team."
4. "A circus dog."
5. "A bookkeeper."
6. "Two men in formal suits or uniforms."
7. "Two people shaking hands and bowing."
8. "A ceremonial procedure or ritual."

**C.** Drive-laden percepts are prefaced by words such as "object," "entity," "formation," and "image" that function to mitigate the emotional impact of the emerging percept.

1. "This object looks like a penis."
2. "This image looks like a wolf."

Note: This does not include references to location such as "this area looks like a gun."

**D.** Machine content or objects related to mechanical activities that do not include common modes of transportation such as cars, boats, or airplanes.

1. "A pair of pliers."
2. "A computer or generator."

**E.** Human beings or inanimate objects that signify efficiency, machine-like characteristics, or who are engaged in mechanical activities.

1. "A robot."
2. "A puppet or maniquin."
3. (Card III) "A man fixing a toilet; he looks like a plumber."

**F.** Any object which is usually used for aggressive purposes, but which is described with distastefulness of time or place.

1. "A caveman's club."
2. "An old-fashioned gun."
3. "An oriental sword."

**G.** Objects which are associated with sexuality or intimate apparel described with distancing of time or place.

1. "Old-fashioned corsets."
2. "An ancient symbol of fertility."

**H.** Maps of any kind. Islands, inlets, harbors, coastlines, and other geographical entities which

are determined by shape or outline. These must be described (implicitly or explicitly) from a vantage point not naturally accessible to man, e.g., a bird's eye view, a view from an airplane, etc. Such responses need not necessarily meet criteria for "vista" responses.

1. "The continents of North and South America."
2. "A chain of islands."
3. "A geodetic survey type of map showing elevations."

Do not score: "A view across a lake with the opposite shoreline reflected in the water." This kind of response does not capture the sense of being removed or affectively removed which is conveyed by the abstractness of maps or charts or by the inaccessibility of particular vantage points.

I. Responses that include distastiation when it involves reducing the substantiality of reality of an object or figure. Percepts are described as illustrations, pictures, drawings, shadows, sculptures, statues, etc. The important element is that a potentially "real" or affectively alive figure has been transformed to become less so.

1. "Looks like a face, like that poster for "One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest."
2. "It looks like that famous picture of two men playing cards. Not sure who painted it."

Do not score: Totem pole, tombstones, abstract art because these responses lack the kind of transformation alluded to above. Also exclude cartoons or caricatures as these are scored as Higher-Level Denial because humor is introduced in the service of reducing anxiety.

J. Awareness of one's own thought processes is scored when the individual reveals a tendency toward reports of the processes going on in his mind that lead to a particular response. This would also include introspective reports of what he is experiencing during the test.

1. "These tremendous feet attracted my attention at once."
2. "I was going to say arm-like, yet the thing I thought before arms was..."
3. "I like these colors, but I'm not sure why."
4. "Whatever this is it will suggest something to me soon."

K. Figures or objects which are described as balanced, balancing, or controlled. If an object is described as precariously balanced, it may be scored as an instance of the defense faltering.

1. "Two people leaning outward and holding onto that pole. It looks like they are in perfect balance."
2. "A governor or a flywheel."
3. "Balancing rocks, but they could topple over at any second."

Do not score objects which imply in their definition the idea of instability such as a "seesaw" or "teeter totter."

L. Emphasis on subjective feelings of coldness. This is scored where Rorschach imagery is related to cold weather or cold objects directly or indirectly. (Schafer)

1. "Ice."
2. "Snowmen."
3. "Ice cream."
4. "A winter coat."

**M.** Affective deadness or frozenness as inferred from verbalizations of detachment or indifference.

1. "A gory face--I suppose I should find it repulsive, but somehow I don't feel a thing about it." (Holt)
2. "A vagina--it doesn't give me much of a sensation." (Holt)

**N.** Percepts that are scored positively for drive in Holt's system are delivered with virtually no affect or little affective elaboration. Percepts delivered with no surprise, anxiety, or embarrassment, etc.

1. "A penis."
2. "A vagina."

## **PROJECTION**

Projection is a defense in which the individual unrealistically attributes objectionable feelings or experiences to other persons or objects rather than recognize these objectionable tendencies as part of oneself.

### **Indications for Scoring**

**A.** Projection of responsibility for the response is scored when the individual denies in one form or another that he is the origin or in any way responsible for the content of the percept. Manifestations include focusing on other people's percepts in order to minimize the subjectivity or uniqueness of the individual's own percepts. Externalization can also consist of appeals to what the artist "intended it to be." Also included are references to books, movies, or other experiences used to justify the occurrence of drive-laden material. When this kind of justification accompanies responses with formal incongruities, e.g., impossible activities, it is scored for rationalization. (Examples 1-3 from Holt, 1971).

1. "A woman's body--it's obvious, anyone could see it."
2. "If it's supposed to be a sex organ, I fail to see it."
3. "Another patient told me he saw a vagina here."
4. "A bloody monster. Must be all those horror movies that I've seen."

**B.** Projection of responsibility as manifested in requests for greater explicitness of directions from the examiner (more than three requests). If occurring less than four times, these kind of requests may be scored for reaction formation or intellectualization. When a record includes more than three of these requests, they should all be scored as projection. This item also includes questions about what the examiner sees in the blots. Score regardless of frequency. Do not score comments involved with the subject's efforts to

ascertain whether he has made himself clearly understood by the examiner.

1. "Will you tell me what this line is supposed to be?"
2. "Can't turn this one."
3. "How many things do you want for this card?"
4. "You tell me what you see first."
5. "Don't you see the same things I do?"

Note: Do not score: "You see that round part? It looks like a face," or "I'm using this part here. Don't you see what I mean?"

**C. Verbalization conveying a sense of suspiciousness about test materials and concern with relationships between cards or concern with hidden meanings. Also score questions or comments about the process involved in making ink blots.**

1. "These cards all seem related but I'm not sure how."
2. "These all seem to be telling me something."
3. "I have an idea about what this one may really be about."
4. "I know that these blots are really made by folding things together."
5. "Were these made this way on purpose?"

Note: Do not score comments that involve comparisons between similar responses given to different cards, e.g., "This butterfly is different (or "a lot like") the other one I saw."

**D. Expressions of interest or anxiety about what is being recorded.**

1. "That was supposed to be off the record."
2. "Are you going to write that down, too?"
3. "Why do you have to write it all down?"

**E. Comments about being unable to clearly make out what figures (human or animal) are doing or what their motives or intentions might be.**

1. "I can't really tell what the expression on the face is because it's not facing me."
2. "I'm not sure what kind of person is really behind the mask."
3. "That bat looks like it might be a vampire type bat, but I can't see it clearly enough to be sure."
4. "Who knows what could be behind the cloak."

**F. "Superego projection" as expressed in reference to being pointed out or incriminated. Score all references to being accused, scrutinized, spying, or being spied upon. Score marks (if more than one response per record). Pointing fingers, fingerprints, foot prints, detectives or their equipment (bloodhounds, magnifying glass), police or their equipment (handcuffs, whistles, etc.), figures involved in chase, judge, court, executioner, jailer are all scorable items. This is not an exhaustive list of responses, but is intended to set the tone for identifying other responses which deal with these themes.**



**G.** Responses include objects suggesting concern with visual surveillance and detection. This category includes the following:

- a. The perception of eyes as either isolated parts of figures or accompanied by fabulized elaboration, i.e., any feeling attributed to a figure on the basis of an expression or look in the eyes. "A face with mean eyes." (This would receive two scores for projection--one for "mean" and one for "eyes.")
- b. Objects used to enhance human vision (excluding eyeglasses, magnifying glasses, periscope, telescope, microscope, binoculars).

**H.** Responses which include activities suggesting concern with surveillance and detection. This category includes the following:

- a. Figures (H or A) described as searching, peering, staring, or having a penetrating gaze.
- b. Figures (H or A) are described as being visually focused on the subject, e.g., peering, looking, staring, gazing, etc. at the subject. Do not score "facing me" or "looking this way."

**I.** Projection of aggression resulting in suspicion of intentions and lack of trust. Score any responses that include reference to traps, detection, webs, pits, secrecy, plotting, or secret societies.

1. "A spider web."

**J.** Projection of aggression resulting in the frank expectation of being hurt by malevolent objects. Score responses of any content or references to the blots themselves that are described as conveying a strong sense of harmful potential, e.g., ominous, foreboding, dangerous, frightening, scary, threatening, sinister, evil, terrifying, suspicious, looming, hovering, angry, mean, cruel, sarcastic, etc. These states involve fear and imply imminent danger by being hurt, in contrast to affective states which are more depressive (gloomy, dismal, sad, or empty). Phobic verbalizations on the other hand reflect a more diffuse reaction of strangeness or a sense of a shock rather than the experience of impending harm or danger.

1. "A threatening storm cloud."
2. "An evil picture."
3. "A cruel-looking face."
4. "This guy is waiting to attack this guy over here."

**K.** Projection of aggression as expressed in images of figures (H, A, Hd, Ad) which have been (or are being) victimized or are the target of overt aggression.

1. "This cat has been run over."
2. "These animals have just been shot by hunters."
3. "An animal that's been split down the middle."
4. "A butterfly with wings that have been torn to pieces."

(When the figures are described as broken or damaged without a clear implication of victimization, score for Devaluation rather than Projection).

Do not score: Figures described as fighting, blood, or objects which only by implication have been the target of aggression such as an animal skin rug, a tanned hide, etc.

### **PROJECTIVE IDENTIFICATION**

This defense involves the fantasied projection of good or bad self representations into an object for the purpose of either safeguarding a vulnerable self representation by placing it in another object, or for the purpose of harming or controlling the object. Since the content of projections is not experienced as ego alien (in contrast to projection), a fearfully empathic relationship often develops with the hated or feared object. Boundary blurring (confabulatory thinking) is another component of projective identification. The simultaneous expressions of paranoid hyperalertness to attack and primitive rage also suggest the presence of this defense.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Responses in which a figure (H or A) puts a substance or a feeling into another object (H or A) for the purpose of controlling or destroying the recipient.

1. (Card X). "These tarantulas are injecting their poison into the grasshoppers."
2. (Card III) "These are the forces and energies that are controlling what these two people are doing. The force is going to make them have a bloody fight."
3. (Card VI) "This man has electrodes in his neck."
4. (Card VI) "This is an Indian burial site; on top it's a bearhide covering a dirt mound, a burial; stuck the spear with the feathers in the ground to let other tribes know that to come here would bring the wrath of God down upon us."

B. Animals that cause harm by placing dangerous substances in other object. Organisms or substances that when placed in another object cause harm. Score all such animals, organisms, or substances: tarantulas, poisonous snakes and spiders, parasites us plants or substances.

C. A vulnerable or valued object (H, A or Hd or Ad) is protected from danger by placing it in another object (H, A or Hd or Ad).

1. (Card X) "These little innocent, weak-looking creatures seem to be trying to get inside these pink things. Maybe they are trying to find refuge from this world of vicious-looking crabs and insects."

Note: This response is also scorable for splitting due to the polarization of innocent versus vicious figures.

2. (Card VII) "These statues are in a safe with thick walls."

D. Evidence of fearful empathy. Responses which contain figures (H or A) that are

perceived as threatening or attacking also includes empathic statements toward the feared object. Often such empathic statements involve a fearful figure which itself has become the target of aggression.

1. (Card VI) "This looks like an evil cat that's been run over. It really makes me mad that people do things like that all the time."
2. (Card III) "A frightening monster. It looks like its been shot. What a terrible thing for it to have been shot."
3. (Card VII) "A cruel-looking face. Something really bad must have happened to it to make him look that mean."

**E.** Responses which include overt statements of identification with aggressive figures (H or A).

1. (Card I) "An angry man. I'm angry now, too."
2. (Card I). "A face full of hatred, just how I sometimes feel."
3. (Card I) "A raging bull. He just wants to destroy everything in sight. I know the feeling."

**F.** The texture determined is present in responses which include indications of external threat or overt aggression. Fear of an object made hostile by venture of one's own projected aggression all in conjunction with the need for approval and support with the object an indicative of a fearful type of empathy.

1. (Card I) "Kind of an ominous picture just like those eyes are staring out through some sort of mask. It almost looks like cloth, furry around the edges."
2. (Card VII) "A vicious-looking pig. Because of the texture you can see what the skin of a pig would feel like."
3. (Card IV) "A hairy-looking monster ready to stomp on that snail thing in the middle." (Inquiry: Hairy?) "The shading gives it that look."

**III.** Copresence of hyperalertness to attack and primitive rage.

Responses must meet criteria for G and either H or I below.

**G.** The assessment of primitive rage: use both levels of aggression (including oral aggression) found in Holt's Primary Process Scoring System with the exception of less intense drive manifestations (e.g., rotten plants or objects, broken objects, defensive objects, etc).

**H.** Hyperalertness as indicated by content (Schafer, 1959).

Figures (H, A, Hd or Ad) or objects described as threatening, fierce, ominous, evil, sinister, dangerous, cruel, partly hidden or concealed. Dangerous, harmful or aggressive figures that are described as approaching, hovering, linking, stalking, ready to pounce, etc. Themes or images involving traps, pits, webs, being snared, caught or deceived.

**I.** Hyperalertness as indicated by the F(C) determinant (Lerner and Lerner, 1980;

Singerman, 1980). The determinant is scored when specific form are articulated within a heavily shaded area. When shading is used to deliver a form or when shading is utilized on a colored portion of a blot.

Examples:

1. G with H (Card IX) "Two evil-looking creatures tearing each other limb from limb."
2. G with H (Card IV) "That monster just squashed that snail. Now it looks like he might be headed this way toward me."
3. G with I (Card II) "A face with a cut and bleeding tongue. The differences in the shades of pink make it look like a tongue with the light part in the center. These parts are the dripping blood."
4. G with I (Card VI) "The center looks like the jaws of a machine that could crush you. The light space in the center is what would be left."
5. G with I "This part looks like a face with a pointed chin. It has a real angry look to it."

### **RATIONALIZATION**

Rationalization involves justification for the purpose of making acceptable ideas, feelings, or behavior more tolerable. Rationalization usually seeks to find more socially appropriate motives or explanations for either conflicted, illogical, or unnatural ideas or actions. On the Rorschach, this defense can occur in response to the presence of either "undesirable" drive content or to the presence of formal incongruities.

**A.** Percepts which contain either libidinal or aggressive drive material are made more acceptable by placing the drive manifestation within a socially approved context. This context can include social custom, ritual, mythology, folklore, drama, or pretense.

1. (Card III) "It looks like men who are ready to attack. It must be some kind of yearly ritual." (Note: The first statement would be scorable for projection and the second for rationalization).

**B.** Repudiation of intentionality in percepts which include aggressive or libidinal content. This kind of repudiation may attribute intention to chance, accident, misfortune, or to previous circumstances.

1. (Card II) "Two people in a fight--maybe they just accidentally ran into each other."
2. (Card III) "Here's a man and it looks like he's about to have this red stuff land on his head. He just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, I guess."
3. (Card VI) "This is a squashed cat--probably just a case of bad luck."
4. (Card VII) "Here are two people arguing or having a fight. They must have had a rough day because they look pretty mad."

**C.** The presence of libidinal or aggressive drive material is justified through reference to clichés or aphorisms. Also included are efforts to explain behavior in terms of average

expectations.

### **Indications for Scoring**

1. (Card II) "Two dogs rubbing noses and kissing. Dogs do that all the time.
2. (Card IV) "A scary monster--what can you expect--suppose most of them are."
3. (Card X) "This looks like some water that has spilled on the floor--no use crying over it as they say."

**D.** Responses which include major formal incongruities are accompanied by attempts at justification. Without the presence of justification these kinds of responses would be scorable as Massive or Bland Denial or Hypomanic Denial. See note on page following item for criteria defining attempts at justification.

1. "It looks like a three-headed dog. It must be Cerebus."

**E.** The patient makes an effort to explain or justify the perception of a particular response through reference to external stimuli or experience.

1. "A children's poster. I'm redecorating my child's room so that's why I thought of that." (Also scorable for isolation).

Note: When responses with the kinds of justifications which include drive-laden material score for projection of responsibility and not rationalization (D).

### **INTELLECTUALIZATION**

The aim of this defense is to substitute logic, knowledge, and objectivity for feelings and impulses.

### **Indications for Scoring**

**A.** Intellectualization: In this process, the response is stripped of its drive and affective charge by its being presented in an overly technical, scientific, literate, or intellectual way. (Lerner and Lerner, 1980)

1. "Two homo sapiens."
2. "Two Kafkaesque figures."

**B.** Exaggerated striving for aesthetic, historical, or scientific specificity in the Rorschach content. This may be expressed in trivial, time-consuming, or verbose specificity. Also score any sort of technical jargon used to describe any response. Some examples may include naming of animal species, geologic periods, gods, anatomy, tribes, or various historical figures. (Schafer)

1. "A lateral trilobite from the cenozoic period."
2. "Enlongated cylindroids."

C. Reference to textbook illustrations or to dictionary definitions.

D. References to literary or dramatic personas.

E. Reference to intelligence or to content related to intellectual functioning.

1. "A man with a very large head."
2. "The human brain."
3. "An intelligent-looking face."
4. "A wise old man."

F. A tendency toward abstract or artistic expressions of emotion. Affect is conveyed under the guise, as it were, or metaphoric or abstract verbalizations.

1. "The red is symbolic of conflict."
2. "It looks like a Danse Macabre."

Note: This scoring criteria should not be confused with more general and hollow interpretations of the blot in which the chief aim is to externalize responsibility--an example would include responses to the cards as being "incomprehensible modern art."

G. Reference to emotion or affect in a response which is attributed to or described in terms of artistic qualities of the blots.

1. "If it were a drawing, it would be dramatic from the artist's point of view."
2. "Whoever made these seemed to be interested in capturing the feeling of..."
3. "The use of pastels gives it a calm and pleasant feeling."

Responses in this category should almost convey the feeling of an art historical analysis stressing the particular techniques used to produce emotional affects.

H. References to testing procedures or any aspect of a blot as interesting, fascinating, curious, puzzling, right, hard, wrong, etc. Remarks which suggest that the subject views the testing procedure as an intellectual exercise which may or may not be pleasant or enjoyable. There is evidence of a rigid systematic approach to the test as manifested by a repeated pattern of card rotation. Score positively each time a rotation pattern repeats itself during the test.

J. There is evidence of a rigid, systematic approach to the test as manifested by repeated sequences of location choice. For example, a response sequence might consist of W, D, W or D, W. In order for this item to be scored, a location sequence would have to repeat itself at least three times in a row or manifest at least five different times within a record. Once these criteria are met, each instance of the location sequence is scored (for example, a sequence of D, W, D that appeared three times in a row would receive a score of three).

**K.** Percepts are stated in a probabilistic manner. Do not score more than five times in a record.

1. "Maybe a top."

Note: Drive-laden percepts that are stated probabilistically are scored for Higher-Level Denial.

### **DEVALUATION**

This defense refers to the use of derogatory statements about others which the individual employs to either fend off or minimize his own wishes for need fulfillment; this defense can also mitigate the disappointment accompanying needs going unmet. Devaluation seeks to tarnish the importance of one's inner and outer objects.

**A.** Human or animal figures (parts or wholes) whose physical (facial features, demeanor, posture, etc) appearance is described in negative, critical, or perjorative terms. This includes a figure described as ugly, unattractive, disgusting, repulsive, gross, homely, ridiculous, stupid, weak, sick, diseased, disfigured, deformed, distorted, defective, funny-looking, rotten, rotting, decrepit, worn out, useless, worthless.

1. "A homely face."
2. "An ugly dog."
3. "A fat guy."
4. "A deformed baby."
5. "A diseased piece of flesh."
6. "A distorted vagina."

Note: Do not score responses in which a figure is described as aggressive in one way or another way, e.g., as mean, cruel, or frightening. These responses embody primarily the projection of aggression rather than an effort to tarnish an object's importance or value. (Similarly, do not score figures which have been damaged, broken, etc. When these suggest concerns with victimization and should be scored as Projection). Phobic Verbalizations, (strange, bizarre, awful, horrible, etc) may express an underlying devaluation which may be revealed by spontaneous elaboration or inquiry. When this is the case (e.g., "A strange face." (Inquiry) "Because it looks deformed."), score for both Phobic verbalization (Repression) and Devaluation. Also do not score unelaborated descriptions such as odd, different, unusual as Devaluation.

**B.** Inanimate objects described in negative, or critical terms.

1. "An ugly flower." (Also score for Pollyannish Denial).
2. "A disgusting-looking piece of modern architecture."
3. "A really gross piece of furniture."
4. "A man wearing an ugly coat."
5. "The Backlands or some such wilderness."

**C.** Human or animal (whole or part) figures. Missing body parts.

Only score when this is described spontaneously during free association or when the missing body part is integrated with the final response.

1. "A bird without wings."
2. "A body without a backbone."
3. "A headless person."
4. "A skeleton."
5. "A monster without arms."
6. "A deer without antlers."

**D.** Human figures (part or whole) are described as having physical characteristics or other qualities of animals. These are distinct from percepts in which human or animal parts are combined to create a hybrid creature.

1. "That looks like a bosom, that looks like a rat."
2. "A person's face with a sly look. Crafty like a fox."
3. "A man with the appetite of a bear."
4. "A man with a bristly beard. I bet he'd feel like a porcupine."

**E.** Responses involving humans or animals or human parts or animal parts which entail incongruous combinations in the form of "composite responses" (Weiner, 1966, p. 70). The nature of the composite response is one in which parts from two or more separate percepts are combined into a "hybrid creature." Score part-human, part-animal responses with one or more animal features as Massive Denial and Devaluation.

1. "A person, half-female, half-cow."
2. "A woman with breasts, high-heeled shoes, and a bird's beak for a mouth."  
(Lerner and Lerner, 1980).
3. (Card III) "Two people with the heads of chickens."

**F.** Percepts of humans and animals in which devaluation in the form of disparagement and rejection of objects appears to be motivated by envy and revenge. Often percepts motivated by envy involve responses scorable for both Primitive Idealization and Devaluation.

1. (Card IV) "It looks like a man who everybody thinks is great but I think he stinks."

Note: Score for both Primitive Idealization and Devaluation.

**G.** Animals or insects which are commonly thought of as repulsive, loathsome, or disgusting. This includes roaches, rats, vultures, leaches, slugs, lice, maggots, ticks, fleas.

Do not include any other kinds of animals or insects.

**H.** Related to (A) but slightly more specific is the disparagement of masculine and feminine identification. This would relate to rejecting or hostile characterizations of men or women. Included in this would be disparaging attitudes toward conventional or stereotyped sexual roles and status. Various forms of "symbolic castration" (Schafer, 1954).

2. "A woman defecating."



Note: Unless a socially undesirable role is ascribed to a figure, do not score for aggressive interactions such as "Two people killing each other." (Scored as Projection).

J. Mythological, supernatural, and fictional characters are involved in the percept. These figures should embody a negatively tinged connotation. This would not include devils, occult figures, ogres, and the like. (H) and (A) categories are included here.

1. "Mephistopheles, there he is."
2. "It looks like Satan."
3. "A witch on a broomstick."

Note: Do not include such figures that are regarded as popular percepts on a given card. For example, do not score "witch" on Card IX or "monster" on Card IV.

K. Remarks which reflect a direct derogation of the blot itself, the testing enterprise, the artist's capabilities, or the examiner.

1. "I hate this, it disgusts me."
2. "These blots are aesthetically ugly."
3. "I cannot believe this is the way you spend your time-how boring."
4. "You should take shorthand if you had any sense."

#### Devaluation of Women

1. "Amazon."
2. "Old hen."
3. "Shrew."
4. "Flat-chested woman."
5. "Two women gossiping away."

#### Devaluation of Men

1. "Gnomes."
2. "Dwarfs."
3. "A little man."
4. "A man with a receding hairline."

Human figures are described whose activities, vocation, or social status embodies a negatively tinged connotation or socially unacceptable behaviors. This includes reference to existing functions and does not include descriptions of intercourse or other sexual activities. Included are figures such as thieves, criminals, bums, beggars, hobos, Ku Klux Klansmen, murderers, cannibals, savages, headhunters, slaves.

1. "Two cannibals cooking something in a pot."
5. "At least these pictures are in color." (Here there is an implicitly devaluing view of the preceding test material).

6. "Inquiry: "This looks like a bat; not this crap over here."

Self-deprecatory remarks in which the individual makes criticisms or attacks relating to his performance. (similar to Holt's self-depreciation).

1. "I must be one of the boring ones."
2. "I must be crazy to see things like that."
3. "I don't have much of an imagination, I guess."

### **PRIMITIVE IDELIZATION**

In this defense the subject describes unrealistic, all-good and powerful object images. the defensive aim of this aggrandizement of objects is to ensure the individual's protection against "bad" objects; objects are made so powerful that they cannot be destroyed or harmed by one's own aggression or by that projected onto other objects. Another aim is to vicariously share in the power and greatness of the idealized objects as gratification of one's own narcissistic needs.

#### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Human figures, objects, and animals are described in blatant and excessively positive terms.

1. "Two handsome, muscular Russians doing that famous dance."
2. "A seahorse, a beautiful animal in all its splendor and beauty."

B. Parts of human or animal figures are described in blatant and extreme positive terms:

1. (Card I) It looks like a gorgeous female body, so supple, perhaps a ballet dancer.
2. (Card X) "A rippling, muscular arm."

C. Specific human figures or positively described distortions of human form are perceived. This would include officials, objects of fame or strength, athletic superstars (Lerner & Lerner):

1. "Charles DeGaulle."
2. "An astronaut, one of those fellows who landed on the moon."
3. "Jesus Christ."

D. Specific great or spectacular animal percepts or percepts involving spectacular natural phenomena."

1. (Card VIII) "It looks like Mighty Mouse."
2. (Card VIII) "It looks like Rin Tin Tin."
3. (Card IX) "It looks like the Grand Canyon."

E. Percepts that involve an enhancement of the human form. This rating would include statues of famous figures, giants, supermen, angels, idols, mythological figures, and deities (Lerner & Lerner):

1. "A bust of Queen Victoria."

2. "Powerful beings from another planet ruling over these other creatures."
3. "A bust of Jesus Christ."

**F.** Objects that are possessions or part of the apparel or tools of figures of adoration, or strength.

1. "A crown, a king's crown."
2. "A crest of royalty."

**G.** The individual refers to the examiner, testing procedure, or testing materials in blatantly positive terms.

1. "You really know how to listen--I wish the other Doctors did as well."  
(Note: also score for devaluation).
2. "These tests were realloy amazingh--you must have learned so much about me. I know you could help me."

**H.** Percepts which are elaborated in which laudatory remarks toward the tester appear to serve the function of the individual sharing in the greatness of the idealized tester.

1. "It's easy and more productive for me this time around in taking the test. Your so much more intelligent and sensitive seeming than the other psychologist." (Note: Also score for devaluation).

### **HIGHER LEVEL DENIAL**

This defense, sometimes referred to as neurotic denial, involves an active attempt to reduce or to minimize the impact of painful or conflict-laden perceptions. This defense does not imply gross distortion or highly selective perception. Rather it sets to diminish the psychological significance of what has been accurately perceived. On the Rorschach, this defense is utilized to deal with a variety of dysphoric states. Neurotic denial must occur in the context of accurate form perception (F+).

### **Indications for Scoring**

**A.** Disavowal of impulse as manifest in descriptions of a percept in negative terms (must be in free association). In these instances, percepts must be of definite form.

1. "It's not a bat."
2. "Those people are not angry at each other."
3. "That woman is not sexy."

Note: Do not include examples such as the following: "It just feels like a female shape to me, not in any bodily sense."

**B.** Threatening material is expressed, but the threat is minimized, neutralized, or made small. (Holt)

1. Minimization of threat or dysphoric affect is accompanied by supplying a more benign manifestation of the threat or dysphoric affect. This can involve making threatening situations or figures less substantial or less immediately pressing.

Minimization can also be expressed in the tendency to describe dysphoric affect states as an absence or reductive of positive feelings.

- a. "It looks like the shadow of an evil monster."
  - b. "It looks like a foreshadowing of the nuclear holocaust that will soon ensue."
  - c. "Here is a hint of the anger that this couple feels toward each other."
  - d. "It looks like a face. It isn't too happy looking."
  - e. "Two people looking at each other. They don't look very friendly toward each other."
2. The individual introduces qualifications that make the threat of less intensity.
    - a. "Looks like these two have just had a bit of a fight."
    - b. "The face has a definite expression--almost a sad expression."
  3. Sexual or aggressive content is seen in tiny areas.

This is not scored, however, when the percepts include small body parts such as penises, eyes, vaginas, teeth, noses, or claws.

**C.** Attempts are made to repudiate or retract an entire response. (Holt, repudiation or disavowal of a response).

1. "Two human beings fornicating." In inquiry: "Did I say human beings? I didn't say that--those are two large apes."
2. "A penis--no, don't write that down, it really looks like a snake instead." (Holt's example for repudiation).

**D.** An attempt to reduce potential threat of any affect by resorting to humor. This can take the form of justifications, modifications, and often minimizations that are achieved through reference to humor. Often this is expressed in terms of a structural characteristic present in a particular response.

1. (Card I) "Two people face to face having an argument-their faces are so close together it is almost comical."
2. (Card II) "It looks like a bear. But no, it really looks more like a cartoon or a caricature of a bear because of the funny shaped head."

**E.** Drive-laden percepts are stated in a probabilistic manner.

1. "It may be a wolf."

### **OMNIPOTENCE**

Omnipotence is a defense in which the individual makes claim to unrealistic powers, influence, inflated worth, etc., often in attempt to deal with fears of powerlessness and worthlessness which are denied. This may take the form of a conviction that the individual has the right to expect gratification and homage from others or to be somehow treated as a special person. Omnipotence often involves an idealization of the self in which there is an unconscious conviction that one deserves to be lauded by others and treated as privileged.

**Indication for scoring**

- A. During either Rorschach proper or inquiry the individual describes himself with latent and excessively positive terms. This may take one of several forms.
1. Individual makes laudatory remarks to special abilities. References may be made to the self as having special test-taking abilities or special capabilities outside of the testing situation.
    - a. "I think you are going to hear some very distinctive responses. My vocabulary is such that it will only be truly understandable by the next century."
    - b. "That looks like a seahorse. Due to my keen sensibilities I can discern that to be an especially pretty seahorse. It might not look like that to many others, however."
    - c. "I saw some interesting things on that card; that was really quite clever of me. I've always been told I'm quite clever."
    - d. "I could go on with this all night."
  2. Individual sees himself in the actual blot (i.e. percept includes the self) or his possessions and this is elaborated with aggrandizing remarks.
    - a. "That looks like me when I was dressed up to go to the prom. I was the prettiest girl at the prom that night."
- B. In describing the percept the person uses the word "we" in referring to himself as the perceiver. Schafer (1954, p. 241) refers to this as the "editorial we."
1. "Here we see a person."
  2. "We will say it looks like a snake assuming we are asked to see such things."
- C. The individual "lectures" the examiner on how to improve his testing technique. "You might do better doing the pictures (see chart) first and from these you could easily write down what I saw."
- D. The individual gives the examiner permission to write something down or to ask various questions etc.
- "You can write down that I said I was tired of this."
- E. The individual demonstrates a kind of haughtiness in relation to the examiner.

1. "I think I've spelled that idea out sufficiently."

### **HYPOMANIC DENIAL**

This defense is characterized by an extreme tendency to avoid the recognition or experience of emotional pain. In contrast to higher levels of denial, hypomanic denial has a strained or forced quality which often involves gross and sometimes transparent distortions of reality. Meaningful integration of contradictions is often avoided if this could lead to the experience of emotional pain. Likewise, contradictions can be unrealistically or capriciously integrated in the service of denying painful aspects of reality. On the Rorschach, this defense can involve distortions of reality (F-), particular confabulations surrounding an initially accurate perception (F+), or it may involve specific types of incongruous combinations.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Neutral, benign, or frankly pollyanish responses which are justified entirely or almost entirely on the basis of personal conviction as opposed to objective perceptual details. Justification should have the flavor of a wish or need on the part of the individual to see that particular content. (Schafer, 1954, p. 254).

1. (Card X) "A flower." On inquiry: "Because I want it to be. Flowers give me a good feeling, and that's that."
2. (Card IX) "It looks like an ice cream sundae-strawberry at the bottom." On inquiry: "I guess because I am hungry and I just wanted to see it."

B. Responses which include statements what should or should not have been included in the blot with the aim of denying or minimizing potential or perceived threat, aggression, or dysphoric affect. Often this will take the form of flat assertions about whether a given feature of the blot's construction should or should not be there.

1. (Card II) "It's two bears, but the red should absolutely not be there. It's misguided,\* a picture of bears should not include these red parts."

Do not score verbalizations in inquiry that are directed towards telling the examiner that aspects of the blot were used in forming the percept. This is different than flat assertions about what should or should not be contained in the actual representation. For example, do not score:

1. (Card IV) "A monster." In inquiry: "I'm not using the lower, dark part down here. I only see the monster in this part of the blot."

C. Responses which include pollyanish concepts as opposed to objects. These concepts may be expressed with or without the use of color symbolism.

1. (Card X) "Love."
2. (Card VII) "Hope."

3. (Card IX) "A new beginning."

**D.** Color is used in the response in a way that results in a highly personalized or idiosyncratic meaning in order to deny the presence of aggression or dysphoric affect. This "magical use of color" (Schafer, 1954) involves primarily the avoidance or minimization of aggressive or dysphoric affective states.

1. (Card III) "I would say a small demon on each side except red is a good color and makes me feel cheerful so I know what they are! They are disguised! They are really cherubim blowing trumpets!" (Schafer, 1954, p. 253).
2. (Card II) "A battleship only it's too hopeful for that. It's white, and that's a hopeful color." (Schafer, 1954, p. 253).

\* This sort of criticism of the blot's construction may also be scored as devaluation (i) if the derogation of the blot is explicit.

**E.** Responses which include references to color that are explicitly mentioned as symbolizing pollyanish concepts. These responses include the (Csym), (CFsym) and more rarely, the (FCsym) categories, but only in those instances when color is used to represent a pollyanish concept or object.

- 1.(Card VII) "The pink and light blue stand for peace and serenity."
- 2.(Card IX) "The pink color symbolizes a flower and growth in humanity."
- 3.(Card IX) "The green stands for elusive peace, oh that elusive peace."

**F.** A response that contains a confabulation in which an initially described or potential threat or difficulty is denied/avoided or overcome. Concomitantly, there should also be a shift from a depressive to a euphoric or nearly euphoric affect tone. (Schafer, 1954, p. 255).

1. (Card V) "An insect. It has a slight growth on the right wing. The growth is grayer than the rest which is a sign that it will disintegrate and go away, and it will be a free moth which will not die in the candle flame." (Schafer, 1954, p. 254).

Note: This response also includes magical use of color and should be scored for both instances of hypomanic denial.

2. (Card VI) Here is a tree growing on a rugged mountain top. It could be blown over by the wind but I know it will make it.

**G.** Inappropriate combinations which involve the reduction of potential aggression or dysphoric affect. Here the need to reduce the impact of threatening material leads to a partial lapse of reality testing and of the "ego's synthetic function." (Weiner, 1966, p. 449).

1. "A lion with a mouse's head."
2. "A dark cave with a chandelier hanging up in front of the entrance."

**H.** Responses which include figures (animal or human with or without distantiation in time and space) that are described with an associated affect, description, intention, or as being engaged in an activity which involves a major incongruity. (Lerner and Lerner).

1. "A henchman laughing."
2. "A sexy Santa Claus."
3. "Fighting nuns."

**I.** Arbitrary Form-Color Response (Holt and Weiner): Form and color are incompatibly combined without awareness of the resulting anomaly. These responses can be either FCarb or CFarb.

1. "Blue people." (Exner).
2. "Red snow."
3. "Orange mist."

**J.** Pollyanish content is given to blots with particularly inappropriate stimulus properties. This involves either pollyanish content with F- form level, or rather flagrant denial of other stimulus properties, particularly color.

1. (Card I) "A pretty flower." F-
2. (Card VII) "A rainbow."

**K.** Figures (H or A) are endowed with qualities suggesting a hypomanic mood state. In contrast to pollyanish denial which emphasizes a superficial appraisal of fun or pleasantness, this item refers to the elaboration of figures feeling state. This goes beyond the attribution of simple happiness, enjoyment or having fun to more frank hypomania: e.g., increased energy, increased self-esteem, gregariousness, over enthusiasm, restlessness, triumphant attitude or stance.

1. (Card III) "Two very confident looking people."
2. "A man so full of energy he doesn't know where to go first."
3. (Card VII) "Two dancers. They look so happy that they couldn't sit still if they wanted to." (Also scored for Pollyanish Denial).
4. (Card X) "This person has just had a great idea and he's telling this one."
5. (Card III) "Two people dancing to exhaustion." (Weiner).

**L.** Responses which include aggressive or dysphoric content that contain a shift of attention from the content of the percept to either the quality of the form or the quality of the individual's formation of the percept.

1. (Card I, side D) "Witches. They are very well drawn witches."
2. (Card III) "Two people fighting. How cleverly conceived."

Note: Evaluative statements concerning the quality of the drawing may also be scored as intellectualization (I), but, when the percept includes aggressive or dysphoric content, this



shift should be scored instead as hypomanic denial.

M. Pollyanish responses which include repetition or overemphasis of specific responses. This repetition should appear to be directed toward the reduction or mitigation of aggressive content or dysphoric affect.

1. (Card IX) "This green plant is like a respite from those mean witches. In fact, those mean witches don't look mean like they did before."

N. Behavior during testing includes features of euphoria. This would include overt reference to the individual feeling happy, cheerful, self-confident, etc. When hypomanic denial is unstable, euphoria may be interspersed or may alternate with hostility or depression. Score instances of a driven, outpouring of words in which it appears that there is chain thinking, notable digression, puns, quips, or self references that appear irrelevant. (Schafer, 1954, p. 254). Apply these criteria conservatively and score only when striking or flagrant. Do not score this item more than once for a given response.

1. (Prior to Card I) "I know I'm going to enjoy this because I'm in such a good mood."
2. (Card X) "I'm glad to see this one. It makes me feel good. It's just how I feel--full of light and sunshine."

Note: Hypomanic denial is differentiated from omnipotence in that the former refers to a mood state (euphoric or occasionally hostile) while the latter involves an exaggeration of the individual's attributes such as prowess or importance. These defenses may or may not coexist.

### **MASSIVE OR BLAND DENIAL**

This is a defense which "involves significant distortions of reality to the point that a segment of subjective experience or of the external world is not integrated with the rest of the experience. There is a striking loss of reality testing, and the individual acts as if he were unaware of an urgent, pressing aspect of reality." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980) Massive denial differs from neurotic denial whereby the individual actively seeks to minimize, negate, or repudiate an accurately perceived threat or conflict. While pollyanish and hypomanic denial both include an often transparent motive, i.e., the avoidance of pain through focusing on benign or pleasurable experience, massive or bland denial often occurs without a clear affective content. On the Rorschach, this defense takes two principal forms. Bizarre incongruities and flagrant contradictions are blandly accepted without awareness or without any attempt at justification. The complete inability to perceive or to integrate certain extremely prominent stimulus characteristics constitutes a second indication of massive or bland denial.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Composite responses (Holt and Weiner). Two or more separate percepts are combined into a single "hybrid creature." Also included are figures with more than the necessary number of body parts and figures with parts organized in an unrealistic way. Striking

incompatibilities are blandly accepted.

1. (Card III) "A person but instead of a mouth there is a bird's beak." (Lerner and Lerner).
2. (Card III) "Two people but their top half are female and the bottom half male. Each has breasts and a penis." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980).
3. (Card IV) "A frog with a mustache." (Exner).
4. (Card X) "A two-headed lobster." (Holt).
5. (Card X) "A face. It's all mixed up--the eyes are above the nose and the mouth is sideways." (Holt).

Note: A crucial element in this and the following manifestations of massive or bland denial is the bland acceptance of major incongruities and contradictions without contextual justifications or awareness of a lapse in reality testing.

When such responses are accompanied by efforts at justification (reference to mythology, art, folklore, fairy tales, cartoons, etc.), do not score as massive or bland denial. Similarly, this kind of response should not be scored when the subject indicates he/she is aware of the unrealistic quality of response. Occurring in a setting of humor, whimsy, or adequate contextual justification, incongruous combinations may indicate the potential for creativity or regression in the service of the ego. Listed below are a variety of incongruous combinations which because of sufficient justifications and awareness are not scored as massive or bland denial. Do not score:

1. "A three-headed dog--Cerberus." (Weiner, 1966).
2. "A beetle with butterfly wings--but that's ridiculous because they couldn't go together." (Weiner, 1966).
3. "People with breasts and penises--it could be natives doing some kind of ritual dance and wearing a ritual costume having bisexual representations." (Weiner, 1966).
4. "A person with a green and yellow face--I could see it as a mask just painted that way, with yellow eyes and a green mustache." (Weiner, 1966).

**B. Inappropriate or impossible activities.** Also included are figures which are given incongruous attributes:

1. "A man reading while asleep." (Lerner and Lerner, 1980).
2. "A person with his head looking behind him--his head can swivel 360 degrees."
3. "Two beetles doing the Charleston." (Weiner, 1966).

Note: Do not score animals engaged in human behavior when this involves either the kinds of behavior animals are trained to do or is a common reflection of the tendency to anthropomorphize.

Do not score: "Dancing bears or Dogs kissing."

**C. Impossible combinations (Holt and Weiner).** In these responses an impossible relationship is described between two or more parts of the blot. "Impossibility is 'achieved' in two principal ways; through a discrepancy of size, through putting together things that do

not occur together in reality or through a mixing of natural and supernatural frames of reference." (Holt, p. 30). While composite responses involve the acceptance of a nonexistent figure, impossible combinations involve the creation of an impossible relationship between two components of a blot.

1. "A prairie dog climbing on a butterfly." (Holt).
2. "Two animals holding a bridge in their mouth." (Holt).
3. "A witch riding a jet plane." (Holt).
4. "Mice sitting back in an armchair with a cigarette--pensive look."

Note: Since impossible combinations often involve inappropriate activities, do not score the latter when it occurs as part of an impossible combination. Otherwise, a single response can receive more than one score for bland denial.

1. "Red bears flying-through those clouds." Score for FCarb and inappropriate activity.

D. "Unlikely combinations" (Weiner, 1966, p. 79) in which objects are related to one another in a manner that significantly stretches but does not completely violate realistic considerations.

1. "Monkeys balancing rabbits on their heads." (Weiner, 1966, p. 79)
2. "Two elephants standing on two other elephants." (Weiner, 1966, p. 79)

Note: Carefully differentiate these responses from combinations that can be realistically expected to occur in reality such as, "a man riding a horse" or "two wolves fighting over a piece of meat."

E. The separateness of objects (H, A, Hd, Ad) is denied through the arbitrary connection of figures based on contiguity or juxtaposition. When such connections do not occur in nature, there need be no further elaboration of the relationship between figures or objects except that they are connected, attached, stuck to one another, glued together, etc. For example:

1. (Card VIII) "Three butterflies attached to each other."
2. (Card X) "All these creatures seem stuck together."

F. Rejections on free association of Cards I, III, VI, or VIII. These cards have been shown to have the lowest frequency of rejection (Weiner). In addition, they all contain extremely popular responses. Rejection of these cards indicates the inability to perceive or to integrate the salient aspects of consensually validated reality.

G. Complete absence of determinants other than form. Aside from the Rorschach blots offer a variety of more or less salient determinants which normally contribute to the response process. The inability to appropriately respond or utilize these non-form determinants suggests massive denial of significant aspects of internal and external experience. Give this item a weighted score of three.

H. Absence of Klopfer populars. Whereas normal subjects give nearly six populars (Exner) per record the complete absence of populars suggests a gross inability to recognize that which is most easily seen. Plainly visible reality is overwhelmingly denied.

### **POLLYANISH DENIAL**

This defense is characterized by "persistent efforts through selective perception, minimization, and reversal in fantasy to be conscious of only cheerful, optimistic, benevolent, pretty untroubled, and otherwise positive aspects of experience, relationships, and behavior." (Schafer, 1954, p. 234). Responses should be of minus form level.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Pollyanish objects are apparent in the content of the response. Such objects are those that symbolize the pretty and serene aspects of life such as flowers, dawns, and sunsets. When objects are described with attributes that emphasize their benevolence and harmlessness, score for reaction formation (I).

B. Figures are described with pollyanish emphasis on fun, pleasure, pleasantness, happiness, and the like. Include figures engaged in activities such as dancing, playing, or relaxing. These kinds of responses should convey the sense of a mildly euphoric affect state. In contrast, idealization refers to the exaggeration of an object's power, worth, or attractiveness rather than to the affect state.

1. (Card IV) "There is a boy having a lot of fun sitting on a waterplug. I mean a fire plug. His feet are in opposite directions. His head is back. I think he is laughing." (Schafer, 1954, p. 244).
2. (Card IX) "Two girls dancing with very full skirts. Their hair is blowing back from their heads. They seem to be enjoying themselves, carefree."

C. Favorite objects involved with holidays, such as the Easter bunny, Christmas trees, Maypoles, and fireworks; responses which include objects engaged in activities that are characterized by a childlike innocence or playful quality.

1. (Card III) "Two people playing hopscotch."
2. (Card II) "These are two people playing pattycake."

D. Statements about the card itself or about what is depicted in the card which emphasize a surface orientation or superficial pronouncement of the card. Often these remarks may have a rather stereotyped ring about them, echoing frequently used reactions or expressions that tend toward sentimentality. Reference to positive qualities of blots or percepts are included here.

1. "Oh, isn't this one sweet."
2. "How lovely and delicate, this one is."
3. "It's so gentle."
4. "A pretty face."
5. "A pleasant abstract painting."

6. "A smiling face."

Note: In a sequence of responses, this may involve a shift to primitive idealization or vice versa. Both responses must meet scoring criteria for these defenses.

### **REACTION FORMATION**

Reaction formation refers to the unconsciously determined replacement of or overemphasis on attitudes and impulses that are the opposite of particularly threatening, unconscious ones (Schafer, 1954). Thus, original feelings are regarded as unacceptable and are substituted with feelings, behavior, or intention of opposite emotional tone. On the Rorschach, reaction formations vary in their content, but include attitudes and feelings such as tenderness, doubting, conscientiousness, self sufficiency, self-assuredness, and toughness. When the defense is stable, what is seen is only the end product of the substitution rather than both opposites in alternation.

Instances of more unstable reaction formation can include manifestations of the underlying rejected impulses such as disorderliness or sadism.

### **Indications for Scoring**

A. Spontaneous verbal attempts at supplying inquiry in the service of being "helpful" to the examiner. Score only if these comments come before any inquiry on the examiner's part.

1. "Am I being clear enough in explaining it to you what makes it look like that? I wish I could say exactly what it looks like to me."

B. Spontaneous behavioral attempts at supplying inquiry in the service of being helpful to the examiner. (Schafer, 1954).

1. The individual spontaneously turns the card toward the examiner so that the latter can see the card right side up.

C. Concern with "messiness," aggression, or "sloppiness" of blots which conveys a mild sense of discomfort in reaction to these qualities.

1. "I...uh...hate to say this, but it...ah...looks pretty messy to me."
2. "I wish they didn't have that smeared quality..."
3. "Uh, I hate to say this, but those look like two people fighting."

D. Spontaneous expressions of willingness to be cooperative with regard to the testing process. Attitudes of conscientiousness and helpfulness should be manifest.

1. "Maybe I shouldn't take so long if time is important."
2. "I'm sure I could get more from this card if you would like me to."
3. "Why don't I slow down so it would be easier for you to get this all down."

E. Score when forty or more responses are given with an attitude of helpfulness and

compliance on the part of the individual as manifested in (D 1) above. The high number of responses should be manifestly linked to a kind of conscientiousness and the individual's underlying belief that "more is better."

Score where R is forty or more and at least one statement of conscientiousness is present such as:

1. "I can say more if you'd like me to."
2. "Should I tell you everything I see?"

Note: In order to score Item E, Item D will also be present. Item D, however, can be scored without the presence of Item E.

**F.** Reaction formations against passivity which leads to excessive toughness or hardness. This is most clearly demonstrated when the subject displays a reactive toughness in reaction to the content of a particular response containing an image which stirs up conflict over the gratification of passive-dependent needs. A strong antisentimentalist bias and difficulty dealing with tenderness are also evidence of this kind of reaction formation.

1. (Card II) "Two people holding or touching their hands together; maybe like in a dance. A pretty corny type of dance. Almost maudlin."
2. (Card III) "A valentine--it's such a sentimental custom--giving valentines. It makes me laugh."

**G.** Pollyanish content responses that use space as the location:

1. (Card II) "Sea shells."
2. (Card II) "A snow cone."

**H.** Exaggerated emphasis on responses which reflect a striving for tact and rapport with others. This is scored when at least two responses from each of the FC, F(C) FC<sup>1</sup>, and FCh categories are present. Do not score this item on the basis of the thematic content of the response. This may also be scored if eighty percent of the responses using these determinants are form dominant.

Responses which include figures or objects whose attributes, actions, or intentions emphasize images of duty-laden obedience, submission, altruism, cleanliness, meticulousness, sincerity, gentleness, or expressions of gentleness and benevolence be tied to specific actions or intentions of figures or objects rather than used as more superficial and impressionistic descriptions of the card.

1. (Card X) "A very neat floral arrangement."

Note: Score for both reaction formation because of the emphasis on neatness and pollyanish denial (A) because of the representation of the floral arrangement.

2. (Card III) "A person helping another with their package; a good samaritan type."

3. (Card III) "A person with a tender expression on his face."

Do not score responses which reflect a more impressionistic, superficial, or sentimental perception of the card such as the following:

1. "Oh, isn't this card sweet."
2. "The colors are so gentle and beautiful."

These responses would be scored as pollyanish denial (A) because of their surface orientation rather than involvement with the intention or observation of objects.

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

**Rorschach Responses**

Response #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<b>Neurotic</b>									
Neuro. Denial									
Pollyan. Denial									
Intellectualization									
Reaction Formation									
Rationalization									
Repression									
Isolation									
<b>Borderline</b>									
Splitting									
Proj. Ident.									
Devaluation									
Prim. Ideal.									
Projection									
Omnipotence									
<b>Psychotic Defenses</b>									
Massive Denial									
Hypomanic Denial									



Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

**Rorschach Responses**

Response #	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
<b>Neurotic</b>									
Neuro. Denial									
Pollvan. Denial									
Intellectualization									
Reaction Formation									
Rationalization									
Repression									
Isolation									
<b>Borderline</b>									
Splitting									
Proj. Ident.									
Devaluation									
Prim. Ideal.									
Projection									
Omnipotence									
<b>Psychotic Defenses</b>									
Massive Denial									
Hypomanic Denial									

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

**Rorschach Responses**

Response #	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
<b>Neurotic</b>									
<u>Neuro. Denial</u>									
<u>Pollvan. Denial</u>									
<u>Intellectualization</u>									
<u>Reaction Formation</u>									
<u>Rationalization</u>									
<u>Repression</u>									
<u>Isolation</u>									
<b>Borderline</b>									
<u>Splitting</u>									
<u>Proj. Ident.</u>									
<u>Devaluation</u>									
<u>Prim. Ideal.</u>									
<u>Projection</u>									
<u>Omnipotence</u>									
<b>Psychotic Defenses</b>									
<u>Massive Denial</u>									
<u>Hypomanic Denial</u>									

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

**Rorschach Responses**

Response #	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
<b>Neurotic</b>									
Neuro. Denial									
Pollvan. Denial									
Intellectualization									
Reaction Formation									
Rationalization									
Repression									
Isolation									
<b>Borderline</b>									
Splitting									
Proj. Ident.									
Devaluation									
Prim. Ideal.									
Projection									
Omnipotence									
<b>Psychotic Defenses</b>									
Massive Denial									
Hypomanic Denial									

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

Total Defense Responses

Response #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
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**Neurotic**Neuro. DenialPolivan. DenialIntellectualizationReaction FormationRationalizationRepressionIsolation**Borderline**SplittingProj. Ident.DevaluationPrim. Ideal.ProjectionOmnipotence**Psychotic Defenses**Massive DenialHypomanic Denial

Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Judge \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**RORSCHACH DEFENSE SCALES**  
(Cooper & Arnow, 1986; Cooper et al. 1988)

Frequency**Neurotic**Neuro. DenialPollvan. DenialIntellectualizationReaction FormationRationalizationRepressionIsolation**Borderline**SplittingProj. Ident.DevaluationPrim. Ideal.ProjectionOmnipotence**Psychotic Defenses**Massive DenialHypomanic DenialTotal Defenses Scored

**APPENDIX H**  
**REVISED PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST (PCL-R)**

R. D. Hare (1991)

Note. The Hare PCL-R was published during completion of this manuscript. Please refer to The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-revised manual (Toronto: Multi-health Systems) for complete documentation.

**APPENDIX I**  
**STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (SIP)**  
**CODING FORM**

**IDENTIFYING DATA**

Patient Number\_\_\_\_\_ Legal Status\_\_\_\_\_

Charges\_\_\_\_\_

Dates: DOB\_\_\_\_\_ Testing Age\_\_\_\_\_ Test Date(s)\_\_\_\_\_

Adm. Date\_\_\_\_\_ Prior Adms. to BSH: 1 2 3 4 5 >6

Dis. Date\_\_\_\_\_ (1-comp.; 2-not comp.; 3-commit; 4-not commit;  
5-unknown)

**DEMOGRAPHIC DATA**

Race: 1-caucasian 2-black 3-hispanic 4-asian 5-other

Nationality: 1-U.S. 2-other (How long in U.S.?)\_\_\_\_\_

Marital Status: 1-never married 2-living as a couple 3-married (#\_\_\_\_)  
4-separated 5-divorced (#\_\_\_\_) 6-widowed

If subject is separated or divorced:

How long did the relationship last? (Specify time)

How long ago did the relationship end? (Specify time)

Children: 0-none 1-one 2-two 3-three 4-four or more  
5-stepchildren 6-adopted/foster

If subject has children, obtain information on: age; sex; whether children are blood/adopted/foster/affinial; where living; and how children are supported.

Religion: 1-cath. 2-prot. 3-jewish 4-muslem 5-none 6-other

Military: 0-none 2-honorable d/c 3-dishon. d/c 4-combat 5-wounded in combat

Socioeconomic Status: 1-executive, major professional  
2-manager, lesser professional 3-small business owner, semiprofessional  
4-clerical, sales, technician 5-skilled worker 6-semiskilled worker  
7-unskilled worker

Last residence: 1-own home/apt. 2-with parents 3-other family's home 4-friends



5-motel/boarding house 6-homeless

## DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY

### Early Childhood History

Planned or unplanned pregnancy: 0-unknown 1-planned 2-unplanned

Birth complications/defect(s): 0-none 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Bottle or breast fed: 0-unknown 1-breast 2-bottle

Developmental milestones: 0-no difficulties 1-slow (motor and/or cognitive)

\_\_\_\_\_  
Serious illness: 0-none 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Injuries: 0-none 1-doctor's office 2-reqd. hospitalization 3-scars/impairment

\_\_\_\_\_  
Separations from family: 0-none 1-yes Type/Age \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### Family Constellation and Atmosphere

Parents Current Marital Status: 1-married 2-single 3-widowed 4-sep/div.  
(Age of pt. at time of parents sep/div/death \_\_\_\_\_)

Single Parent: 1-Mother 2-Father

Step Parent: 1-Mother 2-Father (age of pt./quality of relationship)

\_\_\_\_\_

Adopted: 0-no 1-yes (age of pt./quality of relationship)

\_\_\_\_\_

<u>Parent History:</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Father</u>
<u>Occupation:</u>	_____	_____
<u>Years Education:</u>	_____	_____
<u>Psychiatric Hx:</u>	0-no 1-yes	0-no 1-yes _____
<u>Mood Disorder:</u>	0-no 1-yes	0-no 1-yes _____
<u>Arrest/Incarceration:</u>	0-no 1-yes	0-no 1-yes _____
<u>Alcohol Abuse:</u>	0-no 1-yes	0-no 1-yes _____
<u>Drug Abuse:</u>	0-no 1-yes	0-no 1-yes _____
<u>Spouse Psychological/Emotional Abuse:</u> 0-none 1-mild 2-moderate 3-severe		

verbal \_\_\_\_\_

behavioral \_\_\_\_\_

Spouse Physical Abuse: 0-none 1-mild 2-moderate 3-severe

Saw Fa strike \_\_\_\_\_

Saw Mo strike \_\_\_\_\_

Child abuse: 0-none 1-mild 2-moderate 3-severe

Bad temper w/you? \_\_\_\_\_

Ever ridicule, belittle, criticize, call names, made to feel unloved/unwanted? \_\_\_\_\_

Emotionally cruel to you? \_\_\_\_\_

Physically hurt you? \_\_\_\_\_

Other violence: 0-none 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Father's absence: 0-never 1-< 6 mo. 2-> 6 mo. 3-1 yr. 4-> 1 yr. 5-d/c  
(age of pt.\_\_\_\_)

Mother's absence: 0-never 1-< 6 mo. 2-> 6 mo. 3-1 yr. 4-> 1 yr. 5-d/c  
(age of pt.\_\_\_\_)

What effect did the absence/death have on you? \_\_\_\_\_

Family trauma (i.e. strains, changes, deaths, witness of s/th): \_\_\_\_\_

Siblings:

Number of siblings: blood siblings \_\_\_\_\_ step siblings \_\_\_\_\_

1a) M/F \_\_\_\_\_ 1b) age \_\_\_\_\_ 1c) arrests Y/N 1d) psych. hospitalization Y/N  
 2a) M/F \_\_\_\_\_ 2b) age \_\_\_\_\_ 2c) arrests Y/N 2d) psych. hospitalization Y/N  
 3a) M/F \_\_\_\_\_ 3b) age \_\_\_\_\_ 3c) arrests Y/N 3d) psych. hospitalization Y/N  
 4a) M/F \_\_\_\_\_ 4b) age \_\_\_\_\_ 4c) arrests Y/N 4d) psych. hospitalization Y/N  
 5a) M/F \_\_\_\_\_ 5b) age \_\_\_\_\_ 5c) arrests Y/N 5d) psych. hospitalization Y/N

Who was the dominant figure in the family?: \_\_\_\_\_

What was the quality of your relationship to the dominant figure? 0-warm/close  
 1-variable 2-cold/distant 3-uncaring/indifferent 4-hostile/aggressive

Relationship w/family: 0-warm/close 1-variable 2-cold/distant  
 3-uncaring/indifferent 4-hostile/aggressive

Mother 0 1 2 3 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_ 0 1 2 3 4

Father 0 1 2 3 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_ 0 1 2 3 4

Sib. 1 0 1 2 3 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_ 0 1 2 3 4

Sib. 2 0 1 2 3 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_ 0 1 2 3 4

Sib. 3 0 1 2 3 4 Other \_\_\_\_\_ 0 1 2 3 4

Continuity of residence: 0 stable, no moves or absences  
 1 stable, > 3 moves or absences  
 2 stable, < 3 moves or absences  
 3 occasionally unstable  
 4 frequently unstable  
 5 chaotic

Family Activities:

Describe your relationship with parents/siblings/other family?

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Vacations/daytrips

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Sports/movies/games

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Discipline:

Who usually disciplined you?      Mother      Father      Other

What methods(s)? (Obtain frequency)

- a) natural/logical consequences
- b) admonitions/religion
- c) threatened/made fun of
- d) isolation/sent to room
- e) grounded/lost privs./\$\$
- f) had things or pets taken away
- g) switch/cane on buttock
- h) belt/strap on buttock
- i) slapped or spanked w/hand
- j) struck with fist
- k) switch/cane other than buttock
- l) belt/strap other than buttock

- m) beaten (e.g. board/pipe)
- n) cut, burned or thrown
- o) threatened with a weapon
- p) weapon used

How did you feel about being disciplined? \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

Any memorable incidents? \_\_\_\_\_

### **MEDICAL HISTORY**

#### **Physical & Psychosomatic Disorders**

**Physical & psychosomatic conditions:** 0-none 1-yes

<u>Type of Illness</u>	<u>Treatment</u>
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

**Previous Operations:** 0-none 1-yes

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

#### **Neurological History**

**Seizures:** 0-no 1-yes 3-trx \_\_\_\_\_

**Head Injuries:** 0-no 1-yes 3-trx \_\_\_\_\_

**Dissociative Episodes:** 0-no 1-yes 3-trx \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**Neuro Exam/CT/BEAM/PET:** 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Other LOC: 0-no 1-yes 3-trx \_\_\_\_\_

Headaches: 0-no 1-yes 3-trx \_\_\_\_\_

Handedness: Right Left Ambi Switched

Family LH: No + \_\_\_\_\_

### Substance Use History

	<u>How Much</u> <u>How Often</u>	<u>How injected</u> (smoked, pills injected, sniffed, etc.)	<u>Age</u> <u>1st</u> <u>Used</u>
Alcohol	_____	_____	_____
Marijuana/Hashish	_____	_____	_____
Stimulants (speed, ice, crystal, PCP Cocaine	_____	_____	_____
Barbituates	_____	_____	_____
Hallucinogens (LSD, Mescaline, MDA)	_____	_____	_____
Analgesics (Codine, Demerol, Percodan)	_____	_____	_____
Opiates, Heroin	_____	_____	_____
Inhalants (glue cough medicine)	_____	_____	_____
Others	_____	_____	_____
Others	_____	_____	_____

Psychiatric History

Drug/Alcohol Tx:      0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Outpatient Tx:      0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Psychiatric Hosp.:      0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Medication:      0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Last Outpatient Contact: (Date/Type) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

(Medical History Chart Review Data)

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### Exposure to Violence

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There are no margins, text, or other markings on the paper.



### History of Injury to Self

Ever attempt to hurt yourself or commit suicide:

- a. Precipitant:
- 1--physical illness
  - 2--long term depression
  - 3--loss of job
  - 4--death of a loved one
  - 5--relationship break up
  - 6--other
- b. Agent(s) used:  
(circle number & type)
- 1--overdosing, cutting, starving
  - 2--drowning, strangulation, asphyxiation
  - 3--injection of lethal poison, shooting,  
jumping from height or running in front of  
vehicle
- c. Physical injury:
- 1--mild/no medical
  - 2--moderate/required doctor's attention
  - 3--planning (method, place)
- d. Plan:
- 1--no plan, sudden urge
  - 2--some planning, same day
  - 3--planning (method, place)
- e. Others:
- 1--no plan to involve others
  - 2--suicide pact
  - 3--homicide/suicide

	<u>Precipitant</u>	<u>Agent</u>	<u>Injury</u>	<u>Plan</u>	<u>Others</u>
1					
2					
3					
4					

Self mutilation:    0-none    1-cutting    2-stuffing    3-burning    4-hitting

Tattoos: 0-none 1 2 3 or more \_\_\_\_\_

Scars from self infliction/ self caused accidents:      0-none   1   2   3 or more

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History of injurious behavior to others

Bad temper: 0-denies      1=yes (infrequent, intermittent, chronic)

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Thoughts of injury: (Ever been so angry you thought of killing someone? What kept you from acting?) 0-denies      1=yes \_\_\_\_\_

---

(Other than index offense)	1	2	3	4
	<u>Thoughts</u>	<u>Threats</u>	<u>Attempts</u>	<u>Complete</u>
a) hit another w/ your body	1	2	3	4
b) hit with weapon or object	1	2	3	4
c) stab or cut another	1	2	3	4
d) shoot someone	1	2	3	4
e) strangle w/ your hands	1	2	3	4
f) strangle w/ rope etc.	1	2	3	4
g) drown	1	2	3	4
h) set fire	1	2	3	4
i) hit with vehicle	1	2	3	4
j) poison	1	2	3	4
k) tie person/animal up	1	2	3	4
l) have sex w/out consent	1	2	3	4
m) injure or kill animals/birds	1	2	3	4

Additional Information: \_\_\_\_\_

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### **COGNITIVE AND INTERPERSONAL FUNCTIONING**

#### **School adjustment/performance**

**Feelings about attending school:** \_\_\_\_\_

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**Achieved:** 0-college 1-technical/trade school 2-HSC 3-expelled/dropped

**Grades:** 0-average 1-below average 3-above average GPA\_\_\_\_

**Grades and Subjects Repeated:** \_\_\_\_\_

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**Special Ed/Testing:** 0-none 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

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**Hyperactive:** 0-no 1-yes 3-medication \_\_\_\_\_

**Dyslexia:** 0-no 1-yes 3-special classes \_\_\_\_\_

**School Changes:** 0-none 1 2 3 4 5 or more \_\_\_\_\_

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Ever cheat on tests/assignments: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Ever Truant: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Suspensions: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Expulsions: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Behavior Problems: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

### Friendships

Describe the type of friends and friendships you had while growing up:

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Friends/club/gang: 0-no/loner 1-yes/friends 2-yes/club/gang

Anyone you could confide in? 0-no/loner 1-yes/close friends

Pets: \_\_\_\_\_

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Sports: 0-no 1-yes/noncontact 2-yes/contact (time length played)

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Clubs/organizations: (game clubs, 4-H, scouts, music groups, youth groups etc.)

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Ever hold any offices in any group organizations? 0-none 1-yes

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Vocation

Occupation(s)/Jobs      How ended:    0                      1                      2                      3  
    Better Position      lay off      quit      fired

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Number of jobs in past 3 years:      0-disability    1    2    3    4    5 or more

Last job which lasted 6 months or longer: \_\_\_\_\_

If unemployed query whether:

- 1-looking for work, receiving unemp. or compensation benefit
- 2-looking for work, no benefits
- 3-not looking for work, receiving benefits (pension, SSI, welfare)
- 4-not looking, no government benefits
- 5-institutionalized

Primary source of support during past 6 months:    1-self support from work,  
    2-family supported (living with family, trust fund, school),  
    3-government benefit (pension, disability)    4-personal savings  
    5-criminal activity    6-institutionalized    7-other

Best job (descriptive title): \_\_\_\_\_

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Avocation/Fantasy

What are your favorite leisure activities? \_\_\_\_\_

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Watch or play sports: \_\_\_\_\_

Hunting/fishing/collecting: \_\_\_\_\_

Television/Movies: (preferences, names of favorites)

- 1-romance              2-comedy              3-science fiction      4-action adventure
- 5-fictive crime    6-true crime              7-horror              8-adult

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Favorite games or stories: \_\_\_\_\_

Idealized figures: (who and why; egs. fictional characters, movie actors, musicians, athletes, military or political figures, intellectuals)

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Books: (comics, novels, nonfiction, true crime, magazines)

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Erotica/Pornography: (owns magazines/books/videos, rents videos, frequents adult book/video shops, live entertainment, solicits prostitutes)

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## CRIMINAL HISTORY

### Delinquent Behavior

Stealing: 0-no    yes, Type: 1-Family   2-Shoplifting   3-B & E   4-Robbery

Vandalism: 0-no   1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Runaways: 0-no   1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Sexual Behavior: 0-no   1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Alcohol: 0-no   1-yes Age/Severity \_\_\_\_\_

Drugs: 0-no   1-yes Age/Severity \_\_\_\_\_

Juvenile fines (mischief, speeding etc.): 0-no   1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Juvenile Arrests: 0-no   1-yes # Times \_\_\_\_\_

Placements: 0-no   1-yes # Times \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

### Adult Criminal History

Prior arrests (not including current offense) 0-no   1-yes

Age at first arrest   0--10 to 15   1--15 to 17   2--18 to 20   other

First offense \_\_\_\_\_

Ever arrested for use of weapons: 0-no   1-yes

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Ever arrested or convicted of any of the following?

(Circle if appropriate)

	<u>Arrest</u>	<u>Convicted</u>	<u>Probation</u>	<u>Mandated Treatment</u>	<u>Sentence Where Time</u>
Disorderly Person	A	C	P	MT	_____
Dist. the Peace	A	C	P	MT	_____
Viol. of Restrain	A	C	P	MT	_____
Vagrancy	A	C	P	MT	_____
Drinking	A	C	P	MT	_____
Drugs Possession	A	C	P	MT	_____
Drugs Trafficking	A	C	P	MT	_____
Major Driving Viol.	A	C	P	MT	_____
Weapons Possession	A	C	P	MT	_____
Stealing	A	C	P	MT	_____
Burg./B&E, Nite/Day	A	C	P	MT	_____
Forgery/Fraud	A	C	P	MT	_____
Treason/Espionage	A	C	P	MT	_____
Auto Theft	A	C	P	MT	_____
Arson	A	C	P	MT	_____
Burning a Dwelling	A	C	P	MT	_____
Threats	A	C	P	MT	_____
Fighting	A	C	P	MT	_____
Robbery	A	C	P	MT	_____



A & B	A	C	P	MT	_____
Assault of P.O.	A	C	P	MT	_____
Voyeurism/Exposure	A	C	P	MT	_____
Obscene phone calls	A	C	P	MT	_____
Child Molestation	A	C	P	MT	_____
Rape	A	C	P	MT	_____
Other sex crimes	A	C	P	MT	_____
Kidnapping	A	C	P	MT	_____
Asslt. Int. Murder	A	C	P	MT	_____
A & B D/W	A	C	P	MT	_____
Manslaughter	A	C	P	MT	_____
Murder	A	C	P	MT	_____
Escape/Bail Breach	A	C	P	MT	_____
Other	A	C	P	MT	_____
Other	A	C	P	MT	_____
Other	A	C	P	MT	_____
Other	A	C	P	MT	_____

Did you ever have troubles in jail such as restriction of privileges, solitary etc.?

<u>Where</u>	<u>When</u>	<u>Restriction</u>	<u>Reason</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

Current Offense DataPrecipitants to current charge/conviction:

Family conflict 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Work conflict 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Peer conflict 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Love conflict 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Bad News 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Other 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_

Crime/gang/substance related \_\_\_\_\_

Other persons involved: 0-no 1-yes \_\_\_\_\_Mental statusChange of mental status before offense: 0-no 1-yes Duration \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Kind of change: 1-depressed 2-argumentative 3-psychotic 4-dissociation 5-other

\_\_\_\_\_

Memory: 1-complete account w/affect 2-complete account absent of affect 3- brief omissions 4-major omissions 5-full amnesia 5-denies

\_\_\_\_\_

Dissociative episode: 0-no 1-depersonalization 2-derealization 3-bothResponsibility and intent: 1-denies responsibility and intent  
2-admits responsibility but denies intent  
3-admits responsibility and intentPlanning: 1-premeditated 2-same day 3-impulsive 4-unclear

Prior threats/assaults toward victim: 0-none 1-verbal threats 2-physical assaults

Situation: 1-ambush 2-argument 3-crime related 4-other

Intoxication: 0-no 1-yes Type: \_\_\_\_\_

Psychotic: 0-no 1-yes Evidence of psychosis: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Immediate reaction: 1-sought help 2-notified authorities 3-fled 4-hid evidence  
5-suicide attempt 6-other \_\_\_\_\_

What was done with victim: 1-covered body 2-hid body 3-dismembered 4-left

Location: 1-home of victim 2-home of subject 3-home of both 4-public outdoors  
5-public indoors 6-car 0-unknown

Time: 1-6am-6pm 2-6pm-12pm 3-12pm-6am 0-unknown

Day of week: 0-Monday-Friday afternoon 1-Friday evening-Sunday evening

\_\_\_\_\_

Victim: 1-genealogical kin 2-affinial kin 3-acquaintance 4-stranger

Weapon(s): 1-firearm 2-knife 3-club/bat/etc. 4-strangulation  
5-beating w/o weapon 6-drowning 7-fire 8-vehicle 9-other

Subject's account of the offense: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**Offense data, disposition etc.:**

DSM-III-R Diagnoses:Axis I: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Axis II: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Medication: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX J**  
**EXPERIMENTAL SCORING CRITERIA AND CODING FORMS**  
**FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE DEGREE OF DEHUMANIZATION**

### **GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF DEHUMANIZATION**

Dehumanization is a construct which provides theoretical understanding of how empathic inhibition and interpersonal detachment occur. Dehumanization enables an individual to avoid or to lessen the emotional significance of others; in psychoanalytic terms--to libidinally decathect, which is a subconscious protective maneuver. It can be conceptualized as a component of intrapsychic structure which creates a powerful "psychological wedge" that separates the intrapsychic and socialized inhibitions to harm from the physical act. Bernard et al. (1965) emphasized that dehumanization includes two distinct but interrelated processes which are self and other directed. Self directed dehumanization occurs when the individual fails to experience his own humanness and sees himself as a part object. When the defense is object directed, the perception of others is altered to diminish those attributes considered most human. Both forms are mutually reinforcing, and are used for the same purpose, emotional self protection. It has been postulated that object directed dehumanization may be situationally or developmentally induced. The extent to which one dehumanizes ranges from temporary or recurrent episodes, which are situation or person dependent, to partial or permanent conditions, which are characterologically embedded. The three gradations of dehumanization are: temporary, partial and permanent.

**Transient or temporary dehumanization** is situation or person dependent and may occur across all diagnostic categories and levels of personality organization. It requires exogenous validation and reinforcement, and is experienced as ego syntonic for only a limited time period. Dissociation is likely to have been experienced during the offense. Afterward, when the individual is removed from the situation, and others with whom the offense was committed, the event is experienced as ego dystonic. **Score: 1**

**Partial dehumanization** is more endogenously motivated than temporary dehumanization. Individuals or groups are ego syntonically viewed in extremes, such as superhuman and bad human. This split of the object representation endures over time and across contexts. Partial dehumanizers characterologically make identifications selectively with only a few members of the human race, and negative attributes are associated with "outsiders". Dissociation may have been experienced during the offense. Afterward, the individual continues to experience the event as ego syntonic. **Score: 2**

With **permanent or total dehumanization**, others are not individualized and are considered interchangeable commodities, to be used and discarded without concern for their welfare. This stance is characterologically embedded, ego syntonic, and not dependent upon the behavior of others. Libidinal identification and affect, positive and negative, for others is consciously absent and is replaced with indifference (Bernard et al., 1965; Miller & Looney 1974). The offense subsequently experienced as ego syntonic and of minimal consequence.

**Score: 3**



Subject # \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Rater \_\_\_\_\_

**DEHUMANIZATION SCORING FORM**

Rorschach \_\_\_\_\_

PCL-Interview &amp; chart \_\_\_\_\_

SIP Interview &amp; chart \_\_\_\_\_

Parent-Victim Descriptions \_\_\_\_\_

Highest \_\_\_\_\_

Lowest \_\_\_\_\_

Mode \_\_\_\_\_

**APPENDIX K**  
**VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA**

C. Loftin et al. (1987)

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Loftin  
(personal communication, January, 1991)

# **RELIABILITY STUDY - VICTIM-OFFENDER RELATIONSHIP FORM**

Loftin et al. (1987)

When selecting an appropriate response try to follow these rules:

- (1) choose YES when there is definite indication in the file that the attribute is present;
- (2) choose NO when there is definite indication in the file that the attribute is absent, or when there is no mention of it in the file and no reason to suspect that it is present;
- (3) choose SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN when there is something in the file that suggests that this attribute may be present, but there is not enough information to be certain;
- (4) choose UNKNOWN when the attribute is relevant (i.e., the question is raised by something in the investigation), but no information was available.

The difference between SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN and UNKNOWN is that for UNKNOWN no information is available about a relevant attribute, while for SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN the available information is ambiguous.

## 1. Incident number.

(INCIDENT)

Last two digits of year (e.g., 83) followed by three-digit incident number.

## 2. Is it reasonable to infer that the homicide is a result of mutual criminal activities on the part of the victim and offender?

Exclude consumption of controlled substances and traffic violations, but include the sale and distribution of controlled substances, as well as accessory to a crime.

(OTHCROME)

1=YES -- SPECIFY:

2=NO

8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN -- SPECIFY:

9=UNKNOWN

## 3. Did the victim and offender reside in the same building or block, but not in the same household?

(VRESIBK)

1=YES

2=NO  
 8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN  
 9=UNKNOWN

4. Did the victim reside in the same household as the offender at the time of the incident?

(VRESIDE)

1=YES  
 2=NO  
 8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN  
 9=UNKNOWN

5. Did a romantic relationship exist between the victim and offender in either the immediate or distant past?

A romantic relationship is a dyadic heterosexual or homosexual relationship involving partners who are legally married, dating or cohabiting couples where it is reasonable to infer that both parties are consenting to sexual relations.

Note: This would exclude most cases of prostitution and incest.

(ROMANTIC)

1=YES  
 2=NO  
 8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN  
 9=UNKNOWN

6. Was the victim related consanguinally to the offender (blood relative)?

(CONSANGN)

1=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S PARENT -- Go to 14  
 2=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S CHILD -- Go to 14  
 3=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S SIBLING -- Go to 14  
 4=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S GRANDPARENT -- Go to 14  
 5=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S GRANDCHILD -- Go to 14  
 6=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S CONSANGUINIAL AUNT/UNCLE -- Go to 14  
 7=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S AUNT/UNCLE,(UNKNOWN WHETHER  
 CONSANGUINIAL OR AFFINIAL) -- Go to 14  
 8=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S CONSANGUINIAL NIECE/NEPHEW -- Go to 14  
 9=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S NIECE/NEPHEW,(UNKNOWN  
 WHETHER CONSANGUINIAL OR AFFINIAL)-- Go to 14  
 10=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S HALF SIBLING -- Go to 14

- 11=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S CONSANGUINIAL COUSIN (FIRST DEGREE)  
-- Go to 14
- 12=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S CONSANGUINIAL COUSIN (OTHER OR UNKNOWN DEGREE) -- Go to 14
- 13=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S COUSIN (FIRST DEGREE- UNKNOWN WHETHER CONSANGUINIAL OR AFFINIAL) -- Go to 14
- 14=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S COUSIN (OTHER OR UNKNOWN DEGREE - UNKNOWN WHETHER CONSANGUINIAL OR AFFINIAL) -- Go to 14
- 15=NO
- 16=UNKNOWN
- 17=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN -- Go to 14

7. Was the victim related affinally to the offender (related through marriage)?

(AFFINIAL)

- 1=YES, MARRIED TO EACH OTHER (COMMON LAW INCLUDED) -- Go to 14
- 2=YES, LEGALLY SEPARATED, OR DIVORCED FROM EACH OTHER -- Go to 14
- 3=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-PARENT -- Go to 14
- 4=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-CHILD -- Go to 14
- 5=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-SIBLING -- Go to 14
- 6=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S IN-LAW -- Go to 14
- 7=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-GRANDPARENT -- Go to 14
- 8=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-GRANDCHILD -- Go to 14
- 9=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S AFFINIAL AUNT/UNCLE -- Go to 14
- 10=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S AFFINIAL NIECE/NEPHEW -- Go to 14
- 11=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S AFFINIAL COUSIN (FIRST DEGREE) -- Go to 14
- 12=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S AFFINIAL COUSIN (OTHER OR UNKNOWN DEGREE) -- Go to 14
- 13=YES, VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S STEP-COUSIN -- Go to 14
- 14=NO
- 15=UNKNOWN
- 16=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN -- Go to 14

8. If answered NO to questions 6 and 7, but the victim is a relative of the offender, how is the victim related to the offender?

(HOWREL)

- 1=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S ADOPTED PARENT -- Go to 14
- 2=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S ADOPTED CHILD -- Go to 14
- 3=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S ADOPTED SIBLING -- Go to 14
- 4=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S FOSTER PARENT -- Go to 14

5=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S FOSTER CHILD -- Go to 14  
 6=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S FOSTER SIBLING Go to 14  
 7=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S LEGAL GUARDIAN Go to 14  
 8=VICTIM WAS OFFENDER'S LEGAL WARD -- Go to 14 9=UNKNOWN

9. If the victim was a relative of the offender, but it did not fall into any of the categories in questions 6, 7, or 8, how were they related?

Note: Relationships such as Big Brothers, Fraternity Brothers, or close family friends that are referred to as "aunt" or "uncle" are not considered to be relatives.

DESCRIBE RELATIONSHIP \_\_\_\_\_

10. Prior to the day the homicide occurred, would the victim have recognized the offender?

(STRANGER)

1=YES  
 2=NO -- Go to 14  
 3=SUSPECT THAT THE VICTIM WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE OFFENDER  
 4=SUSPECT THAT THE VICTIM WOULD NOT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE  
 OFFENDER Go to 14  
 9=UNKNOWN Go to 14

11. Was the relationship between the victim and offender based on recurrent circumstances such as working in the same place, being in the same business (legal or illegal), living in the same neighborhood, using the same facilities (transportation, schools, parks, restaurants, etc.), or was it based on voluntary friendship, or both?

(RELCIRCM)

1=CIRCUMSTANCES  
 2=FRIENDSHIP -- Go to 13  
 3=BOTH  
 4=NEITHER -- Specify: -- Go to 13  
 9=UNKNOWN -- Go to 13

12. What circumstances brought the victim and offender together? (CSTANCE)

Describe the circumstances \_\_\_\_\_

13. Did the victim and offender communicate frequently (once a week or more over a period of at least three months), now or in the past?

(FREQCOMM)

1=YES

2=NO

3=COMMUNICATED, BUT FREQUENCY UNKNOWN

9=UNKNOWN

14. Was the victim a police officer?

(VICTCOP)

1=YES

2=NO

9=UNKNOWN

15. Was the killer a police officer?

(OFFNDCOP)

1=YES

2=NO -- Go to 17

9=UNKNOWN -- Go to 17

16. Was the killer a police officer acting in the line of duty?

(COPDUTY)

1=YES

2=NO

8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN

17. Did the victim have a type of relationship with the offender that has not been previously mentioned?

(OTHERREL)

1=YES -- SPECIFY:

2=NO

8=SUSPECTED BUT UNCERTAIN -- SPECIFY:

9=UNKNOWN

---

**Write a brief description of the victim offender relationship**



**APPENDIX L**  
**HOMICIDE CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA**

D. G. Cornell (1987)

Note. Reprinted by permission of Dr. Cornell,  
(personal communication, March, 1991)

## ADOLESCENT HOMICIDE TYPOLOGY

### CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA

Dewey G. Cornell

Programs in Clinical and School Psychology

School of Education

University of Virginia

These criteria were employed in Cornell, D., Benedek, E., & Benedek, D. (1987). Juvenile homicide: Prior adjustment and a proposed typology. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57, 383-393. For further information, contact Dr. Cornell at University of Virginia, 405 Emmet Street, Charlottesville, VA 22903-2495. (804) 973-3943.

## ADOLESCENT HOMICIDE TYPOLOGY

### CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA

Adolescents charged with homicide generally can be classified into one of three groups, based on the circumstances of the offense: 1) Psychotic at time of offense 2) Crime-related motive for offense and 3) Conflict-related motive for offense. Classification criteria are listed below.

Information describing the defendant's behavior during the offense is needed to classify the case. Ideally, this information should include a detailed police report (including a review of the scene, accounts of witnesses, and any statement made by the defendant at the time of arrest) and the defendant's account of the offense during the forensic evaluation. It is useful to compare two or more accounts of the offense in order to obtain a more reliable and complete assessment. As always, the reliability and completeness of the data-base will limit the validity of the classification results. However, many relatively clear-cut cases can be classified with comparatively brief information, provided that the information is accurate.

All defendants should be considered for each of the three groups in the same sequence-- Psychotic, Crime, and Conflict. Defendants who meet the criteria for the Psychotic group should be classified as Psychotic even if they meet criteria for the other groups. Defendants who meet criteria for the Crime group, but not the Psychotic group, should be classified in the Crime group even if they meet criteria for the Conflict group. Only those defendants who meet neither Psychotic nor Crime group criteria should be classified into the Conflict group.

In a consecutive series of 72 cases, each defendant could be classified into one of the three groups. Agreement between two independent clinicians (one a psychiatrist and one a clinical psychologist) was 89% (Kappa = .80).

### GROUP CRITERIA

1) **Psychotic Group** The defendant must be psychotic at the time of the offense. Psychosis is defined according to DSM III and may include psychosis due to drug intoxication, schizophrenia, major affective disorder, or another psychiatric disorder.

The two most common and clear-cut indications of psychosis are hallucinations (false sensory experiences, such as hearing voices or seeing visions) and delusions (belief in grossly unrealistic or bizarre ideas). For example, a defendant may hallucinate the voice of God telling him to kill someone, or may have the paranoid delusion that the victim is trying to kill him.

Less often, psychosis may be indicated by grossly bizarre behavior. This may include incoherent or extremely illogical speech (thought disorder), or some kind of extremely unusual or absurd action (for example, tearing off one's clothing, drinking one's urine). In many cases, bizarre behavior will reflect delusional ideas or a response to hallucinations.

One difficult scoring problem occurs when a defendant claims psychotic symptoms, but appears to be malingering. A survey of over 300 consecutive forensic evaluations (Cornell and Hawk, unpublished data) reveals that approximately 10% of the defendants are diagnosed as malingering psychotic symptoms. Presumably, a similar proportion of adolescent homicide defendants may do the same. For the most part, the coder is forced to rely on the forensic examiner's clinical assessment of the adolescent's presentation. Key diagnostic information to consider are: 1)

Are there any independent reports of bizarre behavior by the defendant at the time of the offense? 2) Is there a history of psychosis or severe psychiatric disorder? 3) Are the defendant's claimed symptoms typical of psychosis and do they cluster into recognized diagnostic categories? 4) Does the defendant present convincing symptoms at the time of the evaluation? None of these questions can determine the issue alone, but they can help in assessing difficult cases.

Some common claims are not to be considered a basis for coding a defendant as psychotic. Claimed amnesia for any time period does not by itself constitute psychosis. Vague statements such as "I was out of my head" or "I must have been crazy" or "I don't know why I did it" have no bearing in this classification. Also, intoxication on drugs or alcohol at the time of the offense is common for many violent crimes, and does not in itself indicate psychosis. There may be an unusual case in which a defendant was intoxicated on hallucinogenic drugs and experienced mild or transitory hallucinations prior to the offense (such as seeing walls move or feeling slightly paranoid). This does not necessarily indicate that the defendant was psychotic during the offense. Note that defendants who planned to carry out a criminal act such as a robbery may become intoxicated in order to prepare for the offense. Later, they may exaggerate their degree of intoxication in hopes that it will be considered a mitigating factor in their case. In principle, the Psychotic group should include cases in which psychosis was a major factor, if not the determining factor, in the homicide.

2) **Crime group** The homicide was committed in the course of some other criminally motivated act, such as robbery, burglary, or rape. It should be evident that the defendant had some clear self-serving motive for the offense (for example, obtaining money). The homicide is often secondary or unplanned. For example, a person might awaken during a burglary, confront the youth, and as a result be killed.

There are several special cases that need to be included in this category. "Contract" murders or murders motivated by revenge against a witness or informant to another criminal act should be coded in this group. Defendants who purposely sought out victims for physical abuse (for example, gangs who molest tramps) and inadvertently killed someone would be coded here. Defendants who belong to delinquent gangs and kill rival gang members also are coded in the Crime group.

Typically, the victims are strangers, but this is not a requirement. A number of Crime homicide victims are neighbors or acquaintances. It is possible for the victim to be a family member, but this needs careful evaluation. One possible example was a defendant who murdered a family member in order to assume control of the family business and collect insurance. Here one needs to weigh carefully any history of interpersonal conflict which suggests an alternative motive for the offense.

3) **Conflict Group** The homicide was motivated by interpersonal conflict with the victim. The defendant may have been involved in an argument or dispute with the victim. It is not necessary that the homicide be carried out during an argument. The most common example is an adolescent who ambushes an abusive father.

As the notion of interpersonal conflict implies, the defendant generally must have some relationship with the victim. In rare cases, it may be a brief or distant relationship. For example, an adolescent murdered a relative stranger after a homosexual encounter.

In these cases, there must be an absence of psychosis, even though a psychotic youth may murder a person during an argument, or may have had a long history of conflict with the victim. In most cases, there is an absence of any other criminal act, such as robbery. This should never be the

primary motive for the offense. Occasionally, a defendant will steal from the victim after the homicide. For example, a defendant murdered a parent and then took the parent's money and went to Florida. Here the conflict with the parent is primary and a Crime group coding is not indicated.

### **Coding Examples**

1. A 15 year old watched his father beat his younger sister. That night he loaded his father's gun, crept into the father's bedroom, and shot his father in his sleep.
2. A 17 year old was angry and upset that his girlfriend broke up with him and started to date another guy. Two weeks later he got into a fight with the fellow and stabbed him to death. He took the fellow's money and removed the stereo from his car.
3. A 16 year old and his friend made a habit of robbing street beggars when they needed extra cash. One of the beggars resisted and the youth hit the old man over the-head with a brick, killing him. They dropped the money and ran. Later, the youth said that he did not intend to kill the old man, but that when he called them names and spit at them, it made him so mad he had to get even.
4. A 14 year old spent the summer cutting grass for an elderly neighbor woman. She was to pay him at the end of the summer when a check arrived from a pension settlement. She became ill and ended up using the money for medical treatment. The boy was furious that he was not paid. He decided to break into her house and take the money he was due. The woman came home unexpectedly and confronted him in the house. After an argument, he struck and killed her.
5. A 15 year old girl was constantly at odds with her mother, and twice ran away from home. On one occasion the two came to blows and had to be separated by the girl's father. Over a two month period the girl became progressively more withdrawn and remained in her room. She paced throughout the night and began to talk about witchcraft and demon possession. She refused to eat, claiming that her mother was poisoning her food. One afternoon the father came home from work and found his wife stabbed to death. The girl was found hiding in the basement, reading the Bible and chanting "kill the devil."
6. An 18 year old went into a liquor store with a gun and demanded money. When the store clerk lurched forward to grab the gun, the youth shot and killed him. Later, the defendant claimed no memory for the offense. He stated that he had been taking PCP that day. He reported that in the past he had become paranoid when taking drugs and sometimes heard voices saying "I'm going to get you." He tells the examiner that he had the same experiences earlier on the day of the offense.
7. A 16 year old had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as behavior and discipline problems in the home. His father abandoned the family home, leaving the mother to support four children. After 6 months, the mother felt that she could not cope with the 16 year old

any longer and still care for the younger three. One of the problems was that the 16 year old was constantly picking on his 14 year old brother, and beat him up on two occasions. Reluctantly, the mother had the court place her oldest son in temporary foster care, until she could figure out what to do with him. The son was enraged. He had been experimenting with mescaline and pcg, several times hallucinating while high. Two weeks after his removal from the home, he became extremely intoxicated on drugs. He returned home and ransacked the house. He found the family gun and began shooting out the windows, screaming incoherent statements each time he fired. When his younger brother returned home, the boy shot and killed him in the doorway. In the forensic interview, the boy claimed that he had little memory for what happened, except that he kept seeing devil faces in the windows and tried to shoot them.

8. A 17 year old was charged with killing a 25 year old man. The victim was found nude in his home, with multiple stab wounds. The boy told police that he had met the man earlier in the day while at the public library. The man was very friendly, and suggested the two of them go over to his apartment and have a beer. After several beers, the man went into the bedroom and then returned undressed. The boy stated that when the man attempted to touch him, he panicked, pulled out his pocket knife, and stabbed the man. Afterwards, the boy took money from the man's wallet and fled the scene.
9. Two 15 year old boys were arrested for the murder of a 14 year old, who was found strangled in an abandoned house. After many initial denials, one of the boys confessed that his partner had talked him into jumping the victim because he was felt to be a "nerd", who told local police about their drug dealing. They started out intending to "teach him a lesson" and just frighten him into not talking to the police anymore. However, they got into an argument and the victim not only threatened to tell the police even more, he struck one of them with a board. The two 15 year olds were enraged and strangled the 14 year old into unconsciousness, intending to subdue him, not kill him.
10. A 15 year old complained that other kids at school constantly teased him about being overweight. He became depressed and withdrawn, and was failing several classes. He began to think about getting revenge, and several times had dreams in which he attacked one of his classmates - a girl he used to have a crush on, but who always made fun of him and called him "fatso." One weekend he was sick with the flu and not able to study for a big test on Monday. He flunked the test and afterwards, this same girl told him he was not only fat, he was stupid. During that week the boy had several dreams about killing the girl. On Friday after school he smoked some marijuana and followed the girl home. No one else was home, so he went inside and confronted her about the teasing. He struck her with a wrench and killed her.

### **Explanation for Coding Examples**

1. This 15 year old should be coded into the Conflict group. The murder was motivated by conflict with the abusive parent, even though the youth was not the victim of the abuse. There is no evidence of psychosis or another criminal motive.
2. This 17 year old should be coded into the Conflict group. Even though he robbed the victim, this was not the primary motive for the offense. The stealing appears to be secondary to his rivalry with the victim.
3. This case should be coded into the Crime category. The homicide occurred in the course of a robbery. The conflict with the victim emerged after the person was assaulted. The fact that the youth did not intend to kill the victim (a frequent claim) is not relevant, since it was committed in the course of a criminally motivated act.
4. This is a difficult case, since elements of both Crime and Conflict are involved. However, the youth broke into the house with the intent of committing a crime. Even if the youth felt justified in stealing money that he felt was owed to him, it is still a crime to do so. The coding rules specify that a Crime code should be considered before a Conflict code. The only exception would be in cases in which the crime is truly secondary to the homicide, such as when the victim is robbed as an afterthought to the murder. If the youth had simply gone over the woman's house and confronted her about the money, gotten into an argument and then killed her, the coding would be Conflict.
5. This girl had clear conflicts with her mother, but the murder was committed during a psychotic episode. There is clear evidence of psychotic symptoms both before and after the offense. The Psychosis category must be given priority, even if crime or conflict motives are involved. It is not uncommon for a psychotic defendant to have some recognizable basis for the offense, and the victim may be someone with whom the youth had a conflictual relationship.
6. This is a crime case. Many crimes are committed under the influence of drugs or alcohol, so intoxication alone would not negate the apparent criminal intent in what the defendant did. There is some question of psychosis, but the symptoms appear to be mild and not related to the offense. They even may not have occurred at the time of the offense. Unless it seems very likely that the defendant was psychotic during the robbery, almost all such cases merit a Crime coding. Transient perceptual disturbances or paranoid feelings during drug intoxication are not necessarily strong enough to merit calling the defendant psychotic, especially if there is not indication that the defendant failed to realize that the symptoms were merely a drug experience.
7. This is the companion example to number 6 above. Here is a case in which a drug intoxication has induced a psychosis. If the defendant's account is credible, he appears to have reacted to visual hallucinations and paranoid fears. His anger at his family and especially his brother deserve close attention in the forensic evaluation as an alternative

explanation for the offense. Both may be true. However, if there is clear evidence of psychosis (this is an example of sufficient although not indisputable evidence), the Psychosis category should be given priority. Code Psychosis.

8. Even though the youth just met the victim, it appears that the homicide was motivated by the conflict triggered by the man's sexual advance. Here the theft of money from the victim does not appear to be the primary motive for the offense. Code Conflict case.
9. The primary motive for this offense is that the two boys were seeking revenge on a peer who informed about their drug dealing. This is a crime-related act. The fact that the boys did not intend to kill the victim, and only did so in the course of their argument, is not relevant. What they were doing was criminal in itself, even if the homicide had not occurred. Code Crime.
10. The primary motive for this offense is the boy's conflict with the girl. The depressive symptoms and dreams raise some questions about psychosis, but there are no clear psychotic symptoms. No hallucinations, no delusions, no bizarre or irrational behavior. (Saying that for someone to kill someone over such a trivial matter as being teased indicates irrational behavior would be circular reasoning. Clearly, all homicide is in a sense irrational and bizarre. The Psychotic category is intended to be more restrictive and focused on a mental state found in a subgroup of homicide defendants). Code Conflict.



**APPENDIX M**

**MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION APPROVAL OF THE STUDY**



# *The Commonwealth of Massachusetts*

277

## *Executive Office of Public Safety Criminal History Systems Board 1010 Commonwealth Avenue*

MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS  
Governor

CHARLES V. BARRY  
Secretary

*Boston, Massachusetts 02215*

*(617) 727-0090*

CHARLES V. BARRY  
Chairman

FRANCIS J. CARNEY, JR.  
Executive Director

February 26, 1988

Reneau Kennedy, M.S.  
Goldberg Medical Associates  
Bridgewater State Hospital  
10 Administration Road  
Boston, MA 02324

Dear Mr. Kennedy:

The Criminal History Systems Board approves your research application entitled, "Men Who Murder: A Comparison of Psychic Structure Between Two Forensic Groups." This approval is based on your application and on the signed assurances contained therein. Having received this approval, you are entitled to have access, with the consent of the criminal justice agencies involved, to Criminal Offender Record Information ("CORI") for individuals participating in your study.

You are bound by the Research Regulations of the Criminal History Systems Board, your research application and your assurances. Persons violating these provisions may be subject to the civil and criminal sanctions of Massachusetts General Laws c.6 [[177-178 and those sanctions set out in Section 6.03(2) of the Research Regulations.

You are required to show a copy of this letter to the disseminating agency even if said agency does not ask to see it. If the disseminating agency has any questions about the extent of your access or what is contained in your application, the agency should contact the undersigned. You are also required to notify the Criminal History Systems Board in writing at the completion of your project that you have destroyed all identifying Criminal Offender Record Information.

Sincerely,

Ruth A. Moore  
Legal Counsel  
Security & Privacy Council

Peter Larkowich  
General Counsel  
Criminal History Systems Board

**APPENDIX N**  
**SUBJECT INFORMED CONSENT FORM**

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

I, \_\_\_\_\_ currently a patient at Bridgewater State Hospital, hereby volunteer and consent to participate in a research project to be conducted by Reneau Kennedy, M.S., a staff psychologist at the Bridgewater State Hospital. This investigation is concerned with learning about different personality characteristics of patients charged with violent offenses. The conditions of my participation are the following:

1. Taking part in this study will mean meeting, with the researcher on two occasions in which time I will complete tests designed to measure aspects of my personality. I will also be interviewed by the researcher about my educational and family background. This participation will take approximately 3 hours of my time.
2. I understand there is no foreseeable risk involved in any of this work and am aware that I may choose not to answer any questions that I find embarrassing or offensive.
3. My participation is fully voluntary and shall not affect either my treatment or evaluation at Bridgewater State Hospital, or the terms or length of my confinement.
4. I will not receive compensation, remuneration, or payment of any kind for my participation in this study.
5. The researcher is hereby authorized to inspect and utilize my Bridgewater State Hospital records and other records prepared by or in possession of the Department of Correction for this project.
6. Information collected by the researcher through interview and testing, shall be confidential and privileged. Such information shall not be made part of my records either at Bridgewater State Hospital or at any other correctional facility.
7. All data collected will be coded so that my identity will not be revealed in any data analysis or any report of the results.
8. The researcher may submit a report of the results of this study for publication.

9. I understand that I will be given a written summary of the final paper upon my request. However, nothing in this Consent Form shall be construed to afford me any right of access to any notes, data, records, analysis, or other material collected, developed or utilized by the researcher in preparation of the final product.

10. I hereby release the Executive Office of Human Services, the Department of Correction, and Goldberg Medical Associates, and their agents and servants from any and all claims for damage for libel, slander, invasion of the right to privacy, and all other claims based on the use of my records and my participation in this study.

11. I understand that I am free to consult with my attorney, the representative of the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee, or other legal counsel should I have questions regarding the legal implications of my participation in this project.

12. The above consent is given by me freely and voluntarily without any promises, threats or duress.

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_  
Bridgewater, MA

\_\_\_\_\_  
Patient's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Witness

**APPENDIX O**  
**PROTOCOL FOR CONFIDENTIAL RECORD CODING**

## PROTOCOL FOR CODING RECORDS

1. Assign each patient a code number.
2. The code numbers will not be immediately transferrable.
3. All data variable sheets and related documents identified by code number only.
4. All identifying information removed from data variable sheets and related documents.
5. There will be a single code book kept in a locked file cabinet in a secured office at Bridgewater State Hospital.
6. Research materials will be kept in a locked file cabinet outside the facility.
7. After all research use has been made of the data, the material will be destroyed.

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in the state of Massachusetts.
- Present      **Clinical Fellow**, MGH Law and Psychiatry Service. Services include  
psychological testing, risk assessment evaluations, forensic consultation,  
research, and professional presentations.

Present	<b>Consultant</b> , Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, Boston, MA. Special projects and research advisor to Commissioner William O'Leary.
January 1995	<b>Consultant</b> , Kentucky Justice Cabinet, Frankfort, KY. Organizational assessment of a juvenile high-risk secure treatment unit for Secretary Paul Isaacs.
July-August 1994	<b>Consultant</b> , Justice Resource Institute, Boston, MA. Investigation and evaluation of legal advocacy access to intensive residential treatment program residents.
July-August 1994	<b>Consultant/Investigator</b> , "Court-Based Intimate Violence Study", University of Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Research Center for Excellence Assistant to Principal Investigator Dr. Ira Packer, Assistant Commissioner, Division of Forensic Mental Health. Responsible for the preparation of a research grant.
1992-1994	<b>Clinical Fellow</b> , MGH Law and Psychiatry Service, Suffolk County House of Correction, South Bay. Principal Investigator for pilot study, "Situational and Dispositional Cofactors of Recidivism in the Commission of Crimes of Stalking and Restraining Order Violations". Staff duties involved mental status assessment of new inmates and emergency crisis coverage for the jail. Additional services included psychological and neuropsychological testing for both MGH forensic cases and SCHOC.
1990	<b>Consultant/Senior Researcher</b> , UCLA Psychobiobehavioral Stress and Hypertension Project. Assistant to Principal Investigator Dr. Hector Myers. Responsible for conducting extensive biomedical and psychometric literature review, constructed research design, and established procedural protocol and code book for data analysis.
1989-1990	<b>Resident Associate</b> , California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA. Supervisor of undergraduate residents providing personal and academic counseling. Other responsibilities included supervision of house government, training of upper-class counselors, monitoring social functions and providing emergency psychological crisis intervention and first aid.
1987-1989	<b>Clinical Fellow</b> , Departments of Psychology and Neurology, The McLean Hospital, Belmont, MA. Administered psychological and neuropsychological test batteries to psychiatric inpatients (children, adolescents and adults) and provided written evaluations to hospital staff.
1987-1988	<b>Assistant Psychologist</b> , Bridgewater State Hospital, Bridgewater, MA. Member of the Assessment Unit treatment team; provided psychological

services for patients in an all male maximum security psychiatric hospital. Responsibilities included: initial psychological assessment of patient mental status, health and the potential for violent behavior. Crisis intervention counseling, short-term psychotherapy, group therapy, assessment and maintenance of a safe, therapeutic milieu.

- 1986-  
1987      **Clinical Fellow**, Departments of Psychology and Neurology, The McLean Hospital. Clinical rotations on the Neurology and Substance Abuse inpatient units. Served as inpatient case administrator in which treatment planning, work up and aftercare were monitored. Provided long term individual and group psychotherapy to outpatients. Completed expert witness forensic training and became court qualified. Completed psychological and neuropsychological test evaluations. Attended full range of professional lectures, seminars and case conferences. Individual supervision by staff psychologists and psychiatrists.
- 1985-  
1986      **Psychology Extern**, Bridgewater State Hospital, Bridgewater, MA. Member of the Assessment Unit treatment team. Responsibilities included assessment of new patient mental status and potential for violence, followed by weekly monitoring of patient treatment. Provided individual and group psychotherapy to adult male forensic patients.
- 1985-  
1986      **Community Residence Counselor**, The McLean Hospital. Responsible for primary psychiatric care of adult inpatients. Counseling for emotional, behavioral and social concerns to ensure that immediate and long term treatment goals were met. Other duties included development and maintenance of a therapeutic milieu, planning and implementing daily activities, and monitoring the overall health and safety of residents.
- 1983-  
1985      **Administrative Assistant**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Alumni Association, Cambridge, MA. Prepared, coordinated and implemented all logistical and publicity arrangements for Reunion Gift committees. Worked with senior Institute officers in identification of major contributors. Monitored program budgets and database system, and supervised support staff.
- 1982-  
1984      **Consultant**, Tufts University Dean of Students, Medford, MA. Designed and presented counseling skill workshops for Resident Directors and Assistants.
- 1982      **Consultant**, University of Oregon Dean of Housing, Eugene, OR. Designed, budgeted and taught a two month supervisory skills training course on: conflict resolution, problem solving, pro-social behavior, employee motivation and job delegation.



- 1981-1982      **Associate Director**, University of Oregon Crisis Center. Initiated and implemented 24 hour back-up supervision for hotline staff providing information, direction and assistance with emergency face to face interventions. Taught graduate level course (Crisis Intervention) and gave a variety of theoretical and preventative workshops covering diagnosis, interpersonal communication skills, conflict resolution and intervention methods. Responsible for selection, training and supervision of work-study and volunteer telephone counselors, and for long range program goals and budget.
- 1981-1982      **Practicum Counselor**, University of Oregon Counseling Center. Provided short and long term therapy to a variety of students covering individual, marriage, family and emergency situations. Administered and interpreted psychological tests, maintained records, prepared interim and final reports.
- 1981      **Research Assistant**, University of Oregon Vietnam Veteran longitudinal psychosocial project. Duties included interview of subjects and data coding.
- 1980-1981      **Practicum Counselor**, Family Counseling Services and DeBusk Counseling Center, Eugene, OR. Provided family, marriage and individual counseling to the community. Prepared treatment plans, interim and final reports.
- 1979      **Guidance Counselor and High School Teacher**, Papua New Guinea Education Department, Rabaul, East New Britain. Provided career, personal and crisis counseling for boarding school students. Initiated, organized and budgeted an overseas student exchange program. Taught Literature and Politics, supervised library and ancillary staff, and performed boarding school supervision.
- 1975-1987 & 1980      **High School Teacher**, Victoria Department of Education, Victoria, Australia. Taught English, Social Science and Remedial Reading. Assisted Pupil Welfare Coordinator with student and parent counseling and with staff training programs. Coordinated school camps, student work experience program and high school orientation programs.

### SCHOLARLY WRITINGS

- Kennedy, R. (1981) Human Nature, Communication and Counseling. Unpublished Master's synthesis paper, University of Oregon.
- Kennedy, R. (1994) A Study of the Relationship Between Dehumanization and Intrapsychic Structure in Subgroups of Men who Murder. Doctoral dissertation, Boston University.
- Kennedy, R. & Rosenberg, H. Oh Those Crazy Cards Again--A Test/Retest Analysis of the Rorschach Protocols of Hermann Goering. Manuscript submitted for publication.

## PRESENTATIONS AND WORKSHOPS

- 1995 **When to Worry & How to Know--Issues of Risk Assessment in Domestic Violence Situations and Crimes of the Heart: Lessons Learned from Domestic Murderers.** Lectures presented at a two day training conference on family violence. Minnesota Association of County Probation Officers, St. Cloud, MN.
- Ghost or Machine? Neuropsychological Correlates in a Group of Adolescent Murderers.** Presented in the symposium "The Neuropsychology of Personality II: Recent Research", annual meeting for the Society of Personality Assessment, Atlanta, GA.
- Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence.** Panel presentation at the 4th Annual Bridgewater Violence Conference, Bridgewater, MA.
- 1994 **The Psychology of Murder in Domestic Settings.** Medical Ground Rounds Presentations for the Ada County Medical Education Consortium of Physicians, Boise and Nampa, ID.
- The Mind of a Nazi.** Psychiatry Grand Rounds presentation for Cambridge City Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, MA.
- A Personality Analysis of Hermann Goering.** Seminar presented to the Boston Psychoanalytic Society monthly workshop on the psychoanalytic study of psychoses.
- Domestic Violence: Issues for Mental Health Professionals.** Lecture co-presented with Ronald Schouten, M.D., at The Law and Psychiatry Seminar Series, MGH, Harvard University Medical School, Boston, MA.
- A Question of Brain or Mind? Neuroanatomy and Rorschach findings of Dr. Robert Ley.** Presented in the symposium "The Neuropsychology of Personality I: Recent Research", annual meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment, Chicago, IL.
- Bloodspots and Inkblots: A Rorschach Analysis of Men who Murder.** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment, Chicago, IL.
- Stalker or Restraining Order Violator?** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment, Chicago, IL.

**Mindsets of Extremes: Rorschach Profiles Of Hitler's Successor and a contemporary White Supremacist Leader.** Lecture presented to the Law and Psychiatry Journal Club, MGH, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA.

**Stalker and Restraining Order Violator Outcome Study.** Presentation to the Suffolk County Sherrieff's Department.

**Domestic Murderers in Massachusetts 1992-1994.** Presentation to Subcommittee on Risk Assessment, Dedham District Court, Dedham, MA.

**Crimes of the Heart; The Criminal Mind.** Workshops presented at the 1st Annual Governor's Training Conference on Crime Victim Assistance, Boise, ID.

**Hermann Goering - Part II; The Results of Two Rorschach Studies.** Presented to The Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, Boston, MA.

**Consideration of Dangerousness and Lethality Issues In Domestic Violence Cases.** Panel presentation given at a three day bail reform workshop for Massachusetts Trial, Probate and Family Court Judges.

**Recognizing Early Signs of Propensities to Violence.** United States Secret Service panel presentation for the "Teen Violence Conference", Louisville, KY.

**Youth Related Homicide: A Study of Patterns & Characteristics of Perpetrators and Victims.** Presented to the Commissioner's Quality Council, Department of Youth Services, Boston, MA.

1993

**From Thought to Action: A Typology of Domestic Violence Offenders.** Plenary Session for "Managing Violence In Domestic Situations", a two-day workshop for Massachusetts Chief Probation Officers. Braintree, MA.  
**Assessment of the Actively Homicidal Perpetrator.** Half day workshop presented to the Massachusetts Chief Probation Officers, Braintree, MA.

**Rorschach Indices of Sleep Disorders I: Insomnia.** Poster Session co-presented with John Getz, Ph.D., at the 8th Annual Psychology Conference, University of Scranton, PA.

**Oh Those Crazy Cards Again.** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment, San Francisco, CA.

**Were the Nazi War Criminals Psychopaths?** Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality Assessment, San Francisco, CA.

**Deadly Consequences: What Murderers Teach Us About Prevention Strategies, Preliminary Data.** Presented at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry Research Seminar, Law and Psychiatry Program, Worcester, MA.

**Nazi Psychology: A Rorschach Study of Hermann Goering.** Psychiatry Grand Rounds Presentation, Harvard University Medical School, Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, MA.

**Domestic Violence and the Men Who Murder.** Workshop presented at second annual clinical symposium of the Center for Behavioral Medicine, conference on "Families in Crisis: Family Violence From a Clinical, Legal, and Cultural Perspectives", Holy Family Hospital. Andover, MA.

**Serial Sexual Homicide.** Lecture presented to the Idaho State Police, Boise, ID.

**Men Who Murder.** Lecture presented at PGY4 Forensic Seminar Series, MGH, Harvard Medical School, Boston MA.

**A Medical Perspective of Domestic Violence.** Lecture co-presented with Ronald Schouten, M.D. at the fourth annual Law Enforcement Forum entitled "Contemporary Issues of Domestic Violence and Stalking". Massasoit Community College, Brockton, MA.

1988

**The Psychology of Murder.** Presented to the Mystery Writers of America. Los Angeles, CA.

### **PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS**

Society for Personality Assessment  
 American Psychological Association, Divisions 5 & 41  
 North American Society of Adlerian Psychology  
 Psi Chi (National Honorary Psychological Fraternity)  
 Phi Delta Kappa (National Honorary Education Fraternity)  
 Pi Lambda Theta (National Honorary Education Fraternity)

### **ADVANCED TRAINING**

Forensic Expert Witness Testimony 1986, 1988, 1993  
 Rorschach Tutorial Workshop 1993  
 Advanced Rorschach Interpretation 1993, 1994