

## **Corporate Liability Exemptions—A Fiasco**

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By James Alexander Webb

**Recent unprecedented concentrations and accumulations of economic power wielded by a few corporate giants should alert us to the possibility of a structural defect in the operation of our capitalist system.**

**Donor influence and corporate money now override democratic politics. Corporations should be subject to customary limits on injurious or fraudulent activities, especially collusion in government misconduct. The loss of such limits leads to the growth of power that compounds dangerously over time.**

**Granted, a robust capitalist system requires a wide range of freedom of action. But it also depends on legal impartiality. Unfortunately, the current corporate model underpinning the global economy lacks that balance due to a seemingly minor aspect of corporate law.**

**Whether acting alone or as part of a corporation, those who violate others' rights should be held accountable. Limited liability undermines this accountability.**

**Corporate personhood is often cited as the root cause of corporate abuse of power. However, in the proper context, personhood can be a practical simplification for organizations operating in the economy.**

**Personhood, per se, is not the source of dysfunction. To be clear, there is no need to deny investors' individual rights simply because they act together. However, corporate control over government policy has bypassed vital constitutional limits.**

**Concern about corporate influence in politics has legitimacy. Since governments often pursue policies and programs that disregard fundamental rights, private and corporate financial support for election influence, as well as legislation and policy stances, should be subject to limitations.**

**Unfortunately, such curtailment in the U.S. is uncommon. Paradoxically, banning all organized support for political activities would be unconstitutional. The 2010 Supreme Court decision in *Citizens United v. FEC* acknowledged this by holding that groups could not be restricted from engaging in political activity.**

**The case for amending the limited liability corporate template includes the need to address certain objections to this decision.**

**But more to the point, political movements or campaigns often support causes that undermine constitutional protections. Consequently, preventing negative political outcomes**

**requires broader changes in public awareness beyond the reforms addressed here, including the repeal of specific laws or regulations.**

**Our present concern is corporate behavior. This looks beneath the capitalist paradigm. It recognizes a legal landscape that fosters errant corporate entities incompatible with authentic Capitalism.**

**These legalities transcend the mere license to act. They serve as a legal shield against centuries-old common-law principles that have underpinned civil society. Corporate malefactions, often dismissed as unavoidable, have gone unredressed. Affected parties have been denied due process and compensation for damages incurred; harmful legislation is orchestrated by corporate interests, while corporate influence in foreign affairs threatens imminent global conflict.**

**The ramifications are serious: such outcomes have emboldened top-heavy domestic and transnational financial firms to capture legislative and regulatory agendas and exert detrimental global influence at the highest echelons of sovereignties worldwide.**

**Therefore, it is essential to critically examine the tradition of corporate limited liability. As voluntary owners, individual shareholders in corporations should share civil liability (excluding joint and several liability for the entire judgment) in proportion to their profit-seeking shareholdings (i.e., pro rata).**

**Unfortunately, comprehension of this problem remains almost nonexistent, posing a significant barrier to any such reform. The problem arises not from the current exemption from insolvency risk, but rather from the protection that further indemnifies parties against corporate misconduct.<sup>1</sup>**

**A careful examination of the topic reveals that reform would not entirely eliminate indemnity, because even with unlimited liability for corporations, firms would likely implement contractual protections to mitigate shareholder exposure to financial insolvency.**

**Our concern is with corporations that wield economic or political influence. This implies that, since many small businesses are owned by their directors, liability reform would have little impact at this scale, since officers are not currently protected against tort claims.**

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<sup>1</sup>An exception to the lack of attention is found in this article, which addresses the legal nuances in defense of unlimited liability:

Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts

Author(s): Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman

Source: The Yale Law Journal, May, 1991, Vol. 100, No. 7 (May, 1991), pp. 1879-1934

Published by: The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/796812>

**The relevant issue first arises in the chartering of corporations, which goes beyond mere recognition of a collective form of ownership in a business, i.e., by granting limited liability to shareholders.**

**And secondly, in policies maintained by localities that could decline to maintain the regime of limited liability for corporations chartered outside their jurisdiction.**

**Not all limits on liability, such as those afforded by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which shields publishers from liability, are proper limits on the conduct of tort actions. Even for individuals, freedom of expression need not be limited to the extent that libel and defamation have been afforded under tort law. What should be controlling is only the pursuit of direct or complicit acts of overt violence against other parties.**

**For defenders of capitalism, if nothing else, simply exposing this problem reveals a source of growing hostility toward corporations seen as integral to capitalism; it defends the capitalist system by rejecting the current corporate model as authentic free-market capitalism and by challenging the derivative culture of irresponsibility that spills over into general social and political behavior.**

**Moreover, the current distortion of the legal environment for corporate behavior hinders efficiency gains from privatization. For instance, without full liability, the privatization of certain services may be seen as not sufficiently protective of public welfare. Privatizing Air Traffic Controller employment would eliminate the current political barriers to safe staffing levels.**

### **Capitalism and the Corporation**

*Within these all-powerful, predatory, worldwide institutions, there is zero respect or concern for personal freedom or political liberty. There is no empathy for those they harm. [1]—Peter Breggin*

Concerns about the economic power of trusts or large financial conglomerates are not new. Metrics used in 20th-century Industrial Organization studies include market share and concentration ratios (e.g., the share of total shipments controlled by the four largest firms in an industry). However, these tools do not reveal what more directly affects society, such as the State granting exemptions from shareholder liability and the assumption of corporate liabilities after bankruptcy.

Such protection seems to promote capital formation. This is incorrect. A simple change in how investments are allocated, or a shift in the culture of personal achievement through financial gain, does not result in a net decrease in the total funds available for investment in the economy.

Under a new regime in which shareholders face higher risks of loss, investors have alternatives beyond insurance against litigation exposure, including savings accounts or corporate bonds.

Additionally, with fewer shareholders, the remaining shareholders would have a greater incentive to be more vigilant about improper or risky corporate behavior.

The mercantilist economic model granted favored companies exclusive rights to engage in trade. During the 18th century, the British East India Company exercised its chartered monopoly. That company threatened to take control of commercial activities around the port of Boston, which led to the Boston Tea Party's ardent response against the company in 1773.

Now, in the 21st century, corporate connections between Big Tech and Big Pharma, in an environment of special privilege, have come to dominate not only the public health sector but also social media, broadcast media, academia, medical journals, and licensing.[2]

Recently, we have witnessed an unprecedented capture of the Public Sector itself. The corporate-backed WHO inflated a limited, mildly symptomatic novel flu-like illness into a false pandemic. [3] This explains the coordinated overreaction that began in 2020 and led to the implementation of baseless emergency measures worldwide.

2021 saw lockdowns and vaccine mandates become realities. Reminiscent of the military-industrial complex's influence on policymakers that led to decades of reckless war, the medical-pharmaceutical corporate profiteers, although in league with elements of the Deep State, managed to mobilize the world into funding an unproven injectable treatment for a pandemic that was also unproven, and imposed it on an uninformed public, with providers legally protected from fair accountability for harmful outcomes.

Such a distortion of justice involved financial subsidies as incentives (expensed to the affected population).

We are witnessing the culmination of the statutory separation of financial control from the public to the corporate elite, driven by unprincipled taxation and monetary infusions. Much of this responsibility stems from acquiescence to an illicit fiat (counterfeit) money scheme that rests on the 20th-century co-optation of our socially evolved Dollar as a medium of exchange. [4]

The accelerating global erosion of fundamental liberties threatens to surpass the losses experienced under Nazism and Bolshevism between the World Wars. Moreover, a looming financial crisis now makes it more likely that personal accounts for central bank digital currency will be implemented. Such implementation, coupled with AI-enabled intrusive monitoring, now makes it possible to monitor even the least important citizen, providing a means of absolute control over individual freedom.

In addition, there is the ideological harm to capitalism. The obvious excessive corporate interference in social and political spheres provides ammunition for Nihilist and Marxist critics of capitalism.

Over the last few centuries, what has passed for the free-market capitalist system has been but an attenuated form of capitalism. Genuine Capitalism holds sway, wherein capital, as a means of production, is employed productively in a market system devoid of politically derived economic privilege.

Functional economies don't require or benefit from government interference in traditional common law dispute resolution. The framers trusted jurisprudence rather than government-instituted officialdom. Amendment VII of the U.S. Constitution illustrates this: "In Suits at common law...the right of trial by jury shall be preserved..." The jury was seen as an extra-governmental check against the common tendency to abuse power.

In short, the climate under which corporations operate is distorted by a negation of time-tested, powerful juridical precepts commensurate with civil life. Civil suits proffer an essential means of protection against organized maleficence. Additionally, the high level of indemnification for private firms under recent special legislation has become too commonplace. Less visible than these favors have been the fallout from the long-practiced public offering of corporate stock as a source of corporate finance, which, with limited liability, reduces incentives for prudent investor scrutiny.

Caution typically limits participation in a group activity that might involve egregious behavior. So why should owners (shareholders) get a pass? Requirements regarding articles of incorporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission's oversight of stock offerings indicate recognition of the challenges inherent in the current corporate model.

A free-market capitalist framework precludes disruptive political interference in markets or market activities. It provides a standard for evaluating both the corporate form of business and its market setting. The corporation, as constituted, is an artificial rather than a natural business organization.

In particular, customary belief holds that the corporate form is a necessary and proper element of modern capitalism. However, genuine capitalist-oriented societies need not adopt limited liability. Robert Nozick, in his thought experiments exploring societal evolution from first principles, conceded that the corporate form would, absent statutory interventions, be limiting.

*"...it may not **diminish** [his emphasis] their liability as compared to other persons....Those voluntarily dealing with a corporation....will do so by contracts explicitly limiting the corporation's liability.... A corporation's liability to those involuntarily intertwined with it will be unlimited, and it presumably will choose to cover this liability with insurance policies." [5]*

Corporate behavior tends to be driven by a propensity to gain market share. Research reveals that unscrupulous corporations block competitors by supporting, rather than opposing, new regulatory and anti-trust policies. Such an anti-competitive result was thoroughly documented by economic iconoclast Murray Rothbard in his posthumous work, [\*The Progressive Era\*](#).

Throughout the 20th century, business sectors performed sub-optimally due to unnecessary crony protection under the guise of regulation. Consequently, we now have a corporate-government symbiosis, as Mussolini termed it, corporatism. The case presented here demonstrates that a license to avoid responsibility through liability limits good performance.

The almost universally adopted yet incorrect conjecture that limited liability for shareholders is beneficial because it facilitates investment in the funds required for a robust economy suggests that other incentives may be at play. Limitations on tort claims for damage to life and personal

welfare would benefit the ownership class and limit the general public's ability to be made whole. So, after capital accumulation among the financially successful produced an ownership class during the Industrial Revolution, is it a surprise that liability indemnity prevailed with chartering authorities? And now that the propertied class includes most decision-makers, it seems that no one is left to challenge the conjecture.

### **Unobjectionable aspects of the corporation**

Some critiques of the corporation focus on the legal status of corporate personhood. The owner-indemnified corporate form of business only partially conflicts with our free-market template. Businesses appropriately employ contractual means to organize collective action. They appropriately coordinate disparate ownership of wealth toward a common business goal by marshaling shareholder capital. The right of individuals to freely associate and employ managers for such ends is merely an extension of individual rights to undertake necessary business activities privately.

Ludwig von Mises used the term "methodological individualism" to explain that the meaning of "collective action" depends entirely on individual actions. [6] This idea applies to business firms, whether or not they are organized as corporations. When viewed this way, businesses can protect themselves from legislative and judicial overreach. Because they are composed entirely of individuals, they should retain all the rights afforded to individuals.

Examples of breaches of these rights include disruptive regulatory reporting requirements, IRS intrusions that are even more onerous than those imposed on individuals, and instances of the loss of Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections.

They may have to compete against rivals receiving discriminatory subsidies. There are antitrust laws that defy simple logic, such as those against restraint of trade that arbitrarily impose penalties for raising, lowering, or maintaining a product's price profile. There are insider-trading laws that are a perfect example of confusing the necessary coordination of informed valuations with game-table cheating.

Recently, we have experienced COVID lockdowns and mandates that have disproportionately impacted small businesses, while often exempting larger companies (which have more influence with authorities). Such a climate of legal pitfalls creates opportunities for unscrupulous corporate interests to gain a competitive edge.

Modern civilization has seamlessly accommodated scale disparities: freight trains cannot stop at intersections and are given the right of way over other vehicles.

Corporations have been granted legal personhood in various contexts. Of course, personhood is a fiction, but for practical legal reasons, it has valid uses. Generally, litigating every matter

involving a corporation by creating a separate case for each shareholder or employee would be impractical.

Personhood also confers the unique trait of continuity, enabling the corporation to have an indefinite lifespan that outlasts its owners. However, such personhood cannot fairly exempt individual shareholders from liability for harmful or illegal actions that occur under their watch, even if those actions are litigated later under new ownership.

The extent of liability for small enterprises should be determined by courts, not by rigid statutes, given inconsistencies across government legal venues. For instance, joint and several liability (sometimes for the entire award) assigned to a corporation, even when it is only marginally responsible or merely connected by circumstances, warrants reexamination. [7]

Hence, a more nuanced approach to liability may be applicable to smaller enterprises. Close corporations and general partnerships have been a vital source of entrepreneurial innovation. Moreover, owners are often officers who, while not personally liable for financial obligations, are exposed to liability for malfeasance as a restraint, even under incorporation.

Sometimes, legislation that is clearly unconstitutional assigns liability too broadly. Increased insurance coverage for indemnities suggests a potential solution. Reforms such as pre-arranged arbitration agreements, a justice system focused on tort rather than criminal law, and even private provision of judicial services have merit. [8]

Instead of focusing on corporate personhood, treating firms or businesses as owned by identifiable individuals comports with methodological individualism. Reducing limited liability diminishes the losses to creditors or injured parties from corporate bankruptcy or dissolution. While contractual protections would arise without limited liability, bankruptcy protections need not protect corporate assets as they currently do.

The limitations granted to individuals by bankruptcy have origins in the reform of earlier, strict corrective measures like debtor's prison. An organization of individuals, whether or not called a corporation, does not need to be granted the bankruptcy protection of a "person" when that protection is available to each shareholder individually.

However, what applies to individuals' rights would logically extend to a group of individuals when considering rights enshrined in the First Amendment. In this way, opposition to the 2010 Citizens United Supreme Court decision may have merit for limited-liability organizations but be less relevant in a world without liability exemptions. Rather than seeking to limit corporate financial support for political or government policy, removing shareholder protections offers a more straightforward approach and avoids constitutional issues.

We can envision a form of liability protection for shareholders through arbitration clauses, enshrined in contractual agreements between private parties. However, following the principles of methodological individualism, aside from contractual arrangements, there would be no room for exemption from civil or even criminal liability for a shareholder (owner) of a corporation that had previously been dissolved or declared bankrupt.

In other words, a corporation is a convenient way to refer to a group of individuals. These individuals would have no basis to shift responsibility for their actions onto a corporate "person"; no corporation would have independent rights, since it is simply a collective association of fully responsible individuals.

This applies to nonprofit corporations as well. The collective actions of a lynch mob do not absolve the individual culpability of its participants.

A practicable transition to a world of shareholder responsibility might contractually limit liability to, for example, a fixed multiple of a shareholder's investment. Such exposure would likely lead to the expansion of the insurance industry to provide indemnity for investors. Even more, ratings and appraisal services would expand as scrutiny of corporate activities and behavior increases.

Of course, many investors, rather than buying shares in corporations they knew little about, would forgo expectations of high returns and choose bonds or other instruments with more modest returns. Nonetheless, a reform of limited liability would not reduce the overall availability of financial capital; instead, it would promote more responsible investing (see figure 1).

If our model of equitable corporate and shareholder legal responsibility had prevailed since the start of the Industrial Revolution, it would have lessened the ammunition for condemning the dominant form of Capitalism.

Recent corporate prescriptive privileges and corporate relationships with political coadjutors and journalists have infiltrated social media, economic, academic, and medical sectors. Global policy consolidation prevents grassroots remedies. State-level adjudication might have protected us from what threatens to become a society of organized crime syndicates.

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This comprises a brief comparison between the current liability exposure of shareholders and the proposed exposure under shareholder liability for corporate malfeasance.

Corporate limited liability for financial indebtedness applies to shareholders in either case.

For corporate malfeasance, shareholders are liable for actionable damages.

How would this affect the corporate sources and uses of funds? It may be reasonable to infer that the ratio of funding from initial offerings to debt financing should be considerably lower.

This implies that the price-earnings ratio would be affected. Given that fewer shares would be issued and total earnings would be less affected, earnings per share should be higher than they would otherwise be. Today, the market has a P/E ratio of approximately 15. Hence, there should be a lower P/E ratio due to higher earnings per share, especially given the greater risk of loss to shareholders. Sources of funding would rely on debt more than on public stock offerings.

In the words of Investopedia:

*...suppose there are two similar companies that differ primarily in the amount of debt they assume. The one with more debt will likely have a lower P/E value than the one with less debt.*




Figure 1

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### Lack of a complete corporate form in history

The U.S. Constitution notably excluded any avenue for the Federal chartering of corporations. The founders had good reason to be wary after experiencing the monopolistic hold on commerce by the Hudson's Bay Company and, especially, the British East India Company. As a result, chartering evolved only in individual states. Ultimately, corporations gained limited liability standing as states competed for reciprocal economic benefits by granting this privilege.

The Nineteenth Century saw the rise of the general partnership, the adoption of the corporate model, and a gradual increase in the adoption of limited liability. Initially, incorporation provided permanence and continuity, offering advantages over sole proprietorships and partnerships. Therefore, the early legal status of corporations did not include limited liability, but by the 20th century, several states had already granted corporations that status.

*"Stockholders of the English joint-stock companies had finally come to assume 'double liability'—i.e., the stockholder was liable to the extent of his investment plus a like amount—and some states experimented with charters specifying either double liability or unlimited liability. After 1830, however, statutes were passed in the various states providing for limited liability, and by 1860 this principle was generally accepted." [9]*

## Limited liability not needed

Were these state concessions necessary? The unprecedented economic growth rate in the nineteenth century occurred as businesses were organized as general partnerships (without limited liability) until the latter part of the century. Ted Nace notes:

*"The volume of manufactured goods grew by an average of 59% per decade from 1809 to 1839, then by 153% in the 1840's and 60% in the 1850's." [10]and... "Limited liability... wasn't a widespread feature of the corporation until about 1875..." [11]*

Therefore, the absence of the limited liability corporate model does not seem to have hindered economic performance in the American experience.

This supports the thesis that the limited liability privilege under tort law granted to joint stock companies was due to factors other than the claimed need to promote economic growth. (see [commentary](#) by J.S. Miller).

In 1916, John Maurice Clark had his doubts:

*"Has the principle of limited liability been carried too far?...one of the worst features of the internal organization of corporations is its wonderful aptitude for dividing responsibility, concealing it from outside observers...to an economics of responsibility it is one of the very roots of evil." [12]*

Shareholders' tendency to focus on bottom-line results has led to reduced involvement in corporate affairs. Would having fewer, but more responsible, shareholders improve corporate behavior?

The market has mechanisms to indemnify participants from liability, such as insurance. Professionals across numerous industries routinely procure malpractice or errors and omissions insurance, a prudent expense for those engaging in activities that involve risk. In addition, arbitration provisions clarify and expedite litigation.

Bankruptcy protections for insolvency need reevaluation. The waiver of corporate shareholders' risk (beyond their investment), granted by current law, including in corporate bankruptcy, unnecessarily removes a vital level of responsibility from corporations.

For criminal, reckless, negligent, or tortious behavior, more should be at stake than just the corporation's balance sheet. Exempting shareholders from liability removes incentives to make careful investments and to avoid risky or potentially harmful actions.

Appropriate shareholder financial exposure to civil liability would increase investors' insurance needs and should reduce gross under-compensation of injured parties. No longer would shareholders avoid due process liability through corporate dissolution, bankruptcy, or the layering of corporate ownership.

Malfeasance (where the threat of treble damages arises) could extend potential financial liability beyond corporate assets and shareholder equity to the shareholder's other assets, especially if loss of life is involved. Even if only proportional to shareholdings (i.e., pro rata), such reduced liability protection would have an impact. Investors would become more cautious about funding enterprises involved in activities that risk moral turpitude.

For example, a medical procedure or medication could cause damages of \$10 million or more per wrongful death in the U.S. A hypothetical scenario with 25,000 fatalities and many more injuries from a vaccine could easily cost several hundred billion dollars, and possibly triple that amount (treble damages) for intentional malfeasance or punitive damages far beyond this. Currently, an objective review of VAERS (Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System) data indicates a substantially higher number of adverse events associated with mRNA vaccines. Such exposure would likely lead to significant changes in corporate behavior.

### **Corporate power overreach**

*"...the existing corporate system has carried us well onto the threshold of a gentle totalitarianism."* William Appleman Williams

Employees or management, unless they are intentionally involved in fraud or misconduct, are not the ultimate responsible parties; owners are.

What distinguishes individuals conspiring to violate others' rights from owners of an enterprise, implicit in wrongdoing?

Consider contractors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in operations that violate domestic or international law and human rights, now shielded by directives from the Department of Defense or other agencies. Culpability in a conspiracy is individual. According to the law of agency (the doctrine *respondeat superior*-*"let the master answer"*), vicarious liability lies with the employer. Shareholders are the employers. Should each shareholder not face personal culpability that might exceed the loss of such shareholder's investment, at least financially?

The Founders included a Commerce Clause in the Constitution: *"The Congress shall have Power...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States...To establish uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;"*— Art . 1 Sec. 8.

Congress could legislate on corporate bankruptcy protections. Why should there be corporate personhood in bankruptcy that insulates the stockholders who, under simple methodological individualism logic, jointly caused damages to other parties?

Hesitancy among corporations to participate in questionable government actions, such as providing personnel and equipment for dubious military ventures, might be expected if corporations were held liable for complicity.

Not all of the success of corporate power derives from the corporate means of business formation. A lack of investor caution contributes to the growth of corporate autonomy. Moreover, the corporate sector has pressed for privileges and unwarranted legal advantages. These include the acquisition of various property rights through excessive patent law protections; property titles, including broadcast spectrum rights; subsidies; local property tax exemption incentives; natural resource and mining claims; and the exploitation of property site ownership through perpetuated, duplicated, accelerated tax depreciation allowances on buildings that far exceed long-term costs.

The latter allows for avoiding otherwise normal tax liabilities on site value, all the while benefiting from publicly expensed law enforcement and infrastructure provisions. Deriving public or community revenue exclusively from site value and natural resources, and thus eliminating taxes on income, buildings, and improvements, would shift these costs primarily onto corporate urban real estate holdings. This would improve urban infill, remove disincentives to assigning the best use, and enhance physical structures and upgrades.

International treaties, such as NAFTA, the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment), the World Bank, and the IMF, often favor recovery of damages and legitimate claims by sovereign nations over those of offending multinational and transnational corporations.

Other policies inadvertently favor more prominent firms. Critics of corporate power highlight tax policies that contribute to increases in scale. R.H. Coase apprised us that, unavoidably, firms often become more vertically integrated due to tax policies:

*"Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers...to the extent that firms already exist, such a measure as a sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be."* [13]

All too often, government courts interpret legal limits as sanctioning pollution or other environmentally negligent activities that remain within regulatory bounds. In other words, more stringent limits result from tort actions when statutes or rules do not set boundaries of action. This is particularly true in environmental protection legislation, which has been a primary reason for inadequate corporate abatement of water and air pollution.

Additionally, under the influence of growing industrial interests over the last two centuries, tort law remedies have been replaced, preventing victims from suing polluters for damages. No longer could an individual sue for individual damages if the damage was not different or significantly more than that suffered by others in society. A "Public" nuisance (affecting the general public) could only be enjoined through a public authority. [14]

One often-overlooked attribute of progress is the principle of spontaneous self-organization. Under orderly market environments, economic institutions arise spontaneously. Such emergent

order produces coordinated economies when planning is decentralized and governed by a market price system.

By the same token, under a lack of customary respect for free choices in markets, retrogressive or anti-social attributes of tyranny emerge spontaneously and inexorably, with no master plan needed. Hence, the *Iron Law of Oligarchy*. When we consider regulatory capture by private factions and the perverse incentives enabled by legislation, the resulting tendency toward unsavory, politicized outcomes should come as no surprise. Of this, the founders were clearly aware, as they erected checks and balances on power.

A bona fide free market would not grant corporations immunity. In this respect, the evolution of concerted government policy contravenes sound jurisprudence. It disrupts the common-law remedies necessary for a functioning market economy.

Especially onerous is the practice of exempting specific industries from liability altogether through legislation such as the *Price-Anderson Act* for the nuclear power industry; the various vaccine damage [acts](#), including [PREP](#) (*Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act*, 2005) that exempt medical industry and medical profession participants; and the various bailout and bankruptcy protections for banks and financial institutions.

Even more economically insidious are the quasi-governmental entities, such as the Federal Reserve System (FED), which hold monopoly privileges granted by legal tender laws. Where was the Constitutional authority to charter the FED? The acceleration of wealth disparity between the 1% and the 99% can be easily attributed to the influence of financially dominant corporations, which are virtually in league with the Fed, controlling the Fed's flow of funds through quantitative easing. See [here](#).

Of immediate urgency is the evident malversation, most notable in the deceptive handling of the COVID pandemic by the FDA, CDC, and WHO, in collaboration with Big Pharma (especially Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson). Corporate arrogance regarding deliberate media disinformation, widespread shadow banning, and corporate social media censorship were associated with the recent contrived global pandemic. Instead of shareholder inhibition, we witnessed a culture of shareholder proprietorship in ill-gained profiteering.

*"COVID-19 is not the problem; it is a problem, one largely solvable with early treatments that are safe, effective, and inexpensive...The problem is endemic corruption in the medical-industrial complex, currently supported at every turn by mass-media companies. This cartel's coup d'etat has already siphoned billions from taxpayers, already vacuumed up trillions from the global middle class, and created the excuse for massive propaganda, censorship, and control worldwide. Along with its captured regulators, this cartel has ushered in the global war on freedom and democracy."* [15] Robert F. Kennedy Jr.

## Conclusion

Our economic system has gradually come more under the influence of a corrupt, irresponsible financial and political plutocracy. This outcome calls for less, not more, government involvement in funding, protections, and bailouts in the private sector.

Emergent corporatism poses a paradox for capitalism. However, it does not have to define mature capitalism. Corporatism is a deviation from genuine free-market capitalism, an unnecessary distortion of the Founders' vision of a just society. They rejected the idea of chartering corporations in favor of the core principles of common law and free markets.

Unnecessary privileges bestowed on corporations have produced an aberrant capitalism inimical to a prospering free economy. Now, under limited liability, Big Tech and Big Media, in concert with Big Pharma, Wall Street, and the Security State, have breached historical limits of power. They are eroding Western civil protections for individuals under the guise of safety measures against unsubstantiated, manufactured threats ([see](#)). Aggregated control by just a few investment funds and transnational corporations is so pervasive that laws restricting electioneering communications, such as those in reaction to the 2010 Citizens United decision, would have little impact even if reinstated. Workarounds through media and other avenues, already evident in Big Pharma's influence over global political agendas, appear unpreventable.

This convergence of influence, reminiscent of the effects of interlocking directorates, accounts for the recent, seemingly inexplicable uniformity in COVID-19 global policy. Financial inducements drive such extraordinary manipulation of public and private policy. The scale of this phenomenon results from an unnatural, extra-market, artificial impetus to the rise of unchecked, avaricious corporations able to capture putative medical authorities, such as the FDA, CDC, and WHO, which receive more funding from corporate than public sources.

Whether or not these considerations engender actual reform, they nevertheless contribute to an understanding that current failures now attributed to Capitalism can only apply to *attenuated* Capitalism, not *genuine* Capitalism free from legislated corporate liability exemptions.

The influence of the corporate limited-liability privilege in skewing common-law protections against severe social and political risks must be confronted. Holding shareholders accountable for corporate misconduct is the solution. Without this, true Capitalism risks appearing as a failed system, and Western civilization could face irreversible policies that undermine fundamental freedoms.

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[1] Breggin, Peter R. and Ginger Ross Breggin. 2021, *Covid-19 and the Global Predators*, Ithaca N.Y., Lake Edge Press. p.335-6.

- [2] For example, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. BlackRock Corporation became the world's largest asset manager, with \$9.5 trillion in assets under management by October 2021. By January 13, 2021, Vanguard, with about \$7 trillion in global assets under management, had become the largest provider of mutual funds and the second-largest provider of exchange-traded funds in the world, after BlackRock's iShares. State Street has custody of, or administers, over \$40 trillion in investments.
- [3] Pandemic: " occurring over a wide geographic area and affecting an exceptionally high proportion of the population"...Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
- [4] [See](#) Rothbard, *What Has Government Done To Our Money*. Online at Mises.org
- [5] Nozick, Robert. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, New York, Basic Books, Inc., pp.133-4
- [6] Mises, Ludwig Von. Revised 1963. *Human Action*, Chicago, Yale University Press. pp. 4143
- [7] (See *The Tyranny of Good Intentions* by Paul Craig Roberts and Lawrence M. Stratton). The limitations required of such policies need not justify retaining imprudent limited liability statutes.
- [8] See [here](#), and Rothbard, Murray N. 1973. *For a New Liberty*, New York, Macmillan Co., pp. 228-274
- [9] Robertson, Ross M. 1964. *History of the American Economy*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., p.245
- [10] Nace, Ted. 2005. *Gangs of America*, San Francisco, BK Publishers, Inc., pp.54-5 [11]  
Ibid. p.52
- [12] John Maurice Clark, 1936, *Preface to Social Economics*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart. pp. 89-90
- [13] Coase, R.H. "The Nature of the Firm", *Economica*, Nov. 1937, (p.492).
- [14] Amador, Jorge (1987). Take Back the Environment, *The Freeman*, Foundation for Economic Education, (pp.19, 22), Fee.org.
- [15] Kennedy, Robert F. Jr. 2021. *The Real Anthony Fauci*, New York, Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., p.446