

Further the following is said there :—

“ The personified appearance of the Lord leaves no room for the desire to possess any other object of concentration. The fact of the mind being held fast there is what is called concentration. And, O king, hear what that personified appearance of the Lord is that should be meditated upon ; there can be no concentration without something upon which the mind may rest. The face is cheerful and pleasing to the mind, the eyes are full of freshness and depth like lotus-leaves, the cheeks are beautiful, the forehead is bright and high, the ears are symmetrical and well-adorned by drops, the neck is long like the shell of a conch ; the auspicious sign of fortune, the Śrīvatsa, marks his chest ; with a deep navel and deep furrows appearing in the abdomen ; with eight or four arms hanging from his body ; sitting with thighs and shanks evenly placed, and feet placed in the form of a *Svaṣṭika*. Such is the appearance of Viṣṇu clad in clean yellow garb, adorned with beautiful head-dress, armband, bracelet, etc. ; carrying his bow, the Śārṅga, his discus, his club, his sword, his conch-shell and his rosary of Rudrākṣa. He has become Brahma. With mind merged in Him, let the Yogī devote himself to meditating upon Him. Let him apply his mind to him so long as his concentration becomes well established. Practising this concentration or doing some other work in accordance with his own wishes, so long as the mind learns not to get away from the object of concentration, the Yogī should in that state consider his concentration achieved.—1.

Sūtra 2.

तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् ॥ २ ॥

तत्र Tatra, there, प्रत्यय Pratyaya, of the mental effort, एकतानता Ekatañatā, continuation. ध्यानम् Dhyānam, meditation.

2. The continuation there of the mental-effort (to understand) is meditation (dhyāna).—108.

तत्र प्रत्ययैकतानता ध्यानम् । तस्मिन्देशे ध्येयालम्बनस्य प्रत्ययस्यैकतानता सहस्रः प्रवाहः प्रत्ययान्तरेणापरामृष्टो ध्यानम् ॥ २ ॥

VYĀSA.

Meditation is the continuance, *i.e.*, the unchanging flow, of the mental effort to understand the object of meditation, untouched by any other effort of the understanding.—108.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes the meditation which is brought about by concentration :— ‘Continuance of the mental effort to understand it is meditation.’ Continuance of the mental effort means one-pointedness. The Commentary is easy. Here too says the Purāṇa : ‘Meditation is the continuance of one-pointedness with reference to the effort of understanding directed to any object, there being absence of desire to understand anything else at the time. This is brought about, O King, by the foregoing accessories’—2.

Sūtra 3.

तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः ॥ ३ ॥

तद् Tad, the same, एव Eva, the same. अर्थे Artha, object, the light of the object. मात्र Mātra, alone. निर्भासन् Nirbhāsam, shining with. स्वरूप Svarūpa, itself. शून्यम् Śūnyaṃ, devoid of. एव Iva, as it were. समाधिः Samādhiḥ, trance, contemplation.

3. The same when shining with the light of the object alone, and devoid, as-it-were, of itself, is trance (or contemplation, Samādhi).—109.

तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः । ध्यानमेव ध्येयाकारनिर्भासं प्रत्ययात्मकेन स्वरूपेण शून्यमिव यदा भवति ध्येयस्वभावादेशात्तदा समाधिरित्युच्यते ॥ ३ ॥

VYĀSA.

When on account of the object of contemplation taking entire possession of the mind, contemplation shows forth only the light of the form of the contemplated object, and is devoid, as it were, of its nature of self-cognition, then it is called trance (or contemplation).—109.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes trance which is brought about by meditation :—

“ The same when it shines by the light of the object alone, and is devoid, as it were of itself, is trance.” The Bhāṣyakāra explains :—‘ When on account of contemplation, etc.’ ; Shows forth only the form of the object of contemplation : ‘ Devoid, etc.’ Inasmuch as the question arises that if it is devoid of the nature of self-cognition, how can it illuminate the object, he adds :—‘ As it were.’ He mentions its cause :—‘ On account of the object of contemplation taking entire possession of the mind.’

The Purāṇa has on this too : “ Trance is that in which the mind takes in the nature of the object of thought free from ‘Fancy’ (kalpanā). It is brought about by meditation.” Fancy (kalpanā) consists in the perception of the act and the object of meditation as distinct from each other. The Trance-Cognition is free from this fancy.

Having described the eight accessories of Yoga to Khandikya, Kuśīdhvaja thus summarized :—‘ The knower of the field is the employer of the means. The means is knowledge, that is not intelligent. Having achieved the work of salvation, it has nothing of its duty left to do, and turns back.’—3.

Sūtra 4.

त्रयमेकत्र संयमः ॥ ४ ॥

त्रयम् Trayam, the three. एकत्र Ekatra, together. संयमः Saṃyamaḥ, Saṃyama.

4. The three together are Saṃyama.—110.

त्रयमेकत्र संयमः । तदेतद्धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमेकत्र संयमः । एकविषयाणि त्रीणि साधनानि संयम इत्युच्यते । तदस्य त्रयस्य तान्त्रिकी परिभाषा संयम इति ॥ ४ ॥

VYĀSA.

These three together, concentration, meditation and trance are Saṃyama. The practice of all the three accessories with reference to one object of thought is Saṃyama. This word Saṃyama is a technical term of the science meant to denote the three.—110.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Inasmuch as the mention of concentration, meditation and trance, all three, each by its own separate name at every place, would be very lengthy, this aphorism is introduced

with the object of laying down a technical term for the sake of brevity :—'The three together are Saṃyama.' The Bhāṣyakāra explains :—'With reference to one object, etc.' He removes the possible doubt that the word has the radical meaning of these three :—'The word is a technical term, etc.' (The word Tantra in the original means the science of Yoga. Hence 'Tāntrika' means a technical term of the science.) The province of Saṃyama is the 'Three changes' and such other places.—4.

Sūtra 5.

तज्जयात्प्रज्ञालोकः ॥ ५ ॥

तद् Tad, of that. जयात् Jayât, by the achievement. प्रज्ञा Prajñā, of the cognition. लोकः Lokah, the visibility.

5. By achievement thereof comes the visibility of the Cognition.—111.

तज्जयात्प्रज्ञालोकः । तस्य संयमस्य जयात्समाधिप्रज्ञाया भवत्यालोको यथा यथा संयमः स्थिरपदे भवति तथा तथा समाधिप्रज्ञा विशारदी भवति ॥ ५ ॥

VYĀSA.

By the achievement of this 'Saṃyama' comes the visibility of the Trance-Cognition. As Saṃyama becomes firmer and firmer so does the Trance-Cognition become more and more lucid.—111.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author mentions the fruit of the practice for the achievement of Saṃyama :—'By achievement thereof comes the visibility of the Cognition.' Visibility consists in the maintenance of its flow free from impurity and unimpeded by any other effort of cognition. The Commentary is easy.—5.

Sūtra 6.

तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः ॥ ६ ॥

तस्य Tasya, its. भूमिषु Bhūmiṣu, to the planes, regions. विनियोगः Viniyogah, application.

6. Its application is to the planes.—112.

तस्य भूमिषु विनियोगः । तस्य संयमस्य जितभूमेर्यान्तराभूमिस्तत्र विनियोगः । नह्यजिताधरभूमिरन्तरभूमिं विलङ्घ्य प्रान्तभूमिषु संयमं लभते । तदभावाच्च कुतस्तस्य प्रज्ञालोक ईश्वरप्रणिधानाज्जितोत्तरभूमिकस्य च नाधरभूमिषु परचित्तज्ञानादिषु संयमो युक्तः । कस्मात्तदर्थस्यान्यथैवावगतत्वाद् भूमेरस्या इयमनन्तरा भूमिरित्यत्र योग एवोपाध्यायः । कथम् । एवं ह्युक्तम् । योगेन योगो ज्ञातव्यो योगो योगात्प्रवर्तते । योऽप्रमत्तस्तु योगेन स योगे रमते चिरमिति ॥ ६ ॥

VYĀSA.

When one plane has been conquered by Saṃyama, it is applied to the next immediately following. No one who has not conquered the lower plane, can jump over the plane immediately following, and then achieve Saṃyama with reference to the plane further off. And if this

Saṃyama cannot be achieved, how can the visibility of the Cognition come? For him, however, who has conquered the higher planes by making Īśwara the motive of all actions it is not proper to perform Saṃyama with reference to the lower planes, such as thought-reading, &c. Why? Because the object thereof has already been achieved by means other than this. As to which is the next immediate plane after a certain plane, it is the practice of Yoga alone that will teach this. How? It has been so said :—'The Yoga is to be known by the Yoga; the Yoga becomes manifest by the Yoga; whoever is not confused, enjoys the Yoga for long by the Yoga.'—112.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

But whereto is this Saṃyama to be applied in order to achieve this fruit? For this reason the author says :—'Its application is to be to the planes.' The Commentator specifies the planes. 'When one plane, &c.' The application is to the unconquered plane immediately following the plane, that is, the mental state, which has been conquered.

When the Indistinct Trance Cognition, having the gross world for its sphere, has been achieved by Saṃyama, the application of the Saṃyama is to be to the yet unconquered Distinct Trance. When that has been conquered, the application is to be to the Meditative Transformation. Similar is the application to the Ultra-meditative.

For this very reason the Purāṇa introduces the trance with reference to the subtle objects, after the thought-transformation into gross objects has been achieved, and all the arms and ornaments have been put off one after the other :—'Then let the wise man meditate upon the form of the Lord as devoid of the conch, the club, the discus and the bow, calm and possessing only the rosary of Rudrākṣa. When concentration has become well-established hereupon, then let the Yogī meditate upon HIM as devoid of the ornaments of head-dress, armet, &c. Then should he devote himself to HIM as possessed of the limbs alone; and then should he think of himself as HIS SELF. 'I am HE.' Then should he devote himself to the thought of the 'I am' alone.

But then why is it that one conquers the higher plane only after having conquered the lower one? Why does he not conquer in the reverse order? For this reason the Bhāṣyakāra says :—'No one who has not conquered the lower plane, &c.' No one who starts to the Ganges from the Śilāhrada, reaches the Ganges without first reaching the Meghavāna.

"For him who has conquered the higher planes by making Īśwara the motive of all actions, &c." Why? Because the object, i.e., the conquest of the higher planes, has been achieved by another very proximate means, that is, devotion to God. When an object has been achieved, then the employment of a means for its achievement which does not introduce something new in the expected result, oversteps the propriety of the rule of practice.

Well, let that be. But the sub-planes are known by authority. Their order, however, is not so known. How is that order to be known? For this reason he says :—'As to which is the next, &c.' When the preceding state of Yoga is conquered it becomes the cause of the knowledge of the nature and activity of the next. This is to be understood by seeing that the state is intended to be spoken of as being identical with the object of which the state is named.

Sūtra 7.

त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वेभ्यः ॥ ७ ॥

त्रयम् Trayam, the three, अन्तरङ्गम् Antaraṅgam, forming an internal part more than, more intimate. पूर्वेभ्यः Pūrvebhyah, than the preceding.

7. The three are more-intimate than-the-preceding.—113.

त्रयमन्तरङ्गं पूर्वैर्भ्यः । तदैतद्धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमन्तरङ्गं संप्रज्ञा तस्य समाधेः
पूर्वैर्भ्यो यमादिभ्यः पञ्चभ्यः साधनेभ्य इति ॥ ७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The three, concentration, meditation and trance are more intimate means of the Cognitive Trance than the preceding five, the restraints, &c.—113.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

How is it that Saṁyama alone is to be employed in all places here and there, and not the other five, although both are the accessories of Yoga equally? For this reason the author says:—'The three are more intimate than the preceding ones.' This three-fold means has the object to be achieved as its direct sphere of operation; it is, therefore, called intimate. The restraints, &c., are not such; they are, therefore, called non-intimate. This is the meaning.—7.

Sūtra 8.

तदपि बहिरङ्गं निर्बीजस्य ॥ ८ ॥

तद् Tad, that. अपि Api, even. बहिरङ्गम् Bahiraṅgam, the external part, non-intimate. निर्बीजस्य Nribijasya, to the seedless.

8. Even that is non-intimate to the seedless.—114.

तदपि बहिरङ्गं निर्बीजस्य । तदप्यन्तरङ्गं साधनत्रयं निर्बीजस्य योगस्य बहिरङ्गं
भवति कस्मात्तदभावे भावादिति ॥ ८ ॥

VYĀSA.

This intimate triad of means too becomes an external accessory of the seedless-trance. Why? Because it comes into existence upon its cessation.—114.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The triad of means is intimate only to the Cognitive Trance, not to the Ultra-Cognitive. The Ultra-Cognitive Trance being seedless, there is no similarity between the spheres of their operation and also because the seedless-trance is born when the triad of means has long been under restraint, and the Cognitive Trance has reached its highest culmination, or which is the same thing, when the state of the higher desirelessness consisting as it does of the purity of knowledge, is reached. 'The triad of means, &c.' 'Even that is non-intimate to the seedless.'

'Intimacy' consists in having a common sphere of operation. Then, however, does not exist here. There is no immediate sequence here. What it is said that the non-intimate means of devotion to the Lord brings about that state and that therefore there is overlapping, it is meant that although the definition of the intimate overlaps, including as it does the means of devotion to the Lord, it does not possess the characteristic of following in immediate sequence and thus differs from the non-intimate. For this reason, in order to show that in the case of the Ultra-Cognitive the Saṁyama is rather a remote cause, it is said that it comes into existence upon the cessation thereof.—8.

Sūtra 9.

व्युत्थाननिरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ
निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः ॥ ९ ॥

व्युत्थान Vyutthāna, of outgoing. निरोध Nirodha, of suppressing. संस्कारयोः Saṁs-kārayoh, of the potencies. अभिभव Abhibhava, the disappearance. प्रादुर्भावौ Prādur-bhāvau, and the appearance. निरोध Nirodha, of the suppression. क्षण, Kṣaṇa, with the moment. चित्त Chitta, of the mind. अन्वयः Anvayaḥ, the conjunction. निरोध Nirodhha, of the suppression, suppressive. परिणामः Parīṇamaḥ, modification.

9. The suppressive modification is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression (nirodha), when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.—115.

अथ निरोधचित्तक्षणेषु चलं गुणवृत्तमिति कीदृशस्तदा चित्तपरिणामः । व्युत्थान-
निरोधसंस्कारयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ निरोधक्षणचित्तान्वयो निरोधपरिणामः । व्युत्थान-
संस्कारादिचतुर्धर्मा न ते प्रत्ययात्मका इति प्रत्ययनिरोधेन निरुद्धा निरोधसंस्कारा अपि
चित्तधर्मास्तयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ व्युत्थानसंस्कारादिचतुर्धर्मा हीयन्ते निरोधसंस्कारा
आश्रीयन्ते निरोधक्षणं चित्तमन्वेति तदेकस्य चित्तस्य प्रतिक्षणमिदं संस्कारान्यथात्वं
निरोधपरिणामस्तदा संस्कारशेषं चित्तमिति निरोधसमाधौ व्याख्यातम् ॥ ९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Change is of the very nature of the functioning of 'the qualities.' What sort of change does, therefore, take place at the time of this functioning in the moments of mental suppression? 'The suppressive modification is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression, when the outgoing and suppressive potencies disappear and appear respectively.'

The outgoing potencies are the characteristics of the mind. It is not that they are suppressed by the restraints of the acts of cognition, being of the nature of the acts of cognition, (as they are not of the nature of the acts of cognition). The potencies of suppression too are characteristics of the mind. The respective suppression and appearance of these two, when the characteristics of the outgoing potencies are destroyed and the potencies of suppression acquired, is the moment of suppression which the mind appears in conjunction with. This acquiring of different potencies by the one mind every moment is the suppressive change. In that state the potencies alone are left in the mind. This has been described as the Suppressive Trance.—115.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The three changes are to be utilized in 'By Saṁyama over the three changes, &c.' (P. III, 16).

It is desirable to explain them. Hence the question in connection with the seedless trance mentioned in the last aphorism: 'What sort of a change, &c.' In the states of outgoing mental activity and trance (Cognitive), the heaping up of different evident changes is a matter of direct knowledge. No change is, however, perceived in the Suppressive Trance. It is not, however, that it does not exist because it is not directly perceived, inasmuch as the mind is changeable on account of its being made up of the three qualities, and because it is impossible that the 'qualities' should not change even for a moment. This is the meaning of the question. The aphorism is the answer to the question:— 'The suppressive change is the conjunction of the mind with the moment of suppression, when the outgoing and suppressive potencies appear and disappear respectively.' In relation to the Ultra-Cognitive the cognitive too is an outgoing. Suppression is that by which this is suppressed,—the illumination of knowledge, the higher desirelessness. The disappearance and appearance (mentioned here) are of these outgoing and suppressive potencies respectively. This being the case, the disappearance of the outgoing and the appearance of the suppressive potency consists in the conjunction of the mind, the characterized, with the moment of suppression. This conjunction in time with the suppression is the conjunction with both these states. The mind as an individualized phenomenon capable of possessing characteristics, does not, either in the Cognitive or the Ultra-Cognitive states, differ in nature from the states of the suppression and manifestation of potencies.

Well, but the afflictions following Nescience, which have their root in Nescience, are removed on the removal of Nescience, and do not after the removal of Nescience stand in need of any other effort distinct therefrom to remove them. In the same way, seeing that the potencies having their origin in the outgoing acts of the mind are removed by the removal of the outgoing activity itself, the potency of suppression should not be needed further for their removal. For this reason the Bhāṣyakāra says:— 'The potencies of the outgoing, &c.' It is not necessary that the effect should be removed by the mere removal of the cause. The cloth is not destroyed by the removal of the weaver. The fact is that the effect which is of the nature of the cause itself, is only removed upon the removal of that cause.

The afflictions which have been described as following Nescience have been said to be of the nature of Nescience itself. It is, therefore, very proper that they should be removed on the removal of Nescience. It is not in this way that potencies are of the nature of the acts of Cognition; because it is seen that memory exists even though the acts of Cognition have been suppressed for a very long time. For this reason although the acts of Cognition may have ceased for a long time, it is necessary that the storage of potencies of suppression be attended to for the removal of the potencies originating in the acts. The rest is easy.—9.

Sūtra 10.

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् ॥१०॥

तस्य Tasya, its, प्रशान्त-वाहिता Prasānta-vāhitā, undisturbed (प्रशान्त) Flow (वाहिता) संस्कारात् Saṃskārāt, by potency.

10. By potency comes its undisturbed flow.—116.

तस्य प्रशान्तवाहिता संस्कारात् । निरोधसंस्काराभ्यासपाटवापेक्षा प्रशान्त-वाहिता चित्तस्य भवति तत्संस्कारमान्द्ये व्युत्थानधर्मिणा संस्कारेण निरोधधर्मः संस्कारो-ऽभिभूयत इति ॥ १० ॥

VYĀSA.

Undisturbed flow comes to the mind by the deftness of practice in the generating of the mental potencies of suppression. In case the potencies are weak, the potency characterized by suppression is overpowered by the potency characterized by outgoing activity.—116.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Of what sort is the change of the mind brought about by means of the powerful suppressive tendency, when the potencies of outgoing activity have been altogether overpowered? In answer to the question the author says:— 'By potency comes its undisturbed flow.'

"Undisturbed flow" means the flow in uninterrupted succession of the suppressive potencies alone, free from the impurity of the outgoing potencies.

But then why does it stand in need of the deftness in generating potencies? Why not potency alone? For this reason the Bhāṣyakāra says:— 'In case the potencies are weak, &c.' The potencies referred to are those of suppression. Those however who read a 'not' before 'overpowered,' explain the potencies to be those of the outgoing activities.—10.

Sūtra 11.

सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयौ चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥११॥

सर्वार्थता Sarvārthatā, of all pointedness, एकाग्रता Ekāgratā one pointedness, of these two. क्षय Kṣaya, the destruction (of all pointedness). उदय Udaya, the rise (of one pointedness) these two respectively of the previous two. चित्तस्य Chittasya, of the mind. समाधिपरिणामः Samādhi-pariṇāmaḥ, the trance modification.

11. The trance modification of the mind is the destruction and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness, respectively.—117.

सर्वार्थतैकाग्रतयोः क्षयोदयौ चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः । सर्वार्थता चित्तधर्मः । एकाग्रतापि चित्तधर्मः । सर्वार्थतायाः क्षयस्तिरोभाव इत्यर्थः । एकाग्रताया उदय आविर्भाव इत्यर्थः । तयोर्धर्मित्वेनानुगतं चित्तं तदिदं चित्तमपायोपजनानयोः स्वात्मभूतयोर्धर्मयोरनुगतं समाधीयते स चित्तस्य समाधिपरिणामः ॥ ११ ॥

VYĀSA.

All-pointedness is a characteristic of the mind. One-pointedness is also a characteristic of the mind. The destruction of all-pointedness is its disappearance. The rise of one-pointedness is its appearance. The mind puts on both these characteristics. This mind then following along both these characteristics of destruction and manifestation which make its very nature, inclines towards contemplation. This is the trance modification of the mind.—117.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author shows the state of the mental change towards Cognitive trance. 'The trance modification of the mind is the disappearance and rise of all-pointedness and one-pointedness respectively.'

All-pointedness means distractedness. It cannot be destroyed; hence its destruction is only its disappearance. Nothing which exists is destroyed. Rise is appearance. The disappearance and birth of the characteristics of all-pointedness and one-pointedness which are of the very nature of the mind, means that the disappearance is to be of all-pointedness, and the appearance is to be of one-pointedness. The mind following these too becomes inclined towards trance. The meaning is that it becomes qualified by the trance condition which is achieved gradually by the latter condition becoming the former.—11.

Sūtra 12.

ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥१२॥

ततः Tataḥ thence, पुनः Punaḥ, again, शान्तोदितौ Śānta-uditau, the subsiding and rising, (शान्त) (उदित) तुल्य-प्रत्ययौ Tulya-pratyayau, having similar, (चित्त) Cognitive, acts, (प्रत्यय) चित्तस्य Chittasya, of the mind, mental, एकाग्रता Ekāgratā, of the one-pointedness, परिणामः Pariṇāmah, modification.

12. Thence again comes the mental modification of one-pointedness, when the subsiding and rising cognitive acts are similar.—118.

ततः पुनः शान्तोदितौ तुल्यप्रत्ययौ चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः । समाहितचित्तस्य पूर्वप्रत्ययः शान्त उत्तरस्तत्सदृश उदितः समाधिचित्तमुभयोरनुगतं पुनस्तथैवासमाधि-
भ्रवादिति । स खल्वयं धर्मिणश्चित्तस्यैकाग्रतापरिणामः ॥ १२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of him whose mind is inclined towards the trance modification, the former cognitive act subsides; and the later that rises is similar thereto. The mind inclined towards trance is common to both. The same happens again and again up to the end of trance.

This of course is the modification of the one-pointedness of the mind which exists as an individualized unit independent of the characteristics.—118.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Thence again comes the mental modification of one-pointedness, when subsiding and cognitive acts are similar.'

Again, when trance having been achieved, the later state of trance becomes the former, the former subsides and the later cognitive trance modification arises. That is to say, one becomes the past and the other the present. When both these cognitive acts of him who has become inclined towards trance, become similar to each other, it becomes one-pointed. This shows the achievement of trance, and also of one-pointedness itself. The Bhāṣyakāra shows the limit:—'Up to the end of trance.'—12.

Sūtra 13.

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः ॥१३॥

एतेन Etena, by this, भूत Bhūta, in the objective phenomena, इन्द्रियेषु Indriyāsu, and in the instrumental phenomena, धर्म Dharma, the characteristic quality, लक्षणा

Lakṣaṇa, the secondary quality, अवस्था Avasthā, condition of all these three, परिणामाः Pariṇāmāḥ, the changes, व्याख्याताः Vyākhyātāḥ, are described.

13. By this are described the changes of characteristic (dharma), secondary quality (lakṣaṇa), and condition (avasthā) in the objective and instrumental phenomena.—119.

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः । एतेन पूर्वोक्तेन चित्त-
परिणामेन धर्मलक्षणावस्थारूपेण भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मपरिणामो लक्षणपरिणामोऽवस्थापरिणाम-
इत्येवोक्तो वेदितव्यः । तत्र व्युत्थाननिरोधयोर्धर्मयोरभिभवप्रादुर्भावौ धर्मिणि धर्मपरि-
णामो लक्षणपरिणामश्च । निरोधश्चिलक्षणस्त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तः । स खल्वनागतलक्षण-
मध्वानं प्रथमं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तो वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नः । यत्रास्य स्वरूपेणाभि-
व्यक्तिरेषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्वः । न चातीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां विमुक्तः तथा व्युत्थानं
त्रिलक्षणं त्रिभिरध्वभिर्युक्तं वर्तमानलक्षणं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तमतीतलक्षणं प्रतिपन्न-
मेषोऽस्य तृतीयोऽध्वः । न चानागतवर्तमानाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां विमुक्तः । एवं पुनर्व्युत्थान-
मुप संपद्यमानमनागतलक्षणं हित्वा धर्मत्वमनतिक्रान्तं वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपन्नं यत्रास्य
स्वरूपमिदं सत्यां व्यापार एषोऽस्य द्वितीयोऽध्वः । न चातीतानागताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यां
विमुक्तमित्येवं पुनर्निरोध एव पुनर्व्युत्थानमिति । तथावस्थापरिणामः । निरोधक्षणे
निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तो भवन्ति दुर्बला व्युत्थानसंस्कारा इति । एष धर्माणामवस्थापरि-
णामस्तत्र धर्मिणे धर्मैः परिणामो धर्माणां व्यध्वनां लक्षणैः परिणामो लक्षणानामप्यव-
स्थाभिः परिणाम इत्येवं धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामैः शून्यं न क्षणमपि गुणवृत्तमवतिष्ठते ।
चलं च गुणवृत्तम् । गुणस्वाभावं तु प्रवृत्तिकारणमुक्तं गुणानामिति । एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु
धर्मधर्मिभेदात्त्रिविधः परिणामो वेदितव्यः । परमार्थतस्त्वेक एव परिणामो धर्मिस्वरूप-
मात्रा हि धर्मो धर्मिविक्रियैवैषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्च्यत इति । तत्र धर्मस्य धर्मिणि वर्तमान-
स्यैवाध्वस्वतीतानागतवर्तमानेषु भावान्यथात्वं भवति न तु द्रव्यान्यथात्वम् । यथा सुवर्ण-
भाजनस्य भित्त्वान्यथ क्रियमाणस्य भावान्यथात्वं भवति न सुवर्णान्यथात्वमिति । अपर
आह । धर्मानभ्यधिको धर्मो पूर्वतत्त्वानतिक्रमात् । पूर्वापरावस्थाभेदमनुपतितः कौटस्थे-
नैव परिवर्तत यद्यन्वयी स्यादिति । अयमदोषः । कस्मात् । एकान्ततानभ्युपगमात्तदेतन्नै-
लोक्ष्यं व्यक्तेरपैति नित्यत्वप्रतिषेधात् । अपेतमप्यस्ति विनाशप्रतिषेधात् । संसर्गाच्चास्य
सौक्ष्म्यं सौक्ष्म्याच्चानुपलब्धिरिति । लक्षणपरिणामो धर्मोऽध्वसु वर्तमानोऽतीतलक्षणयुक्तो
जनागतवर्तमानाभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्तः । तथा वर्तमानो वर्तमानलक्षणयुक्तोऽतीताना-
गताभ्यां लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्त इति । तथा नागतोऽनागतलक्षणयुक्तो वर्तमानातीताभ्यां
लक्षणाभ्यामविमुक्त इति । यथा पुरुष एकस्यां स्त्रियां रक्तो न शेषासु विरक्तो भवतीति ।
अत्र लक्षणपरिणामे सर्वस्य सर्वलक्षणयोगादध्वसङ्करः प्राप्नोतीति परैर्दोषश्चाद्यत इति
तस्य परिहारः । धर्माणां धर्मत्वमप्रसाध्यम् । सति च धर्मत्वे लक्षणभेदोऽपि वाच्यो न
वर्तमानसमय एवास्य धर्मत्वम् । एवं हि न चित्तं रागधर्मकं स्यात् । क्रोधकाले रागस्या-
समुदाचारादिति । किंच त्रयाणां लक्षणानां युगपदेकस्यां व्यक्तौ नास्ति सम्भवः । क्रमेण
तु स्वव्यञ्जकाञ्जनस्य भावो भवेदिति । उक्तं च रूपातिशया वृत्त्यतिशयाश्च विरुध्यन्ते ।

सामान्यानि त्वतिशयैः सह प्रवर्तन्ते तस्मादसङ्करः । यथा रागस्यैव क्वचित्समुदाचार इति न तदानीमन्यत्राभावः किंतु केवलं सामान्येन समन्वागत इत्यस्ति तदा तत्र तस्य भावः । तथा लक्षणस्येति न धर्मी व्यध्वा । धर्मास्तु व्यध्वानस्ते लक्षिता अलक्षितास्तत्र लक्षितास्तां तामवस्थां प्राप्नुवन्तोऽन्यत्वेन प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते । अवस्थान्तरतो न द्रव्यान्तरतः । यथैका रेखा शतस्थाने शतं दशस्थाने दश एका चैकस्थाने । यथा चैकत्वेऽपि स्त्री माता चाच्यते दुहिता च स्वसा चेति । अवस्थापरिणामे कौटस्थ्यप्रसङ्गदोषः कैश्चिदुक्तः । कथम् । अथ्येनो व्यापारेण व्यवहितत्वाद्यदा धर्मः स्वव्यापारं न करोति तदानागतो यदा करोति तदा वर्तमानो यदा कृत्वा निवृत्तस्तदातीत इत्येवं धर्मधर्मिणोर्लक्षणानामवस्थानां च कौटस्थ्यं प्राप्नोतीति परैर्दोष उच्यते । नासौ दोषः । कस्माद् गुणिनित्यत्वेऽपि गुणानां विमर्दं वैचित्र्यान् । यथा संस्थानमादिमद्धर्ममात्रं शब्दादीनां गुणानां विनाशयविनाशिनामेवं लिङ्गमादिमद्धर्ममात्रं सत्त्वादीनां गुणानां विनाशयविनाशिनानां तस्मिन्विकारसंबन्धेति । तत्रेदमुदाहरणं मृद्धर्मी पिण्डाकाराद्धर्माद्धर्मान्तरमुपसम्पद्यमानो धर्मतः परिणमते घटाकारमिति । घटाकाराऽनागतं लक्षणं हित्वा वर्तमानलक्षणं प्रतिपद्यत इति लक्षणतः परिणमते । घटो नवपुराणतां प्रतिक्षणमनुभवन्नवस्थापरिणामं प्रतिपद्यत इति । धर्मिणोऽपि धर्मान्तरमवस्था धर्मस्यापि लक्षणान्तरमवस्थेत्येक एव द्रव्यपरिणामो भेदेनोपदर्शित इति । एवं पदार्थान्तरेष्वपि योज्यमिति । त एते धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा धर्मस्वरूपमनतिक्रान्ता इत्येक एव परिणामः सर्वानमून्विशेषानभिप्लवते । अथ कोऽयं परिणामोऽवस्थितस्य द्रव्यस्य पूर्व-धर्मनिवृत्तौ धर्मान्तरोत्पत्तिः परिणाम इति ॥ १३ ॥

VYĀSA

It must be understood that by describing as above the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition with reference to the mind, the change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality and the change of condition with reference to the objective forms of matter and instruments of action and sensation have also been described.

There, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of the outgoing activity and suppression were the modifications of characteristic (primary quality) in the characterized (the object as existing independently of the quality); also the modification of secondary quality. Suppression has three secondary qualities; it is connected with three paths of being (adhvā).

Having given up the first path of being which consist of the secondary quality not yet manifested, it takes it up as a secondary quality existing in the present, although it has not thereby overstepped its primary quality. It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested. This is its second path of being. It is not devoid of the past and the yet-unmanifested qualities (lakṣaṇa).

Similarly is the outgoing activity possessed of three secondary qualities and is connected with three paths of being. Having given up

the present secondary quality, but not having given up its characteristic, it puts it on as the second quality of the past. This is its third path of being, and it is not devoid of the secondary qualities of the future and the present.

Similarly, inclining again to outward activity, it gives up the yet-unmanifested secondary quality; but not having given up its characteristic of existence as such, it gets on to it as the secondary quality of the present, where manifesting its true nature, it acts as such. This is its second path of being. And it is not devoid of the past and the future secondary qualities.

Similarly, suppression again and outgoing activity again.

Similar is the modification of condition. During moment of suppression, the suppressive potencies are being strengthened; and the potencies of the outgoing activities are being weakened. This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.

Thus the objective changes by means of the characteristics; the characteristics possessed of three paths of being are changed by means of secondary qualities; the secondary qualities too are modified into conditions.

Thus is it that the functioning of the "qualities" is never devoid even for a moment of the changes of the characteristics, secondary qualities and conditions; and the functioning of the qualities consists in ceaseless activity. It has further been said that the cause of the activity of the 'qualities' is their very nature.

By this must be understood the three-fold change in the objective and instrumental phenomena, due to the conception of a distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. In reality, however, there is but one change, because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterized; and it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. It is only the characteristic present in the characterized object that changes states in the past, the present and future, the substance is not changed. Thus when a vessel of gold is broken to be made into something else, it is only the condition that changes, not the gold.

Another says:—The characterized is nothing more than the characteristic, inasmuch as the reality of the former does not overstep the latter. If it were something co-existent, it would change as an independent existence only, simply changing into distinct anterior and posterior conditions.

This is no defect. Why? Because constancy is not found therein. Thus the three worlds give up their individual appearances, because

eternity has been denied to them. Yet they exist in the case of disappearance also, because destruction has been denied to them.

Further its subtlety is due to conjunctive existence; and it is not perceived on account of its subtlety.

The change of secondary quality is the moving of the characteristic along the paths of being. The past characteristic joined to the past secondary quality, is not devoid of the future and the present secondary quality.

Similarly, the present (characteristic) joined to the present secondary quality is not devoid of the past and the future secondary quality. Similarly, the future joined to the future secondary quality is not devoid of the present and past secondary qualities. For example, a man who is attached to one woman, does not hate all the others.

Others find a fault in this change of secondary qualities. They say that all the qualities being in simultaneous existence, their paths of being must be confused, (and thus overlapping one another cannot be considered as distinct and different).

This is thus met with. That the characteristics do exist as such requires no proof. When there is such a thing as a characteristic, the differences of the secondary qualities also must be posited. It is not only in the present time that the characteristic characterizes. If it were so the mind would not possess the characteristic of attachment, seeing that attachment is not in manifestation at the time of anger. Further the three secondary qualities are not possible of existence in one individual simultaneously. They may however appear in succession by virtue of the operation of their several causes. And so it has been said:—'The intensities of nature and those of function are opposed to each other; but the ordinary manifestations co-exist with the intense ones.' Therefore, there is no confusion. For example, attachment being in the height of manifestation with reference to some object, it does not for that reason cease to exist with reference to all other objects. On the contrary it is then ordinarily in existence with reference to them.

Similar is the case with the secondary qualities. It is not the characterized object that is possessed of the three paths of being. It is the characteristics that are possessed of the three paths. They may be visible or latent. Of these the visible ones assume different conditions, and are termed accordingly differently because the conditions are different and not the substance. This is in the same way as the figure of 1 means ten in the place of ten, hundred in the place of hundred, and one in

the place of unity. Or again a woman, although one, is called a mother, a daughter and a sister.

Some make the theory of change of condition defective as rendering independent existence necessary. How? There being intervals between the operations of the paths of being a characteristic is the future one, when it does not perform its function; it is the present one when it does; it has become the past when it has ceased to operate.

Now the defect that the opponents find is that in this way, the characteristic and the characterized object, as also the secondary quality and the condition must necessarily be considered as independent existences.

This is no defect. Why? On account of the variety due to the interaction of the 'qualities' even in case of the 'qualified' being permanent. As the coming together of the indestructible qualities of sound, &c., is only a characteristic having a beginning and is destructible, so also is the undifferentiated phenomenal state of matter with a beginning, and is only a characteristic of the indestructible 'qualities' of Essentiality, &c., and is as such destructible. It is for this reason that it is termed a 'Vikāra,' a product. Here is an illustration in this connection. Clay is an object possessed of characteristics. Its existence in the shape of a sod is a characteristic thereof. Given up this particular characteristic it takes up another; and thus takes up another characteristic when it takes up the form of a jar. In the form of jar its secondary quality gives up its futurity and comes to possess the secondary quality as manifested in the present. It thus changes its secondary quality. The jar changes, showing comparative oldness and newness every moment. This is change of condition.

Another characteristic taken up by the characterized substratum is but a change of condition. Of the characteristic too another secondary quality is a change of condition. It is, therefore, the change of one substance only that is thus shown by differentiation. In this way this may be applied to other things also. Thus it is that the change of characteristic, secondary quality and condition do not overstep the being of the characterized substratum, and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specializations thereof.

Well what is this change? Change is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.—119.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author classifies the changes of the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter, whose use will be described later, but whose occasion has come now:—'By this

the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition in the objective and instrumental phenomena have been described.'

The Commentator explains :—'It must be understood, &c. The question is that it is the fact only of mental change that has been mentioned, not its modes in the shape of characteristic secondary quality and condition. How is it then that they are spoken of here over and above that? For this reason he says :—'There the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of outgoing and suppression, &c.' The brief meaning is that the words of characteristic, secondary quality and condition have no doubt not been used, but it is not that for that reason the changes themselves of characteristic, secondary quality and condition have not been described. Thus in the aphorism :—'The suppressive modifications' &c. (III. 9), the change of characteristic, is spoken of.

Further he says that by showing this change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality also in the characteristic taken as substratum indicated :—'So also the change of secondary quality.'

Secondary quality stands for 'Lakṣaṇa.' It means that by which something is indicated. This quality is due to difference in time. It is by time that a thing is given certain qualities by means of which it is differentiated from certain things standing in a different relationship to time.

Suppression has three different secondary qualities. It is but another mode of saying that it is related to three paths of being. The word 'adhvā,' path of being, implies time.

"Having given up the first path of being, which consists of the secondary quality not yet manifested,"

The question arises, 'Does this suppression, while giving up the first path of being, overstep the nature of the characteristic too in the same way as it gives up the path of being?' The Commentator says that it does not :—'Although it has not overstepped its primary quality too.'

It does not overstep its characteristic, but takes up the secondary quality as existing in the present. The same suppression which had not manifested yet, has now come into present existence, not that suppression has become non-suppression.

The meaning of the nature of a thing existing in the present is now described :—'It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested.'

'True nature' is that which performs the function proper to its existence as such. Manifestation means its essentialization as such.

With reference to the yet unmanifested first path of being this is its second path of being.

Well if it be so that it gives up the yet unmanifested path of being and takes up the present, and that having given up the present state, it will pass on to the past path of being, then, it necessarily follows that paths of being are subject to birth and destruction. This however is not proper, because nothing is born that exists not, nor is anything that exists destroyed. For this reason the Commentator says :—'And it is not devoid of the past and the yet unmanifested secondary quality,' which go on existing in their generic unspecialized state.

Having shown the secondary quality of the present existence of the yet unmanifested suppression, the Commentator now shows the third path of being, the passing on to the past of the present outgoing activity :—

"Similar is the outgoing activity, &c."

Well then does suppression alone exist in the yet unmanifested state, not outgoing activity? The Commentator says No :—'Similarly inclining again to outward activity, &c.'

This repeated manifestation of the outgoing activity is not the manifestation of any individual output thereof. It is a manifestation of the same class only. That which has passed cannot come back.

"The manifestation of true nature is the essentialization of the object as possessing the capacity of performing its proper function."

It is this change of secondary quality thus described, which appears with reference to objects of the same class over and over again. For this reason the Commentator says :—'Similarly, suppression again, &c.'

Now he describes the changes of condition which is indicated by the change of characteristic :—'Similar is the modification, &c.'

The strength and weakness of the characteristics in their present path of being, are their conditions. The increase or decrease of weakness and strength every moment is the change of condition.

He summarizes :—'This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.'

Now he determines the different relation of the different changes :—'Thus the object changes, &c.'

Is then this change of the 'qualities' only occasional? He says No :—'Thus it is that the functioning of the qualities is never, &c.'

But then why is this change ever-existent? He says :—'The functioning of the qualities consists in ceaseless activity.' The word 'and' in this sentence means a cause.

Functioning means action. But whence this functioning itself? He says :—'It is of their very nature.' 'It has been said' here in before.

This three-fold change of the mind is taught by the author of the Aphorisms to be existing in the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter. He says :—'By this must be understood, &c.'

'This' means the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. When the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized is kept in sight, the physical elements of Prithvī, &c., are the objects characterized, and the bodies of cow, &c., or the jar, &c., are the changes of the characteristic thereof. The forms which the characteristics put on in the past and the yet unmanifested and the present ones constitute the change of their secondary quality. When the cow, &c., have taken up the secondary qualities as existing in the present, their change of condition consists in their taking up the states of the newly-born calf, a little advanced in age, youth and old age. In the case of the jar, &c., too, their newness and oldness are their changes of condition.

Similarly are the instrumental phenomena the characterized objects. The taking in of this or that blue, &c., is the change of characteristic of the sense of sight. The change of secondary quality consists in the assumption by the characteristic of the qualities due to the existence in the present, &c., as such. The present sensation of a jewel, &c., may be distinct or indistinct. This is its change of condition.

The change of the objective and instrumental phenomena is described, looking upon the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition as distinct from the characterized.

Now the Commentator speaks of them when they are looked upon as the same :—'In reality, however, there is but one change, &c.' The word 'however' turns away from the other view according to which the characteristic and the characterized are looked upon as distinct. Its reality is made known here, not that the nature of change is denied to the other. For what reason? Because the characteristic is the very being of the characterized.'

The question is that if the characteristic is only a modification of the characterized, how is it that people do not confuse the notions of the changes? For this reason he

says :—' And it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed through the characteristic.' By the word 'characteristic' here are understood all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. All this is the modification of the characterized alone by means of them. There is, therefore, but one change of the characteristic, &c., one not confused with the others, because there is no real distinction between them, the characterized objects themselves do not overlap one another.

The question arises that inasmuch as the characteristic and the characterized are not different from each other, and because the paths of being of the characteristic objects are different, the characteristic also must in this case behave as the characterized object, on account of the characteristic and the characterized object being the same. For this reason he says :—' It is only the characteristic present in the characterized, &c.'

'That changes states' :—The word 'state' here means a different arrangement of the thing, a different appearance. Thus when vessels of gold are styled differently as a Ruchaka and Svastika, they differ only so far ; not that the substance gold becomes not-gold. The reason is evident. They do not differ entirely. This will be stated further on.

The Commentator brings forward the example of the Baudha, who holds that the characteristic only is what exists :—'Another says :—It is only the characteristics of the Ruchaka, &c., that are being thus born, which are the realities. There is no such thing as gold which might be looked upon as a substance remaining the same among more changes than one. If there be such a thing as substance which remains constant even though the characteristics are being changed, then that thing would be immutable like the power of consciousness. It would become an independent reality ; independent, that is to say, of the change which is of the very nature of the thing appearing to change. As the power of consciousness does not give up its nature even though the 'qualities' are constantly putting on different appearances, and is therefore independently eternal, so also would gold, &c., become independently eternal. This, however, is not desirable. Therefore the characteristic is not different from the characterized ; the substance is not different from the qualities.'

The Commentator refutes this argument :—'This is no defect. Why ? Because constancy is not found therein.'

We might admit this if we found that as a matter of fact the substance was constant in its so-called eternity like unto the power of consciousness. We, however, do not find this constancy of eternity. On the other hand the whole of this world, to say nothing of one substance only, is seen giving up its individual appearances ; the appearances, that is to say, that are meant to perform certain functions.

How is this ? On account of eternity being denied to them by the authority of reasoning. If a jar of earth did not give up its individuality of appearance, it would plainly be seen as a jar even when it existed in the condition of a half-jar or in that of powdered clay, &c. ; and it would go on performing its function too all the same as before. Hence the three worlds are non-eternal.

Well then let it be non-eternal alone, being practically quite non-existent as it is like the lotus of the sky, on account of its universality and the non-performance of any function. For this reason he says :—'It exists in the case of non-appearance also, because destruction has been denied to it.'

The meaning is that it is not so very insignificant as to be altogether non-eternal and therefore to be classed as non-existent. Why ? Because destruction has been denied to it by reason.

Thus stands the reasoning :—

That which is non-existent is never visible and does not perform any function, as the lotus of the sky.

The three worlds, however, sometime have some functions and are visible.

So are the following causes proving its existence to be mentioned. A thing is seen being born ; characteristic secondary quality and conditions are ever found appearing therein. For this reason they are out of the category of such non-existent things as the lotus of the sky and the horns of a man.

It is not, therefore, constant in its eternity, so that it may be classed with the independent reality of consciousness. On the contrary it is only in a way eternal. This also proves that it is changeful. It is eternal in its change.

By this it must be understood that in a piece of clay exist its effects the states of the jar, &c., which have not yet expressed themselves. Well, let that be. But if it exist even if removed, how is it that it is not perceived as before ? For this reason the Commentator says :—'It becomes subtle on account of conjunctive existence, that is, on account of its merge into the casual state. It becomes unperceivable on account of its subtlety and is not, therefore, perceived.'

Having thus explained the change of characteristic the Commentator now explains the change of secondary qualities also as such secondary qualities.

'The change of secondary qualities, &c.'

The meaning is that each secondary quality is followed by others along with itself. The question is that inasmuch as at the time of conjunction with one secondary quality, the others are not perceived, how can it be said that the others also are present along with it ? For this reason the Commentator says :—'For example, a man who is attached to one woman, &c.' The non-existence of perception does not disprove the existence of anything, proved to exist by other means of knowledge. The birth itself of a thing at different places is a reason for its existence. Nothing that exists not, can be born. As for example, the horn of a man.

The Commentator states a defect suggested by another :—'Others find a fault in this change of secondary quality.' If the past and the present, exist at the time when the present characteristic is in existence in the present, then the three paths of being must overlap one another. If, however, the paths come into being one after the other, then it comes to this that the non-existent comes into existence. This is the meaning.

He refutes the argument :—'This is thus met with, &c.' The existence of the characteristics in the present is only proved by perception. It also gives the knowledge of its existence in the past and in the future as related to the present. It is plain that the non-existing does not come into existence and the existing is not destroyed. He says the same :—'If it were so the mind would not possess, &c.' The mind is found possessing the characteristic of attachment after the time of anger has passed away. If it be that attachment did not exist at the time of anger as capable of manifestation in the future, how could it be born ? And if not born, how could it be perceived ?

It may be so. Even then, however, how is it proved that paths of being do not overlap ? He gives the answer :—'Further the three secondary qualities, &c.' The three secondary qualities are impossible of existence simultaneously. Where ? In one mental modification. In succession, however, one of the qualities does come into manifestation by virtue of its manifesting cause. The ascertainment of the secondary qualities being dependent upon the thing qualified thereby, it is along with the form of the thing qualified that the mind becomes possessed of the qualities. He quotes Pāñchaśikhā Āchārya on this very subject :—'And so it has been said, &c.' This has been explained before. He summarizes :—'Therefore there is, &c.' On account of the contrary characteristics of manifestation and disappearance remaining merged in the cause, the paths of being do not overlap. He gives an illustration :—'For example, attachment to, &c.' The knowledge of the existence of attachment with anger was explained before. Now,

however, is explained the existence of relationship existing between attachment with respect to one object and attachment with reference to another. He applies the illustration to the subject to be illustrated:—'Similar is the case with secondary qualities &c.'

The question is that inasmuch as identity can exist even though the identical object may not be perceived as such altogether, it follows that characteristic, secondary quality and condition being distinct phenomena, the characterized object which is nothing separate from them, should also be considered to be distinct from itself under each and every one of these varying states. He says that this view is not desirable, because it is contradicted by the perception of the identical substance remaining the same under all varying states. 'It is not the characterized object that is possessed of the three paths of being,' because the characteristics which are not distinct from it, are possessed of the three paths of being. The fact of the taking up of the three paths of being of the characteristics is further elucidated:—They are either visible, i. e., essential, present, or latent, that is not *in esse*. These are the past and the future. Of these, visible ones assume different states of strength and weakness, &c., and are termed accordingly differently, because the states are different, not the substance. By the word state are to be understood here all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. This is the meaning. It is only perception as such that establishes the distinction from, or the identity of the characterized object with the characteristic, the secondary quality or the condition. If there were unqualified identity between the characterized object and the characteristic, &c., then characteristics, &c., would no longer be what they are. They would not qualify, characterize and condition, as does not the very substance of the characterized object itself. Nor would they qualify the characterized object in case of unqualified distinction; as the horse and the cow can in no way become the characteristic, secondary quality and condition, each of the other. Perception establishes that the characteristic and the secondary quality are neither totally distinct nor completely identical with the characterized object, and it also shows that the characteristics, &c., have all of them the properties of appearance and disappearance, and that during these changes the object remains the same; and it also shows that the characteristics are not mutually exclusive. This is so perceived by every individual self. We follow this common perception. It is not competent to us to leave that aside and establish some theory of the perception of characteristics which may please ourselves.

The Commentator gives on this very subject an illustration from the world:—'This is in the same way as figure of 1 &c.'

As the nature of unity remains the same, although with reference to its relative position it is styled as hundred, &c., so also the nature of the characterized object remains the same but it is styled differently on account of the differences brought about by the distinctions of distinct characteristics, secondary qualities and conditions. This is the meaning.

He gives another illustration to elucidate the subject to be illustrated:—'Or again a woman, although one, &c.'

In this connection he introduces the discussion of a defect considered as existing in this by others:—'Some make the theory of the change of conditions, &c.'

In the change of condition, i. e., the change of condition, of characteristic and secondary quality all the three, the defect of the imminence, of the independent existence of the characterized, the characteristic, the secondary quality and the condition is pointed out.

He puts the questions:—How? The answer is:—'There being intervals between the operations of the paths of being, &c.' The existence of milk as such in the present is the operation of the yet unmanifested path of being of curds. When on account of being

intercepted thereby, the characteristic of changing into curds does not operate notwithstanding its presence in milk, then it is said to be yet unmanifested. When it does come into manifestation, it is said to be in present operation. When having achieved the change, it ceases from the operation of setting in the formation of curds, &c., then it is said to exist in the past. Thus the characterized, the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition existing as they do all of them in all the three times, must be recognized as independent existences. Eternity is but existence for ever. Further, there being existence for ever, all the four are never born. And this much and no more is the description of independent eternity (Kūṭastha nityatā). The meaning is that the independent eternity of the power of consciousness too has no other speciality.

He refutes the argument:—'This is no defect.' Why? On account of the variety due to the inter-action of the 'qualities' even in the case of the qualified being permanent. Inter-action means the relation of overpowering and being overpowered by each other. The variety is of the inter-action. This is the meaning. Although the qualified and the qualities, all the four always exist, the eternity does not consist in being independent of phenomenal changes, because the nature of their change consists in the appearance and disappearance of their modifications, which modifications although brought about by the variety of the inter-action of the qualities, are of the very being of the thing modified.

The power of consciousness, however, does not put forth any such modifications of its own being as periodical appearance and disappearance. Its eternity, therefore, is independent of phenomenal change. As they say:—'He whose nature is not destroyed, the wise call constant in eternity.'

Now he shows that the variety of inter-action is the cause of the variety of modification in the substratum (Prakṛiti) and the Vikāras, the phenomena thereof. As the coming together, which may be described as the change into Prithvī, &c., has a beginning and is destructive, that is a disappearing characteristic only of sound, &c., i. e., of the five tanmātras of sound, touch, form, taste and smell, which in relation to their effects are indestructible, i. e., do not pass into latency.

He shows the same in the case of Prakṛiti:—'So also the undifferentiated phenomenal state of matter, &c.' That is termed a product. Not however subject to such changes is the power of consciousness. This is the substance.

Having illustrated the Prakṛiti and the product (Vikṛiti), which are proved by philosophers, he now takes an illustration from the product itself well known in the world, in order to show the variety due to the inter-action of the qualities which is the cause of the changes of the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition: 'Here is an illustration of this connection, &c.'

It is not necessary that there should be change of condition in the case of secondary qualities only. The characteristic, the secondary quality and the condition are all implied here by the word condition (avastha) in the text. All, therefore, is a change of conditions. For this reason he says:—'Another characteristic taken up by an object, &c.'

He gives the definition of Change (Pariṣāma), which covers the whole connotation of the word:—'Change is the assumption by an existing object, &c.'—13.

Sūtra 14.

शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी ॥१४॥

शान्त Śānta, to the latent. उदित Udita, to the rising. अव्यपदेश्य Avyapadēśya, the unpredicable. धर्म, Dharma, characteristics. अनुपाती Anupāti, common, closely following. धर्मी Dharmī, the object characterised.

14. "The object characterized" is that which is common to the latent, the rising and unpredictable characteristics.—120.

तत्र । शान्तादिताप्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी । येन्यतावच्छिन्ना धर्मिणः शक्तिरेव धर्मः स च फलप्रसवभेदानुमितसद्भाव एकस्यान्योऽन्यस्यान्यश्च परिदृष्टः । तत्र वर्तमानः स्वव्यापारमनुभवन्धर्मी धर्मान्तरेभ्यः शान्तेभ्यश्चाप्यपदेश्येभ्यश्च भिद्यते । यदा तु सामान्येन समन्यागता भवति तदा धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रत्वात्कोऽसौ केन भिद्येत । तत्र ये खलु धर्मिणो धर्माः शान्ता उदिता अव्यपदेश्याश्चेति । तत्र शान्ता ये कृत्वा व्यापारानुपरताः सव्यापार उदितास्ते चानागतस्य लक्षणस्य समनन्तरा वर्तमानस्यानन्तरा अतीताः । कर्मधर्मतीतस्यानन्तरा न भवन्ति वर्तमानाः पूर्वपश्चिमताया अभावात् । यथानागतवर्तमानयोः पूर्वपश्चिमता नैवमतीतस्य तस्मान्नातीतस्यास्ति समनन्तरः । तस्मादनागत एव समनन्तरो भवति वर्तमानस्येति । अथाव्यपदेश्याः के सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । यत्रोक्तम् । जलभूम्योः परिणामिकं रसादिवैश्वरूप्यं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम् । तथा स्थावराणां जङ्गमेषु जङ्गमानां स्थावरेष्वित्येवं जात्यनुच्छेदेन सर्वं सर्वात्मकमिति । देशकालाकारनिमित्तोपबन्धात् । न खलु समानकालमात्मनामभिव्यक्तिरिति । य एतेष्वभिव्यक्तानभिव्यक्तेषु धर्मेष्वनुपाती सामान्यविशेषात्मा सोऽन्वयी धर्मी । यस्य तु धर्ममात्रमेवेदं निरन्वयं तस्य भोगाभावः । कस्मादन्येन विज्ञानेन कृतस्य कर्मणोऽन्यत्कथं भोक्तृत्वेनाधिक्रियेत । तत्स्मृत्यभावश्च नान्यदृष्टस्य स्मरणमन्यस्यास्तीति वस्तुप्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च स्थितोऽन्वयी धर्मी यो धर्मान्यथात्वमभ्युपगतः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । तस्मान्नेदं धर्ममात्रं निरन्वयमिति ॥ १४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Characteristic is the virtue (or power) of an object differentiated by fitness. The existence of this fit and proper virtue of an object is inferred by the production of specific results thereof, as found to be of one sort in one and of another sort in another (object). Of these characteristics the present is that which is showing itself in operation ; and it differentiates between those that have become latent and those that are unpredictable yet. When, however, it coincides with the generic quality common to all these states, then it becomes of the very nature of the object alone ; then what is it in itself, and by what does it differ ?

Now of the characteristics of an object that are either latent, rising or unpredictable, the latent are those that have been in operation and ceased. The rising characteristics are those that are in operation. They are immediate postcedents of the yet unmanifested secondary quality. Those that have passed are the postcedents of the present ones. Why are not the present ones the immediate consequents of the past ? On account of the absence of the relation of antecedence and postcedence (between the two). As the relation of antecedence and postcedence exists between the present and the future, not so between it and the past. It is not, therefore, the

immediate antecedent of the past. For this reason it is only the yet unmanifested that is the antecedent of the present.

What then are the unpredictable ? All are of the nature of all. With regard to this it has been said :—The variety of all forms of juice, &c., due to the changes of earth and water, is seen in stationary objects. So also of the stationary in the self-moving and of the self-moving in the stationary. Thus all is of the nature of all without the destruction of species. This is subject to the limitations of time, space, form and disposing cause. Their natures certainly do not manifest simultaneously.

'The characterized object' is that constant nature thereof which remains common to all these manifested and unmanifested characteristics and which is the substratum of both the generic and the specific. In the case of him, however, to whom this is a characteristic only without a substratum, there must be absence of experience. How is it possible to adopt one cognition as the enjoyer of the action done by another ? Further there would be no memory thereof, because no one can remember what has been seen by another. Further a substratum common to changing states does exist, because objects are called back to memory and recognized as such. It is this constant substratum that is identified as such even when it has taken up a different characteristic. For this reason it is not a mere characteristic, not common to different states.—120.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The word 'characteristics' is used here to denote characteristic, secondary quality and condition, because that is the basic quality. The Commentator describes the characterized object which is subject to this three-fold change, by the aphorism :—"The 'characterized object' is that which is common to the latent, the rising and the unpredictable characteristics." The characterized object is that which is possessed of a characteristic. It is not possible of being known without the characteristic being known. He explains the characteristic :—"Differentiated by fitness, &c." The characteristic is the virtue of a substance, such as clay, &c. That is the power of its producing a powder, a kneaded lump, a jar, &c. All these exist therein in a state of latency (non-manifestation).

If the characteristics exist in a state of latency in an object, they have to manifest themselves. But they do not manifest without the help of such adjuncts as water, &c. Water, &c., do not however exist in the causal states of the objects that are produced. Whence then do they come ? For this reason he says :—"Differentiated by fitness. The power producing jars, &c., is differentiated by the fitness (capacity) of being dependent for action upon the action of water, &c. Hence jars, &c., derive the capacity of being helped into manifestation by water, &c., from their causes themselves. They are not accidental. This is the meaning.

Or, it might be that the words, "characterized by fitness" are an answer to the question. 'What is a characteristic ?' It is the virtue (power) of an object. The

meaning is that it is their fitness alone that is the characteristic. Hence it is proved that the characterized object is what is possessed of that. He mentions authority for its existence :—'The existence of this fit and proper virtue of an object is inferred by the production of specific results thereof, as found to be this or that, that is, the different appearances as powder, kneaded lump, a jar, &c. The meaning is that it is seen to be distinct in different objects by the observation of its effects, and the difference that is apparent in its effects. 'Found' means observed.

He now describes how a lump of kneaded clay which is perceived as existing in the present, differs from the state of its existence as powder which has now become latent and the state of its existence as a jar which is yet unpredictable :—'Of these characteristics the present is that, &c.' The meaning is that if they did not differ, the operations of the powder and the jar would also become similar to those of the kneaded lump, and overlapping be the result.

He now says that the distinction described is not possible in the case of a lump which is yet in the state of latency :—'When however it coincides with the generic quality, &c.' What is it in itself and by what distinguishing trait should it differ ?

Having thus described the distinguishing traits of characteristics, he now divides them :—'Now of these characteristics of an object, &c.'

The rising characteristics are those that exist in the present.

Now he explains the antecedence and postcedence of the pathways of being :—'They are the immediate postcedents, &c.' He asks the reason :—Why are not the present ones the immediate consequents of the past ? He states the reason :—On account of the absence of the relation of antecedence and postcedence between the two. He explains the non-perception of a thing by the object in which it exists :—He also shows the non-perception of the existence by being the opposite of the perception thereof :—'As the relation of antecedents and postcedence between the yet-unmanifested and the present, &c.' He summarizes :—For this reason the yet-unmanifested is the only immediate antecedent of the present, because the yet-unmanifested precedes the present. The past cannot be the antecedent of the present. The present precedes the past and is therefore its antecedent, not unpredictable of it. Hence is it established that the past is the least important of the pathways of being.

Well, let that be. It is possible to distinguish the present and the past as being and having been perceived respectively. The unpredictable characteristics, however, from the very fact of their being unpredictable, are incapable of being distinguished. With this in mind he puts the question :—'What are then the unpredicables ? And in what objects are we to examine them ?' He answers the question :—'All are of the nature of all.' With regard to this it has been said :—(He establishes the same). 'The variety of all forms of juice, &c., due to the changes of earth and water, &c.' The liquid is possessed of the soniferous, tangiferous, luminiferous and gustiferous ultimate atoms. The earth (solid) is possessed of the soniferous, the tangiferous, the luminiferous, the gustiferous and the odoriferous ultimate atoms. A modification of all these is seen in the variety of all the forms of juice, &c., found in the roots, fruits, flowers, leaves, &c., of tree, creeper and cane-plant, &c. All these cannot be the modifications either of the solids or of the liquids different in nature from themselves. It has of course been shown that nothing can come out of nothing.

Similarly the modifications of unmoving objects are seen in moving objects in the shape of a variety of chyle, &c. It is of course the use of these fruits, &c., that brings about the wealth of the variety of forms, &c.

Similarly is seen the modification of animals into plants. It is well-known that pomegranates become as big as the fruits of Tāla by obtaining a suck of blood.

He concludes :—'Thus all is of the nature of all, &c.' Thus all, i.e., liquid and solid, &c., is of the nature of all, i.e., juice, &c. He gives the reason thereof :—'Without destruction of species.' The liquidity and solidity (earthiness), the generic qualities of these, are recognized as existing everywhere, and they are not therefore destroyed.

Well, but if all this is of the nature of all, then everything being present everywhere always and in all possible modes, even those results which do not exist simultaneously should manifest at once. For certainly, when all the necessary causes of an effect are present, it would not delay in its appearance. For this reason he says :—This is subject to the limitations of time, space, &c. Although everything can of course become the cause of everything, yet the operation of the cause is limited by space. Thus Kāsmīra (Cashmere) being the country of saffron, it will not grow in the Pāñchāla country, even though the other causes of its growth were all present there. Hence saffron does not grow in the Pāñchāla and other countries.

Similarly there are no rains in the summer season ; therefore no growth of rice is possible in that season. Similarly a deer does not give birth to a man ; the form of man cannot arise out of that of a deer. Similarly, a man who is not virtuous, does not enjoy the nature of pleasure ; the disposing cause of virtue does not operate in him. Therefore it is that on account of the limitations of space, time, form and disposing cause, the nature, i.e., existing objects, are not produced simultaneously.

Having thus divided the characteristics, he now describes the substratum as being common to all these states :—'The characterized object is that common, &c.' The generic is the nature of the characterized, the substratum ; and the specific is the characteristic. The substratum is of the nature of both these. This is the meaning.

Having shown that the substratum, the characterized object, appearing in all the states thereof, is proved by direct knowledge, he now calls to mind the undesirable consequences of the theory of the Vaiṣṭhika philosophers, who say that no independent substratum exists, and that the mind is but a momentary act of cognition :—'In the case however, &c.'

Further the object is called back to memory and recognized as such. Yajñādatta does not call back to mind what has been seen by Devadatta. For this reason whoever has been the seer must be the recogniser.—14.

Sūtra 15.

क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः ॥१५॥

क्रम Krama, of succession. अन्यत्वे Anyatvam, the distinctness. परिणाम Pariṇāma, of modifications. अन्यत्वे Anyatve, for the distinctness. हेतुः Hetuḥ, the reason.

15. The distinctness of succession is the reason for the distinctness of modifications.—121.

क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुः । एकस्य धर्मिण एक एव परिणाम इति प्रसक्तोः क्रमान्यत्वं परिणामान्यत्वे हेतुर्भवतीति । तद्यथा चूर्णमृत्पिण्डमृद्घटमृत्कणमृदिति च क्रमः । यो यस्य धर्मस्य समनन्तरो धर्मः स तस्य क्रमः । पिण्डः प्रच्यवते घट उपजायत इति धर्मपरिणामक्रमः । लक्षणपरिणामक्रमो घटस्यानागतभावाद्वर्तमानभावः क्रमः । तथा पिण्डस्य वर्तमानभावादतीतभावः क्रमो नातीतस्यास्ति क्रमः । कसात्पूर्वपरतायां सत्यां समनन्तरत्वं सा तु नास्त्यतीतस्य तस्माद् द्वयेरेव लक्षणयोः क्रमः । तथावस्थापरिणाम-क्रमोऽपि घटस्याभिनवस्य प्रान्ते पुराणता दृश्यते । सा च क्षणपरम्परानुपातिना क्रमेण-भिन्न्यमाना परां व्यक्तिमापद्यत इति । धर्मलक्षणाभ्यां च विशिष्टोऽयं तृतीयः परिणाम

इति । त एते क्रमा धर्मधर्मिभेदे सति प्रतिबन्धस्वरूपाः । धर्मोऽपि धर्मी भवत्यन्यधर्मस्वरूपापेक्षयेति । यदा तु परमार्थतो धर्मिणोऽभेदोपचारस्तद्द्वारेण स एवाभिधीयते धर्मस्तदायमेकत्वेनैव क्रमः प्रत्यवभासते । चित्तस्य द्वये धर्माः परिदृष्टाश्चापरिदृष्टाश्च । तत्र प्रत्ययात्मकाः परिदृष्टा वस्तु मात्रात्मका अपरिदृष्टास्ते च सत्तैव भवन्त्यनुमानेन प्रापितवस्तुमात्रसद्भावाः । निरोधधर्मसंस्काराः परिणामोऽथ जीवनम् । चैशक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मादर्शनवर्जिता इति ॥ अतो योगिन उपात्तसर्वसाधनस्य बुभुत्सितार्थप्रतिपत्तये संयमस्य विषय उपक्षिप्यते ॥ १५ ॥

VYĀSA.

It then coming to this that there can be but one modification for one substratum, it is said that the distinctness of succession becomes the cause of the distinctness of modifications. This takes place as follows:—The order of causation is : the clay as powder, the clay kneaded into a lump, the clay appearing as a jar, the clay appearing as a half-jar, the clay appearing as a potsherd.

The succession of a characteristic is that characteristic, which comes before it immediately. The kneaded lump of clay disappears and the jar appears in close sequence. This is the order of the sequence of the changes of the characteristic. The order of the change of secondary qualities is the sequential appearance of the present state of a jar out of its yet-unmanifested state of existence. Similarly is there a succession for the passing into its past state, of the present state of the kneaded lump of clay. There is no succession for the past. Why? Immediate sequence exists only where there is a relation of antecedence and postcedence. That does not exist in the case of the past. Hence succession exists in the case of two secondary qualities only.

Such is also the succession in the case of the change of condition. A new jar begins to become old in immediate sequence of its appearance as a new one. This oldness is found being manifested in succession which follows the sequence of the moments of time, until it reaches the last stage. And this third change is distinct from the changes of characteristic and secondary quality. All these successions find their being in the conception of there being a distinction between the characteristic and the characterized object, because the characteristic also becomes sometimes the characterized, in its relation to the nature of another characteristic.

When, however, the characterized object is spoken of as being what it really is, as not distinct from the characteristic, then by virtue of that conception, the object itself is described as a characteristic; and then the succession appears to be one only.

The characteristics of the mind are two-fold, the conscious (or patent Paridṛṣṭa) and the unconscious (or latent, A-paridṛṣṭa). Of these the patent are those that appear in consciousness as notions. The latent are those that are but the substance itself. They are seven only and it is by inference that their existence itself has been established. 'Suppression, characterization, potentialization, constant change, physical life, movements, power are the characteristics of the mind, besides consciousness.'

Hereafter is introduced the subject of Samyama to be performed by a Yogī with the object of obtaining the knowledge of any desirable subject, when he has mastered all the means of obtaining knowledge as described. -121.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'The distinctness of succession is the reason for distinctness of modifications.' Is one substratum subject only to one change, which may be described as characteristic, secondary quality, or condition, as the case may be? Or, are the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition more than one? What does it come to then? It comes to this that the change must be one because the substratum is one. A cause which has but one form, cannot produce a variety of effects, because the variety in that case would be causeless.

This being the suggestion, it is said:—Distinct changes are posited, because the orders of succession are different.

Observers of the world have plainly observed that an order obtains in the succession of the changes of one clay into dust, kneaded lump, jar, half-jar and sherds. It is also seen that the sequence between powdered clay and kneaded lump is independent of the sequence between kneaded clay and jar: the sequence between a jar and a half-jar is quite another. The sequence between a half-jar and pot-sherds is again quite different. In each of these one of the elements precedes another. The difference of order existing in one succession of changes establishes the distinctness of the changes. Although the substratum of clay is one, it puts on a succession of changes, whose order is established by allied characteristics appearing in succession to each other in due order. The appearance is not, therefore, causeless. This is the meaning.

As is the case with the changes of characteristics, so also is the distinctness of the succession the reason for the distinctness of the changes of secondary qualities and the changes of condition.

The same is illuminated by the Commentary:—'It comes to this that there can be but one modification for one substratum, &c.'

'The succession of characteristic, &c.' :—The word 'succession' is used here to denote that which succeeds, looking upon the one to be nothing distinct from the other.

'Such is also the succession in the case of the change of condition.' And so it happens that the barley grain, even though kept with great care by a cultivator in a grain-pit is, on the lapse of a large number of years, reduced to a condition, such that the cohesion of its particles gives way to the mere touch of hand, i.e., of being reduced to an atomic condition. This is not possible to take place all at once causelessly in the case of new grain. It is, therefore, by a succession of different states appearing one after the other in moments of time as being small, smaller and smallest on the one side, and large, larger and largest on the other, that the specific condition appears.

This distinctness of succession exists only in the case of distinctness being conceived as between the characteristic and the substratum. So he says :— 'All these successions find their being, &c.'

The state of the characterized and the characteristic are relative down from the undifferentiated phenomenal to the products, and *vice versa*, inasmuch as the solids, clay, etc., are also characteristics in correlation with the ultimate atoms (the *tanmātras*, or divine measures). So he says :— 'The characteristic also sometimes becomes the characterized object in relation to the nature of another characteristic.'

When, however, the conception of the unity of the substratum and the characteristic is entertained with reference to the real substratum, the noumenal, *i.e.*, when 'by virtue of that conception,' of the substratum being common to all its states, the characterized object itself is considered as the characteristic, then there is but one change, the change, that is to say, of the characterized object alone. Characteristic, secondary quality and condition enter then into the very being of the characterized.

It is to be considered as having been said by this that the substratum is far removed from the state of constant independent eternity (*Kūṭastha nityatā*).

Speaking of the change of characteristic, the Commentator takes up in the context, the distinctions of the modality of the characteristics of the mind :— 'The characteristics of the mind, &c.'

The conscious (patent) characteristics are those that come into our consciousness, of which we are conscious. The latent are those of which we have no direct knowledge. Those that appear, in consciousness as notions are the real cognitions, &c. Suppression, etc., are those that are but the substance itself. This explains that they are not of the nature of illumination.

Well, but if characteristics are latent, they certainly do not exist at all. For this reason he says :— 'And it is by inference that their existence as substance itself is established.' The knowledge that comes through authority is also spoken of here as inference by the similarity of their coming into existence after other knowledge. He mentions the seven characteristics by a verse :— 'Suppression, &c.'

Suppression is the ultra-cognitive state of mental modifications. It is known by authority as well as by inference to be a state of residual potency.

By the word 'characterization' the author suggests virtue and vice. The reading in some places is 'Karma' (action) instead of 'Dharma' (characterization). There too virtue and vice caused by action are to be understood. Virtuous and vicious tendencies of the mind (or, which is the same thing, good and bad character) are known by authority or inferred by the existence of pleasure and pain.

Potentialization or the power which generates mental potencies, is inferred by memory.

Similarly is the constant change of the mind in evolution inferred from the fact of the mind being made up of the three 'qualities' and of the function of the qualities being changeful.

Similarly physical life, the specific action of the mind which sustains physical life, is inferred as a characteristic of the unconscious mind by expiration and inspiration.

Similarly are the movements of the mind, *i.e.*, the acts which set the different organs and parts of the body into motion, inferred by these very movements following thought in that direction.

Similarly is power the subtle state of all the effects of thought which manifest in action (It is the idea of all actions). That this also as a characteristic of the mind, is inferred by seeing the gross appearances due to the mental images thereof.—15.

Sūtra 16.

परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम् ॥१६॥

परिणाम-त्रयं Pariṇāma-traya, the three fold change. संयमात् Samyamāt by Samyama over. अतीत Atīta, of the past. अनागत Anāgata, of the future. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, knowledge.

16. By *Samyama* over the three-fold change, comes the knowledge of the past and the future.—122.

परिणामत्रयसंयमादतीतानागतज्ञानम् । धर्मलक्षणवस्थापरिणामेषु संयमाद्योगिनां भवत्यतीतानागतज्ञानम् । धारणाध्यानसमाधित्रयमेकत्र संयम उक्तस्तेन परिणामत्रयं साक्षात्क्रियमाणमतीतानागतज्ञानं तेषु सम्पादयति ॥ १६ ॥

VYĀSA.

By *Samyama* over the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition, comes to the Yogis the knowledge of the past and the future. The triad of concentration, meditation and trance together has been termed *Samyama*. When direct knowledge of the three-fold change is obtained by means of *Samyama*, knowledge of their past and present is obtained.—122.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Henceforward up to the end of the chapter, the objects of *Samyama* and the attainments which indicate mastery over them, are discussed. Of these, the first object of the *Samyama* of a Yogi, familiar with all the accessories of Yoga, that is introduced, is the triad of changes itself, whose modality has already been described :— 'By *Samyama* over the three-fold changes, comes the knowledge of the past and the future.'

The question is that inasmuch as direct knowledge is obtained only of the object with reference to which *samyama* is performed, how is it that the *Samyama* on the triad of changes will become the cause of the direct knowledge of the past and the future? For this reason the Commentator says :— When direct knowledge of the three-fold change has been obtained by means of *Samyama*, the knowledge of the past and the future, having as they do the relation of co-existence with these changes, is also brought about. The direct knowledge of the triad of changes itself, is the direct knowledge of the past and the present which it comprehends. The very essence of the one being the essence of the other, the object of *Samyama* and direct knowledge are not different (in the aphorism). This is the meaning.—16.

Sūtra 17.

शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात्सङ्करस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात्सर्वभूतकतज्ञानम् ॥१७॥

शब्द Śabda, the word. अर्थे Artha, the meaning, the object. प्रत्यय Pratyaya the idea of all these. इतरेतर Itaretara, of each with the other. अध्यासात् Adhyāsāt, because of the coinciding. सङ्करः Saṅkaraḥ, becoming one, appearing as one. तत् Tat, their. प्रविभाग Pravibhāga, distinctions. संयमात् Samyamāt, by *Samyama* over. सर्वे Sarva, all. भूत Bhūta, of living being. रता Ruta, of the sounds. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, knowledge.

17. The word, the object and the idea appear as one, because each coincides with the other ; by Saṃyama over their distinctions comes the knowledge of the sounds of all-living-beings.—123.

शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानामितरेतराध्यासात्सङ्करस्तत्प्रविभागसंयमात्सर्वभूतस्तज्ञानम् । तत्र वाग्वर्णेष्वेवार्थवती । श्रोत्रं च ध्वनिपरिणाममात्रविषयम् । पदं पुनर्नादानुसंहारबुद्धि-निर्ग्राह्यमिति । वर्णा एकसमयासम्भित्वात्परनिरनुग्रहात्मानस्ते पदमसंपृश्यानुप-स्थाप्याविभूतास्तिरोभूताश्चेति प्रत्येकमपदस्वरूपा उच्यन्ते । वर्णः पुनरैकैकः पदात्मा सर्वाभिधानशक्तिप्रचितः सहकारिवर्णान्तरप्रतियोगित्वाद्द्वैश्वरूप्यमिवापन्नः । पूर्वश्चेत्तरे-णात्तरश्च पूर्वेषु विशेषेऽवस्थापित इत्येवं बहवो वर्णाः क्रमानुरोधिनोऽर्थसङ्केतेनावच्छिन्ना इयं त एते सर्वाभिधानशक्तिपरिवृत्ता गकारौकारविसर्जनीयाः सास्नादिमन्तमर्थं द्योत-यन्तीति । तदेतेषामर्थसङ्केतेनावच्छिन्नानामुपसंहृतध्वनीकमाणां य एको बुद्धिनिर्भा-सस्तत्पदं वाचकं वाच्यस्य सङ्केत्यते । तदेकं पदमेकबुद्धिविषयमेकप्रयत्नाक्षिप्तमभागम-क्रममवर्णं बौद्धमन्त्यवर्णप्रत्ययव्यापारोपस्थापितं परत्र प्रतिपिपादयिषया वर्णैरेवाभिधी-यमानैश्चार्थमाणैः श्रयमाणैश्च श्रोत्रभिरनादिवाग्व्यवहारवासनानुबिद्धया लोकबुद्ध्या सिद्धवत्संप्रतिपत्त्या प्रतीयते तस्य सङ्केतबुद्धितः प्रविभागः । एतावतामेवं जातीयको-ऽनुसंहार एतत्पार्थस्य वाचक इति । सङ्केतस्तु पदपदार्थयोरितरेतराध्यासरूपः स्मृत्या-त्मकः । योज्यं शब्दः सोऽयमर्थो योज्यमर्थः सोऽयं शब्द इत्येवमितरेतराध्यासरूपः सङ्केतो भवतीति । एवमेते शब्दार्थप्रत्यया इतरेतराध्यासात्सङ्कीर्णाः । तद्यथा गौरिति-शब्दो गौरित्यर्थो गौरिति ज्ञानं य एषां प्रविभागज्ञः स सर्ववित् । सर्वपदेषु चास्ति वाक्यशक्तिर्दृक् इत्युक्तेऽस्तीति गम्यते न सत्तां पदार्थो व्यभिचरतीति । तथा नह्यसाधना क्रियास्तीति । तथा च पचतीत्युक्ते सर्वकारकाणामाक्षेपो नियमार्थोऽनुवादः कर्तृकरण-कर्मणां चैत्राश्रितण्डुलानामिति । दृष्टं च वाक्यार्थं पदरचनं श्रोत्रियंश्छन्दोऽधीते । जीवति प्राणान्धारयति । तत्र वाक्ये पदपदार्थाभिव्यक्तिस्ततः पदं प्रविभज्य व्याकरणीयं क्रियावाचकं वा कारकवाचकं वा । अन्यथा भवत्यश्वोऽजापय इत्येवमादिषु नामाख्यात-सारूप्यादनिर्ज्ञातं कथं क्रियायां कारके वा व्याक्रियेतेति । तेषां शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानां प्रविभागः । तद्यथा श्वेतः प्रासाद इति क्रियार्थः श्वेतः प्रासाद इति कारकार्थः शब्दः क्रियाकारकात्मा तदर्थः प्रत्ययश्च । कस्मात् । सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धादेकाकार एव प्रत्ययः सङ्केत इति । यस्तु श्वेतोऽर्थः स शब्दप्रत्यययोरालम्बनीभूतः स हि स्वाभिर-वस्थाभिविक्रियमाणो न शब्दसहगतो न बुद्धिसहगतः । एवं शब्द एवं प्रत्ययो नेतरेतर-सहगत इत्यन्यथार्थोऽन्यथाशब्दोऽन्यथा प्रत्यय इति विभागः । एवं तत्प्रविभागसंयमा-द्योगिनः सर्वभूतस्तज्ञानं सम्पद्यत इति ॥ १७ ॥

VYĀSA.

Now the power of speech functions in the manifestation of literal sounds only. The auditory power is the substratum for the changes of sound alone. A word, however, is taken in by the will-to-know (buddhi),

understanding) all at once, having taken up a unified appearance just as the last literal sound ceases. Literal sounds, from the impossibility of being expressed simultaneously, have not the nature of giving support to each other. They appear and disappear showing no connection with the particular word, nor bringing it into consciousness. It is, therefore, said that each of them is not the word (itself).

The letter, however, is singly a constituent of the word ; it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects ; it is, as it were, of universal application, inasmuch as it appears in combination with every conjoined letter, it takes different places in different combinations, sometimes being placed before and sometimes after another letter. Thus there are many literal sounds, which being placed in different orders, help in denoting, by convention, certain different sounds according to the difference in the order of their positions. For example, the literal sound of g, au, and h, possessed as they are of the potentiality of giving names to all objects, denote in this particular order (gauh) the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c., (a cow).

A word is that single manifestation of consciousness, which appears just as the succession of literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning ceases ; it is a conventional sign for the thing signified.

Thus a single word is perceived as a single manifestation of consciousness ; it is brought into existence by a single effort ; it has no parts and no order ; it is not a whole of separate and distinct literal sounds. It is a phenomenon of the will-to-be (buddhi) ; it is brought into consciousness by the operation of the notion of the last literal sound ; it is understood by the mind of the world, as having come into existence by conjunction (of letters) on account of the eternal habit brought about by its ever having been with the help of literal sounds, separately named, uttered and heard, that the power of speech has functioned for the purpose of transferring the complete verbal thought signs from one mind to another. (And this being so), the ordinary mind distinguishes a word from another by conventional meaning, saying that such and such a succession of so many letters, so ending, denotes such and such an object.

Convention, however, is a manifestation of memory showing the mutual correlation of word and meaning, in the shape of coincidence. 'This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object'—such is the convention showing the one correlated to the other.

Thus do word, meaning and idea run into each other on account of mutual correlation of coincidence. Take, for example, the word cow

the object cow and the idea cow. Whoever knows their distinction knows all.

And in all words lies the power of a sentence. If you say "A tree," the word 'is' is understood, inasmuch as the object signified by a word never fails of existence.

Similarly no action is possible without its means. Thus on pronouncing the word 'cooks,' all the appliances necessary for the act of cooking are meant to be understood. It is only for the purpose of specialization that the object, the subject and the instrument such as Chaitra, fire and rice are expressly mentioned.

Then is also seen the combination of words in sentences for expressing meanings by the entire sentences. 'The Vedic student reads the hymns, lives, bears life.' In a sentence like this the words and the meanings of words are both expressed in consciousness. Hence should words be etymologically divided as expressing actions or nominal cases. Otherwise how would it be possible to construe a word, a noun or a verb, when one cannot be known from the other on account of external similarity. For example, take the words Bhavati, Aśvah, Ajapâyāh.

The words, the meaning and the idea of the sentence are distinct from each other. Thus *svetate prāsādah* (The mansion shines white) means an action. The words *svetah prāsādah* (A white mansion), signify a noun.

Both forms of speech denote both a noun and an affirmation of an action and also the meaning and the idea thereof. How? By the correlation, 'this is that.' The notion puts on but one appearance, the same as the conventional sign. As to the white object, it is the support for both the word and the idea. It changes its state, but goes neither with the word nor with the idea. Such is a word and such an idea; none goes with the other. Another is a word, another its meaning and another the idea. By performing Samyama in this way on their mutual distinction, a Yogi obtains knowledge of the sounds of all living beings.—123.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS

This is another subject for Samyama, here discussed:—'The word, the object and the idea appear as one, because each coincides with the other; by Samyama on their distinctions comes knowledge of the sounds of all living beings.'

Here with the object of explaining the sound (verbal) which denotes a meaning, the commentator first mentions the province of the operation of the power of speech (VĀK). Now the power of speech, Vāk, manifests literal sounds in eight places. As it is said:—'There are eight seats of literal sounds, the chest, the throat, and the head, and also the root of the tongue, the teeth, the nose, the lips and the palate.'

This VĀK, the power of speech, is purposed to operate in literal sounds only, such as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world. It does not operate to express the sign as such of a thing signified. This is the meaning.

He ascertains the sphere of the operation of the power of hearing:—The auditory power, again, operates to change itself into the particular form of a literal sound, which is a distinct modification of the manifested inarticulate sound striking against the organs of speech. Its operation is limited to that much; it does not as such signify the thing signified. This is the meaning.

He distinguishes the verbal sign signifying an object as such, from literal sounds as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world:—'A word, however, (that is to say, the sign signifying a thing) is taken by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, just as the last literal sound disappears.' Each of the literal sounds is first taken in according as the sounds are familiar to the world; and after they have been taken into the mind, they are brought together into a single manifestation of consciousness, and thus as a sign signifying an object it is taken in by the understanding all at once. The single verbal sound 'cow' is a word, and is taken in as such by the understanding. Although each of the preceding sounds of component letters tends to bring into the field of consciousness the sound of the whole verbal sign, yet until the last literal sound is added to the sound-image that is being formed, the whole is not made distinct and clear. When the last literal cognition has, however, come into operation, the entire sound-image constituting the word becomes clear. For this reason it is said that 'a word is taken in by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, just as the last literal sound ceases.'

'Literal sounds from the impossibility, &c.' This is said in reply to him who does not recognize on account of the distinctions obtaining among the different classes of letters, that words are taken in as entire single concepts all at once, but establishes on the contrary that the letters themselves singly have the power of signifying the object.

It may be in one of two ways that the literal sounds may generate the mental impression of the signified object as each is being pronounced as a part of a complete word. They may carry the capacity of signifying the object, each of them, either as pegs which give support to a basket hung therefrom; (Thus whenever the peg goes, the basket would go too) or, they may give support to the meaning as several stones placed together and made into a platform give support to a stool.

The first theory does not hold. The pronouncement of one letter only does not carry the object to the mind, for if it did, the uttering of the other letters would be quite useless. When a work has been completed, the employment of an effort for its achievement, such as is not calculated to give the completed work any extra quality, would take the effort out of the category of the means of achievement.

If this does not hold, the other remains. It is certainly possible in this case, as was not possible in the case of many pegs placed separately, that stones placed together to make a single platform should hold a stool, because in this case the capacity of giving support to the stool is being employed at one and the same time. Letters, however, cannot all be pronounced simultaneously, and for this reason they cannot carry the meaning to the mind even when brought together, because each of them does not take after the other, and the pronouncement of the one does not suggest the other. They do not attach to the form of one word only as if they were of its very nature. They, therefore, do not suggest the word, as each is being pronounced and passing into latency. Each maintains itself in separate and independent existence like a rod of steel. It is, therefore, said that each of them is not of the nature of a word.

Inasmuch as this defect would not arise, if the letters forming parts of a word constituted as such the word itself, he says:—'Each letter, however, singly is a necessary constituent of a word: it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects.' All the potentialities of making all names are present in it. Thus the letter, G, is found to

exist in the words GAU, GANA, GAURA, NAGA, etc., which signify different objects (a cow and others respectively). It has, therefore, the potency of supplying names for each and all of these objects. Similarly is the letter, O, found in the words, SOMA, ŚOCHI, etc., which means God and other things, and that too has, therefore, the capacity of naming all these objects. Similarly should it be understood everywhere else. Each of these letters G, etc., appears in combination with, *i. e.*, in contact with other conjoined letters, such as, O, etc. On account of there being such contact, it becomes, as it were, of universal application, *i. e.*, each of these letters becomes, as it were many, and does not remain, as it is, one only. It does not of course, actually become many. Therefore the words, 'as it were,' have been added. The letter, of course, remains the same.

The letter, G, placed before and the letter, O, placed thereafter distinguish the consequent sonorous impression from the words GANA, etc. Similarly does the letter, O, placed after G, distinguish it from the words ŚOCHI, etc. A specific sonorous impression is thus established in the mind as the succession of literal sounds appearing in the word ceases. This specific mental impression is the single image of the word, GAU, as manifested in the mind (sphota). It is this sonorous image that denotes the specific quality of the species COW.

This is the meaning. It is impossible that the notion of an object be caused by literal sounds on account of there being a fixed order of their succession in a word: because they do not come into existence simultaneously. Nor is it proper to hold that notwithstanding the order of the succession of literal sounds in a word being fixed they come together to manifest the notion of an object by the operation of their residual potencies, in the same way as there is absence of antecedence and postcedence in the purificatory potencies brought about by oblations of combustibles, etc.; or in the same way as the heavenly state of existence is brought about. This is so, because option is inadmissible.

Knowledge of an object is not, therefore, caused by literal sounds. It is necessary that there should be perception of a single word as the means of calling it forth.

This, however, is not the case with a word. A word is expressed by sounds which differ from each other in the effort which is put forth in pronouncing them (prayatna). These constituent sounds which go to form this and that word, each differing from the other, are similar to each other in having their place of formation in the mouth and the effort requisite for their pronouncement, always the same. For this reason they make up a word similar to the others in some respect, although dissimilar in reality. The similarities here and there differ from each other by the difference caused by the relative positions of the letters. It is by this complement that words appear as possessing different parts and composite natures, although in reality they are single and without parts. This happens in the same way as a face possessing a constant tinge of colour and fixed features and dimensions show more reflections than one, each possessed of different colour, dimensions and features, when placed differently with respect to a mirror, a dagger and a jewel. The difference is not real.

A verbal sign is single and partless. The letters are taken to be its parts by virtue of the difference of the contiguity of similar letters in different words. The difference of words being thus due to the conception of there being constituted by letters conceived as such a single and partless sonorous image (sphota). Having no distinctions in itself, it is kept up in the mind, as it were, distinct and possessed of parts. It is for this reason that the specific sonorous image of the word Gau is not determined by its part G, because therein it is similar to the sonorous images of such other words as GAURA, etc. It, however, determines the whole verbal image when qualified by the literal sound O. Similarly the letter O is not competent to determine the single whole, the sonorous image of

the word GAU, on account of its similarity therein with the words ŚOCHI, etc. It, however, does so, being qualified by the literal sound G. Although they do not co-exist, yet one can be qualified by the other by means of residual potencies coming to co-exist. And the two residual potencies have not different spheres of action, because two precepts of two different parts and the potencies born therefrom, have one word as the sphere of their operation. By the perception of the parts alone, the whole word is not manifested; but it is manifested as the succession of literal sounds ceases: and it should be added that the consciousness of the cessation of this succession manifests by virtue of the residual potencies of the perceptions of the different parts. It is a matter of observation that the past unmanifested impressions strengthen the present manifested impression by means of the successive storage of their residual potencies. Thus the notion of the existence of a tree at a distance is at first dim, but by and by becomes distinct. It is not, however, possible that this may be the method of the literal sounds bringing about the perception of the object. Because the rule of dimness and clearness applies only to perceptive cognitions; and it is not by perceptions that literal sounds bring about the consciousness of an object. It cannot, of course, be that each of the constituent literal sounds of a word should produce an indistinct image of the object which becomes distinct only in the end. If the image is raised by the letters it must be quite distinct. Or, it may be said that it is never born at all. It can never be said that it remains indistinct and dim (asphota). The dissimilarity is that in the case of the sonorous image the distinctness and indistinctness are fancied after the perceptibility is established. Thus when the notion of the cessation of literal sounds takes its place in the mind through the auditory sense, along with the residual potencies left therein by the perception of each literal sound in succession, the literal sounds come together into the manifested sonorous image of a single word. This manifestation is brought about by a specific output of energy. The speciality of this energy depends upon the fixity of a particular order of the succession of literal sounds. When, therefore, the order of the succession changes, the specific energy which is competent to bring about the particular verbal manifestation no longer exists, and the particular manifestation is not brought about. Literal sounds are thus limited to the expression of a particular meaning by their dependence upon the order of their succession. They, therefore, show the conventional limitation as it appears in the world, to be the sphere of the operation of a word having more parts than one. So many as two, three, four, five or six literal sounds possessing the power of naming all objects denote the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c., when they appear as G, AU and the aspirate H.

Well, then, is it the letters alone which by virtue of distinct orders of succession denote an object? Is not a word independent of its constituent letters? For this reason he says:—'Thus a single word, &c.'

'The succession of literal sounds' is the succession brought about by literal sound.

'The succession of literal sounds limited to a particular object ceases':—Such are the letters of a word at the time when the successive pronouncement of the literal sounds is over.

'Manifestation of consciousness' means the shining out of the Will-to-know (the buddhi) in the shape of a particular image.

'Limited to a particular conventional meaning':—The literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning are, as has been said, the sounds of G, AU and H, in accordance with the conceptions of superficial observers. The meaning is that G, &c., are also taken to be the signifiers of an object, being as they are the parts of a word and thus its necessary constituents. In reality, however, it is a single mental phenomenon which, as a word, signifies an object. He renders the same plainer:—'Thus a single word

is a single manifestation of consciousness, &c. All this related to it is understood by the mind of the world, &c.'

But why a single manifestation of consciousness? For this reason he says:—'It is the object of a single effort of consciousness.' A cow: This single word is the object of a single phenomenon of consciousness; it is, therefore, spoken of as a single manifestation.

He mentions the cause of its manifestation:—'It is brought into existence by a single effort.' The effort which manifests the word RASA is different from the effort which manifests the word SĀRA. And it is single, inasmuch as it is possessed of the quality of the individuality of the word RASA from the beginning, is differentiated by the fruit thereof, and has a determinate order of the antecedent and postcedent (literal sounds thereof). The different parts of the word which are understood to be existing as such by differences in similarity and order of contiguity, do not exist as such in reality, and a word is, therefore, said to be without parts. For this reason it has no order, because there is no existence in it of parts which may exist either before or after each other.

The question arises, that literal sounds appearing in order before and after one another in a word and being therefore its parts, how is it said under the circumstances that a word has no order and no parts? For this reason he says:—'It is not a whole made of separate and distinct literal sounds.' Literal sounds are not parts of a word; but by means of differences in similarity and order of contiguity, the word puts on of itself different forms and appears as it is in reality. The faces appearing in a jewel, a dagger, a mirror, &c., are not parts of the real face. 'It is a manifestation of the Will-to-know (buddhi). This means that the collective appearance at the cessation of a succession is known by the *buddhi*, is found in the *buddhi*. The operation of the notion of the last literal sound means the residual potency of the cognition of that sound. This residual potency when it is thrown in with the residual potencies of the cognitions of the previous literal sounds, brings the whole word into consciousness, that is, renders it to the object of cognition. And it is shown below that the residual potencies left in the mind by the cognitions of sounds, coincide in space with the sphere of the word they make up.

Well; but if a word has no parts, no order and no constituent literal sounds, why does it never appear as such? A white crystal may appear to be red when besmeared with molten shellac; but it is not that it will not appear pure white even when the colour has been removed. Literal sounds are, therefore, parts of a word. For this reason he says:—'It is understood by the mind of the world, &c.' The eternal functioning of the power of speech has gone on through the articulation into words of different literal sounds. This has been carried on with the help of literal sounds, separately named, uttered and heard by the hearers for the purpose of transferring them from one to other minds. Eternal habit is secured by the operation.

'On account of eternal habit' means that the mind which has perceived thus, is possessed of the habit thus acquired; the habit, that is to say, of understanding the whole word as coloured by separate literal sounds. 'As having come into existence' (Siddhavat) means 'as it were, having a real and independent existence.'

By 'conjunction of letters' he means the speech of the older people which has always been so achieved. 'Thus is the word known.' The meaning is this. There is a certain application (upādhi) which may either be applied to anything or separated from it. Take for example lac or something similar. If it is separated from the crystal it shines out in its white purity. This is proper. As to the notion of a word, however, it is never produced except by a particular sound which is brought about by a particular effort. Further a word is always marred by similarity, and its notion is generated in the mind only as being made up of literal sounds. How then is it possible that a word may also be spoken

or known as pure and independent of literal sounds? As they say:—'Sounds being similar in their nature becomes causes of wrong impressions. The cause of wrong impression takes them in as such; in the sight of those who know the word, it is fixed with reference to its means of production. This certain confusion in the world is but the contradiction of knowledge.' Because the body of a word shows itself as always made up of articulated sounds; the world being superficial observers, believe that the literal sounds themselves are words; and they think that the literal sound only appearing in different combinations give different meanings. He says this:—'Distinguished by conventional meaning, etc.' The meaning is that for the benefit of the ordinary mind to whom the real word is unknown as such, a word is divided into literal sounds by an act of the mind which is called convention. He describes the division into article sounds:—'Of so many letters,' neither more nor less.

'Such and such a succession' means one having a particular order of uninterrupted succession. 'Succession so ending,' is that which is taken in by a single act of the understanding. He illustrates such and such an object:—'Such as the generic quality of a cow, &c.'

'Well; but if convention means that a particular word is to denote a particular object, then there is no confusion between word and meaning. For this reason he says:—'Convention, however, &c.'

'A manifestation of memory':—The existence of this conventional relation is due to the function of memory. The convention which determines the meaning is not only this, that such and such a meaning has been given to such and such a sound; it is also that such and such a sound is remembered as correlated to such and such a meaning. This is the meaning,

'Whoever knows their distinction performs Samyama thereon and thereby knows all,' that is, understands the sounds of all living beings. The genitive case used, 'their distinction' is used only with reference to convention in which the forms are not distinct.

A word has thus been established to be a single partless and jointless output of sound in which the literal sounds are only fancied to be articulations. Now he establishes that a sentence also is a single complete notion in the mind and that the words are simply fancied to be parts thereof. So he says:—'And in all words lives the power of a sentence.' This is the explanation. A word is used to convey information to another. It is only what they are intended to convey that is conveyed to the other. The same is intended to be conveyed by them which is the field of any action, &c., with reference to them. It is not the object alone that is signified by them, but the entire meaning of a sentence. All words are meant to complete the meaning of a complete sentence. Hence the same is their meaning. For this reason, where even a single word is used, even there the meaning is understood to be what it would be, if it were used together with another word. The whole meaning is not conveyed by one word alone. Why? Because that such alone has not the power to convey the whole meaning. Therefore in such places it is the sentence alone that conveys the meaning not the separate words. Because however the words are parts of a sentence, they too have the power of denoting the meaning of a sentence, in the same way as literal sounds have the power of conveying the meaning of a word on account of appearing as articulations thereof. For this reason just as every literal sound is possessed of the power of forming all means, so every word also is as such possessed of the power of forming all sentences and thus denoting the meaning intended to be conveyed by all sentences. This is what is meant by saying, 'And in all words lives the power of a sentence.' When some one says, 'A tree,' it is understood, that a tree exists. The word, 'tree,' together with the word, 'is,' understood, give the meaning of a sentence, and hence the word, tree, exists as part of a sentence.

But then how is it that the word, 'is,' is understood? For this reason he says:—'The object signified by a word never fails of existence.' In the world, words are the means of ascertaining the existence of objects; and a word, always joining the object signified to the word 'is,' everywhere gives the meaning of a sentence. This is the meaning of an object never failing of existence. It is for this reason the practice of those who know the usage of words, that wherever there is no other verb, the word 'is' and 'becomes' are to be considered understood, and are to be supplied.

Having described the nominal bases as never failing of a particular action he now shows that a particular-action never fails of a noun:—Thus on pronouncing the word 'Cooks' the appropriate agents of the action signified are always understood. And the word excludes other inappropriate agents. It is thus that the meaning of a sentence is differentiated.

Similarly are words found existing in a sentence although they are not required there: and for this reason all the more is it that words possess the power of giving the meaning of a sentence. For this reason he says:—'Then is also seen the combination of words in a sentence.' Not even thus the words 'Vedic student,' &c., used independently would convey such a meaning if they were not understood as conjoined to the words 'is,' &c. Thus the meaning is that this too has been fancied to be a part of a sentence.

Let that be. But if the words themselves have the power of conveying the meaning of a sentence, there is no use of making sentences. The meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence is conveyed by the words themselves. For this reason he says:—'In a sentence like this, &c.' It has been said that the meaning intended to be conveyed by a word is not conveyed by a word alone, until it is conjoined to another word understood. Hence are words separated from a sentence and fancied as separate from them; and hence also are words separated from the meaning of a sentence, and are distinguished as either verbs or nominal bases. Thus are words to be etymologically explained by introducing the divisions of cases.

But then why should so much trouble be taken to explain them? For this reason he says:—'Otherwise how, etc.'

In the sentence GHATO BHAVATI, BHAVATĪ BHKĪṢĀM DEHI, BHAVATĪ TIṢṬHATI, the nouns and verbs appear to be similar in external shape. The word BHAVATI in the first sentence is a verb and means 'exists.' In the other two sentences it is a noun and might be translated as 'Your ladyship.'

Similarly in the sentences, Āsvastvam and Āśvas Ysti, the former Āśvas is a verb and means 'be appeased.' The second Āśvas is a noun and means a horse.

Similarly in the sentences, Ajāpayah Piva and Marayajapaya śhat-rūn. In the former sentence it means the milk of a she-goat, and in the second it means 'kill.'

Thus names and verbs being similar in external appearance, they would not be known as nouns and verbs if they were not to be separated from the sentence. How could they otherwise be explained as either verbs or nominal bases? Hence words should be separated from a sentence and explained. It is not that, merely by thus explaining words after having taken them out of the sentence, they would really become different in nature.

Having thus ascertained the nature of words, he now begins the discussion of the absence of real confusion (saṅkara) among word, meaning and idea, upon which confusion has been fastened by convention:—'These are the word, the meaning and the idea among which obtains a distinction.'

Thus, Śvetate Prāsādah, (white shines the mansion) means an action. It is very plain here that the action of looking white which has to be established, comes first,

and then arises the consciousness of the purpose of the action having been established. The word 'Śveta' is a separate thing. Even where the word and meaning have their forms established, there exists a difference between word and meaning. He says this:—'Śvetah Prāsādah iti' (the place is white). The word here has the meaning of a noun. The absence of the case-ending is because the word is intended to express its own meaning. He divides the meaning:—'These are words denoting both a noun and an action. The meaning of both these words is both of the nature of a noun and an action.' He divides the idea:—'And also the meaning and the idea thereof.' It is the word 'CHA' in the original which gives the meaning of the words, 'the meaning of the idea thereof.' The relation shown here is with another object which is signified.

The question is that if word, meaning and notion are known as single on account of confusion (saṅkara, coming together) whence does the distinction come? He puts the question with this object:—'How?' He gives the answer:—'By the correlation, this is that, &c.'

The meaning is that the cause of the notion of unity is the qualification of the convention; it is not real, however. The use of words 'In the conventional sign' in the locative case shows that convention is the cause thereof. He shows the reality:—'And the white object, &c.' The 'states' are newness and oldness. 'Goes with' means becomes confused.

By performing Saṁyama in this way with reference to the distinctions of word, meaning and idea, the sounds of all animals, insects, &c., become distinctly intelligible to the Yogī. The Saṁyama performed with respect to the speech of man is equally performed with respect to their sounds also, inasmuch as both are of the same class. The Yogī knows their different sounds, their different meanings and their notions. Thus is it proved.—17.

Sūtra 18.

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् ॥१८॥

संस्कार Samskāra, of residual potencies. साक्षात्करणात् Sākṣāt Karaṇāt, by the bringing of into consciousness. पूर्व Pūrva, of previous. जाति Jāti, life: status. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, knowledge.

18. By bringing residual-potencies into consciousness, the knowledge of previous life-states (Jāti)—124.

संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानम् । द्वये खल्वमी संस्काराः । स्मृतिक्लेशहेतवो वासनारूपा विपाकहेतवो धर्मो धर्मरूपास्ते पूर्वभवाभिसंस्कृताः । परिणामचेष्टानिरोधशक्तिजीवनधर्मवदपरिहृष्टाश्चित्तधर्मास्तेषु संयमः संस्कारसाक्षात्क्रियायै समर्थः । न च देशकालनिमित्तानुभवेर्विना तेषामस्ति साक्षात्करणम् । तदित्थं संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्पूर्वजातिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते योगिनः । परत्राप्येवमेव संस्कारसाक्षात्करणात्परजातिसंवेदनम् । अत्रेदमाख्यातं श्रयते । भगवतो जैगीषव्यस्य संस्कारसाक्षात्करणाद्दशसु महासर्गेषु जन्मपरिणामक्रममनुपेक्ष्यते विवेकज्ञानं प्रादुरभूत् । अथ भगवानावद्व्यस्तनुधरस्तमुवाच । दशसु महासर्गेषु भयत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन त्वया नरकतिर्यग्गर्भसंभवं दुःखं सम्पश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनस्तद्यमानेन सुखदुःखयोः किमधिकमुपलब्धमिति । भगवन्तमावद्व्यं जैगीषव्य उवाच । दशसु महासर्गेषु भयत्वादनभिभूतबुद्धिसत्त्वेन मया नरकतिर्यग्भवं दुःखं संपश्यता देवमनुष्येषु पुनः पुनस्तद्यमानेन यत्किंचिदनुभूतं तत्सर्वं दुःखमेव प्रत्यवैमि । भगवानावद्व्य उवाच । यदिदमायुष्मतः प्रधानव-

शिवमनुत्तमं च संतोषसुखं किमिदमपि दुःखपक्षे निःक्षिप्तमिति । भगवान् जैगीषव्य उवाच । विषयसुखापेक्षयैवेदमनुत्तमं संतोषसुखमुक्तम् । कैवल्यसुखापेक्षया दुःखमेव । बुद्धिसत्त्वस्यायं धर्मस्त्रिगुणस्त्रिगुणश्च प्रत्ययो हेयपक्षे न्यस्त इति दुःखरूपस्त्वृष्णातनुः तृष्णादुःखसन्तापापगमात्तुप्रसन्नमबाधं सर्वानुकूलं सुखमिदमुक्तमिति ॥ १८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Residual potencies are two-fold,—those appearing as habits and causing memories and afflictions; and those appearing as virtue and vice and causing fruition. These are the unconscious characteristics of the mind-change (pariṇāma), activity (cheṣṭā), suppression (nirodha), ideation in action (śakti), physical life (Jivana), characterization (dharma), now appearing along with them as they have been potentialized in previous births. Saṁyama over these has the power of achieving the direct knowledge of the residual potencies. And their direct knowledge is not possible without the knowledge of space, time and operative cause. Thus is it that a Yogī brings into consciousness the previous life-states by obtaining direct knowledge of residual potencies. Similarly is obtained the knowledge of the life-states of others by obtaining direct knowledge of their residual potencies.

The following story is heard in this connection :—Bhagavān Jai-giṣavya obtained the knowledge of the distinction between the real and the unreal after he had seen the direct succession of live-changes during ten great creations by having obtained direct knowledge of his residual potencies. The holy Ātaṣya, having taken a body asked him : 'You have lived and thereby become chastened through ten Great Kalpas. The essence of your Will-to-know has not been overpowered. You have experienced the troubles of life in hells, among animals and in wombs. You have been born again and again among men and gods. Have you through all this life experienced the greater quantity of pleasure or of pain,—which ?

Jai-giṣava replied to Bhagavān Ātaṣya :—'I have lived through ten great creations. My mental essence has not been overpowered. I have experienced the troubles of hell and animal life. I have been born again and again among men and gods. I consider all that I have experienced as pain only.'

Said the revered Ātaṣya :—'This mastery of your reverence over the the First Cause and this invaluable joy of contentment of yours,—do you place these too to the credit of pain ?

The revered Jai-giṣavya said—'The joy of contentment is invaluable only in comparison with the pleasures of sensation. Compared to

the bliss of absolute freedom (Kaivalya) it is pain only. The possession of the three qualities is of the nature of the essence of the Will-to-know and whatever is possessed of the three qualities is thrown to the side of avoidable pain. The chain of desire is of the nature of pain. It has been said that when the anxiety of the pain of desire is removed, then comes joy, calm, undisturbed, all-embracing.'—124.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The residual potencies born of cognitions are the causes of memories. The potencies of Nescience, &c., are the causes of the fruition of the afflictions of Nescience, &c. Fruition has the form of life-state, life-experience and life-period. The causes have the forms of virtue and vice.

'Potentialized in previous births':—Brought about their causes in previous life-states. The characteristics of the mind are change, activity, suppression, active ideation, physical life and characterization. Like them are these potentializations too unconscious. The characteristics have been heard about and inferred. Saṁyama performed over these along with their sub-heads has the power of producing the direct knowledge of both the residual potencies.

Well ; if this be so, the two residual potencies may be directly known. But how can the previous life-states be known in this way ? For this reason the Commentator says :—'And their direct knowledge is not possible without the knowledge of space, time and operative cause.' Operative cause is the former body and the organs of the powers of sensation and action. The meaning is that the knowledge of the residual potencies together with the circumstances of their fruition, is not different at all from the direct knowledge of life-state, &c. Now he says that the Saṁyama over one's own potencies applies to others also :—'Similarly is obtained the knowledge, &c.'

For the purpose of creating faith in this he relates the story of the dialogue between the revered Ātaṣya and Jai-giṣavya :—'The following story, &c.' The great Kalpa is the Great Creation.

'Having taken a body':—This means possessed of the glory of a Nirmānkāya. 'Chastened' denotes the state from which the dirt of Rajas and Tamas has been removed.

'Mastery over the First Cause' is godhead. It is by the possession of that, that he sets the Pradhāna, the First Cause, into motion and gives to whomsoever he pleases such powers of body and sense as he wishes ; and having made for himself thousands of bodies and powers he goes about as he pleases in heaven, midheaven and earth.

Contentment is the destruction of desire, the characteristic of calmness of the essence of the Will-to-be.

Sūtra 19

प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् ॥१६॥

प्रत्ययस्य Pratyayasya, of the notions. पर Para, of other (minds). चित्त Chitta, of minds. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, knowledge.

19. Of the notions, the knowledge of other minds—125.

प्रत्ययस्य परचित्तज्ञानम् । प्रत्यये संयमात्प्रत्ययस्य साक्षात्करणत्तः । परचित्तज्ञानम् न च तत्सालम्बनं तस्याविषयीभूतत्वात् । रक्तं प्रत्ययं जानात्यमुग्धिमन्नालम्बने रक्तमिति न जानाति । परचित्तस्य प्रत्ययस्य यदालम्बनं तद्योगिचित्तेन नालम्बनीकृतं परप्रत्ययमात्रं तु योगिचित्तस्यालम्बनीभूतमिति ॥ १९ ॥

VYĀSA.

By Samyama over the notions and thus by obtaining the direct knowledge of the notions, comes the knowledge of other minds. But not of its object, that not being the direct object of the Yogi's mind. He knows the mental emotion of love, but does not know the object of love. Because that which has been the object of the other man's mind has not been the object of the Yogi's mind. It is only the other's mental state that has been the object of the Yogi's Samyama.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Of the notions, the knowledge of other minds.

Because the mind of the other only becomes directly known, the notion only is known.

As the direct knowledge of the potencies brings about the knowledge of the previous life-states also, by causing the direct knowledge of the environments, so also it follows that when the mind of another is known, the object which is responsible for the existence of any particular state of the mind should also become known. This being the suggestion, the Commentator says:—'But not along with its object.' The former Samyama was with reference to all the environments: this is with reference to the mind of the other only. This is the meaning.

Sūtra 20.

कायरूपसंयमात्तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानम् ॥२०॥

काय Kāya, of the body. रूप Rūpa, over the form. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. तद् Tad, that (form). ग्राह्य Grāhya, capable of receiving (that). शक्ति Śakti, the power. तद्ग्राह्यशक्ति Tad Grāhya Śakti, Of perceptibility. स्तम्भे Stambhe, on the checking of. चक्षुः Chakṣuḥ, of the eye. प्रकाश Prakāśa, with the light. असंप्रयोगे Asamprayoge, there being no contact. अन्तर्धानम् Antardhānam, disappearance.

20. By Samyama over the form of the body, on perceptibility being checked, and thus there being no-contact with the light of the eye, comes disappearance.—126.

कायरूपसंयमात्तद्ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे चक्षुःप्रकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानम् । कायस्य रूपे संयमाद्रूपस्य या ग्राह्या शक्तिस्तां प्रतिष्ठन्नाति । ग्राह्यशक्तिस्तम्भे सति चक्षुःप्रकाशासंप्रयोगेऽन्तर्धानमुत्पद्यते योगिनः । एतेन शब्दाद्यन्तर्धानमुक्तं वेदितव्यम् ॥ २० ॥

VYĀSA.

By Samyama over the form of the body, he checks the perceptibility of the form. On perceptibility being checked, and thus there no longer being contact with the light which carries it to the eye, disappearance of the Yogi is brought about. By this the cessation of the perception of sound, &c., must be understood as explained.—126.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

“By Samyama over the form of the body, on perceptibility being checked, and thus there being no contact with the light of the eye, comes disappearance.”

The body is made of the five tattvas. It becomes an object of perception to the eye on account of its possession of colour (for form). It is by colour that the body and its form becomes objects of perception. When the Yogi performs Samyama with reference to the form of the body, then is checked the operation of the perceptibility of colour, which is responsible for causing the ocular perception of the body. For this reason when the power of being perceived is checked, the Yogi is no longer visible. Thereby the light of sensation which is born in the eye of another, does not come into contact with the body that has disappeared. The meaning is that the body of the Yogi does not become the object of the other's knowledge. Disappearance is to be brought about when it is desired that the Yogi should not be seen by anybody. By this should also be understood another aphorism to the following effect:—By Samyama over the sounds, touches, tastes, smells of the body, their perceptibility being checked, there is no contact with the tympanum, skin, tongue and nose; and hence these disappear.

Sūtra 21.

सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च कर्म तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञान-
मरिष्टेभ्यो वा ॥२१॥

सोपक्रमम् Sopakramam, fast in fruition. निरुपक्रमम् Nirupakramam, slow. च Cha, and, or. कर्म Karma, action, Karma. तत् Tat, over these. संयमात् Samyamât, by Samyama. अपरान्त Aparānta, of death. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, the knowledge. अरिष्टेभ्यः Ariṣṭebhyaḥ, by portents. वा Vā, or.

21. Karma is either fast-in-fruition or slow; by Samyama over these comes knowledge of death; or, by portents.—127.

सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च कर्म तत्संयमादपरान्तज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वा । आयुर्विपाकं कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । तत्र यथाद्रं वृद्धं वितानितं रूसीयसा कालेन शुष्येत्तथा सोपक्रमम् । यथा च तदेवं सम्पिण्डितं विरेण संशुष्येदेवं निरुपक्रमम् । यथा वाशिः शुष्के कक्षे मुक्तो वातेन समन्ततो युक्तः क्षेपीयसा कालेन दहेत्तथा सोपक्रमम् । यथा वा स एवाशिस्तृणराशौ क्रमशोऽज्यवेपु न्यस्तश्चिरेण दहेत्तथा निरुपक्रमम् । तदैकभक्तियुक्तं कर्म द्विविधं सोपक्रमं निरुपक्रमं च । तत्संयमादपरान्तस्य प्रायणस्य ज्ञानमरिष्टेभ्यो वेति त्रिविधमरिष्टमाध्यात्मिकमाधिभौतिकमाधिदैविकं च । तत्राध्यात्मिकं धोषं स्वदेहे पिहितकर्णो न शृणोति ज्योतिर्वा नेत्रेऽज्यवेपु न पश्यति । तथाधिभौतिकं यमपुरुषान्पश्यति पितृनतीतानागतानकसात्पश्यति । तथाधिदैविकं स्वर्गमकस्मात्सिद्धान्वा पश्यति । विपरीतं वा सर्वमित्यनेन वा जानात्यपरान्तमुपस्थितमिति ॥ २१ ॥

VYĀSA.

The Karma which fructifies as life-period is two-fold, that which is fast-in-fruition and that which is slow-in-fruition. Thus, for example,

a wet piece of cloth, well spread, dries in a short time. Similarly the fast-in-fruitation.

The same cloth when gathered up, however, will take a long time to dry. Similar is the slow-in-fruitation.

Further fire, thrown into dry hay and accompanied by wind in every direction, burns it in a short time; such is the fast-in-fruitation. The same fire, however, applied to detached pieces of straw out of a heap, burns them in a very long time. Similarly the slow-in-fruitation.

Thus the one-birth Karma which is responsible for the period of life is two-fold, the fast-in-fruitation and the slow-in-fruitation. By Samyama over these comes the knowledge of death, the smaller end of life.

'Or, by the portents':—A portent is three-fold:—Personal (ādhyātmanika), elemental (ādhibhautika) and divine (ādhidaivika). Of these, the personal:—He hears not the sound in his own body on stopping the passage of the ears. He sees not the light in the eyes on pressing them.

And the elemental:—He sees the messengers of Yama. He sees suddenly and without thought the ancestors that have passed away.

Similarly the divine:—He sees the heavenly worlds and the Siddhas suddenly. Or, he sees everything contrary to what he has been seeing the whole of his life.

It is by these that a Yogī may optionally know the proximity of death.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Karma is either fast-in-fruitation or slow; by Samyama over these comes the knowledge of death; or, by portents.'

The Karma which fructifies into life-time is two-fold, the fast-in-fruitation and the slow-in-fruitation. The one-birth Karma certainly which is the cause of life-time, life-state and life-experience, fructifies into life-period. The fast-fructifying Karma is that which is going on fructifying without any reference to what time it may take to finish by causing experience, of which more has been over and a little only remains, whose operation is going on but whose fruitage is impossible to enjoy during life by one body and which, therefore, delays the Yogī, keeping him in the bondage of births.

The same when but a small portion of the fruit has been enjoyed and which is operating to produce the remaining fruit with reference to the time that has been taken by the enjoyment of the past, works but slowly and, now and then, is slow to fructify.

The Commentator renders this plain by two illustrations:—'As for example.' He gives an illustration to render the same plainer still:—'Or, as fire.'

The words 'smaller end of life' (aparānta) mean death with reference to the Great Latency which is the ultimate end. By Samyama over that Karma, that is, over virtue and vice, accrues the knowledge of death. By this the Yogī knows his fast-fructifying Karma, and then makes many bodies for himself and thereby enjoys the fruit thereof as fast as he likes and dies whenever he pleases.

He takes up the context:—'Or by portents.' The indications are three-fold. They are called portents (ariṣṭas), because they frighten like an enemy.

'Or sees everything contrary, &c.':—This excludes the trick of jugglers. But otherwise he begins to see heaven in villages and towns; he begins to see also that the world of men only is the world of gods. - 21.

Sūtra 22.

मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि ॥२२॥

मैत्र्यादिषु Maitri ādiṣu, over friendliness, &c. बलानि Balāni, the powers.

22. Over friendliness, &c., the powers.—128.

मैत्र्यादिषु बलानि । मैत्रीकरुणामुदितेति तिस्रो भावनास्तत्र भूतेषु सुखितेषु मैत्रौ भावयित्वा मैत्री बलं लभते । दुःखितेषु करुणां भावयित्वा करुणबलं लभते । पुण्यशालेषु मुदितां भावयित्वा मुदिताबलं लभते । भावनातः समाधिर्यः स संयमस्ततो बलान्यवन्ध्यवीर्याणि जायन्ते । पापशीलेषूपेक्षा नतु भावना । ततश्च तस्यां नास्ति समाधिरित्यतो न बलमुपेक्षातस्तत्र संयमाभावादिति ॥ २२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Friendliness, compassion and complaisance are three feelings. Of these he gets the power of friendliness by habituating the mind through conscious volition to sympathy towards happy beings. He gets the power of compassion by habituating the mind to compassion towards sufferers. He gets the power of complaisance by habituating the mind to complaisance towards the virtuous. By conscious habituating volition comes trance which is Samyama. Thereby are born the powers which know of no obstacle in their working.

It is indifference that is practised towards the sinful, not conscious habitual volition. Hence there is no trance here; and hence by reason of there being no Samyama, there is no power of indifference.—128.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Over friendliness, &c., the powers.' By the performance of Samyama over friendliness, &c., the powers of friendliness, &c., come to him. Of these the power which comes by the practice of the feeling of friendliness, is that by which he can make the whole living world happy, and hence becomes the well-wisher of all.

Similarly, by the power of compassion he lifts suffering creatures out of pain and the causes of pain.

Similarly, by the power of complaisance he becomes just to all the world.

Now the Commentator describes that the conscious practice of habituating volition is the cause of trance, as this will be of use further.

'By conscious habituating volition comes trance which is Samyama.'

Although Samyama means concentration, meditation and trance, and not only trance, still because trance is their immediate effect and is, therefore, the chief of the three, therefore the word is used here as applying to the same.

In some places the reading is—

'Conscious habituating volition is trance.' There conscious habituating volition and trance would become the causes, i. e., the limbs of Samyama taken as whole.

Power (virya) is effort. For this reason the man who possesses the power of friendliness, &c., puts forth an effort to render people happy, &c., and his effort is not checked.

Indifference, however, means absence of effort. There can be no volition with respect to that; nor does there exist anything such as happiness, &c., which might thereby be brought into existence.—22.

Sūtra 23.

बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि ॥२३॥

बलेषु Balaṣu, over the powers. हस्ति Hasti, elephants. बल Bala, power. आदीनि Ādini, and the others.

23. Over the powers, the powers of elephant, &c.—129.

बलेषु हस्तिबलादीनि । हस्तिबले संयमाद्दस्तिबलो भवति । चैनतेयबले संयमाद्दैनतेयबलो भवति । वायुबले संयमाद्वायुबलो भवतीत्येवमादि ॥ २३ ॥

VYĀSA.

By Saṁyama with reference to the strength of an elephant he comes to possess the strength of an elephant.

By Saṁyama over the power of the king of birds, one gets the power of the king of birds.

By Saṁyama over the powers of Vāyu, one gets the power of Vāyu—129.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Over the powers, the powers of elephant, &c. He gets the strength of whomsoever he performs Saṁyama over.—23.

Sūtra 24.

प्रवृत्त्या लोकन्यासात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टज्ञानम् ॥२४॥

प्रवृत्त्या Pravṛtityāḥ, of the higher sense-activity. लोक Loka, of the light. न्यासात् Nyāsāt, by the directing. सूक्ष्म Sūkṣma, of the subtler. व्यवहित Vyavahita, of the veiled. विप्रकृष्ट Viprakṛṣṭa, of the remote. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, the knowledge.

24. The knowledge of the subtle, the veiled, the remote, by directing the light of higher sense-activity towards them.—130.

प्रवृत्त्या लोकन्यासात्सूक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टज्ञानम् । ज्योतिष्मती प्रवृत्तिरुक्ता मनसस्तस्यां य आलोकस्तं योगी सूक्ष्मे वा व्यवहिते वा विप्रकृष्टे वार्थे विन्यस्य तमर्थमधिगच्छति ॥ २४ ॥

VYĀSA.

The higher sense-activity of lucidity has been described. It is that higher sight which the Yogi's mind directs towards the subtle, the veiled or the remote and thereby knows the object.—130.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Throwing that sight by Saṁyama over the subtle, the veiled and the remote, the Yogi thereby knows the object.—24.

Sūtra 25.

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्ये संयमात् ॥२५॥

भुवन-ज्ञानम् Bhuvana-Jñānam, the knowledge of the regions. सूर्ये Sūrye, on the sun. संयमात् Saṁyamāt, by Saṁyama.

25. By Saṁyama on the sun, knowledge of the regions.—131.

भुवनज्ञानं सूर्ये संयमात् । तत्प्रस्तारः सप्तलोकान्तात्रावीचैः प्रभृति मेरुपृष्ठं यावदित्येवं भूर्लोकः मेरुपृष्ठादारभ्य आध्रुवाद् ग्रहनक्षत्रताराविचित्रोऽन्तरिक्षलोकः । ततः परः स्वर्लोकः पञ्चविधो माहेन्द्रस्तृतीयो लोकः । चतुर्थः प्राजापत्या महर्लोकः खिविधो ब्राह्मः । तद्यथा जनलोकस्तपो लोकः सत्यलोक इति । ब्राह्मखिभूमिको लोकः प्राजापत्यस्ततो महान् । माहेन्द्रश्च स्वरित्युक्तो दिवि तारा भुवि प्रजा इति संग्रहः श्लोकः । तत्रावीचेरुपर्युपरि निविष्टाः पण्महानरकभूमयो घनसलिलानलानिलाकाशतमःप्रतिष्ठा महाकालाम्बरीपरैरवमहारौरवकालसूत्रान्धतामित्राः । यत्र स्वर्कर्मोपार्जितदुःखवेदनाः प्राणिनः कष्टमायुर्दीर्घकालमाक्षिप्य जायन्ते । ततो महातरसा तलातलपुतलवितलतलातलपातालालाख्यानि सप्त पातालानि । भूमिरियमष्टमी सप्तद्वीपा वसुमती यस्याः सुमेरुर्मध्ये पर्वतराजः काञ्चनस्तस्य राजतवैदूर्यस्फटिकहेममणिमयानि शृङ्गाणि । तत्र वैदूर्यप्रभानुरागानीलोत्पलपत्रश्यामो नमसो दक्षिणभागः श्वेतः पूर्वः स्वच्छः पश्चिमः कुरण्टकाभ उत्तरो दक्षिणपाद्वै चास्य जम्बूयतीत्यं जम्बूद्वीपस्तस्य सूर्यप्रचाराद्रात्रिंशदिवं लग्नमिव वर्तते । तस्य नीलश्वेतशृङ्गवन्त उदीचीनास्त्रयः पर्वता द्विसाहस्रायामास्तदन्तरेषु त्रीणि वर्षाणि नवनवयोजनसाहस्राणि रमणकं हिरण्यममुत्तराः कुरव इति । निषधहेमकूटशैला दक्षिणतो द्विसाहस्रायामास्तदन्तरेषु त्रीणि वर्षाणि नवनवयोजनसाहस्राणि हरिवर्षं किंपुरुषं भारतमिति । सुमेरोः प्राचीना भद्राश्वमाल्यवत्सीमानः प्रतीचीनाः केतुमालगन्धमादनसीमानः मध्ये वर्षमिलावृतम् । तदेतद्योजनशतसाहस्रं सुमेरोर्दिशि दिशि तदर्धेन व्यूढम् । स खल्वयं शतसाहस्रायामो जम्बूद्वीपस्ततो द्विगुणेन लवणोदधिना वलयकृतिना वेष्टितः । ततश्च द्विगुणा द्विगुणाः शाककुशकौञ्चशाल्मलगोमेधपुष्करद्वीपाः सप्त समुद्राश्च सर्वपराशिकल्पाः सविचित्रशैलावतंसा इक्षुरससुरासर्पिर्दधिमण्डक्षीरस्वादकसप्तसमुद्रपरिवेष्टिता वलयकृतयो लोकालोकपर्वतपरिवाराः पञ्चाशद्योजनकोटिपरिसङ्ख्याताः । तदेतत्सर्वं सुप्रतिष्ठितसंस्थानमण्डमध्ये व्यूढम् । अण्डं च प्रधानस्याणुरवयवो यथाकाशे खद्योत इति । तत्र पाताले जलधौ पर्वतेष्वेतेषु देवनिकाया सुरगन्धर्वकिन्नरकिंपुरुषयक्षराक्षसभूतप्रेतपिशाचापस्मारकाप्सरो ब्रह्मराक्षसकूष्माण्डविनायकाः प्रतिवसन्ति । सर्वेषु द्वीपेषु पुण्यात्मानो देवमनुष्याः । सुमेरुद्विदशानामुद्यानभूमिः । तत्र मिश्रवनं नन्दनं चैत्ररथं सुमानसमित्युद्यानानि । सुधर्मा देवसभा । सुदर्शनं पुरम् । वैजयन्तः प्रासादः । ग्रहनक्षत्रतारकास्तु भ्रूवे निबद्धाः । वायुविक्षेपनियमेनोपलक्षितप्रचाराः । सुमेरोरुपर्युपरि सन्निविष्टा दिवि विपरिवर्तन्ते । माहेन्द्रनिवासिनः षडेव देवनिकायाः । त्रिदश अग्निष्वात्तायामास्तुषिता अपरिनिर्मितवशावर्तिनः परिनिर्मितवशावर्तिनश्चेति । ते सर्वे

सङ्कल्पसिद्धाः । अग्निमाद्यैश्वर्योपपन्नाः कल्यायुषो वृन्दारकाः कामभोगिन औपपादिक-
देहा उत्तमानुकूलाभिरप्सरोग्भिः कृतपरिचारा महति लोके प्राजापत्ये पञ्चविधा देवनि-
काया । कुमुदा ऋभवः प्रतर्दना अञ्जनाभाः प्रचित्ताभा इत्येते महाभूतवशिने ध्याना-
हाराः कल्पसहस्रायुषः । प्रथमे ब्रह्मणे जनलोके चतुर्विधो देवनिकायो ब्रह्मपुरोहिता
ब्रह्मकायिका ब्रह्ममहाकायिका अजरा अमरा इति । ते भूतेन्द्रियवशिने द्विगुणा द्विगुणा-
त्तरायुषः । द्वितीये तपसि लोके त्रिविधो देवनिकायः । आभास्वरा महाभास्वराः
सत्यमहाभास्वरा इति । ते भूतेन्द्रियप्रकृतिवशिने द्विगुणद्विगुणात्तरायुषः सर्वे
ध्यानाहारा कल्पसहस्रायुष ऊर्ध्वरेतस ऊर्ध्वमप्रतिहतज्ञाना अधरभूमिष्वनावृतज्ञान-
विषयाः । तृतीये ब्रह्मणः सत्यलोके चत्वारो देवनिकाया अच्युताः शुद्धनिवासाः
सत्याभाः संज्ञासंज्ञिनश्चेति । अकृतभवनन्यासाः स्वप्रतिष्ठा उपर्युपरिस्थिताः प्रधान-
वशिने यावत्सर्गायुषः । तत्राच्युताः सवितर्कध्यानसुखाः शुद्धत्रयीनिवासाः सविचार-
ध्यानसुखाः सत्याभा अनन्दमात्रध्यानसुखाः संज्ञासंज्ञिनश्चास्मितामात्रध्यानसुखा-
स्तेऽपि त्रैलोक्यमध्ये प्रतिष्ठन्ते । त पते सप्तलोकाः सर्वे सप्तब्रह्मकाः । विदेहप्रकृति
लयास्तु मोक्षपदे वर्तन्ते इति न लोकमध्ये न्यस्ता इत्येतद्योगिना साक्षात्करणीयम् । सूर्य-
द्वारे संयमं कृत्वा ततोऽन्यत्रापि । एवं तावदभ्यसेद्यावदिदं सर्वं दृष्टमिति ॥ २५ ॥

VYĀSA.

Their detail :—There are seven regions. Of these beginning from Avichi up to the back of the Meru, is the region called Bhur.

Beginning from the back of the Meru up to the pole-star adorned with planets, asterisms and stars, is the starry region, the Antarikṣa.

Beyond this is the region Svar, having five planes. The third is Mahendra ; the fourth is the Maharloka of the lords of creation ; after this is the three-fold Brahma region. These are the Janaloka, the Tapoloka and the Satyaloka.

* First comes the triple plane
Of Brahmā's region high ;
Creation's lords have then
Their region ; and then,
Cometh Indra's region—
Know all these as Heaven ;
Then come the stars above,
And the last cometh Bhur.*

This verse puts all these together.

Then up to the Avichi, one placed above the other, are the six great hells, the Mahākāla (1), the Ambariṣa (2), the Raurava (3), the Mahāraurava (4), the Kālasūtra (5), and the Andhatāmisa (6), in which are the excesses of earth, air, fire, ākāśa, and darkness respectively. Here are born beings who are to suffer from the consequences of their stored up Karma.

Then are the seven Pātālas, the nether worlds, Sutala, Vitala, Talātala, Mahātala, Rasātala, Atala and Pātāla.

The eighth is this earth, having seven dvīpas and known as Vasumatī. In the middle thereof is the golden king of mountains, the Sumeru. Its peaks are of silver, coral, crystal, gold and pearl. Here, blue like the leaf of the blue lotus, on account of the sheen of the emerald, is the southern region of the heavens ; the eastern is white, the western bright, and the northern yellow.

And on its right side is the Jambu (tree), whence is this called the Jambudvīpa. Its night and day take their round of existence from the motion of the sun.

This has three northern mountain chains having blue and white peaks. Their length is 2,000 yojanas. Surrounded by these mountains are three continents, 9,000 yojanas each. They are Ramaṇaka, Hiraṇmaya, and Uttarakuru.

To the south are the three mountain chains, Niṣāda, Hemakūta, and Hemaśrīṅga, 2,000 yojanas in extension each. Among these are continents, Harivarṣa, Kimpuruṣa and Bhārata. The eastern regions of Sumeru are bounded by Bhadrāśa and Malayavat, the western by Ketumāla and Gandhamādana.

In the middle is the continent of Ilāvrita. All this is one hundred thousand yojanas of Sumeru, each side being half that dimension.

It is to be known that this Jambudvīpa is 100,000 yojanas in dimension. It is surrounded by double its extent of salt ocean.

Each twice as large as the preceding one are the other dvīpas : Śaka, Kuśa, Krauñcha, Śālmala, Gomedha, and Puṣkara. So are the seven oceans. There are beautiful mountains looking like mustard seed. The seven oceans which surround these like bracelets, taste as sugar-cane, wine, clarified butter, curds, gruel and milk (besides the salt one). They reach up to the real horizon. They measure fifty crores of yojanas (500,000,000). All this is well arranged in the sphere of phenomenal world.

Here then in the Pātālas, the oceans and the mountains are the habitations of the elementals. The *asuras*, *gandharvas*, the *kinnaras*, *yakṣas*, *rākṣasas*, *bhūtas*, *pretas*, *piśāchas*, *apasmarakas*, *apsaras*, *brahmarākṣasas*, *kuṣmāndas*, and *vināyakas*, live there.

In the dvīpas live good men and gods. Sumera is the garden of the gods. The gardens are Miśravana Nandana, Chaitrāratha, and Sumānasa. Sudharmā is the council of the gods. Sudarśana is their city ; Vaijāyanta their palace.

Above the Sumeru is the astral region, in which the planets, asterisms and stars move round the pole-star, carried on in their courses by certain motive forces (Vāyus).

In the Mahendraloka live six classes of devas, the tridaśas, agniśvātās, yāmyas, tuṣitas, aparānirmitavaśavartinās, and parinirmitavaśavartinās. All of them have the power of fulfilment of desires by mere thoughts, and are possessed of the attainments known *Apimā*, &c. Their life-times are measured by a Kalpa. They are very beautiful. They enjoy their desires. Their bodies come into existence without parents, by the mere force of their good actions. They have good and obedient nymphs in their families.

In the great Prājāpatya regions there are five descriptions of gods; Kumudas, Ribhus, Pratardanas, Añjanābhas, and Prachitābhas. They have the Mahābhūtas in their power. Contemplation is their food. They live on for a thousand Kalpas.

In the the first sphere of Brahmā, the Janaloka, there are four classes of gods, the Brahmapurōhitas, the Brahmakāyikas, the Brahmamahākāyikas, and the Amaras. They have power over the elements and the powers of sensation and action. Each lives twice as long as the preceding one.

In the second, the Tapoloka, there are three classes of gods, the Abhāsvaras, the Mahābhāsvaras, and the Satyamahāsvaras. They have power over the source of elements and powers, the tanmātras. Each lives twice as long as the preceding one.

All of them are nourished by contemplation. Their knowledge is not checked in the region above them. There is nothing which is hidden from them on the lower planes.

In the third sphere of Brahmā, the Satyaloka, live four classes of gods, the Achyutas, the Suddhanivāsa, the Satyābhās and the Samjñāsamjñinas. They do not build habitations. They live in themselves, one above the other. They have their power over the Mūlaprakṛiti. They live on till the end of creations. Of these, the Achyutas enjoy the bliss of the Indistinctive trance (savitarka samādhi); the Suddhanivāsas enjoy the bliss of the Meditative trance. The Satyābhās revel in pure bliss, (ānanda). The Samjñāsamjñinas are happy in the Egoistic trance. They live within the three regions (trilokī).

These are the seven regions including the Brahmālokas. The Vi-dehas and the Pakṣitīlayas have reached the state of quasi-freedom, they have therefore not been placed in the phenomenal world.

All this, the yet unseen, the Yogī must see by performing Saṁyama over the solar entrance and thence over the connected objects. Let him practise until all becomes clear.—131.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'Knowledge of the regions by Saṁyama over the sun.'

First, the Commentator describes the seven regions briefly up to the end of the verse which puts them together. Then he takes up in detailed description :—'Then up from Avīchi, etc.' The word 'ghana' is used for Prithivī (earth). These great regions are to be understood as having many sub-divisions. He gives their other names :—'The Mahākāla, &c.' 'Its night and day take their round of existence from the motion of the sun.' Whichever portion the sun leaves, there is night. Whichever the sun adorns there is day.

He gives the dimensions of the whole of the Jambudvīpa. This is a hundred thousand yojanas. How is this hundred thousand arranged? Half of it, that is fifty thousand, is placed on either side of the Meru. It is for this reason that the Meru is the middle thereof. The oceans are twice each. They are like heaps of mustard seed. As the heap of mustard seed is neither above the ground like a heap of barley, nor yet level with the surface of the earth, so are the oceans also. They are adorned by mountains as with ornaments. Such are the dvīpas. All this sphere of the earth is very well arranged in the body of Brahmā's Egg together with the seven dvīpas and all its forests and mountains, cities, oceans, which surround it like a necklace.

Now he shows who live there in different places :—'Here then in the Pātālas, &c.'

He mentions the arrangement of the Sumeru :—'Sumeru is the garden of the gods.'

Having described the Bhurloka with its various details, he now describes the Antarīkṣaloka as well with details :—'Above the Sumeru is the astral region, &c.'

'Operation of motive forces,' means the working of the forces.

He describes the heaven world :—'In the Mahendra loka, &c.'

'Classes of gods' means species of gods. He describes the highest of powers of all the six :—'All of them have the power of fulfilment, &c.' Desirable objects come to them by the mere force of wishing for them. They are very beautiful, adorable. 'They enjoy their desires.' This means that they are fond of the sex-passion.

He describes the Maharloka :—'In the great, &c.' 'They have the Mahābhūtas in their power.' Whatever they like, the Mahābhūtas supply them with. The Mahābhūtas take this and that form in obedience to and in accordance with their wishes.

'Contemplation is their food' :—They are satisfied by mere contemplation and grow thereby.

He describes the Janaloka :—'In the first of the Brahmālokas, &c.' 'They have power over the elements and the powers of sensation, &c.' The elements are the Prithivī, &c. The powers are the senses of hearing, &c. Howsoever they desire to employ these, they do so employ them.

Following the order of the above description he now takes up the second region of Brahmā :—'In the second, &c., they have power over the source, &c.' The source is the five tanmātras. They have power over them. The Āgamīs say that by their wish the tanmātras take the form of any body they desire.

'Each lives twice as much as the preceding one' :—The Mahābhāsvaras have twice the limit of the age of the Abhāsvaras; the Satyamahāsvaras have double their age. This is the meaning.

'Their knowledge is not checked in the region above them' :—'Above' means in the Satyaloka. From the Avīchi up to the Tapaloka whatever is there of the subtle and remote, they know.

He describes the third region of Brahmā, the Satyaloka :—'In the third sphere of Brahmā, &c.' 'They do not build habitations, houses.' Because they have no place where to support themselves, they live in themselves independent of any support in space.

They have power over the Mūlaprakṛiti. The three qualities, the Sattva, the Rajas and the Tamas, function in accordance with their wishes. They live up to the end of creation. And so it is heard:—Having reached the performance of a function similar to that of Brahmā, their spirits are prepared for that, and they accordingly reach the highest state.

Having described the generic function of the gods, he now takes their names and describes the specific functions of each:—‘Of these the Achyutas, &c.’ The gods named Achyutas derive their happiness by the contemplation of gross objects. They are satisfied thereby. The gods known as Suddhanivāsinas find happiness in the contemplation of subtle objects; they are pleased thereby. The gods named Satyābhās derive happiness from the contemplation of the objects of the senses. The Samjñāsamjñīnas derive their happiness from the contemplation of egoism alone, and are pleased thereby. All these take up the Cognitive trance.

Why are the performers of the ultra-cognitive trance, the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas, not placed within the lokas? Those whose Will-to-be is active and shows objects to the Puruṣa, carry on the evolution of the universe and are, therefore, within the world. Not so the Videhas and the Prakṛitilayas, even though their minds have still their duty to fulfil. All this up to the Satyaloka and down to the Avichi, the Yogī should know in the solar entrance, i. e., the tube called Suṣumnā.

Even by this much all is not known. For this reason he says:—‘And thence on other objects besides the Suṣumnā, wherever the teacher of Yoga points out, until all this world becomes visible.’

The essence of the Will-to-know is by its very nature possessed of the power of illuminating the universe. Being however covered by darkness it illuminates only those regions from which the cover is removed by Rajas. When the solar entrance is uncovered, the regions are illuminated. This rule does not apply elsewhere. The Saṁyama performed elsewhere has only the power of unveiling as much of the Buddhist essence, as the Saṁyama is performed with reference to. Thus all is plain.—25.

Sūtra 26.

चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानम् ॥२६॥

चन्द्रे Chandre, on the moon. तारा Tārā, of the stars, starry. व्यूह Vyūha, of the systems. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, the knowledge.

26. On the moon, the knowledge of the starry systems.—132.

चन्द्रे ताराव्यूहज्ञानम् । चन्द्रं संयमं कृत्वा ताराणां व्यूहं विजानीयात् ॥ २६ ॥

VYĀSA.

Let him know the starry systems by performing Saṁyama with reference to the moon.—132.

Sūtra 27.

ध्रुवे तद्गतिज्ञानम् ॥२७॥

ध्रुवे Dhruve, on the pole-star. तद् Tad, of their. गति Gati, movement. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, the knowledge.

27. On the pole-star the knowledge of their movements.—133.

ध्रुवे तद्गतिज्ञानम् । ततो ध्रुवे संयमं कृत्वा ताराणां गतिं विजानीयात् । ऊर्ध्व-
विमानेषु संयमं कृत्वा तानि विजानीयात् ॥ २७ ॥

VYĀSA.

Then let him know the movements of the stars by performing Saṁyama with reference to the pole-star.—133.

Sūtra 28.

नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानम् ॥२८॥

नाभि Nābhi, of the navel. चक्रे Chakre, on the plexus. काय Kāya, of the body. व्यूह Vyūha, of the system. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, the knowledge.

28. On the plexus of the navel, the knowledge of the system of the body.—134.

नाभिचक्रे कायव्यूहज्ञानम् । नाभिचक्रे संयमं कृत्वा कायव्यूहं विजानीयात् ।
धातपित्तश्लेष्माणस्यो दैवाः । धातवः सप्त त्वग्लोहितमांसस्नाय्वस्थिमज्जाशुक्राणि ।
पूर्वं पूर्वमेवां बाह्यमित्येष विन्यासः ॥ २८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Let him know the system of the body by performing Saṁyama over the plexus of the navel. There are three humours, gas, bile and phlegm. There are seven substances, skin, blood, muscle, tendon, bone, fat and semen. The previous in order among these is external to the next following. Such is their comparative position.—134.

Sūtra 29.

कण्ठकूपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः ॥२९॥

कण्ठ Kaṇṭha, of the throat. कूपे Kūpe, in the pit. क्षुत् Kṣut, of hunger. पिपासा Pipāsā, thirst. निवृत्तिः Nivṛtitiḥ, the subdual.

29. In the pit of the throat, subdual of hunger and thirst.—135.

कण्ठकूपे क्षुत्पिपासानिवृत्तिः । जिह्वाया अधस्ताच्चन्तुस्ततोऽधस्तात्कण्ठस्ततोऽध-
स्तात्कूपस्तत्र संयमाच्छुत्पिपासे न बाधेते ॥ २९ ॥

VYĀSA.

Below the tongue is the throat; below that the gullet; below that the pit (stomach). By Saṁyama there, hunger and thirst cease not.—135.

Sūtra 30.

कूर्मनाड्यां स्थैर्यम् ॥३०॥

कूर्मनाड्यान् Kūrma-nāḍyām, tortoise tube, स्थैर्यम् Sthairyam, steadiness.

30. On the tortoise tube (kurmanāḍī), steadiness.—136.

कूर्मनाड्यां स्थैर्यम् । कूपादध उरसि कूर्माकारा नाडी तस्यां कृतसंयमः स्थिरपदं
लभते । यथा सर्पे गोधा चेति ॥ ३० ॥

VYĀSA,

Below the throat pit in the chest is a tube of the shape of a tortoise. By performance over that, the Yogī gets firmness of position as that of snake, alligator, &c. (i.e., the power of hibernation).—136.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

26, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

Whatever the Yogī wishes to know, he must perform Saṁyama with reference to that. Thus Saṁyama tending to bring about the cessation of hunger and thirst and steadiness have been taught by the words of the aphorism and have been explained by the words of the Commentary already explained.—30.

Sūtra 31.

मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् ॥ ३१ ॥

मूर्धं Murdha, of the head, the coronal. ज्योतिषि Jyotiṣi, on the light सिद्ध Siddha, of the perfected ones. दर्शनम् Darśanam, the vision.

31. In the coronal light, vision of the Perfected-Ones.—137.

मूर्धज्योतिषि सिद्धदर्शनम् । शिरः कपालेऽन्तर्दिष्टं प्रभास्वरं ज्योतिस्तत्र संयमं
कृत्वा सिद्धानां द्यावापृथिव्योरन्तरालचारिणां दर्शनम् ॥ ३१ ॥

VYĀSA.

In the skull there is a bright light in the hole. By Saṁyama thereupon comes vision of the perfected ones, the Siddhās, moving in space between earth and heaven.—137.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By the word 'coronal' the Suṣumnā tube is indicated. The Saṁyama is to be there.—31.

Sūtra 32.

प्रातिभाद्वा सर्वम् ॥ ३२ ॥

प्रातिभाद् Prāti bhād, by prescience. वा Va, or. सर्वम् Sarvam, all.

32. Or, all knowledge by prescience (prātibha).—138.

प्रातिभाद्वा सर्वम् । प्रातिभं नाम तारकं तद्विवेकजस्य ज्ञानस्य पूर्वरूपम् । यथो-
दये प्रभा भास्करस्य तेन वा सर्वमेव जानाति योगी प्रातिभस्य ज्ञानस्योत्पत्ताविति ॥ ३२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Prescience is also named Tāraka. It is the fore-runner of discriminative knowledge, as light is the fore-runner of the sun at sunrise. The Yogī may also know everything by that, (as an alternative means) after the birth of knowledge, called prescience.—138.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Prātibha, prescience, is the same as self-suggestion (Uha), the coming into consciousness without external aid of anything unknown. When Saṁyama is performed with the object of attaining the Highest Intellection, then at the time of the height of practice, there takes its rise a power which, as it were, draws in all knowledge. The Yogī knows everything by that. It is called Tāraka, (from tri to swim, to cross over), because by bringing about the Highest Intellection it helps in crossing over the world of life and death.—32.

Sūtra 33.

हृदये चित्तसंवित् ॥ ३३ ॥

हृदये Hṛidaye, in the heart. चित्त Chitta, of the mind. संवित् Saṁvit, the knowledge.

33. In the heart, the knowledge of the mind.—139.

हृदये चित्तसंवित् । यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेद्यं तत्र विज्ञानं तस्मि-
न्संयमाच्चित्तसंवित् ॥ ३३ ॥

VYĀSA.

In the lotus-like cavity, the temple in the city of Brahmā, lives the Intelligence. By performing Saṁyama with reference to that, comes the power of knowing the (Chitta).—139.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The Commentator describes the word Heart (Hṛidaya). The self is called Brahma, being largest of all. His city is that in which he is housed, knowing it as he does to be his own. Cavity means hollow. The same is the lotus too with its face downwards. The same is the temple.

He gives the reason for the mind knowing mind (the Manas knowing the Chitta): 'Intelligence lives there.' By Saṁyama over that, the Yogī knows the Chitta with its modifications.—33.

Sūtra 34.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो
भोगः परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थसंयमात्पुरुषज्ञानम् ॥ ३४ ॥

सत्त्व Sattva, of the objective essence. पुरुषयोः Puruṣayoḥ, and of the Puruṣa. अत्यन्त Atyanta, quite. असङ्कीर्णयोः Asaṅkīrṇayoḥ, distinct from each other. प्रत्यय Pratyaya, the notion of distinction. अविशेषः Avišeṣaḥ, the absence. भोगः Bhogaḥ, is experience. परार्थत्वात् Parārthatvāt, because it exists for another. स्वार्थे Svārtha, on his own object. संयमात् Saṁyamāt, by Saṁyama. पुरुष-ज्ञानम् Puruṣa-Jñānam, the knowledge of the Puruṣa.

34. Experience consists in the absence of the notion of distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective-Essence, which are really quite distinct-from-each-other,

because it exists for another. By Samyama on his own object, comes the knowledge of the Puruṣa—140.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः परार्थत्वात्स्वार्थसंयमात्पुरुष-
ज्ञानम् । बुद्धिसत्त्वं प्रख्याशीलम् । समानसत्त्वोपनिबन्धने रजस्तमसो वशीकृत्य सत्त्वपुरु-
षान्यताप्रत्ययेन परिणतम् । तस्माच्च सत्त्वात्परिणामिनोऽत्यन्तविधर्मा विशुद्धोऽन्यदिच-
तिमात्ररूपः पुरुषस्तयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषो भोगः । पुरुषस्य दर्शितविषय-
त्वात् । स भोगप्रत्ययः सत्त्वस्य परार्थत्वाद् दृश्यः । यस्तु तस्माद्विशिष्टचित्तिमात्ररूपोऽन्यः
पौरुषेयः प्रत्ययस्तत्र संयमात्पुरुषविषया प्रज्ञा जायते । न च पुरुषप्रत्ययेन बुद्धिसत्त्वात्मना
पुरुषो दृश्यते । पुरुष एव तं प्रत्ययं स्वात्मावलम्बनं पश्यति । तथा ह्युक्तम् । विज्ञातार-
मरे केन विज्ञानीयादिति ॥ ३४ ॥

VYĀSA.

The essence of the Will-to-be is of the nature of illumination ; and when it overpowers the qualities of Disturbing energy (Rajas) and Inertia (Tamas), which are equally related to it by co-existence, it takes up the form of the notion of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective Essence. Widely different from that changing Objective Existence also in characteristic is the Puruṣa who appears as pure consciousness. They are quite distinct from each other. Experience consists in the notions of the two not being taken as distinct, because the objects are shown to him. The notion of enjoyment is the knowable, because the Essence of matter exists for another. There is another notion, however, the notion of the Puruṣa, which is quite distinct from this, and which appears as pure consciousness.

By Samyama with reference to this notion is born the knowledge of the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is not known by that notion of itself, which is the self-same as the Objective Buddhi. The Puruṣa only sees that notion of self by himself. And so it has been said :—' By what, Oh ! is the knower to be known ?—140.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

When the Essence of the Will-to-be, which is of the very nature of the luminous essence of things, which is extremely pure, and which is on account of the utter suppression of the Rajas and Tamas modified into the phenomenon of the distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence, is entirely different from the Puruṣa, what to speak of the Rajas and the Tamas ? It is with this in his mind that the author of the aphorisms says, ' Distinction between the Puruṣa and the Objective Essence.'

Having the same in mind the author of the Commentary too says :—' The essence of the Will-to-be, &c.' Not only possessing the nature of illumination, but modified too at the same time as the discriminative knowledge, and therefore extremely pure and luminous, it therefore bears extreme resemblance to consciousness. This would mean confusion.

For this reason he says :—' Which are equally related to it by co-existence.' Co-existence is the relation of one not existing without the other. Those which bear the relation of co-existence equally, are the qualities of Disturbing Energy (Rajas) and Inertia (Tamas), 'Overpowering' means controlling. He describes the absence of confusion :—' Widely different from the Changing Objective, &c.'

The word 'also' signifies that it is not only different from the Sattva, but from the Rajas and Tamas also. 'Changing Objective existence' is used to indicate the distinction of the unchanging Puruṣa.

'The notion of these two not being taken as distinctive':—The Will-to-be is of the nature of either the quiescent, the disturbed, or the forgetful notions. When consciousness is reflected into it, then the quiescence, the disturbance and the forgetfulness are fastened on to the consciousness. (This happens in the same way) as the moon reflected into pure water, looks as if trembling on account of the unsteadiness of the water.

He mentions the cause of experience :—'Because the objects are shown to the Puruṣa.' This has been explained often.

Well ; let the essence of the Will-to-be different from the Puruṣa. But how can experience be different from the Puruṣa ? For this reason he says :—'The notion of enjoyment,' i. e., the notion consisting of enjoyment, 'is of the Objective Essence and therefore existing for the sake of another.' All that is enjoyable is of the nature of the knowable. Objective Essence is for the sake of another, because it consists of many things brought together ; and because experience is a characteristic. That also is for the sake of another. It becomes the enjoyable of that particular enjoyer for whose sake soever it may be in existence.

Or, it may be said that experience is the feeling of pleasure and pain as being in consonance or dissonance with the prevailing mental trend at any time. This cannot be in consonance or dissonance with itself. No self-contradictory manifestation can exist in itself. Hence it must be the objects that are either in consonance or dissonance ; and it is this that constitutes experience. The self is the enjoyer ; the knowable is that which he enjoys.

'Which is quite distinct from this':—The words 'on account of existence for the sake of another' are to be supplied here as understood to explain the distinction.

Well ; let that be. But if the Puruṣa is thus the object of knowledge, then there must be posited another intelligence, which this intelligence knows, and so on and on and thus there would be no stability of thought. For this reason he says :—'The Puruṣa is not known by that notion of itself, &c.' This is the construction: The non-intelligent is illuminated by consciousness, not consciousness by the non-intelligent. How could the notion of the Puruṣa (being non-intelligent, as being a modification of the Will-to-be illuminate the conscious self ? It has, however, been said that the conscious self, not depending for illumination upon another, illuminates the non-intelligent. By saying that the notion of the Puruṣa is of the nature of the essence of the Will-to-be, it is meant to be stated that it is of the nature of the non-intelligent, and is therefore unconscious as such. What looks like the objective appearance of the Puruṣa, and becomes as such an object of knowledge, is the reflection of the Puruṣa into the essence of the Will-to-be. This reflection depends upon the Puruṣa as the reflection of the face into the mirror depends upon the face. The Will-to-be becomes the object of the Puruṣa by that reflection and not in its own nature of illumination. The notion of self-knowledge consists in making the object of knowledge, the reflection of the Puruṣa into the Buddhi. He illustrates the same by a Vedic text (Br. Up. II, 4-14 :—) 'And so it has been said' by Īsvara :—'By what Oh ! is the knower to be known ?' That is, by nothing.—34.

Sūtra 35.

ततः प्रातिभ्रवणवेदनादर्शास्वादवार्ता जायन्ते ॥३५॥

ततः Tatah, thence. प्रातिभ्रः Prātibha, prescience. श्रवण Śrāvāṇa, higher hearing. वेदन Vedana, higher touch, आदर्श Ādarśa, higher vision. आस्वाद Āsvāda, higher taste. वार्ता Vārtā, higher smell. जायन्ते Jāyante, proceed.

35. Thence proceed prescience, higher hearing, touch, vision, taste, and smell.—141.

ततः प्रातिभ्रवणवेदनादर्शास्वादवार्ता जायन्ते । प्रातिभात्सुक्ष्मव्यवहितविप्रकृष्टातीतानागतज्ञानम् । श्रवणाद्विश्वश्रवणम् । वेदनाद्विव्यस्पर्शाधगमः । आदर्शाद्विव्यरूपसंविद् । आस्वादाद्विरससंविद् । वार्ताते दिव्यगन्धविज्ञानमित्येतानि नित्यं जायन्ते ॥ ३५ ॥

VYĀSA.

By prescience comes the knowledge of the subtle, the intercepted, the remote and the past and future. By higher hearing comes the hearing of divine sounds; by touch, the knowledge of divine touch; by vision comes the knowledge of heavenly colour; by smell, the cognition of higher odours; by taste comes the cognition of divine tastes. These are born constantly.—141.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Saṅgyama over self-illumination is impossible until the Pradhāna has fulfilled its object of making the whole of herself known to the Puruṣa. Therefore, the author shows all the attainments which precede it:—'Thence proceed prescience, higher hearing, touch, vision, taste, and smell.' By this it is also said that mind, hearing, skin, eye, tongue and nose favourably strengthened with the virtues resulting from the practice of Yoga, are the invisible causes respectively of prescience and higher hearing, &c.

The words Śrāvāna, &c., used in the text are technical terms for denoting the hearing of divine sounds, &c. The Commentary is easy.—35.

Sūtra 36.

ते समाधायुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः ॥३६॥

ते Te, they. समाधि Samādhai, to trance. उपसर्गाः Upasargāḥ, obstacles. व्युत्थाने Vyutthāne, to the outgoing of the mind. सिद्धयः Siddhayaḥ, perfections.

36. They are obstacles to trance, but perfections to the out-going mind.—142.

ते समाधायुपसर्गा व्युत्थाने सिद्धयः । ते प्रातिभादयः समाहितचित्तस्थोत्पद्यमाना उपसर्गास्तद्दर्शनप्रत्यनीकत्वात् । व्युत्थितचित्तस्थोत्पद्यमानाः सिद्धयः ॥ ३६ ॥

VYĀSA.

They, the powers of prescience, &c., prove to be obstacles when they appear in a mind which has reached the state of trance; because they oppose the knowledge obtained in that state. When, however, they appear in a mind which is active in going out, they are attainments.—142.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

As it may be that one who has been performing Saṅgyama with reference to the self, may on the appearance of these attainments think that he has achieved what had to be achieved, and thus give up further effort, the author says:—'They are obstacles to trance, but perfections to the out-going mind.'

It is only he whose mind is active in going out that becomes proud of the possession of these as attainments. A beggar in life may think that the possession of a little wealth is the fulness of riches. The Yogi, however, who is inclined to the attainment of trance must reject them whenever they come. He has vowed the removal of all the three descriptions of pain to their utmost limit. That being the object of the Puruṣa, how can he take pleasure in the attainments which are the opponents of that state of being? This is the meaning of the aphorism and the commentary.—36.

Sūtra 37.

बन्धकारणशैथिल्यात्प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः ॥ ३७ ॥

बन्ध Bandha, of bondage. कारण Kāraṇa, of the cause. शैथिल्यात् Śaithilyāt, on relaxation. प्रचार Prachāra, of the passages. संवेदनात् Saṃvedanāt, by knowledge. च Cha, and. चित्तस्य Chittasya, of the mind. पर Para, other's. शरीर Śarīra, body. आवेशः Āveśaḥ, entering into.

37. The mind may enter another body, on relaxation of the cause of bondage, and by knowledge of the passages of the mind.—143.

बन्धकारणशैथिल्यात्प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च चित्तस्य परशरीरावेशः । लेलीभूतस्य मनसोऽप्रतिष्ठस्य शरीरे कर्माशयवशाद् बन्धः प्रतिष्ठेत्यर्थः । तस्य कर्मणो बन्धकारणस्य शैथिल्यं समाधिबलाद्भवति । प्रचारसंवेदनं च चित्तस्य समाधिजमेव कर्मबन्धक्षयात्स्वचित्तस्य प्रचारसंवेदनाच्च योगी चित्तं स्वशरीरान्निष्कृष्य शरीरान्तरेषु निःक्षिपति निःक्षिप्तं चित्तं चेन्द्रियाण्यनुपतन्ति । यथा मधुकरराजानं मक्षिका उत्पतन्तमनुत्पतन्ति निविशमानमनुनिविशन्ति तथेन्द्रियाणि परशरीरावेशे चित्तमनुविधीयन्त इति ॥ ३७ ॥

VYĀSA.

The mind (chitta) which by nature passes into new states of life and never remains fixed in one state, is bound down to, i.e., comes to stay in a body, because of the power of the vehicle of action. By the force of trance, the vehicle of action which chains it down, slackens its operation. And the consciousness of how the mind acts in the body is also the fruit of trance. By the destruction of the bonds imposed by Karma, and by knowing the method of the mind acting upon the body, the Yogi withdraws his mind from his own body and throws it into the body of another. As the mind is thus thrown into another body, the powers of sensation, &c., follow it. Even as bees follow their king, as he goes on resting or moving on, so do the powers follow the mind as it enters another body.—143.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having described the power of knowledge, which has its culmination in the knowledge of the Puruṣa, as being the result of Saṁyama, the author now describes the result of Saṁyama which takes the shape of the power of action :—'The mind may enter another body on relaxation of the cause of bondage, and by knowledge of the passages of the mind.' 'By the force of trance':—This means the performance of Saṁyama on the cause of bondage. Trance alone is mentioned because that is the principal factor of the three. By 'passages of the mind' are understood the passages through which and the modes according to which the mind acts in the body. There are nerves in the body by which the mind travels in the body to perform its functions. From the performance of Saṁyama on the passage of the mind along these nerves, accrues the consciousness thereof, which slackens the bond. Then by destruction of the cause of bondage he no longer remains confined to the body. But it may be that even though he may no longer be confined to the body, he may not know how to get out of the body by the proper passage, and he may thus not be able to go out of the body without injury, and may not also be able to enter another body. For this reason the passages and modes of movement also must be known. As the powers of sensation, &c., follow the mind they take their proper places in the body, as the mind enters therein.—37.

Sūtra 38.

उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककण्टकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च ॥३८॥

उदान Udāna, over Udāna. जयात् Jayāt, by mastery. जल Jala, water. पङ्क Paṅka, mud. कण्टक Kaṅṭaka, thorns, with these. आदिषु Ādiṣu, and with the others. असङ्गः Asaṅgaḥ, non-contact. उत्क्रान्तिः Utkrāntiḥ, ascension. च Cha, and.

38. By mastery over UDĀNA, ascension and non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c.—144.

उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककण्टकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च । समस्तेन्द्रियवृत्तिः प्राणादिलक्षणा जीवनं तस्य क्रिया पञ्चतयी प्राणो मुखनासिकागतिराहृदयवृत्तिः । समं नयनात्समानश्चानाम्भिवृत्तिः । अपनयनादपान आपादतलवृत्तिः । उन्नयनादुदान आशिरोवृत्तिः व्यापी व्यान इति । एषां प्रधानं प्राणः । उदानजयाज्जलपङ्ककण्टकादिष्वसङ्ग उत्क्रान्तिश्च प्रायणकाले भवति तां वशित्वेन प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Life which shows itself as the operations of Prāṇa and others, is the manifestation of all the powers of sensation and action. Its action is five-fold. The Prāṇa moves through the mouth and the nose, and manifests itself within the chest.

The Samāna manifests up to the navel. It is so called because it carries equally (Sama) (to all parts of the body, the juice of food, &c.). Manifesting down to the soles of feet (all over) is the Apāna, so called because it carries away (apa). Manifesting up to the head is the Udāna, so called because it carries upward (ut). The Vyāna is so called because it pervades the whole body in every direction. Of these, the Prāṇa is the chief.

'By mastery over Udāna is secured non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c., and ascension comes at the time of death. He secures that because he has the power.'—144.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By mastery over Udāna is secured non-contact with water, mud, thorns, &c. 'Life is the manifestation of the functions of all the powers of sensation, &c.' It functions as Prāṇa, &c. Prāṇa and others are indications thereof. The functioning of the indriyas is two-fold, external and internal. The external is indicated by the cognition of colour, &c. The internal function is life. It is a particular effort, which is the common property of all the indriyas (powers of action and sensation) and the cause of the different actions of the Vāyu Tattva, the motive power of the body. As they say :—'Prāṇa and other motive forces, the functions of the Vāyu Tattva, are the five modifications of the Vāyu Tattva. They are the five modifications of the Indriyas (powers of action and sensation) in common. Because they point to this that 'its action is five-fold,' the action of that effort (prayatna) is five-fold.

The Prāṇa has its sphere from the fore-part of the nose down to the heart. The Samāna is that which carries equally, that is, to places where it is properly required and inasmuch as is required, the chyle which is made of foods and drinks. Its sphere of action is down from the heart to the navel. The Apāna is the cause of sending out of the body urine, feces, fetus, &c. Its sphere of action is up to the navel and also down to the soles of feet. The Udāna is so called because it carries upwards chyle, &c. Its function is from the fore-part of the nose up to the head. The Vyāna is all-pervading. The Prāṇa is the chief of all these that have been described, because the Vedic text speaks of all these going out when Prāṇa goes out.

Having thus described the differences of Prāṇa, &c., with reference to their functions and the places of their location, the Commentator now introduces the aphorism :—'By mastery over Udāna, &c.' When Udāna is mastered by the performance of Saṁyama thereupon, he is no longer checked by water, &c.

As to ascension, that takes place by the path which has its beginning in the flame (the Archirādi, northern path), after death. Having mastered that path, he ascends by that path.

By the performance over Prāṇa, &c., and by the acquirement of mastery over these, come appropriate attainments too. They should be understood according to the differences of their function, place of manifestation, and mastery, etc.—38.

Sūtra 39.

समानजयाज्ज्वलनम् ॥३९॥

समान Samāna, over Samāna. जयात् Jayāt, by mastery. ज्वलनम् Jvalanam, effulgence.

39. By mastery over Samāna comes effulgence.—145.

समानजयाज्ज्वलनम् । जितसमानस्तेजस उपध्मानं कृत्वा ज्वलयति ॥ ३९ ॥

VYĀSA.

He who has obtained mastery over the Samāna blows the fire into flame and thus shines.—145.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The fire is of the body. The blowing it into flame means rendering it brighter.—39.

Sūtra 40.

श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमादिव्यं श्रोत्रम् ॥४०॥

श्रोत्रं Śrotra, the power of hearing. आकाश Âkâśa, Âkâśa between these two. सम्बन्ध Sambandha, over the relation. संयमात् Saṃyamât, by Saṃyama. दिव्यं Divyam, higher. श्रोत्रं Śrotram, power of hearing.

40. By Saṃyama over the relation between Âkâśa and the power-of-hearing, comes the higher power-of-hearing.—146.

श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमादिव्यं श्रोत्रम् । सर्वश्रोत्राणामाकाशं प्रतिष्ठा सर्वशब्दानां च । यथाक्तम् । तुल्यदेशश्रवणानामेकदेशश्रुतिव्यं सर्वेषां भवतीति । तच्चैतदाकाशस्य लिङ्गम् । अनावरणं चाक्तम् । तथामूर्तस्याप्यन्यत्रानावरणदर्शनाद्विभुत्वमपि प्रख्यातमाकाशस्य शब्दग्रहणनिमित्तं श्रोत्रम् । बधिराबधिरधेरेकः शब्दं गृह्णात्यपरो न गृह्णातीति तस्माच्छ्रोत्रमेव शब्दविषयम् । श्रोत्राकाशयोः संबन्धे कृतसंयमस्य योगिनो दिव्यं श्रोत्रं प्रवर्तते ॥ ४० ॥

VYĀSA.

In Âkâśa abide all powers of hearing and all sounds. As has been said :—'To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of hearing comes to be the same.'

And this is a reason for (the existence of Âkâśa). Absence of obstruction also has been so spoken of. The Âkâśa is also described as all-pervading, seeing that there is absence of obstruction in other places also than where a form may be.

The power of hearing is the means of perceiving sound. Of a deaf and a not-deaf, one senses sound and the other does not. Therefore, the power of hearing only is the sphere for the action of sound. Whoever performs Saṃyama with reference to the relation between the power of hearing and the Âkâśa, evolves the power of higher audition.—146.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

It has been said that the power of higher audition comes to the Yogī who is performing Saṃyama with reference to the purpose of the self, because there yet remains something of the Pradhāna to be seen. Now the author says that the powers of higher audition and other sense powers come by the performance of Saṃyama with reference to the powers themselves :—

'By Saṃyama on the relation between the power of hearing and Âkâśa (the soniferous ether) comes the higher power of audition.' He describes the sphere of Saṃyama :—'The relation between the power of hearing and Âkâśa,' the relation being that of the thing supporting and the thing supported.

All powers of hearing, even though they have their origin in the principle of egoism, reside in the Âkâśa, placed in the hollow of the ear. It is this where the power of hearing is located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or defect, as the case may be, is noticed in the power of hearing also.

Further, when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing, the sounds of solids, &c., are to be taken in, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear, stands in need of the capacity of resonance residing in the substratum, the Âkâśa of the ear.

In the perception of the external smells of solids, &c., by the senses of smell, &c., working in unison with the qualities of odour, &c., the operation is seen to be that the senses of smell, taste, touch, sight and hearing are located in physical vehicles only, because the powers of smell, &c., are seen to be working soundly or defectively when the physical vehicles are sound or injured respectively.

This sense of hearing then, having its origin in the principal of egoism, acts like iron, drawn as it is by sound originating and located in the mouth of the speaker, acting as loadstone, transforms them into its own modifications in sequence of the sounds of the speaker, and thus senses them. And it is for this reason that for every living creature, the perception of sound in external space is in the absence of defects, never void of authority. So says the quotation from Pañchasikha :—'To all those whose organs of hearing are similarly situated, the situation of hearing is the same.' All those are Chaitras and other organs of hearing are similarly situated in space. The meaning is that the powers of hearing of all are located in Âkâśa. Further the Âkâśa in which the power of hearing is located is born out of the soniferous Tanmātra, and has therefore the quality of sound inherent in itself. It is by this sound acting in unison that it takes the sounds of external solids, &c. Hence the hearing, i.e., the sound of all is of the same class. (The class is determined by the relative situation in space).

This then establishes that the Âkâśa is the substratum of the power of hearing, and also possesses quality of sound. And this sameness of the situation of sound is an indication of the existence of Âkâśa. That which is the substratum of the auditory power (Śruti) which manifests as sound of the same class, is Âkâśa. Such a manifestation of sound cannot be without such an auditory power. Nor is such an auditory power a quality of Pṛithvī, &c., because it cannot be in its own self both the manifest and manifested (vyangya and vyañjaka).

Further the absence of obstruction is an indication of Âkâśa. If there were no Âkâśa, the forms would be in such close contact with one another that even a needle-point would not find room between them. Everything would thus be obstructed by everything. It cannot be said that the absence of obstruction is the result only of the non-existence of things possessed of form, because non-existence depends upon existence, inasmuch as there can be no cessation of existence in the absence of existence. Further the power of consciousness cannot be its substratum, because it is immutable and cannot, therefore, be limited. And further space and time, &c., are nothing different from the Pṛithvī and other substances. Therefore such a kind of change can only be of the Âkâśa. Thus all is plain.

When it is shown that absence of obstruction is an indication of the existence of Âkâśa, then it is clear that wherever absence of obstruction is found, there must be Âkâśa in existence, and hence the Âkâśa is proved to be all-pervading also. For this reason, the Commentator says :—'Therefore although having no form, &c.'

He mentions authority for the existence of the power of hearing :—'The power of hearing is the means, &c.' Action is found to be capable of performance by means of an instrument only. As a hole can be made by a gimlet only, so here too the action of hearing sound can only be performed by means of some instrument only. Whatever is the instrument of hearing, is the power of hearing. But then why should not the eye and other organs be the instruments of hearing also? For this reason he says :—'A deaf and a not-deaf, &c.' The proof is given by the canons of agreement and difference both.

Further this is suggestive of other powers. By Samyama over the relations between the skin and Vāyu, the eye and the light, the taste and the Apas, the nose and Prithvī, the attainment of the higher powers of touch, &c., is also to be understood.—40.

Sūtra 41.

कायाकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चाकाशगमनम् ॥४१॥

कायाकाशयोः Kāyākāśayoh, between the body (काय) and the Ākāśa. सम्बन्ध Sam-bandha, over the relation. संयमात् Samyamāt, by Samyama. लघु Laghu, light. तूल Tūla, cotton. समापत्तेः Samāpatteh, by attaining to. च Cha, and. चाकाश Ākāśa, through space. गमनम् Gamanam, passage.

41. By Samyama on the relation between the body and the Ākāśa, or by attaining to (the state of thought transforming as) the lightness of cotton, &c., passage through space (Ākāśa).—147.

कायाकाशयोः संबन्धसंयमाल्लघुतूलसमापत्तेश्चाकाशगमनम् । यत्र कायस्तत्राकाशं तस्यावकाशदानात्कायस्य तेन संबन्धावाप्तिस्तत्र कृतसंयमो जित्वा तत्संबन्धं लघुषु वा तूलादिष्वपरमाणुसमापत्तिं लब्ध्वा जितसंबन्धा लघुर्भवति लघुत्वाच्च जले पादाभ्यां विहरति ततस्तूर्णनाभितन्तुमात्रे विहत्य रश्मिषु विहरति ततो यथेष्टमाकाशगतिरस्य भवतीति ॥ ४१ ॥

VYĀSA.

Wherever there is the body, there is the Ākāśa. The body becomes related to the Ākāśa, because the latter gives room to the former. Having mastered the relation by the attainment of the state of thought transforming into light things such as cotton, &c., down to the atom, the Yogī becomes light. Thence does he get the power of roaming through space and walking over water with his feet. He walks over a spider's web, and then walks over the rays of light. Then does he get the power of roaming through space at will.—147.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

By performance of Samyama on the relation between the body and the Ākāśa, or having attained by Samyama on cotton, &c., the state of the mind transforming itself as such, it becomes the cause of manifesting the qualities present therein. The Commentator mentions the stage of the attainments :—' Moves over water, &c.'—41.

Sūtra 42.

बहिरकल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशावरणक्षयः ॥४२॥

बहिः Bahiḥ, actual passing out. अकल्पिता Akalpita, outside the body. वृत्तिः Vṛtitiḥ, acting. महा-विदेहा Mahā-videhā, the great ex-corporeal. ततः Tataḥ, by that. प्रकाश Prakāśa, of light. आवरण Āvarana, of the veil. क्षयः Kṣayaḥ, the destruction.

42. Actual-passing-out and acting outside the body is the Great Excorporeal; by that is destroyed the veil of light.—148.

बहिरकल्पिता वृत्तिर्महाविदेहा ततः प्रकाशावरणक्षयः । शरीराद् बहिर्मेनसो वृत्तिलाभो विदेहा नाम धारणा सा यदि शरीरप्रतिष्ठस्य मनसो बहिर्वृत्तिमात्रेण भवति सा कल्पितेत्युच्यते । या तु शरीरनिरपेक्षा बहिर्भूतस्यैव मनसो बहिर्वृत्तिः सा खल्वकल्पिता तत्र कल्पितया साध्यन्त्यकल्पितां महाविदेहामिति । यया परशरीराण्याविशन्ति योगिनः । ततश्च धारणातः प्रकाशात्मनो बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य यदावरणं क्लेशकर्मधिपाकत्रयं रजस्तमोमूलं तस्य च क्षयो भवति ॥ ४२ ॥

VYĀSA.

That form of concentration in which the mind acts upon something outside the body, is named excorporeal concentration.

This excorporeal concentration, if taking place by merely the mind functioning, while yet staying in the body, is called Fancied (kalpita) Excorporeal.

That, however, in which the mind has no need of the body left and passes out of the body and then functions outside the body, is called the Actual Excorporeal concentration.

Of these, the Actual Excorporeal, which is also called the Great Excorporeal, is attained by means of the Fancied Excorporeal. It is by this that the Yogis effect their entrance into other bodies. By this concentration the veil of the luminous essence of the Will-to-be, in the shape of the three vehicles of affliction, action and fruition, which has its origin in the Rajas and Tamas, is destroyed.—148.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes another Samyama too, which becomes the means of entering into another body, and also the means of destruction of afflictions, actions and fruitions :—' Actual passing out of the body and then acting there, is the Great Excorporeal; by this the veil of light is destroyed.'

The Commentator describes the Excorporeal :—' That form of concentration in which the mind functions outside the body, &c.' In order to describe the nature of the Actual Excorporeal and for explaining its means, he describes the Fancied Excorporeal :—' If that, &c.' ' By merely the mind functioning outside the body.' Fancy means that the presence outside the body has been fancied, although the mind is still in the body and has been acting outside only functionally and not by actual presence.

He describes the Great Excorporeal :—' That however.' Now he says that the relation between the Fancied and the Actual Excorporeal is that the former is the means of attaining the other.' ' By that concentration.'—By means of that concentration the mental modification of the Great Excorporeal is achieved. The afflictions, the actions and the three-fold fruition thereof in the shape of life-state, life-time and life-experience have all their origin in the Rajas and the Tamas; because when the Rajas and the Tamas are

destroyed, the manifestation of the discrimination takes place by the quality of essentiality (Sattva) alone. This three-fold fruition having its origin in the Rajas and the Tamas, is of their nature and covers the essence of the Will to-be therewith. It is destroyed with its destruction, and the mind of the Yogī goes about at will and similarly knows also.—42.

Sūtra 43.

स्थूलस्वरूपसूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद् भूतजयः ॥ ४३ ॥

स्थूल Sthūla, the gross. स्वरूप Svarūpa, the substantive. सूक्ष्म Sūkṣma, the astral. अन्वय Anvaya, conjunction. अर्थवत्त्व Arthavattva, purposefulness. संयमाद् Saṃyamād, by Saṃyama. भूत-जयः Bhūta-jayaḥ, mastery over the elements.

43. By Saṃyama on the gross (sthūla), the substantive (svarūpa), the astral (sūkṣma), conjunction (anvaya) and purposefulness (arthavattva), is obtained mastery over the elements (bhūtas).—149.

स्थूलस्वरूपसूक्ष्मान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमाद्भूतजयः । तत्र पार्थिवाद्याः शब्दादयो विशेषाः सहकारादिभिर्धर्मैः स्थूलशब्देन परिभाषिताः । एतद्भूतानां प्रथमं रूपम् । द्वितीयं रूपं स्वसामान्यं मूर्तिर्भूमिः । स्नेहो जलं बहिरुष्णता वायुः प्रणामी सर्वतो गतिराकाश इत्येतत्स्वरूपशब्देनोच्यते । अस्य सामान्यस्य शब्दादयो विशेषाः । तथा चोक्तम् । एकजातिसमन्वितानामेषां धर्ममात्रव्यावृत्तिरिति । सामान्यविशेषसमुदायोऽत्र द्रव्यं द्रष्टव्यम् । द्विष्टो हि समूहः प्रत्यस्तमितभेदावयवानुगतः शरीरं वृक्षो यूथं वनमिति शब्देनोपात्तभेदावयवानुगतः समूहः । उभये देवमनुष्याः । समूहस्य देवा एव एकौ भागो मनुष्या द्वितीयो भागस्ताभ्यामेवाभिधीयते समूहः । स च भेदाभेदविवक्षितः । आभ्राणां वनं ब्राह्मणानां सङ्घ इति । आभ्रवणं ब्राह्मणसङ्घ इति । स पुनर्द्विविधो युतसिद्धावयवोऽयुतसिद्धावयवश्च । युतसिद्धावयवः समूहो वनं सङ्घ इति । अयुतसिद्धावयवः सङ्घातः शरीरं वृक्षः परमाणुरिति । अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहो द्रव्यमिति पतञ्जलिः । एतत्स्वरूपमित्युक्तम् । अथ किमेषां सूक्ष्मरूपं तन्मात्रं भूतकारणं तस्यैकोऽवयवः परमाणुः सामान्यविशेषात्मा अयुतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समुदाय इत्येवं सर्वं तन्मात्राण्येतत्तृतीयम् । अथ भूतानां चतुर्थं रूपं क्वातिक्रियास्थितिशीला गुणाः कायस्वभावानुपातिनोऽवयवशब्देनोक्ताः । अथैषां पञ्चमं रूपमर्थवत्त्वं भोगापवर्गार्थता गुणेष्वेवान्वयिनी । गुणास्तन्मात्रभूतमौक्तिकेष्विति सर्वमर्थवत् । तेष्विदानीं भूतेषु पञ्चसु पञ्चरूपेषु रूपे संयमात्तस्य तस्य रूपस्य स्वरूपदर्शनं जयश्च प्रादुर्भवति । तत्र पञ्चभूतस्वरूपाणि जित्वा भूतजयी भवति । तज्जयाद्भूतानुसारिण्य इव यावोऽस्य सङ्कल्पानुविधायिन्यो भूतप्रकृतयो भवन्ति ॥ ४३ ॥

VYĀSA.

Here the word Sthūla, gross, is used to denote the specific forms of Pīthvī, Apas, Tejas, Vāyu and Ākāśa, which appear as sound, colour, taste and odour, and have the qualities of conjoint action, &c. This is the first appearance of the elements.

The second appearance is that which is common to the others too. The Pīthvī has forms, the Apas smoothness, the Tejas heat, the Vāyu impulsion, the Ākāśa motion in every direction. This is denoted by the word substantive appearance (svarūpa), sounds, touches, tastes, colours are the specific manifestations of these common qualities. And so it has been said:—‘These manifested together in one species manifest their own distinguishing characteristics.’ A group of the generic and specific qualities is here considered a substance (dravya).

A group is of two descriptions. The first is that in which the distinction of individuals disappears in the whole, such as the body, the tree, the herd, the forest. The second is where the word shows the distinction between different individuals of the same group, as for example, a group of both gods and men. Of this group the gods are one portion, and the men the other. Both make one group. In this the distinction of individuals may or may not be mentioned; as in a grove of mangoes, a crowd of Brāhmaṇas; a mango grove, the Brāhmaṇa class.

This again is of two descriptions; where the parts of the whole are separate from each other and where they are not. A forest and a class are groups where the parts are separate from each other. A body, a tree, an atom are all groups whose parts are not separable from each other. Substance, according to Patañjali, is a group whose parts are not meant to be distinguished from each other, and cannot be separated from each other. This has been called the etheric or substantive appearance (svarūpa).

And now what is their subtle appearance? It is the Tanmātra (the astral atom), the cause of the elements. The atom is one part thereof. It is a group, a composite substance, which consists of generic and specific qualities, and whose parts are not distinguished from each other, and which cannot be separated from one another. All the Tanmātrās are similar to this. This is the third appearance of the elements.

Now as to the fourth appearance of the elements. These are the ‘qualities’ whose characteristics are essence, activity and inertia, and which follow the nature of effects. These are denoted by the word conjunction (anvaya).

And now the fifth appearance of purposefulness (arthavattva). The purpose of experience and emancipation is apparent in conjunction with the qualities. The qualities are to be found in Tanmātrās, in the elements and in things made of elements. Hence all these are full of purpose. Now by Saṃyama over the five elements, with their five

appearances, the nature of every appearance over which Samyama is performed, becomes apparent and conquest over it is obtained. Having obtained conquest over the five appearances he becomes the Lord of elements. The powers of the elements begin by this conquest to follow his thought, as the cows follow their calves.—149.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

'By Samyama on gross, the substantive appearance, the subtle, the conjunction and purposefulness, is obtained mastery over elements.' Mastery is obtained by Samyama over each separately, the gross, the substantive, the subtle, the conjunction and purposefulness. The Commentator describes the gross:—'The word Sthūla here, &c.' The sounds, the touches, the colours, the tastes, and the odours of Ākāśa, Vāyu, Tejas, Apas, and Prithivī are their specific forms so far as may be.

The notes of the gamut, DO and MA, etc., cold and heat, etc., blue and yellow, etc., sweet-smelling, &c., all these differ from each other in name, appearance and object. For this reason they are specific. Of the qualities, five are the specific forms of the Prithivī; four (except smell) of the Apas; three (besides odour and taste) of the Tejas; two (besides odour, taste and colour) of the Vāyu and only one of the Ākāśa. These specific forms together with the characteristics of conjoint action, &c., are termed Gross in this philosophy.

Among those, the characteristics of the Prithivī are:—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability, manifestation (vritti), difference, support, turbidity, hardness, enjoyability by all.

The characteristics of the Apas are:—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, heaviness, coolness, preservation, purification, cementation.

The characteristics of the Tejas are:—Going upward, cooking, burning, lightness, shining, destruction, power; possessed of such qualities is the Tejas different from the previous ones.

The qualities of the Vāyu are:—transverse motion, purification, throwing, pushing, strength, movability, throwing no shadow, roughness; these are the various characteristics of the Vāyu.

The characteristics of the Ākāśa:—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, and non-obstruction: these three are said to be the characteristics of Ākāśa, different from the characteristics of the preceding ones.

It is together with these characteristics that they are called gross.

Form (mūrti) is hardness brought about (samsiddhikam), stability of the lines of action and manifestation.

Tejas is heat, stomachic, solar, terrestrial; everywhere heat exists along with Tejas.

The whole of this terminology makes no distinction between the characteristic and the characterized.

The Vāyu is changing; has the nature of constant motion. By movements of straw, &c., and by the movements of the body, the Vāyu is inferred to be everywhere possessed of the quality of motion.

The Ākāśa is motion in all directions, because the perception of sound is found everywhere. It has been established above that the sounds of terrestrial objects, &c., are only perceived on account of the sound-quality of Ākāśa, which resides in the power of hearing.

This is meant by the word Svarūpa, substantive appearance. It is of this generic form that the sounds of the notes DO, &c., heat, &c., whiteness, &c., astringent and sweet

smell, &c., are the specializations. The generic qualities of form, &c., too, such as Jambīra, Panas and emble fruit, &c., differ from each other on account of the differences of taste, &c. For this reason these tastes, &c., are specific modifications of these. And so it has been said:—Of those that fall under a common genus, *i.e.*, those each of which possesses one generic quality of form, smoothness or flow, &c., the differences are due to the characteristics possessed by the individual appearances of DO, &c.

Thus the generic qualities of form, &c., and the specific qualities of sound, &c., have been described.

Now he speaks to those who say that a substance (dravya) is the substratum of the generic and the specific: 'In this philosophy a substance is a collection (samudāya) of the generic and specific qualities.' Even those who desire to establish that substratum of the qualities, cannot possibly conceal the fact of their existence in one group together. And if they do conceal it, it cannot be that a substratum of theirs may be possible of existence as substance. Hence let even that be the substance. We, however, do not find a substratum separate from the collection of qualities, and existing as substance.

As a collection of stones differs from the stones, and as further a different kind of their collection in the shape of a mountain is called a substance, the doubt arises that a mere collection is a substance. For the purpose of removing that doubt and for establishing that it is only a particular kind of collection that is called a substance, he now describes the variety of groupings:—'A collection is of two descriptions.' Because of this a substance is not a mere collection. This is the meaning. 'Two descriptions' mean two different sorts of collections. He describes the first mode:—'The first is that in which the distinction of individuals disappears altogether in the whole.' They are so called because the distinction between the different parts has disappeared. It is so called because the separation has disappeared. This is the meaning: A collection is understood by the words body, tree, herd, forest. These words denote a collection, but do not denote the different parts of the collections. That is no word denoting these individual parts is used. Hence it is the collection that is understood. Four illustrations are given with reference to the parts being joined or separate and with reference to intelligence and non-intelligence. The meaning of the joined and separate parts will be described further on.

He describes the second mode:—'A collection, the distinction of whose parts is understood by the words as both gods and men.'

'Gods and men': This collection signifies an account of the parts being indicated by separate words, the two separate parts of the group.

But the question is that inasmuch as the distinction of parts is not conveyed by using the word *both*, how is it said that the idea of the collection carries with it the idea of the distinction of parts? For this reason he says:—And it is by these two parts that a collection is signified. The word 'both' together with the words signifying the different parts forms the collection, since the sentence as such denotes the meaning to be conveyed by it. This is the meaning.

Again he says that they are two-fold:—'This again, &c.' With reference to whether the distinction is or is not intended to be conveyed. He describes where the distinction is intended to be conveyed:—'A grove of mangoes, a crowd of Brāhmaṇas.' There must be distinction because the genitive case is actually used (not only implied.) As in the case of the phrase, 'the cow of the Gargas.'

He describes where the distinction is not intended to be conveyed:—'Mango grove, Brāhmaṇa class.' The meaning is that the mangoes are the same as the grove; it is not intended that there should be difference understood between the collection and the individuals that go to make up the collection. They both imply a common object.

He mentions another division:—'That again is twofold. Where the parts of the whole are separate from each other.' This means that there is space between the individuals that go to make up the collection. Such groups are signified by the words, a herd, a forest.

Their parts have spaces between them, the trees and the kine.

The groups whose parts are not separate from each other are such as a tree, a cow, an atom. Their parts have no space between them. Whether they are taken to be the generic or the specific qualities, or the udders, &c., they have no spaces between.

Now he establishes which of these collections is what is called a substance:—'Whose parts are not meant to be distinguished from each other, &c.'

Having thus described a substance as the context demanded, he now comes to the subject in hand:—'This has been called the substantive appearance.'

He puts a question with the object of describing the third appearance:—'And what is their subtle appearance?' and gives the answer:—'It is the Tanmātra, &c.' One of its parts is an atom possessing dimension. The generic quality thereof is form (mūrti). Sound, &c., are its specific qualities. It consists of the generic and specific qualities. It is a group which follows the difference of the generic and specific qualities, its parts existing without any intervening space. Further as an atom has subtlety in appearance, so are the Tanmātras subtle in appearance. He summarizes:—'This is the third.'

Now the fourth appearance of the elements consists of the qualities which have respectively the characteristics of illumination, activity and inertia and whose characteristics too follow the nature of effects. For this reason are they described by the word Conjunction (anvaya). Now he describes their fifth appearance, purposefulness:—'The purpose of enjoyment and emancipation is apparent in conjunction with the qualities.'

Well, even if it be so, if the qualities be purposeful, how are the effects of the qualities purposeful? For this reason he says:—'The qualities are to be found, &c.' The things made of elements are such as a cow or a jar.

Having thus described the Saṁyama and that upon which the Saṁyama is to be performed, he now describes the Saṁyama and its fruit:—'Now by Saṁyama over the elements, &c.' The powers (prakṛitis) of the elements are their natures.—43.

Sūtra 44.

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्धर्मानभिघातश्च ॥ ४४ ॥

ततः Tataḥ, thence. अणिमादि Animā-ādi, of attenuation and the other powers. प्रादुर्भावः Prādurbhāvaḥ, the manifestation of. काय Kāya, of the body. सम्पद् Sampad, perfection. तद् Tad, their. धर्म Dharma, characteristics. अनभिघातः Anabhighātaḥ, non-resistance by. च Cha, and.

44. Thence the manifestation of attenuation (anīmā) and the other (powers); as also the perfection of the body and non-resistance by their characteristics.—150.

ततोऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः कायसम्पत्तद्धर्मानभिघातश्च । तत्राणिमा भवत्यणुः । लघिमा लघुर्भवति । महिमा महान्भवति । प्राप्तिरङ्गुल्यग्रेणापि स्पृशति चन्द्रमसम् । प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिघातः । भूमावुन्मज्जति निमज्जति यथोदके । वशित्वं भूतभैतिकेषु वशीभवत्यवश्यश्चान्येषाम् । ईशितृत्वं तेषां प्रभवाप्यव्यूहानामीष्टे । यत्र कामावसायित्वं सत्यसङ्कल्पता यथा सङ्कल्पस्तथा भूतप्रकृतीनामवस्थानम् । न च शक्तोऽपि पदार्थ-विपर्यासं करोति । कस्मान् । अन्यस्य यत्र कामावसायिनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य तथा भूतेषु

सङ्कल्पादिति । एतान्यष्टावैश्वर्याणि कायसम्पद्द्रव्यमाणा तद्धर्मानभिघातश्च पृथ्वी मूर्त्या न निरुणद्धि योगिनः शरीरादिक्रियाशीलामप्यनुविशतीति । नापः सिर्गन्धाः क्लृदेयन्ति । नाग्निरुष्णो दहति । न वायुः प्रणामी वहत्यनावरण्णात्मकेऽप्याकाशे भवत्यावृत्तकायः सिद्धानामप्यहृद्यो भवति ॥ ४४ ॥

VYĀSA.

Of these, attenuation (Animā): becomes atomical. Buoyancy becomes light. Enlargement: becomes large. Approach (Prāpti): touches even the moon by the tip of his finger. Unrestrained will (Prākāmya): absence of restraint to his will: merges into earth just as he plunges into water.

Control (Vaśitva):—Obtains power over the elements and objects made thereof, and controls others.

Creative Power (Īśitritva):—Controls appearance and disappearance and aggregations.

Fulfilment of desires is the objective reality of one's determination, i.e., the natures of the elements assume such appearances as he thinks of.

Although he possesses the power, he does not interfere to set the objects of the world topsy-turvy. Why not? Because his desire with reference to them is the same always which another Siddha of the same power has formerly willed. These are the eight attainments. The perfection of the body will be described. 'Non-resistance by their characteristics':—The Pṛithivī does not by cohesion interfere with the action of a Yogi's body. He might even enter a stone in virtue of the use of his powers. The waters with their viscosity do not wet him. The fire does not burn him by its heat. The air moves him not by its motion. Even in Ākāśa, which naturally offers no obstruction, his body might become obstructed to sight. Even the Siddhas may fail to see him.—150.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author describes what powers the Yogi attains, when the elements begin to follow his thoughts:—'Thence the manifestation of Attenuation (Animā) as also the perfection of the body, and non-resistance by their characteristics.'

The Commentator says that by Saṁyama over the gross states of the elements and thereby mastering them come four attainments. Of these, attenuation is the power of the body's becoming small even though it is large. Buoyancy means the power of its becoming light, even though it is heavy. Having become light it moves in space like a straw or a piece of cotton wool. Enlargement is the power of its becoming large like a mountain or the sky, even though it is small. Approach is the power by which all existences come within the reach of the Yogi; thus he can touch the moon with the tip of his finger, though standing on the earth.

He describes the attainments obtained by the performance of Saṁyama over substantive appearance (svarūpa). Unrestrained will is the absence of restraint to his will. His

form is not resisted by the substantive qualities of form, &c. He merges into and emerges out of earth, as if it were water.

He describes the attainment to be obtained by Samyama and consequent mastery over the subtle form :—'Control :—The elements are Pṛithvī &c.' Objects made thereof are such as a cow and a jar. 'Obtains power over them': acts with reference to them just as he wishes.

As to the objects made of the elements, it is necessary that when their causes, the tamātras, and the atoms of Pṛithvī, &c., are controlled, their effects also should come under control, because they remain in whatever condition or arrangement he places them.

Now he describes the attainments to be obtained by Samyama over and mastery of the conjunction (anvaya):—Creative Power:—Having mastered the Mūlaprakṛiti he can control the birth, destruction, and present existence, as it is for the time being of the elements and things made of them.

He describes the attainments due to the performance of Samyama over purposefulness, 'Fulfilment of desires' means the objective reality of one's desires. The Yogī who has become the master of the purpose of the qualities, makes everything according to the purpose he thinks they should fulfil. Even if he conceives that poison should act upon the body as Amṛita, it would act so, and having taken poison he would still live.

Well, let that be, but if he possessed these powers he would interfere with the order of nature in the world, but why does he not do so? He may transform the moon into the sun: or he may make the day from which the moon is totally absent, one from which she is not at all absent. For this reason he says:—Although he possesses the power, etc., these worshipful ones who have obtained the power of ordering as they desire, do not like to act against the will of īśvara. As to the powers of objects they are changeable according to the difference of class, space, time and condition, and their natures are not for that reason permanent. It is, therefore, proper that they should act in accordance with their desire. These are the eight attainments.

'Non-resistance by their characteristics :—The mention of non-resistance of these elements after the attainment of attenuation, &c., even though this is the result of the attainments themselves, is similar to the mention of the perfection of the body even though this is achieved by this very attainment. The reason is that the object of Samyama mentioned in this aphorism may be easily understood together with the fruit to be obtained by the performance of the Samyamās mentioned in the aphorism. The rest is easy.—44.

Sūtra 45.

रूपलावण्यबलवज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् ॥ ४५ ॥

रूप Rūpa, beauty. लावण्य Lāvanya, grace. बल Bala, strength. वज्र Vajra, of adamant, adamantine. संहनन Samhanana, the power of striking or of bearing the strokes, hardness, all these embody. कायसम्पत् Kāya-Sampat, perfection of the body.

45. The perfection of the body consists in beauty, grace, strength and adamant hardness.—151.

रूपलावण्यबलवज्रसंहननत्वानि कायसम्पत् । दर्शनीयः कान्तिमानतिशयबले वज्रसंहननश्चेति ॥ ४५ ॥

VYĀSA.

Fit to be seen, lovely, possessed of great strength, a body hard as adamant.—151.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The body is said to be adamantine when its build is as hard as that of adamant.

Sūtra 46.

ग्रहणस्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः ॥ ४६ ॥

ग्रहण Grahana, the act. स्वरूप Svarūpa, the substantive appearance. अस्मिता Asmitā, egoism. अन्वय Anvaya, conjunction. अर्थवत्त्व Arthavattva, purposefulness (of sensation). संयमाद् Samyamād, by Samyama over. इन्द्रिय-जयः Indriya-jayah, mastery over the senses.

ग्रहणस्वरूपास्मितान्वयार्थवत्त्वसंयमादिन्द्रियजयः । सामान्यविशेषात्मा शब्दा-
द्विर्षयः । तेष्विन्द्रियाणां वृत्तिर्ग्रहणम् । न च तत्सामान्यमात्रग्रहणाकारं कथमनालो-
चितः स विषयविशेष इन्द्रियेण मनसा चानुव्यवसीयेतेति । स्वरूपं पुनः प्रकाशात्मनो
बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य सामान्यविशेषयोर्युतसिद्धावयवभेदानुगतः समूहो द्रव्यमिन्द्रियम् । तेषां
तृतीयं रूपमस्मितालक्षणाद्ग्रहणः तस्य सामान्यस्येन्द्रियाणि विशेषाश्चतुर्थं रूपं व्यव-
सायात्मकाः प्रकाशक्रियास्मितिशीला गुणा येषामिन्द्रियाणि साहज्जराणि परिणामः ।
पञ्चमं रूपं गुणेषु यदनुगतं पुरुषार्थवत्त्वमिति । पञ्चस्वेवैतेष्विन्द्रियरूपेषु यथाक्रमं
संयमस्तत्र तत्र जयं कृत्वा पञ्चस्वरूपजयादिन्द्रियजयः प्रादुर्भवति योगिनः ॥ ४६ ॥

46. By Samyama over the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness (of sensation) comes mastery over them.—152.

VYĀSA.

Sound, &c., possessed of generic qualities are objects. The act of sensation consists in the functioning of the senses with reference to the objects. And this functioning is not merely the taking in of the generic qualities of an object, because if also the specific qualities of an object were not thus taken in, how would they otherwise be perceived by the mind?

As to their substantive appearance, a sense is a substance; it is a collection of generic and specific qualities whose parts are not possessed of intervening space and are not distinguishable as being separate from each other. These generic and specific qualities are of the essence of the Will-to-be whose very nature is illumination.

Their third appearance is the principle of individuality characterized by egoism. The senses are the specialized appearances of that generic appearance.

The fourth appearance consists of the qualities which are of the nature of illumination, activity and inertia and which determine the nature of phenomena. The senses together with the principle of individuality are their manifestations.

The fifth appearance is that of their having the purpose of the Puruṣa to fulfil. This is inherent in the qualities. Saṃyama is to be performed over the five appearances of sensation, respectively, one after the other. When all the five appearances have been mastered, then the power of over-mastering sensation is manifested in the Yogī.—152.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author describes the means of conquering the senses for the Yogī who has mastered the elements :—' By Saṃyama over the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness (of sensation), comes mastery over the senses.' The meaning is that Saṃyama is to be performed with reference to the act, the substantive appearance, the egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness, separately, one after another. The act of sensation consists in the taking in of objects, and this depends upon the objects to be taken in. Hence the determination of the nature of the act depends upon the determination of the nature of the objects to be taken in.

The Commentator describes the nature of the object to be taken in :—' Sounds, &c., are possessed of the generic and specific qualities.'

Having described the objects to be taken in he now describes the act of taking in :—' And the functioning, &c.' This functioning consists of sensing, i. e., the sense being modified into the form of the object. As to those who hold that the sphere of the function of the senses is the generic qualities alone, he says to them :—' And it does not consist in taking in only the form of the generic qualities.' That which is taken in is not only co-existence with the generic qualities of the object. The mind is dependent for its action upon external senses, and works upon the external objects and depends upon them. If this were not so, there would be no blind and deaf people. If, such being the case, the senses were not to have the specific qualities for their sphere of action, the specific qualities would not at all be known. How then would the mind know them in sequence? Hence the act of sensation consists in the taking in of both the generic and the specific qualities.

This act of taking in is the first phenomenon of the senses.

Now he describes the second appearance :—' As to substantive appearance :—' It is the principle of individuality which produces the power of sensation out of its own essence (the Sattva). Hence the instrumentality which is generic nature of the senses and also the action in connection with the appointed sphere of colour, &c., which is the specific quality, both are of the nature of illumination. This is the meaning.

This is their third appearance. The principle of individuality is of course the cause of the senses. Wherever the senses are there must the principle of individuality be. Being thus the common cause of the senses, it is the generic quality of these senses.

The fourth appearance :—The qualities appear as possessing two forms. They are of the nature of things which exist as such ; and they are also of the nature of the power which determines the existence of phenomena. Of these the nature of the things in existence as such consists in their being the objects of knowledge ; and these are the five Tanmātras, the elements and the things made of the elements. The power again which

determines the existence of the phenomena takes up the form of the instruments of knowledge, and consists of the senses together with the principle of individuality. This is the meaning. The rest is easy.—46.

Sūtra 47.

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च ॥ ४७ ॥

ततः Tatah, thence. मनो-जवित्वम् Mano-javitvam, quickness (as of the mind). विकरण-भावः Vikaraṇa-bhāvaḥ, uninstrumental perception. प्रधान Pradhāna, over the first cause. जयः Jayah, mastery.

47. Thence come quickness as of mind, un-instrumental-perception and mastery over the Pradhāna (First Cause.)—153.

ततो मनोजवित्वं विकरणभावः प्रधानजयश्च । कायस्यानुत्तमो गतिलाभो मनोजवित्वम् । विदेहानामिन्द्रियाणामभिप्रेतकालदेशविषयापेक्षो वृत्तिलाभो विकरणभावः । सर्वप्रकृतिवैकारवदित्वं प्रधानजय इत्येतास्तिष्ठः सिद्धयो मधुप्रतीका उच्यन्ते । एताश्च करणपञ्चकस्वरूपजयादधिगम्यते ॥ ४७ ॥

VYĀSA.

Quickness as of mind consists in the attainment by the body of very quick motion.

Un-instrumental Perception means the action of the senses at any time or place without the necessity of the presence of the body.

Mastery over the Pradhāna means the power of control over all the modifications of the Prakṛiti. These three attainments are called by the name of Madhupratikā. These are obtained by conquering the substantive appearance (svarūpa) of the five instruments of sensation.—153.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

The author mentions the attainments due to the conquest of the five appearances of the senses :—' Thence come quickness as of mind, un-instrumental perception and mastery over the Pradhāna.'

Un-instrumental perception is the action of the senses outside the body. Place means Cashmère, &c. Time means past, &c. Sphere means the subtle, &c.

Mastery over the Pradhāna means control of the modification of the Prakṛiti by the conquest of the senses together with the power of conjunction. These are the attainments which are called the Madhupratikās by the knowers of Yoga.

Well, it may be that by the conquest of the senses they may come under control. But how their causes, the Pradhāna, &c.? For this reason he says : ' And these, &c.' The five appearances of the senses are their act, &c.

' By their conquest, &c.' The meaning is this : It is not by the mere conquest of the senses that these powers are obtained, but by the conquest of all the five appearances ; and the Pradhāna, &c., fall within these.—47.

Sūtra 48.

सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञातृत्वं च ४८

सत्त्व Sattva, pure objective essence. पुरुष Puruṣa, consciousness. अन्यता Anyatā, the distinction between. ख्याति-मात्रस्य Khyāti mātrasya, to him only who recognises. सर्व-भाव Sarva-bhāva, over all states. अधिष्ठातृत्वम् Adhiṣṭhātṛitvam, supremacy. सर्व-ज्ञातृत्वम्, Sarva-jñātritvam, omniscience. च Cha, and.

48. To him who recognizes the distinction between consciousness and pure-objective-existence comes supremacy over all states of being and omniscience.—154.

सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्रस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वं सर्वज्ञातृत्वं च । निर्धूतरजस्तमोमलस्य बुद्धिसत्त्वस्य परे वैशारद्ये परस्यां वशीकारसंज्ञायां वर्तमानस्य सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिमात्ररूपप्रतिष्ठस्य सर्वभावाधिष्ठातृत्वम् । सर्वात्मानो गुणा व्यवसायव्यसेयात्मकाः स्वामिनं क्षेत्रज्ञं प्रत्यक्षेणदृश्यात्मत्वेनोपस्थिता इत्यर्थः । सर्वज्ञातृत्वं सर्वोत्तमानां गुणानां शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मत्वेन व्यवस्थितानामक्रमोपारूढं विवेकजं ज्ञानमित्यर्थः । इत्येषा विशेषा नाम सिद्धिर्यां प्राप्य योगी सर्वज्ञः क्षीणक्लेशबन्धनो वशी विहरति ॥ ४८ ॥

VYĀSA.

Supremacy over all states of being comes to him who, having the essence of the Will-to-be in the highest state of purity on account of the impurities of the Rajas and the Tamas having been destroyed, and when the consciousness of power is at the highest, takes his stand at the manifestation of the distinction between the Objective Essence and consciousness (Puruṣa). It means that the 'qualities' which are the substrata of all phenomena, being of the nature of the things that are in existence, as well as of the power which determines this existence, present themselves before the Lord, the knower of the field, as one whole.

Omniscience means the simultaneously discriminative knowledge of the 'qualities' being as they are of the nature of all phenomena, and showing forth as they do separately the quiescent, the disturbed and the unpredictable characteristics. This attainment is known as the 'Sorrowless' (viśoka).

Reaching this the Yogī moves omniscient and powerful, with all his afflictions ended.—154.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now the author shows the attainments subsidiary to the attainment of the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa, with the object of attaining which are performed the Saṃnyamas which bring about power of knowledge and action, and which by direct knowledge, and one after the other, go on strengthening faith in the object promised, by means of the presents of the attainments that are being made constantly :—'To him who realizes the distinction between the Objective Existence and consciousness, comes just then supremacy over all the states of being and omniscience.'

Purity comes by the dirt of Rajas and Tamas being removed. Thence comes the consciousness of the highest power. The mental Essence was before the attainment of this state covered by the Rajas and the Tamas. On the removal thereof it becomes subject to the power of the masterful Yogī. When it becomes subject to the Yogī who has just attained to the possession of the knowledge of the distinction between Objective Essence and consciousness then the Yogī becomes supreme over all states of being. The Commentator explains the state:—'The Guṇas which are the substrata, &c.' The objects to be determined and the determination mean the intelligent and the non-intelligent phenomena. The power of action is explained by this.

He mentions the power of knowledge: 'Omniscience, &c.' and gives a name to this two-fold attainment well-known to the Yogīs, with the object of inclining towards desirelessness: "This is named the 'Sorrowless.'" Such a Yogī is described to be one whose afflictions and bonds, i. e., Karmas have been destroyed.—48.

Sūtra 49.

तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् ॥ ४९ ॥

तद्वैराग्यात् Tadvairāgyāt, by desirelessness for that. अपि Api, even. दोष-बीज Doṣa-bija, of the seed of bondage. क्षये Kṣaye, on the destruction. कैवल्यम्, Kaivalyam, absolute independence.

49. The seed of bondage having been destroyed by desirelessness even for that, comes absolute-independence (Kaivalya).—155.

तद्वैराग्यादपि दोषबीजक्षये कैवल्यम् । यदास्यैवं भवति क्लेशकर्मक्षये सत्त्वस्यायं विवेकप्रत्ययो धर्मः सत्त्वं च हेयपक्षे न्यस्तं पुरुषश्चापरिणामी शुद्धोऽन्यः सत्त्वादित्येवमस्य ततो विरज्यमानस्य यानि क्लेशबीजानि दग्धशालिबीजकल्पान्यप्रसवसमर्थानि तानि सह मनसा प्रत्यस्तं गच्छन्ति । तेषु प्रलीनेषु पुरुषः पुनरिदं तापत्रयं न भुङ्क्ते । तदेतेषां गुणानां मनसि कर्मक्लेशविपाकस्वरूपेणाभिव्यक्तानां चरितार्थानामप्रतिप्रसवे पुरुषस्यात्यन्तिको गुणवियोगः कैवल्यं तदा स्वरूपप्रतिष्ठा चितिशक्तिरेव पुरुष इति ॥ ४९ ॥

VYĀSA.

When he comes to think that the discrimination of the distinctive natures, is after all a manifestation of the quality of Essentiality (Sattva) and that the quality of essentiality has been classed with avoidable pains; and that the Puruṣa is unchangeable, pure and other than the quality of essentiality (Sattva) then he begins to lose his desire for that, and then the afflictions having had their seed burnt up, become incapable of sprouting again like the burnt up seeds of rice.

Then all the seeds of afflictions pass, together with the mind, into latency. When they have become latent, the Puruṣa does not then suffer from the triad of pain. This then, the state, that is to say, in which the qualities manifest in the mind as afflictions, actions and fruitions do not, having fulfilled their object, come back to action, is the final separation

of consciousness from the qualities. This is the state of absolute independence, when the Puruṣa remains consciousness alone, as in its own nature.—155.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Because the other Saṁyamas are all but the semblances of the object of the Puruṣa the author now shows that the Saṁyama for the attainment of discriminative knowledge is the fulfilment of the purpose of the Puruṣa, inasmuch as its fruit is the attainment of absolute independence by means of the manifestation of desirelessness: 'On the destruction of the seed of afflictions by desirelessness even for that, comes absolute independence.' When on the destruction of actions and afflictions, the Yogi becomes conscious of what he says is knowledge of discrimination as a characteristic of the Sattva, &c.' The rest has been described here and there and is therefore easy.—49.

Sūtra 50.

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे सङ्गस्मयाकरणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् ॥ ५० ॥

स्थानि-उपनिमन्त्रणे Sthāni-upanimantrane, on the invitation by the presiding deities. (निमन्त्रणं) (स्थानि) सङ्ग Saṅga, attachment. स्मय Smaya, smile of satisfaction. अकरणम् Akaraṇam, non-performance of. पुनः Punaḥ, again. अनिष्ट Anīṣṭa, with the undesirable. प्रसङ्गात् Prasaṅgāt, contact being possible.

50. When the presiding-deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction; contact with the undesirable being again possible.—156.

स्थान्युपनिमन्त्रणे सङ्गस्मया करणं पुनरनिष्टप्रसङ्गात् । चत्वारः खल्वमी योगिनः प्रथमकल्पिको मधुभूमिकः प्रज्ञाद्योतिरतिक्रान्तभावनीयश्चेति । तत्राभ्यासी प्रवृत्तमात्र-ज्योतिः प्रथमः । ऋतम्भरप्रज्ञो द्वितीयः । भूतेन्द्रियजयी तृतीयः । सर्वेषु भावितेषु भावनीयेषु कृतरक्षाबन्धः कृतकर्तव्यः साधनादिमान् । चतुर्थस्वतिक्रान्तभावनीयस्तस्य चित्तप्रतिसर्ग-एकोऽर्थः सप्तविधा अस्य प्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ञाः । तत्र मधुमतीं भूमिं साक्षात्कुर्वतो ब्राह्मणस्य स्थानिना देवाः सत्त्वविशुद्धिमनुपश्यन्तः स्थानैरुपनिमन्त्रयन्ते भो इहास्यतामिह रम्यतां कमनीयेषु भोगः कमनीयेषु कन्या रसायनमिदं जरामृत्युं बाधते वैहायसमिदं यानममी कल्पद्रुमाः पुण्या मन्दाकिनी सिद्धा महर्षय उक्तमा अनुकूला अप्सरसो दिव्ये श्रोत्रचक्षुषी वज्रोपमः कायः स्वगुणैस्सर्वमिदमुपार्जितमायुष्मता प्रतिपद्यतामिदमक्षयमजरममरं स्थानं देवानां प्रियमित्येवमभिधीयमानः सङ्गदोषान्भावयेद् घोरेषु संसाराङ्गारेषु पच्यमानेन मया जननमरणान्धकारे विपरिवर्तमानेन कथञ्चिदासादितः क्लेशतिमिरविनाशयोगप्रदीप-स्तस्य चैते तृष्णायेनयो विषयवायवः प्रतिपक्षाः । स खल्वहं लब्धालोकः कथमनया विषयमृगतृष्णया वञ्चितस्तस्यैव पुनः प्रदीप्तस्य संसाराग्नेरात्मानमिन्धनीकुर्यामिति । स्वस्ति वः स्वप्नोपमेभ्यः कृपणजनप्रार्थनीयेभ्यो विषयेभ्य इत्येवं निश्चितमतिः समाधिं भावयेत् । सङ्गमरुत्वा स्मयमपि न कुर्यादेवमहं देवानामपि प्रार्थनीय इति । स्मयादयं सुखितमन्यतया मृत्युना केशेषु गृहीतमिवात्मानं न भावयिष्यति । तथाचास्य छिद्रान्तर-रपेशी नित्यं यत्नोपचर्यः प्रमादो लब्ध विवरः क्लेशानुत्तम्भयिष्यति ततः पुनरनिष्ट-प्रसङ्गः । एवमस्य सङ्गस्मयाचकुर्वतो भावितोऽर्थो हृदीभविष्यति भावनीयश्चार्थोऽभिमुखी भविष्यतीति ॥ ५० ॥

VYĀSA.

'When the presiding deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction; contact with the undesirable being again possible.' There are four classes of Yogis:—(1) The prathama kalpika; (2) The madhubhūmika; (3) The Prajñāyotih; (4) The atikrāntabhāvaniya.

The first is the one who is practising and in whom the light is just appearing. The second is he who has attained the Ritambharā cognition. The third is he who has attained power over the elements and the senses, who preserves all that has been known and has to be known, who has been doing what has to be done and who is given to practice. The fourth is the Atikrāntabhāvaniya. His sole object is to make the mind latent in the Pradhāna. Its stages are the seven-fold in finality.

Of these then the Brāhmaṇa to whom opens up the yet unseen plane of Madhumatī, is invited by the gods from their various places. They tell him, 'Come, sit here; enjoy yourselves here; this is a lovely enjoyment, here is a lovely damsel; this is the elixir of life, which counteracts old age and death; here is a vehicle which moves through the skies; these the kalpa trees; this is the pure stream of Mandākinī; these the perfected ones, the great seers, and beautiful and obedient nymphs; here are clairvoyance and clair-audience; here a body of adamant strength. You have earned all these by your virtues. Come, take all this. This is an eternal, unfading, undying position which the gods love.'

Thus addressed, let him contemplate upon defects of attachment. 'It is with difficulty that I have procured the light of Yoga, the destroyer of the darkness of afflictions, after having been long backed by the flames of the world and rolled into the darkness of birth and death. These winds of sensuous enjoyment, brought into sensuous existence by desire, are calculated to put that light out. Having seen all this how should I allow myself to be deluded by the mirage of sensuous enjoyments and put myself as fuel again into the burning fire of the same changeful existence. Farewell then, ye sensuous enjoyments; ye are but dreams, fit only to be enjoyed by weaklings.'

Having thus come upon a fixed resolution, let him practise his meditation. Having thus not allowed himself to become attached, let him not indulge himself in a smile of satisfaction that even the gods begged him. If he indulges in such satisfaction, he will never perceive himself as having his hair in the grasp of death, and resting in fancied

security. Thus forgetfulness ever on the watch for a hole, and ever full of efforts, would find its way into the mind; and once there it will bring the afflictions back to life; and thence will come in contact with the undesirable. Thus avoiding attachment and mental pride, the high mental state will obtain firm hold upon him and the object that is to be attained, will ever keep in front.—156.

VACHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Now seeing that there is possibility of obstacle in the way of the Yogī who is practising the means of perfect freedom (kaivalya), the author teaches the cause of its removal :—'When the presiding deities invite, there should be no attachment and no smile of satisfaction; there being possibility of contact with the undesirable again.'

The presiding deities are Mahendra, &c., who function in the regions of the powers thus obtained by the Yogī. The invitation comes from them. Attachment and a smile of satisfaction should not be indulged therein, because in that case there is again the possibility of the recurrence of the undesirable. Now with the object of determining the class of the Yogī whom the gods invite from their places, the Commentator mentions all the classes of possible Yogīs : 'There are four classes, &c.' Now he describes the nature of the Prathama-kalpika :—'Of these he who practises, &c.' In him the light of the knowledge of objects, such as the mind of others, &c., has just appeared; it has not been mastered by him. He mentions the second :—'He who possesses the truth-bearing cognition, &c.' The cognition there is truth-bearing (Ritambharā). It is he who desires to conquer the elements and the senses.

He mentions the third :—'He who has conquered the elements and the senses.' By this the elements and the senses have been conquered by Saṃyama over the gross and other appearances and over the act of sensation and other appearances. He described him further :—In all those that have been achieved by the conquest of the elements and the senses, such as knowing the mind of others, &c., he makes up his mind to preserve, so that they may not be destroyed. In those again which have still to be achieved, such as the 'Sorrowless, &c.' up to the higher desirelessness, he resorts to all the means that should be adopted. The effort of many achieves the object of attainment by resorting to the proper means only.

He mentions the fourth :—'The fourth, &c.' This worshipful being absolutely free while yet in life, and possessing only the last body, has the sole object of making the mind latent in the First Cause (Pradhāna).

Out of these he determines the Yogī who is invited by the gods :—'To whom opens up the yet unseen plane of Madhumatī, &c.'

As to the neophyte (Prathama-kalpika) there is not the least suspicion in the mind of Mahendra, &c., that he will get to the end of Yoga. The third also is not to be invited by them, because he has got what they invite him for, by his conquest of the elements and the senses. In the fourth also the suspicion of attachment is removed the farthest on account of his having reached the state of higher desirelessness. He who remains is the second alone, fit to be the object of invitation. It is he alone whose cognition is truth-bearing, that can be the object of invitation. 'Undying' is that which is not destroyed. 'Unfading' is that which is ever renewed.

He describes the fault of the smile of satisfaction :—'If he indulges in the smile of satisfaction, &c.' He will never understand impermanency, being possessed of a false sense of security on account of satisfaction. The rest is easy.

In different places it has been said that omniscience results from Saṃyama. That, however, does not mean the knowledge of everything without exception. It only describes the nature of the knowledge, as when they say, 'We have tasted all vegetables.' The meaning here is that we have tasted all sorts of sauces, not that there is none left. The word 'all' (sarva) does signify that nothing remains; as in the word 'The eater has eaten all the food that was given to him.' Here the meaning is that nothing remains.—50.

Sūtra 51.

क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम् ॥ ५१ ॥

क्षण-तत्क्रमयोः Kṣaṇa-tat-kramayoh, (क्षण) over the moments, (तत्) And their. (क्रम) succession. संयमात् Saṃyamāt, by Saṃyama. विवेकजम् Vivekajam, born-of-discrimination. ज्ञानम्, Jñānam, knowledge.

51. By Saṃyama over the moments and their succession, comes knowledge born-of-discrimination.—157.

क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमाद्विवेकजं ज्ञानम् । यथा अपकर्षपर्यन्तं द्रव्यं परमाणुरेवं परमापकर्षपर्यन्तः कालः क्षणे यावता वा समयेन चलितः परमाणुः पूर्वदेशं जहादुत्तरदेशमुपसंग्रहेत स कालः क्षणः तत्प्रवाहाविच्छेदस्तु क्रमः क्षणतत्क्रमयोर्नास्ति वस्तु समाहार इति । बुद्धिसमाहारो मुहूर्ताहारात्त्रादयः । स खल्वयं कालो वस्तु शून्योऽपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः शब्दज्ञानानुपाती लौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवावभासते । क्षणस्तु वस्तुपतितः क्रमावलम्बी । क्रमश्च क्षणानन्तर्योत्पत्तौ तं कालविदः काल इत्याचक्षते योगिनः । न च द्वौ क्षणौ सह भवतः । क्रमश्च न द्वयोः सह भुयोरसंभवात्पूर्वस्मादुत्तरस्य भाविना यदानन्तर्यं क्षणस्य स क्रमस्तस्माद्द्वर्तमान पवैकः क्षणेन पूर्वोत्तर क्षणाः सन्तीति तस्मान्नास्ति तत्समाहारः । ये तु भूतभाविनः क्षणास्ते परिणामान्विता व्याख्येयास्तेनैकेन क्षणेन कृत्स्नो लोकः परिणाममनुभवति तत्क्षणापारुढाः खल्वमी सर्वे धर्मास्तयोः क्षणतत्क्रमयोः संयमात्तयोः साक्षात्करणं तदश्च विवेकजं ज्ञानं प्रादुर्भवति ॥ ५१ ॥

VYĀSA.

As an atom is a substance in which minuteness reaches its limit, so, a moment is a division of time in which minuteness reaches its limit. Or a moment is that much of time which an atom takes in leaving the position in space it occupies and reaching the next point. The succession of moments is the non-cessation of the flow thereof. The moments and their collection do not fall into a collection of actual things. The Muhūrta, the day and night are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental concept, and which comes into the mind as a piece of verbal knowledge only, appears to people whose minds are given to out-going activities, as if it were an objective reality. The moment falls under the head of reality, and is maintained by succession. This succession consists in the sequence of moments. The Yogīs who know time call this by the name of time.

Further two moments cannot co-exist. There can be no succession of two co-existent moments. It is impossible. The uninterrupted sequence of the first moment and of the one which follows, is what is called succession. For this there is but one moment existing in the present; the antecedent and postcedent moments do not exist. Therefore, there cannot be any collection of them.

Further, the moments that have passed and those that have yet to come, should be described as existing in consequence of universal change in evolution. For this reason the whole world undergoes change every moment, all these characteristics are relatively established in that one moment of time. By Samyama over the moments and their succession, direct knowledge is obtained of them both, and thence is manifested discriminative knowledge.—157.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Here the author describes the samyama which is the means of obtaining the knowledge born out of discrimination:—'By Samyama over moments and their succession comes knowledge born of discrimination.' The Commentator gives the meaning of the word 'moment' by an illustration:—'As the atom, &c.' Wherever in a piece of stone, which is being divided and divided again and again, smallness reaches a point beyond which it cannot go, it is said to reach the limit of minuteness. That is called an atom. Similarly, the uttermost limit of minuteness of time, is a moment, a division of time which is not related to any other division of time as a part antecedent and postcedent.

He describes the same moment in another way:—'Or, as much as, &c.' The meaning is that a moment is that much of time in which a mere atom may go off its present place.

He describes the meaning of the word succession:—'The non-cessation of the flow, &c.' 'Thereof' means of the moments.

Further this sort of succession is not real. It is, on the other hand, a mental concept. Because it is impossible that a collection of them should be contemplated as real, seeing that they do not exist simultaneously, he says this:—'The moments and their succession, &c.' Because succession has for its characteristic the existence of a moment not in simultaneity, and because the collective existence of moments is devoid of objective reality, the collective existence of moments and their succession is also void of objective reality. Men without the natural excessive intellection of a Vaibāntika, being every moment given to knowledge which consists in out-going activity, and who are, therefore, confused, think that this Time is a reality.

Well then, is the Moment also unreal? He answers in the negative. 'The moment, however, is classed among realities, is a real substance. 'It is given support to by succession':—The succession that gives support to the moments is only a mental concept, the result of imagination (vikalpa).

He gives the reason for the succession giving support to the moment:—'As to succession, &c.'

He gives the reason for the succession being unreal:—'And two moments, &c.' The word 'and,' here signifies the reason 'why.'

He says to him who holds that the moments each belonging to a different class may co-exist:—'There can be no succession, &c.'

Why is it impossible? For this reason he says:—'Succession is, &c.' He concludes:—'For this reason.'

Well, then, are the antecedent and postcedent moments of the nature of the horns of a hare only? He says, No. 'The moments that are gone and those that are yet to come, &c.'

Existing in consequence of universal change:—This means followed in sequence similar. Concludes:—'Therefore, &c.' Because the present only has the power over the actions of objects proper to it.—51.

Sūtra 52.

जातिलक्षणदेशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात् तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः ॥५२॥

जाति Jāti, genus. लक्षण Lakṣaṇa, differentia. देश Deśa, position in space by all these. अन्यता Anyatā, by separateness. अवच्छेदात् Anavachchedāt, there being no distinction. तुल्ययोः Tulyayoh, of two similars. ततः Tataḥ, thereby. प्रतिपत्तिः Pratipattiḥ, the distinction.

52. Two-similars are thereby distinguished when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position-in-space.—158.

तस्य विषयविशेष उपक्षिप्यते । जातिलक्षणदेशैरन्यतानवच्छेदात्तुल्ययोस्ततः प्रतिपत्तिः । तुल्ययोर्देशलक्षणसारूप्ये जातिभेदाऽन्यतायां हेतुः । गौरियं वडवेयमिति । तुल्यदेशजातीयत्वे लक्षणमन्यत्वकरं कालाक्षी गौः । स्वस्तिमती गौरिति । द्वयोरामलयेर्जातिलक्षणसारूप्याद् देशभेदाऽन्यत्वकर इदं पूर्वमिदमुत्तरमिति । यदा तु पूर्वमामलकमन्यव्यग्रस्य ज्ञातुरुत्तरे देश उपावर्तते तदा तुल्यदेशत्वे पूर्वमेतदुत्तरमेतदिति प्रविभागानुपपत्तिः । असन्दिग्धेन च तत्त्वज्ञानेन भवितव्यमित्यत इदमुक्तम् । ततः प्रतिपत्तिर्विवेकज्ञानादिति कथं पूर्वमामलकसहक्षणेदेश उत्तरामलकसहक्षणाद् देशाद्भिन्नः । ते चामलके स्वदेशक्षणाभवाभिन्ने । अन्यदेशक्षणाभवास्तु तयोर्न्यत्वे हेतुरिति । एतेन दृष्टान्तेन परमाणोस्तुल्यजातिलक्षणदेशस्य पूर्वपरमाणुदेशसहक्षणासाक्षात्करणादुत्तरस्य परमाणोस्तद्देशानुपपत्तादुत्तरस्य तद्देशानुभवा भिन्नः सहक्षणेदात्तयोरीश्वरस्य योगिनोऽन्यत्वप्रत्ययो भवतीति । अपरे तु वर्णयन्ति । येऽस्या विशेषास्तेऽन्यताप्रत्ययं कुर्वन्तीति । तत्रापि देशलक्षणभेदा मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदश्चान्यत्वे हेतुः । क्षणभेदस्तु योगिवुद्धिगम्य एवेत्यत उक्तं मूर्तिव्यवधिजातिभेदाभावान्नास्ति मूलपृथक्त्वमिति वार्षगण्यः ॥ ५२ ॥

VYĀSA.

Its sphere is defined:—'Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position in space.' When position and secondary qualities are the same, the genus causes distinction between two similars. Thus 'This is a cow,' 'This is a mare.' When position and genus are common, the secondary quality causes distinction, as is the case with a black-eyed cow and an auspicious cow. Between two emblematic fruits in which the genus and secondary qualities are the same, difference of position causes distinction.

This is anterior and this is posterior. When, however, the anterior emblematic fruit moves on to the position of the posterior one in space, at a time when the seer may be looking elsewhere, the position becoming the same, it can no longer cause distinction (as to which it was originally), the anterior or the posterior? In the knowledge of truth, however, there should be no doubt. Hence has it been said, 'They are thereby distinguished.' It means, by discriminative knowledge How? The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblematic fruit. And the emblematic fruits are separate in the sequential notions of the movements in time correlated to their distinct positions in space. The sequential notion of space correlated to another moment of time is the means of their distinction.

As in this case, so in the case of atoms which have community of genus, secondary quality and position in space. By discovering the yet unknown correlation of every atomic position in space to a different moment of time, the sequential notion of such a position in space for the anterior atom becomes distinct from such a position in space for the distinction of atoms, on the analogy of this illustration. The powerful Yogi knows this distinction by the correlated moment.

Others however say:—It is the last peculiarities (the *Viśeṣa* of the *Vaiśeṣikas*) that cause the notion of distinction. Even there the distinction is the difference of space and secondary quality and the difference of form, distance and genus. The distinction on account of the moment of time can, however, be grasped by the intellect of a Yogi alone.

As has been said by *Vārṣaganya*:—'On account of the absence of the difference of form, intervening space and genus, there is no separation in the root.'—158.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Although this knowledge born of discrimination has all existences for the sphere of its operation, as will be shown further, still being very subtle, one particular sphere is first defined:—'Two similars are thereby distinguished, when not separately distinguishable by genus, differentia and position.' For ordinary men the difference of genus is the cause of the knowledge of distinction. When genus such as the characteristic of a cow is the same; when also space, such as presence in the east, &c., is the same; then the distinction of the black-eyed and the auspicious is the other means of distinction. In two emblematic fruits the genus of emblematic fruit is the same, the differentia of roundness, &c., are the same. The difference of space, however, is another means of distinction. When, however, some one desirous of testing the knowledge of the Yogi, takes the anterior fruit when he has his attention turned towards something, and places it in the spot previously occupied by the other fruit, having removed the other fruit from there or having concealed it, then the space also becomes the same, and it can no longer be decided that this is

the former and this is the latter. The ordinary wise man who is clever in the use of the three means of knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the two under such circumstances. The knowledge of realities, however, should be free from doubt. It is not proper that a Yogi who is possessed of discriminative knowledge should remain doubtful. Hence has the author of the aphorism said:—'Are thereby distinguished, &c.'

Explains 'thereby.' It means by discriminative knowledge. The question now is: How can knowledge born by *Samyama* over moments and their succession distinguish an emblematic fruit from another which is the same with reference to genus, secondary quality and position in space? The Commentator gives the answer:—'The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit, is different from the space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior emblematic fruit.' 'The space correlated to the moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit, means the space which coincides with the one moment of time of the anterior emblematic fruit; or in other words, the change which has no interval between itself and the one moment of time. It is different from the position in space correlated to the moment of time of the posterior fruit, i.e., from the un-interrupted change of the posterior fruit.'

Let there be the difference of positions in space; but how does it affect the distinction of the fruit? For this reason he says:—'And the emblematic fruits are separate in the sequential notions of their moments of time correlated to their positions in space. The moment of time that is correlated to the distinct position in space of the emblematic fruit, is that portion of time which is indicated by the change of anteriority and posteriority in its own position in space. The notion of this moment of time correlated to its distinct position means the knowledge thereof. It is by this knowledge that the fruits are distinguished. The performer of *Samyama* knows that the two emblematic fruits are different, by the knowledge of their becoming characterized by a moment of time correlated to the change of anteriority and posteriority, in a position other than that in which the changes of anteriority and posteriority in a moment of time existed formerly. Now although the former place has been changed, the *Samyama* is performed with reference to the moment of time correlated to the present changed position of the same object, qualified by the change of position in space different from the former one. By the performance of this *Samyama* direct knowledge is obtained of the change in time in the other position. For this reason it has been said:—'The sequential notion of the moment of time correlated to another position in space, becomes the cause of their distinction.'

Now he says that by the analogy of this very illustration, the same sort of distinction should be believed as existing among atoms, on the authority of a Yogi who alone can conceive of the distinction. 'On the analogy of this illustration, &c.'

'Others however say:' (he cites their opinion) 'it is the last, &c.' The *Vaiśeṣikas* say that there are certain ultimate peculiarities which are manifest in the permanent substances. It is thus argued. The Yogis who are absolutely free do not distinguish between objects whose genus, position in space and secondary qualities are the same, and in which there is no interval; and cannot specify either by pointing out mutual differences or by defining their realities. There must, therefore, be some ultimate peculiarity (*Viśeṣa*): and it is that, that they make out to be the differentiating quality of permanent substances, such as atoms, &c.

He refutes this theory:—'Even there, &c.' Genus, space and secondary quality have been illustrated. Form is a manifestation of arrangement along certain lines. Thus having removed a thing whose parts are beautifully arranged, another object whose parts are ugly in arrangement, is placed in the same position when the seer is otherwise employed. In this case the knowledge of distinction is obtained by the difference of arrangement.

Or, form may mean the body. It is by relation to the body that the selves whether in evolution or free are distinguished by means of the action of the elements, such as it may be. Thus when the notion of distinction is caused anywhere by other means, it is not necessary to posit a differentia in the shape of ultimate peculiarity (Antya Viśeṣa), as the cause of the distinction. This is similar to the case of the Dvīpas of Kuśa and Puṣkara in their aspect of planes of space.

Inasmuch as it has been said that the differences of genus, position and time, &c., are known by the intellect of the ordinary man, it is said that the difference of moment of time (kṣaṇa) is known by the intellect of the Yogī alone. The word 'alone' signifies the difference of the moment of time, not that of the intellect of the Yogī. It is inferred that the distinction between released Puruṣas also is known by the intellect of the Yogī by their relation to the body moving in the elements (bhūtachara).

The teacher thought that in the case of those who do not possess the means of distinction, there are no distinctions in the case of the Pradhāna. Therefore, he said:— 'Although destroyed with reference to those whose objects have been gained, it is not destroyed with reference to others, being common to the others.'

He says this:— 'On account of the absence of form, &c.' The meaning is that the universe has difference indicated by the causes mentioned. But there is no distinction in the root, the Pradhāna.—52.

Sūtra 53.

तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकज्ञानम् ॥ ५३ ॥

तारकम् Tārakam, the intuitional. सर्वविषयम् Sarva-viṣayam, having everything (सर्वे) for its Sphere of operation (विषय). सर्वथा-विषयम् Sarvathā-viṣayam, (सर्वथा) having all conditions (विषय) For its sphere of operation. अक्रमम् Akramam, having no succession. च Cha, and. इति Iti, this.

53. And it is the intuitional; has everything for its sphere-of-operation; has all-condition for its sphere-of-operation; has no succession. This is the entire discriminative knowledge.—159.

तारकं सर्वविषयं सर्वथाविषयमक्रमं चेति विवेकज्ञानम् । तारकमिति स्वप्रतिभेत्यमनौपदेशिकमित्यर्थः । सर्वविषयत्वान्नास्य । किञ्चिदविषयीभूतमित्यर्थः । सर्वथा-विषयमतीतानागतप्रत्युत्पन्नं सर्वं पर्यायैः सर्वथा जानातीत्यर्थः । अक्रममित्येकक्षणोपासकं सर्वं सर्वथा गृह्णातीत्यर्थः । एतद्विवेकज्ञं ज्ञानं परिपूर्णमस्यैवांशो योगप्रदीपो मधुमती भूमिमुपादाय यावदस्य परिसमाप्तिरिति ॥ ५३ ॥

VYĀSA.

It is intuitional:—This means that the knowledge comes by one's own prescience and not by teaching.

Has everything for its sphere of operation:—This means that there is nothing yet known, which might not be made its object.

Has all conditions for its sphere:—The all, as it was or will be, or is with all minor modes of expression. It means that he knows all the conditions of these objects.

Has no succession:—It means that he takes in the 'all' as correlated to but one moment.

This is the entire discriminative knowledge:—The light of Yoga is part of this only, beginning with the Madhumatī up to the end of this knowledge.—159.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having thus described one branch of discriminative knowledge, the author now describes discriminative knowledge:—It is intuitive; has everything as the sphere of its operation; has all conditions as its sphere; has no succession; this is the entire discriminative knowledge.'

'Discriminative knowledge.' This is the statement of the thing defined. The rest is the description. Intuition is called Tāraka, because it becomes the cause of crossing the ocean of the universe. He distinguishes this from the knowledge by prescience already described:—'Has all conditions for the sphere of its operation.'

'Modes of expression.' means minor modes of differentiation. For this reason the knowledge of discrimination is complete. There is nothing anywhere which may not at any time or in any way be its object. This is the meaning. There may be other knowledge obtained by cognitive trance, but that also is a part of this, and where therefore can there be any knowledge beyond this? It is for this reason complete. The Commentator says this:—'The light of Yoga, i.e., the Cognitive Yoga, is a part thereof.'

Now he says what is the beginning and what is the end:—'Beginning with the Madhumatī, &c.' The truth-bearing cognition is the Madhu, honey, because it causes, such sweet bliss. The meaning is, 'having obtained the purity of cognition as described.' The Madhumatī is that state which is possessed of that and gives sweet bliss. The mind having reached that state, manifests up to the end of that state, passing through seven-fold stages of intellectual progress. It is for this reason that discriminative knowledge becomes intuitional, inasmuch as its branch, the light of Yoga, is intuitional.—53.

Sūtra 54.

सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यम् ॥ ५४ ॥

सत्त्व-पुरुषयोः Sattvapuruṣayoh, of the objective essence and the consciousness. शुद्धिः Śuddhi, of the purity. साम्ये Sāmye, on their becoming equal. कैवल्यम् Kaivalyam, absolute independence.

54. When the purity of the Objective-Essence and that of the Puruṣa become equal, it is absolute independence.—160.

प्राप्तविवेकज्ञानस्याप्राप्तविवेकज्ञानस्य वा । सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यमिति । यदा निर्धूतरजस्तमोमलं बुद्धिसत्त्वं पुरुषस्यान्यताप्रतीतिमात्राधिकारं दग्धकृशबीजं भवति तदा पुरुषस्य शुद्धिसारूप्यमिवापन्नं भवति तदा पुरुषस्यापचरितभोगाभावः शुद्धित्तस्यामवस्थायां कैवल्यं भवति । ईश्वरस्यानीश्वरस्य वा विवेकज्ञानभागिन इतरस्य वा । नहि दग्धकृशबीजस्य ज्ञाने पुनरपेक्षा काचिदस्ति सत्त्वशुद्धिद्वारेणैतत्समाधि-जमैश्वर्यं ज्ञानं चोपक्रान्तं परमार्थतस्तु ज्ञानाददर्शनं निवर्तते तस्मिन्नित्युत्तरे

क्लेशाः क्लेशभावात्कर्मविपाकाभावाच्चरिताधिकाराद्चैतस्यामवस्थायां गुणा न पुरुषस्य
दृश्यत्वेन पुनरुपतिष्ठन्ते तत्पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं तदा पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रज्योतिरमलः केवली
भवति ॥ ५४ ॥

इति श्रीपातञ्जलभाष्ये सांख्यप्रवचने विभूतिपादस्तृतीयः समाप्तः ॥ ३ ॥

VYĀSA.

In the case of him who has obtained discriminative knowledge as well as in the case of him who has not obtained discriminative knowledge, it is absolute independence (kaivalya), when the purity of the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa become equal. When the essence of the Will-to-be with the dirt of the Rajas and the Tamas removed, has the notion of the distinctness of the Puruṣa as its sole remaining object, and all the seeds of affliction have been burnt up, then does it, as it were, assume a state of purity similar to that of the Puruṣa. In that state the purity of the Puruṣa consists in the absence of that enjoyment which is attributed to him, as it were, figuratively. In that state comes absolute independence (kaivalya), whether it be to the master or to the ordinary man, to him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge or to him who is not.

He in whom the seed of affliction is burnt up, has no longer any need of knowledge anywhere. It is as the means of purifying the substance of the Will-to-be that knowledge and the powers born of trance have been touched upon. In reality ignorance is removed by knowledge. On its cessation there are no longer any afflictions. When there are no afflictions, there is no fruition of actions. The Gunas in that state have fulfilled their object. They, therefore, no longer present themselves to be seen by the Puruṣa. Then the Puruṣa shining in his own pure light, becomes absolutely independent (kevala)—160.

VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS.

Having now described the means of absolute independence, the Saṁnyamas together with the attainments, the author now introduces this aphorism in order to show that the knowledge of the distinction between the Objective Essence and the Puruṣa is the direct means of absolute independence:—'In the case of him who has obtained, &c.' The meaning is that the knowledge born of discrimination does, all the same, become the means of absolute independence, whether or not there is the knowledge born of discrimination. 'It is absolute independence (kaivalya) when the purity of the Objective Essence and that of the Puruṣa become equal.'

'The master' is he who has by the performance of Saṁnyama obtained the power of knowledge and action. The ordinary man is he who has not obtained these powers. To him who is possessed of discriminative knowledge by the performance of Saṁnyama described just before, or, to another who has obtained knowledge otherwise, in either case, the attainments are never under requisition for the purpose. 'He in whom the seeds of affliction, &c.'

Well, but if they are unnecessary for absolute freedom their teaching is useless. For this reason the Commentator says:—'As a means of the attainment of the purity of the Objective Essence, &c.'

The attainments are not absolutely unnecessary in attaining absolute independence. They are not its direct means. The knowledge born of discrimination and that which is obtained by the successive performance of Saṁnyama is only an indirect cause. The principal cause is the knowledge of distinction. This is the meaning. Ignorance is removed by knowledge. Knowledge means the Highest Intellection.—54.

In this chapter the direct means of Yoga have been described. Also the evolutionary changes have been dilated upon. Also the conjunction with the elements by Saṁnyama. Also the knowledge born of discrimination. This is the third chapter of VĀCHASPATI'S GLOSS on Vyāsa's Commentary of the aphorisms of Yoga. The third Chapter, the Chapter on Attainments, is finished.