A contested organizational field perspective of the diffusion of public–private partnership regimes: evidence from India

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Given the quantum of infrastructure that needs to be developed in India over the foreseeable future, private sector participation in infrastructure development is inevitable. The Government of India has taken several steps to enable public–private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure development at the state and municipal levels. While these schemes are available for most Indian states, their adoption has varied considerably. Some states have embraced the notion of PPPs and have leveraged the incentives and schemes initiated by the central government to craft vibrant PPP programmes. Others have chosen to ignore PPPs or create hybrid institutional forms for project delivery. In this paper, we analyse how the institutional environment for PPPs has evolved differently in three demographically similar states—Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. We make use of a contested relational perspective of organizational fields involving the use of strategic action fields as a theoretical framework to understand the dynamics that led to the evolution of PPP-enabling fields in these states. We find that even under coercive, central, isomorphic pressures, PPP-enabling fields are highly contested by field members and field settlements are a result of the interplay of various relational interactions between participants. This paper contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics involved in the evolution of organizational fields and furthers our understanding of the context-based settlement within these fields.

Keywords: Contestation, Indian infrastructure, organizational fields, PPP-enabling fields, public–private partnerships.

Introduction

India plans to develop at a rapid pace over the next decade. The Twelfth Five Year Plan estimates an investment requirement of INR 4 000 000 crore (USD 1 trillion) in infrastructure over the next five years alone (Planning Commission, 2011). Such huge investments come with their own challenges and it is unlikely that the government can mobilize financial and, more importantly, human resources to achieve these targets on its own. Private involvement in infrastructure construction, management and finance is therefore imperative.

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are contractual arrangements between a public and a private sector entity to provide a public asset or service for public benefit where some investment is made by the private sector and there is substantial risk-sharing between the public and private sectors (Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2008; Government of India, 2010). Such arrangements are often meant to look beyond being project-financing mechanisms and leverage the sharing of competencies and knowledge to develop a sustainable, value-adding partnership (Klijn and Teisman, 2003; Greve and Hodge, 2005). PPPs have been in use all over the world with mixed results. Some commentators have been cautiously optimistic about the success of certain PPP programmes such as the UK’s private finance initiative (Hall, 1998; Pollitt, 2002), while evidence elsewhere—such as in Denmark (Greve, 2003) and Australia (Walker and Walker, 2000)—indicates that PPPs have proved to be more costly and wasteful than traditional public delivery approaches. In particular, there is criticism on the use of PPPs purely for financing.
projects, since the private sector’s cost of capital is often always higher than the public sector’s cost of capital, leading to both a more expensive project and a tendency in projects that use an availability/annuity payment strategy to shift payment obligations ‘off balance sheet’ and towards future generations of taxpayers (e.g. Froud, 2003).

Private participation in Indian infrastructure has gained momentum in the last decade, both in terms of the creation of public policies around PPPs and in terms of the visible involvement in infrastructure service delivery (Wallack, 2009). Several measures have been initiated by the Government of India to encourage private participation in infrastructure. The Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), in partnership with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), has mandated the creation of ‘PPP’ cells in several Indian states that will help identify PPP projects, build capacity and offer policy support. There is strong regulatory pressure on various state governments to conform with this mandate. To take care of inadequacies in the ability of local governments to structure projects, the DEA has empanelled a set of transaction advisors to assist government agencies in developing PPP projects and writing concession agreements (Department of Economic Affairs, 2008a). In order to finance the project development phase, the DEA has instituted the Indian Infrastructure Project Development Fund to provide funds to be used to meet project development expenses such as the costs of hiring transaction advisors (Department of Economic Affairs, 2008b).

State governments across India have equal access to these schemes and such measures by the central government—the mandate to create a state-level PPP cell in particular—have created strong pressures for the enactment of PPP programmes at the state level. However, rather than evolving isomorphically in response to these homogeneous, centralized pressures, states have demonstrated a variety of responses and institutional arrangements for the delivery of PPPs. Some states have embraced the notion of PPPs and have leveraged the incentives and schemes initiated by the central government to craft vibrant PPP programmes. Others have chosen to ignore PPPs or have created hybrid institutional forms for project delivery. In this paper, we try to look at why this is the case. Our primary theoretical focus is to understand the contested settlement of organizational fields surrounding PPPs and how existing institutional arrangements react to external pressures in the context of the introduction of PPPs as a mode of asset creation and service delivery. From a practical viewpoint, we expect to contribute to understanding on how local governments are likely to react to pressures to undertake PPPs and therefore how PPP movements can best be organized so that the likelihood of appropriate adoption is maximized. We do this by first reviewing the literature on organizational fields and institutional responses to external pressures. Then, we look at the empirical evidence from three demographically similar states in India—Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat—that have responded in three different ways to the ideology of PPPs put forth by the central government. Following this, we build our arguments about how regulatory and normative pressures for change are negotiated within organizational fields to arrive at context-specific settlements or field configurations.

Theoretical underpinnings

Institutional analyses of organizational settings are increasingly being conducted at a ‘meso’-level of analysis, which lies between the organizations, on the one hand, and the macrostructures corresponding to societies and nation-states, on the other hand (Scott, 2008). Very similar to the concept of societal sectors (Scott and Meyer, 1991), these meso-levels of analysis are now popularly known as organizational fields. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined organizational fields as the organizations in aggregate that constitute a recognized area of institutional life (italics in original). Organizations need to interact with a variety of other organizations and institutions in the course of their operations. Organizational fields in a particular domain consist of those organizations which interact with each other more frequently and fatefuly than other organizations outside the field (Scott, 2008). Organizations are in turn connected to broader institutional environments through these organizational fields.

Wooten and Hoffman (2008) traced the evolution of research on organizational fields and noted that early work in this area studied the responses of organizations to the organizational fields that they were embedded in (Zucker, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Orru, Biggart and Hamilton, 1991; Edelman, 1992). Field contestations and agency considerations were largely ignored. Very simply put, these early conceptualizations tended to regard fields as monolithic sets of schemas that shaped organizational action. Later work, however, embraced the notion of agency and change within organizational fields. Scholars studied the emergence, evolution and diffusion of organizational fields in different settings (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993; Scott et al., 2000). Thornton (2004), for instance, described the process of field change in the publishing industry. Oliver (1991) provided a set of responses available to organizations when confronted with institutional or field pressures, as well as criteria under which
organizations might choose to manipulate the fields that they are embedded in. Other scholars have attended to the divergent and disruptive changes in organizational fields (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Dacin et al., 2002; Rao et al., 2003). Indeed, as Hoffman’s (1999) study of corporate environmentalism indicates, organizational fields are formed around issues of importance and are also finite in time surrounding the issues’ growth and decline. Creation, diffusion and change are thus endemic to organizational fields.

The conception of organizational fields has thus evolved over time from a static, isomorphism-inducing model to being ‘highly contextualized spaces where disparate organizations involve themselves with one another in an effort to develop collective understandings regarding matters that are consequential for organizational and field-level activities’ (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008) (italics in original). Organizational fields are now perceived as dynamic ‘fields of struggles’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) between organizations and actors who continually attempt to alter the rules of the game and the balance of power (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Seo and Creed 2002; Schneiberg and Soule, 2005). They are not just networks of organizations but are dynamic contexts surrounding organizations. Fields are active arenas of social interaction and are often contested on various fronts. The key components of a field—its structures, resources, logics and memberships—emerge out of and are contested by the interaction between the various organizations in the field. Rather than being settled social spaces, they are arenas of conflict where organizations attempt to advance their interests (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Scott, 2008). Researchers have also noted that fields often remain conflicted even when they appear to be settled (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001).

Despite these advancements in the study of organizational fields, relatively little has been understood with regard to the relations between organizations within the field. Several researchers have called for a better understanding of fields as mechanisms or fields as processes (Hoffman and Ventresca, 2002; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). There is therefore a need to move away from the study of field outcomes to a study of field interactions as those leading to outcomes. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to knowledge in this area by studying field process dynamics and issues of contested settlements, particularly in the context of the creation and diffusion of new fields.

There is a rich history of scholarly thought on how institutions and fields are structured and how they change to give rise to new orders. Structuration theory (Giddens, 1979) remains one of the foremost frameworks used in this regard and can be used to describe the contested relationships between schemas (or rules), resources and the agency of actors. However, while structuration theory acknowledges the possibility of institutional change through the duality that exists between schemas (rules) and resources (Giddens, 1979, Sewell, 1992), very often little is said about the process of change. Barley and Tolbert (1997) attempted to address this issue and operationalized structuration by proposing a model where ‘scripts’ are created and either are enacted by actors to reify the predominant institutions or are modified by actors and are externalized to create new institutional forms. Barley and Tolbert (1997) also proposed a methodology for studying institutional change.

While this traditional institutionalist technique is useful for observing institutional change within organizations over a long-term period, it is relatively static in its conceptualization of institutions and deals with institutions as they exist at ‘points in time’. Furthermore, while it may be possible to use this approach when the level of analysis is limited to an organization, it becomes difficult to extend this to the study of fields, where increasingly complex processes of contestations are being enacted among a variety of actors. To address these shortcomings, we turn to the theory of social movements, which adopts a field-level perspective and offers a more dynamic interpretation of processes such as coalition-building, field politics and contestation, framing and agency (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Benford and Snow, 2000). Furthermore, there have been several recent attempts to integrate social movement theory with institutional theory (Davis et al., 2005; McAdam and Scott, 2005) precisely to investigate ways in which social movement theorizations can provide greater insights into the creation and diffusion of organizational fields.

In this regard, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) proposed an operational framework to study the dynamism at the level of an organizational field by bringing together elements of social movement theory and institutional theory in their conceptual paper on strategic action fields (SAFs). Their aim was to ‘explain the underlying structure of and sources of change and stability in institutional life in modern society’. SAFs are defined as ‘Meso-level social orders within which actors interact with a common understanding of relationships, rules and purposes’. In essence, SAFs are highly situationally embedded, dynamic fields that comprise incumbent actors interested in upholding the status quo, governance units that aid them and challengers who attempt to modify the existing rules of engagement or establish a new order. There is continuous movement and competition between these actors and skilled actors (Fligstein, 2001) with power and access to resources, knowledge and networks and frame and reframe ideologies within these fields.
SAFs thus become arenas of contestation between the various collective as well as individual actors in the field. Rules, norms and meanings are continually challenged, new actors and forms emerge and jostle for superiority and any equilibrium achieved may only be temporary. More often than not, there are likely to be contradictions in the institutional arrangements of these fields (Seo and Creed, 2002) that are then reconciled by field actors. Following on the lines of the literature on social movements (McAdam et al., 2001), the need for reconciliation can also arise as a result of external shocks and perturbations and often lead to ‘Episodes of Contention’ among various actors. These external events could create focal issues which could in turn lead to the formation of a new field.

The power and legitimacy held by the incumbents, the strategy and framing approach adopted by the challengers, the timing of action and the extent of disruption of resources and ties all lead to institutional settlements to these episodes of contention, where wholly new structures or field configurations may emerge. In the case of stable SAFs, incumbents have great power, are certified by external actors and often co-opt opposing forces. However, when fields are thrown into a crisis due to shocks arising from the invasion from or destabilization of nearby fields, resource flow can be affected, ties can be destabilized and, if challengers can time the framing of their logics at the time of greatest crisis, then hybrid or wholly new forms of meaning may emerge, which in turn will be contested, negotiated settlements. We believe that viewing organizational field dynamics through the lens of SAFs that embrace a logic of dynamism and change can help us better analyse the settlement processes within these fields and can be instrumental in explaining change and variation among organizational fields.

The organizational fields surrounding PPP projects in India provide an interesting empirical setting to investigate the dynamics of field change and diffusion. The notion of an organizational field for PPPs or a ‘PPP-enabling field’ has already been proposed and has been defined as the network of organizations which enable PPP programmes to be implemented (Jooste and Scott, 2011; Jooste et al., 2011). Jooste et al. (2011) evaluated the diffusion of PPP-enabling fields from the UK into British Columbia, Victoria and South Africa, and they showed that although some degree of isomorphism is evident, the PPP-enabling fields in each case are configured differently. However, this study does not investigate the process of field diffusion and evolution.

In the Indian context, as mentioned earlier, the central government has applied strong coercive pressures and has attempted to ‘force’ isomorphism by creating identical institutional forms (such as the PPP cells) across states. Yet the results are anything but isomorphic. States with very similar formal institutional and demographic characteristics have exhibited a variety of responses—from embracing PPPs and strengthening their institutions to circumventing or rejecting the notion of PPPs. There is therefore a need to study the ways in which state governments and different organizations, which are members of the state-level PPP-enabling field, respond to these central, coercive pressures and the relational dynamics between these organizations that lead to final PPP field settlements in various environments.

In this paper, we attempt to study the dynamics of evolution and the process of contested settlements of PPP-enabling fields in Indian states, in order to understand why and how states respond and evolve when confronted with the ideology of PPPs. We therefore use the relational contested perspective of organizational fields as a theoretical base and the SAF framework as an operational lens to achieve the following research objectives:

1. We aim to understand how different configurations of PPP-enabling fields emerge in different Indian states.
2. We aim to contribute to the literature on the relational view of organizational fields and provide empirical data that can help us better understand the dynamic elements involved in the formation and contested settlement of these fields.

To achieve these objectives, we turn our attention to PPP-enabling fields surrounding infrastructure projects in three different states in India. In keeping with the SAF framework, we plan to first identify the incumbent and challenger actors in these fields with regard to the provision of infrastructure services and PPPs. Alongside identifying these key actors, we simultaneously plan to classify and describe the SAFs or logics present in the PPP-enabling fields on the basis of Scott’s (2008) three pillars of institutions—regulative SAFs such as the laws and processes that currently govern infrastructure creation and PPPs, normative SAFs such as the current discourse on PPPs and cognitive SAFs that deal with cultural attitudes towards PPPs. While these constructs can be statically measured at a point in time, we plan to investigate the dynamics of these variables as well by studying the political framing of the PPP paradigm by both the incumbents and challenger actors and using discrete episodes of contention where organizational regimes clash to study the agency and contestation among the challengers and the incumbents in these fields. Our goal here is to illustrate how actors make use of the different SAFs during these episodes to influence the settlements of these fields. In the end analysis, we
hope to present the settlement in the field in terms of the configuration of actors in the fields, creation of new actors, artefacts, archetypes and the logics of the PPP-enabling fields observed. The scope of our study is limited in that we focus on a few empirical examples in the domain of PPPs for the delivery of infrastructure services. We therefore do not aim to provide a comprehensive understanding of the procedural dynamics of organizational field change. Rather, as our objectives indicate, by focusing on the configurations, contestations and settlements in this particular empirical setting, we attempt to provide some evidence that informs the dynamics within the contested perspective of organizational fields in general and PPP-enabling fields in particular.

Research methodology

We adopted an empirical case-based research methodology (Yin, 2003) to answer our research questions. We chose to conduct detailed studies of the PPP-enabling fields surrounding the PPP programmes in three Indian states. We chose the states of Gujarat, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu using a selective sampling procedure. In particular, we studied the PPP environment as pertaining to the roads and water and sanitation (W&S) sectors in these three states. According to the 2011 Indian census, all three of these states have similar levels of population. All of them rank within the first quartile of Indian states when ordered based on the state GDP per capita, indicating their relative prosperity (Unidow FIS, 2011). All three of these states also feature among the top investment destinations in India. These states are therefore comparable across demographic and economic parameters. Furthermore, the relative strength of their economies indicates that infrastructure investments are likely to be a priority in their environments. Despite these similarities as indicated in Table 1, the extent to which PPP projects have been undertaken in these states varies considerably. India’s PPP database indicates that in the road sector, Gujarat has awarded 20 PPP projects as of October 2011 and Karnataka has awarded 9, while Tamil Nadu has awarded only 4 projects. This pattern exists across other sectors as well. This provides a dimension of contrast across these states and allows us to investigate how states that are similar in terms of several developmental indicators, and subject to the same pressures from the central government, differ with regard to their PPP-enabling fields.

In terms of data collection and analysis, we first used secondary data in the form of archival reports, newspaper reports and other publicly available data to map the history and culture of each state with respect to private provision of infrastructure. Project-related agreements were studied where available. Following this, semi-structured interviews were conducted with various stakeholders in the PPP-enabling fields of the three states, in order to ascertain the current configuration as well as the historical evolution of the field. Interviewees included representatives from private development firms, financiers, local community representatives, transaction advisors, local NGOs and government officials. These interviews across stakeholder groups were intended to help us remove particular informant biases in the data collected. Table 2 reports the number and the distribution of interviews conducted in each of the states. Interviews were also conducted at the national level to capture the national government’s perspective on the PPP programmes in the states. The average length of an interview was 1 h. In some cases, we conducted repeat interviews with the same informants in order to clarify issues that they had raised. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and compared with each other and the secondary data sources to ensure the internal validity of the data.

Detailed case studies of approximately 10 000 words on the evolution and the current state of the environment for PPPs in each state were then prepared. The compiled case studies were shared for review with key informants and their concurrence was taken before their content was analysed. The cases were then coded using open coding techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) to identify the incumbents, challengers and episodes of contention for each state. Axial coding techniques (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) were then used to understand the interplay between codes and how the organizational field for PPPs evolved in each state. This enabled us to understand the relationship between agency, institutional forces and organizational form.

Empirical findings

An overview of the PPP-enabling fields in the three states is given in Tables 3 and 4. The tables also list the different regulative, normative and cognitive logics that mediated the episodes of contestation between

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Key characteristics of the states under study</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area (’000 sq. km)</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (billion USD)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPs awarded in the road sector</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
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</table>
incumbents and challengers. We discuss each of the three cases in the following sections.

**Gujarat**

Gujarat is one of the most developed states in India and is one of the fastest growing economies in the country. The state is highly industrialized and has attracted significant foreign investments in a variety of sectors. Infrastructure services in Gujarat were traditionally delivered through public agencies. The construction of infrastructure was often contracted out to private firms.

**Incumbent actors and initial conditions**

Over the last two decades, the Government of Gujarat realized the importance of infrastructure as a driver of economic growth and desired to create a situation of infrastructure surplus in the state. As the Chief Minister of Gujarat recently noted:

> We want to make Gujarat a globally preferred place to live in and to do business … We are aware that this will not happen without world class infrastructure in all sectors including the amenities for social life. Therefore, we are committed to benchmark our infrastructure with Best of the World.³

Gujarat has thus framed the creation of infrastructure as a chief priority or goal for the state. While the government can support the ‘normal’ infrastructure requirements of the state, creating infrastructure that will enable it to realize its vision of competing with the ‘top 50 highest per capita income nations’ requires

<table>
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<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Interviews conducted state wise and with central government representatives</th>
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<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Gujarat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP cell</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agencies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private developers</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government officials</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financiers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction advisors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total interviews</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Actors and contesting fields in the road sector for the three states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Gujarath</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent actors</td>
<td>GIDB, PWD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>PPP cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulative SAFs</td>
<td>Coercive central government pressure to push PPP projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative SAFs</td>
<td>• Success stories from NHAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Success stories from success of PPP in ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• World Bank guidelines to pursue PPPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pressure from ADB to from PPP cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive SAFs</td>
<td>Commercial culture reinforced challengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Framing</td>
<td>Creating world-class infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: GIDB, Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board; PWD, Public Works Department; KSHIP, Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project.
resources that cannot be completely provided by the government, given the fiscal and human resource constraints. Gujarat therefore started looking towards PPPs to augment public resources for investments in infrastructure.

The Gujarat Infrastructure Development Act (the GID Act, also popularly known as the Build–Operate–Transfer (BOT) Act) was enacted by the state in 1999, when only a handful of PPPs had been enacted in India. The act created the grounds for the formation of a dedicated institution with a mandate to promote and develop PPPs in various sectors of infrastructure to accelerate development in the state. Under the premise of this act, the Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board (GIDB) was set up as a dedicated institution. The GIDB is chaired by the chief minister and acts as a coordination agency that is responsible for the approval of projects. The organization was instrumental in enacting various interventions and frameworks that defined the process of identifying, structuring and awarding PPPs in Gujarat, thereby bringing legitimacy to the notion of private sector participation in infrastructure. Thus, even prior to the creation of PPP cells and other interventions by the DEA, Gujarat, through the GIDB, had already taken several steps to create an enabling environment for PPPs in the state.

The political and bureaucratic will to undertake PPPs appeared to be a persistent feature in the state of Gujarat right from the top political leadership to the line agencies implementing projects. Our interviews with private firms also indicated that a good rapport existed between the public and private sectors and that their history of prior interaction led private developers to look favourably upon partnering with the state government for infrastructure development. On a related note, many of our informants mentioned the entrepreneurial spirit and the proclivity of Gujaratis to turn towards the private sector for the provision of their needs. One senior government bureaucrat termed this as the ‘Genius of the Gujarati’. Scholars have noted this phenomenon as well (Mehta and Joshi, 2002), wherein the state of Gujarat has traditionally been home to a greater ratio of entrepreneurs per capita as opposed to other Indian states. Mehta and Joshi (2002) identified Gujarat as India’s traditional entrepreneurial hub and suggested that participating in private ventures may be endemic to the Gujarati culture. Several informants felt that this outlook of accepting and cherishing the role of private enterprise, and a track record of having used private firms to deliver services in sectors other than infrastructure in the past, has helped ease in the notion of private sector participation in the delivery of essential services such as transportation and W&S infrastructure. The basic set of institutions in the state—regulative, normative and cognitive—is quite well aligned to the idea of private participation in infrastructure service delivery.

**Table 4** Actors and contesting fields in the water sector for the three states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Gujarath</th>
<th>Tamil Nadu</th>
<th>Karnataka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent actors</td>
<td>GWIL</td>
<td>CMWSSB, TWAD</td>
<td>BWSSB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Challengers</td>
<td>PPP cell</td>
<td>PPP cell</td>
<td>PPP cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulative SAFs</td>
<td>Coercive central government pressure to push PPP projects</td>
<td>Coercive central government pressure to push PPP projects</td>
<td>Coercive central government pressure to push PPP projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative SAFs</td>
<td>• Success stories from roads and ports</td>
<td>• Success stories from other states</td>
<td>• Success stories from other sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive SAFs</td>
<td>• International water sector experiences</td>
<td>• International water sector experiences</td>
<td>• International water sector experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Highly politically sensitive sector</td>
<td>• Water scarcity and prevailing bad impression on government water agencies</td>
<td>• Water scarcity and prevailing bad impression on government water agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Narmada river protests</td>
<td>• Sensitive nature of the water</td>
<td>• Sensitive nature of the water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Huge mistrust in private involvement in water</td>
<td>• Water scarcity mandates private participation</td>
<td>• Water scarcity mandates private participation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political framing</td>
<td>Create necessary institutions before venturing into PPP</td>
<td>Water scarcity mandates private participation</td>
<td>No particular thrust for water sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: GWIL, Gujarat Water Infrastructure Limited; CMWSSB, Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board; TWAD, Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board; BWSSB, Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board.
Challenger actors and episodes of contention

The central government’s push towards PPPs in the late 2000s described earlier can be considered to be the set of directives that ‘challenged’ the incumbent logic on infrastructure development. However, this exogenous event aligned well with the existing organizational field for infrastructure delivery in Gujarat. The GIDB subsumed the newly created PPP cell under its organization and functions—a strategy in marked contrast to that followed in most other states, where the PPP cell is housed within the finance department. Armed by this increase in capacity, the GIDB set about framing the role for PPPs in infrastructure development by creating awareness among various public agencies and conducting training programmes for professionals in these agencies. The GIDB also adopted several of the toolkits created by the central government and the planning commission such as the model concession agreements (MCAs), request for proposal (RFP), request for qualification (RFQ) documents and so on. Next, a vision document for infrastructure called ‘Vision 2020’ was developed with the help of private consultants. This document contained a demand assessment for infrastructure in various sectors and also helped guide various sectoral government agencies in identifying PPP projects.

The GIDB’s proactive presence, the framing of infrastructure as a crucial need in the state, the coercive pressures applied by the central government and the presence of a highly capable private sector that was willing to partner with the government constituted a series of fields and forces that were aligned towards PPPs in the state. Also, the central government had undertaken a major programme for the development of India’s highway network, coordinated by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI). The NHAI had successfully bid out several stretches of highway under the BOT model. Although successful tendering is not an indicator of project success, NHAI’s experience led to an increase in confidence within the government on the appropriateness of PPPs for road development. This served to further intensify the strength of the enabling field towards PPPs. In this case, therefore, the challenger institutions were in step with and reinforced the incumbent actors and logics. There were very few observable episodes of contention in the road sector. A separate organization called the Gujarat State Road Development Corporation (GSRDC) was created with a mandate to promote PPPs. The GSRDC works in tandem with the Public Works Department (PWD) (the public agency responsible for roads in Gujarat) and the GIDB to take up projects on a PPP basis. A large portion of the road network in Gujarat—20 projects as mentioned earlier—is now under PPPs.

Several of the organizations and logics that are prevalent in the road sector such as the presence of the GIDB and the GID Act, the schemes and policies of the central government and the overarching need for infrastructure development in the state directly affect the W&S sector in Gujarat as well. However, while PPPs in the road sector were positively influenced by proximate SAFs, national and international experiences in water have led government agencies in the W&S sector to tread more cautiously. International experience with regard to improvements in service delivery efficiencies as a result of private sector involvement in W&S is mixed (Marin, 2009). While some success stories exist, these are often overshadowed by high-profile failures such as the failure of the water concession in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Nickson and Vargas, 2002) and elsewhere. Closer to home, a project to raise the height of a dam across the river Narmada ran into heavy opposition from special interest groups headed by the Narmada Bachao Andolan who protested the displacement of people and the destruction of eco-systems that would result due to increases in water levels upstream.

In this sector, the incumbents were not as prone to adopting PPPs as in the road sector, and this posed a conflict with the views and logics espoused by the challengers, led by the GIDB’s PPP cell. This led to several episodes of contention as projects were conceptualized. In one municipal water supply project, the challenger PPP cell hired a consultant to structure the project. The incumbent municipal employees scrutinized the reports for various irregularities and delayed the process considerably. They then insisted on a risk allocation framework that was heavily skewed in favour of the municipality. As a result, no private firms bid for the project. The government is currently considering developing this project through its own line agencies. Due to proximate SAFs such as those surrounding the river Narmada, the cognitive biases that they create against PPPs and inadequate framing of the PPP agenda by the challengers, PPP projects are virtually non-existent in the W&S sector.

Tamil Nadu

Similar to Gujarat, Tamil Nadu is one of the most developed states in the country as well as a fast-growing economy. It draws high levels of foreign direct investments in part because of its literacy levels, maturity of the manufacturing sector (automobiles and textiles, in particular) and excellence in terms of human resources and infrastructure. However, its apparent advantages and a largely investor-friendly government notwithstanding, the state appears to have lagged behind in its use of PPPs for infrastructure development.
**Incumbent actors and initial conditions**

Tamil Nadu has relied on public departments for the development of its infrastructure. The history and orientation towards infrastructure in Tamil Nadu contrast considerably with those of Gujarat. Political movements in Tamil Nadu in the 1950s were guided by a pro-Dravidian ideology and the logic of a welfare state (Lakshman, 2011). This ideology persists even today, and the two primary political parties in the state have their roots in the Dravidian movement earlier in the previous century. The elections to the state assembly in 2006, for instance, featured campaign promises for distributing free colour televisions, while more recently in 2011, the government in its budget speech announced the distribution of free electric fans, mixies, grinders and cash to 10th and 12th grade students. Thus, whereas the citizens of Gujarat were open to the private sector providing basic amenities, in Tamil Nadu, there is an expectation that basic necessities will be provided by the government, often free of charge. In turn, our interviews too revealed that the government considers itself to be the most capable of providing infrastructure services and is often not willing to charge for them.

A recent study done by the Confederation of Indian Industries on Tamil Nadu’s Vision for 2025 (CII, 2008) listed various priority sectors and issues for the state. Infrastructure was ranked 8th in a list of 14 key enablers. Despite the need for infrastructure, the presence of a reasonable level of existing infrastructure has led the state to prioritize other campaigns in health and education. Our interviews with private sector informants also revealed issues with regard to corruption and related impediments that increase the transactions costs of doing business in Tamil Nadu. In one case in the road sector, a newly elected government expropriated an ongoing PPP project under the charge of negligent procurement by the previous government. This further lowered the private sector’s confidence to enter into long-term agreements in Tamil Nadu.

**Challenger actors and episodes of contention**

The pro-PPP movement espoused by the central government and its champions emerged as ‘challengers’ in the SAF pertaining to infrastructure in Tamil Nadu. The pressure to create a PPP cell in the state led to the creation of a cell within the finance department. However, although the cell was functionally created, it was one of the most poorly staffed PPP cells in the country. With the exception of two experts from the ADB, only one government representative was assigned to this cell. Furthermore, this representative was in charge of other key functions within the department of finance and could therefore devote very little time to the affairs of the PPP cell. Our interviews with the representatives from the PPP cell also revealed that this cell functioned only part time. The ADB representatives were often in New Delhi, helping the DEA with PPP-related issues in other states. This was a direct response to the fact that very little by way of PPPs was taking place in Tamil Nadu.

Unlike Gujarat, Tamil Nadu does not have an act or a policy that guides its decision-making on PPPs. The PPP cell therefore sought to come up with a PPP policy and hired a consultant to prepare a draft. However, the finance department and other government agencies did not adequately debate this draft and the policy has not been adopted yet. We encountered confusion and resistance when we attempted to locate a copy of this PPP policy. Several of our informants were aware of the efforts that were undertaken to create a draft policy. However, most of them did not know where this policy currently was or how one might obtain a copy of it. The government had in effect contrived to ‘lose’ its own draft policy.

The success of the national highways programme positively influenced the ideology for PPPs in the road sector, while global and local failures in water privatization negatively influenced the PPP-enabling field in the W&S sector. However, Tamil Nadu’s history of welfare state politics, an expectation that basic services would be delivered by government and deep mistrust between the public and private sectors led to strong anti-PPP incumbents who were well equipped to counter their challengers.

Apart from the apathy towards the draft PPP policy, several other episodes of contention resulted. Private firms and select government representatives whose ideas were in line with the challengers proposed a variety of PPP projects. However, in most cases, the project agreements were structured with the private sector bearing most of the risks, leading to poor competition and project failure. For instance, in a water supply project in the town of Tirupur, the local government insisted that the private sector also build a sewage treatment plant, free of cost, in return for the PPP concession. This led to a much larger debt service obligation on the part of the private provider, which has now placed this project under great stress. In other sectors, PPPs have been taken up with reduced private sector participation. In the road sector, for instance, a few projects have been developed through a Special Purpose Company called the Tamil Nadu Road Development Corporation, where half of the equity is held by the Government of Tamil Nadu. The other organization is also a quasi-private entity with public institutions holding stakes in the venture.
In conclusion, there seem to have been determined efforts in Tamil Nadu to thwart the induction of PPPs. In some cases, a loose-coupling strategy is adopted wherein institutional forms such as the PPP field are ceremonially adopted (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) but do not fulfil a meaningful function. In other cases, the strategy is more subtle, as incumbents raise the stakes during project negotiations or circumvent discussions (as in the case of the PPP policy) so as to prevent effective PPP arrangements from emerging. The challengers have been unable to frame the argument around PPPs in a manner that is convincing to the larger population, and the large size and entrenched nature of the incumbents impede this goal. The few projects that have been undertaken have been championed by individuals within the system and are not symptomatic of a larger programmatic approach towards PPPs. However, it must be noted that the field in Tamil Nadu has not yet settled. The fact that some PPPs have been enacted indicates that the incumbents have not been able to co-opt or subsume the challengers. Skilled challengers are able to enact PPPs even under unhelpful conditions. In a suburb of Chennai, a particularly popular and proactive municipal chairman personally canvassed for a PPP project in the sanitation sector and won the trust and belief of his fellow citizens. The project was awarded as a PPP and user deposits that were collected exceeded estimates. Recently, the newly elected government has evinced interest in creating enabling legislation for PPPs in the state—an activity that the first author of this paper is involved with. The field for infrastructure development in Tamil Nadu is therefore currently in dynamic equilibrium and may well change in the future.

**Karnataka**

Karnataka’s economy was predominantly agriculture based. In the late 1980s, several outsourcing, electronics and software firms set up their base in the state—mainly in the capital city of Bangalore—leading to an information technology revolution in the state. This led to a huge influx of population into the urban areas of the state, which placed great stress on the existing infrastructure, which continued to lag behind requirements.

**Incumbent actors and initial conditions**

As in the case of Tamil Nadu, infrastructure in Karnataka was traditionally delivered through public agencies. Many of our informants indicated that infrastructure is indeed a priority sector for the state. Road traffic in many parts of the state had reached unmanageable proportions and water supply was inadequate. Karnataka’s state polity had framed itself as pro-development and this dearth of infrastructure represented a serious problem. Karnataka’s focus on infrastructure development is evinced by the fact that Karnataka has established a separate infrastructure department within the government for streamlining and delivering infrastructure projects, much in the manner of the GIDB in Gujarat, and unlike the case in Tamil Nadu, where sector-specific line agencies—such as the roads department or the water boards—are in charge of developing pieces of the state’s infrastructure, with no central coordination mechanism. However, as opposed to the GIDB, Karnataka’s infrastructure department is relatively nascent and was established only in 2006. Therefore, while Gujarat’s orientation towards infrastructure development stemmed from steps taken in the 1990s, Karnataka’s orientation is much more recent. The orientation of the Government of Karnataka towards PPPs also falls in between the extremes exhibited in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. On the one hand, historical policies did not directly oppose the notion of PPPs as in the case of Tamil Nadu. On the other hand, the state was not as ‘prepared’ as Gujarat to take advantage of the PPP-oriented schemes enacted by the central government.

**Challenger actors and episodes of contention**

This relative ambivalence to the orientation of PPPs indicated that challengers with skill in framing the debate around PPPs could positively affect the proclivity of Karnataka to embrace private sector participation in infrastructure service delivery. Senior bureaucrats in the Government of Karnataka were enthused by the notion of PPPs. When the central government mandated the creation of PPP cells in 2006, the Government of Karnataka responded by creating the Infrastructure Development Department (IDD) to coordinate infrastructure development within the state. The PPP cell was then placed within this department. Karnataka’s PPP cell is a vibrant unit and is well staffed. Most of its employees work full time for the PPP cell, and several of them have considerable experience in developing PPPs. The PPP cell, with the blessings of the IDD, set about creating a series of enabling conditions for PPPs in the state. Vision documents were prepared in various sectors. In the road sector, for instance, a comprehensive study was commissioned to enumerate the new roads that were needed in the state while also indicating which of these could be undertaken through PPPs. Pilot PPP projects were undertaken in the several sectors to test the waters and to build confidence among stakeholders that PPPs could be used for efficient infrastructure delivery. For instance, Karnataka wished to provide 24 x 7 water supply through PPPs.
in several towns. Three towns were chosen and 24 × 7 water supply systems were implemented in parts of these towns, covering around 10% of the total population, to showcase the potential for PPPs. The IDD created model documents for RFQs and RFPs for selection of private operators, private consultants and legal advisors. The PPP cell also created an Infrastructure Policy for the state that addressed the need for and the modalities by which PPPs were to be undertaken. The state also established a ‘Single Window Clearance’ system for projects, where a single authority would be responsible for providing the various permits and clearances necessary for a project. The purpose here was to make it as easy as possible for the private sector to enter into development partnerships with the state.

The challengers thus skilfully attempted to manipulate the SAF to provide support for PPP projects in the state and to incorporate PPPs in the logic of infrastructure delivery. However, although the challengers were able to influence change at the level of the Government of Karnataka, this change does not seem to have percolated down the political chain to line departments and municipal governments. Officials whom we interviewed at these levels such as the chairman of the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board continued to indicate a preference for public sector service delivery. Others voiced suspicions on whether PPPs were designed to benefit the private sector or the citizens of the state. Political willingness to enact PPPs was relatively low across the state, outside of the secretariat in Bangalore.

These factors led to several episodes of contention in the road and W&S sectors, similar to those observed in Tamil Nadu, as the implementation of PPP projects was attempted. In the road sector, for instance, the agency responsible for developing road projects undertook several PPPs at the behest of the IDD, but did not claim complete ownership of these projects. As a result, MCAs were adopted directly and were not customized based on the constraints for each project. This in turn led to payment terms and risk allocation frameworks that were perceived as inequitable. There was hardly any competition for these projects as the private sector often stayed away. In many cases, there was only one bidder for the project. India’s PPP database also highlights an interesting anomaly. Nearly 50 PPP projects are listed in the road sector for Karnataka. However, only nine of these have been implemented at the time of writing of this paper. The other projects have been proposed as PPPs by the IDD, but are yet to be implemented as such by the line departments.

The water sector in Karnataka presents an interesting contrast. The incumbent–challenger dynamics are similar to that in the road sector. Some of the pilot PPP projects that have been implemented have not yet been scaled up due to societal pressures. However, the absence of a strong resistance to PPPs as in the case of Tamil Nadu and the absence of a strong negative proximate field such as the incidents involving the river Narmada in Gujarat have positioned the SAF in the W&S sector in Karnataka as being more attuned towards PPPs when compared with Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. As a consequence, several reputed international firms such as Veolia, Suez and Degremont have a presence in Karnataka and are on the lookout for project opportunities here. More PPPs have been enacted in this sector in Karnataka when compared with the other two states.

**Discussion and reflection**

In this paper, we have attempted to empirically evaluate the process of settlement in PPP-enabling fields in three different states in India. Our observations, as presented in Table 5, indicate that the states witnessed a variety of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Gujarat</th>
<th>Tamil Nadu</th>
<th>Karnataka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settlement of challenger organization</td>
<td>PPP cell subsumed under GIDB</td>
<td>PPP cell is housed in Department of Finance</td>
<td>IDD was created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of new actors</td>
<td>GSRDC created roads for PPP projects</td>
<td>No new actors were created</td>
<td>KSRDC created for PPP in roads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of artefacts and archetypes</td>
<td>GID Act, individual sectoral policies for PPP</td>
<td>Case of ‘lost’ policy on infrastructure</td>
<td>Government order for PPPs, drafting PPP policies for sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logics of the field</td>
<td>PPP as default for roads, no PPPs in water</td>
<td>PPP considered in exceptional cases</td>
<td>PPPs are used. The policies are implemented in letter and not in spirit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: GIDB, Gujarat Infrastructure Development Board; GSRDC, Gujarat State Road Development Corporation; KSRDC, Karnataka State Road Development Corporation.
forms may not be created. However, existing forms will be strengthened and their logics modified, reinforced and legitimized. This kind of settlement is observed in the case of Gujarat, particularly in the road sector where the GIDB merged with the PPP cell and legitimized the use of PPPs in the state.

In cases where there are no strong biases for or against challenger logics in the proximate cognitive, normative and regulative fields, actors must make use of their social skill to shape up the field. Here, when access to resources is comparable among challengers and incumbents, the group that shows the greatest skill in both framing (Lounsbery et al., 2001; Benford and Snow, 2000) and timing its arguments is likely to establish the new order within the field. Field settlement is often unpredictable in this case and external forces or entrepreneurial moves that provide additional power to select actors or lead to a transfer of resources within the field can have a bearing on the final settlement. It is likely that new institutional forms will come into being with formal attempts to legitimize their existence, such as the enactment of enabling legislation or policies surrounding PPPs in this case. However, field stability might only be temporary. The efficiency of field performance will be closely monitored and cognitive dissonance might occur, leading to renewed contestations if the balance of power shifts within the field or if transactions within the field result in suboptimal outcomes. This was the case with the road sector in Karnataka where the contestation and settlement were largely influenced by the social skill of actors in framing their actions and strategies. New organizations were formed and attempted to craft PPP projects. However, they encountered much resistance when attempting to award projects and the degree of institutionalization of the new PPP-enabling field was low in the state.

In cases of strongly negative proximate cognitive and normative fields surrounding challenger logics, contradictory logics will ensue (Seo and Creed, 2002) and there will be considerable contestation between actors in an attempt to reconcile these logics. While settlements will be a function of the strength of proximate fields and the social skill of the actors involved, incumbent logics are likely to hold sway either formally or informally through loose-coupling mechanisms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), even if challenger actors occupy positions of power within the field. In the instance of Gujarat’s water sector, high anti-PPP sentiments in proximate cognitive fields blunted the efficacy of challenger actors and logics and led to the outright rejection of PPPs in this sector. In the case of Tamil Nadu, a PPP cell was established only in a ceremonial instance of Gujarat and occupied positions of power within the field. In the case of Tamil Nadu, a PPP cell was established only in a ceremonial instance of Gujarat and occupied positions of power within the field. In the case of Tamil Nadu, a PPP cell was established only in a ceremonial
access to resources and occupying positions of power must reframe existing logics. For instance, despite a strong anti-PPP sentiment in Tamil Nadu, there have been instances where committed project champions have been able to influence proximate actors into undertaking successful PPP projects solely on the basis of being able to mobilize resources within their field to frame PPPs as the most viable option for their projects. However, institutionalizing these frames is a long drawn-out process and a strategic niche management-related approach (Geels and Schot, 2007) may need to be followed where niches are first formed, regimes are then influenced and finally the socio-technical landscape is changed.

Oliver (1991) provided a typology of organizational responses to institutional pressures and attempted to posit a model through which a set of predictive factors (causes, constituents, content, control and context) leads to the formulation of an appropriate response (acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation). Her work acknowledges the rich spectrum of organizational responses. However, a lack of understanding on the process by which responses are arrived at, the varied ability of actors to re-orient organizational responses and the potential for sequentially combining responses affects the predictability of this model. Several subsequent studies have shed light on the processes of organizational change (Lounsbury et al., 2001; Dacin et al., 2002; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), but rather than building towards a predictive model, have often merely acknowledged that process matters. Our study attempts to add to this body of literature by focusing specifically on the issue of contested settlements during the process of field change, by identifying potential outcomes of these contests based on causal factors and by understanding the processes that contribute to these outcomes. We have done this through providing ‘thick’ empirical descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of field contestations and settlements in three institutional contexts in India. We have also added ‘logic alignment’ and ‘actor skill’ to the set of constructs developed by Oliver (1991) as useful measures with which to view institutional change. Thus, when challenger and incumbent logics are aligned, contests are minimized and existing institutional forms thrive, as was the case for PPPs in Gujarat, particularly in roads. When these logics conflict and contestations ensue, loosely coupled structures may be observed (as in the case of Tamil Nadu), and challengers must create and develop niches from positions of strength in order to influence change. When neither challenger logics nor incumbent logics are orthogonal, new institutions and temporary settlements arise and actor skill determines the degree of institutionalization of these new forms (as seen in Karnataka).

From the perspective of PPP-enabling fields, we have shown that the evolution of these fields is path dependent and likely to be highly contested. PPP-enabling fields must be aligned with existing project delivery and other proximate fields in order for PPPs to be institutionalized. Practitioners cannot merely transplant legislation, procedures and formal structures used in successful PPP programmes elsewhere and normatively mandate their use in an attempt to popularize PPPs as an alternative mode of service delivery. When PPP-enabling fields are misaligned with proximate project delivery fields, a methodical process of niche creation and expansion involving showcasing pilot projects, crafting communication strategies and so on is likely to be required.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have viewed PPP-enabling organizational fields as ‘arenas of contestation’ where different actors advance their interests and in turn affect the settlement of these fields. This formulation allows us to better understand agency, settlement and change in organizational fields and also enables us to develop predictive models of outcomes of field configurations taking into account the alignment between incumbent and challenger fields and the social skills of actors. We have shown that an alignment with the cognitive and normative elements of incumbent logics is likely to aid the diffusion of challenger logics. However, when such alignment is not present, considerable contestations will result and the outcome will be determined by actor skill, the distribution of resources within the field, the influence of proximate fields and the degree of normative and cognitive dissonance between incumbent and challenger logics. New institutional forms can arise and adoption can be substantive or symbolic.

The contested organizational field perspective presented in this paper also brings social movement theory closer to institutional theory and the study of organizational fields. By adopting a dynamic view of the strategic actions of actors, we have brought in the various elements of social movement theory into the conceptualization of organizational fields. By doing so, we have attempted to shift the focus of debate in the study of organizational fields towards the agency of field actors. These actors mobilize resources (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) and act strategically to advance their interests (Oliver, 1991; Lounsbury et al., 2001). However, their actions are embedded in and influenced by proximate fields that connect actors to the wider institutional structure. Thus, as Giddens (1979) observed, actors create structures, which in turn empower their actions. Social movement theory as
operationalized through SAFs allows us to understand the processes behind institutional change.

While our empirical analysis is restricted to PPP-enabling fields in India, the results of this analysis can be extended to other national contexts as well and to arenas outside of PPPs. From a practical viewpoint, policy-makers for PPP programmes should tailor PPP policies keeping in mind the varied contextual institutional conditions surrounding these programmes and the various actors involved, as well as the power and skill that these actors possess. For PPP policies to succeed, normative and cognitive alignment of logics is necessary. There is also a need for further research in this area. Our findings must be validated and extended through studying other diverse PPP-enabling fields. Ways and means by which the alignment of logics can be brought about must be studied. The interplay between PPP-enabling fields and the execution of projects within these fields is also an area that needs further exploration. Such research could concentrate on the micro-dynamics of how project actors and project outcomes shape field evolution. We invite researchers to use, extend and debate the contested organizational field perspective for the study of PPPs and other domains pertaining to engineering projects, organizations and organizational fields.

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