# Preserving Japan's 'Pacifist' National Identity: Historical Discourse and the Psychocultural Shame-Guilt Complex

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# Table of Contents

## Abstract

As unprecedented events that claimed many human lives and brought World War II to an end, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have rendered pacifism a sociocultural norm and concept influential in shaping Japanese value structure and preferences. In Japan, pacifism has been endowed with the power to describe and predict the evolution of national identity through doctrinal socialization and institutionalization. Therefore, despite determination by policymakers of the current ruling conservative political party to "normalize" the nation's military forces, pacifist ideology persists in Japanese individual and collective identities, social relations, and practices according to its specification in the Constitution of Japan as the right to live in peace, renunciation of all forms of war as a means of settling international disputes, and elimination of any armed forces. As the foundation of Japanese defense policy and symbol of Japan's eminent identity as a 'pacifist' state, Article Nine of the Constitution maintains and reiterates the spoken discourse of the Emperor of Japan who expressed regret for the loss of human lives in the wake of the war. However, his public expression of shame in absence of guilt arguably bears a link to the irresolute, paradoxical decision-making style of Japanese policymakers that is characterized by an incremental expansion of the operational scope of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in spite of the legal constraints of the pacifist constitution. Furthermore, the purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of an imperfect shame-guilt complex, and the role of discourse in shaping and preserving Japan's 'pacifist' national identity. The outcome will be a depiction of pacifism as unique to the Japanese sense of national unity that may be lost if the Constitution is revised in order to allow the JSDF to participate in collective self-defense activities.

# I. Introduction

Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan, drafted in 1947 as a post-World War II measure, states, "The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." In addition to seeking to rectify past behaviors, this defense policy inspired a new form of national identity that helped to unify Japan and give its people an opportunity to make peace with the events of the war. Nearly 70 years later, Japanese policymakers may revise the nation's pacifist constitution due to growing regional expansion by China and North Korea. According to Director of the Institute of Oriental Culture at the University of Tokyo Akihiko Tanaka (2007), the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have been expanding their scope of activities "as pressure mounts on Japan to make a more visible contribution to international efforts in peace and security" (as cited in Tatsumi & Oros, 2007, p. 6). From this statement, I contend that if Japan is to remain a strong supporter of peace and prosperity in the region and the world, Japanese policymakers will have to be more resolute about the nation's unique identity as a 'pacifist' state when the time comes to decide whether or not to "normalize" national security and defense policy. This is the focus of my argument because Japan's decision will have a critical impact on its contribution to preserving peace within the international community and serve as a statement to the world about the future of the nation as a global power.

In this paper I will explore how historical discourse represented by the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" speech of the Emperor of Japan and by the text of Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan was able to socioculturally imbue Japanese collective consciousness with the principles of pacifism and, in turn, institutionalize pacifist norms

in Japan's national identity. I will establish a correlation between the symbolic social status of the Emperor of Japan and the nation's imperfect shame-guilt complex—characterized by the prevalence of shame and presumed absence of guilt—in order to explain the status quo contradictory nature of security and defense policy. Through this exploration, I expect to show that, even several decades after the end of World War II, the existence of strong pacifist norms within Japanese society is an indication pacifist or, in a broader context, antimilitarist ideology remains a virtue of principle, obligation, and utility manifesting as the core national and global identity of Japan. This will support my argument that pacifism is the macrocosmic ideological system within which all contesting Japanese political ideologies since the postwar era have functioned as microcosmic attempts to guide collective consciousness, identity construction, national interests and behaviors, and the evolution of national security and defense policy in Japan.

## II. Historical Context and Evolution of Japanese Defense Policy

The potential for threats to a country's national security is a universal characteristic of the global international security environment today, given the heterogeneous nature of government and politics around the world. Japan is no exception with a history of being both an issuer and receiver of threats particularly during World War II. These experiences have had a compound effect on security and defense policy in Japan. Therefore, the evolution of Japanese defense policy, which is inextricably linked with security policy, can be divided into these five periods: post-World War II, the Cold War, post-Cold War, post-9/11, and post-2015 ISIS Hostage Crisis. During the years following the end of World War II, Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan both inaugurated a pacifist

foreign policy and provided the very basis essential to shaping Japanese national security policy. To this day, this clause still serves as a symbol of Japan's postwar determination to never again enter into wars with another country. However, as indicated by the drafting of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), to Japan the events of the Cold War demonstrated the importance of a defense posture allowing for multifaceted operations necessary for defense, and a deployable capability for disaster relief among other missions that secure public livelihood. For example, three important changes in Japan's defense establishment[1] occurred in the post-Cold War era: (1) the centralization of the decision-making process, (2) the advancement of the Japan Defense Agency to create the Ministry of Defense (MOD), and (3) the expansion of the operational scope of the JSDF (Tatsumi & Oros, 2007, p. 117). Each of these changes revealed Japan had begun to realize that choosing only to focus on the defense of its homeland was not going to suffice in enhancing its security. Additionally, the events of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War furthered discussion around an effective way for Japan to diverge from its Cold War praxis of passive pacifism and function as a society more attuned to a sort of "reluctant realism."[2]

Through much focus on contributing more to global security affairs, Japan has been able to strengthen its alliance with the United States and earn the respect from the

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[1] Andrew Oros and Yuki Tatsumi (2007) define Japan's defense establishment "as the community of government institutions that are directly involved in shaping and executing Japanese military security policy" (p. 11). It has two components: civilian and military. Civilian institutions consist of Internal Bureau (IB) of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and relevant Cabinet offices, while the military component is comprised of the JSDF.

[2] Reluctant realism, or transitional realism, is defined as a transitional theory, an apprehensive unification of norms and system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations (e.g. realpolitik) that culminates in the dominance of one theoretical paradigm over the other. See Kliman, Daniel M. *Japan's security strategy in the post-9/11 world: Embracing a new realpolitik*. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2006. 156.

international community afforded by making this conscious effort. The concept of international contribution to maintaining peace and stability in the world, in addition to humanitarian aid and disaster relief, has been embraced by many people in Japan because they expect the nation to play a more important role in the world after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 and the ISIS hostage crisis in 2015. While any future constitutional revisions are expected to cherish pacifist ideology and denounce combative activities, easing the constraints of the Constitution to permit an expansion of the JSDF's activities through enacting landmark laws reflects a revolutionary change in Japanese defense policy.

### *Post-World War II*

On August 15, 1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito publicly announced the surrender of the Empire of Japan to the world. This radio broadcast recorded via phonograph, referred to as the "Jewel Voice Broadcast," served as the catalyst for bringing the violence and aggressions of World War II to a bitter end. The unconditional surrender of Japan, as demanded by the United States, came only days after atomic bombs had been dropped over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9 inflicting mass death and destruction. However, Japan's surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 1941, which claimed the lives of 2,403 Americans, precipitated the outbreak of World War II with the United States declaring war on Japan, and Germany and Italy, Japan's allies, declaring war on the United States. With Japan, Germany, and Italy as the nation's common adversaries, the United States led Allied forces in the Pacific theatre—the locale of major campaigns and battles during the war—against Japanese forces from 1941 to 1945. On July 26, 1945, once German and Italian forces

had already conceded and Japan's infrastructure had taken considerable damage affecting its military capability, the Allied Powers—the United States, Britain, and China—issued the Potsdam Declaration, which specified the terms for the unconditional surrender of the Empire of Japan. The last words appended to these terms foreshadow the narrative of Japan's consequential fate after refusing to concede: "The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction" (1945, para. 13).

The dropping of atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was and remains historic and unprecedented. Naturally, Japan agreed to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration proclaiming unconditional surrender and on September 2, 1945 a formal ceremony was held in Tokyo Bay, Japan aboard the USS *Missouri* at which Japanese government officials signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. In this treaty, the particular text critical to understanding the context of Imperial Japan's ensuing metamorphosis and path toward renunciation of war is found. The proclamation reads: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the State shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of the surrender" (1945, para. 7). On this Victory over Japan Day, or simply V-J Day, U.S. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and, in accordance with the agreement, oversaw the Allied Occupation of Japan. In order to provide specific guidelines for the conduct of Japanese affairs during the occupation, an official legal document titled the "US Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" was drafted. This document secured the authority of the Supreme Commander by setting two main objectives:

(a) To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world.

(b) To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of democratic self-government but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the freely expressed will of the people. (1945, Part I, para. 1,2)

To achieve these objectives, Japan was "completely disarmed and demilitarized" to eliminate the authority and influence of militarism on Japanese society, the people were "encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights", and the economy was adapted for peaceful purposes (1945, Part I, para. 4-6). In addition to being psychologically devastated and physically battered by the effects of war, the vital need to rebuild left Japan with no other option but to accept the provisions and impending policy procedures of the agreement. Nevertheless, this begs the question of whether Japan had been prepared to make pacifism the premise of its fundamental law.

With Japan assenting to demilitarization in addition to democratization, the Occupation administration was able to liberalize the crucial areas of Japanese society, government, and economy in only a few years. By 1947, the Japanese government had drafted a new constitution instituting a parliamentary system of government to replace the

militaristic and quasi-absolute monarchy system that established the previous Meiji Constitution. Under this form of liberal democracy, the purpose of Japan's postwar constitution was to ensure peace and stability for the nation and guarantee certain fundamental rights. In terms of governing power, Article One of the Constitution of Japan designates the Emperor of Japan as "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides the sovereign power" (1947, Ch. I). This clause eliminated the emperor's authoritative power while preserving his image as a sacred figure. With freedom of religion considered a fundamental human right, an order called the Shinto Directive was issued by the Allies to remove Shinto as the state religion separating church from state and, ultimately, prevent Japan from ever reverting back to the nationalistic and militant culture that incited World War II. The cornerstone and most characteristic section of the Japanese Constitution, is Article Nine, which states:

> (1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
>
> (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (1947, Ch. II)

This article birthed the pacifist national defense policy in Japan that has made the idea of antimilitarism a legal and sociocultural norm. In tangible terms, Article Nine bans the overseas deployment of troops and participation in operations of collective self-defense, government spending on defense over one percent of the nation's GNP, sharing

defense technology, and aids in other self-imposed restrictions such as eliminating the possession of nuclear arms, arms exportation, and military use of space (Suzuki, 2008, p. 75). The rigidity of its structure and phrasing renders it capable of both intentionally embodying the purpose of the Allied occupation and strategically protecting the Japanese people from future security threats. Therefore, through the Japanese government's institution of legal, binding framework to confirm the indefinite demilitarization of Japan, the Allied occupation supported the nation's transformation into a pacifist state. At the same time, Japan's ability to rebuild itself as a 'peace-loving nation' (*heiwa kokka)* and implement domestic and foreign policies in the interest of postwar pacifism stems from the belief that the Japanese people were victims of war, rather than belligerents (Dian, 2015, p. 364). Since the people of Japan placed the blame for the war on the military as an institution, Emperor Hirohito was exonerated from standing trial as a war criminal because as the former sovereign state leader he possessed the political utility to legitimize the reforms of the occupation. This vindication conserved his sacredness and also legitimized his symbolic existence as the principal instrument of peace.

### *The Cold War*

With World War II over and Japan reconstructed as a pacifist nation committed to preserving peace and stability within its territory and among its people, the United States did not anticipate having to deal with the Communist oppression of the Soviet Union in the region. However, the United States soon began pressuring Japan to rearm and remilitarize in order to defend against the communist regime following the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War. Andrew Oros (2007) explains, "The United States played the leading role in Japan's disarmament after Japan's surrender to end World War II, and

then, conversely, in Japan's rearmament after the outbreak of the Cold War with the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, China)" (p. 76). This took the form of General MacArthur demanding the reinstatement of Japanese armed forces to relieve US troops of their duties in Japan for the purpose of deployment to the Korean Peninsula. On August 10, 1950, the National Police Reserve was created as a constabulary force with one goal: maintain public order by defending the homeland. The group reorganized twice before becoming the Safety Force, and then finally in 1954 it became the military force known today as the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The creation of the JSDF was met with much disapproval and protest from the public for the simple fact that the postwar Constitution strictly prohibits Japan from possessing any armed forces. Yet, Japanese government officials argued that Article Nine does not deny Japan the right of self-defense on an individual basis, but rather it prohibits the right to collectivize with other nations for self-defense (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 16).

This matter was further complicated by the one-sided, asymmetrical US-Japan alliance shaped and fortified through the US-Japan Security Treaty signed into effect in 1951—later ratified in 1960—that called for the US military to provide military security for Japan without reciprocation by Japanese military forces (Oros, 2014, p. 228). In other words, the United States was committed to the defense of Japan, and Japan was strictly limited to the defense of Japan. Yuki Tatsumi (2008) explains, "From the very beginning of the US-Japan alliance, Japan has been placed in a position of having a constitution that essentially banned Japan from having any form of military force on the one hand, yet feeling pressure to become a more reliable ally for the United States on the other" (p. 5). Though, during the Cold War, when the United States called on Japan to become a more

engaged military ally by increasing military presence in the region, Japan remained adamant about its security role in both regional as well as international affairs and adopted an isolationist regional strategy of one-country pacifism (Singh, 2002, p. 82). Instead, the Japanese committed to the war effort by making a huge financial contribution because the national agenda at the time was economic recovery. Hence, Japan's Cold War national security policy had three basic principles: "a limited role of military power, reliance on the US-Japan alliance to ensure its external security, and efforts to achieve its security through other means of national power as diplomatic efforts to strengthen international institutions and economic measures" (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 15). These principles were based on an initiative known as the "Yoshida Doctrine", which employed 'self-binding restrictions' such as the ban on the dispatch of the JSDF abroad (Dian, 2015, p. 370).

With resources scarce from the events of the war, Japanese policymakers prioritized economic recovery in order to regain autonomy and status in the international community. These political leaders, the media, and the general public all attributed the misfortunes of the war to the military because of its role in steering Japan down the expansionist path (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 12). The Yoshida Doctrine served as Japan's foreign policy strategy during the postwar period and originates from a compromise between progressive and conservative ideals, upon which pacifist ideology, the alliance with the United States, and the emphasis on economic development were established. Pacifism itself became the hallmark of the progressive tradition under this doctrine while the conservative tradition relied on the principles of pacifism to eschew any participation in the proxy conflicts of the Cold War in Asia. Yet, the mutual understanding between

parties was that pacifism was "useful to avoid both dangers and the costs of the Cold War and to concentrate on the aim of building a prosperous and respected nation" (Dian, 2015, p. 370). Since the general consensus among Japanese policymakers of either tradition on investing in its military consisted of allocating resources for other purposes, Japan's national security policy dealt more with legalities than drafting strategic measures. However, Japan soon came to the realization that economic power alone was not enough to gain respect from the international community and yield influence.

### *Post-Cold War*

The death of Japanese Emperor Hirohito in January 1989 led to the dissolution of the compromise between the conservative and progressive Japanese policymakers who maintained governance of the state during the postwar period. As a result, national debate over Japan's role in the world and the potential for the peace-loving nation to transform itself into a "normal" state emerged between Japanese bureaucrats of the two traditions (Dian, 2015, p. 370). Subsequently, progressive policymakers formed The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and conservative policymakers formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) configuring Japan's political system. Before collapsing in the second half of the 1990s, the SDP was the largest opposition party and staunchest advocate of pacifism (Suzuki, 2008, p. 76). The LDP as the surviving ruling party, on the other hand, surged in political influence within the Japanese government—also known as the Diet—and grew rather emphatic about revising Article Nine to endow the JSDF with a more expansive role. However, the supposed truth of the Emperor's involvement in the war atrocities of the Japanese Imperial Army acted to subvert the postwar victimization narrative that fostered the policies of the Yoshida Doctrine. This introduced a fundamental dilemma

into Japanese public perception of events surrounding World War II: the inherent discrepancy between the purported image of Emperor Hirohito during the Allied occupation of Japan via postwar discourse and his actual authoritarian role in planning and legitimizing the war. According to Matteo Dian (2015), "Acknowledging Hirohito's responsibilities meant that he and his 'faithful subjects' were not seen as having been betrayed by the militarist clique, but were directly responsible for the war and the war crimes committed by the Imperial Army" (p. 372).

The end of the Persian Gulf War in addition to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the Cold War and marked the next significant stage in the evolution of Japanese defense policy. In the post-Cold War era, the United States resolved to no longer allow Japan to rely on U.S. hegemony to secure its defense in the face of a common adversary due to the form in which the Japanese government chose to contribute to the war efforts. Even though Japan pledged an excess of US$10 billion, reluctance to dispatch non-combat personnel to the Gulf subjected the nation to criticism from both the West and the Arab states. Given "the resultant vulnerability of the East Asian security environment, characterized by a possible drawdown of U.S. military forces and the uncertainty posed by the rise of China" (Singh, 2002, p. 82-83), Japanese policymakers became insistent on revisiting Japan's strategy of one-country pacifism. Therefore, the Gulf War was a pivotal time for Japanese defense policy because the criticism Japan received by solely employing "checkbook diplomacy" to engage in war efforts forced the government to think further than just the defense of its territory and focus on establishing new rules to aid in governing the international security environment in the post-Cold War period. Additionally, the war proved to Japan that military power in the post-Cold War

era plays a crucial role in shaping international relations, and that Japan was unprepared for military crises.

### *Post-9/11*

The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 marked a critical time for Japan to contribute to the security of the international community. These attacks served as another awakening for Japan to remain conscious that conventional security tension and threats continue to persist in the world despite the end of the Cold War era (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 27). As quoted by Kyodo News, Prime Minister of Japan Junichirō Koizumi in the wake of 9/11 argued for Japan's participation in the war on terror with this statement: "Unless Japan takes responsible actions in the international community against these acts of terrorism, we will be isolated from the international community" (as cited in Tatsumi & Oros, 2007, p. 55). Therefore, in 2004 a task force called the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, or the Araki Commission, was assembled with the intent of furnishing a report that assessed the goals of Japanese national security policy. In placing emphasis on the defense of Japan and prevention of threats in the international security environment, the former *National Defense Program Outline* (NDPO) of the 1990s underwent revisions and was reshaped into the *National Defense Program Guideline* (NDPG). This 2004 document advocated for Japan to "move beyond an exclusively defense-oriented posture for the first time in Japan's postwar history" (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 1) and further signified a willingness to utilize the JSDF as a chief facet of its national security policy. Therefore, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Japan made unprecedented decisions to dispatch Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) vessels for a refueling mission in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in November

2001, Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) aircrafts to Kuwait and Qatar for a transport mission in March 2002, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) troops to Iraq for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, both of the latter being in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Lee, 2007, p. 141). These activities demonstrated that Japan had become committed to taking a more active role in the international community, but in no way implied Japan had plans to seek an independent assertive military capability. Still, the original limitations of the postwar Constitution placed on Japan's right to self-defense through an armed force were rescinded and replaced by broader ones that to a certain extent remain congruent with the principles of pacifism.

At the same time, the influence of Japanese pacifist liberals on domestic politics has declined just enough in the last few decades to create opportunity for nationalist sentiment to make its way into the realm of strategic thinking that endeavors to legitimize the JSDF's roles in national and collective defense. In concurrence with a percentage of the current generation that does not feel as obligated by history to retain pacifist ideology in the same manner as the previous generations, but rather perceives Japan needs to take a more assertive role in the world, nationalists argue that legal and sociocultural norms of antimilitarism constrain Japan from "normalizing" its national security and defense policy (Tatsumi & Oros, 2007, p. 23). As proponents of constitutional revision in the Diet, nationalist bureaucrats have sought to justify how the JSDF is constitutional and a legitimate entity, in the face of Article Nine specifically prohibiting Japan from possessing a military force, by arguing that the nation is entitled to exercise the right to self-defense as a sovereign state (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 45). For this reason, the JSDF has taken on new missions to portray itself as a military body with a scope of activities

outside of just homeland defense. As described by Tatsumi (2008), the JSDF has grown into:

> An organization that commands state-of-the-art weapon platforms that maximizes today's advanced technology with the expectation that it will be engaged in a variety of new missions: homeland defense; international peacekeeping; humanitarian support for the victims of large-scale disasters; and provision of support as a member of the international coalition against terror. (p. 65)

Still, given Japan's wartime past with Korea, China, and Russia in the Asia Pacific region outside of the context of World War II, these countries regard contemporary actions and policy changes of Japan with concern and acrimony. Japan instituted the JSDF and its land, sea, and air force branches within less than a decade after drafting the 1947 "Peace Constitution". Since then, the core mission of the JSDF has gradually expanded to exemplify Japan's commitment to preserving a peaceful and stable international security environment outside of the defense of Japan despite constant debate around the constitutional legitimacy of its existence and scope of operations (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 95). Although the JSDF is continuously proclaimed a non-combat military force without war potential by the Japanese government, lingering concerns rooted in antimilitarism have hindered the JSDF from gaining an identity as a professional military organization (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 95). The original classification of the JSDF as a constabulary force rather than a military force may serve to appease doubts concerning the legitimacy of its existence, but Japanese policymakers have had to create a complex web of law legalities in order to expedite the process of responding to requests for assistance within the international community. By enacting laws to justify the legitimacy of the JSDF, the Diet

has created a paradoxical military body that is treated as a military according to international law but lack thereof within Japan. This is reminiscent of Ruth Benedict's description of the nature of the Japanese (1946/2005):

> These contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan … The Japanese are to the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around, loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways. (p. 2)

Incremental changes in Japanese defense policy over the last 25-30 years certainly give the impression of an emerging defense establishment with a reputation distinct from that of the postwar period, but the theme of contradiction embodied within its structure purports Japan as ambivalent and apathetic to the concerns of members within the international community, namely the United States and its rhetoric surrounding collective self-defense.

The US-Japan alliance bears a significant influence on Japanese defense policy revision considerations because Japanese policymakers recognize that only through maintaining this sound relationship with the United States—its sole treaty ally and the one country committed to defending Japan in the event it comes under an armed attack—can it ensure its own security in the post-Cold War security environment (Tatsumi & Oros, 2007, p. 17). If Japan had decided not to join in on the war on terrorism efforts, then the nation might have once again become subject to mass scrutiny or viewed as an isolationist, non-military state and left vulnerable to attack. Thus, the US-Japan alliance became affirmed as "one of the most accomplished bilateral relationships in history" by

Prime Minister Koizumi during his final visit to Washington as Japan's executive leader in 2006 (as cited in Tatsumi, 2008, p. 2).

Shinzō Abe, who succeeded Koizumi as Prime Minister of Japan in September of the same year, has since reaffirmed the strength of the alliance convincing individuals on both sides that his leadership presents a real opportunity for Japan to "liberate itself from the institutional and legal legacy of World War II and the Cold War" that posed challenges to Japan's national security policy (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 2). Under the Abe administration, the Diet passed legislation to establish the specific procedure for constitutional revision. As the first bill in Japanese history to articulate actual steps toward turning intense discussion about the possibility of revision into a real, legal action, the National Referendum Law gave Japanese policymakers the ability to legally discuss the matter of constitutional revision while keeping within the limits of the Constitution, which states that revisions can only be made with two-thirds majority of all the Diet members per subsequent majority approval of the public (Tatsumi, 2008, p. 30). Abe, while also serving as the President of the Liberal Democratic Party, showed determination to address the growing difficulty of making a more visible contribution to ensuring peace and security within the international community, but a year later he unexpectedly announced his resignation. From 2007 until 2012, Japan functioned under the leadership of five different prime ministers, all of whom did not seem particularly interested in continuing down Abe's path of instituting policies and measures to "normalize" Japanese security and defense policy.[3] For this reason, many of the

[3] In sequential order of taking office, these five prime ministers are: Yasuo Fukuda (September 2007–September 2008), Tarō Asō (September 2008–September 2009), Yukio Hatoyama (September 2009–June 2010), Naoto Kan (June 2010–September 2011), and Yoshihiko Noda (September 2011–December 2012).

initiatives launched by the Abe administration were either suspended or effectively terminated. Instead, each administration took a more cautionary approach to security and defense policy prioritizing the strengthening of the economy and, thus, Japan remained reliant on the United States for its military security.

### *Post-2015 ISIS Hostage Crisis*

In December 2012, Shinzō Abe once again took office as Prime Minister of Japan and resumed the goal of advancing domestic and foreign policy he begun during his first term. His premiership comes with efforts to boost Japan's declining economic growth as well as restructure Japanese defense policy. As 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Abe's intent to redefine security policy and challenge pacifist legal and sociocultural norms made for a controversial year. These actions were performed to further expand the operational scope of the JSDF and exhibit a true commitment to materializing a tangible contribution to preserving peace and security within the international community. In pushing for a reinterpretation of the Constitution in order to allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense, Prime Minister Abe and his Cabinet mapped out a plan of action with three key components: "enacting a national security law for Japan to engage in collective self-defense, requesting a record budget for defense spending in fiscal 2015, and revising the US-Japan defense guidelines" (Chen, 2015, para. 2).

The Islamic State hostage crisis of 2015 that resulted in the death of two Japanese citizens added more urgency and momentum to the discussion of revamping Japanese security and defense policy. Prime Minister Abe was quoted by the Japan Times (2015) saying, "Basically, we will push ahead with 'proactive pacifism' to realize a world

without terrorism" (para. 15). Furthermore, the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito Party, the LDP's ruling coalition conservative partner, reached an agreement on bills to expand the role of the JSDF. This newly passed legislation makes it possible for Japan to deploy the JSDF to aid friendly nations under attack if three basic requirements are met: the armed attack "gravely affects the peace and security" of Japan or endangers the lives of Japanese citizens; the use of force is the only way to protect Japan and the rights of citizens; the use of force will be commensurate with the security threat (Aoki & Kameda, 2015, para. 9-11). However, concern that JSDF involvement in joint missions in the Middle East might incite a war in the region persists among many Japanese citizens. According to a 2015 Kyodo News Poll, 57.9 percent of respondents said Japan's support ought to be nonmilitary while 16.6 percent said the nation ought to provide logistical support to the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State group (para. 2). Therefore, it is clear pacifist ideology and antimilitary sentiment in Japan will shape public perceptions of the expanding role of the JSDF while public fear of becoming embroiled in conflict will limit Abe's security and defense agenda.

In chronicling the historical evolution of Japanese defense policy, it is apparent Japan has sought to change the legal framework of its postwar constitution in order to meet the demands of an international security environment in a constant state of flux, and preserve peace and stability within the homeland. With internal pressure from its domestic bureaucratic system and external pressure from a world power like the United States to "normalize" defense measures, Japan will have to shed its passive mentality and transition away from its reluctance to adapt in order to construct a definitive identity rooted in its uniqueness. In maintaining an internationally certified military body not

legally recognized under domestic law, Japanese policymakers have seemingly situated the nation in a self-contradictory position in order to simultaneously oblige and disoblige proponents and opponents of constitutional revision. Strategic analysis of the potential outcomes of revising Article Nine of the Constitution to allow the overseas dispatch of the JSDF for participation in activities pertaining to collective self-defense exposes the virtue of rearticulating this position within a cultural connotation that is uniquely Japanese. On the one hand, Japanese policymakers may already realize that overturning its institutionalized promise to "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation" only to become embroiled in war and once again suffer the loss of Japanese lives will bring shame upon the state as well as dishonor the commemorated memory of all those affected by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On the other hand, policymakers probably also realize that had Japan not consented JSDF involvement in activities to promote international peace and stability, the nation may have likely been isolated from the international security network again risking Japanese lives due to a security and defense policy that does not hold contingencies for potential security threats. The inevitable loss of human life in either situation highlights a fundamental fear that obligates Japan to take action, even if that action is as minimal or nominal as it has been throughout its postwar history.

My assessment is Japan desires to honor its initial agreement with the United States to renounce war in the wake of World War II out of respect for human life: those alive and those whose lives were claimed by the war. From my perspective, Japan has an obligation to its citizens, historical memory, and the very hope of perpetuating peace and stability in the world given the nation went a step further than the prescribed criterions

for the postwar Constitution imposed by the Allied occupation by *forever* renouncing war. This responsibility can be manifested in two senses—identity or security—but choosing one jeopardizes the other. In the first sense, if Japan chooses to revise the Article Nine peace clause withdrawing the proclamation to settle international disputes without using the threat of force, then the nation will show its commitment to security and forsake its prevailing identity as a 'pacifist' state. In the second sense, however, if Japan were to concretize its identity through effectuating the pacifist ideology depicted in Article Nine, then a sort of national "ataraxia"—a state of serene calmness—might become prevalent throughout Japan because the decision honors the sacrifice made by victims of World War II, the legacy of the "Peace Constitution", and the value of human life. In addition, by assuming a definitive pacifist-oriented national identity and becoming self-content, Japan will gain the ability to settle into a sociopolitical niche within the greater international community and adopt a fresh interpretation of security. The difference between these two scenarios is rooted in the divergent outcomes of choosing to focus on one over the other. In the case of prioritizing security, there is a higher likelihood for shame, and even guilt, to inflict pain on Japanese collective consciousness given the intentional abandonment of pacifist legal and sociocultural norms. However, the possibility is lower in the case of prioritizing identity because, even if Japan had to defend against an armed attack as a pacifist-oriented state, the nation remained virtuous in its obligation to honoring the postwar generation and protecting human lives through conserving the sanctity of Article Nine. In support of this assertion is discussion around the role of Japan's hierarchical social order in dictating the virtue of duty and obligation to a population that is unique through its renunciation of war as a collective society.

## III. The Prevalence of Shame and Latency of Guilt in Sociocultural Norms

In becoming democratized and liberated from an authoritative, militaristic Imperial regime during the post-World War II era, Japan placed greater emphasis on social relations and social strata among the populace to maintain social order. The goal of preserving peace and stability within Japanese society necessitated the institution of certain sociocultural norms to construct a new sense of collective identity and further promote this social order. Therefore, as a social system in which the virtue of one's behavior is determined according to the standards of society, Japan's conventional hierarchical social structure of the Imperial era was reframed in a postwar context. As a pioneer of cultural anthropology through her 1946 study of Japanese culture in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, Ruth Benedict introduced the concept of shame as the prime social sanction in Japanese society due to its role in preserving social order, rules of behavior, and morals. In this volume, she writes, "True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin" (p.223). This cultural theory proposed that shame in Japan derives from individual conduct being based on the attentive gaze of others while guilt in western cultures stems from a call to be truthful to oneself, acting in accordance with internalized ideological or religious rules, irrespective of the gaze of others. Benedict further explains, "Shame is a reaction to other people's criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasying to himself that he has been made ridiculous" (p. 223). The notion of Japanese sensitivity to the judgment of other individuals or class of individuals supports Benedict's use of the term "shame culture" to characterize Japanese society because the Japanese sense of self only manifests through conforming to the sociocultural

norms that earn approbation and decrease the risk of ostracism.

However, despite recognizing the primacy of shame in Japan during the war period, her conceptualization of a shame culture and guilt culture has since been disproven due to its "culturally simplistic dichotomy that cannot be maintained from both a psychological and philosophical modern viewpoint" (Hein, 2010, p. 156). The fact is, Benedict conducted her research in the United States, rather than in Japan, using Japanese migrants and during wartime because the war being fought between the two nations made it impossible to facilitate actual fieldwork in Japan. Needless to say, this posed methodological limitations that resulted in a narrowed scope of contextual knowledge and a skewed, inadequate conceptualization of Japanese culture. Through utilizing the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT)[4] to assess whether Japanese subjects are capable of expressing emotions of both shame and guilt, Takie Sugiyama Lebra (1983) discovered that subjects experienced feelings of both shame and guilt and, in turn, is able to differentiate between the two emotional states. This discovery led her to argue that shame intensifies guilt because Japanese sensitivity to exposure of the self stems from an acute awareness of the Japanese individual to realize sense of self while under the constant gaze of others, which personifies the standards of proper public conduct. This idea is conveyed when she states, "The shame complex orients one inward. Paradoxical as it may sound, a strong concern about what one looks like outwardly in the eyes of audience preoccupies one with the state of his inner self. It is my proposition that, for Japanese, guilt is locked together with introspectiveness or self-reflection" (Lebra, 1983, p. 201). Her insight adds a new level of depth to the discussion of shame in Japan and reveals the

[4] The purpose of the Thematic Apperception Test is to reveal subjects' underlying motives, concerns, and perceptions of the social world.

deficiency of Benedict's depiction of Japanese society as a shame culture.

Nonetheless, Lebra (1983) acknowledges Benedict's accuracy in perceiving the prevalence of shame in Japanese culture and contends her fault was "in characterizing Japan as a shame culture *in contrast to* a guilt culture" (p. 193). Shame, she implies, is easier to recognize in Japan because the homogeneous nature of society acts as a social stressor to preempt divergence from well-defined norms. The lack of cultural and ethnic diversity in Japan, as compared to a society like the United States, fosters a larger realm of spectators who all adhere to the same standards of society. Therefore, shame as a psychological complex can be depicted through this sequence of events: an individual violates a norm, this misstep catches the eyes of an audience, the Japanese self is exposed, and, as a consequence, shame is felt in reaction to interpersonal and/or intrapersonal scrutiny of this norm violation. In accordance with this psychocultural mechanism, Lebra might agree with Benedict (1946/2005) as she states:

> A failure to follow their explicit signposts of good behavior, a failure to balance obligations or to foresee contingencies is a shame (*haji*). Shame, they say, is the root of virtue. A man who is sensitive to it will carry out all the rules of good behavior. 'A man who knows shame' is sometimes translated 'virtuous man,' sometimes 'man of honor.' (p. 224)

However, Benedict's view becomes too contrived when she describes shame as occupying "the same place of authority in Japanese ethics that a 'clear conscience,' 'being right with God,' and the avoidance of sin have in Western ethics" (p. 224) because she does not appear to consider the slight possibility that guilt might exist in Japan. Her assertion epitomizes shame in Japan as the psychological culmination of impropriety

given its ubiquity, but the ability to detect guilt in Japan means understanding that the central object of this emotional state is a negative assessment of an *act* committed as opposed to an individual's whole *self* in shame (Thonney, Kanachi, Sasaki, & Hatayama, 2006, p. 87). Lebra exhibits her knowledge of this concept by defining shame and guilt "as two psychic channels for processing stress into self-punishment" (p. 192) that are anchored in the individual's self.

This definition of shame and guilt establishes a relationship between the two emotional states and validates discussion on the actual existence of guilt in Japan. By recognizing that the Japanese individual internalizes the gaze of society through the process of socialization, alongside a propensity for self-reflection, in order to construct a measure for social behavior, Pauline Kent (1992) indicates that their experience of shame can be personal and/or public (p. 123). These two realms of shame are delineated through the public display of conformity and fastidiousness and the private divulgence of one's true heart and experiences, which support the development of the individual's sense of self. Private, or personal, shame occurs when the individual compares the idealized conception of himself with his real self and feels inferior, but public shame is experienced when the individual compares himself to others and feels himself to be inferior (Kent, 1992, p. 104). Kent closes the gap between shame and guilt when she explains, "As private shame is most concerned with self-image and identity it becomes the medium through which public shame is translated into guilt and, as such, it is considered a more intense internal sanction of behavior than the sanction of public shame" (p. 103). Deriving guilt from the personal intensification of public shame requires the broadening of the shame complex to include guilt, which produces the concept of a

"shame-guilt complex" and further insinuates that shame and guilt serve to bifurcate the Japanese self into two parts: the private (inner) self and the public (superficial) self.

Thus, Lebra's initial argument (1983) that feelings of shame "intensify rather than preclude those of guilt" (Thonney et al., 2006, p. 87) is confirmed. In Freudian theory, shame may be related to the "ego-ideal" as part of the mind that imposes on itself concepts of ideal behavior developed from parental and social standards, while guilt may be related to the "super-ego" as the part of one's mind that acts as a self-critical conscience, reflecting social standards learned from parents and teachers. In Japan, this is exemplified, for example, through the cogency of filial piety—respect, obedience, and care for one's family—to place especial value on social evaluation as a means of approbation rather than more internalized ethical codes. Guilt for the Japanese, therefore, may manifest most in a failure to meet family expectations given that this deficiency violates the standards of society (Thonney et al., 2006, p. 87). This emphasizes Lebra's point about norm homogeneity acting as a stressor considering Freud defines the process of being unable to cope with personal feelings of guilt in a suitable way as repression. Patrick Hein (2010) expounds on Freud's definition of repression:

> People who repress negative experiences or thoughts by keeping them secret or erasing the scaring, unpleasant parts from one's memory are more prone to experience high anxiety levels, arousal, stress, have flat, stereotyped emotional responses and resist information that might produce change. (p. 158)

Ironically, Japan has been labeled by neighboring nations like South Korea as a political state with, in the words of political theorist Hannah Arendt, the "inability to express feelings or a lack of emotional expressiveness" (as cited in Hein, 2010, p. 158). Such an

inability certainly corresponds with the nation's psychocultural shame-guilt complex and sheds significant light on the lingering issue of the Japanese government reluctantly apologizing for the nation's war crimes committed during World War II.

Catherine Lu (2008) acknowledges the utility that the shame-guilt complex can bring to reconciliation efforts when experiences of shame and guilt feelings are sincere and actualized. However, if political leadership and political culture do not bolster this complex, then the outcome of such efforts will inevitably be ineffective. Lu legitimizes this assertion by proclaiming, "In threatening old identities, values and beliefs, experiences of shame and guilt may provoke defensive, reactionary and violent political responses, and thus may precipitate hideous rather than salutary transformations" (p. 367). Therefore, the partial completion of the shame-guilt complex by government leadership in Japan can be linked to the national adoption of a twofold, self-perceived victim identity in the wake of World War II. This identity contains a narrative of "dual victimization" that is characterized by, on one hand, feeling "victimized by the blind ambition of Japan's military leadership" and, on the other, also feeling "victimized by the United States and foreign powers, that in the Japanese view, had conducted a ruthless campaign of conquests to strengthen their own power" (Ogawa, 2011, p. 393). Although this self-image may stem from an inability to express guilt due to repression, the undisputable loss of human lives during the war serves as the psychological object to which this emotion has been affixed and manifested as Japan's contemporary pacifism. In light of this discussion, a valid response to Ruth Benedict's characterization of Japan as exclusively a shame culture (1946/2005) is: Just because guilt was not perceptible while conducting research does not mean guilt does not exist in Japan. She presumed the

Japanese to not have a sense of guilt because the scope of their behavior is determined by extrinsic public shame exposure rather than internal feelings of guilt, but it is plausible that the emotion by and large remains latent.

Benedict appears to unconsciously create the appropriate space to locate guilt when she declares:

> Where shame is the major sanction, a man does not experience relief when he makes his fault public even to a confessor. So long as his bad behavior does not 'get out into the world' he need not be troubled and confession appears to him merely a way of courting trouble. Shame cultures therefore do no provide for confessions, even to gods. They have ceremonies for good luck rather than for expatiation. (p. 223)

Since numerous victims from China and South Korea, for example, have openly attested to Japan's war crimes during World War II, the concealment, or repression, of bad behavior is no longer warranted because it has become public. This confirms that it is custom for the Japanese to present a false image to the outside world in order to acculturate themselves to the expectations of their family, social networks, and society as a whole. In relation to political leadership in Japan, Hein (2010) suggests:

> The emotional unwillingness to connect with the victims, to feel sorrow, grief or compassion for others may be rooted in childhood experiences of failed identification with a positive father role model: the biographies of the fathers of Junichirō Koizumi, Tarō Asō and Shinzō Abe tell the stories of ruthless, self-sacrificing men who embodied the national shame of having lost the war and bearing personal guilt. (p. 159)

He goes on to argue that if these prime ministerial leaders have never had the opportunity to reconcile the normative, symbolic image they associate with their fathers, then they will continue to emulate this image to meet social expectations, which undermines the public manifestation of guilt and, thus, reconciliation with victims of war. Abe's decision to resign from his position as Prime Minister is an example of anxiety-ridden behavior because it confirms that repressing one's anxiety leads to an inability to make sound decisions and take constructive action. However, aligning public image with self-image serves to balance internal conflict and dilemma with sociocultural norms of morality and, in turn, allows public shame to take on the characteristics of guilt (Hein, 2010, p. 158).

Furthermore, as if to exonerate Benedict from ridicule over rashly labeling Japan a shame culture, Kent (1992) clarifies, "Benedict used shame to delineate the *pattern* of Japanese society," and "the pattern of shame is used to describe the bond that gives Japanese society its characteristic of a society regulated by an idea of taking one's proper place" (p. 100). Gauging the 'eyes of the world' facilitates the process of taking one's proper place, which Benedict articulates with distinction when she explains the structure of Japan's hierarchical social system. This concept is engrained in the Japanese language as it employs many customs of polite speech that vary based on knowledge of an individual's social status and social level to ensure they are addressed in the proper fashion (Kent, 1992, p. 105). Benedict (1946/2005) further demonstrates this when she states:

> 'If you do this, if you do that,' their elders say, 'the world will laugh at you.' The rules are particularistic and situational and a great many of them concern what we should call etiquette. They require subordinating one's own will to the ever-

> increasing duties to neighbors, to family and to country. (p. 273)

Kent summarizes Benedict's in-depth exposition of the way social hierarchy systematizes Japanese civil society:

> Benedict saw the sanction of shame at the core of such behavior as: fast allegiance to the emperor, the calculated reciprocation of favours and deeds such as *on* (a beneficiary gesture that results in the receivers' indebtedness) by such methods as those dictated by *giri* a debt repaid in quantitative equivalent and due on special occasions, and *gimu* which are debts limitless in both amount and duration. Shame is also the regulator of behavior that contributes to a highly refined and universally understood hierarchical system. It acts as the compass that directs those compelled to use the well-defined map of rules that govern the course of behavior in varying situations. Those who stray from the path are subjected to humiliation and, in certain situations, excommunication. (p. 100)

From this, one thing becomes clear: Japan is a collective society that operates according to the effectual sanction of shame. However, I contend that in order for guilt to manifest in the same vein as shame and reconcile with the social dynamics of Japanese culture there must be an equal and complementary recognition of shame caused and shame suffered. This, in turn, will neutralize the distortedness of Japan's dual victimization narrative and permit effective reconciliation with the victims of the nation's wartime past. Otherwise, the manifestation of shame combined with the latency of guilt in Japan will eventually give rise to and expose a fractured, imperfect, irresolute Japanese identity consequently devoid of the freedom to decide the fate of the nation's pacifist defense policy.

## IV. The Role of Discourse in Shaping Japanese Collective Consciousness and the Constitutional Revision Debate

Upon ascertaining the relationship between the hierarchical social system and the psychocultural shame-guilt complex in Japan, the nation's systemic obligation to perpetuating the standards of society becomes indicative of the theoretical principle known as collectivism. For Japanese society, this principle regards the interests of the populace as a single group over that of individuals in order to preserve a homogeneous social order representative of a collective consciousness. In the previous section, an imperfect shame-guilt complex emerged as concomitant with the collective nature of Japanese society through a normative propensity to manifest shame and repress guilt. However, what is responsible for endowing Japanese collective consciousness with the capacity to retain its existence and homogeneity? The path to answering this question lies within that which incorporates the bases of thought, language, communication, and knowledge: the realm of discourse. Virtually inescapable to any conceivable mind in the structuralized world, the ubiquity of discourse immortalizes the history of ideas and gives historicity to events associated with these ideas. Social theorist and historian of ideas Michel Foucault (1969/2002) describes discourse as "spatio-temporal"—the place and date of its appearance—not because it possesses history, but by virtue of being historical in itself "as a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time" (p. 117). By defining the particular forms of representation, codes, conventions and patterns of language, discourse plays a central role in identifying specific fields of experiences and bringing cultural as well as historical meaning to them.

Discourse is the product of rudimentary thought that manifests itself as language in the form of written or spoken communication and, in succession, lays the foundation for bodies of knowledge to construct certain conventional truths for a society. In order for discourse to become apprehensible, representations must be displayed and juxtaposed to allow individuals to organize the world around them and articulate the confines of reality (Foucault, 1966/1970, p. 338-39). Therefore, given that language is representative of thought, verbal signs are endowed with the power to transcend the system of signs as a word, or a series of words, and communicate a specific idea whose meaning is differentiable in a particular space. On the topic of the representative value of language and its further implications, Foucault states:

> On the projected surface of language, man's behaviour appears as an attempt to say something; his slightest gestures, even their involuntary mechanisms and their failures, have a *meaning*; and everything he arranges around him by way of objects, rites, customs, discourse, all the traces he leaves behind him, constitute a coherent whole and a *system* of signs. Thus, these three pairs of *function* and *norm, conflict* and *rule, signification* and *system* completely cover the entire domain of what can be known about man. (p. 389-90)

Within the purview of Japanese society, the archetypal modalities for *function* and *norm*, *conflict* and *rule*, and *signification* and *system* are, respectively, psychological, sociological, and linguistic. Therefore, the two prominent historical events fitting into the framework of these concepts are the reading of the "Imperial Rescript of the Termination of the War" by Japanese Emperor Hirohito—coined the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" —and the drafting of the Constitution of Japan because both can be credited with shaping the

orientation of Japanese collective consciousness towards pacifism. As pieces of spoken and written communication, the Emperor's speech and the Constitution of Japan's text are effective forms of discourse through association with the monumental moment Japan distinguished itself as a pacifist state. This affirms Foucault's initial conceptualization of discourse as giving historicity to events associated with certain ideas (1969/2002) and further demonstrates that this process facilitates the transmutation of thought into knowledge because these historical occurrences function as localities to map the evolution of Japanese defense policy.

The paramount importance of the Emperor announcing the surrender of Japan originates in his occupancy of the highest possible social position within the bounds of the nation's hierarchical social structure as a sacred figure. Holding cultural and historical continuity in high regard through the conventional belief that his lineage descends from an early deific being who descended from Heaven, Japan passed the mandate to rule the state and its people on to Emperor Hirohito during the Imperial era. After his exoneration from the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, the provisions of the Constitution conserved his sacredness by assigning him a purely ceremonial role as the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, but eliminated any and all of his political power. This preservation of his social prestige affirmed and legitimized the discourse uttered from his mouth to agree to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration and end World War II, especially since this was the first time in Japanese history when an emperor had publicly addressed his subjects as a collective and they were privy to his voice. Consistent with Foucault (1969/2002) proclaiming, "Discourse is constituted by a group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements, that is, in so far as they can be assigned particular

modalities of existence" (p. 107), Emperor Hirohito's speech exists within the spatio-temporal plane of discourse by embodying the particularistic, linguistic signs of Japanese language to make a statement representative of a specific idea that had a psychological and sociological impact on the Japanese state and its people, serving to bring about the dual victimization paradigm. This idea certainly parallels the principles of pacifism as established as a doctrine through the legal, binding text of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, considering *function* and *form*, *conflict* and *rule*, *signification* and *system* are the modalities through which such a statement is able to exist as spoken or written discourse. Foucault helps connect the spoken discourse of the Japanese Emperor and the written discourse of Article Nine to the idea of pacifism as doctrine in this comprehensive explanation:

> Doctrine involves the utterances of speakers in the sense that doctrine is, permanently, the sign, the manifestation and the instrument of a prior adherence—adherence to a class, to a social or racial status, to a nationality or an interest, to a struggle, a revolt, resistance or acceptance. Doctrine links individuals to certain types of utterance while consequently barring them from all others. Doctrine effects a dual subjection, that of speaking subjects to discourse, and that of discourse to the group, at least virtually, of speakers. (p. 226)

Furthermore, through fostering this materiality as a statement, Emperor Hirohito's public expression of shame (1945), juxtaposed with a private manifestation of guilt, during the radio broadcast of his speech is perceived best when he says:

> The enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb … taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should We continue to fight, not only would it result in an

> ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization … We cannot but express the deepest sense of regret … The thought of those officers and men as well as others who have fallen in the fields of battle, those who died at their posts of duty, or those who met with untimely death and all their bereaved families, pains Our heart night and day. (para. 6-9)

As atoms of discourse, statements allow for the communication to, between and among subjects through representations that use signs to materialize a distinct identity with a substance, a support, a place, and a date (Foucault, 1969/2002, p. 101). If there is a change in any of these conditions, then the constancy of a statement ceases to be and its identity no longer functions within the domain originally intended. Therefore, considering this speech was broadcasted on August 15, 1945 from the Tokyo Imperial Palace nine days after the atomic bombs were dropped over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the loss of human life from these unprecedented events is the very substance that supports the decision to surrender and, subsequently, renounce the use of force to settle international disputes. This discussion about the Emperor's spoken discourse provides adequate knowledge to address my earlier point that questioned Japan's willingness to imbue its postwar constitution with pacifist ideology. Accordingly, I argue that his position as the premier political leader and religious figure in Japan at the time of the nation's surrender imparted indissoluble materiality to his speech and instigated a steadfast commitment by his subjects, the people of Japan, to the principles of pacifism. Foucault attributes the representative power of such a statement to "a constancy that allows of various uses, temporal permanence that does not have the inertia of a mere trace

or mark, and which does not sleep on its own past" (p. 104). This insinuates the spoken discourse of the Emperor carries substantial virtue and fosters a unity throughout time that spans: from the moment his speech planted the early idea of pacifism in the minds of the people by inspiring hope for peace and stability in Japan through nonviolence, throughout the period the Constitution of Japan was being written, to the moment debate about constitutional revision began in present-day Japan.

Making revisions to Article Nine has been the focal topic of ongoing dialogue between conservative and progressive policymakers because, while the former tradition wants to amend the clause and extend the range of options the government can explore in order to advance the national defense policy, the views of the latter advocate maintaining the pacifist ideology represented in the text of the clause to ensure Japan remains a peaceful nation and honors the commitment made by the postwar generation, which includes the Emperor and his sacred discourse. These two distinct viewpoints appear as two juxtaposed statements that in praxis constitute the field of political discourse on the matter of constitutional revision. Once these statements are stratified and formed in their respective, singular systems, they are dispersed as discourses in dualistic configurations called discursive formations. A discursive formation employs a statement in the same way a text employs a sentence: by retaining spatio-temporal constancy through grouping together relations that are created between the planes of their appearance, authorities of delineation, and forms of specification (Foucault, 1969/2002, p. 44). According to Foucault (1969/2002), to analyze a discursive formation "is to weigh the 'value' of statements. A value that is not defined by their truth, that is not gauged by the presence of a secret content; but which characterizes their place, their capacity for circulation and

exchange, their possibility of transformation" (p. 120). Since current Japanese political discourse is concerned with making a visible contribution to ensuring peace and security within the international community as well as upholding the nation's obligation to the postwar generation, the emergence of a discursive formation within this realm proves that the virtue of the Emperor's speech has been maintained, rather than effaced, and institutionalized as a piece of Japanese history bearing psycho-, socio-, and politico-cultural influence.

Given the contrasting views of progressive and conservative policymakers, the current scope of operations in which the JSDF is able to engage, despite the fact that the text of Article Nine explicitly bans the maintenance of any armed forces, is indicative of Japan's paradoxical dilemma. The capacity for contradiction to transcend the verbal space of political dissension stems from discursive formation's role in governing the expression of specific groups of statements within the general plane of relations that enable representations and conclusions to be perceived, situated, and determined (Foucault, 1969/2002, p. 163). As conveyed by Foucault (1969/2002), this exemplifies the purpose of discursive formation "to describe statements, to describe the enunciative function of which they are bearers, to analyse the conditions in which this function operates, to cover the different domains that this function presupposes and the way in which those domains are articulated" (p. 115-16). While the regulation, selection, organization, and redistribution of discourse on constitutional revision from the two opposing parties has resulted in changes to the legal framework of the Constitution of Japan to broaden the activities of the JSDF, Article Nine remains intact as the piece of written discourse that embodies the spirit of Emperor Hirohito's spoken discourse and

underpins the national defense policy with pacifist ideology. In advancing the discussion of discourse to this point, it is reasonable to assert that these historical forms of discourse have converged with normative social thought. Therefore, by dictating the conditions under which defense policy is allowed to progress, Emperor Hirohito and Article Nine have imposed pacifist standards upon the Japanese collective consciousness to prevent history from repeating itself. Foucault brings his initial explanation of discourse full circle with this in-depth explication of the significance of discourse and discursive formation to tracing the history of ideas in a society:

> The archaeological description of discourses is deployed in the dimension of a general history; it seeks to discover that whole domain of institutions, economic processes, and social relations on which a discursive formation can be articulated; it tries to show how the autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status of pure ideality and total historical independence; what it wishes to uncover is the particular level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have their type of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various historicities. (p. 164-65)

This helps to promote the notion of the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" and the Article Nine clause as historic statements that are reinforced through the capacity for Japan's hierarchical social system to subordinate the diversity of individual will to the homogeneity of collectivist pacifist ideology.

Yet, this homogeneity is discontinuous and binary in the development of political discourses that vary in perspective. The fact that the Emperor did not formally express guilt for the aggressive behaviors of the Japanese Imperial Army but ultimately assents to

the pacifist clause bears a consequential connection to the difficulty Japanese collective consciousness has with actualizing the shame-guilt complex. This proposes that the absence of his personal manifest experience of guilt has deprived Japanese society of a well-defined sociocultural norm for expressing collective feelings of guilt and, instead, allowed this emotion to manifest in dissimilar ways producing divergent perspectives on the best way to sustain peace in Japan. This is especially true in the face of potential security threats and pressure from the international community—the United States in particular—to take an active role in helping to secure global peace. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) supports this assertion through the idea that discourse and the system of society exist in parallel producing the limits of one another:

> The cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical knowledge of the social world are internalized, 'embodied' social structures. The practical knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by 'reasonable' behaviour within it implements classificatory schemes (or 'forms of classification', 'mental structures' or 'symbolic forms'—apart from their connotations, these expressions are virtually interchangeable), historical schemes of perception and appreciation which are the product of the objective division into classes (age groups, genders, social classes) and which function below the level of consciousness and discourse. (p. 468)

Bourdieu's description of the relationship between discourse and society further authenticates Lebra's psychocultural investigation of the Japanese (1983) by employing psychoanalysis to advance and leap over representation, concretize its relations, and expose functions bearing norms, conflicts burdened with rules, and significations forming

a system (Foucault, 1966/1970, p. 408). This yields the opportunity to examine Japanese collective consciousness in the context of Freudian theory. By perceiving the Emperor's speech and Article Nine as discursive objects of repressed guilt feelings from the unconscious, the discovery is that Japanese collective consciousness processes guilt through the thematic idea of pacifism represented in these historical discourses. According to Foucault (1969/2002), "the manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more than the repressive presence of what it does not say; and this 'not-said' is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said" (p. 25).

The psychocultural shame-guilt complex and the virtue of discourse have been depicted as quintessential to the sociocultural homogeneity of Japanese society, but the normative experience of guilt has yet to truly manifest itself in Japanese collective consciousness. In displacing the guilt of having caused suffering during World War II and subscribing to the dual victimization paradigm, Japan's identity as a pacifist state is insecure. The Emperor's speech and Article Nine emphasize Japan's transition from a hostile state to a peaceful one and promote pacifist ideology, but have not equipped Japanese collective consciousness with the sovereignty required to manifest a unified sense of national identity due to an imperfect shame-guilt complex. Since this unity is not self-evident, the knowledge of a founding subject, of an original experience of shame and guilt, of the opportunity for universal conciliation along any plane of social relations becomes impaired only to be signified as conventional truth (Foucault, 1969/2002, p. 228). Foucault succinctly epitomizes the virtue of discourse:

> Discourse is no longer much more than the shimmering of a truth about to be born in its own eyes; and when all things come eventually to take the form of

> discourse, when everything may be said and when anything becomes an excuse for pronouncing a discourse, it will be because all things having manifested and exchanged meanings, they will then all be able to return to the silent interiority of self-consciousness. (p. 228)

It is through assimilating the mechanics of an actualized shame-guilt complex and the suppression of collective identity delusions to the pressure of conforming to the standards of Japanese society that a system of sociocultural unconsciouses becomes perceptible. These unconsciouses are representative of guilt and defined by the whole of formal structures that render idealized discourse significant, give their coherence and obligation to the rules that regulate needs, and provide the norms of life with a foundation apart from that which is found in nature (Foucault, 1966/1970, p. 414).

## V. From Collective Consciousness to National Identity: Realism vs. Constructivism

Up to this point, I have focused much of my argument on the intangible factors specific to constructivism, while just briefly touching on the structural and material factors that form the basis of realism in international relations, because constructivist theory emphasizes the influence of ideas, ideals, identities, images, cultures, and norms on international politics (Akimoto, 2013 p. 26). Realism, on the other hand, may indeed serve to explain the reason behind Japanese policymaker's attempts at "normalizing" its military capability and cultivating a US-Japan military alliance by being embodied in the political culture of antimilitarism, but it does not account for the construction of Japan's security identity as a pacifist state considering the preserved legal framework that still bans full rearmament. This limitation placed on state behavior cannot be explained by isolating constructivism from realism because variables, such as structures, threat

perceptions, and political processes, have shaped Japan's minimalist defense policy while ideational forces have influenced it. Through the simultaneous construction of security identity and national identity as the prime source of social, cultural, psychological, and political obligation for Japanese collective consciousness, pacifist ideology governs Japanese defense policy and Japanese society as a whole. Akitoshi Miyashita (2007) asserts the importance of combining the constructivist and realist perspectives and takes an eclectic approach to describing the evolution of defense policy. He states, "To the extent that power and interests cannot be understood except within their normative frameworks and that norms often shape interests and define power, constructivists make a major contribution to our understanding of why countries, as well as individuals, behave the way they do" (p. 116). Therefore, if politics produces norms and cultures to the same degree as historical events, then Japan's core security identity as a pacifist state is not likely to change so long as tangible forces are not perceived by policymakers and the public alike to jeopardize peace and security.

Yet, Daisuke Akimoto (2013) delineates the pacifist ideology codified in the Constitution of Japan as negative, absolute pacifism due to its strict prohibition of using any kind of force to settle disputes, and the status quo of defense policy as positive, relative pacifism because the use of force becomes permissible under certain conditions, such as self-defense (p. 25). This reveals the origin of political debate surrounding the legitimacy of the JSDF and constitutional revision. Pacifism as a liberal ideal is "based on a belief that human beings inherently possess good nature and reason for peace and cooperation" (Akimoto, p. 38), which under no circumstance justifies taking the life of another human being. Thus, negative pacifism continues to restrict the range of defense

policy options for Japan through the idealistic renunciation of war specified in Article Nine. However, positive pacifism has enabled more recent "normalized" military activities of the JSDF abroad in the form of peacekeeping and peace-building operations with the United Nations (UN) through interpreting the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution as support for international cooperation (Akimoto, p. 41). With the post-9/11 international security environment plagued with threats of terrorism against nations of the international community, in 2004 Prime Minister Koizumi exploited the gap between Article Nine and the Preamble of the Constitution in order to legitimize the dispatch of the JSDF for humanitarian aid and reconstruction missions in Afghanistan and Iraq by reciting these words of the Preface:

> We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources. (1947, Preface, para. 2-4)

By asserting that Japan's peace and the peace of any other nation is inextricably linked with world peace and security through the text of the Preamble, Koizumi was able to spark a compromise between conservative and progressive bureaucrats permitting the JSDF to engage in post-conflict international peace operations (Akimoto, p. 191). Meanwhile, Article Nine was purported as representing an egoistical principle of one-nation pacifism during a time when the US-Japan alliance was viewed as critical to the

defense of Japanese territory as well as maintaining peace and security within the international community.

The subsequent shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism at both the political and public levels intensified the constitutional revision debate. While many still felt Japan ought to maintain the belief that war is futile and immoral as declared by the Constitution, the fear of entrapment in an unnecessary conflict or abandonment by the United States as an ally crept into numerous minds as corporeal proof of the potential consequences that can result from not safeguarding against threats to domestic and international peace and security. In order to depict this shift, Akimoto (2013) suggests four analytical models of Japan's security identity that are each mutually inclusive of the core pacifist security identity but vary according to the state of the international security environment: 'Japan as a pacifist state', 'Japan as a UN peacekeeper', 'Japan as a normal state', and 'Japan as a US ally' (p. 49). His theoretical framework of Japan's assumed security identities follows the progression of security and defense policy throughout the postwar period into the Post-Cold war era by highlighting the impact of internal and external pressures on Japan to seek remilitarization. From the perspective of realists, the hegemony of the United States and the anarchic nature of the international security environment bear an influence on Japan's intent to enhance military security and rationalize the incremental shift from negative pacifism to positive pacifism. Akimoto's depiction of Japan as donning an array of security identity "hats" under certain circumstances relates to the five periods during which Japanese security and defense policy experienced significant advancements and allows for the pairing off of each one with a particular hegemonic strand of political ideology: post-World War II and the left-

wing, progressive tradition (absolute, negative pacifism), the Cold War and the moderate, mercantilist tradition (passive pacifism), post-Cold War as well as post-9/11 and the realist, conservative tradition (positive pacifism), and post-2015 ISIS Hostage Crisis and the right-wing, nationalist view (relative, 'proactive' pacifism) (Hirata, 2008, p. 127). The objective of each Japanese political culture can be summarized as: pacifists seek to prevent Japan from becoming a militarist state with the potential to wage wars, mercantilists pursue economic rather than military power, realists want military power to be commensurate with economic power, and nationalists assert state autonomy and the preservation of Japan's uniqueness. However, upon close examination of these pairings as specific spatio-temporal coordinates for the state of Japanese security and defense affairs throughout its postwar history, the resiliency of pacifist norms becomes evident. This examination reveals pacifism has been reinterpreted under different political lenses signifying that each culture recognizes the negatives of violence and war through sociocultural norms and historical context.

In considering the contemporary practice of constitutional reinterpretation that has enabled the Japanese government to reach certain security and defense objectives without formal revision, Yasuhiro Izumikawa (2010) credits constructivists Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein with further distinguishing the pacifist ideology represented in the Constitution of Japan from the institutionalized norms of antimilitarism detected in status quo interests of security and defense policy. He asserts that Japanese political culture is monolithically bound to these norms because the idea of antimilitarism "is influential precisely because it can appeal to a coalition of groups with different interests or value systems" (p. 160). This is confirmed by Andrew Oros (2008) who defines security

identity as "a set of collectively held principles that have attracted broad political support regarding the appropriate role of state action in the security arena and are institutionalized into the policy-making process" (p. 9). Therefore, Japan's identity shifts are a result of antimilitarist principles reified as ideas that resonate with contesting political ideologies seeking a caliber of state behavior appropriate to the changing nature of the international security environment. In order to accurately portray the present-day interpretation of Japanese defense policy, Oros prepends 'domestic' to 'antimilitarism' and introduces the term "domestic antimilitarism". Through "focusing on limits to the reemergence of militarist elements at home, yet still accepting as legitimate a defensive role for a military at home" (p. 6), domestic antimilitarism is founded on three tenets: no traditional armed forces, no use of force by Japan except in self-defense, and no Japanese participation in foreign military conflict. However, Japan is treading the line of this security identity with the dispatch of the JSDF overseas for non-combat missions. Coincidentally, Berger (2010) indicates three traits of Japanese society that aid in understanding this partial remilitarization of its defense policy, "Its strong sense of ethnocentric nationalism, its peculiar combination of strong group loyalty with a lack of centralized decision making, and the relative absence of a sense of war guilt" (p. 124). Each of these traits are significant to understanding Japanese defense policy, but the first and last are pertinent to the present aim of this paper to define the role of historical discourse and the shame-guilt complex in constructing a pacifist-oriented national identity.

Umut Özkirimli (2010) defines nationalism "as a 'discourse,' a particular way of seeing and interpreting the world, a frame of reference that helps us make sense of and structure the reality that surrounds us" (p. 206). He complements Foucault's concept of

spatio-temporality (1969/2002) by asserting that the discourse of nationalism is structured according to the notions of identity as the division of the world "into 'us' and 'them,'" temporality as the timeless nature of a nation, and spatiality as the designation of a particular territory as the "homeland" (p. 208-09). Additionally, to understand Berger's notion of ethnocentric nationalism (2010), it is beneficial to consider Kevin Doak's analysis of nationalism (2006) because he fosters the idea of "the nation" as the core of nationalism by discerning that individual identity is traced to nationalism through the collective unity of "the people" (p. 7). As "a particularly powerful way of conceiving of the people, as a cultural unit with a shared identity, and as a political agent independent of the political state" (Doak, p. 10), the nation establishes the cultural theory behind nationalism that considers identity and politics. This consideration, in turn, is an ideological effort to minimize the gap between the historical advent of the nation and the political structures that claim to speak and act on behalf of the nation (Doak, p. 34). Doak further specifies that Japanese nationalism in comparison to that of the United States is multifaceted because there are no pluralities of specification in English. In Japanese, there are three types of nationalism: *minzokushugi*, *kokuminshugi*, and *kokkashugi*. He explains:

> The first 'nationalism' is rooted in a concept of *minzoku*, the people as an ethnic (some argue 'racial') group; the second is based on the principle of the *kokumin*, the people as constituted into a political unit (which may, but need not, be ethnic); and the final, as we have seen, is really about placing the state (*kokka*) above all else, potentially even above the nation. (p. 3)

By differentiating the distinct forms of Japanese nationalism, he supports the assertion

that the psychocultural shame-guilt complex of the people of Japan directly correlates to the historical discourse of the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" and the Article Nine clause. Therefore, in fostering a means to conceive identity, it is reasonable to argue that the intellectual and emotional activity of such discourses has produced a type of Japanese nationalism, or national identity, inspired by political, moral, and social values, which have been institutionalized in collective consciousness.

Linus Hagström and Karl Gustafsson (2014) provide valuable insight into the construction of identity from collective consciousness through emphasizing the centrality of emotion in nationalism. In addition to confirming that shame bears a correlation with one's sense of self, they declare that the absence of a sense of self results in an inability to make decisions about interests and behaviors because the " 'range of imaginable conduct' is defined, inter alia, through the production and reproduction of discursively emergent norms and institutions" (p. 13). In further reasoning, "Something only becomes *collectively* conceivable if it is at the same time communicable and coercive" (p. 14), Hagström and Gustafsson imply that Japanese leadership mentality regards political discourse as the type of agency instrumental in identity construction. The revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, which is attributed to coercion of the Diet by Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, is one instance in Japanese postwar history where the intentions of a leader were made to influence a shift in the construction of a new identity for Japan. His conservative agenda sought out an identity that boasted a revised constitution allowing the expansion of JSDF operations and strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States by balancing the security and defense agreements of the treaty. However, his intransigent demeanor toward opposing views incited backlash

among the public because it seemed to threaten the nation's liberal democracy (Miyashita, 2007, p. 112). As a consequence, there were mass demonstrations and protests at an unprecedented level to rebuke Kishi and force his resignation. Despite being succeeded by a more moderate conservative leader after assuming responsibility for provoking civil unrest and stepping down from his position, the US-Japan Security Treaty gained government approval. This historical experience resulted in Japan's characteristic minimalist approach to defense and national security because such insecurity about the nature of political-military culture among the people served to reinforce the virtue of pacifist norms.

Ironically, the relative absence of a sense of war guilt that Berger (2010) asserts is indicative of Japan's gradual rearmament over time establishes a link between the political agendas of former Prime Minister Kishi and current Prime Minister Abe considering Kishi is Abe's maternal grandfather. This connects back to discussion around the manifestation of guilt through failure to meet family expectations suggesting that Japanese defense and security policy under Abe's leadership is heavily influenced by the conservative, nationalistic beliefs of his familial political predecessor. The parallel is obvious when considering the authoritative actions taken by Kishi to impose the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Abe to enact the National Referendum Law instituting legal procedures for revising the Constitution. Kishi's agenda seemingly inverted the bottom-up decision making style of Japanese bureaucracy while Abe's agenda has attempted to invert the bottom-up social phenomenon of nationalism. In both instances, these political leaders came under severe criticism from the people and resigned. The nationalist sentiment passed down from Kishi presumes that nationalism is

always intertwined with the state by treating nation and state in the same regard. The combination of this "family tradition" with serving as the first prime minister born in the postwar period, lacking a personal link to Japan's wartime identity, imparts a unique perspective on Japanese nationalism to Abe. Using Doak's specified terms (2010) to portray the distinct connotation of Japanese nationalism consistent with Kishi's political legacy, albeit controversial, Abe most noticeably favors civic nationalism (*kokuminshugi)* embroidered by *kokkashugi* as opposed to ethnic nationalism (*minzokushugi*). This is represented in his intent for constitutional revision, which stems from the nationalist view of the current Constitution as a product of the occupation reforms during the postwar period, changes in the international security environment as realist rationale for "normalizing" security and defense policy, and Japan as possessing the sovereign right to institute its own constitution without international interference (Akimoto, 2013, p. 213). To support this idea, Gavan McCormack (2014) states, "Japan's nationalism, as formulated by Abe and his colleagues, is fragile and febrile—currently distorted, denied, and channeled into a 'correct history' movement, beautiful Japan campaigns, and antagonism to China and Korea" (p. 87).

Furthermore, the discursive framings of North Korea as possessing long-range nuclear missile capabilities and China as expanding and asserting its military capabilities are pressures conditioning Prime Minister Abe to campaign for constitutional revision and achieve the goal of "normalizing" Japanese security and defense policy. Though as a nationalist he contends that Japan's identity as a pacifist nation threatens its physical survival and the construction of a "normal" identity, in the 'eyes of the world'—China, North Korea, and the international community at-large—efforts to rearm are viewed as

the construction of an identity resembling that of wartime Japan. If, as noted by Hagström and Gustafsson (2014), "States are constructions of the imagination that come into being through the collective meaning-making of human beings, for example, through 'foreign and security policy' " (p. 13), then it is in Japan's best interest to authenticate its own sense of identity as well as the basis of its relationship with the United States given the status quo of the international security environment. As a result of constructing this national 'self' identity, Japan ought to balance the virtue of ideational elements with the complex structural and material forces of the outside world. In support of this recommendation, Alexander Bukh (2013) communicates, "History can be traced to very pragmatic and immediate interests of the actors and it's the winding roads of history with its unexpected shifts in relations of power that enable the transformation of certain pragmatic interests into sentimental identity constructs" (p. 186). The sociocultural power of norms constructs a pacifist-oriented national identity for Japan by anchoring the imperfect shame-guilt complex specific to Japanese collective consciousness, the spoken discourse of Emperor Hirohito, the written discourse of Article Nine, and even the nationalist discourses of Prime Ministers Nobusuke Kishi and Shinzō Abe to the idea of pacifism. As prominent state leaders who have strived to advance Japan's sense of national identity in the direction of nationalist ideology, Kishi and Abe fail to realize that traditions are not mere sociocultural devices mutually interchangeable across different planes. According to Takaaki Suzuki (2008), "They entail an ongoing and often contested process among a multiplicity of participants who seek to interpret and reinterpret meaning within a particular rhetorical frame appropriated from the historical horizon of a specific place" (p. 80).

For all intents and purposes of my argument, the bitter memories of World War II and the pacifist morals and heritage of Japan during the postwar era represent an emotive past that complicates either the path to constructing a new, 'normal' identity or the path to balancing its 'pacifist' identity with actions that show its commitment to preserving peace and stability at home and within the international community. In any event, the process of resolving the final structure and character traits of Japan will jointly implicate political power and cultural narratives, but within the context of reinterpreting a past discursive through its own spatio-temporality. This, however, raises the question of, "What exactly is 'normal' for Japan?"

## VI. Conclusion

This paper opens with a detailed account of how Japanese defense policy has evolved in response to the characteristic events of the post-World War II era, the Cold War era, the post-Cold War era, the post-9/11 terrorist attacks, and the post-2015 ISIS Hostage Crisis in order to establish the historical context for exploring the persistence of pacifist ideology within Japanese society. However, a theoretical framework for relating social structure to the pacifist national defense policy based on Ruth Benedict's classification of Japanese society as a shame culture (1946/2005) is not optimal because her research methodology has been proven inaccurate. By focusing on the psychocultural dimension of shame and guilt, Takie Sugiyama Lebra (1983) provides the insight necessary to properly analyze and identify the characteristic elements of Japanese culture that signify the pervasiveness of shame and the latency of guilt. Examining the influence of historical forms of postwar discourse on Japanese collective consciousness confirms that pacifism is the hegemonic ideology to which all subsequent political ideology is oriented because

it is embedded in collective consciousness as a sociocultural norm and concept. Consequently, the hierarchical social order of Japanese culture, which ranks the virtue of one's discourse according to their station or position in society, serves to socialize and institutionalize the principles of pacifism. These pacifist norms are shown to derive from the spoken discourse of Emperor Hirohito considering his particular social status as symbol of the state and unity of the people. Therefore, his verbal expression of deep regret for the loss of "many innocent lives" and potential "total extinction of human civilization" if Japan had continued to fight represents an ideational cause that reconciles the structural and material effects of war on Japanese society. Even if history has implicated his role in the militaristic, expansionist war crimes of the Imperial Army and caused public distrust of him as well as the military as an institution, the power of his words is not diminished because the people of Japan conceptualize military aggression and war as the corruptive forces responsible for desecrating his divine sacredness as the Emperor of Japan.

Emperor Hirohito's speech is consequential to the discussion of national identity because the ability for pacifist ideology to transcend his symbolic social image and serve as the corporeal premise of the revised Constitution of Japan, which bears the renunciation of war through the Article Nine clause, demonstrates the degree to which his discourse resonated with the people of Japan in the aftermath of the atomic bombings. His discourse, therefore, carries unparalleled virtue holding Japanese citizens responsible for their own commitment to the fundamental idea of pacifism and the postwar generation who sacrificed for the greater good of Japan and humanity. Furthermore, given that security identity can be viewed as a subset of the broader topic of national

identity, describing the multiple security identities Japan has assumed under the authority of different strands of political ideology confirms the assertion that pacifist ideology permeates Japan's national identity. This remains true even in the midst of the current debate about constitutional revision because these competing versions of national identity, which are constructed through different discursive formations, aim to define Japan's role in the world and the best approach to utilizing the JSDF as a military capability for securing this role while under the hegemony of a core identity based on the principles of pacifism. This identity is hegemonic through the patterns of Japanese culture that portray shame as pervasive and guilt as latent. Shame and guilt are emotional experiences that make up the psychocultural shame-guilt complex of Japanese collective consciousness. Thus, the prevalence of shame in Japanese society can be attributed to the strong psychocultural commitment to pacifism while the relative absence of guilt explains the mainstream debate over whether to revise the pacifist national defense policy represented by Article Nine. The reasoning behind such an argument is, the spatio-temporality of the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" and Article Nine as historical forms of postwar discourse shapes and predicts the laws, policies, and procedures of government regardless of the relative strength of any contesting political ideology.

In transcending the realm of discourse to take on symbolic and iconographic meanings, the Emperor's speech and Article Nine have immortalized the idea of pacifism. The manifest shame and latent guilt of the events of war, namely the atomic bombings, have further brought about a cascade of collective perceptions and traditions of cultural, political, and social identity because Japan's uniqueness is undoubtedly rooted in its pacifist constitution and its history as the only nation to have experienced

nuclear attack. As a nation driven by its uniqueness and a differentiation from other nations of the world, Japan exemplifies this fundamental distinction through its 'pacifist' national identity, which is viewed as abnormal or nonsensical by the realist standards of nations like the United States. Debate over JSDF expansion and constitutional revision is structured according to the discourses of security and identity between policymakers in favor of maintaining Japan's unique identity and policymakers who prefer "normalization" to uniqueness. Yet, these discursive debates are uniquely Japanese through allowing historical experience as well as contemporary context to shape the mutable and contested political ideological attempts at understanding situational realities, and influence the sociocultural processes that facilitate the formation of Japanese national security and defense policy. This suggests that Japanese policymakers have not responded to external pressures to "normalize" the nation's military institution according to the expectations of realism because Japan's interests and behavior must be determined within the historical and contextual frame of security and identity. Therefore, to answer the question posed at the end of the previous section: "Normal" for Japan is relative to and conditioned by its own mental-historical and sociopsychological topography.

While this normalcy is reflected in the propensity for Japan's national identity to exemplify the collective idea of peace, the means for achieving peace entails taking on a more active security role in international affairs. The contradiction between interests of identity and interests of security does not erode the principles of pacifism, but rather advances beyond realist-constructivist theoretical expectations to adapt pacifist ideology to the changing international security environment. In considering the current condition of this security environment, the adoption of a realist foreign policy to anticipate threats

to peace and security certainly seems more strategic for Japan, but remaining committed to its deep-seated, constructed pacifist ideology to avoid becoming mixed up in the developing hostilities of the world is strategic as well as virtuous. Therefore, I recommend that Japan act in accordance with international law to support the concept of collectivism among all populations and abstain from operations promoting collective self-defense because these activities "phantomize", or give vitality to, the idea of violence and aggression. Collective defense presupposes the existence of an entity or force to defend against creating the space and opportunity for such a situation to manifest. If the Constitution of Japan is revised to permit the full exercise of the right of collective self-defense, then Japan will become "normalized" according to the realist standards for the "necessary" contemporary security and defense posture of a global power. However, contradicting the realist philosophy of collectivizing to safeguard against potential threats or attacks of violence and serving as a moral example to the international community of how to honor a commitment to historical memory will foster the space and opportunity to channel the experience of guilt feelings into a modernized identity construct that amalgamates the security and affirmation of Japan's national pacifist identity. By integrating the principle of international peace and security with the relative needs of the international community, the construction of such an identity demonstrates an idealistic confidence. This confidence has the potential to encourage other nations to take a stand against violence by coming together to secure rather than defend peace and security without resorting to the use of force.

However, as a former expansionist state that has evolved into a prominent world power with an alliance relationship with the United States, Japan remains in a precarious

position among neighboring nations like China, North Korea, and Russia because of its egoistical image. The dissolution of this image is contingent on manifesting guilt in relation to the war crimes committed during World War II for the purpose of establishing a kind of state conviction that balances the principles of pacifism with the efforts of peace-building and peacekeeping. Given the importance of the US-Japan alliance to the international security environment, if Japanese policymakers decide to preserve the nation's pacifist position, then there is the potential to internationalize pacifist ideology as well as promote international peace by dispatching the JSDF for operations that fall under the broad, contemporary definition of collective security. Yet, in the event that the national defense policy is overturned and Japan becomes engulfed in unnecessary conflict or war down the line, it is very likely that this regression will result in an opposite manifestation of guilt provoking civil discontent and volatility. Therefore, upholding Article Nine of the Constitution of Japan sustains the influence of historical experience and pacifist norms on individual and collective consciousness.

Furthermore, I argue that Japan does not have to "normalize" in order to contribute to international peace and security. For Japan to promote world peace while also refraining from becoming involved in any operations adjacent to the preconditions of war is in fact uniquely Japanese. Treading the line that distinguishes realism from constructivism and expectation from actualization is behavior well within the character of a nation shrouded in contradiction. It is normal for Japan to utilize the JSDF for peacekeeping and peace-building operations, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, and other overseas non-combat missions, but still orient its national identity towards pacifist ideology. Japan's latent guilt of losing human lives as both aggressor and victim of

World War II reserves the spatio-temporality of the present as the occasion to manifest this emotional experience and commit to the twofold obligation of ensuring peace and security not solely to its own people, but to all of humanity.

# APPENDIX

*Proposed Cultural Study*

"Social Perceptions of Japan's Pacifism – Correlating Security & Identity with Japanese Defense Policy"

For me as an individual who has a responsibility to fellow citizens and humanity the subject of Japan's 'pacifist' national identity was the ideal topic. In conducting substantial academic research and study to acquire a rich awareness of Japanese history, culture, and security and defense policy, it occurred to me to design a research project that allows for the demonstration of my argument concerning Japan's "normalization" in praxis. The parallel between Japan's pacifist commitment and my own goal to serve the greater good is further motivation to develop a research study to evaluate the correlation between security and identity. I am confident that this research can yield promising outcomes that offer insightful information about the social implications of evolving national security and defense measures in light of Japan's role within the international community. My intention is for this project to be further used as a model for conducting the same research in other nations around the world. This aligns with my ultimate career goal of establishing a think-tank organization with a mission of historically evaluating social values and customs and their role in preserving a secure identity for society.

The proposed cultural study calls for immersion in Japanese society in order to observe the lives of citizens and evaluate how social perceptions of national security bear an influence on national identity. This immersion will foster an understanding of the social impact of Japan's pacifism to properly carry out the study. The scope of the project is framed by the following questions:

(1) In what ways is pacifist ideology detected in sociocultural norms of Japanese society?

(2) What role do the "Jewel Voice Broadcast" and Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution as historical forms of discourse play in maintaining Japan's pacifist defense policy?

(3) Is there a correlation between the shame-guilt complex and discursive formations of Japanese politics that makes a measurable contribution to the preservation of peace and nonaggression in Japan?

Through this research study, I aspire to evaluate the social perceptions and concerns of Japanese citizens from across generations, and from various socioeconomic, religious, and educational backgrounds, in regard to national security and defense policy in Japan. The ultimate goal of my research is to discover whether Japanese national identity is directly correlated to perceptions of security influenced by dominant Japanese political ideologies, or pacifist ideology in the Constitution of Japan.

The study takes a qualitative and quantitative approach. My plan for conducting the research project is to utilize an evaluation system that requires creating two separate types of assessments: an interview and a survey. The difference is that each interview entails posing five open-ended questions and five true or false questions to participants while the survey presents five Likert scale questions and five multiple choice questions. The objective is to observe and detect the manner in which responses to both sets of questions vary depending on the particular form of communication—written and spoken. However, both evaluation metrics solicit for personal perceptions and attitudes regarding security and the current pacifist national defense policy. An additional approach is to

alternate the order that the interview and the survey are administered to observe and detect whether this affects responses. I chose this particular methodology because it fosters the ability to discern the role of discursive forms of communication in rendering citizens capable of effectively interpreting spoken and written discourse, and expressing their true perceptions of security in Japan. In becoming familiar with the work of Takie Sugiyama Lebra (1983) for the objectives of this paper, I may also incorporate elements of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) in order to prime the individual consciouses of study participants to mentally process the ideas of security and identity specific to this project and assimilate them to their own perceptions.

To ensure the reliability, accuracy and validity of the research data, I plan to stratify participants into appropriate categories according to age, gender, birthplace, education level, occupation, marital status, income, household occupancy and potential conflicts of interest. With the data properly compiled and organized, this allows for better analysis of each completed interview and survey in order to begin to identify specific trends as well as create models and reports. The success of this investigation is contingent on my qualified ability to engage in meaningful, culture-sensitive conversations through my competency of Japanese language and culture. Interaction with Japanese colleagues provides a constant pool of knowledge about cultural differences and similarities that are beneficial to collaborative understanding. Furthermore, this project promotes cultural exchange and mutual understanding because learning and embracing Japanese customs and beliefs will positively impact the research.

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