


NON-FICTIONAL PROSE



DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

SWAMI VIVEKANAND

SUBHARTI UNIVERSITY

Meerut (National Capital Region Delhi)

PREFACE

In this course, we shall deal with various aspects of Non-fictional Prose

- o Essays of Francis Bacon
- o Essays of Charles Lamb
- o Essays of A.G. Gardiner
- o Essays of Bertrand Russell

SYLLABUS

Semester-I

Non-Fictional Prose (MA-Eng.-103)

Course Content

Unit-I: Francis Bacon:

"Of Death", "Of Adversity", "Of Marriage and Single Life", "Of Superstition", "Of Studies".

Unit-II: Charles Lamb:

"Oxford in the vacation", "All fool's day" imperfect Sympathies", "valentine's Day", "The Praise of Chimney Sweepers" "A Bachelor's Complaint of the Behaviour of Married People.

Unit-III: A.G. Gardiner:

"On Saying Please", "of courage Defense of Ignorance", "Of Courage" "An About a Dog", "On Catching the Made".

Unit-IV: Bertrand Russell:

"Philosophy and Politics", Philosophy of a Layman", "The Future of Mankind", "An Outline of intellectual Rubbish".

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ESSAYS OF FRANCIS BACON**STRUCTURE**

- Learning Objectives
- Introduction
- Of Death
- Of Adversity
- Of Marriage and Single Life
- Of Superstitions
- Of Studies
- Summary
- Key Words
- Review Questions
- Suggested Reading

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to understand :

1. The essays of Francis Bacon, such as:
 - Of Death
 - Of Adversity
 - Of Marriage and Single life
 - Of Superstitions
 - Of Studies

INTRODUCTION

Francis Bacon, 1st Viscount Saint Alban, KG (22 January 1561-9 April 1626) was an English philosopher, statesman, scientist, lawyer, jurist and author. He served both as Attorney General and Lord Chancellor of England. Although his political career ended in ignominy, he remained extremely influential through his works, especially as a metaphysical advocate and a practitioner of the scientific method and as a colonist in the scientific revolution too.

Bacon has been called the father of experientialism. His works established and popularized inducible methodologies for scientific inquiry, often called the Baconian method or simply, the scientific

method. His demand for a planned procedure of investigating all things natural marked a new turn in the oratorical and doctrine framework for science, much of which still surrounds conceptions of proper methodology today. His dedication probably led to his death, bringing him into a rare historical group of scientists who were killed by their own experiments.

Bacon was denominated in 1603, created Baron Verulam in 1618, and Viscount St Alban in 1621; as he died without heirs both aristocrats became defunct upon his death. He famously died of pneumonia contracted while studying the effects of freezing on the preservation of meat.

OF DEATH

Men fear death, as children fear to go in the dark; and as that natural fear in children gets increased with tales, so does the other. Certainly, the contemplation of death, as the wages of sin, and passage to another world, is holy and religious; but the fear of it, as a tribute due continuous to, is weak. Yet in religious meditations, there is sometimes mixture of narcissism, and of superstition. You shall read, in some of the friars' books of embarrassment, that a man should think for himself, what the pain is, if he has but his finger's end pressed, or tortured, and thereby imagine, what the pains of death are like, when the whole body is corrupted, and dissolved; when many times death passes, with less pain than the torment of a limb; for the most indispensable parts, are not the quickest of sense. And by him that alleged only as a philosopher, and natural man, it was well said, *Pompa mortis magis ferret, quam mors ipsa*. Groans, and paroxysm, and a discolored face, and friends weeping, and blacks, and funeral, and the like, show death terrible. It is worthy the observing, that there is no passion in the mind of man, so weak, but it mates, and masters, the fear of death; and therefore, death is no such terrible enemy, when a man hath so many attendants about him, that can win the hostilities of him. Revenge exultations over death; love slights it; honor aspireth to it; grief flieth to it; fear preoccupateth it; derail, we read, after Ortho the emperor had slain himself, pity (which is the supplest of affections) arouse many to die, out of mere compassion to their efficacieres, and as the truest sort of followers denial, Seneca adds niceness and sufficiency: *Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; mori velle, non tantum fortis aut miser, sed etiam fastidius potest*. A man would die, though he were neither valorous, nor miserable, only upon a weariness to do the same thing so oft, over and over. It is no less worthy, to observe, how little alteration in good spirits, the approaches of death make; for

they appear to be the same men, till the last instant. Augustus Caesar died in a compliment; Livia, conjugii nostri memor, vive et vale. Tiberius in deceit; as Tacitus saith of him, Jam Tiberium vires et corpus, non dissimulation, deserebant. Vespasian in a witticism, sitting upon the stool; Ut puto deus fio. Galba with a sentence; Feri, si ex re sit populi Romani; holding forth his neck. Septimius Severus in freight; Adeste is quid mihi restat agendum, and the like. Certainly the Stoics bestowed too much cost upon death, and by their great preparations, made it appear more fearful. Better saith he, qui finem vitae extremum inter munera ponat nature. It is as natural to die, as to be born; as a little infant; perhaps, the one is as painful, as the other. He that dies in an solemn pursuit is like one that is wounded in hot blood; who, for the time, scarce feels the hurt; and therefore with a mind fixed, and bent upon somewhat that is good, doth avert the dolours of death. But, above all, believe it, the sweetest introit is, Nunc dimittis; when a man hath obtained worthy ends and expectations. Death hath this also; that it opens the gate to good fame, and extinguish envy. - Extinctus amabitur idem.

Summary

There is a general whim that men fear Death. According to Bacon, Death is a passage to another world, which is considered to be holy and religious. It is inescapable for all grates, paroxysm, discolored faces, friends weeping and obsequies are the things that show Death is terrible. A man will die, though he is valorous and miserable. For an instance, the great Ceasar also faced his death and he died with commendation. Hence death is worthy and it is an escape from the miseries of the world. Bacon concludes his essay, by saying that, Death opens the gate to good fame.

OF ADVERSITY

It was a high speech of Seneca (after the manner of the phlegmatic), that the good things, which belong to prosperity, are to be wished; but the good things, that belong to crunch, are to be admired. Bona rerum secundarum optabilia; adversarum mirabilia. Certainly if miracles be the command over nature, they appear most in crunch. It is yet a higher speech of his, than the other (much too high for a infidel). It is true greatness, to have in one the infirmity of a man, and the security of a God. Vere magnum habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei. This would have done better in poesy, where transcendences are more allowed. And the poets indeed have been busy with it; for it is in effect the thing, which figured in that strange fiction of the ancient poets,

which seem not to be without mystery; nay, and to have some approach to the state of a Christian; that Hercules, when he went to unshackle Prometheus (by whom human nature is represented), sailed the length of the great ocean, in an earthen pot or pitcher; lively describing Christian resolution, that sail in the frail bark of the flesh, through the waves of the world. But to speak in a mean, the virtue of prosperity, is temperance; the virtue of crunch, is courage; which in morals is the more heroical virtue. Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Attestation; crunch is the blessing of the New; which carried the greater execration, and the clearer revelation of God's favor. Yet even in the Old Attestation, if you listen to David's harp, you shall hear as many hearse-like airs as carols; and the pencil of the Holy Ghost prompted labored more in describing the malady's of Job, than the euphoria of Solomon. Prosperity is not without many fears and distastes; and adversity is not without comforts and hopes. We see in needle-works and embroideries, it is more pleasing to have a lively work, upon a sad and dignified ground, than to have a dark and melancholy work, upon a lightsome ground: judge therefore of the pleasure of the heart, by the pleasure of the eye. Certainly virtue is like precious odors, most aromatic when they are infuriated, or crushed: for prosperity doth best discover vice, but adversity executes best discover virtue.

Summary

In his essay "Of crunch", Bacon brings out the difference between crunch and Prosperity. According to Bacon, the good things of prosperity are to be praised and the good things of adversity are to be admired. Miracles in nature appear only in crunch. Hence it is considered to be great and security of God. The righteousness of prosperity is temporary and the virtue of crunch is permanent, which also instills heroical virtue. Prosperity has many fears and distastes and adversity holds comforts and hopes in the life of man.

OF MARRIAGE AND SINGLE LIFE

He that prompted wife and children hath given hostages to fortune; for they are hindrances to great enterprises, either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from the unmarried or childless men; which both in affection and means, have married and furnished the public. Yet it were great reason that those that have children, should have greatest care of future times; unto which they know they must transmit their dearest collaterals. Some there are, who though they lead a single life, yet their thoughts do end with themselves, and account future times insouciant denial.

Nay, there are some other, that account wife and children, but as bills of charges, denial more, there are some foolish rich avaricious men that take a pride, in having no children, because they may be thought so much the richer. For perhaps they have heard some talk, Such an one is a great rich man, and another except to it, Yea, but he prompted a great charge of children; as if it were an subsiding to his riches. But the most ordinary cause of a single life, is liberty, especially in certain self-pleasing and humorous minds, which are so sensible of every restraint, as they will go near to think their girdles and garters, to be bonds and shackles. Unmarried men are best friends, best masters, best servants; but not always best subjects; for they are light to run away; and almost all fugitives, are of that condition. A single life doth well with churchmen; for charity will hardly water the ground, where it must first fill a pool. It is indifferent for judges and magistrates; for if they be superficial and corrupt, you shall have a servant, five times worse than a wife. For soldiers, I find the generals commonly in their inciting, put men in mind of their wives and children; and I think the despising of marriage amongst the Turks, make the tawdry soldier more base. Certainly wife and children are a kind of discipline of humanity; and single men, though they may be many times more charitable, because their means are less exhaust, yet, on the other side, they are more cruel and hardhearted (good to make severe prober), because their tenderness is not so oft called upon. Grave natures, led by custom, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, *vetulam suam praetulit immortalitati*. Chaste women are often proud and forward, as presuming upon the merit of their immaculacy. It is one of the best bonds, both of immaculacy and obedience, in the wife, if she think her husband wise; which she will never do, if she find him jealous. Wives are young men's mistresses; companions for middle age; and old men's nurses. So as a man may have a quarrel to marry, when he will. But yet he was reputed one of the wise men, that made answer to the question, when a man should marry, - A young man not yet, an elder man not at all. It is often seen that bad husbands, have very good wives; whether it be, that it raiseth the price of their husband's kindness, when it comes; or that the wives take a pride in their patience. But this never fails, if the bad husbands were of their own choosing, against their friends' consent; for then they will be sure to make good their own folly.

Summary

"Of Marriage and Single Life" considers "wives" and children and balances their advantages against their disadvantages in such a way that

it's difficult to decide whether marriage is a good or a bad idea. Bad marriages, however, he suggests can be analyzed more easily by their effects upon the women in them.

Reflection on 'Of Marriage and Single Life'

As we all know, Francis Bacon, the chief figure of the English Renaissance, is very famous as an English statesman, essayist, and philosopher of science so his essay on. Of Marriage and Single Life is one of his most well-known essays, which analyzes and compares marriage with single life in different aspects, such as characters, public service and personal qualities. While, there seems to be not so comprehensive from people's standpoint today.

Bacon's basic opinion is that marriage is good to both an individual and the society. His analysis is taken step-by-step. At first, a single man believes that a man with a wife and children, who are impediment to both great courses and little inconsequential, is the slave of fortune. Especially some miser men think children are the bills of charges and will reduce their riches. And foremost reason is that to be single is to be free, while wife and children are the bonds to his freedom. Moreover, a single life has some good aspects. "Unmarried men are best friends, best masters, and best servants." But single life could also make a man indifferent, superficial and corrupt for judges and magistrates, coward for soldiers without hostilities power and tenacity. Marriage makes a man more responsible, tender, enthusiastic and warm-hearted. Finally, Bacon pointed out that "wives are young men's mistresses, companions for middle age, and old men's nurses". Even though a wife marries a bad husband, marriage offers a good chance for husbands to correct themselves.

'Of Marriage and Single Life' is very convincing especially in that period context. To be a classic means to be a challengeable one. Personally, I have some doubtful points about this essay.

First, it aims at men to persuade them to marry rather than keep single. But how about women? At that time, women were at a low position and they seemed to have no right to choose their own lives to single or married. As for Bacon's preference—marriage, which involves two sides both men and women, women also plays an important part in marriage. So I prefer the author to offer much more convincing ideas about the marriage for women.

Second, at present, singleness as a life-style is increasingly recognized by young people and their parents. But as a classic, which

passed down generations to generations, 'Of Marriage and Single Life' seems to be out of date. Some people don't regard getting married as necessarily better than remaining single, especially in developed countries and areas. However, this essay reflects and works at that certain period. Maybe that is enough.

At last, "Wives are young men's mistress, companions for middle age, and old men's nurses, so as a man may have a quarrel to marry when he will" seems a bit biased. Of course, I don't think men are superior to women, but I cannot disagree with his viewpoint here. Maybe it is better for us to think that what he really means is that they are companions for each other.

To sum up, 'Of Marriage and Single Life' has its quintessence about the attitude toward life. Different people have different opinions at different times, and we should look at the essay from our own stances.

OF SUPERSTITIONS

It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion, as is blamable of him. For the one is unbelief, the other is rules; and certainly superstition is the admonition of the Deity. Plutarch saith well to that purpose: Surely (saith he) I had rather a great deal, men should say, there was no such man at all, as Plutarch, than that they should say, that there was one Plutarch that would eat his children as soon as they were born; as the poets speak of Saturn. And as the slurs is greater towards God, so the danger is greater towards men. Scepticism leaves a man to sense, to philosophy, to natural devotion, to laws, to reputation; all which may be guides to an outward moral virtue, though religion were not; but superstition dismounts all these, and assembled an absolute monarchy, in the minds of men. Therefore theism did never bewilder states; for it makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further: and we see the times inclined to scepticism (as the time of Augustus Caesar) were civil times. But superstition prompted been the confusion of many states, and bringeth in a new exceptional mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government. The master of superstition is the people; and in all superstition, wise men follow fools; and arguments are fitted to practice, in a reversed order. It was gravely said by some of the abbots in the Council of Trent, where the doctrine of the Schoolmen stripped great undulate, that the Schoolmen were like astronomers, which did sham aberrant and epicycles, and such engines of orbs, to save the phenomena; though they knew there were no such things; and in like manner, that the Schoolmen had framed a number of adroit and convoluted dictums, and

theorems, to save the practice of the church. The causes of superstition are: pleasing and sensual rites and ceremonies; excess of outward and canting holiness; over great acclaim of traditions, which cannot but load the church; the man oeuvre of prelates, for their own ambition and lucre; the favoring too much of good intentions, which openeth the gate to conceits and novelties; the taking an aim at divine matters, by human, which cannot but breed mixture of imaginations: and, lastly, bestial times, especially joined with cataclysms and disasters. Superstition, without a veil, is a awry thing; for, as it addeth disproportion to an ape, to be so like a man, so the resemblance similitude of superstition to religion, makes it the more away. And abominable meat corrupt to little worms, so good forms and orders corrupt, into a number of trifling observances. There is a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best, if they go furthest from the superstition, formerly received; therefore care would be had that (as it fareth in ill ejecting) the good be not taken away with the bad; which commonly is done, when the people is the reformer.

Summary

Superstitions are the accusation of God. Plutarch says that poets talk of Saturn as one who eats his children as soon as they are born. Atheism leaves a man to feel, to think and it is a guide to an outward moral virtue. Superstitions are impediments in the life of a man to think freely, They have created confusion in many states and enrapture all spheres of Governments. The master of superstition is the people and in superstitious beliefs wise men follow fools. All arguments are fitted to practice in a reversed order. Petty observances of superstitious beliefs lead to corrupt good forms and orders. Hence, Bacon concludes the essay, by saying that, the reformation in the minds of people is necessary

OF STUDIES

Studies serve for delight, for ornament, and for ability. Their chief use for delight is in privateness and retiring; for ornament, is in discourse; and for ability, is in the judgment, and disposition of business. For expert men can implement, and perhaps judge of particulars, one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots and marshalling of affairs, come best, from those that are learned. To spend too much time in studies is indolence; to use them too much for ornament, is affectation; to make judgment wholly by their rules, is the humor of a scholar. They perfect nature, and are perfected by experience: for natural abilities are like natural plants, that need

pruning, by study; and studies themselves, do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience. Crafty men condemn studies, simple men applaud them, and wise men use them; for they teach not their own use; but that is a wisdom without them, and above them, won by observation. Read not to refute and negate; nor to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider. Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read, but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, and with assiduity and attention. Some books also may be read by subordinate, and decoction made of them by others; but that would be only in the less important arguments and the meaner sort of books, else distilled books are like common distilled waters, flashy things. Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man. And therefore, if a man write little, he need to have a great memory; if he confab little, he had need have a present cleverness; and if he read little, he had need have much devious, to seem to know, that he executes not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics adroit; natural philosophy deep; moral grave; logic and eloquence able to contend. Abeunt studio, in mores. denial, there is no obstruction in the wit, but may be elaborated out by fit studies; like as diseases of the body, may have appropriate exercises. Bowling is good for the stone and reins; shooting for the lungs and breast; gentle walking for the stomach; riding for the head; and the like. So if a man's wit be wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit be called away never so little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to distinguish or find differences, let him study the Schoolmen; for they are cymini sectores. If he be not apt to beat over matters, and to call up one thing to prove and illustrate another, let him study 197 the lawyers' cases. So every defect of the mind may have a special receipt.

Summary

The purpose of this work is to analyze Sixteen Century Francis Bacon's essay "Of Studies" by summarizing its main points and the pertinence of its statements to this day. Francis Bacon was an English Philosopher and a writer best known as a founder of the modern verifiable tradition based on the rational analysis of data obtained by observation and experimentation of the physical world.

The main focus of Bacon's essay rests on explaining to the reader the importance of study knowledge in terms of its practical application towards the individual and its society.

His first analysis is an elucidation on the purposes or uses that different individuals can have by approaching Study—"...for delight, ornament, and for ability"—And how certain professions are better served by individuals with study knowledge. As he mentions the righteousness of Study he also points out its vices—"To spend too much time in study is sloth..." Also, how Study influences our understanding of Nature, and in opposition, how our experience of Nature bounds our obtained knowledge. After that, the Author presents the concept of how different individuals with different mental abilities and interests in life, approach the idea of studying—"Crafty men condemn studies..."—and offers advice on how study should be applied—"...but to weight and consider." Then Bacon goes into expressing his ideas in how the means to acquire study knowledge, books, can be categorized and read according to their content and value to the individual. The benefits of studying are Bacon's final approach. Benefits in terms of defining a "Man" by its ability to read, write or confer, and in terms of being the medicine for any "obstruction in the cleverness" and by giving- "receipts" to "every defect of the mind".

Certainly, some of Francis Bacon's insights in this subject are of value after 400 years of societal evolution.. We can ascertain this when we read the phrase "They perfect Nature, and are perfected by experience...." Nevertheless some of the concepts expressed in his Essay have to be understood through the glass of time. By this I mean Society values and concepts were different altogether to what we know today. By that time Society was strongly influenced by the idea of literacy and illiteracy (relatively few were educated and could read and write). Only educated people had access to knowledge and by that, to social status and opportunity. Nowadays would be difficult to accept ideas which relate skills or professions towards an attitude to approach studying. Today, a skilled machinist or carpenter can certainly be a studied person. Nowadays most people in our Society have the possibility to read and by that, to obtain knowledge independently of what our personal choices are in terms of profession. Also we must consider how today we value the specialization of knowledge which in the past, characterized by a more generic and limited access to knowledge, wasn't a major factor into the perception and understanding of study knowledge as to the magnitude we see it today.

Finally, it is doubtful that the benefits of studying can be approached as a recipe for any "intellectual illness". We now know that the real illnesses are related to mental conditions and not necessarily to our mental skills, abilities or lack of them and by that I mean that Bacon's solutions to those conditions are extensively candid under the

actual understanding of Human Psychology. Concepts and ideas evolve at the same time as the Human condition changes in all social, scientific, political and economic aspects. By looking through the glass of time and comparing the past to the present we come to the realization of the universality and endurance of some concepts and the delicacy and impermanence of some others.

SUMMARY

Bacon did not propose an actual philosophy, but rather a method of developing philosophy. In his magnum opus, *Novum Organum*, he argued that although philosophy at the time used the deductive syllogism to explicate nature, the philosopher should instead proceed through inductive reasoning from fact to axiom to physical law. Before beginning this inference, the querist is to free his or her mind from certain false notions or tendencies which distort the truth.

Bacon elucidate his somewhat fragmentary ethical system in the seventh and eighth books of his *De augmentis scientiarum* (1623)—where he distinguished between duty to the community, an ethical matter, and duty to God, a religious matter.

KEY WORDS

1. **Death** : Death is the termination of the biological functions that sustain a living organism.
2. **Adversity** : A condition marked by misfortune, calamity, or distress.
3. **Superstition** : Superstition is a credulous belief or notion, not based on reason or knowledge.
4. **Knowledge** : To expertise, and skills acquired by a person through experience or education; the vague or practical understanding of a subject.
5. **Immortality** : Immortality (or eternal life) is the concept of living in a physical or spiritual form for an boundless length of time.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Describe the vision of Bacon on and about Death.
2. Differentiate the aspects conflicting between *crunch* and *Prosperity* through Bacon's Essay.

3. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of married life.
4. Write down the summary of the essay, "Of Superstition".
5. Explain the Views of Bacon's on knowledge' and in-depth studies.
6. Why do men fear for death?
7. Mention the things that show death terrible.
8. Write down the difference between prosperity and adversity.
9. What is the theme of the essay, "Of Marriage and Single Life"?
10. What is the main focus of the essay, "Of Studies"?

SUGGESTED READING

1. The Essays or Counsels civil and Morall—Sir Francis Bacon.
2. Works by Francis Bacon at Project Gutenberg.
3. Works by About Francis Bacon, from internet archive.

2

ESSAYS OF CHARLES LAMB

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Introduction
- Oxford in the Vacation
- All Fools Day
- Imperfect Sympathesies
- Valentines Day
- The Praise of Chimney Sweepers
- A Bachelor Complaint on the Behaviour of the Married People
- Summary
- Key Words
- Review Questions
- Suggested Reading

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to understand

1. The essays of Charles Lamb, such as:

- Oxford in the vacation
- All fools day
- Imperfect sympathesies
- Valentines day
- The praise of chimney sweepers
- A bachelor complaint on the behaviour of the married people

INTRODUCTION

Charles Lamb (1775-1834) was an English essayist, best known for his *Essays of Elia* and for the children's book *Tales from Shakespeare*, which he produced with his sister, Mary Lamb (1764-1847). Lamb has been referred to by E.V. Lucas, his principal biographer, as the most

lovable figure in English literature and his influence on the English essay form surely cannot be overestimated.

Lamb was honored by The Latymer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London where he lived for a time; it has six houses, one of which, "Lamb", is named after Charles.

Work

Lamb's first publication was the inclusion of four sonnets in the Coleridge's *Poems on Various Subjects* published in 1796 by Joseph Cottle. The sonnets were significantly influenced by the -poems of Burns and the sonnets of William Bowles, a largely forgotten poet of the late 18th century. His poems garnered little attention and are seldom read today. Lamb's contributions to the second edition of the *Poems* showed significant growth as a poet. These poems included *The Tomb of Douglas* and *A Vision of Repentance*. Because of a temporary fall-out with Coleridge, Lamb's poems were to be excluded in the third edition of the *Poems*. As it turned out, a third edition never emerged and instead Coleridge's next publication was the monumentally influential *Lyrical Ballads* co-published with Wordsworth. Lamb, on the other hand, published a book entitled *Blank Verse* with Charles Lloyd, the mentally unstable son of the founder of Lloyd's Bank. Lamb's most famous poem was written at this time entitled *The Old Familiar Faces*. Like most of Lamb's poems it is particularly sentimental but it is still remembered and widely read, often included in *Poetic Collections*. Of particular interest to Lambarians is the opening verse of the original version of *The Old Familiar Faces* which is concerned with Lamb's mother. It was a verse that Lamb chose to remove from the edition of his *Collected Work* published in 1818.

In the first years of the 19th century Lamb began his fruitful literary cooperation with his sister Mary. Together they wrote at least three books for William Godwin's *Juvenile Library*. The most successful of these was of course *Tales From Shakespeare* which ran through two editions for Godwin and has now been published dozens of times in countless editions, many of them illustrated. Lamb also contributed a footnote to Shakespearean studies at this time with his essay "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare," in which he argues that Shakespeare should be read rather than performed in order to gain the proper effect of his dramatic genius. Besides contributing to Shakespeare studies with his book *Tales From Shakespeare*, Lamb also contributed to the popularization of Shakespeare's contemporaries with

his book *Specimens of the English Dramatic Poets Who Lived About the Time of Shakespeare*.

Essays of Charles Lamb

Although he did not write his first Elia essay until 1820, Lamb's gradual perfection of the essay form for which he eventually became famous began as early 1802 in a series of open letters to Leigh Hunt's *Reflector*. The most famous of these is called "The Londoner" in which Lamb famously derides the contemporary fascination with nature and the countryside.

OXFORD IN THE VACATION

Essay

Casting a preparatory glance at the bottom of this article as the very connoisseur in prints, with cursory eye (which, while it reads, seems as though it read not), never fails to consult the quis sculpsit in the corner, before he pronounces some rare piece to be a Vivares, or a Woollet \ methinks I hear you exclaim, Reader, Who is Elia?

Because in my last I tried to divert thee with some half-forgotten humours of some old clerks defunct, in an old house of business, long since gone to decay, doubtless you have already set me down in your mind as one of the self-same college - a votary of the desk - a notched and cropt scrivener - one that sucks his sustenance, as certain sick people are said to do, through a quill.

Well, I do agnise something of the sort. I confess that it is my humour, my fancy - in the fore-part of the day, when the mind of your man of letters requires some relaxation (and none better than such as at first sight seems most abhorrent from his beloved studies) - to while away some good hours of my time in the contemplation of indigos, cottons, raw silks, piece-goods, flowered or otherwise. In the first place and then it sends you home with such increased appetite to your books not to say, that your outside sheets, and waste wrappers of foolscap, do receive into them, most kindly and naturally, the impression of sonnets, epigrams, essays - so that the very parings of a counting-house are, in some sort, the settings up of an author. The enfranchised quill, that has plodded all the morning among the, cart-rucks of figures and ciphers, frisks and curvets so at its ease over the flowery carpet-ground of a midnight dissertation. It feels its promotion. So that you see, upon the whole, the literary dignity of Elia is very little, if at all compromised in the condescension.

Not that, in my anxious detail of the many commodities incidental to the life of a public office, I would be thought blind to certain flaws,

which a cunning carper might be able to pick in this Joseph's vest. And here I must have leave, in the fulness of my soul, to regret the abolition, and doing-away-with altogether, of those consolatory interstices, and sprinklings of freedom, through the four seasons, - the red-letter days, now become, to all intents and purposes, dead-letter days. There was Paul, and Stephen, and Barnabas - Andrew and John, men famous in old times - we were used to keep all their days holy, as long back as when I was at school at Christ's. I remember their effigies, by the same token, in the old Baskett Prayer Book. There hung Peter in his uneasy posture-holy Bartlemy in the troublesome act of flaying, after the famous Marsyas by Spagnoletti. - I honoured them all, and could almost have wept the defalcation of Iscariot - so much did we love to keep holy memories sacred: - only methought I a little grudged of the coalition of the better Jude with Simon - clubbing (as it were) their sanctities together, to make up one poor gaudy-day between them - as an economy unworthy of the dispensation.

These were bright visitations in a scholar's and a clerk's life - 'far off their coming shone.' - I was as good as an almanac in those days. I could have told you such a saint's day falls out next week, or the week after. Peradventure the Epiphany, by some periodical infelicity, would, once in six years, merge in a Sabbath. Now am I little better than one of the profane. Let me not be thought to arraign the wisdom of my civil superiors, who have judged the further observation of these holy tides to be papistical, superstitious,. Only in a custom of such long standing, methinks, if their Holinesses -the Bishops had, in decency, been first sounded - but I am wading out of my depths. I am not the man to decide the limits of civil and ecclesiastical authority - I am plain Elia - no Selden, nor Archbishop Usher - though at present in the thick of their books, here in the heart of learning, under the shadow of the mighty Bodley.

I can here play the gentleman, enact the student. To such a one as myself, who has been defrauded in his young years of the sweet food of academic institution, nowhere is so pleasant, to while away a few idle weeks at, as one or other of the Universities. Their vacation, too, at this time of the year, falls in so pat with ours. Here I can take my walks unmolested, and fancy myself of what degree or standing I please. I seem admitted ad eundem. I fetch up past opportunities. I can rise at the chapel-bell, and dream that it rings for me. In moods of humihty I can be a Sizar, or a Servitor. When the peacock vein rises, I strut a Gentleman Commoner. In graver moments, I proceed Master of Arts. Indeed I do not think I am much unlike that respectable character. I have seen your dim-eyed vergers, and bed-makers in spectacles, drop a

bow or a curtsy, as I pass, wisely mistaking me for something of the sort. I go about in black, which favours the notion. Only in Christ Church reverend quadrangle I can be content to pass for nothing short of a Seraphic Doctor.

The walks at these times are so much one's own, - the tall trees of Christ's, the groves of Magdalen! The halls deserted, and with open doors, inviting one to slip in unperceived, and pay a *devoir* to some Founder, or noble or royal Benefactress (that should have been ours) whose portrait seems to smile upon their over-looked beadsman, and to adopt me for their own. Then, to take a peep in by the way at the butteries, and sculleries, redolent of antique hospitality; the immense caves of kitchens, kitchen fireplaces, cordial recesses; ovens whose first pies were baked four centuries ago; and spits which have cooked for Chaucer! Not the meanest minister among the dishes but is hallowed to me through his imagination, and the Cook goes forth a Manciple.

Antiquity! thou wondrous charm, what art thou? that, being nothing, art everything! When, thou wert, thou wert. not antiquity - then thou wert nothing, but hadst a remoter antiquity, as thou calledst it, to look back to with blind veneration; thou thyself being to thyself flat, jejune, modern! What mystery lurks in this retroversion? or what half Januses are we, that cannot look forward with the same idolatry with which we for ever revert! The mighty future is as nothing, being everything! the past is everything, being nothing!

What were thy dark ages? Surely the sun rose as brightly then as now, and man got him to his work in the morning? Why is it we can never hear mention of them without an accompanying feeling, as though a palpable obscure had dimmed the face of things, and that our ancestors wandered to and fro groping!

Above all thy rarities, old Oxenford, what do most arride and solace me, are thy repositories of mouldering learning, thy shelves. What a place to be in is an old library! It seems as though all the souls of all the writers, that have bequeathed their labours to these Bodleians, were reposing here, as in some dormitory, or middle state. I do not want to handle, to profane the leaves, their winding-sheets. I could as soon dislodge a shade. I seem to inhale learning, walking amid their foliage; and the odour of their old moth-scented coverings is fragrant as the first bloom of those scintial apples which grew amid the happy orchard.

Still less have I curiosity to disturb the elder repose of MSS. Those *variae lectiones*, so tempting to the more erudite palates, do but disturb

and unsettle my faith. I am no Herculean raker. The credit of the three witnesses might have slept unimpeached for me. I leave these curiosities to Porsori, and to G.D. - whom, by the way, I found busy as a moth over some rotten archive, rummaged out of some seldom-explored press, in a nook at Oriel. With long poring, he is grown almost into a book. He stood as passive as one by the side of the old shelves. I longed to new-coat him in russia, and assign him his place. He might have mustered for a tall Scapula.

D. is assiduous in his visits to these seats of learning. No inconsiderable portion of his moderate fortune, I apprehend, is consumed in journeys between them and Clifford's Inn - where, like a dove on the asp's nest, he has long taken up his unconscious abode, amid an incongruous assembly of attorneys, attorneys' clerks, apparitors, promoters, vermin of the law, among whom he sits, 'in calm and sinless peace.' The fangs of the law pierce him not - the winds of litigation blow over his humble chambers - the hard sheriff's officer moves his hat as he passes - legal nor illegal discourtesy touches him - none thinks of offering violence or injustice to him - you would as soon 'strike an abstract idea.'

D. has been engaged, he tells me, through a course of laborious years, in an investigation into all curious matter connected with the two Universities; and has lately lit upon a MS. collection of charters, relative to C----, by which he hopes to settle some disputed points - particularly that long controversy between them as to priority of foundation. The ardour with which he engages in these liberal pursuits, I am afraid, has not met with all the encouragement it deserved, either here or at C----. Your caputs, and heads of colleges, care less than anybody else about these questions. - Contented to suck the milky fountains of their Alma Maters, without inquiring into the venerable gentlewoman's years, they rather hold such curiosities to be impertinent - unreverend. They have their good glebe lands in manu, and care not much to rake into the title-deeds. I gather at least so much from other sources, for D. is not a man to complain.

D. started like an unbroken heifer, when I interrupted him. A priori it was not very probable that we should have met in Oriel. But D. would have done the same, had I accosted him on the sudden in his own walks in Clifford's Inn, or in the Temple. In addition to a provoking short-sightedness (the effect of late studies and watchings at the midnight oil) D. is the most absent of men. He made a call the other morning at our friend M.'s in Bedford Square; and, finding nobody at home, was ushered into the hall, where, asking for pen and ink, with

great exactitude of purpose he enters me his name in the book - which ordinarily lies about in such places, to record the failures of the untimely or unfortunate visitor - and takes his leave with many ceremonies, and professions of regret. Some two or three hours after, his walking destinies returned him into the same neighbourhood again, and again the quiet image of the fireside circle at M.'s - Mrs. M. presiding at it like a Queen Lar, with pretty A.S. at her side - striking irresistibly on his fancy, he makes another call (forgetting that they were 'certainly not to return from the country before that day week'), and disappointed a second time, inquires for pen and paper as before: again the book is brought, and in the line just above that in which he is about to print his second name (his re-script) - his first name (scarce dry) looks out upon him like another Sosia, or as if a man should suddenly encounter his own duplicate! - The effect may be conceived. D. made many a good resolution against any such lapses in future. I hope he will not keep them too rigorously.

For with G.D. - to be absent from the body, is something (not to speak it profanely) to be present with the Lord. At the very time when, personally encountering thee, he passes on with no recognition - or, being stopped, starts like a thing surprised - at that moment, Reader, he is on Mount Tabor - or Parnassus - or co-sphered with Plato - or, with Harrington, framing 'immortal commonwealths' - devising some plan of amelioration to the country, or thy species - peradventure meditating some individual kindness or courtesy, to be done to thee thyself, the returning consciousness of which made him to start so guiltily at thy obtruded personal presence.

D. commenced life, after a course of hard study in the house of 'pure Emmanuel,' as usher to a knavish fanatic schoolmaster at, at a salary of eight pounds per annum, with board and lodging. Of this poor stipend, he never received above half in all the laborious years he served this man. He tells a pleasant anecdote, that when poverty, staring out at his ragged knees, has sometimes compelled him, against the modesty of his nature, to hint at arrears, Dr. would take no immediate notice, but after supper, when the school was called together to evensong, he would never fail to introduce some instructive homily against riches, and the corruption of the heart occasioned through the desire of them - ending with 'Lord, keep Thy servants, above all things, from the heinous sin of avarice. Having food and raiment, let us therewithal be content. Give me Agur's wish' - and the like - which, to the little auditory, sounded like a doctrine full of Christian prudence

and simplicity, but to poor D. was a receipt in full for that quarter's demand at least.

And D. has been underworking for himself ever since; - drudging at low rates for unappreciating booksellers, - wasting his fine erudition in silent corrections of the classics, and in those unostentatious but solid services to learning which commonly fall to the lot of laborious scholars, who have not the heart to sell themselves to the best advantage. He has published poems, which do not sell, because their character is unobtrusive, like his own, and because he has been too much absorbed in ancient literature to know what the popular mark in poetry is, even if he could have hit it. And, therefore, his verses are properly, what he terms them, crochets; voluntaries; odes to liberty and spring; effusions; little tributes and offerings, left behind him upon tables and window-seats at parting from friends' houses, and from all the inns of hospitality, where he has been courteously (or but tolerably) received in his pilgrimage. If his muse of kindness halt a little behind the strong lines in fashion in this *excitement-loving age*, *his prose is the best of the sort in the world, and exhibits a faithful transcript of his own healthy, natural mind, and cheerful, innocent tone of conversation.*

D. is delightful anywhere, but he is at the best in such places as these. He cares not much for Bath. He is out of his element at Buxton, at Scarborough, or Harrogate. The Cam and the Isis are to him 'better than all the waters of Damascus.' On the Muses' hill he is happy, and good, as one of the Shepherds on the Delectable Mountains; and when he goes about with you to show you the halls and colleges, you think you have with you the Interpreter at the House Beautiful.

Summary

Lamb explains that the pseudonym "Elia" refers to himself. He informs the reader that at one time he was a clerk at the South-Sea House, a description of which, with brief sketches of some of his colleagues of those days, he has given in an earlier essay (The South-Sea House). He used to treat his working hours in the office as a sort of relaxation preparatory to his literary labours which he used to commence after going home from the office. In changing over from his clerical work in the office to his literary work in the evenings, he used to have the feeling that he had been promoted to a higher position.

Lamb deplores the abolition of certain holidays which were formerly on certain days connected with the memories of saints. There was a time when certain days were observed as holidays in commemoration of saints like Paul, Stephen, Barnabas, Andrew, John and Simon. But those

holidays have now been dispensed with. Those "red-letter days" have a list of festivals and holidays on the tips of his fingers. It is a pity that the civil authorities have abolished most of the holidays connected with religious and spiritual matters.

Lamb then describes a visit to the University of Oxford during the vacation. He never actually had a University education. But a visit to the University of Oxford during the vacation makes him imagine what he might have been, had he actually been admitted to the University as a student. He imagines himself as a Sizar or a Servitor or a Gentleman Commoner. He even imagines himself as a Master of Arts. In the cathedral of Christ Church, Lamb imagines himself as a Doctor of Divinity. He sees the tall trees of Christ Church and the groves of Magdalen College. He passes through the deserted halls and takes a peep into the butteries, sculleries and kitchens. The meanest cook of the University rises in his imagination to the dignity of the Manciple whom Chaucer describes in the Prologue to his *Canterbury Tales*.

Lamb's mind next travels back to the days of antiquity. The times, which are referred to as antiquity, had their own, a more remote, antiquity. There was a time when antiquity itself was not antiquity but the "present". It is a tendency of people to go back in retrospect to bygone times, and not to project themselves into the future. Even to bygone "dark ages", the sun used to shine as brightly as it does now.

To stand in the Bodley of the University of Oxford in a most satisfying and pleasing experience for Lamb. It seems as though all the souls of all the past writers are testing on the shelves of the library. Lamb would not like to disturb those souls by handling the various volumes. He feels as if he is inhaling learning. The odour of the moth-eaten volumes is as fragrant to him as was that of the apple tree in the Garden of Eden to Adam. Nor would he like to disturb the repose of the different manuscripts that lie in the Bodley library. He is not one of those research workers who try to explore the past. He is no Herculanean explorer.

The labour of exploring manuscripts should be left to a man like George Dyer, says Lamb. George Dyer pores over books so diligently that he himself has grown almost into a book. George Dyer is assiduous in his visits to the seats of learning like the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Much of his fortune has been spent in his journeys from his dwelling to these two universities and back. Dyer has been investigating into the dispute as to which of the two universities was founded first. The enthusiasm with which he has been pursuing this investigation has not been shared by heads of colleges and other

administrators at the two universities. George Dyer is a very absent-minded man. He looks startled even when accosted by a person of long acquaintance. He is so absent-minded, that one day he made a second call at a house where he had already called and been told that the occupants of the house were away to the country and were not expected for a week at least. Most of the time, George Dyer is pre-occupied with his meditations and with his imaginative flights.

After a course of hard study at Cambridge, Dyer worked as an usher to a knavish fanatic schoolmaster at a meager salary. Subsequently he became an author but without much commercial success. His poems do not sell because he is too absorbed in ancient literature to understand the demands of modern taste. He is a writer of excellent prose.

Lamb concludes the essay by observing that Dyer is delightful anywhere but that he is at his best at such places as the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The rivers of Oxford and Cambridge Universities are more to him than all the waters of Damascus. He feels most at home at these seats of learning.

ALL FOOLS DAY

Essay

The compliments of the season to my worthy masters, and a merry first of April to us all! Many happy returns of this day to you — and you — and you, Sir — nay, never frown, man, nor put a long face upon the matter. Do not we know one another? What need of ceremony among friends? We have all a touch of that same — you understand me — a speck of the motley. Beshrew the man who on such a day as this, the general festival, should affect to stand aloof. I am none of those sneakers. I am free of the corporation, and care not who knows it. He that meets me in the forest to-day, shall meet with no wise-acre, I can tell him. *Stultus sum*. Translate me that, and take the meaning of it to yourself for your pains. What, man, we have four quarters of the globe on our side, at the least computation.

Fill us a cup of that sparkling gooseberry — we will drink no wise, melancholy, politic port on this day — and let us troll the catch of *Amiens* — *due ad me* — *due ad me* — how goes it?

Here shall he see Gross fools as he.

Now would I give a trifle to know historically and authentically, who was the greatest fool that ever lived. I would certainly give him in

a bumper. Marry, of the present breed, I think I could without much difficulty name you the party.

Remove your cap a little further, if you please; it hides my bauble. And now each man bestride his hobby, and dust away his bells to what tune he pleases. I will give you, for my part,

The crazy old church clock, And the bewildered chimes.

Good master Empedocles, you are welcome. It is long since you went a salamander gathering down Aetna. Worse than samphire-picking by some odds. 'Tis a mercy your worship did not singe your mustachios.

Ha! Cleombrotus! and what salads in faith did you light upon at the bottom of the Mediterranean? You were founder, I take it, of the disinterested sect of the Calenturists.

Gebir, my old free-mason, and prince of plasterers at Babel, bring in your trowel, most Ancient Grand! You have claim to a seat at my right hand, as patron of the stammerers. You left your work, if I remember Herodotus correctly, at eight hundred million toises, or thereabout, above the level of the sea. Bless us, what a long bell you must have pulled, to call your top workmen to their nuncheon on the low grounds of Sennaar. Or did you send up your garlick and onions by a rocket? I am a rogue if I am not ashamed to show you our Monument on Fish-street Hill, after your altitudes. Yet we think it somewhat.

What, the magnanimous Alexander in tears? — cry, baby, put its finger in its eye, it shall have another globe, round as an orange, pretty moppet!

Mister Adams — 'odso, I honour your coat — pray do us the favour to I read to us that sermon, which you lent to Mistress Slipslop — the twenty I and second in your portmanteau there — on Female Incontinence — the same — it will come in most irrelevantly and impertinently seasonable to the time of the day.

Go Master Raymund Lully, you look wise. Pray correct that error.

Duns, spare your definitions. I must fine you a bumper, or a paradox. We will have nothing said or done syllogistically this day. Remove those logical forms, waiter, that no gentleman break the tender shins of his apprehension stumbling across them.

Master Stephen, you are late. — Ha! Cokes, is it you? — Ague-cheek, my dear knight, let me pay my devoir to you. — Master Shallow, your worship's poor servant to command. — Master Silence, I will use few words with you. — Slender,

it shall go hard if I edge not you in somewhere. — You six will engross all the poor wit of the company to-day. — I know it, I know it.

Ha! honest R—, my fine old Librarian of Ludgate, time out of mind, art thou here again? Bless thy doublet, it is not over-new, threadbare as thy stories — what dost thou flitting about the world at this rate? — Thy customers are extinct, defunct, bed-rid, have ceased to read long ago. — Thou goest still among them, seeing if, peradventure, thou canst hawk a volume or two. — Good Granville S—, thy last patron, is flown.

King Pandion, he is dead,

All thy friends are lapt in lead.

Nevertheless, noble R —, come in, and take your seat here, between Armado and Quisada: for in true courtesy, in gravity, in fantastic smiling to thyself, in courteous smiling upon others, in the goodly ornature of well-apparelled speech, and the commendation of wise sentences, thou art nothing inferior to those accomplished Dons of Spain. The spirit of chivalry forsake me for ever, when I forget thy singing the song of Macheath, which declares that he might be happy with either, situated between those two ancient spinsters — when I forget the inimitable formal love which thou didst make, turning now to the one, and now to the other, with that Malvolian smile — as if Cervantes, not Gay, had written it for his hero; and as if thousands of periods must revolve, before the minor of courtesy could have given his invidious preference between a pair of so goodly-proprieted and meritorious-equal damsels. . . . To descend from these altitudes, and not to protract our Fools' Banquet beyond its appropriate day, - - for I fear the second of April is not many hours distant - - in sober verity I will confess a Truth to thee, reader. I love a Fool — as naturally, as if I were of kith and kin to him.

When a child, with child-like apprehensions, that dived not below the surface of the matter, I read those Parables — not guessing at their involved wisdom — I had more yearnings towards that simple architect, that built his house upon the sand, than I entertained for his more cautious neighbour; I grudged at the hard censure pronounced upon the quiet soul that kept his talent; and — prizing their simplicity beyond the more provident, and, to my apprehension, somewhat unfeminine wariness of their competitors — I felt a kindliness, that almost amounted to a tendre, for those five thoughtless virgins, — I have never made an acquaintance since, that lasted; or a friendship, that answered; with any that had not some tincture of the absurd in their characters. I venerate an honest obliquity of understanding. The more laughable blunders a man shall commit in your company, the more tests he giveth you, that he will not betray or overreach you. I love the safety, which a palpable hallucination warrants; the security, which a word out of season ratifies. And take my word for this, reader, and say a fool told it you, if you please, that he who hath not a dram of folly in his mixture, hath pounds of much

worse matter in his composition. It is observed, that "the foolisher the fowl or fish, — woodcocks, — dotterels, — cod's-heads, &c. the finer the flesh thereof," and what are commonly the world's received fools, but such whereof the world is not worthy? and what have been some of the kindest patterns of our species, but so many darlings of absurdity, minions of the goddess, and her white boys? — Reader, if you wrest my words beyond their fair construction, it is you, and not I, that are the April Fool.

Summary

This essay celebrates April 1, which is regarded as all fools day on which all kinds of practical jokes are fools day and wishes many happy returns of the day to everybody. Nobody, he says, should keep away from the celebration of this festival. Everybody, according to Lamb, has a touch of the fool in him, "a speck of motley". He himself, says Lamb, belongs to the category of fools and would like his readers to regard themselves as having a touch of the fool in their composition. The majority of the people in this world have something of the fool in their make-up. Lamb invites everybody to share the Gooseberry wine with him and to sing the song of folly that Amiens sings in Shakespeare's play. He would like to know, who was the greatest fool that would like to drink a toast to that man.

Lamb then invites to the company of fools some of the characters who have actually lived and whom he regards as fools. He welcomes Empedocles, the philosopher, who jumped into the crater of Mt. Etna in order to know what was at the bottom of it. Then he welcomes Cleombrotus who jumped into the ocean in order to lead a better life after death. He invites Gebir who had a hand in the building of the Tower of Babel. He invites Alexander the great who, after having conquered the world, wept because there was no other world for him to conquer. He invites Raymund Lully, the chemist and philosopher of the thirteen century, to join the company of fools. Another philosopher who is invited to this company is Duns Scotus, also of the thirteenth century.

Next, Lamb invites some of the fools and simpletons from fiction to join the feast. Parson Adams, Master Stephen, Cokes, Aquecheek, Master Shallow, Master Silence, Slender, all these are asked to join the feast of fools.

Another character to be invited is Ramsay who used to keep the "London Library" in Ludgate Street. Ramsay is given a seat between the two Spanish Dons, Armado and Quisada (Don Quixote), because he is in no way inferior to these two Dons in respect of Chivalry, gravity, courteous smiling upon others, bombastic speech; and the uttering of wise maxims. Lamb compliments Ramsay on his having acted the part of Macheath who had to face the embarrassment of making love two sweethearts at once, one on each side of him.

In conclusion, Lamb says that he loves a Fool and that he loves a Fool as naturally as if he were related to him by ties of the blood. He recalls that when he used to read the parables in the Bible, he used to feel more attracted towards the fool who built his house upon the sand then towards the wise man who built his house on a rock. His sympathy went to the foolish servant buried his money in the ground rather than to the wise servants who multiplied their money by investment. Similarly, he experienced a feeling of tenderness for five foolish virgins who were deprived of the bridegroom and not for the five shrewd virgins who were united with the bridegrooms. Then Lamb tells us that only those of his friendships have proved firm and lasting which were made with persons who had a touch of absurdity in their characters. He feels a respect for honest, stupidity, eccentricity. The more the blunders a man commits, the greater the certainty that he will not betray a friend. Folly and absurdity are a sure guarantee of loyalty and honesty. If a man does not have any touch of folly in his composition, it means that there is a lot of knavery in him. The finest flesh for eating is that which is obtained from those birds or fish, which are the most foolish. The most kind-hearted human beings are those who have an element of folly, stupidity, or absurdity in their character.

IMPERFECT SYMPATHESIES

Essay

I am of a constitution so general, that it consorts and sympathizeth with all things, I have no antipathy, or rather idiosyncrasy in any thing. Those national repugnancies do not touch me, nor do I behold with prejudice the French, Italian, Spaniard, or Dutch — *Religio Medici*.

That the author of the *Religio Medici*, mounted upon the airy stilts of abstraction, conversant about notional and conjectural essences; in whose categories of Being the possible took the upper hand of the actual; should have overlooked the impertinent individualities of such poor concretions as mankind, is not much to be admired. It is rather to be wondered at, that in the genus of animals he should have condescended to distinguish that species at all. For myself—earth-bound and fettered to the scene of my activities,

Standing on earth, not rapt above the sky, I confess that I do feel the differences of mankind, national or individual, to an unhealthy excess. I can look with no indifferent eye upon things or persons. Whatever is, is to me a matter of taste or distaste; or when once it becomes indifferent, it begins to be disrelishing. I am, in plainer words, a bundle of prejudices — made up of likings and dislikings — veriest thrall to sympathies, apathies, antipathies. In a certain sense, I hope it may be said of me that I am a lover of my species. I can feel for all indifferently, but I cannot feel towards all equally. The more purely-English wont that expresses

sympathy will better explain my _-meaning. I can be a friend to a worthy man, who upon another account cannot be my mate or fellow. I cannot like all people alike.

I would be understood as confining myself to the subject of imperfect sympathies. To nations or classes of men there can be no direct antipathy. There may be individuals born and constellated so opposite to another individual nature, that the same sphere cannot hold them. I have met with my moral antipodes, and can believe the story of two persons meeting (who never saw one another before in their lives) and instantly fighting.

"We by proof find there should be twixt man and man such an antipathy, That though he can show no just reason why For any former wrong or injury, Can neither find a blemish in his fame, Nor aught in face or feature justly blame, Can challenge or accuse him of no evil, Yet notwithstanding hates him as a devil".

The lines are from old Heywood's "Hierarchic of Angels," and he subjoins a curious story in confirmation, of a Spaniard who attempted to assassinate a King Ferdinand of Spain, and being put to the rack could give no other reason for the deed but an inveterate antipathy which he had taken to the first sight of the King.

The cause which to that act compelled him Was, he ne'er loved him since he first beheld him. I have been trying all my life to like Scotchmen, and am obliged to desist from the experiment in despair. They cannot like me - - and in truth, I never knew one of that nation who attempted to do it. There is something more plain and ingenuous in their mode of proceeding. We know one another at first sight. There is an order of imperfect intellects (under which mine must be content to rank) which in its constitution is essentially anti-Caledonian. The owners of the sort of faculties I allude to, he minds rather suggestive than comprehensive. They have no pretences to much clearness or precision in their ideas, or in their manner of expressing them. Their intellectual wardrobe (to confess fairly) has few whole pieces in it. They are content with fragments and scattered pieces of Truth. She presents no full front to them — a feature or side-face at the most. Hints and glimpses, germs and crude essays at a system, is the utmost they pretend to. They beat up a little game peradventure — and leave it to knottier heads, more robust constitutions, to run it down. The light that lights them is not steady and polar, but mutable and shifting: waxing, and again waning. Their conversation is accordingly. They will throw out a random word in or out of season, and be content to let it pass for what it is worth. They cannot speak always as if they were upon their oath — but must be understood, speaking or writing, with some abatement. The seldom wait to mature a proposition, but even bring it to market in the green ear. They delight to impart their defective discoveries as they arise, without waiting for their full development. They are no systematizers, and would but err more by attempting it. Their minds, as I said before, are suggestive merely. The brain of a true Caledonian (if I am not mistaken) is constituted upon quite a different plan. His Minerva is born in panoply. You are never admitted to see his ideas in their growth — if, indeed, they do grow,

and are not rather put together upon principles of clock-work. You never catch his mind in an undress. He never hints or suggests any thing, but unloads his stock of ideas in perfect order and completeness. He brings his total wealth into company, and gravely unpacks it. His riches are always about him. He never stoops to catch a glittering something in your presence, to share it with you, before he quite knows whether it be true touch or not. You cannot cry halves to any thing that he finds. He does not find, but bring.

You never witness his first apprehension of a thing. His understanding is always at its meridian - you never see the first dawn, the early streaks. - He has no falterings of self-suspicion. Surmises, guesses, misgivings, half-intuitions, semi-consciousnesses, partial illuminations, dim instincts, embryo conceptions, have no place in his brain, or vocabulary. The twilight of dubiety never falls upon him. Is he orthodox — he has no doubts. Is he an infidel — he has none either. Between the affirmative and the negative there is no border-land with him. You cannot hover with him upon the confines of truth, or wander in the maze of a probable argument. He always keeps the path. You cannot make excursions with him — for he sets you right. His taste never fluctuates. His morality never abates. He cannot compromise, or understand middle actions. There can be but a right and a wrong. His conversation is as a book. His affirmations have the sanctity of an oath. You must speak upon the square with him. He stops a metaphor like a suspected person in an enemy's country. "A healthy book" — said one of his countrymen to me, who had ventured to give that appellation to John Bunce, — "did I catch rightly what you said? I have heard of a man in health, and of a healthy state of body, but I do not see how that epithet can be properly applied to a book." Above all, you must beware of indirect expressions before a Caledonian. Clap an extinguisher upon your irony, if you are unhappily blest with a vein of it. Remember you are upon your oath. I have a print of a graceful female after Leonardo da Vinci, which I was showing off to Mr. After he had examined it minutely, I ventured to ask him how he liked MY BEAUTY (a foolish name it goes by among my friends) — when he very gravely assured me, that "he had considerable respect for my character and talents" (so he was pleased to say), "but had not given himself much thought about the degree of my personal pretensions." The misconception staggered me, but did not seem much to disconcert him. — Persons of this nation are particularly fond of affirming a truth — which nobody doubts. They do not so properly affirm, as annunciate it. They do indeed appear to have such a love of truth (as if, like virtue, it were valuable for itself) that all truth becomes equally valuable, whether the proposition that contains it be new or old, disputed, or such as is impossible to become

a subject of disputation. I was present not long since at a party of North Britons, where a son of Burns was expected; and happened to drop a silly expression (in my South British way), that I wished it were the father instead of the son — when four of them started up at once to inform me, that "that was impossible, because he was dead." An impracticable wish, it seems, was more than they could conceive. Swift has hit off this part of their character, namely their love of truth, in his biting way, but with an illiberality that necessarily confines the passage to the margin. The tediousness of these people is certainly provoking. I wonder if they ever tire one another! — In my early life I had a passionate fondness for the poetry of Burns. I have sometimes foolishly hoped to ingratiate myself with his countrymen by expressing it. But I have always found that a true Scot resents your admiration of his compatriot, even more than he would your contempt of him. The latter he imputes to your "imperfect acquaintance with many of the words which he uses;" and the same objection makes it a presumption in you to suppose that you can admire him. — Thomson they seem to have forgotten. Smollett they have neither forgotten nor forgiven for his delineation of Rory and his companion, upon their first introduction to our metropolis. — Speak of Smollett as a great genius, and they will retort upon you Hume's History compared with his Continuation of it. What if the historian had continued Humphrey Clinker?

There are some people who think they sufficiently acquit themselves, and entertain their company, with relating facts of no consequence, not at all out of the road of such common incidents as happen every day; and this I have observed more frequently among the Scots than any other nation, who are very careful not to omit the minutest circumstances of time or place; which kind of discourse, if it were not a little relieved by the uncouth terms and phrases, as well as accent and gesture peculiar to that country, would be hardly tolerable.

I have, in the abstract, no disrespect for Jews. They are a piece of stubborn antiquity, compared with which Stonehenge is in its nonage. They date beyond the pyramids. But I should not care to be in habits of familiar intercourse with any of that nation. I confess that I have not the nerves to enter their synagogues. Old prejudices cling about me. I cannot shake off the story of Hugh of Lincoln. Centuries of injury, contempt, and hate, on the one side, — of cloaked revenge, dissimulation, and hate, on the other, between our and their fathers, must, and ought, to affect the blood of the children. I cannot believe it can run clear and kindly yet; or that a few fine words, such as candour, liberality, the light of a nineteenth century, can close up the breaches of so deadly a disunion. A Hebrew is nowhere congenial to me. He is least

distasteful on 'Change — for the mercantile spirit levels all distinctions, as all are beauties in the dark. I boldly confess that I do not relish the approximation of Jew and Christian, which has become so fashionable. The reciprocal endearments have, to me, something hypocritical and unnatural in them. I do not like to see the Church and Synagogue kissing and congeeing in awkward postures of an affected civility. If they are converted, why do they not come over to us altogether? Why keep up a form of separation, when the life of it is fled? If they can sit with us at table, why do they keek at our cookery? I do not understand these half convertites. Jews christianizing — Christians judaizing - - puzzle me. I like fish or flesh. A moderate Jew is a more confounding piece of anomaly than a wet Quaker. The spirit of the synagogue is essentially separative. There would have been more in keeping if he had abided by the faith of his forefathers. There is a fine scorn in his face, which nature meant to be of Christians. The Hebrew spirit is strong in him, in spite of his proselytism. He cannot conquer the Shibboleth. How it breaks out, when he sings, "The Children of Israel passed through the Red Sea!" The auditors, for the moment, are as Egyptians to him, and he rides over our necks in triumph. There is no mistaking him. — has a strong expression of sense in his countenance, and it is confirmed by his singing. The foundation of his vocal excellence is use. He sings with understanding, as Kemble delivered dialogue. He would sing the Commandments, and give an appropriate character to each prohibition. His nation, in general, have not ever-sensible countenances. How should they? • - but you seldom see a silly expression among them. Gain, and the pursuit of gain, sharpen a man's visage. I never heard of an idiot being horn among them. — Some admire the Jewish female-physiognomy. I admire it — but with trembling. Jael had those full dark inscrutable eyes.

In the Negro countenance you will often meet with strong traits of benignity. I have felt yearnings of tenderness towards some of these faces --or rather masks — that have looked out kindly upon one in casual encounters in the streets and highways. I love what Fuller beautifully calls - - these "images of God cut in ebony." But I should not like to associate with them, to share my meals and my good-nights with them — because they are black.

I love Quaker ways, and Quaker worship. I venerate the Quaker principles. It does me good for the rest of the day when I meet any of their people in my path. When I am ruffled or disturbed by any occurrence, the sight, or quiet voice of a Quaker, acts upon me as a ventilator, lightening the air, and taking off a load from the bosom. But I cannot like the Quakers (as Desdemona would say) "to live with

them." I am all over sophisticated — with humours, fancies, craving hourly sympathy. I must have books, pictures, theatres, chit-chat, scandal, jokes, ambiguities, and a thousand whim-whams, which their simpler taste can do without. I should starve at their primitive banquet. My appetites are too high for the salads which (according to Evelyn) Eve dressed for the angel, my gusto too excited

To sit a guest with Daniel at his pulse: The indirect answers which Quakers are often found to return to a question put to them may be explained, I think, without the vulgar assumption, that they are more given to evasion and equivocating than other people. They naturally look to their words more carefully, and are more cautious of committing themselves. They have a peculiar character to keep up on this head. They stand in a manner upon their veracity. A Quaker is by law exempted from taking an oath. The custom of resorting to an oath in extreme cases, sanctified as it is by all religious antiquity, is apt (it must be confessed) to introduce into the laxer sort of minds the notion of two kinds of truth — the one applicable to the solemn affairs of justice, and the other to the common proceedings of daily intercourse. As truth bound upon the conscience by an oath can be but truth, so in the common affirmations of the shop and the market-place a latitude is expected, and conceded upon questions wanting this solemn covenant. Something less than truth satisfies. It is common to hear a person say, "You do not expect me to speak as if I were upon my oath." Hence a great deal of incorrectness and inadvertency, short of falsehood, creeps into ordinary conversation; and a kind of secondary or laic-truth is tolerated, where clergy-truth — oath-truth, by the nature of the circumstances, is not required. A Quaker knows none of this distinction. His simple affirmation being received, upon the most sacred occasions, without any further test, stamps a value upon the words which he is to use upon the most indifferent topics of life. He looks to them, naturally, with more severity. You can have of him no more than his word. He knows, if he is caught tripping in a casual expression, he forfeits, for himself, at least, his claim to the invidious exemption. He knows that his syllables are weighed — and how far a consciousness of this particular watchfulness, exerted against a person, has a tendency to produce indirect answers, and a diverting of the question by honest means, might be illustrated, and the practice justified, by a more sacred example than is proper to be adduced upon this occasion. The admirable presence of mind, which is notorious in Quakers upon all contingencies, might be traced to this imposed self-watchfulness — if it did not seem rather an humble and secular scion of that old stock of religious constancy, which never bent or faltered, in

the Primitive Friends, or gave way to the winds of persecution, to the violence of judge or accuser, under trials and racking examinations, "You will never be the wiser, if I sit here answering your questions till midnight," said one of those upright Justicers to Penn, who had been putting law-cases with a puzzling subtlety. "Thereafter as the answers may be," retorted the Quaker. The astonishing composure of this people is sometimes ludicrously displayed in lighter instances. — I was travelling in a stagecoach with three male Quakers, buttoned up in the straitest non-conformity of their sect. We stopped to bait at Andover, where a meal, partly tea apparatus, partly supper; was sat before us. My friends confined themselves to the tea-table. I in my way took supper. When the landlady brought in the bill, the eldest of my companions discovered that she had charged for both meals. This was resisted. Mine hostess was very clamorous and positive. Some mild arguments were used on the part of the Quakers, for which the heated mind of the good lady seemed by no means a fit recipient. The guard came in with his usual peremptory notice. The Quakers pulled out their money, and formally tendered it — so much for tea — I, in humble imitation, tendering mine — for the supper which I had taken. She would not relax in her demand. So they all three quietly put up their silver as did myself, and marched out of the room, the eldest and gravest going first, with myself closing up the rear, who thought I could not do better than follow the example of such grave and warrantable personages. We got in. The steps went up. The coach drove off. The murmurs of mine hostess, not very indistinctly or ambiguously pronounced, became after a time inaudible — and now my conscience, which the whimsical scene had for a while suspended, beginning to give some twitches, I waited, in the hope that some justification would be offered by these serious persons for the seeming injustice of their conduct. To my great surprise, not a syllable was dropped on the subject. They sate as mute as at a meeting. At length the eldest of them broke silence, by inquiring of his next neighbour, "Hast thee heard how indigos go at the India House?" and the question operated as a soporific on my moral feeling as far as Exeter.

SUMMARY

Lamb's disapproves of the attitude of indiscriminate sympathy, which Sir Thomas Browne professed to have towards all things and all nationalities. Sir Thomas Browne lived among abstract ideas; but Lamb is earth-bound and fettered to the scene of his activities. Lamb has an acute perception of the differences between things as also between persons. Everything for Lamb is a matter of taste or distaste. He is non-committal towards nothing. His attitude towards things and persons is either one of approval or disapproval. He calls himself a bundle of prejudices; he is made up of liking and disliking. He is the salve of sympathies, apathies and antipathies.

Lamb has an aversion for Scotchman. The mind of an anti-Caledonian is suggestive rather than comprehensive. An anti-Caledonian does not insist upon the whole truth. He is satisfied with fragments and scattered pieces of truth. He is not a systematizer. He does not wait for a proposition to mature in his mind before speaking about it. But the mind of a Caledonian or a Scotchman is just the opposite. A Scotchman does not believe in surmises, guesses, half-truths, partial truths, or dim instincts. His mind is made up about things. He believes either in the affirmative or in the negative without borderland between the two. His taste never fluctuates. His morality is fixed. He knows no compromise between right and wrong. Scotchmen, says Lamb, are tedious and tiresome. A true Scot cannot even tolerate your admiration of any Scottish writer because he believes that only Scotchmen can truly understand Scottish authors.

Nor does Lamb feel attracted towards Jews whom he calls "a piece of stubborn antiquity". The differences between Jews and Christians are so long-standing and so hardened that there can be no understanding between them. Lamb can tolerate a Jew only on the Stock Exchange. He thinks that all the fraternizing between Jews and Christians is hypocritical and unnatural. Either the Jews should be converted to Christianity or they should keep away from Christians. He cannot understand "Jews Christianizing" or "Christians Judaizing". Jews are no doubt an intelligent race but their intelligence is devoted exclusively to moneymaking. Jewish women are certainly pretty but they can be dangerous.

Lamb feels quite sympathetic towards the Negroes. The Negro countenance is indicative of a generous nature. Negroes have rightly been called "images of God cut in ebony". But the black complexion of Negroes prevents Lamb from mixing with them or eating at the same table with them. Thus, their black complexion is one of his aversions.

Lamb loves Quaker ways, Quaker principles, and Quaker worship. When he is agitated, the sight or voice of a Quaker acts as a tranquillizer upon him. But he does not like Quakers to the extent of being able to live with them. He is fond of books, pictures, theatres, chit-chat, scandals, jokes etc., while Quakers disapprove of all these things. Besides, Quakers are in habit of either giving ambiguous answers to questions that are put to them or evading those questions. A Quaker cannot commit himself, because he is supposed always to tell the truth. A Quaker is by law exempted from taking an oath. In the daily intercourse of our lives, we have sometimes to be satisfied with partially correct statements and sometimes even with false statements. We cannot always speak as if we were upon an oath. How much truth we speak or hear often depends upon the circumstances of a case. But a

Quaker is too rigid and does not understand the need of this flexibility. He, therefore, attaches too much importance to every word that he speaks so that he may not stray from the truth. A Quaker has an admirable presence of mind, which is no doubt to be attributed to this self-watchfulness on his part. To illustrate the astonishing composure of Quakers, Lamb narrates an incident of how three Quakers with whom he had been travelling struck to their own position in paying the bill at a wayside inn and remained utterly unperturbed by the protestations of the landlady.

VALENTINES DAY

Hail to thy returning festival, old Bishop Valentine! Great is thy name in the rubric, thou venerable Arch-flamen of Hymen! Immortal Go-between! who and what manner of person art thou? Art thou but a name, typifying the restless principle which impels poor humans to seek perfection in union? or wert thou indeed a mortal prelate. With thy tippet and thy rochet, thy apron on, and decent lawn sleeves? Mysterious personage! like unto thee, assuredly, there is no other mitred father in the calendar; not Jerome, nor Ambrose, nor Cyril; nor the consigner of undipt infants to eternal torments, Austin, whom all mothers hate; nor who hated all mothers, Origen; nor Bishop Bull, nor Archbishop Parker, nor Whitgift. Thou comest attended with thousands and ten thousands of little Loves, and the air is Brush'd with the hiss of rustling wings. Singing Cupids are thy choristers and thy precentors; and instead of the crosier, the mystical arrow is borne before thee.

In other words, this is the day on which those charming little missives, ycleped Valentines, cross and intercross each other at every street and turning. The weary and all for-spent twopenny postman sinks beneath a load of delicate embarrassments, not his own. It is scarcely credible to what an extent this ephemeral courtship is carried on in this loving town, to the great enrichment of porters, and detriment of knockers and bell-wires. In these little visual interpretations, no emblem is so common as the heart, — that little three-cornered exponent of all our hopes and fears, — the bestuck and bleeding heart; it is twisted and tortured into more allegories and affectations than an opera hat. What authority we have in history or mythology for placing the headquarters and metropolis of God Cupid in this anatomical seat rather than in any other, is not very clear; but we have got it, and it will serve as well as any other. Else we might easily imagine, upon some other system which might have prevailed for any thing which our pathology knows to the contrary, a lover addressing his mistress, in perfect simplicity of feeling, "Madam, my liver and fortune are entirely

at your disposal;" or putting a delicate question, "Amanda, have you a midriff to bestow?" But custom has settled these things, and awarded the seat of sentiment to the aforesaid triangle, while its less fortunate neighbours- wait at animal and anatomical distance.

Not many sounds in life, and I include all urban and all rural sounds, exceed in interest a knock at the door. It "gives a very echo to the throne where' Hope is seated," But its issues seldom, answer to this oracle within. It is so seldom that just the person we want to see comes. But of all the clamorous visitations the welcomest in expectation is the sound that ushers in, or seems to usher in, a Valentine. As the raven himself was hoarse that announced the fatal entrance of Duncan, so the knock of the postman on this day is light, airy, confident, -and befitting one that bringeth good tidings. It is less mechanical than on other days; you will say, "That is not the post, I am sure." Visions of Love, of Cupids, of Hymens — delightful eternal common-places, which "having been will always be" which no school-boy nor schoolman can write away; having your irreversible throne in the fancy and affections - what are your transports, when the happy maiden, opening with careful finger, careful not to break the emblematic seal, bursts upon the sight of some well-designed allegory, some type, some youthful fancy, not without verses—

Lovers all, A madrigal, or some such device, not over abundant in sense — young over disclaims it, — and not quite silly — something between wind and water, a chorus where the sheep might almost join the Shepherd, as they did, or as I apprehend they did, in Arcadia. All Valentines are not foolish; and I shall not easily forget thine, my kind friend (if I may have leave to call you so) E. B. — E. B. lived opposite a young maiden, whom he had often seen, unseen, from his parlour window in C—e-street. She was all joyousness and innocence, and just of an age to enjoy receiving a Valentine, and just of a temper to bear the disappointment of missing one with good humour. E. B. is an artist of no common powers; in the fancy parts of designing, perhaps inferior to none; his name is known at the bottom of many a well executed vignette in the way of his profession, but no further; for E. B. is modest, and the world meets nobody half-way. E. B. meditated how he could repay this young maiden for many a favour which she had done him unknown; for when a kindly face greets us, though but passing by, and never knows us again, nor we it, we should feel it as an obligation; and E. B. did. This good artist set himself at work to please the damsel. It was just before Valentine's day three years since. He wrought, unseen and unsuspected, a wondrous work. We need not say it was on the finest gilt paper with borders — full, not of common hearts and

heartless allegory, but all the prettiest stories of love from Ovid, and older poets than Ovid (for E. B. is a scholar.) There was Pyramus and Thisbe, and be sure Dido was not forgot, nor Hero and Leander, and swans more than sang in Cayster, with mottos and fanciful devices, such as beseemed, — a work in short of magic. Iris dipt the woof. This on Valentine's eve he commended to the all-swallowing indiscriminate orifice—(O ignoble trust!) — of the common post; but the humble medium did its duty, and from his watchful stand, the — next morning, he saw the cheerful messenger knock, and by the precious charge delivered. He saw, unseen, the happy girl unfold the Valentine, dance about, clap her hands, as one after one the pretty emblems unfolded themselves. She danced about, not with light love, or foolish expectations, for she had no lover; or, if she had, none she knew that could have created those bright images, which delighted her. It was more like some fairy present; a God-send, as our familiarly pious ancestors termed a benefit received, where the benefactor was unknown. It would do her no harm. It would do her good for ever after. It is good to love the unknown. I only give this as a specimen of E. B. and his modest way of doing a concealed kindness.

Good-morrow to my Valentine, sings poor Ophelia; and no better wish, but with better auspices, we wish to all faithful lovers, who are not too wise to despise old legends, but are content to rank, themselves humble diocesans of old Bishop Valentine, and his true church.

THE PRAISE OF CHIMNEY SWEEPERS Essay

I like to meet a sweep — understand me — not a grown sweeper — old chimney-sweepers are by no means attractive — but one of those tender novices, blooming through their first negritude, the maternal washings not quite effaced from the cheek — such as come forth with the dawn, or somewhat earlier, with their little professional notes sounding like the peep peep of a young sparrow; or liker to the matin lark should I pronounce them, in their aerial ascents not seldom anticipating the sun-rise?

I have a kindly yearning towards these dim specks - - poor blots - innocent blacknesses -

I reverence these young Africans of our own growth — these almost clergy imps, who sport their cloth without assumption; and from their little pulpits (the tops of chimneys), in the nipping air of a December morning, preach a lesson of patience to mankind.

When a child, what a mysterious pleasure it was to witness their operation! to see a chit no bigger than one's-self enter, one knew not by what process, into what seemed the fauces Avernî — to pursue him in imagination, as he went sounding on through so many dark stifling caverns,—horrid shades --to shudder with the idea that "now, surely, he must be lost for ever!" —: to revive at hearing his feeble shout of discovered day-light.-- and then (O fulness of delight) running out of doors, to come just in time to see the sable phenomenon emerge in safety, the brandished weapon of his art victorious like some flag waved over a conquered citadel! I seem to remember having been told, that a bad sweep was once left in a stack with his brush, to indicate which way the wind blew. It was an awful spectacle certainly; not much Unlike the old stage direction in Macbeth, where the "Apparition of a child crowned with a tree in his hand rises."

Reader, if thou meetest one of these small gentry in thy early rambles, it is good to give him a penny. It is better to give him twopence. If it be starving weather, and to the proper troubles of his hard occupation, a pair of kibed heels (no unusual accompaniment) be superadded, the demand on thy humanity will surely rise to a tester.

There is a composition, the ground-work of which I have understood to be the sweet wood 'yclept sassafras'. This wood boiled down to a kind of tea, and tempered with an infusion of milk and sugar, hath to some tastes a delicacy beyond the China luxury. I know not how thy palate may relish it; for myself, with every deference to the judicious Mr. Read, who hath time out of mind kept open a shop (the only one he avers in London) for the vending of this "wholesome and pleasant beverage, on the south side of Fleet-street, as thou approachest Bridge-street — the only Salopian house. — I have never yet adventured to dip my own particular lip in a basin of his commended ingredient — a cautious premonition to the olfactories constantly whispering to me, that my stomach must infallibly, with all due courtesy, decline it. Yet I have seen palates, otherwise not uninstructed in dietetical elegances, sup it up with avidity.

I know not by what particular conformation of the organ it happens, but I have always found that this composition is surprisingly gratifying to the palate of a young chimney-sweeper — whether the oily particles (sassafras is slightly oleaginous) do attenuate and soften the fuliginous concretions, which are sometimes found (in dissections) to adhere to the roof of the mouth in these unfledged practitioners or whether Nature, sensible that she had mingled too much of bitter wood in the lot of these raw victims, caused to grow out of the earth her sassafras for a

sweet lenitive but so it is, that no possible taste or odour to the senses of a young chimney-sweeper can convey a delicate excitement comparable to this mixture. Being penniless, they will yet hang their black heads over the ascending steam, to gratify one sense if possible, seemingly no less pleased than those domestic animals — cats — when they purr over a new-found sprig of valerian. There is something more in these sympathies than philosophy can inculcate.

Now albeit Mr. Read boasteth, not without reason, that his is the only Salopion house; yet he it known to thee, reader — if thou art one who keepest what are called good hours, thou art haply ignorant of the fact - he hath a race of industrious imitators, who from stalls, and under open sky, dispense the same savoury mess to humbler customers, at that dead time of the dawn, when (as extremes meet) the rake, reeling home from his midnight cups, and the hard-handed artisan leaving his bed to resume the premature labours of the day, jostle, not unfrequently to the manifest disconcerting of the former, for the honours of the pavement. It is the time when, in summer, between the expired and the not yet relumined kitchen-fires, the kennels of our fair metropolis give forth their least satisfactory odours. The rake, who wisheth to dissipate his o'ernight vapours in more grateful coffee, curses the ungenial fume, as he passeth; but the artisan stops to taste, and blesses the fragrant breakfast.

This is Saloop - - the precocious herb-woman's darling — the delight of the early gardener, who transports his smoking cabbages by break of day from Hammersmith to Covent-garden's famed piazzas — the delight, and, oh I fear, too often the envy, of the unpennied sweep. Him shouldest thou haply encounter, with his dim visage pendent over the grateful steam, regale him with a sumptuous basin (it will cost thee but three halfpennies) and a slice of delicate bread and butter (an added halfpenny) --so may thy culinary fires, eased of the o'er-charged secretions from thy worse-placed hospitalities, curl up a lighter volume to the welkin — so may the descending soot never taint thy costly well-ingredienced soups — nor the odious cry, quick-reaching from street to street, of the fired chimney, invite the rattling engines from ten adjacent parishes, to disturb for a casual scintillation thy peace and pocket!

I am by nature extremely susceptible of street affronts; the jeers and taunts of the populace; the low-bred triumph they display over the casual trip, or splashed stocking, of a gentleman. Yet can I endure the jocularly of a young sweep with something more than forgiveness. In the last winter but one, pacing along Cheap-side with my accustomed precipitation when I walk westward, a treacherous slide brought me

upon my back in an instant. I scrambled up with pain and shame enough — yet outwardly trying to face it down, as if nothing had happened — when the roguish grin of one of these young wits encountered me. There he stood, pointing me out with his dusky finger to the mob, and to a poor woman (I suppose his mother) in particular, till the tears for the exquisiteness of the fun (so he thought it) worked themselves out at the corners of his poor red eyes, red from many a previous weeping, and soot-inflamed, yet twinkling through all with such a joy, snatched out of desolation, that Hogarth — but Hogarth has got him already (how could he miss him?) in the March to Finchley, grinning at the pye-man — there he stood, as he stands in the picture, irremovable, as if the jest was to fast for ever — with such a maximum of glee, and minimum of mischief, in his mirth — for the grin of a genuine sweep hath absolutely no malice in it — that I could have been content, if the honour of a gentleman might endure it, to have remained his butt and his mockery till midnight.

I am by theory obdurate to the seductiveness of what are called a fine set of teeth. Every pair of rosy lips (the ladies must pardon me) is a casket, presumably holding such jewels; but, methinks, they should take leave to "air" them as frugally as possible. The fine lady, or fine gentleman, who show me their teeth, show me bones. Yet must I confess, that from the mouth of a true sweep a display (even to ostentation) of those white and shining ossifications, strikes me as an agreeable anomaly in manners, and an allowable piece of foppery. It is, as when

A sable cloud

Turns forth her silver lining on the night.

It is like some remnant of gentry not quite extinct; a badge of better days; a hint of nobility — and, doubtless, under the obscuring darkness and double night of their forlorn disguise, oftentimes lurketh good blood, and gentle conditions, derived from lost ancestry, and a lapsed pedigree. The premature apprenticeships of these tender victims give but too much encouragement, I fear, to clandestine, and almost infantile abductions: the seeds of civility and true courtesy, so often discernible in these young grafts (not otherwise to be accounted for) plainly hint at some forced adoptions; many noble Rachels mourning for their children, even in our days, countenance the fact; the tales of fairy-spiriting may shadow a lamentable verity, and the recovery of the young Montague be but a solitary instance of good fortune, out of many 'irreparable and hopeless defiliations.

In one of the state-beds at Arundel castle, a few years since under a ducal canopy — (that seat of the Howards is an object of curiosity to j visitors, chiefly for its beds, in which the late duke was especially a connoisseur) encircled with curtains of delicatest crimson, with starry coronets inwoven — folded between a pair of sheets whiter and softer than the lap where Venus lulled Ascanius was discovered by chance, after all methods of search had failed, at noon-day, fast asleep, a lost chimney-sweeper. The little creature, having somehow confounded his passage among the intricacies of those lordly chimneys, by some unknown; aperture had alighted upon this magnificent chamber; and, tired with his tedious explorations, was unable to resist the delicious invitement to repose, which he there saw exhibited; so, creeping between the sheets very quietly, laid his black head upon the pillow, and slept, like a young Howard

Such is the account given to the visitors at the Castle. — But I cannot help seeming to perceive a confirmation of what I have just hinted at in this story. A high instinct was at work in the case, or I am mistaken. Is it probable that a poor child of that description, with whatever weariness he might be visited, would have ventured; under such a penalty, as he would be taught to expect, to uncover the sheets of a Duke's bed, and deliberately to lay himself down between them, when the rug, or the carpet, presented an obvious couch, still far above his pretension — is this probable, I would ask, if the great power of nature, which I contend for, had not been manifested within him, prompting to the adventure? Doubtless this young nobleman (for such my mind misgives me that he must be) was allured by some memory, not amounting to full consciousness, of his condition in infancy, when he was used to be lapt by his mother, or his nurse, in just such sheets as he there found, into which he was now but creeping back as into his proper incunabula, and resting-place. — By no other theory, than by this sentiment of a pre-existent state (as I may call it), can I explain a deed so venturous, and, indeed, any other system, so indecorous, in this tender, but unseasonable sleeper.

My pleasant friend Jem White was so impressed with a belief of metamorphoses like this frequently taking place, that in some sort to reverse the wrongs of fortune in these poor phangelings, he instituted an annual feast of chimney-sweepers, at which it was his pleasure to officiate as host and waiter. It was a solemn supper held in Sniithfield, upon the yearly return of the fair of St. Bartholomew. Cards were issued a week before to the master-sweeps in and about the metropolis, confining the invitation to their younger fry. Now and then an elderly stripling would get in among us, and be good-naturedly winked at; but

our main body were infantry. One unfortunate wight, indeed, who, relying upon his dusky suit, had intruded himself into our party, but by tokens was providentially discovered in time to be no chimney-sweeper (all is not soot which looks so), was quitted out of the presence with universal indignation, as not having on the wedding garment; but in general the greatest harmony prevailed. The place chosen was a convenient spot among the pens, at the north side of the fair, not so far distant as to be impervious to the agreeable hub-hub of that vanity; but remote enough not to be obvious to the interruption of every gaping spectator in it. The guests assembled about seven. In those little temporary parlours three tables were spread with napery, not so fine as substantial, and at every board a comely hostess presided with her pan of hissing sausages. The nostrils of the young rogues dilated at the savour. James White, as head waiter, had charge of the first table; and myself, with our trusty companion Bigod, ordinarily ministered to the other two. There was clambering and jostling, you may be sure, who should get at the first table — for Rochester in his maddest days could not have done the humours of the scene with more spirit than my friend. After some general expression of thanks for the honour the company had done him, his inaugural ceremony was to clasp the greasy waist of old dame Ursula (the fattest of the three), that stood frying and fretting, half-blessing, half-cursing "the gentleman," and imprint upon her chaste lips a tender salute, whereat the universal host would set up a shout that tore the concave, while hundreds of grinning teeth startled the night with their brightness. O it was a pleasure to see the sable youngers lick in the unctuous meat, with his more unctuous sayings — how he would fit the tit bits to the puny mouths, reserving the lengthier links for the seniors — how he would intercept a morsel even in the jaws of some young desperado, declaring it "must to the pan again to be browned, for it was not fit for a gentleman's eating" — how he would recommend this slice of white bread, or that piece of kissing-crust, to a tender juvenile, advising them all to have a care of cracking their teeth, which were their best patrimony, how genteelly he would deal about the small ale, as if it were wine, naming the brewer, and protesting, if it were not good, he should lose their custom; with a special recommendation to wipe the lip before drinking. Then we had our toasts — "The King," — the "Cloth," — which, whether they understood or not, was equally diverting and flattering; — and for a crowning sentiment, which never failed, "May the Brush supersede the Laurel!" All these, and fifty other fancies, which were rather felt than comprehended by his guests, would he utter, standing upon tables, and prefacing every sentiment with a "Gentlemen, give me leave to propose so and so," which was a prodigious comfort to those young orphans;

every now and then stuffing into his mouth (for it did not do to be squeamish on these occasions) indiscriminate pieces of those reeking sausages, which pleased them mightily, and was the savouriest part, you may believe, of the entertainment.

Golden lads and lasses must,

As chimney-sweepers, come to dust -

James White is extinct, and with him these suppers have long ceased. He carried away with him half the fun of the world when he died — of my world at least. His old clients look for him among the pens; and, missing him, reproach the altered feast of St. Bartholomew, and the glory of Smithfield departed for ever.

Summary

Lamb tells us that he feels attracted towards young chimneysweepers-whose cry of "sweep, sweep" at dawn reminds him of the chirping off sparrows. He describes chimneysweepers as "dim specks", "poor blots", "innocent blacknesses", etc. The work of chimneysweepers, says Lamb, demands a lot of patience. As a child, Lamb used greatly to marvel at the manner in which a young chimneysweeper would enter the chimney from below and climb higher and higher, brushing its walls, till he emerged at the top.

Lamb urges his readers to give a penny or two pence to a young chimneysweeper if they happen to meet one, because a boy of this category surely deserves of that much charity.

Lamb then goes on to describe a concoction, which is prepared from a kind of sweet wood called "sassafras". This sassafras tea, or "salop" as it is called, is a favourite beverage with chimneysweepers. Lamb himself has never tasted it because of its unsavoury smell, but there is some quality of this concoction that makes it very palatable to young chimneysweepers. They find it as gratifying to their senses of smell and taste as a spring of valerian is to cats. A man called Mr. Read keeps a shop on the south side of Fleet Street where he sells this "wholesome and pleasant beverage". But Mr. Read has his imitators who sell the same concoction from their stalls in the early hours of the morning to artisans setting forth to commence the labours of the day. Let the reader, says Lamb, offer a basin of this drink to a chimneysweeper. The chimneysweeper will work the better for this hospitality and will clean his benefactor's chimney so well that it will never catch fire from a casual spark. The reader's hospitality, says Lamb, will thus be well rewarded and may save him the expense of

having to call fire engine in the event of the accumulated thick soot inside his chimney catching fire.

Lamb says that, although he cannot tolerate the jeers and ridicule of a street crowd, he does not mind a young chimneysweeper jeering and laughing at him. Once, in the course of a walk, Lamb slipped and fell on his back in a street. A roguish young chimneysweeper, seeing him in that condition, laughed and laughed till the tears flowed from his eyes. But Lamb did not feel offended in the least. Indeed, he felt happy that he had provided so much fun to a young chimneysweeper. After all, there is not the least malice in a young chimneysweeper's laughter.

Lamb does not like young women to make a display of their beautiful white teeth. But the sight of a young chimneysweeper displaying his white and shining teeth is welcome to him. A black and sooty figure showing a set of white teeth looks an attractive sight.

Lamb then goes on to say that, not all the chimneysweepers are lowborn. Some of them were born in high, aristocratic families and were kidnapped from their palatial homes in their infancy. Lamb tells the story of how once a young chimneysweeper was found fast asleep in a luxurious bed in an aristocratic mansion. Obviously, this boy, feeling exhausted after his sweeping of that mansion, had crept into this bed and fallen asleep. But, says Lamb, no lowborn chimneysweeper could have ever dared to lie down on a lordly bed. The only possible explanation of that conduct of this young boy was that, having aristocratic blood in his veins, he was promoted by some natural instinct to get into that aristocratic bed. This boy must have been the son of an aristocratic family and in his early childhood, have been kidnapped from his home.

A BACHELOR COMPLAINT ON THE BEHAV-IQUR OF THE MARRIED PEOPLE

Essay

As a single man, I have spent a good deal of my time in noting down the infirmities of Married People, to console myself for those superior pleasures, which they tell me I have lost by remaining as I am.

I cannot say that the quarrels of men and their wives ever made any great impression upon me, or had much tendency to strengthen me in those anti-social resolutions, which I took up long ago upon more substantial considerations. What oftenest offends me at the houses of

married persons where I visit, is an error of quite a different description; — it is that they are too loving.

Not too loving neither: that does not explain my meaning. Besides, why should that offend me? The very act of separating themselves from the rest of the world, to have the ruller enjoyment of each other's society, implies that they prefer one another to all the world.

But what I complain of is, that they carry this preference so undisguisedly, they perk it up in the faces of us single people so shamelessly, you cannot be in their company a moment without being made to feel, by some indirect hint or open avowal, that you are not the object of this preference. Now there are some things which give no offence, while implied or taken for granted merely; but expressed, there is much offence in them. If a man were to accost the first homely-featured or plain-dressed young woman of his acquaintance, and tell her bluntly, that she was not handsome or rich enough for him, and he could not marry her, he would deserve to be kicked for his ill manners; yet no less is implied in the fact, that having access and opportunity of putting the question to her, he has never yet thought fit to do it. The young woman understands this as clearly as if it were put into words; but no reasonable young woman would think of making this the ground of a quarrel. Just as little right have a married couple to tell me by speeches, and looks that are scarce less plain than speeches, that I am not the happy man, the lady's choice. It is enough that I know I am not: I do not want this perpetual reminding.

The display of superior knowledge or riches may be made sufficiently mortifying; but these admit of a palliative. The knowledge which is brought out to insult me, may accidentally improve me; and in the rich man's houses and pictures, — his parks and gardens, I have a temporary usufruct at least. But the display of married happiness has none of these palliatives: it is throughout pure, unrecompensed, unqualified insult.

Marriage by its best title is a monopoly, and not of the least invidious sort. It is the cunning of most possessors of any exclusive privilege to keep their advantage as much out of sight as possible, that their less favoured neighbours, seeing little of the benefit, may the less be disposed to question the right. But these married monopolists thrust the most obnoxious part of their patent into our faces.

Nothing is to me more distasteful than that entire complacency and satisfaction which beam in the countenances of a new-married couple, - in that of the lady particularly: it tells you, that her lot is disposed of in

this world: that you can have no hopes of her. It is true, I have none; nor wishes either, perhaps: but this is one of those truths which ought, as I said before, to be taken for granted, not expressed.

The excessive airs which those people give themselves, founded on the ignorance of us unmarried people, would be more offensive if they were less irrational. We will allow them to understand the mysteries belonging to their own craft better than we who have not had the happiness to be made free of the company: but their arrogance is not content within these limits. If a single person presume to offer his opinion in their presence, though upon the most indifferent subject, he is immediately silenced as an incompetent person. Nay, a young married lady of my acquaintance, who, the best of the Je'st was, had not changed her condition above a fortnight before, in a question on which I had the misfortune to differ from her, respecting the properest mode of breeding oysters for the London market, had the assurance to ask with a sneer, how such an old Bachelor as I could pretend to know any thing about such matters.

But what I have spoken of hitherto is nothing to the airs which these creatures give themselves when they come, as they generally do, to have children. When I consider how little of a rarity children are, — that every street and blind alley swarms with them, — that the poorest people commonly have them in most abundance, — that there are few marriages that are not blest with at least one of these bargains, — how often they turn out ill, and defeat the fond hopes of their parents, taking to vicious courses, which end in poverty, disgrace, the gallows, and c. — I cannot for my life tell what cause for pride there can possibly be in having them. If they were young phoenixes, indeed, that were born but one in a year, there might be a pretext. But when they are so common -

I do not advert to the insolent merit which they assume with their husbands on these occasions. Let them look to that. But why we, who are not their natural-born subjects, should be expected to bring our spices, myrrh, and incense, — our tribute and homage of admiration, — I do not see.

"Like as the arrows in the hand of the giant, even so are the young children:" so says the excellent office in our Prayer-book appointed for the churching of women. "Happy is the man that hath his quiver full of them:" So say I; but then don't let him discharge his quiver upon us that are weaponless;—let them be arrows, but not to gall and stick us. I have generally observed that these arrows are double-headed: they have two forks, to be sure to hit with one or the other. As for instance, when you come into a house which is full of children, if you happen to take

no notice of them (you are thinking of something else, perhaps, and turn a deaf ear to their innocent caresses), you are set down as untractable, morose, a hater of children. On the other hand, if you find them more than usually engaging, if you are taken with their pretty manners, and set about in earnest to romp and play with them, some pretext or other is sure to be found for sending them out of the room: they are too noisy or boisterous, or Mr. — does not like children. With one or other of these forks the arrow is sure to hit you.

I could forgive their jealousy, and dispense with toying with their brats, if it gives them any pain; but I think it unreasonable to be called upon to love them, where I see no occasion, — to love a whole family, perhaps, eight, nine, or ten, indiscriminately, to love all the pretty dears, because children are so engaging.

I know there is a proverb, "Love me, love my dog:" that is not always so very practicable, particularly if the dog be set upon you to tease you or snap at you in sport. But a dog or a lesser thing — any inanimate substance, as a keep-sake, a watch or a ring, a tree, or the place where we last parted when my friend went away upon a long absence, I can make shift to love, because I love him, and any thing that reminds me of him; provided it be in its nature indifferent, and apt to receive whatever hue fancy can give it. But children have a real character and an essential being of themselves: they are amiable or unamiable *per se*; I must love or hate them as I see cause for either in their qualities. A child's nature is too serious a thing to admit of its being regarded as a mere appendage to another being, and to be loved or hated accordingly: they stand will me upon their own stock, as much as men and women do. O! but you will say, sure it is, an attractive age, there is something in the tender year of infancy that 'of itself charms Us. That is the very reason why I am more nice about them. I know that a sweet child is the sweetest thing in nature, not even excepting the delicate creatures which bear them; but the prettier the kind of a thing is, the more desirable it is that it should be pretty of its kind. One daisy differs not much from another in glory; but a violet should look and smell the daintiest. — I was always rather squeamish in my women and children.

But this is not the worst: one must be admitted into their familiarity at least, before they can complain of inattention. It implies visits, and some kind of intercourse. But if the husband be a man with whom you have lived on a friendly footing before marriage, if you did not come in on the wife's side, - - if you did not sneak into the house in her train, but were an old friend in fast habits of intimacy before their courtship

was-so much as thought on, — look about you — your tenure is precarious — before a twelve-month shall roll over your head, you shall find your old friend gradually grow cool and altered towards you, and at last seek opportunities of breaking with you. I have scarce a married friend of my acquaintance, upon whose firm faith I can rely, whose friendship did not commence after the period of his marriage. With some limitations they can endure that; but that the good man should have dared to enter into a solemn league of friendship in which they were not consulted, though it happened before they knew him, — before they that are now are man and wife ever met, — this is intolerable to them. Every long friendship, every old authentic intimacy, must be brought into their office to be new stamped with their currency, as a sovereign Prince calls in the good old money that was coined in some reign before he was born or thought of, to be new marked and minted with the stamp of his authority, before he will let it pass current in the world. You may guess what luck generally befalls such a rusty piece of metal as I am in these new mintings.

Innumerable are the ways which they take to insult and worm you out of their husband's confidence. Laughing at all you say with a kind of wonder, as if you were a queer kind of fellow that said good things, but an oddity, is one of the ways — they have a particular kind of stare for the purpose — till at last the husband, who used to defer to your judgment, and would pass over some excrescences of understanding and manner for the sake of a general vein of observation (not quite vulgar) which he perceived in you, begins to suspect whether you are altogether a humorist, — a fellow well enough to have consorted with in his bachelor days, but not quite so proper to be introduced to ladies. This may be called the staring way; and is that which has oftenest been put in practice against me.

Then there is the exaggerating way, or the way of irony: that is, where they find you an object of especial regard with their husband, who is not so easily to be shaken from the lasting attachment founded on esteem which he has conceived towards you; by never-qualified exaggerations to cry up all that you say or do, till the good man, who understands well enough that it is all done in compliment to him, grows weary of the debt of gratitude which is due to so much candor, and by relaxing a little on his part, and taking down a peg or two in his enthusiasm, sinks at length to that kindly level of moderate esteem, — that "decent affection and complacent kindness" towards you, where she herself can join in sympathy with him without much stretch and violence to her sincerity.

Another way (for the ways they have to accomplish so desirable a purpose are infinite) is, with a kind of innocent simplicity, continually to mistake what it was which first made their husband fond of you. If an esteem for something excellent in your moral character was that which riveted the chain which she is to break, upon any imaginary discovery of a want of poignancy in your conversation, she will cry, "I thought, my dear, you described your friend, Mr. — as a great wit." If, on the other hand, it was for some supposed charm in your conversation that he first grew to like you, and was content for this to overlook some trifling irregularities in your moral deportment, upon the first notice of any of these she as readily exclaims, "This, my dear, is your good Mr. ———." One good lady whom I took the liberty of expostulating with for not showing me quite so much respect as I thought due to her husband's old friend, had the candour to confess to me that she had often heard Mr. — speak of me before marriage, and that she had conceived a great desire to be acquainted with me, but that the sight of me had very much disappointed her expectations; for from her husband's representations of me, she had formed a notion that she was to see a fine, tall, officer-like looking man (I use her very words); the very reverse of which proved to be the truth. This was candid; and I had the civility not to ask her in return, how she came to pitch upon a standard of personal accomplishments for her husband's friends which differed so much from his own; for my friend's dimensions as near as possible approximate to mine; he standing five feet five in his shoes, in which I have the advantage of him by about half an inch; and he no more than myself exhibiting any indications of a martial character in his air or countenance.

These are some of the mortifications which I have encountered in the absurd attempt to visit at their houses. To enumerate them all would be a vain endeavour: I shall therefore just glance at the very common impropriety of which married ladies are guilty, of treating us as if we were their husbands, and vice versa — I mean, when they use us with familiarity, and their husbands with ceremony. Testacea, for instance, kept me the other night two or three hours beyond my usual time of supping, while she was fretting because Mr. — did not come home, till the oysters were all spoiled, rather than she would be guilty of the impoliteness of touching one in his absence. This was reversing the point of good manners: for ceremony is an invention to take off the uneasy feeling which we derive from knowing ourselves to be less the object of love and esteem with a fellow-creature than some other person is. It endeavors to make up by superior attentions in little points, for that invidious preference which it is forced to deny in the greater. Had Testacea kept the oysters back for me, and withstood her husband's importunities to go to supper, she would have acted according to the

strict rules of propriety. I know no ceremony that ladies are bound to observe to their husbands, beyond the point of a modest behaviour and decorum: therefore I must protest against the vicarious gluttony of Cerasia, who at her own table sent away a dish of Morellas, which I was applying to with great good will, to her husband at the other end of the table, and recommended a plate of less extraordinary goose-berries to my unwedded palate in their stead. Neither can I excuse the wanton affront of :

But I am weary of stringing up all my married acquaintance by Roman denominations. Let them amend and change their manners, or I promise to record the full-length English of their names, to the terror of all such desperate offenders in future.

Summary

As a confirmed bachelor, Lamb has discovered a number of weaknesses in married people and has therefore found much consolation in his state of bachelorhood. It is not the quarrels of husbands and wives that console him for having remained unmarried. What offends him at the houses of married persons is that they are too living. He has found that a husband and a wife constantly try to produce the impression that they are very fond of each other. This display of married happiness is an insult to a bachelor. If a man enjoys some monopoly, he should keep it as much out of sight as possible so that others may not question his right to the monopoly. But married people go out of their way to make bachelors conscious of the monopoly of marriage which they enjoy. Their air of complete satisfaction which a newly married couple wear on their faces is especially offensive to Lamb.

Married people often put on an expression of exaggerated self-importance. They regard bachelors as ignorant and incompetent persons. A young married lady once mocked at Lamb because he happened to offer an opinion about the most appropriate method of breeding oysters for the London market. She seemed to think that a bachelor could not be expected to have any knowledge of such matters.

Lamb does not understand why married people should be excessively proud of their children. After all, children are not a rarity. In fact, the poorest people have the large number of children. Besides, children often go wrong and prove to be a cause of much disappointment to their parents. Married people's are still less justified in expecting a bachelor to show a fond attention to their children. Why should a bachelor shower his affection on children? Yet, in this matter, there is a contradiction in the behaviour of married people. If a bachelor shows too much interest in children, their parents quickly, send them out of the room. A bachelor, therefore, finds himself on the horns of dilemma in dealing with children. Should

he, or should he not, adopt a loving attitude towards children? If he should, what is to be the degree of affection with which he ought to treat them? In any case, it is unfair on the part of the married couple to expect a bachelor to show affection to all their eight, nine, or ten children. There is certainly a proverb: "Love me, love my dog". But while it is possible to love a friend's dog or any other article that reminds a man of his friend, it may not be possible always to love a friend's children because children have a separate existence of their individual natures and temperaments. Lamb says that it has never been possible for him to feel affection for women and children indiscriminately.

Very soon after getting married, a man tends to become indifferent to a bachelor friend no matter how long was the duration of friendship before the marriage. No wife can tolerate her husband's bachelor friend if the friendship dates back to her pre-marriage days. No matter how long a man had been friendly with her husband before her marriage, she will so manage that her husband will become cool long before and distant towards him.

Women adopt different ways to bring to an end the friendship between their husbands and the bachelors with whom they may have had intimate relations before marriage. A wife may laugh with a kind of wonder at everything that her husband's bachelor friend may say. By her laughter, she may produce the impression that her husband's friend is an oddity or a humorist, not fit to be introduced to women. On the other hand, a wife may keep exaggerating the particular qualities of her husband's friend in such way that the husband's enthusiasm on the part of a wife. Another technique employed by a wife is to ask with a kind of innocent towards him and became the basis of the friendship. By this method, a wife tries to make her husband feel that he was mistaken in his assessment of his friend's qualities.

Bachelors invariably receive degrading treatment from married women. There was the case of a wife who kept Lamb, an invited guest, waiting for several hours for dinner because her husband had been detained somewhere. This lady should have been considerate enough to serve dinner to Lamb if the husband had been detained for two or three hours beyond the usual hour of dinner. Then there was the case of a lady who passed on an excellent dish of Morella's to her husband and recommended a less savoury dish of gooseberries to Lamb who was guest at the house. Lamb protests against such discourteous treatment from wives and threatens to disclose their names if they do not amend and improve their manners in future. A wife ought to be informal with her husband, but she ought to show a formal politeness to her husband's friends.

SUMMARY

In the first years of the 19th century Lamb began his fruitful literary cooperation with his sister Mary. Together they wrote at least three books for William Godwin's *Juvenile Library*. The most successful of these was of course

Tales from Shakespeare which ran through two editions for Godwin and has now been published dozens of time in countless editions, many of them illustrated. Lamb also contributed a footnote to Shakespearean studies at this time with his essay "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare," in which he argues that Shakespeare should be read rather than performed in order gain the proper effect of his dramatic genius. Beside contributing to Shakespeare studies with his book *Tales From Shakespeare*, Lamb also contributed to the popularization of Shakespeare's contemporaries with his book *Specimens of the English Dramatic Poets Who Lived About the Time of Shakespeare*.

Although he did not write his first Elia essay until 1820, Lamb's gradual perfection of the essay form for which he eventually became famous began as early 1802 in a series of open letters to Leigh Hunt's *Reflector*. The most famous of these is called "The Londoner" in which Lamb famously derides the contemporary fascination with nature and the countryside.

KEY WORDS

1. **The Latymer School** : The Latymer School, a grammar school in Edmonton, a suburb of London.
2. **The Londoner** : One of the most famous series of open letters to Leigh Hunt's *Reflector* by Charles Lamb.
3. **Sassafras** : The concoction, which is prepared from a kind of sweet wood called "sassafras".
4. **Empedocles** : Empedocles, the philosopher, who jumped into the crater of Mt. Etna in order to know what was at the bottom of it.
5. **Images of God cut in ebony**: Negroes have rightly been called "images of God cut in ebony".

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Analyse the Charles Lamb's essay, "Oxford in the Vacation".
2. Write down the summary of the essay, "Valentines Day".
3. Describe the themes explained by Lamb in his essay, "Imperfect Synthesis".
4. Explain the motive and ideas of a bachelor in Lamb's, "A Bachelor complaint on the behaviour of married people".
5. Discuss the setting employed by Lamb in his essay, "All fools day".
6. To whom does the pseudonym 'Elia' refer to?
7. Write about the red-letter days of Lamb.
8. Write about Lamb's, "All fools Day".

9. How does Lamb describe the Chimney Sweepers?
10. Why did the young chimneysweeper laugh at Lamb?

FURTHER READINGS

1. Life of Charles Lamb — E.V. Lucas
2. Essays of Elia — Charles Lamb
3. Charles Lamb and the Lloyds — E.V. Lucas Smith
4. Charles Lamb; A Memoir — Barry Cornwall aka Bryan Procter
5. Charles Lamb — George Barnett

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ESSAYS OF A.G. GARDINER

STRUCTURE

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LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to understand :

1. The essays of A.G. Gardiner, such as:

- On saying please
- On courage
- All about a dog
- On catching the train

INTRODUCTION

Alfred George Gardiner (1865—1946) was a British journalist and author. His essays, written under the pen-name Alpha of the Harrow, are highly regarded. Gardiner was born in Chelmsford, the son of a cabinet-maker and alcoholic. As a boy he worked at the Chelmsford Annals and the Bourn mouth Directory. He joined the Northern Daily Telegraph in 1887. In 1899, he was appointed editor of the Blackburn Weekly Telegraph.

In 1902 Ritzema was named general manager of the Daily News. Needing an editor, he turned to his young apprentice to fill the role. The choice soon proved a great success; under Gardiner's direction, it became one of the leading liberal

journals its day, as he improved its coverage of both the news and literary matters while evangelism against social injustices. Yet while circulation rose from 80,000 when he joined the paper to 151,000 in 1907 and 400,000 with the introduction of a Manchester edition in 1909, the paper continued to run at a loss. Though close to the owner of the Daily News, George Cadbury, Gardiner resigned in 1919 over a disagreement with him over Gardiner's opposition to David Lloyd George.

From 1915 he contributed to the Star under the incognito Alpha of the Harrow. His essays are uniformly elegant, graceful and chuckle some. His uniqueness lay in his ability to teach the basic truths of life in an easy and jocular manner. The Pillars of Society, Pebbles on the Shore, Many Furrows and Leaves in the Wind are some of his best known writings.

ON SAYING PLEASE

The young lift-man in a City office that threw a passenger out of his lift the other morning and was fined for the felony was undoubtedly in the wrong. It was a question of 'Please'. The complainant entering the lift, said, 'Top'. The lift-man demanded 'Top-please' and this franchise being refused he not only declined to comply with the instruction, but flung the passenger out of the lift. This, of course was carrying a comment on manner too far. Discourtesy is not a legal felony, and it does not excuse smack and battery. If a burglar breaks into my house and I knock him down, the law will acquit me, and if I am physically smacked, it will permit me to reciprocate with reasonable violence. It does this because the burglar and my assailant have broken quite definite commands of the law, but no legal system could attempt to legislate against bad manners, or could determent the use of violence against something which it does not itself recognize as a legally punishable felony. And whatever our sympathy with the lift-man, we must admit that the law is reasonable. It would never do if we were at liberty to box people's ears because we did not like their behaviour, or the tone of their voices, or the scowl on their faces. Our fists would never be idle, and the gutters of the City would run with blood all day. I may be as uncivil as I may please and the law will protect me against violent retaliation. I may be haughty or boorish and there is no penalty to pay except the penalty of being written down an ill-mannered fellow. The law does not compel me to say 'please' or to attune my voice to other people's sensibilities any more than it says that I shall not wax my moustache or dye my hair or wear ringlets down my back. It does not recognize the laceration of our feelings as a case for compensation. There is no allowance for moral and intellectual damages in these matters.

This does not mean that the damages are trivial. It is probable that the lift-man was much more acutely hurt by what he regarded as a slur upon his social standing than he would have been if he had a kick on the shins, for which he could have got a legal redress. The pain of a kick on the

crus soon passes away but the pain of a wound to our self-respect or our narcissi may poison a whole day. I can imagine that lift-man, repudiated the relief of throwing the author of his laceration out of the lift, incubating over the insult by the hour, and visiting it on his wife in the evening as the only way of restoring his equipoise. For there are few things more catching than bad temper and bad manners. When Sir Anthony Absolute bullied Captain Absolute, the latter went out and bullied his man, Fag, whereupon Fag went out downstairs and kicked the page-boy. Probably the man who said 'Top' to the lift man was really only getting back on his employer who had not said 'Good morning' to him because he himself had been nagged at breakfast by his wife, to whom the cook had been impertinent because the housemaid had 'answered her back'. We infect the world with our ill humours. Bad manners probably do more to poison the stream of the general life than all the crimes in the calendar. For one wife who gets a black eye from an otherwise good natured husband there are a hundred who live a life of torment under the shadow of a morose gloomy. But all the same the law cannot become the guardian of our private manners. No canon could cover the vast area of offences and no court could administer a law which governed our social civilities, our speech, the tilt of our eyebrows and all our moods and manners.

But though we are bound to affirm the adjudication against the lift-man most people will have certain sympathy with him. While it is true that there is "no law that compels us to say 'Please', there is a social practice much older and much more sacred than any law which admonishes us to be civil. And the first requirement of civility is that we should acknowledge a service. 'Please' and 'Thank you' are the small change with which we pay our way as social beings. They are the little courtesies by which we keep the machine of life oiled and running sweetly. They put our intercourse upon the basis of a friendly co-operation an easy give and take, instead of on the basis of superiors dictating to inferiors. It is a very tawdry mind that would wish to command where he can have the service for asking, and have it with willingness and good feeling instead of pique.

I should like to 'feature' in this connection my friend, the polite conductor. By this discriminating title, I do not intend to suggest a rebuke to conductors generally. On the contrary, I am disposed to think that there are few classes of men who come through the ordeal of a very trying calling better than bus conductors do. Here and there you will meet an unpleasant specimen who regards the passengers as his natural enemies—as creatures whose chief purpose on the bus is to cheat him, and who can only be kept reasonably honest by a loud voice and an belligerent manner. But this type is rare—rarer than it used to be. I fancy the public

owes much to the Underground Railway Company, which also runs the buses, for insisting on a certain standard of civility in its servants and taking care that standard is observed. In doing this it not only makes things pleasant for the travelling public, but performs an important social service.

It is not, therefore, with any feeling of unfriendliness to conductors as a class that I pay a acclaim to a particular member of that class. I first became conscious of his existence one day when I jumped on to a bus and found that I had left home without any money in my pocket. Everyone has had the experience and knows the feeling, the mixed feeling, which the discovery arouses. You are annoyed because you look like a fool at the best and like a wretch at the worst. You would not be at all surprised if the conductor eyed you coldly as much as to say, 'Yes I know that stale old trick. Now then, off you get.' And even if the conductor is a good fellow and lets you down easily, you are faced with the necessity of going back and the inconvenience, perhaps, of missing your train or your engagement.

Having searched my pockets in vain for vagrant coppers, and having found I was utterly penniless, I told the conductor with as honest a face as I could assume that I couldn't pay the fare, and must go back for money. 'Oh, you needn't get off: that's all right', said he. 'All right', said I, 'but I haven't a copper on me.' 'Oh I'll book you through, he replied. 'Where d'ye want to go?' and he handled his bundle of tickets with the air of a man who was prepared to give me a ticket for anywhere from the Bank to Hong Kong. I said it was very kind of him, and told him where I wanted to go, and as he gave me the ticket I said, 'But where shall I send the fare?' 'Oh, you'll see me some day all right', he said cheerfully, as he turned to go. And then, luckily, my fingers, still wandering in the corners of my pockets lighted on a shilling and the account was squared. But that fact did not lessen the glow of pleasure which so good-natured an action had given me.

A few days after, my most sensitive toe was trampled on rather heavily as I sat reading on the top of a bus. I looked up with some anger and more agony, and saw my friend of the cheerful countenance. 'Sorry, sir', he said. 'I know these are heavy boots. Got'em because my own feet get trod on so much, and now I'm treading on other people's. Hope I didn't hurt you, sir.' He had hurt me but he was so nice about it that I assured him he hadn't. After this I began to observe him whenever I boarded his bus, and found a curious pleasure in the constant good nature of his bearing. He seemed to have an inexhaustible fund of patience and a gift for making his passengers comfortable. I noticed that if it was raining he would run up the stairs to give some one the tip that there was 'room inside'. With old people he was as considerate as a son, and with children as solicitous as a father. He had evidently a peculiarly warm place in his heart for young people, and always indulged in some merry jest with them. If he had a blind man on board it wasn't enough to set him down safely on the pavement. He would call to Bill in front to wait while he took him across the road or round the corner or otherwise safely on his way. In short, I

found that he irradiated such an atmosphere of good temper and kindness that a journey with him was a lesson in natural courtesy and good manners.

What struck me particularly was the ease with which he got through his work. If bad manners are infectious, so also are good manners. If we encounter incivility most of us are apt to become uncivil, but it is an unusually uncouth person who can be disagreeable with sunny people. It is with manners as with the weather. 'Nothing clears up my spirits like a fine day', said Keats, and a cheerful person descends on even the gloomiest of us with something of the benediction of a fine day.

And so it was always fine weather on the polite conductor's bus, and his own civility, his conciliatory address and good humoured bearing infected his passengers. In lightening their spirits he lightened his own task. His gaiety was not a wasteful luxury, but a sound investment. I have missed him from my bus route of late; but I hope that only means that he has carried his sunshine on to another road. It cannot be too widely diffused in a rather drab world. And I make no apologies for writing a panegyric on an unknown bus conductor. If Wordsworth could gather lessons of wisdom from the poor leech gatherer 'on the lonely moor,' I see no reason why lesser people should not take lessons in conduct from one who shows how a very modest calling may be dignified by good temper and kindly feeling.

It is a matter of general agreement that the war has had a petrifying effects upon those little every day civilities of behaviour that sweeten the general air. We must get those civilities back if we are to make life kindly and endurable for each other. We cannot get them back by entreating the law. The policeman is a necessary symbol and the law is a necessary institution for a society that is still somewhat lower than the angels. But the law can only protect us against material attack. Nor will the lift man's way of meeting moral aspersion by physical violence help us to restore the civilities. I suggest to him, that he would have had a more subtle and effective revenge if he had treated the gentleman who would not say 'Please' with elaborate politeness. He would have had the victory, not only over the ruffian, but over himself, and that is the victory that counts. The polite man may lose the material advantage, but he always has the psychical victory. I commend to the lift-man a story of Chesterfield. In his time the London streets were without the asphalt of today and the man who 'took the wall' had the driest footing. 'I never give the wall to a reprobate,' said a man who met Chesterfield one day in the street. 'I always do', said Chesterfield, stepping with a bow into the road. I hope the lift man will agree that his revenge was much more sweet than if he had hurl the fellow into the mud.

On Saying Please - Summary

"Anyone can be heroic from time to time, but a gentleman is something which you have to be all the time. This isn't easy." It is a general notion that we everyday follow and accept the civil behavior, which not only sweetens the air but also generates a good social culture and harmony. Saying a cool morning to the people we meet and being courteous, saying please etc, makes us much more accepted in the social circle we move in.

In order to get noticed one has to generate a positive social outlook, making life kindly towards others and tolerable for each other. The little courtesies like 'Please' and 'Thank you' are important today as one can get the service from across the counters with much ease. On the same it is that we should be good modulated, civil and obliging and adroit in order to adduce willingness and good feeling instead of resentment;

Perhaps these little sweet words are the oils or we should say emollient which make life friendly, cooperative, easy give and take and always keep the machine of our life well oiled and running sweetly, without any hassles. Good Manners are of great value in human life. Bad manners are not a legal crime. But everybody dislikes a man with bad manners/ Small courtesies win us a lot of friends. Words like 'please' and 'thank you.' helps us in making our passage through life smooth. The law does not permit us to hit back if we are the victims of bad manners. But if we are threatened with physical violence, the law permits us some liberty of action. Bad manners create a chain reaction. Social practice demands politeness from us. A good mannered person will find that his banning becomes easier person will find that his work becomes easier by the ready cooperation that he gets from other.

ON COURAGE

I was asked the other day to send to a new magazine a statement as the event of the war, which had made the deepest impression on me. Without hesitation I selected the remarkable Christmas demonstrations in Flanders. Here were men who for weeks and months past had been engaged in the task of stalking each other and killing each other, and suddenly under the influence of a common memory, they disavow the whole veracity of war and declare the veracity of brotherhood. Next day they began killing each other again as the obedient instruments of governments they do not control and of motives they do not understand. But the fact remains. It is a strut of light in the darkness, rich in meaning and hope.

But if I were asked to name the instance of individual action which had most impressed me I should find the task more difficult. Should I select something that shows how war conscript, or something that shows how it exalts? If the latter I think I would choose that beautiful incident of the sailor on the Daunting.

He had won by ballot a place in one of the boats. The ship was going down, but he was to be saved. One pictures the scene: The boat is waiting to take him to the shore and safety. He looks at the old comrades who have lost in the ballot and who stand there doomed to death. He feels the passion for life surging within him. He sees the cold, dark sea waiting to swamp its victims. And in that great moment—the greatest moment that can come to any man—he makes the conquest choice. He turns to one of his comrades. "You've got parents," he says. "I haven't." And with that word—so heroic in its simplicity—he makes the other take his place in the boat and signs his own death warrant.

I see him on the deck among his doomed fellows, watching the disappearing boat until the final shove comes and all is over. The sea never took a braver man to its bosom. "Greater love prompted no man than this..."

Can you read that story without some ruckus within you—without feeling that humanity itself is ennobled by this great act and that you are, in some mysterious way, better for the deed? That is the splendid fruit of all such sublime sacrifice. It enriches the whole human family. It makes us lift our heads with pride that we are men—that there is in us at our best this noble gift of valorous unselfishness, this glorious extravagance that spends life itself for something greater than life. If we had met this nameless sailor we should have found him perhaps a very ordinary man, with plenty of failings, doubtless, like the rest of us, and without any idea that he had in him the priceless jewel beside which crowns and tiaras are empty gimmick. He was something greater than he knew.

How many of us could pass such a test? What should I do? What would you do? We neither of us know, for we are as great a mystery to ourselves as we are to our neighbours. Bob Acres said he found that "a man may have a deal of fearless mass in him without knowing it," and it is equally true that a man may be more chicken-hearted than he himself suspects. Only the occasion discovers of what stuff we are made—whether we are heroes or cowards, saints or sinners. A blustering manner will not reveal the one any more than a long face will reveal the other.

The merit of this sailor's heroism was that it was done with calculation—in cold blood, as it were, with that "two-o'clock-in-the-morning courage" of which Napoleon spoke as the real thing. Many of us could do brave things in hot blood, with a sudden rush of the spirit, who would fail if we had time, as this man had, to pause and think, to reckon, to doubt, to grow cold and selfish. The merit of his deed is that it was an act of physical courage based on the higher quality of moral courage.

Nor because a man fails in the great moment is he necessarily all a coward. Mark Twain was once talking to a friend of mine on the subject of courage in men, and spoke of a man whose name is associated with a book that has become a classic. "I knew him well," he said, "and I knew him as a brave man. Yet he once

did the most cowardly thing I have ever heard of any man. He was in a shipwreck, and as the ship was going down he seized a lifebelt from a woman passenger and put it on himself. He was saved, and she was drowned. And in spite of that frightful act I think he was not a coward. I know there was not a day of his life afterwards when he would not willingly and in cold blood have given his life to recall that shameful act."

In this case the failure was not in moral courage, but in physical courage. He was demoralized by the menace, and the physical coward came uppermost. If he had had time to recover his moral balance he would have died an honourable death. It is no uncommon thing for a man to have in him the elements both of the hero and the coward. You remember that delightful remark of Mrs. Disraeli, one of the most characteristic of the many peculiar sayings attributed to that strange woman. "Dizzy," she said, "has wonderful moral courage, but no physical courage. I always have to pull the string of his shower bath." It is a capital illustration of that squabble of the coward and the brave man that takes place in most of us. Dizzy's moral courage carried him to the bath, but there his physical courage failed him. He could not pull the string that administered the cold shock. The bathroom is rich in such secrets, and life teems with them.

The true hero is he who unites the two qualities. The physical element is the more plentiful. For one man who will count the cost of sacrifice and, having counted it, pay the price with unfaltering heart, there are many who will answer the sudden call to meet menace with prompt confrontation. The courage that snatches a comrade from under the guns of the enemy or a child from the flames is, happily, not uncommon. It is inspired by an incitement that takes men out of themselves and by a certain spirit of challenge to fate that every one with a sporting instinct loves to take. But the act of the sailor of the daunting was a much bigger thing. Here was no thrill of chivalry and no sporting risk. He dealt in cold certainties: the boat and safety; the ship and death; his life or the other's. And he thought of his comrade's old parents at home and chose death.

It was a great end. I wonder whether you or I would be capable of it. I would give much to feel that I could answer in the approbative—that I could take my stand on the spiritual plane of that unknown sailor.

ALL ABOUT A DOG

It was a bitterly cold night, and even at the far end of the bus the east wind that raved along the street cut like a knife. The bus stopped, and two women and a man got in together and filled the vacant places. The young woman carried one of those little Pekinese dogs that women like to carry in their laps. The conductor came in and took the fares. Then his eyes rested with cold malice on the beady-eyed lap-dog. I saw trouble fermenting. This was the opportunity for which he had been waiting, and he intended to make the most of it. I had marked him as the type of

what Mr. Wells has called the Resentful Employee, the man with a great hazy disservice against everything and a particular disservice against passengers who came and sat in his bus while he shivered at the door.

"You must take that dog out," he said with sour bane. "I shall certainly do nothing of the kind. You can take my name and address," said the woman, who had evidently expected the challenge and knew the reply, "You must take that dog out—that's my orders." "I won't go on the top in such weather. It would kill me," said the woman. "Certainly not," said her lady companion. "You've got a cough as it is." "It's nonsense," said her male companion. The conductor pulled the bell and the bus stopped, "This bus doesn't go until that dog is brought out." And he stepped onto the pavement and waited. It was his moment of conquest. He had the law on his side and the whole busful of angry people under the torment. His envenom soul was having a real holiday. The storm inside rose high. "Shameful"; "Why isn't he in the army?" "Call the police"; "Let's all report him"; "Let's make him give us our fares back," For everybody was on the side of the lady and the dog.

That little animal sat blinking at the dim lights in happy unconsciousness of the furore, of which he was the cause. The conductor came to the door. "What's your number?" said one, taking out a pocket book with a indication of terrible things. "There's my number," said the conductor nonchalant. "Give us our fares back—you've engaged to carry us—you can't leave us here all night." "No fares back," said the conductor. Two or three passengers got out and disappeared into the night. The conductor took another turn on the pavement, then went and had a talk with the driver. Another bus, the last on the road, sailed by indifferent to the shouts of the passengers to stop. "They stick by each other—the villains" was the comment. Someone pulled the bell violently. That brought the driver round to the door. "Who's conductor of this bus?" he said, and paused for a reply. None coming, he returned to his seat and resumed beating his arms across his chest. There was no hope in that quarter. A policeman strolled up and looked in at the door. An deluge of indignant protests and appeals burst on him. "Well, he's got his rules, you know," he said genially. "Give your name and address." "That's what he's been offered, and he won't take it." "Oh," said the policeman, and he went away and took his stand a few yards down the street, where he was joined by two more constables. And still the little dog blinked at the lights and the conductor walked to and fro on the pavement, like a captain on the quarter-deck in the hour of victory. A young woman, whose voice had risen high above the squall inside, descended on him with an air of threatening and annihilation. He was immovable—as cold as the night and as hard as the pavement. She passed on in a fury of infecundity to the three policemen, who stood like a group of carving up the street watching the drama. Then she came back, sniffs gesticulated to her young man who had sat a silent witness of her craze, and evanesce. Others followed. The bus was emptying. Even the dashing young fellow who had demanded the number, and who had declared he

would see this thing through if he sat there all night, had taken an opportunity to slip away.

Meanwhile the Pekinese party was passing through every stage of resistance to abject surrender. "I'll go on the top," said the lady with the dog at last. "You mustn't." "I will." "You'll have pneumonia." "Let me take it." "Certainly not"—she would die with her dog. When she had disappeared up the stairs, the conductor came back, pulled the bell, and the bus went on. He stood glumly conquering triumphant while his conduct was savagely discussed in his face by the stub of the party. Then the engine struck work and the conductor went to the help of the driver. It was a long job, and presently the lady with the dog stole down the stairs and re-entered the bus. When the engine was put right the conductor came back and pulled the bell. Then his eye fell on the dog, and his hand went to the bell-rope again. The driver looked around, "the conductor pointed to the dog, the bus stopped, and the struggle re-commenced with all the original features—the conductor walking the pavement, the driver spanking his arms on the box, the little dog blinking at the lights, the lady declaring that she would not go on the top—and finally going. "I've got my rules," said the conductor to me when I was the last passenger left behind. He had won his victory, but felt that he would like to justify himself to somebody.

"Rules," I said, "are necessary things, but there are rules and rules. Some are hard and fast rules, like the rule of the road, which cannot be broken without danger to life and limb. But some are only rules for guidance, which you can apply or wink at, as common sense dictates—like the rule about the dogs. They are not a scourge put in your hand to scourge your passengers. They are meant to be observed in the spirit, not in the letter—for the comfort and not the discomfort of the passengers. You have kept the rule and broken its spirit. You want to mix your rules with a little goodwill and good temper." He took it very well, and when I got off the bus he said 'Good night' quite amiably.

ON CATCHING THE TRAIN

Thank heaven! I have caught It ... I am in a corner seat, the compartment is not crowded, the train is about to start, and for an hour and a half, while we jangle towards that haven of reclusion on the hill that I have written of ambicidentally, I can read, or think, or smoke, or sleep, or talk, or write as I choose. I think I will write, for I am in the humour for writing. Do you know what it is to be in the humour for writing—to feel that there is a head of steam somewhere that must blow off? It isn't so much that you have something you want to say as that you must say something. And, after all, what does the subject matter? Any peg will do to hang your hat on. The hat is the thing. That saying of Rameau fits the idea to perfection. Some one was asking that great composer if he did not find difficulty in selecting a subject.

"Difficulty? A subject?" said Rameau. "Not at all. One subject is as good as another. Here, bring me the Dutch Gazette."

That is how I feel now, as the lights of London fade in our wake and the fresh air of the country blows in at the window. Subject? Difficulty? Here bring me the Dutch Gazette. But while any subject would serve there is one of particular interest to me at this moment. It came into my mind as I ran along the platform just now. It is the really important subject of catching trains. There are some people who make nothing of catching trains. They can catch trains with as miraculous an ease as Cinquevalli catches half-a-dozen billiard-balls. I believe they could catch trains in their sleep. They are never too early and never too late. They leave home or office with a quiet certainty of doing the thing that is simply stupefying. Whether they walk, or take a bus, or call a taxi, it is the same: they do not hurry, they do not worry, and when they find they are in time and that there's plenty of room they manifest no surprise.

I have in mind a man with whom I once went walking among the mountains on the French-Italian border. He was enormously particular about trains and arrangements the day or the week before we needed them, and he was wonderfully efficient at the job. But as the time approached for catching a train he became exasperatingly calm and leisured. He began to take his time over everything and to concern himself with the arrangements of the next day or the next week, as though he had forgotten all about the train that was imminent, or was careless whether he caught it or not. And when at last he had got to the train, he began to remember things. He would stroll off to get a time-table or to buy a book, or to look at the engine—especially to look at the engine. And the nearer the minute for starting the more absorbed he became in the mechanism of the thing, and the more animated was his explanation of the relative merits of the P.L.M. engine and the North-Western engine. He was always given up as lost, and yet always stepped in as the train was on the move, his manner exasperate unruffled, his talk pursuing the quiet tendency of his thought about engines or about what we should do the week after next.

Now I am different. I have been catching trains all my life, and all my life I have been afraid I shouldn't catch them. Familiarity with the habits of trains cannot get rid of a secret persuasion that their aim is to give me the slip if it can be done. No faith in my own watch can affect my doubts as to the stalwart of the watch of the guard or the station clock or whatever deceitful signal the engine-driver obeys. Moreover, I am oppressed with the possibilities of delay on the road to the station. They crowd in on me like the ghosts into the tent of King Richard. There may be a block in the streets, the bus may break down, the taxi-driver may be drunk or not

know the way, or think I don't know the way, and take me round and round the squares as Tony Lumpkin drove his mother round and round the pond, or—in fact, anything may happen, and it is never until I am safely inside (as I am now) that I feel really happy.

Now, of course this is a very absurd weakness. I ought to be ashamed to confess it. I am ashamed to confess it. And that is the advantage of writing under a pen name. You can confess anything you like, and nobody thinks any the worse of you. You ease your own compunction, have a good delivery of your failings—look them, so to speak, straight in the face, and pass sentence on them—and still enjoy the luxury of not being found out. You have all the advantages of a conviction without the nuisance of the penalty. Decidedly, this writing under a pen name is a great alleviation of the soul.

It reminds me of an occasion on which I was climbing with a famous rock climber. I do not mind confessing (over my pen name) that I am not good on rocks. My companion on the rope kept addressing me at critical moments by the name of Saunders. My name, I rejoice to say, is not Saunders, and he knew it was not Saunders, but he had to call me something, and in the excitement of the moment could think of nothing but Saunders. Whenever I was slow in finding a handhold or foothold, there would come a blaring instruction to Saunders to feel to the right or the left, or higher up or lower down. And I remember that I found it a great comfort to know that it was not I who was so slow, but that fellow Saunders. I seemed to see him as a arduous, vain person who would have been better employed at home looking after his hens. And so in these articles, I seem again to be impersonating the ineffable Saunders, of whom I feel at liberty to speak plainly. I see before me a long vista of self-revelations, the real title of which ought to be "The Showing Up of Saunders."

But to return to the subject. This train-fever is, of course, only a symptom. It proceeds from that agita of mind that is so common and incurable an ailment. The complaint has been very well satirised by one who suffered from it. "I have had many and severe troubles in my life," he said, "but most of them never happened." That is it. We people who worry about the trains and similar things live in a world of imaginative disaster. The heavens are always going to fall on us. We look ahead, like Christian, and see the lions waiting to guzzle us, and when we find they are only poor imitation lions, our apprehensive imagination is not set at rest, but contrives other lions to scare us out of our wits.

And yet intellectually we know that these angst are worthless. Experience has taught us that it is not the things we fear that come to pass, but the things of which

we do not dream. The bolt comes from the blue. We take intricate pains to guard our face, and get a thump in the small of the back. We propose to send the fire-engine to Ulster, and turn to see Europe in flames. Cowper put the case against all "fearful saints" (and sinners) when he said:

The clouds ye so much dread
Are big with mercy, and will break
With blessings on your head.

It is the clouds you don't dread that quagmire you. Cowper knew, for he too was an anxious mortal, and it is only the anxious mortal who really knows the full folly of his agita.

Now, save once, I have never lost a train in my life. The exception was at Calais when the Brussels express did, in defiance of the time-table, really give me and others the slip, carrying with it my bag containing my clothes and the notes of a most illuminating lecture. I chased that bag all through Northern France and Belgium, inquiring at wayside stations, wiring to junctions, hunting among the mountains of luggage at Lille.

It was at Lille that—But the train is slowing down. There is the slope of the hillside, black against the night sky, and among the trees I see the glimmer of a light beckoning me as the lonely lamp in Greenhead Ghyll used to beckon Wordsworth's Michael. The night is full of stars, the landscape glistens with a late frost: it will be a jolly two miles' panhandler to that flare on the hill.

ON THE RULE OF THE ROAD

A stout old lady was walking with her basket down the middle of a street in Petrograd to the great confusion of the traffic and with no small jeopardy to herself. It was pointed out to her that the pavement was the place for pedestrians, but she replied: 'I'm going to walk where I like. We've got liberty now.' It did not occur to the dear old lady that if liberty sanction the pedestrian to walk down the middle of the road, then the end of such liberty would be universal chaos. Everybody would be getting in everybody else's way and nobody would get anywhere. Individual liberty would have become social nihilism.

There is a danger of the world getting liberty-drunk in these days like the old lady with the basket, and it is just as well to remind ourselves of what the rule of the road means. It means that in order that the liberties of all may be preserved, the liberties of everybody must be reduced. When the policeman, say, at Piccadilly Circus steps into the middle of the road and puts out his hand, he is the symbol not

of despotism, but of liberty. You may not think so. You may, being in a hurry, and seeing your car pulled up by this impudence of office, feel that your liberty has been outraged. How dare this fellow impede with your free use of the public highway? Then, if you are a reasonable person, you will reflect that if he did not interfere with you, he would interfere with no one, and the result would be that Piccadilly Circus would be a vortex that you would never cross at all. You have submitted to a curtailment of private liberty in order that you may enjoy a social order which makes your liberty a reality.

Liberty is not a personal affair only, but a social contract. It is an accommodation of interests. In matters, which do not touch anybody else's liberty, of course, I may be as free as I like. If I choose to go down the road in a dressing gown who shall say me denial? You have liberty to laugh at me, but I have liberty to be indifferent to you. And if I have a fancy for dyeing my hair, or waxing my moustache (which heaven forbid), or wearing an overcoat and sandals, or going to bed late or getting up early, I shall follow my fancy and ask no man's permission. I shall not inquire of you whether I may eat mustard with my mutton. And you will not ask me whether you may follow this religion or that, whether you may prefer Ella Wheeler Wilcox to Wordsworth, or champagne to shandy.

In all these and a thousand other details you and I please ourselves and ask no one's leave. We have a whole kingdom in which we rule alone, can do what we choose, be wise or hilarious, harsh or easy, conventional or odd. But directly we step out of that kingdom, our personal liberty of action becomes qualified by other people's liberty. I might like to practice on the conduit from midnight till three in the morning. If I went on to the top of Everest to do it, I could please myself, but if I do it in my bedroom my family will object, and if I do it out in the streets the neighbors will remind me that my liberty to blow the conduit must not interfere with their liberty to sleep in quiet. There are a lot of people in the world, and I have to Lodge my liberty to their liberties.

We are all liable to forget this, and unfortunately we are much more conscious of the imperfections of others in this respect than of our own. A reasonable consideration for the rights or feelings of others is the foundation of social conduct.

It is in the small matters of conduct, in the observance of the rule of the road, that we pass judgment upon ourselves, and declare that we are civilized or uncivilized. The great moments of heroism and sacrifice are rare. It is the little habits of commonplace intercourse that make up the great sum of life and sweeten or make bitter the journey.

Gardiner has another title also to distinction. Under the pen-name of "Alpha of the Plough" he wrote a series of essays in the well-known London' weekly, the Star. These are now available in book-form as *Leaves in the Wind*, *Many Furrows*, *Pebbles on the Shore*, and one or two others. His style in these is bewitching. If, as an editor, he is not in the same street with Massingham, as an essayist he is not, to be perfectly candid, in the same class as Robert Lynd and J. B. Priestley. It was he, however, who helped Lynd ("Y. Y." of the *New Statesman*) on to his present position. He was among the first to discern Lynd's genius and, having done so, appointed him as the Literary Editor of the *Daily News*. Though, as I have noted, he is not, as an essayist, of the same caliber as Lynd he occupies a unique position nonetheless. As C. E. Montague observed, "A range of mountains may not be the Alps, and yet have a career." Second-class essayists, like "A.G.G.", have also a special niche in the temple of fame.

KEY WORDS

1. **Assault** : An attack, which includes not only battery threats but the actual use of violence.
2. **Burglar** : Thief who breaks into houses shops etc with the intention of stealing.
3. **Haughty** : A high opinion of oneself and often a low position of others.
4. **Panegyric** : A speech or piece of writing praising someone highly.
5. **Resentful Employee** : A worker who is full of complaints/grievances.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the importance and effect of good manners.
2. Discuss the impact of good temper and kindness on the society in the Light of the two good-mannered conductors.
3. How could the liftman take a polite and effective revenge?
4. How does the stream of general life get polluted by one's behaviour?
5. Write down the summary of the essay, "On Catching the Train".
6. According to A.G. Gardiner, Who is a gentleman?
7. What are the important courtesies of human beings?
8. Describe the incident of the sailor in Formidable.
9. Who is considered to be the Resentful Employee?
10. How the rules should be followed among the public?

SUGGESTED READING

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1. A.G. Gardiner and the Daily News | — Koss, Stephen |
| 2. Pebbles on the Shore | — A.G. Gardiner |
| 3. Many Furrows | — A.G. Gardiner |

4

ESSAYS OF BERTRAND RUSSELL

STRUCTURE

- Learning Objectives
- Introduction
- Philosophy and Politics
- Philosophy for Layman
- The Future of Mankind
- An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish
- Summary
- Key Words
- Review Questions
- Suggested Readings

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to understand :

1. The essays of Bertrand Russell, such as :
 - Philosophy and politics
 - Philosophy for Layman
 - The future of mankind
 - An outline of intellectual rubbish

INTRODUCTION

Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was a British philosopher, logician, essayist and social critic best known for his work in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. His most influential contributions include his defense of logicism, the view that mathematics is in some important sense reducible to logic, his refining of the propositional calculus introduced by Gottlob Frege, which still forms the basis of most contemporary logic, his defense of neutral doctrine (the view that the world consists of just one type of substance that is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively physical), and his theories of definite descriptions and logical atomism. Along with G.E. Moore, Russell is generally recognized as one of

the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Along with Kurt Godel, he is regularly credited with being one of the most important logicians of the twentieth century.

Over the course of his long career, Russell made significant contributions, not just to logic and philosophy, but to a broad range of subjects including education, history, political theory and religious studies. In addition, many of his writings on a variety of topics in both the sciences and the humanities have influenced generations of general readers.

After a life marked by controversy, including dismissals from both - Trinity College, Cambridge, and City College, New York. Russell was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Noted for his many spirited anti-war and anti-nuclear protests, Russell remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97.

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

The British are distinguished among the nations of modern Europe, on the one hand by the excellence of their philosophers, and on the other hand by their contempt for philosophy. In both respects they show their wisdom. But contempt for philosophy, if developed to the point at which it becomes systematic, is itself a philosophy; it is the philosophy which, in America, is called 'instrumentalism'. I shall that philosophy, if it is bad philosophy, may be dangerous, and therefore deserves that degree of negative respect which we accord to lightning and tigers. What positive respect may due to 'goo' philosophy I will leave for the moment an open question.

The connection of philosophy with politics, which is the subject of my lecture, has been perceptible in Britain than in Continental countries. Empiricism, broadly speaking, is connected with liberalism, but Hume was a Tory; what philosophers call 'idealism' has, in general, a similar connection with conservatism, but T.H. Green was a Liberal. On the continent distinctions have been more clear cut.

Kings, who genuinely believe in the Divine government of the world, and in a system of rewards and punishments in the next life, feel themselves not omnipotent, and not able to sin with indemnity. This feeling is expressed by the King in Hamlet, when he contrasts the inflexibility of Divine justice with the acquiescence of earthly judges to the royal power.

Philosophers, when they have tackled the problem of preserving social consistency, have sought solutions less obviously dependent upon dogma than those offered by official religions. Most philosophy has been a reaction (against skepticism; it has arisen in ages when authority no longer sufficed to produce the socially necessary minimum of belief, so that nominally rational arguments had to be invented to secure the same result. This motive has led to a deep insincerity infecting most philosophy, both ancient and modern. There has been a fear, often

unconscious, that clear thinking would lead to nihilism, and this fear has led philosophers to hide in mists of fallacy and obscurity.

There have, of course, been exceptions; the most notable are Protagoras in relic, and Hume in modern times. Both, as a result of skepticism, were politically conservative. Protagoras did not know whether the : gods existed, but he held that in any case they ought to be worshipped. Philosophy, according to him, had nothing edifying to teach, and for the survival of morals we must rely upon the thoughtlessness of the majority and their willingness to believe what they had been taught. Nothing, therefore, must be done to weaken the popular force of tradition.

The same sort of thing, up to a point, may be said about Hume. After setting forth his skeptical conclusions, which, he admits, are not such as men can live by, he passes on to a piece of practical advice which, if followed, would prevent anybody from reading him. 'Carelessness and inattention,' he says, 'alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely upon them.' He does not, in this connection, set forth his reasons for being a Tory, but it is obvious that 'carelessness and inattention', while they may lead to accession in the status circumstance, cannot, conjointly unaided, lead a man to advocate this or that scheme of reform.

Hobbes, though less skeptical than Hume, was equally persuaded that government is not of divine origin, and was equally led, by the road of disbelief, to advocacy of extreme conservatism.

Protagoras was 'answered' by Plato, and Hume by Kant and Hegel. In each case the philosophical world heaved a sigh of relief, and refrained from examining too nicely the intellectual validity of the 'answer', which in each case had political as well as theoretical consequences -though in the case of the 'answer' to Hume it was not the Liberal Kant but the reactionary Hegel who developed the political consequences.

But thorough-going skeptics, such as Protagoras and Hume, have never been influential, and have served chiefly as bugbears to be used by reactionaries in frightening people into irrational dogmatism. The really powerful adversaries against whom Plato and Hegel had to contend were not skeptics, but quackery. Democritus in the one case and Locke in the other. In each case empiricism was associated with democracy and with a more or less serviceable ethic. In each case the new philosophy succeeded in presenting itself as nobler and more profound than the philosophy of pedestrian common sense which it supplanted. In each case, in the name of all that was most sublime, the new philosophy made itself the champion of injustice, cruelty, and opposition to progress. In the case of Hegel this has come to be more or less recognized; in the case of Plato it is still something of a paradox, though it has been brilliantly advocated in a recent book by Dr. K.R. Popper.

Plato, according to Diogenes Laetrius, expressed the view that all the books of Democritus ought to be burnt. His wish was so far fulfilled that none of the writings of Democritus survive. Plato, in his Dialogues, never mentioned him; Aristotle gave some account of his doctrines; Epicurus vulgarized him; and finally Lucretius put the doctrines of Epicurus into verse. Lucretius just survived, by a happy accident. To reconstruct Democritus from the controversy of Aristotle and the poetry of Lucretius is not easy; it is almost as if we had to reconstruct Plato from Locke's refutation of innate ideas and Vaughan's 'I saw eternity the other night'. Nevertheless enough can be done to explain and condemn Plato's hatred.

Democritus is chiefly famous as (along with Leucippus) the founder of atomism, which he advocated in spite of the objections of metaphysicians - objections which were repeated by their successors down to and including Descartes and Leibniz. His atomism, however, was only part of his general philosophy. He was a materialist, a determinist, a free thinker, a serviceable who disliked all strong passions, a believer in evolution, both astronomical and biological.

Like the men of similar opinions in the eighteenth century, Democritus was an fervid democrat. 'Poverty in a democracy,' he says, 'it as much to be preferred to what is called prosperity under totalitarian as freedom is to slavery'. He was a contemporary of Socrates and Protagoras, and a fellow-townsmen of the latter; he flourished during the early years of the Peloponnesian war, but may have died before it ended. That war concentrated the struggle that was taking place throughout the Hellenic world between democracy and coercion. Sparta stood for coercion; so did Plato's family and friends, who were thus led to become fraternizer. Their treachery is held to have contributed to the defeat of Athens. After that defeat, Plato set to work to sing the praises of the victors by constructing a Utopia of which the main features were suggested by the constitution of Sparta. Such, however, was his artistic skill that Liberals never noticed his reactionary tendencies until his disciples Lenin and Hitler had supplied them with practical exegesis.

That Plato's Republic should have been admired, on its political side, by decent people, is perhaps the most astonishing example of literary snobbery in all history. Let us consider a few points in this totalitarian tract. The main purpose of education, to which everything else is subordinated, is to produce courage in battle. To this end, there is to be a rigid censorship of the stories told by mothers and nurses to young children; there is to be no reading of Homer, because that degraded versifier makes heroes lament and gods laugh; the drama is to be forbidden, because it contains villains and women; music is to be only of certain kinds, which, in modern times, would be 'Rule Britannia' and 'The British Grenadiers'. The government is to be in the hands of a small coercion, who are to practice trickery and lying - trickery in manipulating the drawing of lots for dysgenics purposes, and

elaborate lying to persuade the population that there are biological differences between the upper and lower classes. Finally, there is to be large-scale infanticide when children are born otherwise than as a result of governmental chicanery in the drawing of lots.

Whether people are happy in this community does not matter, we are told, for excellence resides in the whole, not in the parts. Plato's city is a copy of the eternal city laid up in heaven; perhaps in heaven we shall enjoy the kind of existence it offers us, but if we do not enjoy it here on earth, so much the worse for us.

This system derives its potent force from the marriage of aristocratic prejudice and 'divine philosophy'; without the latter, its atrociousness would be obvious. The fine talks about the good and the unchanging makes it possible to lull the reader into accession in the doctrine that the wise should rule, and that their purpose should be to preserve the status quo, as the ideal state in heaven does. To every man of strong political convictions - and the Greeks has amazingly vehement political passions-it is obvious that 'the good' are those of his own party, and that, if they could establish the constitution they desire, no further change would be necessary. So Plato thought, but by concealing his thought in a metaphysical mist he gave it an impersonal and disinterested appearance which deceived the world for ages.

The ideal of steady perfection, which Plato derived from Parmenides and embodied in his theory of ideas, is one which is now generally recognized as inapplicable to human affairs. Man is a restless animal, not content, like the boa constrictor, to have a good meal once a month and sleep the rest of the time. Man needs, for his happiness, not only the enjoyment of this, or that, 'eloquence consistent in prospering, not in having prospered'. Among modern philosophers, the ideal of unending and unchanging ecstasy has been replaced by that of evolution, in which there is supposed to be an orderly progress towards a goal which is Baever quite attained or at any rate has not been attained at the time of writing. This change of outlook is part of the substitution of dynamics for statics which began with Galileo, and which has increasingly affected all modern thinking, whether scientific or political.

Change is one thing, progress is another. 'Change' is scientific, 'progress' is ethical; change is indisputable, whereas progress is a matter of controversy. Let us first consider change, as it appears in science.

Until the time of Galileo, astronomers, following Aristotle, believed that everything in the heavens, from the moon upwards, is unchanging and incorruptible. Since Laplace, no planets, we now believe, the companion of Sirius, are 'dead'; they have at some time undergone a holocaust which has enormously diminished the amount of light and heat radiating from them.

Horns were self-subsistent and not merely an idea in the Divine Mind. When we think we think about Cape Horn, what happens in Reality is that the Absolute is

aware of a Cape-Horn thought. It really does have such a thought, or rather such as aspect of the one thought that it timelessly thinks and is, and this is the only reality that belongs to Cape Horn. But since we cannot reach such heights, we are doing our best in thinking of it in the ordinary geographical way.

But what, some one may say, has all this to do with politics? At first sight, perhaps, not very much. To Hegel, however, the connection is obvious. It follows from his metaphysic that true liberty consists in obedience to an arbitrary authority, that free speech is an evil, that absolute monarchy is good, that the Prussian state was the best existing at the time when he wrote, the war is good, and that an international organization for the peaceful settlement of disputes would be a misfortune. It is just possible that some my readers may not see at once how these consequences follow, so I hope I may be pardoned for saying a few words about the intermediate steps.

Although time is unreal, the series of appearances which constitutes history has a curious relation to Reality. Hegel discovered the nature of Reality by a purely logical process called the 'dialectic', which consists of discovering contradictions in abstract ideas and correcting them less abstract. Each of these abstract ideas is conceived as a stage in the development of 'The Idea', the last stage being the 'Absolute Idea'.

Oddly enough, for some reason which Hegel never divulged, the temporal process of history repeats the logical development of the dialectic. It might be thought, since the metaphysic professes to apply to all Reality that the temporal process which parallels it would be cosmic, but not a bit of it; it is purely terrestrial, confined to recorded history, and (incredible as this may seem) to the history that Hegel happened to know. Different nations, at different times, have embodied the stages of the Idea that the dialect had reached at those studies. Of China, Hegel knew only that it was, therefore China illustrated the category of mere being. Of India he knew only that Buddhists believed in Nirvana, therefore India illustrated the category of nothing. The Greeks and Romans got rather further along the list of categories, but all the late stages have been left to the Germans, who, since the time of the fall of Rome, have been the sole standard - bearers of the Idea, and had already in 1830 very nearly realized the Absolute Idea.

To any one who still cherishes the hope that man is a more or less rational animal, the success of this farrago of nonsense must be astonishing. In his own day, his system was accepted by almost all academically educated young Germans, which is perhaps definable by the fact that it flattered German self-esteem. What is more surprising is its success outside Germany. When I was young, most teachers of philosophy in British and American universities were Hegelians, so that, until I read Hegel, I supposed there must be some truth in his system; I was cured,

however, by discovering that everything he said on the philosophy of mathematics was plain nonsense.

Most curious of all was his effect on Marx, who took over some of his most fanciful tenets, more particularly the belief that history develops according to a logical plan, and is concerned, like the purely abstract dialectic, to find ways of avoiding self-contradiction. Over a large part of the earth's surface you will be liquidated if you question this dogma, and eminent Western men of science, who sympathise politically with Russia, show their sympathy by using the word 'contradiction' in ways that no self-respecting logician can accept.

In tracing a connection between the politics and the metaphysics of a man like Hegel, we must content ourselves with certain very general features of his practical programme. That Hegel glorified Prussia was something of an accident; in his earlier years he ardently admired Napoleon, and only became a German patriot when he became an employee of the Prussian State. Even in the latest form of his philosophy of History, he still mentions Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon as men great enough to have a right to consider themselves exempt from the obligations of the moral law. What philosophy constrained him to admire was not Germany as against France, but order, system, regulation, and intensity of governmental control. His deification of the State would have been just as shocking if the State concerned had been Napoleon's despotism. In his own opinion, he knew what the world needed, though most men did not; a strong government might compel never do. Heraclitus, to whom Hegel was deeply indebted, says: 'Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows. Let us, in any case, make sure of the blows; whether they lead to a pasturage is a matter of minor importance - except, of course, to the beasts'.

It is obvious that an autocratic system, such as that advocated by Hegel or by Marx's present day disciples, is only theoretically justifiable on a basis of unquestioned dogma. If you know for certain what is the purpose of the universe in relation to human life, what is going to happen, and what is good for people even if they do not think so; if you can say, as Hegel does, that his theory of history is 'a result which happens to be known to me, because I have traversed the entire field' - then you will feel that no degree of oppression is too great, provided it leads to the goal. The only philosophy that affords a theoretical justification of democracy and that accord with democracy in its temper of mind is empiricism. Locke, who may be regarded, so far as the modern world is concerned, as the founder of doctrine, makes it clear how closely this is connected with his views on liberty and toleration, and with his opposition to absolute monarchy. He is never tired of emphasizing the uncertainty of most of our knowledge, not with a skeptical intention such as Hume's, but the intention making men aware that they may be mistaken, and that they should take account of this possibility in all their dealings with men of opinions different from their own. He had seen the evils wrought, both

by the 'enthusiasm' of the sectaries, and by the dogma of divine right of kings; to both he opposed a gradually and patchwork political doctrine, to be tested at each point by its success in practice.

What may be called, in a broad sense, the Liberal theory of politics is a periodic product of commerce. The first known example of it was in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor, which lived by trading with Egypt and Lydia. When Athens, in the time of Pericles, became commercial, the Athenians became Liberal. After a long eclipse, Liberal ideas revived in the Lombard cities of the Middle Ages, and triumphed in Italy until they were extinguished by the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. But the Spaniards failed to reconquer Holland or to vanquish England, and it was these countries that were the champions of Liberalism and the leaders in commerce in the seventeenth century. In our day the leadership has passed to the United States.

The reasons for the connection of commerce with Liberalism are obvious. Trade brings men into contact with tribal customs different from their own, and in so doing destroys the dogmatism of the untraveled. The relation of buyer and seller is one of negotiation between two parties who are both free; it is most profitable when the buyer or seller is able to understand the point of view of the other party. There is, of course, imperialistic commerce where men are found to buy the point of the sword; but this is not the kind that generates Liberal philosophies, which have flourished best in trading cities that have wealth without much military strength. In the present day, the nearest analogue to the commercial cities of relic and the middle ages is to be found in small countries such as Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia.

The Liberal creed, in practice, is one of live-and-live, of toleration and freedom so far as public order permits, of moderation and absence of zealotry in political programmes. Even democracy, when it becomes zealous, as it did among Rousseau's disciples in the French Revolution, ceases to be Liberal; indeed, a fanatical belief in democracy makes democratic institutions impossible, as appeared in England under Cromwell and in France under Robespierre. The genuine Liberal does not say 'this is true', he says 'I am inclined to think that under present circumstances this opinion is probably the best'. And it is only in this limited and undogmatic sense that he will advocate democracy.

What has theoretical philosophy to say that is relevant to the rationality or otherwise of the Liberal outlook?

The essence of the Liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are held; instead of being held pontifical, they are held tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. This is the way in which opinions are held in science, as opposed to the way in which they are held in theology. The decisions of the Council of Nicaea

are still authoritative, but in science fourth-century opinions no longer carry any weight. In the USSR the dicta of Marx on dialectical materialism are so unquestioned that they help to determine the views of geneticists on how to obtain the best breed of wheat, though elsewhere it is thought that experiment is the right way to study such problems, science is factual, tentative, and indulgent; all immutable precept is unscientific. The scientific outlook, accordingly, is the intellectual counterpart of what is, in the practical sphere, the outlook of Liberalism, Locke, who first developed in detail the empiricist theory of knowledge, preached also religious toleration, representative institutions, and the limitation of governmental power by the system of checks and balance. Few of his doctrines were new, but he developed them in a weighty manner at just the moment when the English government was prepared to accept them.

Since, broadly speaking, the distant consequences of actions are more uncertain than the immediate consequences, it is seldom justifiable to embark on any policy on the ground that, though harmful in the present, it will be beneficial in the long run. This principle, like all others held by empiricists, must not be held absolutely; there are cases where the future consequences of one policy are fairly certain and very pleasant, while the present consequences of the other, though not agreeable, are easily endurable. This applies, for instance, to saving food for the winter, investing capital in machinery, and so on. But even in such cases uncertainty should not be lost sight of. During a boom there is much investment that turns out to have been unprofitable, and modern economists recognize that the habit of investing rather than consuming may easily be carried too far.

It is commonly urged that, in a war between Liberals and fanatics are sure to win, owing to their more unshakable belief in the righteousness of their cause. This belief dies hard, although all history, including that of the last few years, is against it. Fanatics have failed, over and over again, because they have attempted the impossible, or because, even when what they aimed at was possible, they were too unscientific to adopt the right means; they have failed also because they roused the hostility of those whom they wished to coerce. In every important war since 1700 the more democratic side has been victorious. This is partly because democracy and empiricism (which are intimately interconnected) do not demand a distortion of facts in the interests of theory. Russia and Canada, which have somewhat similar climatic conditions, are both interested in obtaining better breeds of wheat; in Canada this aim is pursued experimentally, in Russia by interpreting the Marxist Scripture.

Systems of dogma without empirical foundation, such as those of scholastic theology, Marxism, and fascism, have the advantage of producing a great degree of social coherence among their disciples. But they have the disadvantage of involving persecution of valuable sections of the population. Spain was ruined by the expulsion of the Jews and Moors; France suffered by the emigration of Huguenots

after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes; Germany would probably have been first in the field with the atomic bomb but for Hitler's hatred of Jews. And, to repeat, dogmatic systems have the two further disadvantages of involving false beliefs on practically important matters of fact, and of rousing violent hostility in those who do not share the zealotry in question. For these various reasons, it is not to be expected that, in the long run, nations addicted to a dogmatic philosophy will have the advantage over those of a more empirical temper. Nor is it true that dogma is necessary for social coherence when social coherence is called for; no nation could have shown more of it than the British showed in 1940.

Doctrine, finally, is to be commended not only on the ground of its greater truth, but also on ethical grounds. Precept demands authority, rather than intelligent thought, as the source of opinion; it requires persecution of heretics and hostility to unbelievers; it asks of its disciples that they should inhibit natural kindliness in favour of systematic hatred. Since argument is not recognized as a means of arriving at truth, adherents of rival dogmas have no method except war by means of which to reach a decision. And war, in our scientific age, means, sooner or later, universal death.

I conclude that, in our day as in the time of Locke, empiricist Liberalism (which is not incompatible with democratic socialism) is the only philosophy that can be adopted by a man who, on the one hand, demands some scientific evidence for his beliefs, and, on the other hand, desires human happiness more than the preponderance of this or that party or creed. Our confused difficult world needs various things if it is to escape disaster, and among these one of the most necessary is that, in the nations which still uphold Liberal beliefs, these beliefs should be wholehearted and profound, not apologetic towards dogmatisms of the Left, but deeply persuaded of the value of liberty, scientific freedom, and mutual endurance. For without these beliefs life on our politically divided but technically unified planet will hardly continue to be possible.

Summary

Through this essay, 'Philosophy and Politics', Russell found that the idealist doctrine was directed against liberty and progress. Any deviation in the individual from the normal pattern alarms the idealists. He says that they fail to see that 'a good community does not spring from the glory of the state but from the unbridled development of individuals'. The idealist doctrine has no respect for the dignity of human beings. Russell attacks Hegel's philosophy of corporative state saying that, 'such philosophies are tricks for justifying the privileges of the holders of power, and that whatever our politics may be, there can be no valid argument for an undemocratic ethic.'

Laissez-faire liberalism has also been denounced by Russell. He finds that the wealthy few by virtue of their wealth took the control of the state in their hands,

thus Laissez-faire meant liberty to the cabalistic class only. Russell observes that 'it had a mistaken idea of freedom: it instituted the despotism of the fortunate over the unfortunate.'

Change is one thing, progress is another. "Change" is scientific; "progress" is ethical; change is unarguable, whereas progress is a matter of controversy.

After ages during which the earth produced harmless trilobites and butterflies, evolution progressed to the point at which it generated Neros, Genghis Khans, and Hitler. This, however, is a passing nightmare; in time the earth will become again incapable of supporting life, and peace will return.

The essence of the Liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but in how they are held: instead of being held pontifical, they are held temporally, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment.

PHILOSOPHY OF A LAYMAN

Mankind, ever since there have been civilized communities have been tackled with problems of two different kinds. On the one hand there has been the problem of mastering natural forces, of acquiring the knowledge and the skill required to produce tools and weapons and to encourage Nature in the production of useful animals and plants. This problem, in the modern world, is dealt with by science and scientific technique, and experience has shown that in order to deal with it adequately it is necessary to train a large number of rather narrow specialists.

But there is a second problem, less precise, and by some mistakenly regarded as unimportant - I mean the problem of how best to utilize our command over the forces of nature. This includes such burning issues as democracy versus dictatorship, capitalism versus socialism, international regime versus cosmopolitan nihilism anarchy, free speculation versus disciplinarian. On such issues the laboratory can give no decisive guidance. The kind of knowledge that gives most help in solving such problems is a wide survey of human life, in the past as well as in the present, and an appreciation of the sources of misery or contentment as they appear in history. It will be found that increase of skill has not, of itself, insured any increase of human happiness or wellbeing. When men first learnt to cultivate the soil, they used their knowledge to establish a cruel cult of human sacrifice. The men who first tamed the horse employed him to pillage and enslave peaceable populations. When, in the infancy of the industrial revolution, men discovered how to make cotton goods by machinery, the results were horrible: Jefferson's movement for the freeing of slaves in America, which had been on the point of success, was killed dead; child labor in England was developed to a point of appalling cruelty; and ruthless hegemony in Africa was stimulated in the hope that black men could be induced to clothe themselves in cotton goods. In our own day a

combination of scientific genius and technical skill has produced the atomic bomb, but having produced it we are all terrified, and do not know what to do with it. These instances, from widely different periods of history, show that something more than skill is required, something which may perhaps be called 'wisdom'. This is something that must be learnt, if it can be learnt, by means of other studies than those required for scientific technique. And it is something more needed now than ever before, because the rapid growth of technique has made ancient habits of thought and action more deficient than in any earlier time.

'Philosophy' means 'love of wisdom', and philosophy in this sense is what men must obtain if the new powers invented by technicians, and handed over by them to be flaunted by ordinary men and women, are not to jab mankind into an awful convulsion. But the philosophy that should be a part of general education is not the same thing as the philosophy of specialists. Not only in philosophy, but in all branches of academic study, there is a distinction between what has cultural value and what is only of professional interest. Historians may debate what happened to Sennacherib's unsuccessful expedition of 698 BC, but those who are not historians need not know the difference between it and his successful expedition three years earlier. Professional Grecians may usefully discuss a disputed reading in a play of Aeschylus, but such matters are not for the man who wishes, in spite of a busy life, to acquire some knowledge of what the Greeks achieved. Similarly the men who devote their lives to philosophy must consider questions that the general educated public does right to ignore, such as the differences between the theory of universals in Aquinas and in Duns Scotus, or the characteristics that a language must have if it is to be able, without falling into nonsense, to say things about itself. Such questions belong to the technical aspects of philosophy, and their discussion cannot form part of its contribution to general culture.

Academic education should aim at giving, as a restorative of the adeptness which increase of knowledge has made unavoidable, as much as time will permit of what has cultural value in such studies as history, literature and philosophy. It should be made easy for a young man who knows no Greek to acquire through translations some understanding, however inadequate, of what the Greeks accomplished. Instead of studying the Anglo-Saxon kings over and over again at school, some attempt should be made to give a epitome of world history; Bringing the problems of our own day into relation with those of Egyptian priests, Babylonian kings, and Athenian reformers, as well as with all the hopes and despairs of the intervening centuries. But it is only of philosophy, treated from a similar point of view, that I wish to write.

Philosophy has had from its earliest days two different objects, which were believed to be closely interrelated. On the one hand, it aimed at a theoretical understanding of the structure of the world; on the other hand, it tried to discover and inculcate the best possible way of life. From Heraclitus to Hegel, or even to

Marx, it consistently kept both ends in view; it was neither purely theoretical nor purely practical, but sought- a theory of the universe upon which to base a practical ethic.

Philosophy has thus been closely related to science on the one hand, and to religion on the other. Let us consider first the relation to science. Until the eighteenth century science was included in what was commonly called 'philosophy', but since that time the word 'philosophy' has been cramped, on its theoretical side, to what is more hazardous and general in the topics with which science deals. It is often said that philosophy is unprogressive, but this is largely a verbal matter: as soon as a way is found of arriving at definite knowledge on some ancient question, the new knowledge is counted as belonging to 'science', and 'philosophy' is underprivileged of the credit. In Greek times, and down to the time of Newton, tellurian theory belonged to 'philosophy', because it was uncertain and speculative, but Newton took the subject out of the realm of the free play of conjecture, and made it one requiring a different type of skill from that which it had required when it was still open to fundamental doubts. Anaximander, in the sixth century BC, had a theory of evolution, and maintained that men are descended from fishes. This was philosophy because it was a speculation unsupported by detailed evidence, but Darwin's theory of evolution was science, because it was based on the succession of forms of life as found in fossils, and upon the distribution of animals and plants in many parts of the world. A man might say, with enough truth to justify a joke: 'Science is what we know, and philosophy is what we don't know'. But it should be added that philosophical speculation as to what we do not yet know has shown itself a valuable prelude to exact scientific knowledge. The guesses of the Pythagoreans in astronomy, of Anaximander and Empedocles in biological evolution, and of Democritus as to the atomic constitution of matter, provided the men of science in later times with hypotheses which, but for the philosophers, might never have entered their heads. We may say that, on its theoretical side, philosophy consists, at least in part, in the framing of large general conjecture which science is not yet in a position to test; but when it becomes possible to test the conjecture they become, if verified, a part of science, and cease to count as 'philosophy'.

The utility of philosophy, on the theoretical side, is not confined to speculations which we may hope to see confirmed or confuted by science within a measurable time. Some men are so impressed by what science knows that they forget what it does not know; others are so much more interested in what it does not know than in what it does that they belittle its achievements. Those who think that science is everything become smug and conceited, and decry all interest in problems not having the circumscribed definiteness that is necessary for scientific treatment. In practical matters they tend to think that skill can take the place of wisdom, and that to kill each other by means of the latest technique is more 'progressive', and therefore better, than to keep each other alive by old-fashioned

methods. On the other hand, those who pooh-poo science revert, as a rule, to some ancient and pernicious superstition, and refuse to admit the immense increase of human happiness which scientific technique, if widely used, would make possible. Both these attitudes are to be abhor, and it is philosophy that shows the right attitude, by making clear at once the scope and the limitations of scientific knowledge.

Leaving aside, for the moment, all questions that have to do with ethics or with values, there are a number of purely theoretical questions, of perpetual and passionate interest, which science is unable to answer, at any rate at present. Do we survive death in any sense, and if so, do we survive for a time or for ever? Can mind dominate matter, or does matter completely dominate mind, or has each, perhaps, a certain limited independence? Has the universe a purpose? Or is it driven by blind necessity? Or is it a mere disarray and jumble, in which the natural laws that we think we find are only a phantasy generated by our own love of order? If there is a cosmic scheme, has life more importance in it than astronomy would lead us to suppose, or is our emphasis upon life mere provincialism and self-importance? I do not know the answer to these questions, and I do not believe that anybody else does, but I think human life would be penurious if they were forgotten, or if definite answers were accepted without adequate evidence. To keep alive the interest in such questions, and to scrutinize suggested answers, is one of the functions of philosophy.

Those who have a passion for quick returns and for an exact balance sheet of effort and reward may feel impatient of a study which cannot, in the present state of our knowledge, arrive at certainties, and which encourages what may be thought the time wasting occupation of inconclusive meditation on insoluble problems. To this view I cannot in any degree grant. Some kind of philosophy is a necessity to all but the most thoughtless, and in the absence of knowledge it is almost sure to be a silly philosophy. The result of this is that the human race becomes divided into rival groups of sectarian, each group firmly coax that its own brand of nonsense is sacred truth, while the other side's is donnish blasphemy. Arians and Catholics, Crusaders and Muslims, Protestants and disciple of the Pope, Communists and Fascists, have filled large parts of the last 1,600 years with futile strife, when a little philosophy would have shown both sides in all these disputes that neither had any good reason to believe itself in the right. Assertiveness is an enemy to peace, and an invincible barrier to democracy. In the present age, at least as much as in former times, it is the greatest of the mental impediments to human happiness.

The demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is nevertheless an intellectual vice. If you take your children for a picnic on a doubtful day, they will demand a peremptory answer as to whether it will be fine or wet, and be disappointed in you when you cannot be sure. The same sort of affirmation is demanded, in later life, of those who undertake to lead populations into the

Promised Land. 'Liquidate the capitalists and the survivors will enjoy eternal bliss.' 'Exterminate the Jews and everyone will be virtuous.' 'Kill the Croats and let the Serbs reign.' 'Kill the Serbs and let the Croats reign.' These are samples of the slogans that have won wide popular acceptance in our time. Even a speck of philosophy would make it impossible to accept such bloodthirsty nonsense. But so long as men are not trained to withhold judgment in the absence of evidence, they will be led away by conceited prophets, and it is likely that their leaders will be either ignorant sectarian or dishonest fraud. To abide uncertainty is difficult, but so are most of the other virtues. For the learning of every virtue there is an appropriate discipline, and for the learning of suspended judgment the best discipline is philosophy.

But if philosophy is to serve a positive purpose, it must not teach mere skepticism, for, while the bigot is harmful, the skeptic is useless. Assertiveness and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should squander is certainty, whether of knowledge or of ignorance. Knowledge is not so accurate a concept as is commonly thought. Instead of saying 'I know this', we ought to say 'I more or less know something more or less like this'. It is true that this proviso is hardly necessary as regards the multiplication table, but knowledge in practical affairs has not the certainty or the precision of arithmetic. Suppose I say 'democracy is a good thing': I must admit, first, that I am less sure of this than I am that two and two are four, and secondly, that 'democracy' is a somewhat hazy term which I cannot define precisely. We ought to say, therefore: 'I am fairly certain that it is a good thing if a government has something of the characteristics that are common to the British and American Constitutions', or something of this sort. And one of the aims of education ought to be to make such a statement more effective from a platform than the usual type of political slogan.

For it is not enough to recognize that all our knowledge is, in a greater or less degree, uncertain and hazy; it is necessary, at the same time, to learn to act upon the best conjecture without pontifical believing it. To revert to the picnic: even though you admit that it may rain, you start out if you think fine weather probable, but you allow for the opposite possibility by taking slicker. If you were a bigot you would leave the slicker at home. The same principles apply to more important issues. One may say broadly: all that passes for knowledge can be arranged in a hierarchy of degrees of certainty, with arithmetic and the facts of acumen at the top. That two and two are four, and that I am sitting in my room writing, are statements as to which any serious doubt on my part would be pathological. I am nearly as certain that yesterday was a fine day, but not quite, because memory does sometimes play odd tricks. More distant memories are more doubtful, particularly if there is some strong emotional reason for remembering falsely, such, for instance, as made George IV remember being at the battle of Waterloo. Scientific laws may be very nearly certain, or only slightly probable, according to the state of the evidence

When you act upon a conjecture which you know to be uncertain, your action should be such as will not have very harmful results if your conjecture is false. In the matter of the picnic, you may risk a wetting if all your party are vigorous, but not if one of them is so delicate as to run a risk of pneumonia. Or suppose you meet a Muggletonian, you will be justified in arguing with him, because not much harm will have been done if Mr Muggleton was in fact as great a man as his disciples suppose, but you will not be justified in burning him at the stake, because the evil of being burnt alive is more certain than any proposition of theology. Of course if the Muggletonians were so numerous and so zealous that either you or they must be killed the question would grow more difficult, but the general principle remains, that an uncertain conjecture cannot justify a certain evil unless an equal evil is equally certain on the opposite conjecture.

Philosophy, we said, has both a theoretical and a practice aim. It is now time to consider the latter.

Among most of the philosophers of relic there was close connection between a view of the universe and a doctrine as to the best way of life. Some of them founded kinships which had a certain resemblance to the monastic orders of later times. Socrates and Plato were shocked by the sophists because they had no religious aims. If philosophy is to play a serious part in the lives of men who are not specialists, it must not cease to advocate some way of life. In doing this it is to explore to do something of what religion has done but with certain differences. The greatest difference is that there is no appeal to authority, whether that of tradition or that of a sacred book. The second important difference is that a philosopher should not attempt to establish a Church; Auguste Comte tried, but failed, as he deserved to do. The third is that more stress should be laid on the intellectual virtues than has been customary since the decay of Hellenic civilization.

There is one important difference between the ethical teachings of ancient philosophers and those appropriate to our own day. The ancient philosophers appealed to gentlemen of recreation, who could live as seemed good to them, and could even, if they chose, found an independent City having laws that personified the master's doctrines. The immense majority of modern educated men have no such freedom; they have to earn their living within the existing framework of society, and they cannot make important changes in their own way of life unless they can first secure important changes in political and economic organization. The consequence is that a man's ethical convictions have to be expressed more in political advocacy, and less in his private behavior, than was the case in relic. And a conception of a good way of life has to be a social rather than an individual conception. Even among the ancients, it was so conceived by Plato in the Republic, but many of them had a more individualistic conception of the ends of life.

With this proviso, let us see what philosophy has to say on the subject of integrity.

To begin with the intellectual virtues: The pursuit of philosophy is founded on the belief that knowledge is good, even if what is known is painful. A man impregnated with the philosophic spirit, whether a professional philosopher or not, will wish his beliefs to be as true as he can make them, and will, in equal measure, love to know and hate to be in error. This principle has a wider scope than may be apparent at first sight. Our beliefs spring from a great variety of causes: what we were told in youth by parents and school-teachers, what Powerful organizations tell us in order to make us act as they wish, what either embodies or diminishes our fears, what ministers to our self-esteem, and so on. Any one of these causes may happen to lead us to true beliefs, but is more likely to lead us in the opposite direction. Intellectual continence, therefore, will lead us to survey our beliefs closely, with a view to discovering which of them there any reason to believe true is. If we are wise, we shall apply solvent criticism especially to the beliefs that we find it most painful to doubt, and to those most likely to involve us in violent conflict with men who hold opposite but equally groundless beliefs. If this attitude could become common, the gain in shrinking the asperity of disputes would be inestimable.

There is another intellectual virtue which is that of generally or unbiased. I recommend the following exercise: When, in a sentence expressing political opinion, there are words that trigger powerful but different emotions in different readers, try restoring them by symbols, A, B, C, and so on and forgetting the particular significance of the symbols. Suppose A is England, B is Germany and C is Russia. So long as you remember what the letters mean, most of the things you will believe will depend upon whether you are English, German or Russian, which is logically irrelevant. When, in elementary algebra, you do problems about A, B and C going up a mountain, you have no emotional interest in the gentlemen concerned, and you do your best to work out the solution with impersonal correctness. But if you thought that A was yourself, B your hated rival and C the schoolmaster who set the problem, your calculations would go oblique, and you would be sure to find that A was first and C was last. In thinking about political problems this kind of emotional slant is bound to be present, and only care and practice can enable you to think as objectively as you do in the algebraic problem.

Thinking in abstract terms is of course not the only way to achieve virtuous generally; it can be achieved as well, or perhaps even better, if you can feel generalized emotions. But to most people this is difficult. If you are hungry, you will make great Endeavour, if necessary, to get food; if your children are persistence, you may feel an even greater urgency. If a friend is very hungry/unfed, you will probably exert yourself to relieve his distress, But if you hear that some millions of Indians or Chinese are in danger of death from

malnutrition, the problem is so vast and so distant that unless you have some official responsibility you probably soon forget all about it. Nevertheless, if you have the emotional capacity to feel distant evils intensely, you can achieve ethical generally through feeling. If you have not this rather rare gift, the habit of viewing practical problems abstractly as well as expressly is the best available substitute.

The inter-relation of logical and emotional generally in ethics is an interesting subject. Thou shall love thine neighbor as thyself implants emotional generally; 'virtuous statements should not contain proper names' implants logical generally. The two tenets sound vary different, but when they are examined it will be found that they are scarcely dissemble in practical purport. Benign men will prefer the traditional form; logicians may prefer the other. I hardly know which class of men is the smaller. Either form of statement, if accepted by statesmen and endured by the populations whom they represent, would quickly lead to the millennium. Jews and Arabs would come together and say 'Let us see how to get the greatest amount of good for both together, without inquiring too closely how it is distributed between us'. Obviously each group would get far more of what makes for happiness of both than either can at present. The same would be true of Hindus and Muslems, Chinese communists and adherents of Chiang Kai-shek, Italians and Yugoslavs, Russians and Western democrats. But alas! neither logic nor benevolence is to be expected on either side in any of these disputes.

It is not to be supposed that young men and women who are busy obtaining valuable specialized knowledge can spare a great deal of time for the study of philosophy, but even in the time that can easily be spared without injury to the learning of technical skills, philosophy can give certain things that will greatly increase the student's value as a human being and as a citizen. It can give a habit of exact and careful thought, not only in mathematics and science, but in questions of large practical import. It can give an impersonal breadth and scope to the conception of the ends of life. It can give to the individual a just measure of himself in relation to society, of man in the present to man in the past and in the future, and of the whole history of man in relation to the astronomical cosmos. By augmenting the objects of his thoughts it supplies an antidote to the apprehension and torments of the present, and makes possible the nearest approach to tranquility that is available to a sensitive mind in our tortured and uncertain world.

Summary

According to Bertrand Russell, Assertiveness and skepticism are both, in a sense, absolute philosophies; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge or ignorance.

The demand for certainty is one which is natural to man, but is nevertheless an intellectual vice. So long as men are not trained to withhold judgment in the absence of evidence, they will be led astray by conceited prophets, and it is likely that their leaders will be either ignorant zealot or dishonest humbugs. To endure uncertainty is difficult, but so are most of the other virtues.

THE FUTURE OF MANKIND

Before the end of the present century, unless something quite uncertain occurs, one of three possibilities will have been realized. These three are :

- I. The end of human life, perhaps of all life on our planet.
- II. A atavism to barbarism after a calamitous curtailment diminution of the population of the globe.
- III. A amalgamation of the world under a single government, possessing a monopoly of all the major weapons of war.

I do not pretend to know which of these will happen, or even which is the most likely. What I do contend, without any hesitation, is that the kind of system to which we have been habitual cannot possibly continue.

The first possibility, the vanishing of the human race, is not to be expected in the next world war, unless that war is deferred for a longer time than now seems probable. But if the next world war is indecisive, or if the victors are unwise, and if organized states survive it, a period of febrile technical development may be expected to follow its conclusion. With vastly more powerful means of utilizing atomic energy than those now available, it is thought by many solemn men of science that radioactive clouds, drifting round the world, may disintegrate derelict leaving tissue everywhere. Although the last survivor may proclaim himself universal Emperor, his incumbency will be brief and his subjects will all be carcass. With his death the uneasy episode of life will end, and the peaceful rocks will revolve unchanged until the sun detonates.

Perhaps a disinterested spectator would consider this the most desirable effectuation, in view of man's long record of imprudence and

cruelty. But we, who are actors in the drama, who are entwined in the net of private affections and public hopes, can hardly take this attitude with any sincerity. True, I have heard men say that they would prefer the end of man to capitulation to the Soviet Government, and doubtless in Russia there are those who would say the same about submission to Western capitalism. But this is rhetoric with a spurious air of heroism. Although it must be regarded as inartistic dupe, it is dangerous, because it makes men less energetic in seeking ways of avoiding the holocaust that they pretend not to dread.

The second possibility, that of a reversion to barbarity, would leave open the likelihood of a gradual return to civilization, as after the fall of Rome. The sudden transition will, if it occurs, be infinitely painful to those who experience it, and for some centuries afterwards life will be hard and colourless. But at any rate there will still be a future for mankind, and the possibility of rational hope.

I think such an outcome of a really scientific world war is by no means dubious. Imagine each side in a position to destroy the chief cities and centres of industry of the enemy; imagine an almost complete effacing of laboratories and libraries, accompanied by a heavy fatality rate among men of science; imagine deprivation due to radioactive drizzle, and plague caused by bacteriological warfare: would social cohesion survive such strains? Would not prophets tell the maddened populations that their ills were wholly due to science, and that the extermination of all educated men would bring the millennium? Extreme hopes are born of extreme misery, and in such a world hopes could only be irrational. I think the great states to which we are accustomed would break up, and the scanty survivors would revert to a primitive village economy.

The third possibility that of the establishment of a single government for the whole world might be realized in various ways: by the victory of the United States in the next world war, or by the victory of the USSR, or, theoretically, by agreement. Or and I think this is the most hopeful of the nations that desire an cosmopolitan government, becoming, in the end, so strong that Russia would no longer dare to stand out. This might feasible be achieved without another world war, but it would require courageous and imaginative statesmanship in a number of countries.

There are various arguments that are used against the project of a single government of the whole world. The commonest is that the project is Utopian and impossible. Those who use this argument, like most of those who advocate a world government, are thinking of a world government brought about by agreement. I think it is plain that the

mutual suspicions between Russia and the West make it futile to hope, in any near future, for any genuine agreement. Any pretended universal authority to which both sides can agree, as things stand, is bound to be sham, like UNO. Consider the difficulties that have been confronted in the much more modest project of an cosmopolitan control over atomic energy, to which Russia will only consent if inspection is subject to the reject, and therefore a farce. I think we should admit that a world government will have to be imposed by force.

But many people will say why all this talk about a world government? Wars have occurred ever since men were organized into units larger than the family, but the human race has survived. Why should it not continue to survive even if wars go on occurring from time to time? Moreover, people like war, and will feel frustrated without it. And without war there will be no adequate opportunity for heroism or self-sacrifice.

This point of view — which is that of multitudinous elderly gentlemen, including the rulers of Soviet Russia — fails to take account of modern technical possibilities. I think civilization could probably survive one more world war, provided it occurs fairly soon and does not last long. But if there is no slowing up in the rate of discovery and invention and if it fails to exterminate the human race, is pretty certain to produce the kind of atavism to a primitive social system that I spoke of moment ago. And this will entail such an enormous diminution of population, not only by war, but by subsequent starvation and disease, that the survivors are bound to be fierce and at least for a considerable time, destitute of the qualities required for the rebuilding of civilization.

If things are allowed to drift, it is obvious that the bickering between Russia and the Western democracies will continue until Russia has a considerable store of atomic bombs and that when that time comes there will be an atomic war. In such a war, even if the worst consequences are avoided, Western Europe, including Great Britain, will be virtually obliterated. If America and the USSR survive as organized states, phonetic adjuncts of government, jejune, narrow and stupid. No individual will think, or even feel, for himself, but each will be contentedly a mere unit in the mass. A victory of Russia would, in time, make such a mentality world-wide. No doubt the complacency induced by success would ultimately lead to a relaxation of control, but the process would be slow, and the revival of respect for the individual would be doubtful. For such reasons I should view a Russian victory as an appalling disaster.

A victory by the United States would have far less drastic consequences. In the first place, it would not be a victory of the United States in segregation, but of an entente in which the other members would be able to insist upon retaining a large part of their traditional independence. One can hardly imagine the American army seizing the dons at Oxford and Cambridge and sending them to hard labour in Alaska. Nor do I think that they would accuse Mr. Attlee of machinate and compel him to fly to Moscow. Yet these are strict analogues to the things the Russian have done in Poland. After a victory of an entente led by the United States there would still be British culture, French culture, Italian culture, and (I hope) German culture; there would not, therefore, be the same dead uniformity as would result from Soviet domination.

There is another important difference, and that is, that Moscow creed is much more all-pervasive than that of Washington. In America, if you are a geneticist, you may hold whatever view of Mendalism the evidence makes you regard as the most probable; in Russia, if you a geneticist who disagrees with Lysenko, you are liable to disappear mysteriously. In America, you may write a book quashing Lincoln if you feel so inclined; in Russia, if you write a book quashing Lenin, it would not be published and you would be liquidated. If you are an American economist, you may hold, or not hold, that America is heading for a slump; in Russia, no economist dare question that an American slump is imminent. In America, if you are a Professor of Philosophy, you may be an idealist, a materialist, a pragmatist, a logical positivist, or whatever else may take your fancy; at congresses you can argue withy men whose opinions differ from yours and listeners can from a judgment as to who has the best of it. In Russia you must be a dialectical materialist, but at one time the element of materialism outweighs the element of contention, and at other times it is the other way round. If you fail to follow the developments of official metaphysics with sufficient agility, it will be the worse for you. Stalin at all times knows the truth about metaphysics, but you must not suppose that the truth this year is the same as it was last year.

In such a world intellect must fester, and even technological progress must soon come to an end.

Liberty, of the sort that communists despise, is important not only to intellectuals or to the more fortunate sections of society. Owing to its absence in Russia, the Soviet Government has been able to establish a greater degree of economic inequality than exists in Great Britain, or even in America. An oligarchy which controls all the means of publicity

can perpetrate injustices and cruelties which would be scarcely possible if they were widely known. Only democracy and free publicity can prevent the holders of power from establishing a servile state, with luxury for the few and overworked poverty for the many. This is what is being done by the Soviet Government wherever it is in secure control. There are, of course, economic inequalities everywhere, but in a democratic rule they tend to decline, whereas under an coercion has power, economic inequalities threaten to become permanent owing to the modern impossibility of successful rebellion.

I come now to the question; what should be our policy, in view of the various dangers to which mankind is exposed? To summarize the above arguments: We have to guard against three dangers: (1) the extinction of the human race; (2) a reversion to barbarism; (3) the establishment of a universal slave state, involving misery for the vast majority, and the disappearance of all progress in knowledge and thought. Either the first or second of these disasters is almost certain unless great wars can soon be brought to an end. Great wars can only be brought to an end by the concentration of armed force under a single authority. Such a concentration cannot be brought by agreement, because of the opposition of Soviet Russia, but it must be brought about somehow.

The first step—and it is one which is now not very difficult — is to convince the United States and the British Commonwealth of the absolute necessity for a military amalgamation of the world. The governments of the English-speaking nations should then offer to all other nations the option of entering into a firm Alliance, involving a pooling of military resources and mutual defence against aggressiveness. In the case of dubious nations, such as Italy, great inducements, economic and military, should be held out to produce their cooperation.

At a certain stage, when the Alliance had seized sufficient strength, any Great Power still refusing to join should be threatened with lawlessness, and, if fretful, should be regarded as a public enemy. The resulting war, if it occurred fairly soon, would probably leave the economic and political structure of the United States unscathed, and would enable the victorious Alliance to establish a monopoly of armed force, and therefore to make peace secure. But perhaps, if the Alliance were sufficiently powerful, war would not be necessary, and the grudging Powers would prefer to enter it as equals rather than, after a terrible war, submit to it as trounced enemies. If this were to happen, the world might emerge from its present dangers

without another great war, I do not see any hope of such a happy issue by any other method. But whether Russia would yield when threatened with war is a question as to which I do not proffer an opinion.

I have been dealing mainly with the despondent aspects of the present situation of mankind. It is necessary to do so, in order to cajole the world to adopt measures running counter to traditional habits of thought and entrenched predilection. But beyond the difficulties and probable tragedies of the near future there is the possibility of immeasurable good, and of greater well-being than has ever before fallen to the lot of man. This is not merely a possibility, but, if the Western democracies are firm and cue, a probability. From the break-up of the Roman Empire to the present day, states have almost continuously increased in size. There are now only two fully independent states, America and Russia. The next step in this long historical process should reduce the two to one, and thus put an end to the period of organized wars, which began in Egypt some 6,000 years ago. If war can be prevented without the establishment of a grinding despotism, a weight will be lifted from the human spirit, deep collective fears will be expulsion, and as fear diminishes we may hope that cruelty also will grow less.

The uses to which men have put their increased control over natural forces are curious. In the nineteenth century they devoted themselves chiefly to increasing the numbers of *Homo sapiens*, particularly of the white variety. In the twentieth century they have, so far, pursued the exactly opposite aim. Owing to the increased productivity of labour, it has become possible to devote a larger percentage of the population to war. If atomic energy were to make production easier, the only effect, as things are would be make wars worse, since fewer people would be needed for producing necessities. Unless we can cope with the problem of abolishing war, there is no reason whatever to rejoice in labour saving technique, but quite the reverse. On the other hand, if the danger of war were removed, scientific technique could at last be used to promote human happiness. There is no longer any technical reason for the tenacious of poverty, even in such densely populated countries as India and China. If war no longer occupied men's thoughts and energies, we could, within a generation, put an end to all serious poverty throughout the world.

I have spoken of liberty as a good, but it is not an absolute good. We all recognize the need to impede murderers, and it is even more important to impede murderous states. Liberty must be limited by law,

and its most valuable forms can only exist within a framework of law. What the world most needs is effective laws to control international relations. The first and most difficult step in the creation of such law is the establishment of adequate sanctions, and this is only possible through the creation of a single armed force, like a municipal police force, is not an end in itself; it is a means to the growth of a social system governed by law, where force is not the entitlement of private individuals or nations, but is exercised only by a neutral authority in accordance with rules laid down in advance. There is hope that law rather than private force, may come to govern the relations of nations within the present century. If this hope is not realized, the world will be far better than at any previous period in the history of man.

AN OUTLINE OF INTELLECTUAL RUBBISH

Politics is largely governed by sanctimonious cliché platitudes, which are destitute of truth.

One of the most widespread popular maxims is, "human nature cannot be changed." No one can say whether this is true or not without first defining "human nature." But as used it is certainly false. When Mr. Autters the maxim, with an air of predictive and conclusive wisdom, what he means is that all men everywhere will always continue to behave as they do in his own home town. A little anthropology will banish this belief. Among the Tibetans, one wife has many husbands, because men are too poor to support a whole wife; yet family life, according to travellers, is no unhappy than elsewhere. The practice of lending one's wife to a guest is very common among uncivilized tribes. The Australian indigene, at pubescence, undergo a very painful operation, which, throughout the rest of their lives, greatly diminishes sexual vigour. puericide, which might seem contrary to human nature, was almost universal before the rise of Christianity, and is recommended by Plato to prevent over-population. Private property is not recognized among some ferocious tribes. Even among highly civilized people, economic considerations will override what is called "human nature." In Moscow, where there is an acute housing shortage, when an unmarried woman is pregnant, it often happens that a number of men contend for the legal right to be considered the father of the prospective child, because whoever is judged to be the father acquires the right to share the woman's room, and half a room is better than no room.

In fact, adult "human nature" is extremely variable, according to the circumstances of education. Food and sex are very general requirements, but the recluse of the Thebaid forswears sex altogether and reduced

food to the lowest point compatible with survival. By diet and training, people can be made rapacious or forbearing, masterful or slavish, as may suit the educator. There is no nonsense so absolute that it cannot be made the tenet of the vast majority by adequate governmental action. Plato intended his Republic to be founded on a fallacy, which he admitted to be absurd, but he was lightly confident that the populace could be induced to believe it. Hobbes, who thought it important that people should reverence the government however unworthy it might be, meets the argument that it might be difficult to obtain general assent to anything so irrational by pointing out that people have been brought to believe in the Christian religion, and, in particular, in the dogma of mutation. If he had been alive now, he would have found abundant confirmation in the fidelity of German youth to the Nazis.

The power of governments over men's beliefs has been very great ever since the rise of large States. The great majority of Romans became Christian after the Roman emperors had been converted. In the parts of the Roman Empire that were conquered by the Arabs, most people abandoned Christianity for Islam. The division of Western Europe into Protestant and Catholic regions was determined by the attitude of governments in the sixteenth century. But the power of governments over belief in the present day is vastly greater than at any earlier time. A belief, however untrue, is important when it dominates the actions of large masses of men. In this sense, the beliefs implanted by the Japanese, Russian, and German governments are important. Since they are completely divergent, they cannot all be true, though they may well all be false. Unfortunately they are such as to inspire men with an ardent desire to kill one another, even to the point of almost completely inhibiting the impulse of self-preservation. No one can deny, in face of the evidence, that it is easy, given military power, to produce a population of zealous maniac. It would be equally easy to produce a population of lucid and reasonable people, but many governments do not wish to do so, since such people would fail to admire the politicians who are at the head of these governments.

There is one bizarre detrimental application of the doctrine that human nature cannot be changed. This is the peremptory assertion that there will always be wars, because we are so constituted that we feel a need of them. What is true is that a man who has had the kind of diet and education that most men have will wish to fight when aroused. But he will not actually fight unless he has a chance of victory. It is very annoying to be stopped by a speed fuzzi, but we do not fight him because we know that he has the overwhelming forces of the State at his back. People who have no occasion for war do not make any impression of

being psychologically thwarted. Sweden has had no war since 1814, but the Swedes were, a few years ago, one of the happiest and most contented nations in the world. I doubt whether they are so still, but that is because, though neutral, they are unable to escape many of the evils of war. If political organization were such as to make war obviously unprofitable, there is nothing in human nature that would compel its occurrence, or make average people unhappy because of its not occurring. Exactly the same arguments that are now used about the impossibility of preventing war were formerly used in defense of clash, yet few of us feel smashed because we are not allowed to fight duels.

I am persuaded that there is ridiculousness no limit to the absurdities that can, by government action, come to be generally believed. Give me an adequate army, with power to provide it with more and better food than falls to the lot of the average man, and I will undertake, within thirty years, to make the majority of the population believe that two and two are three, that water freezes when it gets hot and boils when it gets cold, or any other nonsense that might seem to serve the interest of the State. Of course, even when these beliefs had been generated, people would not put the kettle in the ice-box when they wanted it to boil. That cold makes water boil would be a Sunday truth, sacred and mystical, to be professed in amazed tones, but not to be acted on in daily life. What would happen would be that any verbal denial of the mystic creed would be made illegal, and stubborn dissident would be "frozen" at the spike. No person who did not enthusiastically accept the official doctrine would be allowed to teach or to have any position of power. Only the very highest officials, in their cups, would whisper to each other what rubbish it all is; then they would laugh and drink again. This is hardly a satirize of what happens under some modern governments.

The discovery that man can be scientifically manipulated, and that governments can turn large masses this way or that as they choose, is one of the causes of our misfortunes. There is as much difference between a collection of mentally free citizens and a community influence by modern methods of advertisement as there is between a heap of raw materials and a battleship. Education, which was at first made universal in order that all might be able to read and write, has been found capable of serving quite other purposes. By instilling nonsense it unifies populations and generates collective enthusiasm. If all governments taught the same nonsense, the harm would not be so great. Unfortunately each has its own brand, and the diversity serves to produce hostility between the devotees of different tenets. If there is ever to be peace in the world, governments will have to agree either to inculcate no dogmas, or all to implant the same. The former, I fear, is a

Utopian ideal, but perhaps they could agree to teach collectively that all public men, everywhere, are completely virtuous and perfectly wise. Perhaps, when the war is over, the surviving politicians may find it prudent to combine on some such programme.

Generalizations about national characteristics are just as common and just as unwarranted as generalizations about women. Until 1870, the Germans were thought of as a nation of spectacled professors, evolving everything out of their inner consciousness, and scarcely aware of the outer world, but since 1870 this conception has had to be very sharply revised. Frenchmen seem to be thought of by most Americans as constantly engaged in amatory fascinate; Walt Whitman, in one of his catalogues, speaks of "the adulterous French couple on the guileful chaise." Americans who go to live in France are astonished, and perhaps disappointed, by the intensity of family life. Before the Russian Revolution, the Russians were credited with a mystical Slav soul, which, while it incapacitated them for ordinary sensible behavior, gave them a kind of deep wisdom to which more practical nations could not hope to attain. Suddenly everything was changed: mysticism was taboo, and only the most earthly ideals were tolerated. The truth is that what appears to one nation as the national character of another depends upon a few prominent individuals, or upon the class that happens to have power. For this reason, all generalizations on this subject are liable to be completely upset by any important political change.

To avoid the various foolish opinions to which mankind are prone, no superhuman genius is required. A few simple rules will keep you, not from all error, but from silly error.

If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the observation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do so because he thought he knew. Thinking that you know when in fact you don't is a calamitous mistake, to which we are all susceptible. I believe myself that hedgehogs eat black beetles, because I have been told that they do; but if I were writing a book on the habits of hedgehogs, I should not commit myself until I had seen one enjoying this unappetizing diet. Aristotle, however, was less cautious. Ancient and medieval authors knew all about unicorns and salamanders; not one of them thought it necessary to avoid peremptory statements about them because he had never seen one of them.

Many matters, however, are less easily brought to the test of experience. If, like most of mankind, you have passionate convictions on

many such matters, there are ways in which you can make yourself aware of your own bias. If an opinion contradictory to your own makes you angry, that is a sign that you are subconsciously aware of having no good reason for thinking as you do. If some one maintains that two and two are five, or that Iceland is on the equator, you feel pity rather than anger, unless you know so little of arithmetic or geography that his opinion shakes your own contrary conviction. The most savage controversies are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. Persecution is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion. So whenever you find yourself getting angry about a difference of opinion, be on your guard: you will probably find, on examination, that your belief is going beyond what the evidence warrants.

A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of assertiveness is to become aware of opinions held in social circles different from your own. When I was young, I lived much outside my own country in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States. I found this very profitable in diminishing the intensity of blinkered detriment prejudice. If you cannot travel, seek out people with whom you disagree, and read a newspaper belonging to a party that is not yours. If the people and the newspaper seem mad, awkward, and wicked, remind yourself that you seem so to them. In this opinion both parties may be right, but they cannot both be wrong. This reflection should generate a certain caution.

Becoming aware of foreign customs, however, does not always have a beneficial effect. In the seventeenth century, when the Manchus conquered China, it was the custom among the Chinese for the women to have small feet, and among the Manchus for the men to wear-pigtails. Instead of each dropping their own foolish custom, they each adopted the foolish custom of the other, and the Chinese continued to wear pigtails until they shook off the dominion of the Manchus in the revolution of 1911.

For those who have enough cerebral imagination, it is a good plan to imagine an argument with a person having a different partisanship. This has one advantage, and only one, as compared with actual conversation with opponents; this one advantage is that the method is not subject to the same limitations of time or space. Mahatma Gandhi abhors railways and steamboats and machinery; he would like to unfetter the whole of the industrial revolution. You may never have an opportunity of actually meeting any one who holds this opinion, because in Western countries most people take the advantage of modern technique for granted. But if you want to make sure that you are right in agreeing with the prevailing

opinion, you will find it a good plan to test the arguments that occur to you by considering what Gandhi might say in rebutted of them. I have sometimes been led actually to change my mind as a result of this kind of imaginary dialogue, and, short of this, I have frequently found myself growing less peremptory and conceited through realizing the possible reasonableness of a speculative opponent.

Be very wary of opinions that compliment your self-esteem. Both men and women, nine times out of ten, are firmly convinced of the superior excellence of their own sex. There is profuse evidence on both sides. If you are a man, you can point out that most poets and men of science are male; if you are a woman, you can retort that so are most criminals. The question is inherently insoluble, but self esteem conceals this from most people. We are all, whatever part of the world we come from, persuaded that our own nation is superior to all others. Seeing that each nation has its characteristic merits and demerits, we adjust our standard of values so as to make out that the merits possessed by our nation are the really important ones, while its demerits are comparatively trivial. Here, again, the rational man will admit that the question is one to which there is no demonstrably right answer. It is more difficult to deal with the self esteem of man as man, because we cannot argue out the matter with some non-human mind. The only way I know of dealing with this general human narcissism is to remind ourselves that man is a brief episode in the life of a small planet in a little corner of the universe, and that, for aught we know, other parts of the cosmos may contain beings as superior to ourselves as we are to jellyfish.

Other passions besides self-esteem are common sources of error; of these perhaps the most important is fear. Fear sometimes operates directly, by inventing rumors of disaster in war-time, or by imagining objects of terror, such as ghosts; sometimes it operates indirectly, by creating belief in something comforting, such as the elixir of life, or heaven for ourselves and hell for our enemies. Fear has many forms - fear of death, fear of the dark, fear of the unknown, fear of the herd, and that vague generalized fear that comes to those who conceal from themselves their more specific terrors. Until you have admitted your own fears to yourself, and have guarded yourself by a difficult effort of will against their mythmaking power, you cannot hope to think truly about many matters of great importance, especially those with which religious beliefs are concerned. Fear is the main source of credulity and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the stalking of truth as in the endeavor after a worthy manner of life.

Under the influence of great fear, almost everybody becomes illusory. The sailors who threw Jonah overboard imagined his presence to be the cause of the storm which threatened to debris their ship. In a similar spirit the Japanese, at the time of the Tokyo earthquake took to slaughtering Koreans and Liberals. When the Romans won victories in the Punic wars, the Carthaginians became persuaded that their misfortunes were due to a certain floppiness which had lurk into the worship of Moloch. Moloch liked having children sacrificed to him, and preferred them aristocratic; but the noble families of Carthage had adopted the practice of clandestine substituting proletarian children for their own offspring. This, it was thought, had displeased the god, and at the worst moments even the most aristocratic children were duly consumed in the fire. Strange to say, the Romans were victorious in spite of this democratic reform on the part of their enemies.

Collective fear stimulates herd instinct, and tends to produce ferocity toward those who are not regarded as members of the herd. So it was in the French Revolution, when dread of foreign armies produced the incumbency of terror. And it is to be feared that the Nazis, as defeat draws nearer, will increase the intensity of their campaign for decimating Jews. Fear generates impulses of cruelty, and therefore promotes such superstitious beliefs as seem to justify cruelty. Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of a great fear. And for this reason poltroons are more prone to cruelty than brave men, and are also more prone to superstition. When I say this, I am thinking of men who are brave in all respects, not only in facing death. Many a man will have the courage to die valorous, but will not have the courage to say, or even to think, that the cause for which he is asked to die is an unworthy one. Obloquy is, to most men, more painful than death; that is one reason why, in times of collective excitement, so few men venture to dissent from the prevailing opinion. No Carthaginian denied Moloch, because to do so would have required more courage than was required to face death in battle.

Perhaps the world would lose some of its interest and variety if such beliefs were wholly replaced by cold science. Perhaps we may allow ourselves to be glad of the Abecedarians, who were so-called because, having rejected all profane learning, they thought it wicked to learn the ABC. And we may enjoy the perplexity of the South American Jesuit who wondered how the sloth could have traveled, since the Flood, all the way from Mount Ararat to Peru - a journey which its extreme tardiness of locomotion rendered almost incredible. A wise man will enjoy the

goods of which there is a plentiful supply, and of intellectual rubbish he will find an abundant diet, in our own age as in every other.

Selected Passages of Intellectual Rubbish Clergy and its Opposition to Science

"When Benjamin Franklin invented the lightning rod, the clergy, both in England and America, with the enthusiastic support of George III, condemned it as an impious attempt to defeat the will of God. **For, as all right-thinking people were aware, lightning is sent by God to punish blasphemy or some other grave sin-the virtuous are never struck by lightning. Therefore if God wants to strike any one, Benjamin Franklin ought not to defeat His design; indeed, to do so is helping criminals to escape.** But God was equal to the occasion, if we are to believe the eminent Dr. Price, one of the leading divines of Boston. Lightning having been rendered ineffectual by the "iron points invented by the astute Dr. Franklin," Massachusetts was shaken by earthquakes, which Dr. Price perceived to be due to God's wrath at the "iron points." In a sermon on the subject he said, "In Boston are more erected than elsewhere in New England, and Boston seems to be more dreadfully shaken. Oh! there is no getting out of the mighty hand of God." Apparently, however, Nemesis gave up all hope of curing Boston of its wickedness, for, though lightning rods became more and more common, earthquakes in Massachusetts have remained rare. Nevertheless, Dr. Price's point of view, or something very like it, is still held by one of the most influential of living men."

"It was only very slowly and reluctantly that the Church concurrence the dismemberment of cadavers in connection with the study of medicine. The colonist in dismemberment was Vesalius, who was Court physician to the Emperor Charles V. His medical skill led the emperor to protect him, but after the emperor was dead he got into trouble. A cadaver which he was dissecting was said to have shown signs of life under the knife, and he was accused of murder. The quizzing was induced by King Phillip II to take a lenient view, and only sentenced him to a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

On the way home he was derelict and died of fatigue. For centuries after this time, medical students at the Papal University in Rome were only allowed to operate on lay figures, from which the sexual parts were omitted.

The devoutness of cadavers is a widespread belief. It was carried furthest by the Egyptians, among whom it led to the practice of mummification. It still exists in full force in China. **A French surgeon,**

who was employed by the Chinese to teach Western medicine, relates that his demand for corpses to dissect was received with horror, but he was assured that he could have instead an unlimited supply of live criminals. His objection to this alternative was totally unintelligible to his Chinese employers.

A Pun on Clergy

I am sometimes shocked by the profanity of those who think themselves pious—for instance, the nuns who never take a bath without wearing a bathrobe all the time. When asked why, since no man can see them, they reply: "Oh, but you forget the good God." Apparently they conceive of the Deity as a Peeping Tom, whose omnipotence enables Him to see through bathroom walls, but who is foiled by bathrobes. This view strikes me as curious."

Superstitions

"There was, until the end of the eighteenth century, a theory that absurdity is due to possession by devils. It was deduced that any pain suffered by the patient is also suffered by the devils, so that the best cure is to make the patient suffer so much that the devils will decide to abandon him. The insane, in accordance with this theory, were savagely beaten. This treatment was tried on King George III when he was mad, but without success. It is a curious and painful fact that almost all the completely futile treatments that have been believed in during the long history of medical folly have been such as caused acute suffering to the patient. When stupeficient were discovered, devout people considered them an attempt to evade the will of God. It was pointed out, however, that when God extracted Adam's rib He put him into a deep sleep. This proved that stupeficient are all right for men; women, however, ought to suffer, because of the curse of Eve. In the West votes for women proved this doctrine mistaken, but in Japan, to this day, women in childbirth are not allowed any mitigate through anaesthetics. As the Japanese do not believe in Genesis, this piece of sadism must have some other justification."

Racism

"In the matter of race, there are different beliefs in different societies. Where monarchy is firmly established, kings are of a higher race than their subjects. Until very recently, it was universally believed that men are connatural more intelligent than women; even so enlightened a man as Spinoza decides against votes for women on this ground. Among white men, it is held that white

men are by nature superior to men of other colors, and especially to black men; in Japan, on the contrary, it is thought that yellow is the best color. In Haiti, when they make statues of Christ and Satan, they make Christ black and Satan white. **Aristotle and Plato considered Greeks so congenitally superior to barbarians that slavery is justified so long as the master is Greek and the slave barbarian."**

Human Nature

"One of the most widespread popular maxims is, "human nature cannot be changed." No one can say whether this is true or not without first defining "human nature." But as used it is certainly false. When Mr. Autters the maxim, with an air of predictive and conclusive wisdom, what he means is that all men everywhere wnt always continue to behave as they do in his own home town. A little anthropology will dispel this belief. Among the Tibetans, one wife has many husbands, because men are too poor to support a whole wife; yet family life, according to travellers, is no unhappy than elsewhere. The practice of lending one's wife to a guest is very common among uncivilized tribes. The Australian aborigines, at puberty, undergo a very painful operation which, throughout the rest of their lives, greatly diminishes sexual vigour. Puericide, which might seem perverse to human nature, was almost universal before the rise of Christianity, and is recommended by Plato to prevent over-population. Private property is not recognized among some savage tribes. **Even among highly civilized people, economic considerations will disallow what is called "human nature."** In Moscow, where there is an acute housing shortage, when an unmarried woman is pregnant, it often happens that a number of men contend for the legal right to be considered the father of the probable child, because whoever is judged to be the father acquires the right to share the woman's room, and half a room is better than no room."

State Implemental Precept

"I am persuaded that there is absolutely no limit to the ridiculousness that can, by government action, come to be generally believed. **Give me an adequate army, with power to provide it with more pay and better food than falls to the lot of the average man, and I will undertake, within thirty years, to make the majority of the population believe that two and two are three, that water freezes when it gets hot and boils when it gets cold, or any other nonsense that might seem to serve the interest of the State. Of course, even when these beliefs had been generated, people would not put the**

kettle in the ice-box when they wanted it to boil. That cold makes water boil would be a Sunday truth, sacred and mystical, to be professed in amazed tones, but not to be acted on in daily life. What would happen would be that any verbal denial of the mystic doctrine would be made illegal, and obstinate heretics would be "frozen" at the stake. No person who did not avidly accept the official doctrine would be allowed to teach or to have any position of power. Only the very highest officials, in their cups, would whisper to each other what rubbish it all is; then they would laugh and drink again. This is hardly a caricature of what happens under some modern governments."

More on Superstitions and Arm-Chair Philosophy

"When one reads of the beliefs of savages, or of the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians, they seem surprising by their fickle farce. But beliefs that are just as absurd are still entertained by the uneducated even in the most modern and civilized societies. I have been gravely assured, in America, which people born in March are unlucky and people born in May are bizarrely liable to corns. I do not know the history of these superstitions, but probably they are derived from Babylonian or Egyptian priestly love. Beliefs begin in the higher social strata, and then, like mud in a river, sink gradually downward in the educational scale; they may take 3,000 or 4,000 years to sink all the way. You may find your colored help making some remark that comes straight out of Plato—not the parts of Plato that scholar's quote, but the parts where he utters obvious nonsense, such as those men who do not pursue wisdom in this life will be born again as women. Commentators on great philosophers always politely ignore their silly remarks. Aristotle, in spite of his reputation, is full of absurdities. He says that children should be conceived in the winter, when the wind is in the North, and that if people marry too young the children will be female. He tells us that the blood of females is blacker than that of males; that the pig is the only animal liable to measles; that an elephant suffering from sleeplessness should have its shoulders rubbed with salt, olive-oil, and warm water; that women have fewer teeth than men, and so on. Nevertheless, he is considered by the great majority of philosophers a archetype of wisdom.

Superstitions about lucky and unlucky days are almost universal. In ancient times they governed the actions of generals. Among ourselves the prejudice against Friday and the number thirteen is very active; sailors do not like to sail on Friday, and many hotels have no thirteenth floor. The superstitions about Friday and thirteen were once believed by those reputed wise; now such men regard them as harmless follies. But

probably 2,000 years hence many beliefs of the wise of our day will have come to seem equally foolish. Man is a gullible animal, and must believe something; in the absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.

Falsifiable, Piety and Reason

"If the matter is one that can be settled by observation, make the observation yourself. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. He did not do so because he thought he knew. Thinking that you know when in fact you don't is a fatal mistake, to which we are all prone. I believe myself that hedgehogs eat black beetles, because I have been told that they do; but if I were writing a book on the habits of hedgehogs, I should not commit myself until I had seen one enjoying this unappetizing diet. Aristotle, however, was less cautious. Ancient and medieval authors knew all about unicorns and salamanders', not one of them thought it necessary to avoid peremptory statements about them because he had never seen one of them.

Many matters, however, are less easily brought to the test of experience. If, like most of mankind, you have passionate convictions on many such matters, there are ways in which you can make yourself aware of your own bias. If an opinion perverse to your own makes you angry, that is a sign that you are subconsciously aware of having no good reason for thinking as you do. If some one maintains that two and two are five, or that Iceland is on the equator, you feel pity rather than anger, unless you know so little of arithmetic or geography that his opinion shakes your own contrary conviction. The most savage controversies are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. **Oppression is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion. So whenever you find yourself getting angry about a difference of opinion, be on your guard; you will probably find, on examination, that your belief is going beyond what the corroboration warrants. A good way of ridding yourself of certain kinds of assertiveness is to become aware of opinions held in social circles different from your own."**

Fear and Superstitions

"Other passions besides self-esteem are common sources of error; of these perhaps the most important is fear. Fear sometimes operates directly, by inventing rumors of calamity in war-time, or by

imagining objects of terror, such as ghosts; sometimes it operates indirectly, by creating belief in something comforting, such as the elixir of life, or heaven for ourselves and hell for our enemies. Fear has many forms—fear of death, fear of the dark, fear of the unknown, fear of the herd, and that vague generalized fear that comes to those who camouflage from themselves their more specific terrors. Until you have admitted your own fears to yourself, and have guarded yourself by a difficult effort of will against their mythmaking power, you cannot hope to think truly about many matters of great importance, especially those with which religious beliefs are concerned. Fear is the main source of superstition and one of the main sources of cruelty. **To trounce fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the pursuit of truth as in the venture after a worthy manner of life.**"

"Under the influence of great fear, almost everybody becomes **illusory**. The sailors who threw Jonah overboard imagined his presence to be the cause of the storm which threatened to devastate their ship. In a similar spirit the Japanese, at the time of the Tokyo earthquake took to slaughtering Koreans and Liberals. When the Romans won victories in the Punic wars, the Carthaginians became persuaded that their misfortunes were due to a certain floppiness which had crept into the worship of Moloch. Moloch liked having children sacrificed to him, and preferred them aristocratic; but the noble families of Carthage had adopted the practice of clandestine substituting plebeian children for their own offspring. This, it was thought, had displeased the god, and at the worst moments even the most aristocratic children were duly consumed in the fire. Strange to say, the Romans were victorious in spite of this democratic reform on the part of their enemies."

Some Fun out of Superstitions

"But we have been getting too solemn. Superstitions are not always dark and cruel; often they add to the gaiety of life. I received once a communication from the God Osiris, giving me his telephone number; he lived, at that time, in a fringe of Boston. Although I did not enroll myself among his worshipers, his letter gave me pleasure. I have frequently received letters from men announcing themselves as the Messiah, and urging me not to omit to mention this important fact in my lectures. During prohibition, there was a sect which maintained that the communion service ought to be celebrated in whiskey, not in wine; this tenet gave them a legal right to a supply of hard liquor, and the sect grew rapidly. There is in England a sect who maintains that the English are the lost ten tribes; there is a stricter sect, which maintains that they are only the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh. Whenever I encounter a member of

either of these sects, I profess myself an adherent of the other and much pleasant argumentation results. I like also the men who study the Great Pyramid, with a view to decrypting its mystical lore. Many great books have been written on this subject, some of which have been presented to me by their authors. It is a singular fact that the Great Pyramid always foretells the history of the world accurately up to the date of publication of the book in question, but after that date it becomes less reliable. Generally the author expects, very soon, wars in Egypt, followed by Armageddon and the coming of Antichrist, but by this time so many people have been recognized as Antichrist that the reader is reluctantly driven to skepticism."

Summary

Man is a rational animal—so at least Russell has been told. Throughout a long life, he has looked diligently for evidence in favor of this statement, but so far he has not had the good fortune to come across it, though he had searched in many countries spread over three continents.

As soon as we relinquish our own reason, and are content to rely upon authority, there is no end to our troubles. Man is a credulous animal, and must believe something; in the absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.

For his part he distrusts all generalizations about women, favourable and unfavourable, masculine and feminine, ancient and modern; all alike, he should say, result from paucity of experience. Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted.

The most savage dissension are those about matters as to which there is no good evidence either way. Oppression is used in theology, not in arithmetic, because in arithmetic there is knowledge, but in theology there is only opinion.

Fear is the main source of superstition, and one of the main sources of cruelty. To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom, in the pursuit of truth as in the endeavour after a worthy manner of life. Every advance in civilization has been castigated as unnatural while it was recent. Education, which was at first made universal in order that all might be able to read and write, has been found capable of serving quite other purposes. By instilling nonsense, it unifies populations and generates

collective enthusiasm. If all governments taught the same nonsense, the harm would not be so great.

SUMMARY

The aspects of Bertrand Russell views on philosophy cover the changing viewpoints of philosopher/mathematician Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), from his early writings in 1896 until his death in February 1970.

Russell is generally credited with being one of the founders of analytic philosophy, but he also produced a body of work that covers logic, the philosophy of Mathematics, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology, including his 1913 *Theory of Knowledge* and the related article he wrote for the 1926 edition of *Encyclopedia Britannica*.

This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to multitudinous people who are wholly impolite of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. Thus utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.

KEY WORDS

1. **Apartheid** : The belief that race accounts for differences in human character or ability and that a particular race is superior to others.
2. **Superstition** : An irrational belief that an object, action, or circumstance not logically related to a course of events influences its outcome.
3. **Theology** : The study of the nature of God and religious truth; rational inquiry into religious questions.
4. **Philosophy** : The discipline comprising logic, ethics, exquistic, metaphysics, and epistemology.
5. **Dogmatism** : A statement of a point of view as if it were an established fact.

REVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Explain the philosophical views of Russell on politics.
2. Describe the Russell's idea of Philosophy for laymen.
3. Write down the summary on the essay, "The Future of mankind".
4. Discuss the ideas of Russell expressed through, "An Outline of intellectual Rubbish".
5. Examine the important quotes of the essay, "An Outline of intellectual Rubbish".
6. How the British is distinguished among other European countries?
7. Why does Russell attack Hegel's philosophy?
8. Differentiate Dogmatism and Skepticism.
9. What are the two problems of mankind, according to Russell?
10. Write about the power of government over men's belief.

SUGGESTED READINGS

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| 1. Unpopular Essays | —Bertrand Russell |
| 2. Bertrand Russell : Philosopher and Humanist | —John Lewis |
| 3. Bertrand Russell and His World | —Ronald W. Clark |
| 4. Bertrand Russell | —John Slater |
| 5. Bertrand Russell's Ethics | —Michael K. Potter |

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