

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHINGLE SPRINGS RANCHERIA,

Plaintiff,

v .

GRASSY RUN COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT, a public entity; et al.,

"Defendants

Civ. S-96-1414-DFL

FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

The Grassy Run Community Services District and the allied intervenors (collectively the "District") seek a civil contempt citation from the court as to the Shingle Springs Rancheria, Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, (collectively the

"Rancheria") and Richard L. Moody, an employee of the Rancheria. In addition, the District seeks a contempt citation as to Loring Brunius d/b/a Sierra Rock (collectively "Sierra Rock"). The court held an evidentiary hearing on April 3, 1998, and heard oral argument on April 8, 1998.

The court issued a preliminary injunction on December 9, 1997, limiting use of the District's roads. The injunction implements an earlier order of the Court finding that the District's roads are private.

The facts are not much in dispute. There are two areas of dispute that must be resolved. First, there is a question as to whether the purpose of the road building undertaken by the Rancheria on an adjoining parcel was a commercial purpose. The court finds that the predominant purpose of the Rancheria in seeking to establish a second access road was to further its goal of opening a gambling casino on the Rancheria. Second, there is some dispute as to whether Mr. Moody urged the Sierra Rock truck driver to deliver a third load on December 10. According to Mr. Moody he was surprised and upset by the second delivery of road base because it was after 2:30 p.m. However, in light of the credible testimony of the truck driver, Mr. McCoy, who has not been involved in the continuing conflict between the District and the Rancheria, the court finds that Mr. Moody did urge a third delivery on that day knowing that the delivery would be in

violation of the preliminary injunction and further that Mr.

Moody did not chastise the truck driver for the late second

delivery. Shortly after requesting the third delivery, however,

Mr. Moody retracted the request and telephoned Sierra Rock to

call off the third load.

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The court finds that on December 10 and 11, 1997, the preliminary injunction was violated by the Rancheria, Mr. Moody and Sierra Rock. All of the three deliveries of road base violated the court's order because the order prohibits use of the District's roads except for noncommercial, residential purposes. The order permits access for "entities delivering goods and services to Rancheria residents for their personal and noncommercial use only." This section of the preliminary injunction does not apply to the rock deliveries here since a purpose--certainly the principal, if not the only, purpose--of those deliveries was to build a road for the development of the casino. These road base deliveries cannot fairly be described as for the "personal and non-commercial use only" of Rancheria residents. Further, the second delivery was also after 2:30 in the afternoon which constituted a distinct violation of the terms of the order prohibiting commercial vehicles from using the District roads outside of the period from 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m.

Applying the standards in <u>Perry v. O'Donnell</u>, 759 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1985) and <u>In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder</u>

1 Antitrust Litigation, 10 F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 1993), the court 2 finds that the Rancheria and Richard L. Moody are in contempt of 3 the preliminary injunction. The Rancheria and Mr. Moody had 4 actual notice of the injunction and a copy of the injunction by 5 9:00 a.m. on December 10, 1997. Given that Mr. Moody had just 6 that morning ordered three truck loads of road base, it was 7 incumbent on him and Chairman Murray to read the order and to 8 assure compliance with the order. According to Chairman Murray, he believed that the injunction was so broad as to prohibit 10 virtually any use of the District's private roads. Although this 11 overstates the sweep of the order, it should have been clear to 12 Murray and Moody that the order did uphold the private character 13 of the District roads and could affect any commercial use by the 14 Rancheria of those roads. In these circumstances, the Rancheria 15 and Mr. Moody should have sought advice from counsel or from the 16 District before making use of the District roads with heavy equipment. There was no urgency to the delivery of the three 18 loads. In short, the road base order should have been withdrawn once Mr .- Moody realized that a court order had been entered. Furthermore, Mr. Moody, upon reading the order, did not

instruct Sierra Rock to make any deliveries before 2:30. Thus, even had he been confused as to whether building a road off the Rancheria was a use of the roads permitted by the order, there could have been no confusion as to the time limitation in the

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order. Mr. Moody apparently instructed Sierra Rock in November, when the order for road base was first made, that the delivery should be between 9:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. This was consistent with an earlier order of the court. But when the preliminary injunction was issued, it was Mr. Moody's duty to advise Sierra Rock of the terms of the order and to seek assurance that Sierra Rock would comply. Instead, Mr. Moody placed the order and left the Rancheria, leaving it to chance and the memory of Sierra Rock as to when the deliveries would be made.

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Sierra Rock is a third party that finds itself unhappily situated in the midst of contending parties all of whom are potential customers. It received notice of the impending order from Mr. Johnson, attorney for the District, by a letter in late November. The letter warns Sierra Rock not to use District roads for the building of a road adjoining the Rancheria. On December 10, 1997 at 2:25 p.m. it received a fax copy of the preliminary injunction as well as a second copy of the letter from Mr. Johnson. This was just before the second load was delivered from the quarry. According to Sherry Kope, she paid no attention to the fax even though the machine was close at hand. When a Grassy Run property owner called to angrily protest, Ms.

To the extent that Sierra Rock personnel are claiming that the Johnson letter was not received or that its significance was not understood, the court finds to the contrary. This testimony is not credible.

Kope and others at Sierra Rock read and discussed the fax. On the view that only the timing of the delivery was at issue, Mr. Brunius decided to deliver the third load the following morning after 9:00 a.m. It was not a particularly difficult decision to call off the late afternoon delivery since Mr. Moody also called to postpone the third delivery until the following morning.

One aspect of Sierra Rock's knowledge and conduct bears particular attention and this concerns the timing of the second load. Sierra Rock knew that the deliveries were to be made only between 9:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. Mr. Moody had told Sierra Rock in November about this time limitation, and the limitation is posted on a sign at the entrance of the District road. The limitation also appears on the delivery order. See exhibit O. Further, the Johnson letter advised Sierra Rock of the September 24, 1996 order that limited use of the District roads by large trucks to the hours of 9:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Sherry Kope, the weight master and receptionist at Sierra Rock, testified that she was under the impression that Sierra Rock had until 3:00 p.m. to use the District roads. Yet the second truck on December 10 left Sierra Rock so late that it would necessarily be on the

The controversy between the District and the Rancheria is a matter of considerable local notoriety and has been continuing for well over a year. There have been newspaper articles. There

have been confrontations between Sierra Rock trucks and Grassy Run residents. Mr. Brunius was aware of the controversy. In light of the previous orders entered, as well as the Johnson letter, and in view of the continuing controversy, it was incumbent upon Sierra Rock to at least check with the District before using the District Roads on December 10, 1997, particularly since part of that use was in a time period that Sierra Rock knew was not permitted by District regulations and a prior order of the court. Further, Sierra Rock was not entitled to assume that it could traverse the District's private roads so long as it adhered to the time limitations. Even a cursory reading of the order by a lay person would have caused a prudent person in the position of Mr. Brunius to hesitate to send any further trucks across District property, particularly in light of the Johnson letter that specifically warned against use of the District's roads for the purpose of building a road on the property adjoining the Rancheria. Again, the easy and obvious step to take was to inquire of the District whether the final delivery would be permitted.

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In these circumstances, the court finds that Loring Brunius d/b/a Sierra Rock is in contempt of the court's December 9, 1997 order.

In crafting a remedy the court has considerable discretion. The purpose of civil contempt is to assure future compliance.

Since the December 11, 1997 delivery there do not appear to have been any other similar violations of the court's order by the Rancheria, Mr. Moody or Sierra Rock. Further, although the violations here are not fairly described as "technical," they also are not flagrant. Finally, there are mitigating circumstances. The Rancheria posted a sign limiting deliveries; Mr. Moody instructed Sierra Rock to abide by the 9:00 to 2:30 time limit; and the third delivery was postponed until the following day. Sierra Rock's position as a third party, caught between contending factions, is relevant to any sanction as to Sierra Rock.

In light of all of the circumstances, the court finds it unnecessary to impose any sanction to assure future compliance.

The District requests attorneys fees in the amount of \$8,500. This consists of 28 hours at \$240 an hour for Mr.

Nichols and 15 hours at \$125 an hour for Mr. Johnson. The court will not apply Mr. Nichols' rate for a number of reasons. Mr.

Nichols is a District homeowner which explains his participation in the case. Much of the preparation could have been handled by an associate at a lower rate. Moreover, Mr. Johnson would have handled the matter were it not for a conflict with Sierra Rock.

Forty-three hours at Mr. Johnson's rate comes to \$5,375. The court finds that this is a reasonable amount of time at a

reasonable rate.2

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The court has discretion to order payment of attorneys fees depending on the particular facts of the case. In the circumstances here the court awards \$3,000 in fees to the District payable by the Rancheria and Mr. Moody, jointly and severally. The fees shall be paid within fourteen days of the date of this order. As to the remaining \$2,375 the court orders that this sum shall be paid by Sierra Rock, the Rancheria, and Mr. Moody jointly and severally; however, the court holds this portion of the award in abeyance and shall not order payment of the \$2,375 unless there is a violation of the court's December 9, 1997 order within 240 days of the date of this order by Sierra Rock, the Rancheria or Mr. Moody. If there is a violation by Sierra Rock, the Rancheria or Mr. Moody within the next 240 days, the party who violates the order shall be responsible for payment of the entire sum of \$2,375 immediately. Moreover, in the event of a new violation, the court may also make a further finding of contempt, whether civil or criminal, and impose such sanctions as appear appropriate. Thus, the \$2,375 figure shall not act as a limit on the court in the event of a new violation; its purpose

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Rancheria and Sierra Rock each contend that it should not be liable for attorney time spent preparing the case as to the other. However, the activities of the two entities was so interrelated that no segregation of time is appropriate. Furthermore, the Rancheria and Mr. Moody caused Sierra Rock to violate the order.

is only to induce compliance. If there is no further violation by Sierra Rock, the Rancheria or Mr. Moody during the next 240 days, the obligation to pay \$2,375 shall be purged.

The court declines to order payment of the expense incurred by the District in hiring a security guard.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1001 9,1598

United States District Judge