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Last week, when I offered an amendment # 1389 to suspend the 45-day Congressional review of the President's final BRAC recommendations pending the completion of several vital studies pertaining to long-range security needs and the implementation of the overseas BRAC recommendations and redeployment of many of the units presently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan back to bases in the U.S. I also introduced a similar amendment yesterday # 1489, that would allow the Congress discretion to remove individual bases from the closure list based upon the findings of these studies and results of these redeployments. These are two separate options, Mr. President, one of which I hope comes to the floor for a vote.

I underscore the assertions I made last week. The underlying purpose of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is not only good for our armed forces, it is good for the American taxpayer. We all want to eliminate waste and reduce redundancy in the government. But when Congress modified the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law in December 2001, to make way for the 2005 round of base closings, it failed to envision this country involved in a protracted war involving stretched manpower resources, and the burden of large overseas rotational deployments of both troops and equipment.

This is not the time to begin a new round of domestic base closures and massive relocations of manpower and equipment. I am aware, that coming from a member of Congress with a major base on the chopping block, this assertion may just sound like another pitch to defend a home-state parochial interest.

Regardless of the outcome for my base, I am very concerned about how this BRAC round will effect our nation's overall military posture, not just in South

Dakota, but around the country and globally. This BRAC, in particular, has serious implications - both in the short term, because we are engaged in a war, and in the longer term, because of the need to preserve critical infrastructure as we enter an uncertain future. In essence, we cannot lose sight of the imperative that in addition to saving money, perhaps the most critical goal of the BRAC process should be to maximize our nation's warfighting capability. If we fail to follow that principle, the BRAC process will fail us and, ultimately, put this country at risk. This BRAC, in particular, not only has serious implications - it has serious flaws, especially in terms of its timing.

In the short term, our war in Iraq and Afghanistan has put great logistical strain on our active military and reserve forces, in terms of both manpower and resources. Repeated rotational deployments of personnel and assets to overseas areas of operation, have disrupted normal training and maintenance cycles, and left military families with uncertainty. The drain of resources has also raised questions as to our ability to respond to additional flashpoints, if a crisis should arise elsewhere in the world. Yes, the military is performing its ongoing missions remarkably well under the circumstances. But is this the time, to add to those commitments by initiating a massive reshuffle of personnel, equipment and missions between bases all over the country?

[PUT UP WMD BOARD AT THIS POINT] In the long term, these recommendations may pose an even more serious risk to our security. As DoD points out itself in The National Defense Strategy, published earlier this year the nexus of transitional threats, terrorist organizations armed with weapons of mass

destruction is the threat we face in the future. We simply do not know what dangers may emerge from military powers like North Korea, China, Iran or various rogue states in the next 20 years or more. And, the threat of terrorism directed against targets in this country should be indisputable after 9/11.

There have been 4 prior BRAC rounds in the last 20 years, and I believe it is readily apparent that that the Pentagon's 2005 BRAC recommendations go beyond reducing excess infrastructure, and would instead reduce critical infrastructure needed to fight the wars of the 21st century. Prior round have been successful in pulling much of the low-hanging fruit and in reducing waste. This round begins to cut into the muscle. In 1958, for example, there were a large number of Air Force bases in the Northern region. [PUT UP 1st NORTHERN REGION FLYING MISSION BOARDS HERE] Today, one can plainly see how dramatically that number has been reduced, and will be further reduced in the 2005 BRAC round. [PUT UP 2nd NORTHERN REGION FLYING MISSION BOARDS HERE] Of course, one of the flaws I see in this BRAC is not only the stripping of air and naval bases in the northern tier, but I seriously question the Pentagon's what I believe to be one of its most apparent errors in judgment -- to consolidate high-value assets in fewer locations.

In light of potential threats we face, I wonder whether we really want to discard a tenet of military doctrine we have lived by for the last sixty years -- "strategic redundancy." Put simply, it is the doctrine of dispersing high-value assets at different locations in order to prevent their complete destruction in a single attack. [PUT UP "NESTS & EGGS" BOARD AT THIS POINT]

[PUT UP STRATEGIC REDUNDANCY BOARD AT THIS POINT] The Department of Defense seemed to understand this in its March 2005 *National Defense Strategy* when it stated its goal of “*developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations.*”

[PUT UP “PRINCIPLES & IMPERATIVES” BOARD AT THIS POINT] Even in the Pentagon’s deliberative briefing materials, outlining their “principles and imperatives” of this BRAC round, it stated that the department needed secure installations optimally located, that support power projection, sustain the capability to mobilize and “*that ensure strategic redundancy.*” Unfortunately, Secretary Rumsfeld’s recent BRAC recommendations to consolidate some of the nation’s most valuable air and naval platforms at single installations, would apparently abandon that basic tenet in favor of cutting costs.

[PUT UP PEARL HARBOR BOARD AT THIS POINT] Hopefully, we have not forgotten the short-sightedness we once had as a nation before Pearl Harbor. We might dismiss such lapses as distant events from another time and another place, not really applicable to today’s threats. Even in the DOD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support just released a few weeks ago – incidentally this is a partial completion of one of the amendment’s conditions – notes that “*a significant element of mission assurance is continuity of operations - maintaining the ability to carry out DoD mission essential functions in the event of a national emergency or terrorist attack.*” It also states that “*an attack on DoD facilities could directly affect the Departments ability to project power overseas.*” Mr. President,

one well positioned crater in a runway could ground the entire fleet of this country's B-1 bombers during an emergency, if they are all stationed at one location. It should always come back to the intuitive logic possessed by most Americans, Mr President: that we simply cannot allow analytical cost models to trump sound – and proven – security precautions. Strategic redundancy obviously still has a place in our planning – as demonstrated in the Pentagon's planning documents. Why was it not reflected in its BRAC recommendations?

Additionally, the risk of natural disasters is a constant reminder that we shouldn't put all our assets in a single location . [PUT UP TORNADO PICTURE AT THIS POINT] This is a tornado that passed within 1,000 feet of F-16s and B-1 bombers stationed at McConnell AFB in 1991. [PUT UP TORNADO DAMAGE PICTURE AT THIS POINT] Tornadoes have wrecked havoc on air force bases in the past – this one at Carswell AFB. We simply cannot afford to risk our nation's security on the whims of a single deadly tornado that could destroy or damage an entire fleet of aircraft.

Finally, the GAO has also questioned the potential for cost savings estimated by the DoD, calling into question whether we really want to risk our national security for minimal cost savings. [PUT UP & READ 1st GAO BOARD AT THIS POINT] As this implies, much of these cost savings are apparently illusory. To quote the distinguished Chairman of this Committee, Senator Warner during his testimony before the BRAC Commission .. *“Since 32% of BRAC savings come from personnel reductions, this calls into question the entire savings estimate—particularly since we are not reducing any meaningful force structure.”*

[PUT UP & READ 2d GAO BOARD AT THIS POINT]. The GAO also questions the lengthy payback periods, inconsistencies in DOD's estimates of milcon costs and uncertainties of total costs to implement BRAC. GAO estimates up front costs of an estimated \$24 billion to implement this round of BRAC.

To again quote the distinguished Chairman of the armed services committee before the BRAC commission *"My observations are consistent with the testimony of witnesses and Congressional delegations around the country to date who have presented the Commission firm evidence supporting similar observations of questionable data and an internal collapse of the quantitative analytical foundation in lieu of other guidance provided by senior defense officials. These observations are also consistent with issues raised by the Government Accountability Office in its July 1, 2005 report to the Commission and to Congress."*

The distinguished Chairman, Senator Warner has made a reasonable argument that by suspending the 45-day review period until these conditions are met would cause anxiety among some communities by not knowing their ultimate fate or delaying the process of redeveloping the base to civilian use. This may be the case for some communities, but I believe most communities desperately want to retain their bases because they are the lifeblood of their local economy. They would do anything – exhaust every possibility - to have these bases remain open. If anything, knowing that this Congress had done all it could to have all the answers before making such a decision, I think is tremendously important to these communities. I also challenge the perception made by many that theses

communities will have many opportunities to develop these closed bases, and quickly restore their economy. This will probably not be the case in rural areas around bases like Ellsworth and Cannon Air Force bases.

[PUT UP ELLSWORTH/OCEANA BOARD] Some communities may actually prosper from a base closing – where land for business and home development comes at a high premium and sell for thousands of dollars a square foot. Bases like Oceania, will have no difficulty put the land to profitable use. As you can see here, surrounded by a sea of development and prosperity. Other bases, like Ellsworth, in my state, are surrounded by miles and miles of empty range land and has scant hopes of a booming development taking hold of the former base, as compared Oceana. There is little doubt that the nearby community of Rapid City would have no problems with a delay, if it means insuring the right decision has truly been made.

Mr. President, there are just too many unanswered questions regarding our nations long term security needs and the circumstances in which our military may have to operate in the future, to make irreversible decisions that we could pay terrible price for later. We will not be able to easily replace or position these installations and units once this BRAC is fully implemented and we discover we have made a colossal mistake. Let's take a breath and slow down. My two amendments – offered as options – merely allow this nation to have full benefit of all the information that we need before moving ahead to implement BRAC. The risk is too great.