




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PRE-EXAMINATION FORECAST · SOLUTIONS BOOKLET

20 Expected Questions

in Paper 1 & 2 of the UPSC CSE Main
Philosophy Optional

TO HAPPEN ON

30th August 2026, Sunday

Philosophy Optional with **Vikash Sir**

The IAS Akademia · We Are Because You Are

All 56 parts answered
24 classroom charts



PRE-EXAMINATION FORECAST · SOLUTIONS BOOKLET

20 Expected Questions in Paper I & II of the UPSC CSE Mains Philosophy Optional

To be held on Sunday, 30 August 2026

Philosophy Optional with Vikash Sir · with complete solutions to all 56 questions and sub-parts of both papers

EXCLUSIVELY WITH VIKASH SIR**UPSC 2018 — Optional score 155/250 · UPPCS 2020 — Optional score 150/200**

Twenty high-conviction questions drawn from a probabilistic forecast built on eighteen official question papers and a 666-entry topic index — and, around them, a full predicted paper: **every question and every sub-part of Paper I and Paper II, all 56 slots, answered.**

SOURCE OF THE ANSWERS

Every answer in this booklet is written from **Vikash Sir's handwritten notes and class material** — the same expositions, criticisms, counter-responses and comparisons used in the classroom, compressed to the marks each slot carries.

How to use this booklet. The paper follows the UPSC architecture exactly — Q1 and Q5 are the compulsory five-part questions at 10 marks each, and Q2–Q4 and Q6–Q8 carry three parts at 20, 15 and 15. That is 28 parts per paper and 56 in all, and every one of them is answered here. The twenty forecast questions carry a *Why probable* box and a mentor note; the remaining parts complete the paper so that no slot is left unprepared.

Supplementary reading. Where a doctrine is best held in the eye rather than in prose, a full-page classroom chart has been placed immediately after the answer it belongs to. This edition carries **twenty-four** of them across both papers, each labelled with the question it supports, and more will be added in later editions.

This is a probability-based academic forecasting exercise derived from 25 years of UPSC PYQs. No claim is made that these questions will be asked.

The twenty high-conviction calls

The forecast proper. Listed in question-paper order, under the slot each is expected to occupy. The complete 56-part map of both papers follows overleaf.

PAPER I

1(a)	Plato — the Form of the Good and its relation to the other Forms	10
1(b)	Aristotle — the four causes and the charge of teleology	10
2(a)	Kant — objective validity of the categories in the Transcendental Deduction	20
3(a)	Wittgenstein — <i>form of life</i> , and the charge of relativism	20
4(a)	Heidegger — why Being is approached through <i>Dasein</i> ; being-in-the-world against the Cartesian subject	20
5(b)	Vaiśeṣika — <i>paramāṇuvāda</i> and the role of <i>adr̥ṣṭa</i>	10
6(a)	Nyāya — <i>vyāpti</i> , how it is known, and the role of <i>tarka</i>	20
7(a)	Yogācāra — consciousness alone as real; the function of <i>ālayavijñāna</i>	20
7(b)	Sāṃkhya — <i>satkāryavāda</i> against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation	15
8(a)	Śaṅkara — <i>adhyāsa</i> and the two orders of reality	20

PAPER II

1(a)	Rawls' difference principle and the justification of inequality	10
3(a)	Indian secularism as 'principled distance' rather than strict separation	20
3(b)	Retribution as a ground of punishment	15
4(a)	Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau on political obligation — incompatible ?	20
5(b)	The cosmological argument and Kant's objection to it	10
5(d)	Mysticism — its characteristics, and its claim to be knowledge	10
5(e)	Does the divine command theory make moral obligation arbitrary ?	10
6(a)	The free-will defence, and whether it accounts for natural evil	20
7(a)	Exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism on conflicting truth-claims	20
8(a)	The numinous as the distinctive object of religious consciousness	20

Full coverage map

Both papers in the UPSC architecture — Q1 and Q5 compulsory at five parts of 10, Q2–Q4 and Q6–Q8 at 20 · 15 · 15. A ★ marks the twenty forecast calls.

PAPER I · SECTION A — WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

- Q1 · 10** (a) ★ Plato — the Form of the Good · (b) ★ Aristotle — the four causes · (c) Descartes — method of doubt and the *cogito* · (d) Hume — causality and necessary connection · (e) Moore — the defence of common sense
- Q2 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Kant — objective validity of the categories · (b) Spinoza — substance, attribute and mode · (c) Leibniz — monads and pre-established harmony
- Q3 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Wittgenstein — *form of life* · (b) Logical positivism — the verification principle · (c) Quine — the two dogmas of empiricism
- Q4 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Heidegger — *Dasein* and being-in-the-world · (b) Husserl — the phenomenological method · (c) Sartre — freedom, bad faith and responsibility

PAPER I · SECTION B — INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

- Q5 · 10** (a) Cārvāka — perception as the only *pramāṇa* · (b) ★ Vaiśeṣika — *paramāṇuvāda* and *adr̥ṣṭa* · (c) Jaina — *anekāntavāda* and *syādvāda* · (d) Mīmāṃsā — intrinsic validity of knowledge · (e) Yoga — *citta-vṛtti-nirodha* and *kaivalya*
- Q6 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Nyāya — *vyāpti* and *tarka* · (b) Theories of error in Indian philosophy · (c) Buddhism — *kṣaṇikavāda* and its critics
- Q7 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Yogācāra — *ālayavijñāna* · (b) ★ Sāṃkhya — *satkāryavāda* · (c) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika — proofs for the existence of Īśvara
- Q8 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Śaṅkara — *adhyāsa* and the two orders · (b) Rāmānuja — Viśiṣṭādvaita against Advaita · (c) Mokṣa and *jīvanmukti* across the schools

PAPER II · SECTION A — SOCIO-POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

- Q1 · 10** (a) ★ Rawls' difference principle · (b) Negative and positive liberty · (c) Formal and substantive equality · (d) Legal and moral rights · (e) Democracy as a way of life
- Q2 · 20/15/15** (a) Sovereignty — monistic and pluralistic theories · (b) The Marxian theory of the State · (c) Gandhi — the ideal State and trusteeship
- Q3 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Indian secularism as principled distance · (b) ★ Retribution as a ground of punishment · (c) Is capital punishment justifiable?
- Q4 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau on political obligation · (b) Locke on property and its limits · (c) Caste — Gandhi and Ambedkar

PAPER II · SECTION B — PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

- Q5 · 10** (a) The ontological argument · (b) ★ The cosmological argument and Kant · (c) The design argument after Darwin · (d) ★ Mysticism as knowledge · (e) ★ Divine command and moral obligation
- Q6 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ The free-will defence and natural evil · (b) Immortality of the soul · (c) The attributes of God and the paradox of omnipotence
- Q7 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ Exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism · (b) Reason, faith and revelation · (c) Religious language — verification, falsification, analogy
- Q8 · 20/15/15** (a) ★ The *numinous* as the object of religious consciousness · (b) Religion without God · (c) *Karma* and rebirth

1(a) PAPER I · SECTION A · Q1(A) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS

“The Good is not itself Being, but is beyond Being in dignity and power.” Elucidate Plato's conception of the Form of the Good and its relation to the other Forms.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Plato arranges the Ideas in a hierarchy, the basis of the arrangement being the degree of comprehensiveness — Thingness, Manness, Beingness and, at the summit, the Idea of the Good. The Good is therefore not one Idea standing beside the others; it is the principle that controls, guides and over-rules the whole hierarchy. Plato explains it in his own mystical way through the figure of the sun: the sun is not itself the vision, yet it is the known cause of vision, and it gives things their generation, growth and nurture without being generation itself. In the same way the Good is not knowledge, yet it is the cause of truth and knowledge; it is not the being of the Ideas, yet it confers their being. That is the exact sense of the quoted line — the Good stands higher than Being in dignity and power. And it draws everything towards itself while remaining unmoved, as Draupadī drew the princes to her *svayamvara* without herself stirring.

The relation is therefore **teleological, not logical**: the lower Ideas do not follow from the Good as a conclusion follows from a premise — they are ordered by it as means are ordered to an end. Zeller's axiological reading and Stace's mystical reading both rest here: the aim of the whole philosophy is for the soul to regain its pristine glory, and a single glimpse of the Good liberates, which gives Plato a soteriological purpose like that of Indian philosophy. Its threefold significance is that it supplies the first, unmoved cause needed to explain change, it explains bondage and release, and in ethics it is what the seeker contemplates once he has purified himself of the pursuit of pleasure. The difficulty is Plato's own. In the later theology a personal God, with will and purpose, appears beside the impersonal Good — and no relation between the two survives. God cannot be the cause of the Ideas, for Ideas are independent and eternal and exist in nobody's mind; the Good cannot be the ground of God, who is himself the highest reality; and both cannot be equally absolute, since there is only one absolute. There is no harmony between Plato's ontology and his theology.

Present an exposition of Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes. Does the doctrine of the final cause commit Aristotle to teleology in nature?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Aristotle's object is to solve the perennial problem of Being and Becoming — Plato's eternal Ideas at one extreme, Democritus' ever-changing atoms at the other — and his answer everywhere is **formed matter**. Science, he holds, knows a cause as the immediate antecedent and explains mechanically; philosophy looks for the universal causes and the final cause of all things, and explains teleologically. He takes the human production of a chair as his model, on the assumption that human and cosmic production work alike. The **material cause** is the wood, that out of which it is made. The **efficient cause** is the carpenter, with his instruments and his notion of the thing. The **formal cause** is the shape, size, colour and design. The **final cause** is the purpose for which it is made — the office, the living room.

Aristotle then reduces the four to two. Formal and final are identical: the formal cause is what the thing is going to be, the final is what it has become — the end is the real beginning. Final and efficient are identical too, for the wood is cut and shaped only so that a chair may be made; the end guides and regulates the agency. Only the material and the final cause are left, which is precisely what his theory of matter and form requires. So the doctrine does commit him to teleology — but to a natural, immanent teleology, worked out through **potentiality and actuality**. Matter by itself is indeterminate, without quality of its own and distinctionless; all it has is potential. Form is the principle of actualisation. Everything therefore stands on an ascending scale: formless matter of infinite potential at the bottom, then nature, plants, animals, human beings, higher beings, and at the top matterless Pure Form — the Actus Purus, which he equates with God and which draws all change towards itself as the Unmoved Mover. This is the doctrine of unfoldment; Russell calls it optimistic and teleological, the universe developing continuously towards something better than what was before.

Two criticisms are standard. Measured against modern science the account fails at every point: science seeks the immediate antecedent, Aristotle four simultaneous causes; his matter is not physical reality; his explanation is metaphysical and teleological rather than mechanical; and science explains a particular event, whereas Aristotle is answering the whole question of Being and Becoming. The second objection is the more damaging, and it is internal — Pure Matter and Pure Form are given existence at the two ends of his own scale, although his definition of substance makes matter and form inseparable and relative, so that neither can exist alone. The verdict stays Russell's: Aristotle's metaphysics is Plato diluted by common sense, and he is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily.

Explain Descartes' method of doubt. Does the *cogito* provide an indubitable foundation for knowledge?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Descartes wants for philosophy the certainty mathematics enjoys, and so adopts doubt as a *method* — universal, deliberate and provisional, not sceptical in intent. It proceeds in three waves: the senses sometimes deceive, so no sensory report is beyond suspicion; the dream argument removes any criterion for distinguishing waking from dreaming; and the hypothesis of an *evil demon* reaches even arithmetic and geometry. What resists is the act of doubting itself: whatever I am deceived about, I cannot be deceived that I am, since deception requires a subject. *Cogito ergo sum* is therefore self-verifying — ‘necessarily true each time I conceive it’ — grasped by intuition rather than won by inference. From it Descartes extracts the criterion of clear and distinct perception, and with it the *res cogitans*, God, and at last the material world.

As a foundation it is less secure than it looks. *First*, the argument licenses only ‘there is thinking’; the step to an ‘I’ that is a thinking *substance* is an inference Descartes has not earned — Lichtenberg’s and Russell’s objection, and Hume’s failure to find any impression of a self. *Second*, the Cartesian circle: clear and distinct ideas are trusted because God is no deceiver, yet God’s existence is proved by clear and distinct ideas. *Third*, the certainty is momentary and solitary; without the theological bridge nothing follows from it about the world, so the *cogito* is indubitable but sterile. Its lasting achievement is not the system it was meant to found but the turn it forced — after Descartes, epistemology precedes metaphysics.

Examine Hume's analysis of causality. Does he succeed in showing that necessary connection is not given in experience?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Causality is the most important category in Hume, because all our knowledge of matters of fact rests on it: it is on the strength of the causal relation alone that we pass from a present impression to something not before the senses at all — a universal law, the past, the future. Hume therefore applies his own test. If the idea of cause is real, it must be traceable to an impression. Analysing the relation he finds two elements that are genuinely given: *contiguity*, cause and effect being immediately or mediately in contact, as fire and heat; and *priority*, the cause being always antecedent to the effect, which can never be perfectly contemporary with it. The trouble is with the third and most important element, *necessary connection* — the claim that the cause *produces* the effect. Hume refutes it on three grounds. (i) It is not known by a priori reasoning: before actual experience no one can deduce the effect, and that fire has the capacity to burn cannot be established by argumentation. (ii) It cannot be demonstrated: no one can demonstrate that food invariably nourishes, since the opposite can be asserted without contradiction — so rationalism fails to account for a necessary relation between cause and effect. (iii) Observation and experience cannot establish invariability: impressions of the present cannot guarantee the future, and to claim that they do is the fallacy of illicit generalisation, which is the problem of induction.

What, then, is causality? For Hume it has only two elements — past experience of *constant conjunction*, in which flame and heat are conjoined and never connected, and a propensity of human nature in the form of imagination working by its principle of association. This is his **doctrine of belief**: the mind, after a repetition of similar instances, is carried by habit, on the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant. Hence the conclusion for which he is remembered — *necessity exists in our mind and not in nature*. The connection is a psychological necessity, not a real one. **Does he succeed?** Negatively, yes. Nobody has produced the missing impression, and even Kant concedes that necessity is not found *in* experience; he only reverses the conclusion by making causality a category of thought, so that whatever is experienced must pass through the category of causality before it is perceived by the mind at all. Positively the argument is weaker. Hume is a consistent empiricist, but he nowhere explains how his separate and distinct impressions come to co-exist or even to be contiguous; and mental habit is itself made to do causal work — habit *produces* belief — so a universal law is used to explain away universal laws. Nyāya presses the same charge from the other side: *vyāpti* reports an unconditional relation between two facts in the world, secured by *tarka*, not a habit in us. Hume defeats the claim that necessity is perceived; he does not prove that it is nothing but habit. His own honest verdict is the fair one — we have an instinctive, almost biological belief in induction which we can neither shake nor prove, and we may go on using it provided we admit the limits of our knowledge.

“Here is one hand.” Examine Moore's defence of common sense as a reply to scepticism and idealism.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Moore's reply to both the sceptic and the idealist is to refuse to argue on their ground. In *A Defence of Common Sense* he does two things at once: he asserts that the common-sense view of the world is true, and he defends ordinary language, since philosophical paradoxes arise in the first place from rejecting it. He never defines common sense; he exhibits it in two lists. The first are the self-regarding truisms — ‘I know that there exists at present a living human body which is my body’, ‘I have two hands, this is my left hand and this is my right’. The second are the truisms about the world — material things exist, the earth exists, I exist, other human beings exist, we have consciousness. Such beliefs are *public* and not private; whoever holds them acts by them; they are not scientific, but are known intuitively and believed without any absurdity. Religion is deliberately excluded: God is commonly held but not universally held, and is externally imposed rather than intuitive.

The arguments. (i) *Universal acceptance* — these propositions are accepted by every person of normal health and mental state. (ii) *Compulsive acceptance* — beliefs like ‘water quenches thirst’ are compulsive and must be accepted by idealist and realist alike. (iii) *Conviction* — one who denies that he has two hands ought consistently to stop using them. (iv) *Sense experience* — we are bound by sense experience and cannot transcend it; the table does not exist because we have sense experience of it, rather we have the sense experience because of the table. (v) *Dream* — the very concept of a dream presupposes the waking state, and being a relative term it proves that something exists independently of our mind. (vi) *Inconsistency* — the idealist who says we cannot know with certainty that we or other people exist may be ignored, because on his own showing he does not exist; the idealist who denies material things while seated in a chair is absurd; McTaggart cannot argue for the unreality of time without existing in time; and the philosopher's own use of ‘we’ and ‘is’ concedes existence. Against idealism in particular Moore attacks *esse est percipi*: idealism is the result of a confusion between awareness and the content of awareness, a confusion we fall into only because we never have awareness without content. If the two were merely inseparable, ‘consciousness of blue’ would mean ‘consciousness is blue’, and awareness of blue could no longer be distinguished from awareness of green, so that knowledge and error would collapse together. And when we see a tiger the body reacts as it never does to an image, so the distinction between the object and its image is one we already act upon. **Assessment.** Three charges are fair. Moore ends in the same sophistication for which he charges his opponents: his own theory of sense data holds that what we immediately see is a part of the surface of the object and the rest is inferred, and Ryle replies that we never see sense data but objects directly. Stace, in *The Refutation of Realism*, turns Moore's own analytic method against him — ‘some entities exist even without being perceived by any finite mind’ can be proved neither by experience, which cannot reach the non-experienced, nor by inference, which itself rests on prior certain knowledge; so his realism stands unproved, and Russell agreed. Some universally held beliefs are also simply false, such as ‘the sun rises in the east’, and Moore never enumerates or defines the beliefs he defends, while several of his arguments overlap and are accepted as self-evident. Yet rejecting his realism leaves the defence itself untouched. His achievement is that he gave the common man a place in philosophy and awoke technical philosophers to ordinary language — the line that runs from him to Wittgenstein and Ryle.



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PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

— Hierarchy of Ideas · Allegory of the Cave · Theory of the Divided Line —


1 HIERARCHY OF IDEAS

Plato's World of Reality: An Ascent to the Good

THE HIGHEST REALITY, TRUTH & KNOWLEDGE

ASCENT TOWARDS THE GOOD

THE LOWEST REALITY, OPINION & IGNORANCE



4 THE FORM OF THE GOOD
The highest Form. Source of truth, being and value. Gives reality and intelligibility to all other Forms.

3 MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS
Forms of number, geometry and relations. Eternal, abstract, and intelligible.

2 PHYSICAL OBJECTS
Things of the physical world. They participate in Forms. Changeable, imperfect.

1 SHADOWS / IMAGES
Copies of physical objects (reflections, shadows, images). Most distant from truth; mere appearances.

KEY IDEA
The soul must ascend from the world of becoming (appearance) to the world of being (reality) through philosophical knowledge guided by reason.

2 ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE


A ILLUSION
Prisoners chained in a cave see only shadows on the wall, mistaking them for reality.

B IGNORANCE
They are unaware of the real objects and the fire behind them.

C EDUCATION
One prisoner is released, turns around and sees the fire and the objects causing the shadows.

D ENLIGHTENMENT
He ascends out of the cave, is dazzled at first, then sees the sun—the source of truth and the Good.

E RETURN TO THE CAVE
The enlightened one returns to help others, facing ridicule and resistance.



TRUTH & THE GOOD

REALITY KNOWLEDGE (NOESIS)

REASONING (DIANOIA)

BELIEF (PISTIS)

IGNORANCE (EIKASIA)

“ The cave represents the world of appearances; the ascent represents the soul's journey from ignorance to knowledge. ”

3 THEORY OF THE DIVIDED LINE

Plato divides reality and knowledge into four levels. The soul ascends from opinion (*doxa*) to knowledge (*episteme*).

	LOWER REALITY (VISIBLE REALM)		HIGHER REALITY (INTELLIGIBLE REALM)	
REALITY (WHAT EXISTS)	EIKASIA (IMAGINATION)	PISTIS (BELIEF)	DIANOIA (THOUGHT)	NOESIS (INTELLIGENCE)
KNOWLEDGE (STATE OF SOUL)	Opinion / Conjecture	Opinion / Belief	Discursive Thought / Reasoning	Knowledge / Intuition
OBJECT (WHAT IS KNOWN)	Shadows, Reflections, Images	Physical Objects, Sensible Things	Mathematical Objects, Abstract Entities	Forms / Ideas, The Good
	VISIBLE REALM (APPEARANCE)		INTELLIGIBLE REALM (REALITY)	

The Divided Line shows the gradual progress from the lowest opinion about shadows to the highest knowledge of the Good.

HOW THE THREE DOCTRINES ARE CONNECTED

- Ascent from Opinion to Knowledge**
From shadows (Eikasia) to the Good (Noesis).
From ignorance to enlightenment.
- From Becoming to Being**
From changing physical things to eternal Forms.
From the world of senses to the world of reality.
- From Appearance to Reality**
From illusions of the cave to the light of the sun.
From what seems to what is.

Philosophy is the love of wisdom and the journey of the soul towards the Good.”
— Plato

REMEMBER: THE GOAL OF PHILOSOPHY IS NOT INFORMATION, BUT TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUL TOWARDS THE GOOD.

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Philosophy Optional with **Vikash Sir**

8595269455

Telegram: t.me/philosophy_op



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ARISTOTLE'S FOUR CAUSES

— Material • Formal • Efficient • Final Cause | Comparison with Sāṅkhya and Modern Science —

1 THE FOUR CAUSES

1 MATERIAL CAUSE (What it is made of)



The matter or substratum out of which a thing is made.
Example: Bronze of the statue.

2 FORMAL CAUSE (What it is)



The form, essence, structure or defining pattern that makes it what it is.
Example: The shape and design of the statue.



EXAMPLE:
BRONZE STATUE

3 EFFICIENT CAUSE (What brings it into being)



The agent, source of motion or change that produces the thing.
Example: The sculptor who creates it.

4 FINAL CAUSE (What it is for)



The end, purpose or goal for the sake of which the thing exists.
Example: To be admired, to express beauty and art.

TO EXPLAIN A THING FULLY, ARISTOTLE ASKS:
What is it made of? What form does it have?
Who made it? For what end?

 For Aristotle, true explanation is teleological and holistic.

2 COMPARISON WITH SĀṆKHYA

ASPECT	ARISTOTLE	SĀṆKHYA
 Ultimate concern	Seeks complete explanation of a thing through four causes.	Emphasises <i>Satkāryavāda</i> : the effect pre-exists in the cause.
 Material basis	Matter and form are both real and inseparable in substances.	<i>Prakṛti</i> is the material source of the world; evolutes unfold from it.
 Form / structure	Form (essence, structure) gives identity and makes a thing what it is.	Transformation is explained through evolution of <i>tattvas</i> rather than Aristotelian form-matter analysis.
 Efficient agency	Efficient cause is an actual agent/source of change.	<i>Puruṣa</i> is conscious witness, not a creator-God in the ordinary sense.
 Purpose / teleology	Final cause is central; nature acts for an end.	Teleology is not central in the Aristotelian sense.
 View of causation	Explains by four causes working together.	Explains through <i>Prakṛti</i> 's evolution under <i>guṇas</i> (<i>Satkāryavāda</i>).
 Example orientation	Explains individual substances and their purpose in nature.	Explains cosmic evolution from subtle to gross; focus on <i>tattva</i> -sequence.

KEY SIMILARITY

Both seek rational explanation of change and reject purely accidental becoming.

KEY DIFFERENCE

 Aristotle gives a four-fold explanatory model centered on form and purpose, whereas Sāṅkhya explains cosmic evolution through *Prakṛti*, *guṇas* and *Satkāryavāda*.

3 COMPARISON WITH MODERN SCIENCE

	MATERIAL CAUSE (What it is made of)	FORMAL CAUSE (What it is)	EFFICIENT CAUSE (What brings it into being)	FINAL CAUSE (What it is for)
ARISTOTLE'S VIEW	Matter or substratum is one of the four necessary causes. 	Form/essence gives identity, structure and intelligibility. 	Agent or source of change that brings the thing into being. 	End or purpose for the sake of which the thing exists. 
IN MODERN SCIENCE	Science studies matter, composition, elements, particles, energy and material constitution. 	Science studies structure, pattern, organization, elements, mathematical form, laws, models and systems. 	Science explains events through mechanisms, forces, prior conditions, causal interactions and natural processes. 	Purpose-based explanation is generally rejected in physical science. In biology, appears in limited or heuristic forms (function, adaptation, teleonomy). 
STATUS IN SCIENCE	Partially retained and strongly emphasized. 	Transformed and integrated through models, laws and mathematical structures. 	Strongest and central to scientific explanation. 	Mostly rejected in physics; limited, conditional role in biology. 

 SCIENCE ASKS MAINLY:
"How does it happen?"

 ARISTOTLE ALSO ASKS:
"What is it for?"

 MODERN SCIENCE IS PREDOMINANTLY MECHANISTIC;
ARISTOTLE IS EXPLANATORY PLUS TELEOLOGICAL.

FOR ARISTOTLE, EXPLANATION REACHES COMPLETION ONLY
WHEN MATTER, FORM, AGENCY AND END ARE ALL UNDERSTOOD.

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The four causes, and the two comparisons the examiner rewards — with Sāṅkhya *satkāryavāda* (see Q7(b)) and with modern mechanistic science.



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HUME'S PHILOSOPHY

Rational Psychology · Rational Cosmology · Rational Theology
Problem of Induction · Kant's Response

① RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY IS NOT POSSIBLE



- Hume rejects the idea of a substantial, permanent self.
- We never perceive a fixed soul; we only experience fleeting impressions and ideas.
- The mind is only a "bundle or collection of different perceptions".
- Personal identity is a fiction produced by memory, habit and association.

★ Soul / self is not known as a substance; the mind is a bundle of perceptions.

② RATIONAL COSMOLOGY IS NOT POSSIBLE



- We observe only constant conjunction, not a necessary connection.
- Cause-and-effect necessity is not given in experience.
- The expectation that the future will resemble the past comes from habit or custom.
- Therefore reason alone cannot establish metaphysical cosmology.

★ Necessary relation between cause and effect is not perceived.


③ RATIONAL THEOLOGY IS NOT POSSIBLE



- Hume is most powerful in criticising the teleological / design argument.
- From the world's order we cannot validly infer an infinite, perfect God.
- The analogy between the universe and human artifacts is weak.
- The world may show defects, plurality, or limited intelligence.
- Human reason cannot prove God through speculative theology.

★ Hume most successfully attacks the teleological argument for God.

PROBLEM OF INDUCTION



- Induction assumes that unobserved cases will resemble observed cases.
- This cannot be justified deductively.
- It also cannot be justified inductively without circularity.
- Hence scientific and everyday expectations rest on habit, not rational proof.

KANT'S RESPONSE



- Kant famously said: "Hume awoke me from my dogmatic slumber."
- Hume's criticism of causation forced Kant to rethink knowledge.
- Kant responds by arguing for "Synthetic A Priori Judgments".
- Causality is treated by Kant as a category of understanding, not something derived merely from habit.

WHY HUME MATTERS



① Challenges rationalist metaphysics.



② Questions substance, causation and natural theology.



③ Foundations of empiricism and skepticism.



④ Raises the classic problem of induction.



⑤ Directly influences Kant.



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How does Kant attempt to establish the objective validity of the categories in the Transcendental Deduction? Critically examine whether the transcendental unity of apperception is sufficient for this purpose.

WHY PROBABLE Kant appears in every readable Paper I, usually twice, but has not held a 20-mark slot since 2022. The Deduction is the one central Kantian doctrine the recent window has left untouched.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Where the question arises. In the Transcendental Analytic Kant divides the work in two: the Analytic of Concepts, which deals with the discovery and the proof of the twelve categories, and the Analytic of Principles, which deals with their application. Discovery is the *metaphysical* deduction — the categories are read off the table of judgements, since to think is to judge, and all possible modes of thinking must therefore appear among all possible forms of judgement. But discovery settles only where the categories come from. The transcendental deduction settles a different question: by what *right* do they apply to objects at all? Kant uses ‘deduction’ in the sense the jurists of his century gave it — the establishing of a legal title, here the logical right of the categories to constitute empirical knowledge. And the deduction is ‘transcendental’ because it deals not with this or that instance of thinking but with the general conditions of any thinking whatever.

Why the proof is needed. Sense impressions are discrete and disconnected. Knowing consists in thinking about percepts, and to think is to combine percepts into judgements by means of concepts. So far Kant and Hume agree: perceptual data are separate, and the connection must be introduced by concepts such as substance and causality. Hume made those concepts empirical, derived by the association of ideas, and ended in scepticism; and it was that scepticism, Kant says, which aroused him from his dogmatic slumber. Space and time had already been secured in the Aesthetic, because they are the forms of sensibility itself and hence the very condition of anything being perceived at all. The categories enjoy no such easy warrant, and it is precisely here that a proof must be supplied.

The argument. Kant shows that without the synthesising activity of the understanding there can be no empirical knowledge, and that this spontaneous activity is threefold. (i) *Synthesis of apprehension in intuition* — the multiplicity of parts must first be run through and grasped together in one whole; a line AB cannot be built up from its segments unless the segments are held together in a single act. (ii) *Synthesis of reproduction in imagination* — the earlier parts must be reproduced in image form while the later ones are given; when we perceive a tree as hard and fragrant, past experience is being reproduced and fused into one unitary experience. (iii) *Synthesis of recognition in a concept* — the consciousness which grasped the parts severally, which then reproduced the images, and which finally recognises them as one and the same parts belonging to one related whole, must be one and the same consciousness all through. That last requirement is the *synthetic unity of apperception*, apperception being perception plus understanding within one and the same a priori consciousness. The unity, at the level of sensibility and of understanding alike, is derived from neither of them: it is prior to both and the basis of both, and every principle of combination in the understanding is derived from it. Since the categories are just those forms under which any manifold can be brought to the unity of one consciousness, whatever can become an object of experience for me must already conform to them. This is the Copernican result in Kant’s own words — *understanding makes nature out of the materials it does not make*. Nature here does not mean the thing in itself but the sum total of interrelated appearances, a system of phenomena; and phenomena cannot but fall under the laws the understanding prescribes, exactly as percepts cannot but be moulded by the forms of sensibility.

Is the unity of apperception sufficient? It does the work it was designed for and no more, and four limits must be stated. *First*, it proves that there must be *some* rules of synthesis; it does not prove that there are precisely twelve. Those come from the fourfold classification of judgement in formal logic, which Kant took over on the assumption that all possible forms of judgement had been exhausted by Aristotle — an assumption and not a proof. *Second*, the unity is thin, and Kant insists on its thinness himself: the a priori synthetic unity of apperception is only a *logical* presupposition of objective empirical knowledge. It is neither empirical, as Descartes’ *cogito* was, nor ontological, as

Hegel and the Hegelians made it by converting a logical presupposition into a metaphysical reality; and the Paralogisms confirm that this 'I' is no substantial soul. It is fair to ask how so formal a premise can yield content as determinate as substance and causality. *Third*, the answer to Hume is only partial: Kant has not shown that each and every specific law of nature falls under the categories, and specific laws that depend on experience cannot be universal. *Fourth*, the apparatus of a priori forms of perceiving and thinking is today widely held to be ill-conceived, the categories being explained instead as conventions.

In defence, and conclusion. Kant may fairly answer that the content is supplied further on, in the Schematism and the Principles of Pure Understanding, where the categories are given a temporal schema and their objective employment is proved — so that objectivity and self-consciousness turn out to be two sides of one fact. The price is one he pays willingly: knowledge is confined to percepts moulded by the a priori forms, the categories hold only for phenomena, and any transgression yields the illusions of the Dialectic — the paralogisms, the antinomies and the ideal of reason. The verdict is therefore this. The Deduction succeeds in its limiting task, and it succeeds against Hume: causality is no longer a habit of association but a condition without which experience could not be had at all. It does not succeed as a proof of the specific twelve. Apperception establishes *that* there must be categories; it does not establish *which*.

MENTOR NOTE The examiner is testing one distinction: the *metaphysical* deduction asks where the categories come from, the *transcendental* deduction asks by what right they apply. Most scripts merge the two and lose half the marks. Name the threefold synthesis — apprehension, reproduction, recognition — and close with the line that the unity of apperception is *logical*, neither empirical like the *cogito* nor ontological as Hegel made it. That single sentence lifts the band.

Explain Spinoza's conception of substance, attribute and mode. How far does his monism escape the difficulties of Cartesian dualism?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Spinoza defines substance as *that which is in itself and conceived through itself* — needing no other thing either for its existence or for its conception. Two consequences follow at once. Such a being must be *causa sui*, for nothing outside it could produce it; and it must be unique, since two substances would have to limit each other, and what limits requires something outside itself. Hence there is one substance only, infinite and necessarily existing — *Deus sive Natura*. **Attributes** are what the intellect perceives as constituting its essence: infinite in number, of which the human mind knows two, thought and extension. **Modes** are modifications, that which is 'in another and conceived through another' — particular bodies and particular ideas. The scheme is completed by the distinction of *natura naturans*, substance as active, from *natura naturata*, the whole system of modes that follows from it.

Against Descartes. Dualism left an insoluble problem: how can two substances with nothing in common act on each other? Spinoza removes the question rather than answering it. Thought and extension are not two substances but two attributes of one, so mind and body are *the same thing* expressed under different attributes — 'the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things'. There is no interaction to explain, only correspondence, and no need of a transcendent creator either, since God is the immanent and not the transient cause of things.

The cost. Three difficulties remain. The passage from the infinite to the finite is never deduced: why an eternal substance should issue in *these* particular modes is left obscure. Individuality and freedom are diminished — a mode is not a person but a transient modification, and freedom becomes the understanding of necessity rather than the power of alternatives. And the attributes are problematic: infinitely many are asserted, exactly two are knowable, and it is unclear why what the intellect perceives should constitute essence. Hegel's charge of 'acosmism' — that Spinozism annihilates the finite rather than explaining it — is the classic form of the complaint.

Conclusion. Spinoza escapes interactionism completely and at a stroke; parallelism under one substance is the most economical solution the seventeenth century produced. He pays with thoroughgoing determinism and with the reality of the individual — which is why the system is at once the most rigorous rationalist metaphysics and the least habitable.

Explain Leibniz's doctrine of monads. How does pre-established harmony account for the apparent interaction of substances?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**


Leibniz begins from a dissatisfaction with Spinoza. He was greatly impressed by the unity Spinoza had achieved, but Spinoza achieved it at the cost of the variety and individuality of things. Leibniz therefore starts from the opposite thesis, pluralism, and sets himself one question: what must the nature of the parts be, if each part is somehow to contain or express the whole within itself? The answer requires first that extension be denied. Extension is always divisible and can never yield a simple, indivisible substance; it is passive, whereas the world is dynamic; atoms are qualitatively alike and differ only in quantity, in mass and shape, which cannot explain the qualitative variety of the universe; and atoms are dead particles of matter, whereas reality ought to be conceived on the analogy of the one thing of which we are most sure — our own self, which is living and spiritual. So Leibniz keeps Descartes' mind and drops his matter, but widens the notion of mind. If consciousness were the whole essence of mind, our mind would cease to be in dreamless sleep. Below the threshold of clear consciousness there is a dark background of obscurer consciousness — *petites perceptions*, unconscious states — as the small ripples of the sea are individually inaudible and together make its mighty roar.

The monads. Substance is therefore mental force: spiritual atoms, indivisible and eternal, infinite in number. Each is a world in miniature, a macrocosm in a microcosm — Spinoza's one substance broken into bits, each bit as eternal and as real as the whole substance was. Each contains within itself the possibility of everything that will ever happen to it: it is freighted with the past and big with the future. No two are exactly alike, for if two monads agreed in every respect they would not be two monads but one — the identity of indiscernibles; they are qualitatively the same, spiritual atoms all, and differ in the degree of consciousness. And they are *windowless*: independent, self-contained, self-determined, immune to any external influence. Two powers belong to them. By *perception* each mirrors the whole infinity of existence from its own standpoint, the more developed with clear perception and the less developed with confused or obscure perception, so that the universe is represented differently by each. By *appetition* each, being a force, tends to become the whole and to pass from obscure to clear perception; an act done from very obscure perception is mere impulse, one done from clear perception is will. Hence the hierarchy of types: bare or sleeping monads, scarcely more than centres of force expressing themselves as mechanical motion, which are the inanimate objects of the world; conscious monads, vegetable in a dreamlike state and animal, which together may be called souls; self-conscious monads or spirits, human beings endowed with reason; and at the summit the monad of monads, God, pure activity, *actus purus*. Why then do conscious monads look like passive physical objects? Because of *materia prima*, the principle of passivity present in every monad but God, and *materia secunda*, the principle of living and existing in groups — as a beehive from a distance looks like one solid thing.

Pre-established harmony. Now the difficulty. If the monads are windowless, how is the world a harmony and a cosmos rather than a crowd? Leibniz answers that the harmony among them has been pre-established by God: the monads are so arranged that a change in one is preceded and followed by corresponding change in the others, so that what appears to us as interaction is really a concomitant relation. I put on the switch and the fan turns — the change in the switch-monad is due to its own preceding movement, and a correlative change simply takes place in the fan-monad. His own images are exact. An orchestra whose players neither see nor hear one another, each following his own notes, yet presents one harmonious symphony. Two clocks agree not because a mechanism connects them, as Descartes supposed with his interactionism, but because each was so made as to keep time. Applied to mind and body: body is an aggregate of monads, and within the aggregate there is a queen monad which mirrors the activity of the surrounding monads, and through them the changes of all other monads in the universe — this is the soul. Since God has subordinated the working of the lower monads to the higher, the moment a conscious desire to move the

hand arises, a concomitant change takes place in the muscle monads. Bodies act as if there were no souls, and both act as if each influenced the other. On this one hypothesis Leibniz claims to reconcile mind with body, mechanism with teleology and necessity with freedom, to prove this the best of all possible worlds, and even to prove God.

Assessment. The doctrine preserves the self-sufficiency of substance, and the thesis that mechanism is real but grounded in teleology remains attractive: however mechanical the movement of a monad may look, it always works towards an end within it, and that inner plan coincides with the one master plan in the mind of the Creator — mechanism serves purpose as a motor car serves human movement. But the objections are serious. Pre-established harmony is only an assumption made to explain the world: no monad can go beyond itself and perceive the infinity of other monads and their relations, so the evidence for the harmony is by hypothesis unavailable, and the theory of knowledge is left close to solipsism. There is a dilemma about God: if he creates the monads they become finite and cease to be self-contained and eternal, and if they are eternal and self-contained he becomes unnecessary as creator — Leibniz can only answer that ‘creation’ is used in the sense of fulguration or radiation, which reduces the monads to something very like Spinoza’s modes. The best possible world confronts the plain fact of moral and physical evil, which Leibniz can only soften by calling evil a foil that heightens the good as shading heightens a picture. And the system is as deterministic as the pantheism it was meant to escape: every monad, man included, is a cog in the great machine, since every action has its root in an antecedent movement which God implanted, and freedom shrinks to the spontaneous unfolding of action guided by clear perception. **Conclusion.** Leibniz is Spinoza turned on his head — he begins from plurality and must import unity, as Spinoza began from unity and could not recover plurality. He ends in the same blankness, unable to rise to the height at which the diversity of the monads would find a unity of purpose. What survives is the insight that substance is essentially activity and that every part of the world represents the whole; what fails is that the order of such a world is guaranteed by nothing within it.



Aesthetic · Analytic · Dialectic — the map of the first *Critique*. The right-hand column also serves Paper II Q5(a) and Q5(b), where Kant's attack on the proofs is examined.



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
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“To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” Explain the role of the notion of a *form of life* in the later Wittgenstein's account of meaning, and consider whether it commits him to relativism.

WHY PROBABLE Wittgenstein appears in every readable Paper I, but the picture→use transition is saturated (2023 and 2025). *Form of life* has appeared only at 10 marks (2022) and is the natural remaining angle.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The problem the notion answers. The later Wittgenstein is fighting two views at once — Augustine's, that language has an essence lying beneath the surface which analysis will uncover, and his own earlier one in the *Tractatus*, where language had the single fixed function of picturing the relation between propositions and facts. He calls that earlier philosophy of his dogmatic, and gives philosophy a therapeutic task: the healing of technical philosophy. In the *Philosophical Investigations* and the *Blue Book* he rejects both. Meaning does not consist in the picturisation of reality in a fixed, monolithic way; it consists in the multiplicity of practices which make up the *forms of life*. No single essence of language can be discovered, because language is intrinsically connected with all human activity and behaviour — our practical affairs and relations, our personal and public activities. Two fundamental changes follow: the conception of language shifts from representing reality by picturing it to the diversity of uses language has in our life, and the conception of meaning shifts from logical form to the plain principle that *the meaning of a word is its use in the language*.

What the notion does. Three things. (i) It supplies the setting that *use* requires. A tool box holds tools of different functions; the lines on a map mean boundaries or frontiers according to the practice of map-reading; 'bank' means one thing in 'I can bank upon you', another in 'I live by the bank of the river', a third in 'I have to go to the bank today'. Meaning is not read off the word but off what is being done with it, and philosophical disputes arise from the mental blockage of fixed meaning and from philosophers' appropriation of words like truth, reality and soul. (ii) It completes the analogy of the *language game*. Language is not a logical monolith with a fixed meaning; it is used to report, narrate, pray, question, tell a joke. Speaking is an activity, and speakers are like players making certain moves under certain rules — as a game needs its object, a bat or a ball, so language has its rules of grammar, which are a regulative mechanism the participants must master. The term 'language game' is chosen precisely to bring into prominence that speaking a language is part of an activity, part of a form of life; hence the primitive games — the child learning the use of words, the builder and his assistant calling for pillar, slab, beam and brick. The instruction is: don't think, but look. (iii) It dissolves rather than solves philosophical problems. Philosophers crave generality and hunt for the essence common to all expressions, and that craving is itself the blockage from which the problems come; once the language game is actually played, the problems vanish. Wittgenstein does not define the language game, because a game admits of no definition; he offers *family resemblance* instead — as members of a family resemble one another, games have overlapping and criss-crossing similarities, and so form a family.

The illustration to use. A man falls ill, recovers and comes home; a friend asks after his health. He may answer 'God saved me' or 'the doctor saved me'. The first belongs to the language game of religion and does not mean that God dispensed the medicine; the second belongs to common sense — the doctor diagnosed and prescribed. Both statements are meaningful in their respective spheres. This is exactly the contrast with the picture theory, on which metaphysics, religion and ethics were nonsense. Now words like God, Brahman and nirvāṇa have their meaning in their use and not in a reality they are supposed to name, and the religious language game reflects the practices and forms of life of its adherents.

Does this commit him to relativism? The charge is that if sense is internal to a practice, truth and rationality vary with the practice and no criticism from outside is possible. Three considerations answer it. *First*, forms of life are not private worlds, and Wittgenstein's own critique of private language is directed against precisely the picture that would make relativism possible. A private language is in principle understood by one person only, and he shows that it cannot work: if a man writes 'S' for a private sensation such as a tickle, the tickle may be a different thing for

different people; even the same person cannot be certain that the next sensation resembles the last, or whether to use the same symbol; no definition of 'S' can be provided at all; and the beetle in the box — where each may in fact have something entirely different, the beetle standing for pain — simply drops out of the reckoning. A man grown up alone in a desert would have no inner language, since there would be nobody to communicate with. All language is public, and even personal experience is largely public: we laugh when we find something funny. Rules are public, and society governs them through the language games. *Second*, family resemblance means that games overlap and criss-cross; they are not sealed systems, which is what makes translation, learning and criticism possible. *Third*, the same man moves between the religious game and the commonsense game without contradiction, so a form of life is not a prison.

Assessment and conclusion. What Wittgenstein denies is not that a practice can be criticised, but that criticism can be conducted from a standpoint outside every practice. That is anti-foundationalism rather than relativism, and the honest form of the charge is that he leaves us with no super-standard — a cost he accepts openly, since for him the search for one was the disease. *Form of life* is thus the terminus of the later philosophy: it is what makes use rule-governed rather than arbitrary, it is what makes a private language impossible, and it replaces the search for essences with the patient description of practice. Its constructive value shows most clearly where the verification principle failed. Language representing a plurality of forms of life, each with its meaning in its own sphere, is precisely what lets religion, ethics and metaphysics back into significant discourse without any loss of rigour.

MENTOR NOTE Two things separate a top script here. Do not narrate the *Tractatus* — one sentence on the picture theory is the whole correct dose, because the demand is on the later view. And do not treat the private-language argument as a separate topic: it is the strongest reply to the relativism charge, since it establishes that meaning is public *before* any question of plural practices can arise. The 'God saved me / the doctor saved me' illustration is worth writing every time.

State the verification principle of meaning. Examine the objections that led to its abandonment.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The principle and its ground. The verification principle rests on a prior distinction between two kinds of proposition, and the cleanest way to state it is by example. ‘All husbands have heads’ and ‘all husbands are married’ are both true, but they are true in different ways. The opposite of the first can be thought without contradiction — a child born without a head, kept alive by a tube, might go on to marry — so its truth follows from empirical investigation: it is *synthetic*. The opposite of the second cannot be thought without inviting contradiction, because its truth follows from the meaning of the words: it is *analytic*. Every significant proposition must therefore be either analytic or synthetic; and of the two, analytic propositions make no claim upon the world and are trivial, while synthetic propositions are informative. The principle then supplies the test. In Schlick’s formulation, *the meaning of a proposition lies in the method of its verification*; in Ayer’s, a proposition is significant only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. What passes the test are the significant propositions of natural science; what fails is not false but non-sensual — and metaphysics fails. It is not analytic, because the metaphysician makes claims about the world and about existent entities, whereas analytic statements are tautologies or contradictions; and it is not empirical, because metaphysics by its very nature transcends experience, God and soul lying beyond space and time and submitting to no observation. Schlick’s example is exact: ‘the universe is shrinking uniformly’ admits of no method of verification, because if the universe shrank uniformly so would everything in it, including the measuring yardsticks, and because by ‘universe’ we mean everything there is and nothing beyond — not even a method or a principle. Carnap adds two sources of meaningless metaphysical propositions: either the words used, God and soul, are never clearly defined, or the sentence conveys no meaning in its context, as in ‘I think therefore I am’, where ‘am’ stands without a predicate.

The attempts to repair it. The history of the principle is the history of its weakening. Schlick’s version already carried the defect that a single empirical proposition may be verified in more than one way, so that we should have to allow it more than one meaning. Ayer saw that on a strict criterion historical events, universal propositions and value statements would all become meaningless, and made two corrections. He distinguished *strong* verification, which yields conclusive evidence — the pain in my head, which he calls a basic proposition — from *weak* verification, which yields only a probable conclusion, such as ‘there is extraterrestrial life’; Schlick had accepted only the strong. The distinction between what is practically verifiable and what is verifiable in principle had to be admitted too, since ‘life exists on Mars’ became verifiable when the orbiter was sent. He then took over Carnap’s distinction of direct and indirect verification — if a proposition about an effect is directly verified, its cause is indirectly verified — and stated it thus: a proposition is indirectly verified if, by adding one or more propositions to it, a conclusive proposition can be deduced. ‘It rained’ is indirectly verified, because if it rains the ground becomes wet, and that the ground is wet is directly verified. This is strikingly close to the Naiyāyika’s use of *vyāpti* as the logical ground of *anumāna*. On Berlin’s objection Ayer further required that the added propositions be themselves analytic, directly verified, or independently indirectly verified. The nail in the coffin was Alonzo Church’s demonstration, through the symbolic logic of *Principia Mathematica*, that on Ayer’s criteria *any* proposition whatever could be indirectly verified. Ayer conceded that he had been unable to develop a flawless verification theory of meaning.

The objections that ended it. *First* and fatally, the principle of verification is itself unverifiable by the standard it prescribes: it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, so on its own showing it is nonsense — and to say that metaphysics is nonsense is, by Ayer’s own criterion, itself nonsense. *Second*, for all its updating and adaptation, indirect verification failed at the one task it was designed for, the elimination of metaphysics. *Third*, as Passmore put it, throw metaphysics into the fire and science goes with it; try to keep science and metaphysics comes in through the back door. *Fourth*, in their effort to extol the natural sciences the positivists confined philosophy to a narrow technical discipline and failed to see that philosophy is itself the science of sciences, the basis of all inquiry. *Fifth*, the criterion undermines value, creativity and the practical interest of man: God, soul and immortality have, as Kant insisted, a

pragmatic value in the conduct of life. *Sixth*, Quine removes the presupposition altogether — knowledge functions as an integrated whole, no statement is verified in isolation, and ‘all bachelors are unmarried males’ cannot rest on the meaning of the words alone, since meaning depends on linguistic behaviour and behaviour changes.

Conclusion. The principle collapsed, and it was abandoned by the positivists themselves. What replaced it is Wittgenstein’s use theory of meaning, on which language represents a plurality of forms of life, each having its meaning in its own sphere — so that the religious and the commonsense statement are both significant, each in its own game. Kant’s remark is the fairest epitaph: empiricists who deny the very possibility of metaphysics, itself a natural disposition of man, fail to keep the modesty with which they began. Feigl put the self-defeat more sharply still — philosophy is the disease of which it should be the cure. The discipline the movement imposed nevertheless survives, for it made philosophers ask what would count as evidence for a claim, and that question has not gone away.

Examine Quine's critique of the analytic–synthetic distinction. What consequences follow for empiricism?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The aim. Quine's charge in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' is that modern empiricism rests on two beliefs which are not themselves based on any empirical evidence — and that once they go, what remains is a more radical empiricism than the positivists ever had. **The first dogma** is the sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. The empiricist holds that 'a bachelor is an unmarried male' is settled by the meaning of the words and requires no experience at all, whereas 'material objects are heavy' requires experience for its validation or invalidation. Quine's objection is not that the two look alike, but that the empiricists never analysed the first sort properly. He takes the two available explanations of analyticity and rejects both. (i) *Analyticity as definition*, the linguistic theory of necessary propositions: 'bachelor' means an unmarried male because that is how it is defined. But to know this requires experience of linguistic behaviour, and as behaviour changes the relation between words and their meanings changes with it — so analytic statements cannot be explained on the basis of definition. (ii) *Analyticity as cognitive synonymy*: 'bachelor' and 'unmarried male' are synonyms. But cognitive synonymy is itself based on fact, and is therefore contingent and not necessary; we have to look at the social set-up to know empirically whether the two expressions point to the same state of a man. Neither explanation survives, and hence no analytic statement is analytic in the strict sense: experience has a part to play even here.

The second dogma is reductionism, and it is aimed at Russell and those who followed him — the belief that complex statements can be reduced to simple facts, and simple facts verified by experience. Russell held that molecular propositions are logical constructions out of atomic propositions; Wittgenstein made the truth-function of molecular propositions depend on atomic propositions. Quine's reply is a single principle with large consequences: knowledge functions as an integrated whole. It is not possible to verify atomic facts in isolation — such verification is not itself empirical — and no fact can be verified unless all facts are verified by experience. Confirmation attaches to the body of belief and not to its sentences one at a time.

What Quine puts in their place. Having rejected both dogmas he offers his own theory of verification in the form of *radical empiricism*: any verification not carried out by sense experience is meaningless. He does not abolish the distinction between analytic and synthetic; he redraws it as a difference of *degree* and not of form. Analytic statements are the limiting case of synthetic propositions: synthetic statements can be verified in each and every case, while analytic statements stand or fall with the propositions they limit. He uses Carnap's own observation that every statement contains two kinds of element, the factual and the verbal, which is exactly why the two classes shade into one another instead of dividing cleanly. Both analytic and synthetic propositions can therefore be explained within the limits of empiricism — and that is the consequence for empiricism. It survives, but as a holistic and fallibilist doctrine, with no statement immune from revision and none confirmed by itself.

Criticism. Four lines of reply are worth stating. Quine's position is a standing attack on ordinary language philosophy, which holds that we may competently use a distinction we cannot define without circularity. He is Hume in a new form — the same reduction of necessity to experience, and the same difficulty that the doctrine must be stated in terms it does not itself allow. Ayer's answer to Mill applies to him as well: there is a difference between the *origin* of knowledge and its *validation*, and although all knowledge originates in experience, validation may be independent of it, which is precisely what the analytic class was meant to record. And his verification theory ends very close to the Cārvāka's 'perception is the only *pramāṇa*', with the familiar consequence that the principle cannot

satisfy itself. **Conclusion.** Quine's importance lies in the direction rather than in the demolition. He exalts the natural sciences and sets philosophy against dogma, superstition and irrational belief, and it is on that ground — not as a proof that no statement is analytic — that his empiricism without dogmas is to be judged.

**4(a)** PAPER I · SECTION A · Q4(A) · 20 MARKS

Why does Heidegger approach the question of Being through an analysis of *Dasein*? Explain his notion of ‘being-in-the-world’ and examine how far it constitutes a refutation of the Cartesian subject.

WHY PROBABLE Heidegger is absent four consecutive years and was a 20-marker in three of his four appearances since 2017. Highest-conviction single call in the forecast.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Heidegger's question is not what beings are but what it means *to be* — the *Seinsfrage*. Since Being is never encountered apart from some entity to whom it is disclosed, the inquiry must begin with that entity for whom its own Being is an issue. That entity is *Dasein* — literally ‘being-there’, man not as a substance but as an openness to Being. The choice is methodological, not anthropological: *Dasein* is the only ontic route to the ontological.

Being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*) names *Dasein*'s basic structure as a *unitary* phenomenon, hyphenated to forbid its decomposition. Its moments are: *world* as a referential totality of significance, not a container of objects; *being-in* as dwelling and familiarity, not spatial inclusion; and the *who*, ordinarily the anonymous *das Man*. Things are met first as *Zuhandenheit* (ready-to-hand), disclosed in use within a whole of assignments; *Vorhandenheit* (present-at-hand) is a derivative mode arising when equipment breaks down. Care (*Sorge*) is the being of *Dasein*, articulated as facticity, existentiality and fallenness, and grounded in temporality.

Against Descartes. The *cogito* yields a worldless subject and then faces the insoluble problem of proving an external world. Heidegger dissolves rather than solves it: the ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that the proof is still missing but that it is expected at all, since world-disclosure is constitutive of the very being that would demand the proof. Three specific reversals follow — Descartes' *res cogitans* is replaced by existence which has no ‘what’; his taking of things as *res extensa* is exposed as an interpretation of Being as constant presence; and the theoretical spectator is shown to be founded on prior practical engagement.

Critical estimate. The refutation is powerful at the level of method but limited in two ways. First, it changes the subject rather than answering the sceptic: the epistemologist asks for warrant, and Heidegger replies with a description of comportment. Second, Husserl's charge stands — the analytic of *Dasein* looks like a regional anthropology masquerading as fundamental ontology, and Heidegger's own abandonment of the projected second half of *Being and Time* concedes the difficulty. Yet even if it is not a refutation, it is a dislocation: after it, the Cartesian problem can no longer be stated in its own confident terms.

Conclusion. *Dasein* is the door to Being because the question of Being is already alive in it; being-in-the-world removes the gap that the Cartesian subject had to bridge. Heidegger therefore defeats Descartes less by disproving him than by showing that the subject he began from was an abstraction from a more original way of being.

MENTOR NOTE Insist on the German terms and the hyphens — examiners reward *Zuhandenheit*/*Vorhandenheit* used correctly, not merely dropped. The one line that lifts this answer into the top band is the ‘scandal of philosophy’ point: Heidegger's objection is to the *demand* for a proof. If the question is only 15 marks, cut the critical estimate to two sentences and keep the three reversals.

Explain Husserl's phenomenological method. What is achieved by the *epoché* and the reductions?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

What the method is for. Husserl wants philosophy to be a rigorous science, a science of the sciences, and that demands a beginning from what he calls absolute poverty: no assets and no assumptions. The demand is severe, for even to formulate a goal in advance would be a prejudice — which is why his method must be subjective, an objective method having to start from a presupposed end. The rigour cuts against the existing systems. Deductive systems rest on self-evident axioms which no system troubles to prove; rationalism assumes that reason has the capacity to know all possible things and becomes dogmatism; empiricism, holding to experience for its sustenance, ends in scepticism; and even Kant, critical thinker as he was, could not avoid supposing the possibility of scientific knowledge. What is needed is a return to the origin of things.

What conceals the origin. Husserl holds that the primordial data of all knowledge are to be found in consciousness, but that our experience of it is distorted, afflicted with presuppositions, theories and judgements. He names two afflictions. *Psychologism* explains philosophical, logical and mathematical ideals by the laws of psychology and treats logic as a science studying the actual operations of the mind; but psychology treats consciousness as a set of rapidly changing and subjective mental states, and such states can never give the necessary and universal truths of mathematics and logic — psychologism ends in relativism and scepticism on the one hand and solipsism on the other. *Naturalistic belief* accepts the reality of the spatio-temporal world around us without question, holds that whatever is given in sense experience is true and that natural laws can explain all phenomena, and naturalises consciousness itself by identifying it with the brain, which is a physical thing. The decisive point is that this concealment is *contingent*: it can be removed, and the phenomenological method is what removes it.

The method. It has two moments which are simultaneous rather than successive, since *epoché* operates at every stage, even within reduction proper. *Epoché*, from the Greek word for cessation, is bracketing: the suspension of the spatio-temporal reality of the world, a standing at a distance, in which all scientific and metaphysical theories are set aside. We live, Husserl says, in a captivation in acceptances — we take for granted our bodies, our culture, our language — and in *epoché* we no longer accept them. He acknowledges Descartes here, whose method of doubt freed inquiry of distractions in order to admit only what is clear and distinct. Its limit is that it purifies consciousness only of external impurities, leaving the psychological afflictions in place. *Reduction proper* is the transcendental insight which blasts open captivation in acceptedness, and it has three stages. (i) *Psychological reduction* brackets the spatio-temporal world in order to attend to the pure mental process, eliminating moods, feelings and pleasures which distort consciousness; its limit is that it remains close to psychology, for although the naturalistic attitude is bracketed for things of everyday use, we go on affirming our existence as a natural person and continue as a psychologically functioning conscious ego. (ii) *Eidetic reduction*, from *eidos*, essence, turns the focus from the concrete to the universal, from individuals to their essences, freeing the object as given in consciousness from accidental properties such as production and decay so as to arrive at its meaning. (iii) *Transcendental reduction* brackets the empirical ego itself, because pure consciousness is not the property of any ego-substance; the *cogito* is not a particular self, and the individual ego is itself constituted by consciousness. What then remains is pure consciousness, transcendental subjectivity, and here phenomenological reduction reaches rock bottom.

What is achieved. Four things. *First*, the essence, which is the culmination of the method. In essence there are meanings, not existing objects: even when the existent object is destroyed the meaning persists, which is why Husserl takes essences to be primordial and makes them the basis of objectivity. They may be regarded as Plato's Ideas, but they are not transcendent — not independent of consciousness, though not purely mental either, and not the result of pure reason, since they are derived from what is directly given in sense experience. Essence is thus both immanent, because given in consciousness, and transcendent, because not caused by consciousness; here he comes close to Kant, and here he corrects Locke, whose representational theory abstracts essence from the observed object, whereas for

Husserl essence is directly given in it. *Second*, psychologism is defeated and the necessity of logic and mathematics is secured. *Third*, intentionality is established: consciousness is always of something and directed towards something, and objectless consciousness is impossible. Relations require the existence of the things related, but intentionality does not — we can think of a golden mountain without its existing, though we cannot think of nothing at all. The act of thought is *noesis*, the object of thought *noema*, and a noesis always constitutes a noema. This is what overcomes the duality of subject and object which Cartesian dualism could not bridge and which drove Locke's representationalism into Hume's scepticism. *Fourth*, the absolute existence of consciousness: without consciousness there would be no world, and pure consciousness is the locus of certain knowledge. Phenomenology, in the end, is to let a thing show itself from itself in the way in which it shows itself from itself.

What is not achieved. The method's own subjectivity is the standing danger, and Kant's case is the warning — Kant went to the extreme of saying that understanding maketh nature, and there subjectivity becomes subjectivism. Husserl also criticises Descartes for deducing the existence of the world illogically from the *cogito* and the idea of God, while accepting him as the genuine patriarch of phenomenology; his own advance is to see that 'I think *something*' is the correct description of human experience, and to treat the ego as the matrix of experience rather than the first axiom of a deduction. Sartre presses the sharpest objections. He rejects the transcendental ego, distinguishing 'there is consciousness of the pen' from 'I have consciousness of the pen' and denying that any ego can be isolated from the act of being conscious. He rejects the distinction of noesis and noema, because for him intentionality is not the nature of consciousness but *is* consciousness. And he rejects any theory of essence, since existence precedes essence and the meaning of an object cannot survive the object. It was, Sartre says, this radical conclusion that consciousness is contentless which gave birth to existentialism. **Conclusion.** As a foundation phenomenology does not deliver what it promised, for the presuppositionless standpoint is precisely what intentional analysis shows to be unavailable. As a method it is Husserl's permanent achievement. He appeared, like Descartes and Kant before him, when the foundations of the sciences were themselves threatened and irrationalism, nihilism and scepticism had crippled the nerve of Western civilisation, and his work is best summed up as the search for the transcendental conditions which make science, ethics, aesthetics and religion meaningful.

“Existence precedes essence.” Explain Sartre's account of freedom and bad faith. Does his position leave room for moral responsibility?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

For a manufactured article essence precedes existence: the paper-knife is conceived before it is made. Sartre's claim is that in man alone the order is reversed — there is no divine artisan and therefore no human nature laid down in advance; man first exists, encounters himself, and only afterwards defines himself. The ontological basis is the distinction of the *in-itself*, which simply is what it is, from the *for-itself*, consciousness, which is a lack and a nothingness — ‘it is what it is not and is not what it is’.

Freedom. Man is ‘condemned to be free’: freedom is not a property he possesses but his very mode of being, and the one thing he cannot choose is not to be free. Motives do not determine choice, for a motive weighs only within a project I continue to sustain; determinism is itself a stance I adopt. Facticity — body, past, class, situation — is not a limit on freedom but the material through which it operates, so freedom is always situated freedom. Its felt aspects are *anguish*, the vertigo of finding no rail to hold, *abandonment*, since no values are given, and *despair*, since one must act without any guarantee.

Bad faith is the flight from this condition — the attempt to become a thing. It is not lying, which needs two persons, but self-deception, possible only because human being is not self-identical. It runs in two directions: I may collapse into my facticity, like the waiter who is so entirely a waiter that his role does his choosing, or like the coward who pleads that cowardice is his nature; or I may disown facticity and treat myself as pure possibility for whom nothing done is binding — Sartre's woman who leaves her hand in her suitor's and simply is not her body. Even sincerity becomes bad faith when it aims at fixing the self as a determinate object.

Responsibility, and the difficulties. Because I choose not only my acts but the values in whose light they matter, responsibility is total: there are no excuses, and in choosing for myself I choose an image of man, so I answer for all. Three objections press. If all values are self-created, on what ground is bad faith a *fault*? Sartre condemns it, which requires authenticity as a standard his ontology does not obviously license. Total responsibility ignores coercion and structure — a criticism Sartre himself concedes in the *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, where the practico-inert conditions freedom. And if consciousness is a nothingness, the identity of the self that is to be held responsible over time is left unexplained; Kierkegaard, whose ‘dizziness of freedom’ Sartre inherits, at least anchored the self in a relation to God.

Conclusion. Sartre secures responsibility maximally and pays for it with a purely formal ethics: he can tell us to choose without self-deception, not what to choose. His permanent contribution is diagnostic — bad faith remains the most exact description we have of the ways in which people contrive not to notice that they are free.



THE
IAS AKADEMIA
We Are Because You Are



HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY

Dasein · Being-in-the-World · Authenticity · Inauthenticity · Temporality · Critique of Cartesian Subject

1. WHAT IS DASEIN?



- Dasein is "the being for whom Being is a question".
- Not a thing, not merely a rational subject, not an isolated substance.
- Dasein means human existence understood as openness to Being.



KEY TAKEAWAY

Dasein is always already involved in a world.

2. DASEIN IN HEIDEGGER'S METAPHYSICS / FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY




- Heidegger shifts the focus from beings to the meaning of Being.
- Ontological difference: Being vs beings.
- The analysis of Dasein is the route to the question of Being.
- Fundamental ontology studies Dasein as the clearing/site where Being is disclosed.



Heidegger is not doing traditional substance metaphysics.

3. STRUCTURE OF DASEIN



4. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD



- Dasein is not a detached spectator.
- World is a meaningful context of involvement, not a mere collection of objects.
- Ready-to-hand (Zuhandenheit): things we use in practical engagement.
- Present-at-hand (Vorhandenheit): things we encounter as objects.
- Dasein is essentially practical, involved and engaged.

5. AUTHENTIC AND INAUTHENTIC EXISTENCE

AUTHENTIC	INAUTHENTIC
✓ Owns its possibilities	X Lost in the "They" (das Man)
✓ Faces anxiety and finitude	X Conformity, distraction, everydayness
✓ Resolutely confronts death	X Idle talk, curiosity, ambiguity
✓ Lives from self-owned choice	X Flees from death and ownmost possibility

6. BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH & AUTHENTICITY



- Death is Dasein's ownmost, non-relational, unavoidable possibility.
- Anxiety individualizes Dasein.
- Anticipation of death makes authenticity possible.
- Leads to resoluteness (Entschlossenheit): living authentically in the face of finitude.

7. TEMPORALITY



- ▷ Future: projection (towards possibilities)
- ☁ Past: thrownness (factual conditions)
- ⌚ Present: falling / involvement in the world
- Dasein is fundamentally temporal.
- Time is not a container, but the horizon that makes meaning and existence possible.
- Temporality underlies Care.

8. REFUTATION OF THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT



- Rejects mind-body dualism and subject-object split.
- Critiques the isolated thinking ego.
- Human existence is not first a private inner consciousness looking at outer objects.
- Dasein is always already in a world, involved with others and things.
- Heidegger replaces the Cartesian detached subject with situated, relational existence.

9. WHY HEIDEGGER MATTERS

- Reorients metaphysics toward the question of Being
- Influences existentialism, hermeneutics and phenomenology
- Deep critique of modern subjectivism
- Important for UPSC comparisons with Descartes, Husserl, Sartre
- Makes authenticity and temporality central to philosophy

10. FINAL SUMMARY

“ For Heidegger, human existence is not a detached mind but Dasein: a being thrown into a world, projecting possibilities, caring, and confronting Being through time, anxiety and death. ”



Philosophy Optional with Vikash Sir



8595269455



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Dasein · being-in-the-world · care · authenticity · temporality · the refutation of the Cartesian subject.




THE IAS AKADEMIA

We Are Because You Are

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Aim, Anti-Psychologism, Epoche, Reduction, Merits, Drawbacks and Primordial Consciousness



Husserl

NOTE: HUSSERL AND DESCARTES	
Husserl	Descartes
Both begin with radical doubt/suspension and seek certainty.	Both begin with radical doubt/suspension and seek certainty.
Uses epoché not to deny the world but to study consciousness methodically.	Moves to substance dualism and the cogito as a thinking substance.
Focus on how things appear to consciousness (phenomena), not on things as they are.	Aims at knowledge of real substances — God, mind and matter.
Method is descriptive and phenomenological.	Method is metaphysical and deductive.
Develops transcendental subjectivity — the conditions of possibility of experience.	Affirms a thinking self as a substance separate from body.



Descartes



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Aim · anti-psychologism · epoché · reduction · eidetic insight — with the Husserl–Descartes comparison.

5(a) PAPER I · SECTION B · Q5(A) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS

Why do the Cārvākas accept perception as the only source of valid knowledge? Examine their rejection of inference.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The Cārvāka accepts *pratyakṣa* alone because a *pramāṇa* must certify itself, and perception alone presents its object immediately, without waiting on any other cognition. Inference cannot do so, for it rests entirely on *vyāpti*, a universal concomitance — and the knowledge of *vyāpti* is unobtainable. It is not perceived, since perception reaches only the cases observed; it is not inferred, for that is circular; it is not established by testimony, which is itself in question; and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa*, the extraordinary perception of a universal, is a device invented to rescue the theory. Above all, the possibility of an unnoticed condition (*upādhi*) can never be excluded. From this epistemology the metaphysics follows: only the four perceptible elements are real, consciousness is an emergent property of the organised body as intoxicating power emerges from fermented ingredients, and with no soul surviving death there is no *karma*, no *adṛṣṭa*, no rebirth and no Īśvara — so *dharma* is convention and the reasonable end of life is enjoyment.

The rejection is self-defeating in three ways. The argument that *vyāpti* is unknowable is itself an inference from observed failures to all cases. The claim that consciousness arises from matter is not perceived but inferred, and inferred from a concomitance far weaker than smoke and fire. And a man who accepted only perception could not believe in other minds, in the past, or in the fire behind the smoke he sees — ordinary life would become impossible. Nyāya adds that a *pramāṇa* need not be self-certifying, that concomitance reports a natural relation in things (*svābhāvika sambandha*), and that the Cārvāka must in any case distinguish veridical from illusory perception, which requires a criterion perception alone cannot give. Its service to Indian philosophy is nevertheless considerable: it compelled every school to justify its *pramāṇas*, provoked the most sophisticated Indian discussion of induction, and its doubt about the passage from observed to unobserved is precisely Hume's, arrived at two thousand years earlier.

Present an exposition of the Vaiśeṣika theory of atomism (*paramāṇuvāda*) and explain the role of *adr̥ṣṭa* in the process of creation.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Vaiśeṣika reaches the atom by regressive division: a composite is made of parts, and since infinite division would make a mustard seed and a mountain equal in constituents, the series must terminate in the partless, eternal, imperceptible *paramāṇu*. Atoms are of four kinds — earth, water, fire, air — each with its specific quality, and they are distinguished from one another ultimately by *viśeṣa*. Composition proceeds in stages: two atoms form a *dvyāṇuka*, three dyads a *tryaṇuka* or *trasareṇu*, which is the smallest perceptible magnitude, and so upward. The magnitude of the whole derives from the *number* of parts, not from the size of atoms — which is how partless atoms yield extended bodies.

Atoms being inert and eternal, motion must be initiated. Here *adr̥ṣṭa* — the unseen moral force, the accumulated merit and demerit of souls — supplies the occasion, operating under the will of Īśvara at the beginning of a cycle and ceasing at dissolution. Creation is therefore not mechanical but moral: the world is ordered so that souls may reap their *karma*. The evident weakness is that *adr̥ṣṭa* explains too conveniently, and the Buddhist presses the further objection that a partless atom can neither be contacted nor combine at all — the difficulty that later drives Yogācāra idealism.

Explain *anekāntavāda*. How is *syādvāda* related to it, and does the doctrine end in scepticism?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Jaina realism begins from the manifoldness of the real: every substance possesses infinite attributes, is permanent as *dravya* and changing in its *paryāyas*, so the Buddhist doctrine of flux and the Upaniṣadic doctrine of permanence are each a partial truth absolutised. *Anekāntavāda* — non-absolutism — is the epistemological consequence: since the object is many-sided and human knowledge is perspectival, no single judgement can exhaust it. The blind men and the elephant is the standard illustration, and only *kevala-jñāna*, omniscience, is complete. Its instrument is *nayavāda*, the doctrine of standpoints: each of the seven *nayas* is true within its own reference and false the moment it is taken absolutely. *Syādvāda* is the logical expression of this — the sevenfold predication in which every assertion is qualified by *syāt*, ‘in a certain sense’: it is; it is not; it is and is not; it is inexpressible; and the three remaining combinations. *Syāt* is not a particle of doubt but the mark of a standpoint.

Far from scepticism, the doctrine holds every judgement to be *true* — only conditionally. Three objections are pressed. Śaṅkara urges that the same thing cannot both be and not be; the Jaina replies that the predicates are affirmed of different aspects and from different standpoints, so contradiction never arises, and that it is the absolutist who has manufactured the problem. The fourth predication, ‘inexpressible’, is said to be self-refuting since it is expressed; the reply is that what is denied is expressibility by a single simultaneous predication, not expressibility at all. Most seriously, if all views are partial, *anekāntavāda* is itself partial — a reflexivity the Jainas accept, calling it the standpoint that comprehends the rest, which critics find evasive. The doctrine's real cost is dialectical: a position that accommodates every thesis makes refutation difficult. Its value is that it grounds tolerance in metaphysics rather than in indifference — the intellectual counterpart of *ahimsā*, and the natural Indian resource for the debate on religious pluralism.

Explain the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*). How does it differ from the Nyāya view?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The Mīmāṃsaka holds that every cognition is valid simply as cognition: validity belongs to it by its own nature, arising from the very conditions that produce it, and needs no external certificate. Invalidity, by contrast, is always extrinsic — traceable to a defect in the instrument or to subsequent contradiction. Knowledge is therefore self-established and self-luminous, and it is *doubt* that requires a special reason. The doctrinal motive is plain: the Veda, being authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and hence free from the defects that attend a personal author, is intrinsically authoritative, and no further proof of its validity can be demanded or given.

Nyāya takes the opposite view, *parataḥ prāmāṇya*: validity is extrinsic both in origin and in ascertainment — a cognition is valid because produced by an undefective instrument, and is *known* to be valid through corroboration (*saṁvāda*) and the success of the activity it prompts. The Buddhist holds validity extrinsic in origin but intrinsic in ascertainment; Sāṃkhya holds it intrinsic in both. The Mīmāṃsā position has one powerful argument: if every cognition required a further cognition to certify it, that one would need another, and nothing would ever be known — the regress is the decisive consideration, and it is essentially the modern anti-foundationalist point. Against it, error is awkward: the first apprehension of the rope as a snake was, on the doctrine, valid, and to say that it was afterwards cancelled is to concede that validity depends on non-contradiction, which is extrinsic. Nyāya adds that a cognition cannot be its own witness, else no dispute could ever be settled. The defensible verdict divides the question: Mīmāṃsā is right about the *presumption* — the burden lies on the doubter, as with Moore's truisms — and Nyāya right about *ascertainment* once a challenge has been raised.

Explain the Yoga conception of *citta* and its *vṛttis*. How does *aṣṭāṅga-yoga* lead to *kaivalya*?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Yoga accepts the Sāṃkhya metaphysics of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and adds Īśvara and a discipline — hence the old formula that Sāṃkhya is the theory and Yoga the practice. *Citta* is the internal organ, composed of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *manas*, an evolute of *prakṛti* and therefore made of the three *guṇas*; in itself transparent, it is continually modified into *vṛttis*, of which five kinds are named: valid cognition, error, verbal construction, sleep and memory. Bondage arises because *puruṣa*, pure consciousness, is reflected in *citta* and mistakes its modifications for its own — the affliction of *asmitā*, rooted in *avidyā*. Hence the definition: *yogaḥ citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ*, and its consequence, 'then the seer abides in his own form'.

The eight limbs are the graded means. *Yama* and *niyama* are the moral foundation, and no later limb is effective without them — the point to insist on, since Yoga is a discipline and not a technique. *Āsana*, *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra* steady the body and withdraw the senses; *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* — together *saṁyama* — are the inner limbs. *Samprajñāta samādhi* still has an object and is refined through its stages; *asamprajñāta* is objectless, and when even the residual *saṁskāras* are burnt in *nirbīja samādhi*, *kaivalya* follows: the absolute isolation of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*. Note that Īśvara is a special *puruṣa*, an object of devotion who removes obstacles, not the goal — liberation is not union with God. Three criticisms deserve mention: *kaivalya* is isolation, so liberation is negative and asocial, which the Gītā's *karma-yoga* and Advaita's *ānanda* both refuse; the false identification of an essentially unattached *puruṣa* with *citta* is as unexplained here as in Sāṃkhya; and that the cessation of all *vṛttis* discloses the self rather than mere blankness is a claim experience alone can support. Its achievement is the most exact psychology of attention that Indian thought produced.

Explain the Nyāya conception of *vyāpti*. Examine the adequacy of the methods by which *vyāpti* is said to be known, and the role of *tarka* in establishing it.

WHY PROBABLE The Nyāya–Mīmāṃsā epistemology 20-marker is filled in every slot-checkable year. *Vyāpti* itself has been dormant since 2013, while perception (2025), *hetvābhāsa* (2023) and validity (2024) are all recently used.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Vyāpti and its place. Inference, *anumāna*, is etymologically *anu*, after, and *māna*, knowledge — the knowledge which arises after another knowledge. It is mediate and indirect, reached through a mark: the middle term, *hetu*, which is invariably connected with the major term, *sādhya*, and present in the minor term, *pakṣa*. The hill is fiery because it has smoke: hill is *pakṣa*, smoke is *hetu*, fiery is *sādhya*. Inference therefore has two grounds — *pakṣadharmatā*, that the mark is present in the minor term, and *vyāpti*, the invariable association of the middle term with the major — and the knowledge itself arises through *parāmarśa*. *Vyāpti* literally means the state of pervasion: a universal concomitant correlation between two facts, of which one is pervaded, *vyāpya*, and the other pervades, *vyāpaka* — smoke is pervaded by fire. It is of two kinds: *asamavyāpti*, between terms of unequal extension, as smoke and fire; and *samavyāpti*, between terms of equal extension, as nameable and knowable. And it is not mere co-existence. ‘Where there is fire there is smoke’ is not *vyāpti*, because the relation holds only on the condition of wet fuel; such a condition is an *upādhi*, and *vyāpti* is a relation of co-existence between the major and the middle term which is *independent of all conditions*. Because the Naiyāyika spends such effort on this, two questions organise the whole topic: what is *vyāpti*, and how is *vyāpti* known?

The problem of how it is known. This is the Indian problem of induction, and it is raised by the Cārvāka and by Hume alike; every school except the Cārvāka admits the validity of inference, and every school must therefore answer it. The Buddhists base the knowledge of universal propositions on causality, and determine the causal relation by the method of *pañcakāraṇī* — neither cause nor effect is perceived, then the cause is perceived, then immediately the effect, then the cause disappears, then immediately the effect disappears. The Vedāntins hold that *vyāpti* is the result of an induction by simple enumeration, derived from the uncontradicted experience of agreement in presence. Nyāya upholds the Vedāntin view so far, and then goes further: uncontradicted experience of the relation between two facts is supplemented by *tarka*, by indirect proof, and finally by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception.

The Nyāya procedure — five steps. (i) First we observe that there is a relation of agreement in presence, *anvaya*, between the two things: if smoke is present, fire must be present. (ii) Then we investigate whether there is uniform agreement in absence, *vyatireka*: no fire, no smoke. These two are akin to Mill’s joint method of agreement. (iii) Even then we cannot be sure whether the relation is free from conditions, so the third step is to eliminate every *upādhi*. The classroom example settles the point: I put on the switch and the fan rotates, I switch it off and it stops — yet this relation is not *vyāpti*, because it is conditioned upon electricity. To eliminate conditions we must make repeated observations, *bhūyodarśana*, of agreement in presence and in absence under varying circumstances. (iv) There is still room for doubt. A Cārvāka, or Hume, will concede that so far as our past and present experience goes there is no contradiction in saying that where there is smoke there is fire — but will the relation hold for distant regions, for the planets, or in the remote future? (v) Nyāya silences this doubt by *tarka*, hypothetical reasoning, whose business is to show the absurdity of the counter-position. If ‘all smoky objects are fiery’ were false, its contradictory, ‘some smoky objects are not fiery’, would have to be true. But to say that there exists smoke without fire is to admit an effect without its cause, and that violates the law of causation. And if some obstinate person still argues that there are effects without causes, he is sentenced by practical contradiction — why then does he need fire to light his cigar? This indirect proof corresponds roughly to *reductio ad absurdum* in Western logic.

Why even this is not enough — and the final move. Although the Naiyāyikas take great pains to establish *vyāpti* on the ground of observed particular facts, they themselves feel that a generalisation from particulars cannot give us certainty, being always susceptible to the illicit distribution of the middle term, that is, to illicit generalisation. We

cannot say with the same certainty as ‘all men are mortal’ that ‘all crows are black’, because there is nothing in the nature of a crow to prevent it from being grey or brown; whereas men possess an essential character, manhood and birth, which establishes that all men are mortal. It follows that an inductive generalisation must ultimately be based on a knowable class-essence or universal. Hence the Naiyāyikas establish *vyāpti* from *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception, in which the universal itself is perceived: to perceive manhood is to perceive all men in so far as man is concerned, and not to perceive a particular man. **How adequate is all this?** The Cārvāka objection is that each method presupposes what it sets out to prove — observation gives only observed cases, and the passage to all cases assumes the very uniformity that *vyāpti* asserts, so inference is being defended by inference. The elimination of *upādhi* can never be shown to be complete, since an unknown condition remains possible in principle. And *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception is open to the charge of having been devised for the difficulty, and is rejected by the Buddhist because it presupposes real universals. Nyāya’s two replies are strong ones. *Tarka* is not circular, because it does not prove the concomitance at all; it only destroys the counter-supposition — which is why the school is careful never to call it a *pramāṇa*. And the universality claimed is grounded in a real class-essence in the world, not in a habit in us; which is exactly where Nyāya parts company with Hume, for whom necessity exists in the mind and not in nature.

Comparison and conclusion. Set beside Aristotle the differences are instructive. Both logics work with three terms, but Western logic has three propositions where Indian logic has five — *pratijñā*, the hill is fiery, which has to be proved; *hetu*, because it has smoke; *udāharaṇa*, where there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen; *upanayana*, this hill has smoke; and *nigamana*, therefore this hill is fiery. If the first two premises or the last two are eliminated, the Nyāya syllogism resembles the Barbara mood. The Aristotelian syllogism is deductive and formal only, whereas the Nyāya syllogism is deductive and inductive, formal and material together; Indian logic does not separate deduction from induction, and consequently every fallacy in it is a material fallacy. It also rejects the verbalistic view of logic, studying thought as such and not the forms of thought alone — as the division of inference into *svārtha* and *parārtha* shows, the five-membered form being needed only where others are to be convinced. **Conclusion.** Nyāya’s is the most systematic account of inference in Indian philosophy: it states precisely what would falsify a concomitance, gives a procedure for testing it, and in *tarka* possesses a genuine instrument for removing doubt. Its weakness is the one Western philosophy calls the problem of induction, and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception meets that more by postulate than by argument. What survives, and survives well, is the realist insistence that *vyāpti* reports a relation in nature and not a habit in us — and on that ground the problem of induction is, as the school claims, appropriately defended by Nyāya.

MENTOR NOTE Write the switch-and-fan example in every answer on *vyāpti*: the 2020 paper asked it directly — ‘when I put on the switch there is light; is this a *vyāpti* relation?’ — and the answer is no, because the relation is conditioned by electricity, *vyāpti* being invariable and unconditional. Two further marks come almost free: say explicitly that *tarka* is not a *pramāṇa*, and use the crows-and-men contrast to explain why *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception is needed at all.

Examine the principal theories of error (*khyātivāda*) in Indian philosophy. Which of them is the most satisfactory?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

When a shell is taken for silver, what is the *object* of the erroneous cognition? Every theory must preserve three facts: the cognition occurs and has a definite content; it is afterwards cancelled; and while it lasts it moves the subject to act. Indian philosophy's rival answers are, in effect, competing accounts of what can be presented to consciousness.

Nyāya — *anyathā-khyāti*, apprehending one thing as another. Both terms are real: the shell is present, the silver was seen elsewhere, and through *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-pratyakṣa* the remembered silver is presented as though perceived. Error is thus a wrong synthesis of two reals, and correction is the recognition of the true relation. Realism is preserved and no new entity is needed. The objection is phenomenological: the silver appears *here and now*, and an object elsewhere cannot be the content of a present perception.

Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā — *akhyāti*, non-apprehension. There is no positive error at all: two valid cognitions occur, the perception of 'this' and the memory of silver, and only their difference goes unnoticed. This is the necessary consequence of intrinsic validity. But error is not experienced as a gap; 'this is silver' is a single confident judgement, and mere failure to discriminate cannot explain why the man stoops to pick it up. **Kumārila** accordingly moves back towards Nyāya with *viparīta-khyāti*.

Yogācāra — *ātma-khyāti*: the content is an internal representation appearing as external, so error differs from truth only in coherence. This dissolves the distinction it was asked to explain — if all cognition is representation, why is one representation corrected by another? **Sāṃkhya and Rāmānuja** — *sat-khyāti*: all knowledge is of the real, and minute particles of silver are actually present in the shell. Nothing unreal is admitted, but the device is *ad hoc* and makes the subsequent correction hard to describe.

Advaita — *anirvacanīya-khyāti*: the appearing silver is neither real, since it is sublated, nor unreal, since it was experienced and produced effects; it is projected by *avidyā* on the shell at the moment of error and destroyed by knowledge. This alone does justice to the phenomenology — error has positive content — and it generalises: the same analysis explains the status of the world. Its cost is that 'indescribable' names the difficulty rather than resolving it, and a fresh entity must be posited for every mistake.

Conclusion. For ordinary perceptual error Nyāya is the strongest, since it explains the facts without enlarging the ontology; Advaita is the most faithful to what the erring subject actually undergoes, and alone makes error the model for metaphysics; *akhyāti* is the most economical and the least convincing. The underlying question — whether what is presented to consciousness must exist — is the same one Western philosophy meets in the analysis of hallucination, where Nyāya corresponds to the misidentification account and Advaita to the sense-datum account.

Explain the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*). Examine the objections of its critics.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Momentariness is the metaphysical consequence of dependent origination. Whatever is, is conditioned; whatever is conditioned arises and perishes; therefore *sarvam kṣaṇikam* — everything lasts a single moment. Two arguments support it. From **causal efficiency**: to exist is to be able to produce an effect (*arthakriyākāritva*), and to produce is to change, so nothing can remain self-identical through two moments. From **destruction**: no cause of perishing can be identified — the hammer produces the potsherds, not the perishing — so perishing is intrinsic and things are born dying. It follows that there is no substance: what we call a thing is a series (*santāna*) of momentary *dharmas*, and identity is a construction on similarity and causal continuity, as with the flame of a lamp or the water of a river. Applied to the person, the doctrine yields *nairātmyavāda* — five *skandhas* in flux and no *ātman*.

The objections. *Recognition*: ‘this is the very jar I saw yesterday’ is for Nyāya a valid cognition, and it is unintelligible if nothing persists; to call it a construction upon similarity begs the question, since comparing two things requires one subject that has both. *Memory and desert*: if the agent of the deed is not the reaper of its fruit, *karma* becomes unjust — and the Buddhist answer, continuity of the series, either readmits a substrate or leaves the difficulty, which is why *ālayavijñāna* had eventually to be invented. *Causality*: two momentary entities cannot stand as cause and effect, for when the cause is the effect is not, and when the effect arises the cause has already gone — so the relation the Buddhist most needs is the one his ontology forbids. *Bondage and release* presuppose someone bound and freed. And Śaṅkara adds the sharpest point: the very knowledge that everything is momentary must be held by a witness that is not itself momentary, so the self is the presupposition of the doctrine's own assertion. Finally, if destruction requires no cause, why does the jar break only when struck?

Replies and assessment. The Buddhist answers that continuity is causal and not substantial — each moment is the material condition of the next; that recognition is a practical and verbal convenience, not a perception of identity; and that the demand for a witness assumes the substantialism under attack. The exchange leaves the doctrine undefeated as a *critique* of substance: it dissolves the puzzles of change and of the relation of a whole to its parts at a stroke. It remains unsatisfying as a positive account of persons, since memory, recognition and desert all require more continuity than a series provides. The internal history of the school is the best evidence of the strain — from Sautrāntika realism to Yogācāra's store-consciousness, each step supplies a little more of the persistence the original thesis denied.



THE IAS AKADEMIA

— We Are Because You Are —

VALID SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Pramāṇas and the Nyāya–Mīmāṃsā Debate on Validity of Knowledge

1 WHAT IS PRAMĀṆA?



- Pramāṇa means a valid source or means of knowledge.
- Different schools of Indian philosophy accept different numbers of pramāṇas.



KEY TAKEAWAY

The six major pramāṇas commonly discussed are:
Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi.

Pramāṇas are the channels through which we arrive at true knowledge.



2 THE SIX VALID SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

1 PRATYAKṢA (Perception)



- Knowledge gained through direct sense perception.
- Immediate awareness through contact of sense organs and object.

2 ANUMĀNA (Inference)



- Knowledge derived from reasoning from sign to the unseen.
- Example: smoke implies fire.*

3 ŚABDA (Verbal Testimony)



- Knowledge derived from trustworthy words or authoritative testimony.
- In orthodox systems, Veda is supreme testimony.

4 UPAMĀNA (Comparison / Analogy)



- Knowledge obtained by similarity or comparison.
- Example: learning what a "garaya" is by comparing it to a cow.*

5 ARTHĀPATTI (Postulation / Implication)



- Presumption made to explain an otherwise inexplicable fact.
- Example: a person who never eats in the day but remains stout must eat at night.*

6 ANUPALABDHI (Non-apprehension / Non-perception)



- Knowledge of absence through non-perception.
- Example: absence of a pot on the floor is known by not perceiving it.*

3 WHO ACCEPTS WHICH PRAMĀṆAS?

SCHOOL / SYSTEM	PRATYAKṢA (Perception)	ANUMĀNA (Inference)	ŚABDA (Testimony)	UPAMĀNA (Comparison)	ARTHĀPATTI (Implication)	ANUPALABDHI (Non-apprehension)
Cārvāka	✓					
Buddhism	✓	✓				
Vaiśeṣika	✓	✓				
Sāṅkhya / Yoga	✓	✓	✓			
Nyāya	✓	✓	✓	✓		
Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Advaita Vedānta	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

4 DEBATE ON THE VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

SVATAḤ PRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA (Intrinsic Validity) — Mīmāṃsā

- Knowledge is valid by itself at the moment of its rise.
- Cognition reveals both object and its own validity.
- Error is known later, when sublated by another cognition.
- Validity is intrinsic; invalidity is extrinsic.

★ *Important note: Mīmāṃsā begins with trust in cognition unless defeated.*

CORE DIFFERENCE



- Mīmāṃsā: validity is self-established.
- Nyāya: validity is externally established.

PARATAḤ PRĀMĀṆYAVĀDA (Extrinsic Validity) — Nyāya

- Validity of knowledge is known by a later verification.
- A cognition becomes certified as valid when confirmed by successful activity or correspondence.
- Knowledge does not carry its validity by itself.
- Both validity and invalidity are known through external conditions.

★ *Important note: Nyāya stresses examination, confirmation and causal conditions.*

5 WHY THIS DEBATE MATTERS



Central to Indian epistemology.



Explains how truth, error and certainty are understood.



Important for comparing Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.



Frequently useful in UPSC Philosophy Optional answers.



Helps connect pramāṇas with the theory of truth and error.

6 FINAL MEMORY BOX



Indian philosophy studies not only the sources of valid knowledge, but also the question: when and why is knowledge valid?



6 Pramāṇas: Perception, Inference, Testimony, Comparison, Implication, Non-apprehension.



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The six sources of valid knowledge, which school accepts which, and the Nyāya–Mīmāṃsā debate on validity.



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VAIŚEŚIKA PHILOSOPHY OF PADĀRTHA

Bhāva and Abhāva • Classification of Categories • Substance, Quality, Motion, Universals, Particularity and Inherence

1. WHAT IS PADĀRTHA?

- Padārtha means “that which has meaning or object of valid knowledge” (artha-padārtha).
- Vaiśeṣika classifies all that exists and does not exist for metaphysical analysis.
- It provides a framework to understand reality in terms of categories.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Vaiśeṣika is a pluralistic and realistic system that classifies reality into categories.

2. MAIN CLASSIFICATION

PADĀRTHA

BHĀVA
(Positive / Existent)

ABHĀVA
(Non-existence / Absence)

3. BHĀVA — POSITIVE / EXISTENT CATEGORIES

1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 
DRAVYA (Substance) The substratum in which qualities and motions reside.	GUṆA (Quality) Qualities like color, taste, number, magnitude etc.; depends on substance.	KARMA (Motion / Action) Movement or action that produces change; located in substance.	SĀMĀNYA (Universal) Universal commonness, enabling class concepts and cognition.	VIŚEṢA (Particularity) Ultimate differentiator, especially of eternal substances (atoms, self).	SAMAVĀYA (Inherence) Inseparable relation that binds entities; e.g. substance-quality, universal-particular.

DRAVYA — THE NINE SUBSTANCES

1. PRTHVĪ (Earth) 	2. ĀPAH (Water) 	3. TEJAS (Fire) 	4. VĀYU (Air) 	5. ĀKĀṢA (Ether) 
6. KĀLA (Time) 	7. DĪŚ (Space) 	8. ĀTMAN (Self) 	9. MANAS (Mind) 	

4. ABHĀVA — NON-EXISTENCE / ABSENCE

1 	PRĀGABHĀVA (Prior non-existence) Absence of an effect before its production. <i>Example:</i> A pot does not exist before it is created.
2 	PRADHVAṂSĀBHĀVA (Posterior non-existence) Absence of an effect after its destruction. <i>Example:</i> A pot does not exist after it is broken.
3 	ATYANTĀBHĀVA (Absolute non-existence) Total absence of something across all times and in all relations. <i>Example:</i> Color does not exist in sound at any time.
4 	ANYONYĀBHĀVA (Mutual non-existence) One thing is not another; mutual distinctness. <i>Example:</i> Cloth is not a pot; pot is not cloth.

5. HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

- Bhāva explains what exists positively in the universe through six fundamental categories.
- Abhāva accounts for absence and negation in four distinct forms.
- Together, they provide a complete and balanced classification of reality (sattā) and non-reality (asattā). This enables precise analysis, knowledge and reasoning about the world.



BHĀVA — WHAT EXISTS
ABHĀVA — WHAT IS ABSENT

6. WHY VAIŚEŚIKA MATTERS

- Crucial for Indian metaphysics and ontology.
- Systematically explains categories of existence for clear understanding.
- Essential for UPSC comparison with Nyāya and other darśanas.
- Clarifies atomism (paramāṇuvāda), realism, universals (sāmānya) and inherence (samavāya).

For Vaiśeṣika, philosophical understanding begins by classifying reality into what exists (Bhāva) and what is absent (Abhāva). ”

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Padārtha — the six positive categories and the four kinds of absence.



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YOGA PHILOSOPHY

Citta · Kleśas · Citta-vṛttis · Aṣṭāṅga Yoga · Īśvara · Comparison with Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo

1. WHAT IS YOGA?

☆ *Yogaḥ citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ.*

- Yoga aims at cessation of mental modifications (vṛttis), leading to concentration, discrimination and kaivalya (liberation).
- Yoga is closely connected with Sāṅkhya, but accepts Īśvara.

🔑 **KEY TAKEAWAY:** Yoga is practical discipline aimed at mastery of mind and liberation.

2. CITTA (THE MIND-STUFF)



- Citta is the internal organ (antahkarana) in which vṛttis arise and which must be disciplined.

☆ Purified citta reflects consciousness clearly.

3. THE FIVE KLEŚAS




🔗 These kleśas disturb citta and bind the self (puruṣa).

4. THE FIVE CITTA-VṚTTIS

1. PRAMĀṆA → valid cognition (right knowledge)
2. VIPARYAYA → error / false knowledge
3. VIKALPA → imagination / conceptual construction
4. NIDRĀ → sleep
5. SMṚTI → memory

🧠 Yoga seeks nirodha, not mere destruction, but disciplined stilling and mastery of vṛttis.

5. AṢṬĀṆGA YOGA (THE EIGHT-LIMBED PATH)



📖 The last three limbs — dhāraṇā, dhyāna, samādhi — lead toward higher concentration. Together they are called SAMYAMA (combined application) and open the way to inner realization.

6. ROLE OF GOD (ĪŚVARA) IN YOGA

- Yoga accepts Īśvara as a "special puruṣa" (puruṣa-viśeṣa).
- He is untouched by kleśa, karma, vipāka and āśaya.
- Īśvara is a spiritual aid, ideal teacher, and object of devotion (bhakti) and concentration.
- Om̐ is His designation.
- Īśvara-praṇidhāna (surrender to Īśvara) is a powerful means to attain samādhi.

🧘 Unlike strict Sāṅkhya, Yoga gives a significant practical place to God.

7. YOGA AND SRI AUROBINDO'S INTEGRAL YOGA

ASPECT	PĀTANJALA YOGA	INTEGRAL YOGA (SRI AUROBINDO)
🎯 AIM	Kaivalya / liberation of puruṣa from prakṛti.	Supramental transformation and divine life on earth.
🌐 WORLD-VIEW	Withdrawal from citta-vṛttis and bondage.	Transformation of life, matter, and consciousness.
⚙️ METHOD	Aṣṭāṅga discipline leading to nirodha of citta-vṛttis.	Integral synthesis of knowledge (jñāna), devotion (bhakti), works (karma) and psychic-spiritual transformation.
🕉️ ROLE OF GOD	Īśvara as special puruṣa, untouched and aid to concentration and samādhi.	Divine as dynamic, creative reality to be realized in life and manifested.
🌸 END STATE	Isolation/liberation (kaivalya) of puruṣa.	Integral perfection; descent of higher consciousness in mind, life and body.
🏔️ ORIENTATION	More ascetic-psychological discipline; emphasis on stilling of mind.	Evolutionary and world-affirming spirituality; integrates life rather than rejects it.



Both emphasize spiritual discipline, but Pātañjala Yoga aims at nirodha and kaivalya, whereas Integral Yoga seeks transformation of the whole being.



8. REMEMBER & RECALL



For Yoga, *bondage* begins with disturbed citta and kleśas; *liberation* comes through discipline, concentration and samādhi.



From citta-vṛtti-nirodha to kaivalya.



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Citta and its vṛttis · the five kleśas · the eight limbs · Īśvara — and the comparison with Integral Yoga.



THE IAS AKADEMIA

— We Are Because You Are —


NYĀYA CONCEPTION OF INFERENCE

Anumāna · Vyāpti · Pañcāvayava · Hetvābhāsa

1 WHAT IS INFERENCE (ANUMĀNA)?

- Inference is knowledge that arises after knowledge of a mark (līnga/hetu) and its invariable concomitance (vyāpti) with the sādhyā.
- Classic example: smoke → fire
- Inference proceeds from the known sign to the unperceived probandum.
- Inference is accepted as an independent pramāṇa in Nyāya.

2 ELEMENTS OF INFERENCE



WORKED EXAMPLE:

"The hill has fire, because it has smoke."



- Pakṣa: hill
- Sādhyā: fire
- Hetu: smoke
- Vyāpti: wherever there is smoke, there is fire.

3 TYPES OF INFERENCE

- A. Svarthānumāna — inference for oneself
- B. Parārthānumāna — inference for others

Under Parārthānumāna: Pañcāvayava (Five-member Nyāya syllogism)

1. Pratijñā — The hill is fiery.
2. Hetu — because it has smoke.
3. Udāharaṇa — wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.
4. Upanaya — the hill has smoke of that kind.
5. Nigamana — therefore the hill is fiery.

Older Nyāya classification by causal relation:

- Pūrvavat
- Śeṣavat
- Sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa


5 CHARACTERISTICS OF A GOOD HETU

- ✓ 1. Pakṣasattva — present in the pakṣa.
- ✓ 2. Sapakṣasattva — present in similar cases.
- ✓ 3. Vipakṣasattva — absent in dissimilar cases.
- ✓ 4. Abādhitatva — not contradicted by stronger knowledge.
- ✓ 5. Asatpratipakṣatva — not counterbalanced by an equally strong opposing reason.

Nyāya defends vyāpti through repeated observation of agreement in presence (anvaya) and agreement in absence (vyatireka).


ANVAYA (Agreement in presence)

Where smoke is seen, fire is seen.



VYATIREKA (Agreement in absence)

Where fire is absent, smoke is absent.



UPĀDHI (Limiting condition)

A hidden condition that falsely restricts universality. Nyāya insists valid vyāpti must be free from upādhi.



Vyāpti is grasped through observation, comparison of cases, and elimination of upādhi (limiting condition).



★ WITHOUT VYĀPTI, NO VALID INFERENCE IS POSSIBLE. ★

6 HETVĀBHĀSA (FALLACIES OF INFERENCE)

No.	HETVĀBHĀSA	MEANING	EXPLANATION	EXAMPLE
1	Savyabhicāra / Anaikāntika	Inconclusive, irregular reason.	Hetu is found in both similar and dissimilar cases; fails to be invariable.	"The hill is fiery because it is perceivable." (Perceivable things like lake are not fiery.)
2	Viruddha	Contradictory reason proving the opposite.	Hetu establishes the absence of the sādhyā.	"The hill is not fiery because it has smoke." (Smoke indicates fire, so this proves the opposite.)
3	Satpratipakṣa	Countered by an equally strong opposing reason.	A rival hetu of equal strength establishes the opposite conclusion.	"The sound is eternal because it is intelligible." Countered by: "It is non-eternal because it is produced."
4	Asiddha	Unproved middle / reason not established.	Hetu is not established in the pakṣa (or sapakṣa) or is unintelligible.	"The sky-lotus is fragrant because it has a fragrance." (Sky-lotus itself is not established.)
5	Bādhita	Contradicted by stronger evidence.	Hetu is overruled by perception or other pramāṇa.	"Fire is cold (because it is like water)." (Perception shows fire is hot; reason is contradicted.)



Hetvābhāsa leads to error and fallacious conclusion.

7 WHY NYĀYA INFERENCE MATTERS

- It gives a rigorous logic of reasoning.
- It connects epistemology with debate and proof.
- Vyāpti is central to Indian logic.
- Hetvābhāsa helps evaluate bad arguments.
- Very useful for UPSC comparisons with Buddhism, Mīmāṃsā and Western logic.

8 FINAL MEMORY BOX

Nyāya inference is valid when a properly established hetu, grounded in vyāpti and present in the pakṣa, leads to the knowledge of the sādhyā. Invalid inference arises from hetvābhāsa.



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Vyāpti · the five-membered syllogism · the marks of a good hetu · the fallacies of inference.



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THEORY OF ERROR IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Khyātivāda • Nyāya • Prābhākara • Kumārila • Śāṅkara • Buddhism

1 WHAT IS KHYĀTIVĀDA?

Theories of error (khyātivāda) attempt to explain illusion or erroneous cognition, such as seeing silver in nacre or a snake in a rope.



KEY TAKEAWAY

Different schools explain illusion differently depending on how they understand reality, cognition and non-apprehension.

2 THE PROBLEM OF ERROR

CLASSIC ILLUSION EXAMPLES



1



Nyāya — Anyathākhyātivāda

In illusion, a real object experienced elsewhere is misapprehended as present here; error arises from misrelation and memory.

Example:

Silver previously experienced elsewhere is wrongly presented in nacre.

2



Prābhākara Mimāṃsā — Akhyāti

Error is due to non-discrimination or failure to distinguish perception from memory; both elements are valid but their difference is not grasped.

Example:

Perceived nacre + remembered silver are not distinguished.

3



Kumārila Bhaṭṭa — Viparīta-khyātivāda

Error is a positive wrong cognition, a misapprehension in which one thing is taken as another.

Example:

Nacre is positively cognized as silver.

4



Śāṅkara / Advaita Vedānta — Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda

The illusory object is neither real nor unreal, but indeterminable (anirvacanīya); illusion is superimposition (adhyāsa) due to avidyā.

Example:

Snake on rope appears empirically but is sublated by right knowledge.

5



Buddhism — Ātmakhyātivāda

The illusory object is nothing external; what appears is a projection of consciousness itself. Error arises because internal cognition appears as external object.

Example:

What appears as snake is only a mental projection.

4 HOW THE SCHOOLS DIFFER

Aspect	Nyāya <i>Anyathākhyātivāda</i>	Prābhākara Mimāṃsā <i>Akhyāti</i>	Kumārila Bhaṭṭa <i>Viparīta-khyātivāda</i>	Śāṅkara / Advaita Vedānta <i>Anirvacanīya-khyātivāda</i>	Buddhism <i>Ātmakhyātivāda</i>
What appears in error?	Object experienced elsewhere	Perceived object + remembered object (undiscriminated)	Other object positively	Indeterminable object (neither real nor unreal)	Consciousness itself as an object
Source of error	Misrelation and memory	Non-discrimination of perception and memory	Positive wrong cognition	Avidyā (ignorance) and adhyāsa (superimposition)	Projection of internal cognition
Status of illusory object	Real (exists elsewhere)	Real (both elements are real)	Real (as mistaken for another)	<i>Anirvacanīya</i> (indeterminable)	Not external (only internal)
Example explained how?	Silver seen in nacre is remembered silver from elsewhere	Seen nacre and remembered silver not distinguished	Nacre is positively taken as silver	Snake on rope appears but sublated by right knowledge	Snake is only a mental projection of consciousness

5 WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS



Useful for understanding Indian epistemology (theory of knowledge).



Often asked in comparative format in UPSC Philosophy Optional.



Connects theory of knowledge with metaphysics and nature of reality.



Essential for writing deeper, analytical answers in the exam.

6 MEMORY BOX

“The debate on error reveals how each school understands cognition, reality and illusion.”



Nyāya—*Anyathā* | Prābhākara—*Akhyāti* | Kumārila—*Viparīta*
Śāṅkara—*Anirvacanīya* | Buddhism—*Ātmakhyāti*

QUICK REVISION TIPS

- ✓ Focus on the core idea of each theory.
- ✓ Use the rope–snake and shell–silver examples.
- ✓ Learn the Sanskrit terms — they are key in answers.
- ✓ Draw comparisons in table form for clarity.



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The five khyātivādas side by side, with the rope–snake and shell–silver examples.




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How do the Yogācāra Buddhists establish that consciousness alone is real? Explain the function of *ālayavijñāna* and examine the realist objections to it.

WHY PROBABLE Buddhism is present in every readable paper, but *kṣaṇikavāda* and *pratītyasamutpāda* are saturated across 2022, 2024 and 2025. Yogācāra was last touched in 2019 and *ālayavijñāna* in 2015.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda thesis is *vijñaptimātratā* — all that is given is representation-only. It is the internal development of *pratītyasamutpāda* in an idealist direction: if nothing has own-being, the apparent externality of objects must itself be a construction of consciousness.

The arguments. (i) *Sahopalambha-niyama* — object and cognition are never given apart; what is invariably co-apprehended gives no ground for positing a distinct existent. (ii) The dream and illusion argument: dream-objects have vividness, spatial order and causal efficacy in the dream, so these marks cannot certify externality. (iii) The regress against realism: an external atom is either partless, in which case it cannot combine or be perceived, or has parts, in which case it is not ultimate — the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accounts both founder here. (iv) The argument from the *grāhya-grāhaka* duality: subject and object are two aspects of one cognition, and to reify the object is to mistake an internal polarity for an external relation. Dignāga adds that the object of perception must be causally responsible for the cognition's *form*, and only an internal content can be.

Ālayavijñāna. If only consciousness is real, four problems arise: continuity between momentary cognitions, memory, the working of karma, and the regularity of experience. The store-consciousness answers all four. It is a stream in which *vāsanās* (habit-energies) or *bījas* (seeds) are deposited by every act and from which they later fructify; it is *not* a permanent self, being itself momentary and evolving, which preserves *nairātmyavāda*. It explains why my world is orderly without an external order — the seeds ripen in regular sequence — and why worlds are shared, through similarity of seeds among beings. Liberation is the 'revolution of the basis', *āśraya-parāvṛtti*: the store-consciousness purified ceases to project, and the three natures — *parikalpita*, *paratantra* and *pariṇiṣpanna* — mark the passage from construction to the perfected.

Realist objections. The Naiyāyika presses four. *First*, the very distinction between veridical and erroneous cognition collapses: if all is representation, why is the rope-snake corrected by the rope? *Second*, co-apprehension proves nothing — that A is always known with B shows a condition of knowing, not an identity of being; this is the fallacy of confusing the epistemic with the ontic. *Third*, the dream analogy is self-defeating: dreams are recognised as dreams only by contrast with waking, so the contrast cannot be abolished. *Fourth*, *ālayavijñāna* is a permanent substratum in all but name — if it is momentary, it cannot carry seeds across moments; if it endures, *ātman* has been readmitted under another word. Kumārila adds that the theory cannot explain the *determinateness* of experience: why does the seed of a jar yield a jar? The Yogācārin replies that correction occurs *within* the stream by the mutual conflict of seeds; that the store-consciousness is a *saṃtāna*, a series with causal continuity rather than an enduring substance; and that determinateness follows from the specificity of the seed itself.

Conclusion. Yogācāra offers the most rigorous idealism in Indian philosophy and its atomism critique genuinely embarrasses the realist. Its cost is the strain on *ālayavijñāna*, which must do the work of a self while being denied the status of one — the point at which both Nyāya and, later, Śāṅkara press their attack, the latter charging that a momentary series cannot be the witness that knows itself as one.

MENTOR NOTE *Sahopalambha-niyama* and the reply that it confuses epistemology with ontology is the exchange the examiner is looking for. Do not forget to say explicitly that *ālayavijñāna* is *not* a self — candidates lose marks by describing it in terms that make Yogācāra self-contradictory.

Explain the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *satkāryavāda* and defend it against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Where the doctrine stands. Every theory of causation in Indian philosophy answers one basic question: does the effect pre-exist in its cause? Those who say yes are the *satkāryavādins* — Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Rāmānuja — for whom the effect is real. Those who say no are the *asatkāryavādins*, among them the *svabhāvavāda* of the Cārvāka, the momentariness of the Hīnayāna and the *ārambhavāda* of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for whom the effect is a new creation. Jainism and Kumārila say both, on the strength of *anekāntavāda*, the many-sidedness of reality. Among those who say yes a second question divides them: is the effect a real transformation? Advaita, Buddhism and the Vijñānavāda answer no — *vivartavāda*, false appearance, Brahman appearing as the world. Rāmānuja and Sāṃkhya answer yes — *pariṇāmapavāda*, real transformation — the first as *brahma-pariṇāmapavāda* and the second as *prakṛti-pariṇāmapavāda*, in which *prakṛti* is the only cause of this world, at once its material and its efficient cause.

Satkāryavāda. *Sat* is real and *kārya* is effect: the effect is already existent in its cause. It is not a new production but a manifestation of *prakṛti*; there is neither new production nor utter destruction. Production means the development or manifestation of the subtle into the gross, *āvirbhāva*, and destruction is the return of the gross into the subtle, *tirobhāva*. Curd comes from milk and from nothing else. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's five arguments in the *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* are the core of the answer. (i) *Asadakaraṇāt* — the non-existent cannot be produced: if the effect did not pre-exist in its cause it would be as non-existent as a hare's horn. (ii) *Upādānagrahaṇāt* — why do we collect a particular object in order to get a desired effect, if the two are not already related? (iii) *Sarvasambhavābhāvāt* — if *satkāryavāda* is not accepted, everything could be produced from everything and the world would be one giant mess. (iv) *Śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt* — only a cause that is potent for a given effect can produce it, since production is only the manifestation of a potential; were it not so, curd could be produced from water and oil out of sand particles. (v) *Kāraṇabhāvāt* — the effect is of the essence of its material cause and hence similar to it; when the obstructions are removed the effect naturally flows out of the cause, the cloth being contained in the thread and the oil in the oilseed, which needs only to be pressed.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attack. On *asatkāryavāda* the effect is a genuinely new beginning, and the *asatkāryavādins* press four objections. The efficient cause becomes redundant: if the pot already pre-exists in the clay, why should the potter exert himself? The purpose of things becomes redundant: why then can the thread not serve the purpose of cloth, or milk not taste like curd? Repeated birth becomes nonsense: if the effect already pre-exists, its being born again and again is illogical. And cause and effect can no longer be distinguished — they should then bear the same name. A second and independent difficulty is that Sāṃkhya cannot make its own evolution intelligible, since it never satisfactorily accounts for the 'contact' — *saṃyoga*, *sannidhi*, *saṃyogābhāva* — between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. Śaṅkarācārya's criticism is the deepest, and it is made in favour of *vivartavāda*: Sāṃkhya admits that the effect is a real modification and thereby concedes that there is at least a new *form* which did not exist earlier, which is precisely the ground on which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attacks *satkāryavāda*. He adds the third-man fallacy: to give independent reality to both cause and effect is to require a third thing to explain the relation between them, and so on in a regress *ad infinitum*.

The defence. The four objections all mistake manifestation for production, and the replies follow from the five arguments. The potter is not redundant, because only an efficient cause can bring out that for which the material is potent; his work is to manifest a potential, not to create a substance. The thread cannot serve as cloth for the same reason, since the potential of the thread is realised only in a particular arrangement, and arrangement is exactly what the efficient cause supplies. There is no repeated birth, because in the strict sense there is no birth at all, only *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*. And cause and effect are distinguished as the subtle from the gross, not as two substances. Against the *asatkāryavādin's* own position the reply is stronger. If the effect were wholly non-existent before production, creation would be out of nothing, and then the determinateness of causation — milk and not water yielding curd — becomes an accident, which is the whole point of the third and fourth arguments. Nyāya's new whole

is also an expensive purchase: it must introduce *samavāya* to relate the whole to its parts, and prior non-existence as a category doing positive work, whereas Sāṃkhya needs neither, latency being a real state of *prakṛti*. To Śaṃkara the honest reply is the one Śaṃkara himself formulates before turning it: whatever status in reality a form may possess, it possesses in virtue of its substance or cause — which the Sāṃkhyan may accept, since *pariṇāma* is precisely the modification of a substance that neither comes into being nor perishes. What Sāṃkhya cannot concede is Śaṃkara's further step, that the change is therefore only an illusion; and it is worth noting that Śaṃkara offers this as making Sāṃkhya *consistent*, not as refuting it.

What the doctrine buys, and conclusion. *Satkāryavāda* is not an isolated thesis but the foundation of the system. Because the effect pre-exists in its material cause, there must be a root cause of the world of objects, and that is *prakṛti* — that which exists before creation and is itself uncaused; *pradhāna*, the first principle of this universe; *avyakta*, the non-manifested state of all effects; knowable only by inference from its products, being subtle and imperceptible; *jaḍa*, the unconscious and unintelligent principle; and *śakti*, an ever-active unlimited power with motion inherent in it. The same principle makes the evolution of *mahat*, *ahamkāra* and the *tanmātras* intelligible, and makes liberation the resolution of effects back into their cause. **Conclusion.** Sāṃkhya secures the intelligibility of causation and pays for it with a weakened sense of novelty; Nyāya secures novelty and pays with an inflated ontology; Śaṃkara escapes both prices by denying that the change is real at all. Since the question that actually needs answering is why *this* cause yields *this* effect and no other, *satkāryavāda* has the better of the argument.

State the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments for the existence of Īśvara. How far do they meet the objections of the Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Vaiśeṣika begins as a non-theistic system — Kaṇāda's *sūtras* mention no God — and becomes theistic with Praśastapāda and, decisively, with Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, written expressly against the Mīmāṃsaka and the Buddhist. The proofs are inferential, and each names a feature of the world the system's own furniture cannot explain.

The arguments. (i) *Kāryāt* — the world is a composite and therefore an effect; every effect requires an agent possessing direct knowledge of the material, a desire to make and the power to do so; hence an intelligent maker. (ii) *Āyojanāt* — atoms are inert and eternal, so the first conjunction that forms a dyad demands a conscious impeller. (iii) *Dhṛtyādeḥ* — the sustaining and the periodic dissolution of the world require the same agency. (iv) *Padāt* — the Veda is a body of sentences, sentences have authors, and an infallible scripture requires an omniscient author. (v) *Pratyayāt* — the general trustworthiness of our cognitions points to a designer of the cognitive apparatus. (vi) *Adṛṣṭāt* — the moral argument, and the most characteristic: *karma* is unintelligent and cannot allot its own fruits, so a moral governor is required to dispense them justly. The God so established is a *puruṣa-viśeṣa*, a special eternal soul, omniscient and omnipotent, but the *efficient* cause only: He does not create out of nothing, He combines eternal atoms in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa* of eternal souls.

The objections. The *Mīmāṃsaka* denies (iv) outright — the Veda is *apauruṣeya* and needs no author to be authoritative; *dharma* operates by the force of the injunction itself; and a God bound by *karma* is an idle wheel in the machine. The *Buddhist* attacks the central inference: the concomitance between effect-hood and intelligent agency is drawn from pots and potters, where the agency is *observed*, and the world is disanalogous, so the *vyāpti* is defective; further, if God and His will are eternal, creation should be eternal too and there is no reason for it to begin at any particular moment; a perfect being can have no unfulfilled desire, so the motive for creating is unaccountable, and *līlā* is a name rather than a reason; and a compassionate creator would not produce a world so full of suffering — an objection Śaṅkara also presses. *Sāṃkhya* adds that an unattached *puruṣa* cannot act at all, and that *prakṛti*'s own teleology suffices.

Replies and assessment. Udayana answers that the concomitance holds between being an effect and having a maker, not between being a pot and having a potter; that God's will is eternal while its objects are temporally ordered by *adṛṣṭa*; and that suffering is the fruit of deeds, so no cruelty is imputed. The replies save consistency without producing demonstration. These are in substance the cosmological, design and moral arguments, and they share their fate: at best they establish an intelligent orderer of pre-existing material — which is, however, exactly and only what Nyāya claims. The *kāryāt* inference meets Hume's disanalogy objection and Kant's charge that causality has been extended beyond possible experience. The moral argument is the strongest, because it works from a premise the Indian opponent generally grants — the reality of *karma* — and shows that an unintelligent moral law cannot administer itself. **Conclusion.** As proofs they fail; as a systematic requirement they succeed. Given eternal atoms, eternal souls and *karma*, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika needs Īśvara to set the mechanism going, and its theism is honest in claiming no more.

8(a) PAPER I · SECTION B · Q8(A) · 20 MARKS

Explain Śaṅkara's doctrine of *adhyāsa*. How does it ground the distinction between the *vyāvahārika* and the *pāramārthika* orders of reality?

WHY PROBABLE The Vedānta 20-marker is filled in three of the four slot-checkable years, and *adhyāsa* — the doctrine on which the whole Advaitic edifice rests — has been dormant since 2014 despite six bank appearances.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Śaṅkara opens the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* with the *Adhyāsabhāṣya*, and this placement is itself the argument: before any Vedāntic enquiry can begin, the beginningless confusion that makes it necessary must be exhibited. *Adhyāsa* is defined as *smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadṛṣṭāvabhāsaḥ* — the appearance, in the form of memory, of something previously seen in something else. The rope appears as snake; the shell as silver; and, fundamentally, the Self appears as the not-Self.

The structure. Superimposition requires a *substratum* (*adhiṣṭhāna*), an *adhyasta* superimposed on it, and *avidyā* as the ground of the mistake. Its two faces are *svarūpa-adhyāsa* — the mutual superimposition of Self and not-Self, 'I am fat', 'I am a doer' — and *artha-adhyāsa*, the superimposition of the world upon Brahman. Crucially, the error is not a mere absence of knowledge but a positive misapprehension: *anyathā-grahaṇa*. Advaita's own account of error, *anirvacanīya-khyāti*, holds the appearing object to be indescribable — neither real, since it is cancelled, nor unreal, since it was experienced and produced effects.

Grounding the two orders. The doctrine yields the levels directly. An erroneous appearance is *sat* so long as it is uncontradicted and *asat* once *bādha* occurs; hence there must be a reality that is *never* contradicted. Brahman, self-luminous and unsublatable, is *pāramārthika*. The world, coherent and effective yet cancelled in *brahmajñāna*, is *vyāvahārika*. The rope-snake, cancelled within waking life itself, is *prātibhāsika*. The three orders are thus not arbitrary tiers but degrees of immunity from sublation. Two consequences follow: the world is not *asat* like a square circle — Advaita is not nihilism; and *mokṣa* is not the production of anything new but the cessation of superimposition — hence liberation as *prāptasya prāptiḥ*, the attainment of what was already attained.

Objections and replies. Rāmānuja's seven objections press hardest: superimposition requires a locus that is *known*, yet Brahman is said to be unknown; and an error needs a perceiver, but pure consciousness has no faculties. Śaṅkara's answer is that Brahman is not wholly unknown — it is given as the ever-present 'I am', and only its true nature is obscured; the ignorance belongs to the *jīva*, itself a product of *avidyā*, which is why the account is *anirvacanīya* rather than tidy. The Nyāya realist objects that a locus of error must be perceptible; the Advaitin replies that Brahman is *svaprakāśa* and needs no other light. It must be conceded that the doctrine has a circularity, which Śaṅkara does not deny but relocates: *avidyā* is beginningless, and beginningless mutual dependence is not vicious regress but the very structure of *saṃsāra*.

Conclusion. *Adhyāsa* is Advaita's single hinge. It explains why a non-dual reality appears plural, secures the world's practical reality without conceding its ultimacy, and makes liberation cognitive rather than productive. Remove it, and either Brahman becomes one thing among many or the world becomes sheer nothing.

MENTOR NOTE Quote the Sanskrit definition — it is short, and it converts a good answer into an authoritative one. The move that earns marks is deriving the three orders *from* sublatable rather than merely listing them. Keep Rāmānuja to two objections under time pressure; the 'known yet unknown' one is indispensable.

Explain Rāmānuja's account of the relation between Brahman, the self and the world. How does he criticise Śaṁkara's Advaita?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

For Rāmānuja Brahman is *saviśeṣa* — qualified, not attributeless: a personal God possessing infinite auspicious attributes, the inner controller of all. Selves (*cit*) and matter (*acit*) are equally real and eternal, and they stand to Brahman as attributes to a substance, or better, as body to the soul that indwells it (*śarīra-śarīri-bhāva*). Hence *Viśiṣṭādvaita*, qualified non-dualism: one reality, internally differentiated. The technical link is *apṛthak-siddhi*, inseparable existence — modes cannot exist or be conceived apart from their substance, so unity is secured without denying difference. Brahman is both efficient and material cause, and creation is a real transformation of His body (*pariṇāma*), not an appearance (*vivarta*). Souls are atomic and eternal; liberation is not identity but communion and service, reached through *bhakti* and *prapatti*, with *karma* and *jñāna* subserving them. The scriptural texts of difference and of identity are reconciled by the body-soul texts, which Rāmānuja treats as the *ghaṭaka* or mediating *śruti*.

The seven untenables (*saptavidha-anupapatti*) are his attack on *avidyā*. Where does it reside? Not in Brahman, which is pure knowledge, nor in the *jīva*, which is its own product (*āśraya*). It cannot conceal self-luminous Brahman without destroying Brahman's nature (*tirodhāna*). Its own nature is contradictory, since neither real nor unreal exhausts no third possibility (*svarūpa*). 'Indescribable' is unintelligible, for every cognition presents its object as being somehow (*anirvacanīyatva*). No *pramāṇa* establishes it. Attributeless knowledge cannot remove it, since knowledge without content determines nothing (*nivartaka*). And its removal is impossible, for if one man's *avidyā* ceased the world would vanish for all (*nivṛtti*). To these he adds that a Brahman without qualities is indistinguishable from nothing; that texts calling Brahman *nirguṇa* deny only defective qualities; and that *adhyāsa* presupposes a real locus and a real perceiver, so Advaita's own account of error requires what its metaphysics denies.

Assessment. Rāmānuja secures what religion needs — a knowable God, a real world, real persons and a genuine object of devotion — and his exegesis of the conflicting texts is more even-handed than Śaṁkara's subordination of the texts of difference. Two costs follow. Brahman becomes complex, and a complex ultimate invites the question why it requires no explanation. And if souls and matter are eternally distinct modes, the non-dualism is thin: Madhva's frank dualism is arguably the more consistent development. The Advaitin replies that every one of the seven objections assumes that *avidyā* must be either real or unreal — precisely the disjunction Advaita denies — and that the reality of the world at the empirical level was never in question. **Conclusion.** The dispute is finally about what an Absolute is for. Rāmānuja's Brahman explains religious experience and moral effort; Śaṁkara's explains why anything appears at all with the fewest assumptions. Each pays the other's price.

Compare the conceptions of liberation in the major Indian schools. Is *jīvanmukti* an intelligible ideal?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

All the schools agree on the form of the problem: bondage is due to ignorance and *karma*, liberation is release from rebirth and suffering, and it is the highest of human ends — not a reward earned but a condition realised. They differ on what is released, and into what.

The positions. For *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *apavarga* is the soul's absolute cessation of pain; since consciousness is an adventitious quality arising from contact with a body, the liberated soul has no cognition at all — a state critics have found indistinguishable from that of a stone. *Sāṃkhya-Yoga*'s *kaivalya* is the isolation of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*: equally negative, without bliss. *Mīmāṃsā* begins with heaven won by ritual and moves late and reluctantly to release. *Jainism* is emphatically positive — the liberated soul enjoys infinite knowledge, bliss and power, and the embodied *kevalin* is admitted. *Buddhism*'s *nirvāṇa* is the extinction of craving, not of a self, since there is none to extinguish; *Theravāda* describes it by negations, while the *Mahāyāna bodhisattva* deliberately defers his own final release out of compassion. *Advaita* makes liberation cognitive: nothing is produced, and what is realised — *sat-cit-ānanda* — was never absent, so release is *prāptasya prāptiḥ*. *Viśiṣṭādvaita* and *Dvaita* keep the self distinct and make liberation communion and service in the presence of God, attained by grace.

***Jīvanmukti*.** Only *Advaita* and *Jainism* admit liberation while embodied, and *Advaita*'s reasoning is the clearest: if bondage is nothing but ignorance, its removal is complete the moment knowledge arises, and the body continues merely because the momentum of *prārabdha-karma* is not yet spent — the potter's wheel turns on after the potter has left it. The *jīvanmukta* acts without egoity, is beyond attraction and aversion, and becomes a source of moral authority rather than of precept. Objections are pressed from three sides. If ignorance is destroyed, why does the world still appear to him? *Advaita*'s answer — a trace of *avidyā* remains — is taken by critics as an admission that the destruction was incomplete. *Rāmānuja* holds embodiment to be itself the fruit of *karma*, so liberation with a body is a contradiction. *Nyāya* and *Sāṃkhya* simply deny it: release must await the fall of the body.

Conclusion. *Jīvanmukti* is intelligible on one condition — that liberation is a change in knowing rather than a change in being. Where liberation is a *state to be produced*, it must wait for death; where it is a *truth to be recognised*, it can be had now. The second is the more defensible, and its consequences are moral as well as metaphysical: it answers the charge that Indian soteriology is world-fleeing, since the liberated man remains in the world and acts in it — the assumption on which the *Gītā*'s *karma-yoga*, and *Vivekananda*'s and *Gandhi*'s reading of it, entirely depend.



ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA vs RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA vs MADHVĀCĀRYA

Advaita · Viśiṣṭādvaita · Dvaita

➔ Brahman / Īśvara · Soul · World · Māyā · God-World Relation · Liberation ➔

1. THE THREE SCHOOLS



Śaṅkara
Advaita Vedānta

Rāmānuja
Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

Madhva
Dvaita Vedānta



➔ All three accept Vedānta and Brahman/Īśvara, but interpret reality differently.

2. COMPARATIVE TABLE

ASPECT	ŚAṆKARA (Advaita)	RĀMĀNUJA (Viśiṣṭādvaita)	MADHVĀ (Dvaita)
Brahman / Īśvara	Nirguṇa Brahman is ultimate reality; Saguna Īśvara is Brahman associated with māyā at the empirical level.	Brahman/Īśvara (Nārāyaṇa) is personal, qualified, with infinite auspicious attributes.	Viṣṇu is supreme, personal, independent, and absolutely distinct from all else.
Soul (Jīva)	Jīva is ultimately identical with Brahman; individuality is due to avidyā/upādhi.	Jīva is a real mode/part of Brahman, dependent yet distinct; capable of devotion.	Jīvas are eternally distinct from God and from one another; hierarchy among souls is accepted.
World (Jagat)	World is empirically real but ultimately mithyā (neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal).	World is real and is the body of Brahman.	World is fully real and distinct from God.
Māyā / Avidyā	Wārlā/avidyā causes superimposition and appearance of multiplicity.	Rejects māyā as illusion in the Advaita sense; world is genuinely real.	Rejects Advaitic māyā doctrine; plurality and difference are real.
God-World Relation	Vivarta / apparent manifestation; relation explained through adhyāsa and empirical appearance.	Aprthak-siddhi-sambandha; inseparable relation of Brahman with cit and acit, often explained as body-soul relation.	Pañca-vidha-bheda; five real differences—God/soul, God/world, soul/world, one soul/another, one object/another.
Liberation (Mokṣa)	Liberation through jñāna; realization of identity of ātman and Brahman.	Liberation through bhakti, prapatti, and divine grace; soul enjoys communion with God without losing individuality.	Liberation through devotion to Viṣṇu and grace; eternal difference remains even in mokṣa.
Famous Formula	"Brahma satyam jagan mithyā, jīvo brahmaiva nāparah."	"Qualified non-dualism" / Brahman with real attributes and modes.	"Difference is real" / Dvaita based on real plurality.

3. KEY DIFFERENCES AT A GLANCE



Śaṅkara: non-dualism, knowledge-centered, world as mithyā.



Rāmānuja: unity-in-difference, devotion-centered, body-soul relation.



Madhva: strict dualism, bhakti-centered, fivefold difference.

4. QUICK MEMORY HOOKS



Śaṅkara = Identity



Rāmānuja = Qualified Unity



Madhva = Difference

➔ One reality, qualified reality, divided reality. ➔

5. WHY THIS COMPARISON MATTERS

- ★ Essential for Vedānta comparisons.
- ★ Useful in UPSC Philosophy Optional answers.
- ★ Connects metaphysics with epistemology and soteriology.
- ★ Helps compare jñāna, bhakti, and grace.

Śaṅkara seeks identity, Rāmānuja teaches unity with qualification, and Madhva defends eternal difference.



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SRI AUROBINDO: INVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION

Supermind • Mind • Matter • Divine Life • Difference from Advaita Vedanta

1 WHAT IS THE BASIC IDEA?



Reality is Sachchidananda descending into matter through involution, and then re-emerging through evolution.


Evolution is the ascent of consciousness already involved in matter.

2 INVOLUTION (Descent of Consciousness)



In involution, higher consciousness veils itself and becomes increasingly concealed in lower forms.

3 EVOLUTION (Ascent of Consciousness)



Evolution is not creation from nothing; it is the gradual emergence of what was already involved.

★ ROLE OF SUPERMIND

- Truth-consciousness.
- Harmonizes unity and multiplicity.
- Knows by identity, not division.
- Makes divine manifestation possible.
- Key to supramental transformation.

🧠 ROLE OF MIND

- Divides and analyzes.
- Produces ignorance by fragmentation.
- Necessary stage in evolution but not the highest.
- Must be exceeded toward supramental consciousness.

🏔️ ROLE OF MATTER

- Lowest term of involution.
- Appears inert but secretly contains consciousness.
- Starting point of terrestrial evolution.
- Must be transformed, not merely abandoned.

5 KEY CONCEPTS/MEMORY BOX

- ★ All life is evolving consciousness.
- ★ Involution explains how the higher becomes hidden in the lower.
- ★ Evolution explains how the hidden consciousness re-emerges.
- ★ Goal is not only moksha but transformation of life.
- ★ Sri Aurobindo aims at divine life on earth.

7 WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- Important for modern Indian philosophy.
- Central to Aurobindo's metaphysics and spirituality.
- Useful for comparison with Advaita Vedanta.
- Frequently relevant in philosophy optional answers.

AUROBINDO vs ADVAITA VEDANTA

	AUROBINDO	ADVAITA VEDANTA
1. World	world is real and meaningful manifestation.	world is ultimately mithya / appearance.
2. Maya / Ignorance	ignorance is partial consciousness within evolution.	avidya/maya causes superimposition.
3. Goal	supramental transformation and divine life.	liberation through knowledge of identity with Brahman.
4. Attitude to Matter	matter must be transformed.	matter/world is transcended in realization.
5. Brahman and Becoming	becoming is a real expression of Being.	ultimate reality is changeless Brahman; becoming belongs to empirical appearance.
★ Sri Aurobindo is world-affirming and evolutionary, whereas classical Advaita is primarily liberation-centered and world-transcending.		



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Involution and evolution • the role of Supermind — and how Aurobindo departs from Advaita.



I am currently persuing my masters and this is my first attempt of UPSC CSE. Initially after searching about the syllabus and it's pattern I was nervous and and confused by the immense syllabus and large number of subjects. The most major problem I was facing was how to approach this exam and from where ? This question had almost made me change my mind to look for other options but then I had an interaction with Vikash sir and afterwards he gave me a roadmap and an overall structure of this exam and then I will not exaggerate but I got that confidence that it's not something that is impossible and then I started my journey with The IAS Akademia . Now post 2 months of my preparation journey I have been guided by team of the institution, kritika mam and Vikash sir himself . Since sir has himself faced this exam his mentorship regarding each paper and challenges has been very helpful and I have been given my personalised planner for 21 days which keeps on getting revised with daily assigned tasks and tests and one of the most important thing according to me is live answer writing program where we have to write in class within given time and get it checked in class itself in front of other students where we learn even from our classmates too and this has been a real milestone as I had never thought that I would be writing pyq and that too with so much confidence . Now last but not the least selection of optional is a major part of this journey this is where Sir's guidance has been most commendable as I realised that what are the things to be kept in mind while choosing my optional . And now coming to it Sir's approach to this subject is I think the best as compared to anyone else . He makes philosophy seem like a child's play and so intresting that the target seems achievable . Overall my journey with The IAS Akademia has been very satisfying and I am really confident about facing this exam.

• **Abhishek Kumar Rai**

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**1(a)** PAPER II · SECTION A · Q1(A) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS

Explain Rawls' difference principle. Can it justify economic inequality in a democratic society? Discuss.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The difference principle is the second part of Rawls' second principle of justice: social and economic inequalities are permissible only if they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and only alongside fair equality of opportunity — with the first principle of equal basic liberties holding lexical priority. It is chosen in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, where rational parties ignorant of their own place adopt a maximin strategy: since one might turn out to be worst-off, one secures the floor.

It therefore *does* justify inequality, but conditionally: differential rewards are legitimate where incentives raise productivity and the gains reach the bottom, and illegitimate where they merely enlarge the top. Objections come from both sides. Nozick argues that holdings acquired justly need no further justification and that the principle licenses continuous redistributive interference. Sen argues that primary goods are the wrong metric, since equal resources yield unequal capability — a disabled person needs more to achieve the same functioning. Communitarians add that the unencumbered self of the original position is a fiction. In the Indian context the principle is illuminating: it supplies a strong philosophical warrant for affirmative action, since caste-based disadvantage is precisely a morally arbitrary starting position, while Ambedkar's insistence on social alongside economic democracy suggests the difference principle needs supplementing by attention to status and dignity, not merely income.

Distinguish between negative and positive liberty. Which conception better serves a democratic society?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Berlin's two concepts answer two different questions. **Negative liberty** asks how far I am left uninterfered with, and defines freedom as the absence of deliberate obstruction by others; its lineage is Hobbes, Bentham and above all Mill, whose harm principle confines coercion to the prevention of harm to others and leaves self-regarding conduct immune. **Positive liberty** asks who governs me, and defines freedom as self-mastery or rational self-direction — the tradition of Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, Green and Marx. Because the self that is to be master must be capable, positive liberty carries a claim to enabling conditions: education, health, and a livelihood, without which a right is a permission the holder cannot use.

Each has a characteristic corruption. Berlin's warning against positive liberty is that once my 'real' self is identified with my rational self, another may coerce me in the name of my own freedom — the road from Rousseau's being 'forced to be free' to the totalitarian claim to embody the people's will. Negative liberty's defect is emptiness: non-interference secures nothing to the destitute, and Tawney's remark that freedom for the pike is death for the minnows names the difficulty exactly. The democratic answer is that the two are complementary rather than rival — non-interference furnishes the floor, enabling provision furnishes the content, and India's constitutional scheme institutionalises both, the Fundamental Rights guaranteeing the first and the Directive Principles and the right to education the second. Ambedkar's caution decides the emphasis: political liberty resting on social and economic subjection is a top-dressing on soil that will not hold it. The real danger is not positive liberty as such but the transfer of self-mastery from the person to a collective agent claiming to know his mind better than he does.

1(c) PAPER II · SECTION A · Q1(C) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS**Is equality of opportunity sufficient for social justice? Discuss with reference to formal and substantive equality.****EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Formal equality requires that like cases be treated alike: equality before the law, non-discrimination, and careers open to talents. **Substantive equality** looks past the rule to the result, and asks whether the conditions under which the rule operates are themselves fair — Rawls' fair equality of opportunity, which demands that life-chances not be determined by social origin, and beyond it the difference principle. The distinction matters because identical treatment of unequals confirms inequality: where disadvantage is inherited through caste, gender or disability, an equal rule delivers unequal outcomes, and the race is decided at the starting gate. Hence the Indian scheme reads Article 14 together with Articles 15(4) and 16(4), and the Supreme Court has treated equality as a positive obligation permitting reasonable classification, not as a bar on differentiation.

Substantive equality has its own costs. Nozick objects that it can be pursued only by continuous interference with holdings justly acquired; merit and effort appear to be penalised; and the currency is disputed — resources, welfare, or something else. Dworkin's distinction between brute luck and option luck warns against compensating choices as though they were misfortunes, while Sen argues that resources are the wrong metric altogether, since equal resources yield unequal capability: the disabled or the illiterate need more to achieve the same functioning. The verdict is that equality of opportunity is necessary but not sufficient — sufficient only when the conditions of opportunity have themselves been equalised, which is a substantive undertaking. Ambedkar's formula is the best summary: liberty, equality and fraternity form a union, for equality without liberty destroys initiative, liberty without equality is a privilege of the few, and neither survives without fraternity.

Distinguish legal from moral rights. Are human rights natural rights?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

A right is a justified claim on others, correlative with duty, and it may be justified in two different ways. A **legal right** is recognised and enforced by the State: it is determinate in content, assignable to a holder, and backed by a remedy. A **moral right** is grounded in moral reasons alone; it cannot be enforced, but it can be asserted *against* the law, and it supplies the standard by which law is judged. The two can come apart in both directions — the slave-owner's legal right lacked all moral warrant, and the stateless refugee's moral right to protection has no forum. Theories of their relation divide sharply: Locke's natural rights to life, liberty and property are pre-political and inalienable, whereas Bentham dismissed natural rights as 'nonsense upon stilts', holding rights to be the children of law; the historical school treats them as the deposit of custom, and Marx read the rights of man as the rights of bourgeois man.

Human rights are those held in virtue of humanity alone, and they perform exactly the function natural rights performed — providing a standard above the State — but they need not be defended on Locke's theological premises or on a fixed account of human nature. Their better ground is human dignity, or the basic needs and capabilities without which a life is not recognisably human; and the Universal Declaration, with the Indian Constitution's Part III, gives them the positive recognition they require for efficacy. Gandhi's contribution is worth adding: rights are earned by the performance of duties, so a culture of rights without a corresponding sense of obligation is unstable.

Conclusion. The distinction is functional rather than exclusive — moral rights confer legitimacy, legal rights confer effect. A merely moral right is impotent; a merely legal right is arbitrary; the Constitution's division between enforceable Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles is precisely this distinction, institutionalised.

Is democracy merely a form of government, or a way of life? Discuss.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

On the **procedural** view democracy is a method for choosing and dismissing rulers: universal franchise, competitive elections, majority decision, and the rule of law. Schumpeter's formulation is deliberately modest, and its merits are real — the definition is testable, and it refuses the totalitarian claim to represent a people's 'real will' without counting their votes. On the **substantive** view democracy is a mode of associated living whose test is what it does to those who live under it. Mill argued that participation educates the citizen; Dewey made the criterion the growth of the individual; and Ambedkar gave the classic Indian statement — democracy is not merely a form of government but a form of society, and political democracy cannot endure unless it rests on social democracy, that is, on liberty, equality and fraternity accepted as a way of life. His two warnings belong with it: that hero-worship in politics is a road to dictatorship, and that democratic forms laid over an undemocratic society are a top-dressing. Gandhi's *swaraj* makes the same point from the other end: self-government presupposes self-restrained persons, and authority must be decentralised to the village.

Each view corrects the other's excess. The substantive conception risks defining democracy so richly that no actual society qualifies, and it hands an argument to whoever claims to know the people's true interest better than they do. The procedural conception risks reducing democracy to a periodic ritual while domination continues undisturbed — majoritarian mobilisation, the purchase of opinion, and the exclusion of those who cannot organise. The defensible conclusion is that procedure is necessary and culture is what makes it worth having: the vote is the minimum condition, and what gives it value is a society whose members treat one another as equals. India's own record is the argument in miniature — an electoral democracy that has held, and a social democracy still being built.



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"Ideas are weapons in the struggle for justice."



RAWLS : JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

Original Position · Veil of Ignorance · Two Principles · Comparison with Amartya Sen and Macpherson

1 WHAT IS JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS?

- Rawls tries to define principles of justice for a fair democratic society.
- Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.
- A just society is one whose basic structure would be accepted by free and equal persons.



KEY TAKEAWAY

Justice principles are chosen under fair conditions.

2 ORIGINAL POSITION

- It is a hypothetical choice situation.
- Free, rational and equal persons choose principles for the basic structure of society.
- It is a device of representation, not a historical event.



3 VEIL OF IGNORANCE

- People do not know class, caste, income, gender, talent, religion, social status, conception of good, or place in society.
- Because of ignorance of personal advantages, chosen principles are impartial.



NOTE: This prevents bias and privilege.

4 THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE



PRINCIPLE 1: Equal basic liberties for all.
Liberty of conscience, speech, association, political participation, rule of law.



PRINCIPLE 2: Social and economic inequalities are just only if:
(a) offices and positions are open to all under fair equality of opportunity.
(b) they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (Difference Principle).



LEXICAL PRIORITY (ORDER OF PRIORITY)

- First principle has priority over second.
- Fair equality of opportunity has priority over the difference principle.

5 PRIMARY GOODS

- Rights
- Liberties
- Opportunities
- Income and Wealth
- Social bases of self-respect

These are what rational persons want irrespective of their life plans.

6 WHY RAWLS MATTERS

- Revives normative political philosophy.
- Defends equality with liberty.
- Critiques utilitarian sacrifice of minorities.
- Important for welfare state, redistribution and democratic justice.

7 COMPARISON TABLE (See below)

ASPECT	RAWLS	AMARTYA SEN	MACPHERSON
Core focus	Just institutions / ideal principles.	Comparative justice, reduction of actual injustice.	Critique of possessive individualism and market-centered liberalism.
Equality	Fairness through principles and protection of the least advantaged.	Capability equality; what people are actually able to be and do matters.	Real human development over mere market possession.
Method	Original position and veil of ignorance.	Public reasoning, capabilities, real-world comparison.	Historical and critical analysis of liberal-democratic capitalism.
View of freedom	Equal basic liberties plus fair opportunity.	Freedom as capability.	Freedom should mean development of human capacities, not only market choice.
Criticism of Rawls / difference from Rawls	—	Rawls is too transcendental and institution-focused; justice must compare actual lives.	Rawls remains within liberal capitalism and does not sufficiently overcome inequalities created by possessive individualism.



MEMORY BOX

- ✓ Original Position = fair choice situation
- ✓ Veil of Ignorance = no personal bias
- ✓ Principle 1 = equal liberty
- ✓ Principle 2 = fair opportunity + difference principle
- ✓ Sen = capabilities and comparative justice
- ✓ Macpherson = critique of possessive individualism



EXAM VALUE

- Useful for political philosophy, justice, liberalism, equality, welfare state.
- Good for comparison answers with utilitarianism, Nozick, Sen and Marxist critiques.

QUICK QUOTE TO REMEMBER

"Justice as Fairness is the outcome of choice under fair conditions, ensuring that no one can claim unfair advantage."
— John Rawls



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Original position · veil of ignorance · the two principles — compared with Sen and Macpherson.



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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT & DEMOCRACY

Features · Merits & Demerits · Thinkers · Narrow & Wide Democracy · Fabian, Nehruvian & JP Models · Paradox, Challenges & Solutions

1 WHAT ARE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT?

Forms of government are the ways in which political power is organized and exercised.

CLASSIC BASES OF CLASSIFICATION

- Number of rulers – one / few / many
- Source of legitimacy – divine, traditional, popular, legal-rational
- Relation between executive and legislature
- Degree of popular participation



★ Aristotle's classic classification – monarchy, aristocracy, polity and their corrupt forms: tyranny, oligarchy, democracy (in the ancient critical sense).

2 MAJOR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

	👑 MONARCHY	👥 ARISTOCRACY / OLIGARCHY	🗳️ DEMOCRACY	👊 DICTATORSHIP / AUTHORITARIAN RULE
MEANING	Rule by a single person, often hereditary.	Rule by the noblest / best or by a few.	Rule by the people, through their representatives.	Power concentrated in an individual or a small group.
FEATURES (2-3)	• Unity & continuity • Symbolic head • Decision-making concentrated	• Rule of elite / few • Wealth, birth or merit • Limited participation	• Popular sovereignty • Political equality • Rule of law & rights	• No political freedom • Centralised control • Suppression of dissent
MERITS (2)	• Stability • Quick decisions	• Experienced leadership • Efficiency in decisions	• Accountability • Respects human dignity	• Quick decisions • Order & discipline
DEMERITS (2)	• Arbitrary rule possible • No popular accountability	• Elitism & inequality • Exploitation of masses	• Decision-making slow • Risk of majoritarianism	• Abuse of power • No freedom & rights
THINKER / EXAMPLE	Hobbes / UK (Constitutional Monarchy)	Plato (Aristocracy) / Modern Oligarchies	Lincoln / India	Machiavelli (Prince) / Hitler Regime

3 MODERN INSTITUTIONAL FORMS

	🏛️ PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT	🏛️ PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT	🌐 UNITARY GOVERNMENT	🌐 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
FEATURES	• Executive from legislature • Collective responsibility • Flexible & accountable	• Executive separate from legislature • Fixed tenure • President is head	• Single constitution • Power concentrated at centre • One legislature	• Division of powers between union & states • Written constitution • Supreme court
MERITS	• Accountability • Executive-Legislative coordination	• Stability • Clear separation of powers	• Unity & simplicity • Strong decision-making	• Unity in diversity • Local autonomy
DEMERITS	• Instability possible • Party pressure	• Deadlock possible • Less flexible	• Over-centralisation • Neglect of local needs	• Complex & costly • Centre-state conflicts
EXAMPLES	UK, India, Canada, Australia	USA, Brazil, Mexico	France, Japan, UK (in unitary sense)	India, USA, Canada, Australia

4 DEMOCRACY: NARROW vs WIDE MEANING

NARROW MEANING (FORM OF GOVERNMENT)	WIDE MEANING (WAY OF LIFE / SOCIAL ORDER)	KEY THINKERS
• Democracy as a form of government • Based on periodic elections • Majority rule • Representative institutions • Political equality	• Based on liberty, equality, fraternity • Participation in all spheres of life • Respect for rights & dignity • Deliberation, tolerance & social justice	• Lincoln – Govt. of the people, by the people, for the people. • Bryce – Democracy is a way of life. • Rousseau – Popular sovereignty, general will. • Laski – Freedom, equality, fraternity. • Macpherson – Developmental democracy.

5 TYPES OF DEMOCRACY

DIRECT DEMOCRACY	REPRESENTATIVE / INDIRECT DEMOCRACY	LIBERAL DEMOCRACY	PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY	DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY	SOCIAL / ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY	SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY	GRASSROOTS / DECENTRALISED DEMOCRACY
People decide directly on issues. FEATURE: Direct participation (e.g., referendums).	People elect representatives. FEATURE: Decision through elected institutions.	Protects individual rights & freedoms. FEATURE: Constitutional limits on power.	Active participation of citizens. FEATURE: People involved in decision-making.	Emphasis on reasoned discussion & dialogue. FEATURE: Quality of debate before decisions.	Seeks social & economic equality. FEATURE: Welfare state, redistribution.	Democracy with socialist goals. FEATURE: Common ownership, economic planning.	Power at local level, self-governance. FEATURE: Panchayats, local self-government.

6 IMPORTANT DEMOCRATIC MODELS

A. FABIAN DEMOCRACY / FABIAN SOCIALISM	B. NEHRUVIAN DEMOCRACY	C. JP (JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN) – PARTICIPATORY OR PARTYLESS DEMOCRACY
• Belief in gradual reform • Democratic socialism • Welfare state orientation • Use of constitutional & peaceful methods THINKERS: Sidney Webb, Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw	• Parliamentary democracy • Secularism & scientific temper • Planning for development • Social justice & mixed economy • Faith in institutions & rule of law ASSOCIATED WITH: Jawaharlal Nehru	• Decentralisation & people's participation • 'Lok Shakti' over state power • Moral politics & anti-corruption • Critique of party domination • 'Total Revolution' – social, political, economic, cultural & moral transformation

7 THINKERS AT A GLANCE

THINKER	CONTRIBUTION
ARISTOTLE	Classified governments: better & their corrupt forms.
LOCKE	Consent of the governed; limited government.
ROUSSEAU	Popular sovereignty; general will.
J.S. MILL	Representative government; participation & liberty.
LASKI	Pluralism; democratic freedoms & social equality.
MACPHERSON	Developmental democracy; critique of possessive individualism.
AMBEDKAR	Constitutional democracy + social democracy.
GANDHI	Gram Swaraj; decentralised, moral democracy.

8 PARADOX OF DEMOCRACY

Why democracy must protect both participation and constitutionalism.
• Democracy values freedom, but unrestricted freedom may undermine democracy. • Majority rule may suppress minority rights. • Popular mandate can empower anti-democratic forces. • Electoral equality may coexist with social and economic inequality.



9 CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY

CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY
• Majoritarianism • Money power and corporate influence • Criminalisation of politics • Voter apathy • Disinformation / media manipulation • Identity politics and polarization • Centralisation of power • Weak institutions • Social and economic inequality • Populism

10 SOLUTIONS / WAY FORWARD

SOLUTIONS / WAY FORWARD
• Constitutionalism and rule of law • Strong independent institutions • Electoral reforms and transparency • Civic education • Decentralisation and local democracy • Protection of minority rights • Media literacy and informed citizenship • Social justice and reduction of inequality • Inner-party democracy and accountability • Deliberative and participatory forums

11 QUICK REVISION TABLE

FORM	NATURE (IN ONE LINE)	STRENGTH (IN ONE LINE)
MONARCHY	Rule by one, often hereditary.	Stability and continuity.
DEMOCRACY	Rule by the people through reps.	Accountability and human dignity.
PARLIAMENTARY	Executive from legislature.	Accountability & flexibility.
PRESIDENTIAL	Executive separate from legislature.	Stability & clear separation of powers.
FEDERAL	Power divided between union & states.	Unity in diversity & local autonomy.
UNITARY	Power concentrated at centre.	Unity, simplicity & strong authority.

12 MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOKS

★ Government can be classified by rulers, structure, and participation.	★ Democracy has both narrow and wide meanings.	★ Democracy is not only elections but also rights, equality, and participation.	★ Fabian, Nehruvian and JP models give three different democratic emphases: reform, developmental constitutionalism, and participatory decentralisation.	★ The health of democracy depends on institutions, civic virtue, and social justice.
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2(a) PAPER II · SECTION A · Q2(A) · 20 MARKS

Examine the monistic theory of sovereignty. Is it tenable in the light of the pluralist critique?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Sovereignty is the claim that in every State there is a supreme authority whose will is legally final. Bodin defined it as absolute and perpetual power; Hobbes made it the very condition of order, arguing that a divided sovereign is no sovereign at all; and Austin gave the doctrine its classical form — in every political society there is a determinate human superior, not itself in the habit of obedience to a like superior, whose commands are law and are habitually obeyed by the bulk of the society. Its attributes follow: absoluteness, indivisibility, inalienability, permanence and universality. The refinements are familiar — legal sovereignty as the authority competent to make law, political sovereignty as the electorate behind it, and Dicey's account of parliamentary supremacy as the English embodiment of both.

The pluralist critique — Laski, Figgis, Cole, MacIver, Barker — attacks the theory on four fronts. *Empirically* no such determinate superior can be found: most law grows from custom, professional practice, judicial decision and international convention rather than from anyone's command, and the theory fits neither a federal state, where competence is divided by a constitution, nor a state bound by treaty obligations. *Sociologically* it misdescribes allegiance: a man belongs to a church, a union, a university and a family, and the State is one association among many, differing in function rather than in kind, with no title to a monopoly of loyalty. *Legally* it is inaccurate wherever there is judicial review, since the last word on validity then belongs to the courts and to the constitution, not to the legislature. And *morally* it is dangerous: a doctrine of unlimited legal power is an invitation to authoritarianism, which is why Laski held the sovereign State to be a doubtful blessing and urged that power be divided by function.

The monist reply is that pluralism has confused legal with political sovereignty. Legally, some organ must have the final word on what counts as valid law, otherwise conflicts between associations are irresolvable; and the pluralist State, having to adjudicate between the churches and the unions it recognises, becomes sovereign again in the very act of coordinating them. Kelsen and Hart accordingly refine rather than abandon the concept: sovereignty is relocated from a person's command to the ultimate rule of recognition within a legal system. There is also a warning from experience — in a deeply divided society a weakened central authority protects the strongest group, not the weakest individual.

The Indian case is instructive because it satisfies neither theory purely. The Preamble locates sovereignty in the people; the Seventh Schedule divides competence; Article 13 and judicial review subject Parliament to the Constitution, and the basic-structure doctrine subjects even the amending power to limits — yet the Union retains overriding authority in emergency. Externally, human-rights treaties, trade regimes and supranational adjudication have made the external limb of sovereignty less absolute still, while identity and regional claims press from below.

Conclusion. Monism survives as a legal postulate and fails as a political description. Every legal order needs a criterion of final validity; no modern State possesses the unlimited, undivided will Austin described. Pluralism is right about where power actually lies and wrong to suppose that a State can dispense with the authority to decide between the groups it contains. The real advance is that the question has changed: not who commands, but how the power to command is constituted and limited. Sovereignty has not been abolished — it has been constitutionalised.

Explain the Marxian theory of the State. Is the thesis of its 'withering away' defensible?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

For Marx the State is neither an ethical institution, as Hegel held, nor a neutral umpire, as the liberals held, but a historical product of the division of society into classes with irreconcilable economic interests. It appears when such a division appears, and its function is to hold the exploited class down; the *Manifesto's* formula is that the modern State is a committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie. Its visible apparatus — army, police, bureaucracy, courts — is supplemented by the superstructure of law, morality and religion, which presents a particular class interest as the general interest; Gramsci later adds that consent is manufactured in civil society, so that domination is exercised as hegemony and not merely as force. It follows that the rights and the rule of law of which liberalism is proud are, in their historical form, the rights of the property-owner.

Withering away. Because the State exists to manage class conflict, it cannot be reformed into an organ of justice; the proletariat must seize it and use it, through a transitional dictatorship, to abolish the class relations that produced it. Once classes are gone the coercive functions have nothing to do, and the State — in Engels' phrase — withers away rather than being abolished: the government of persons gives place to the administration of things.

Assessment. Four objections. The theory explains the State's class *bias* better than its *existence*: States precede capitalism and discharge functions — external defence, coordination, public goods, the settlement of non-class disputes — which no account of class rule exhausts. The determination of the superstructure by the base is drawn too tightly: universal franchise, factory legislation, progressive taxation and independent courts show a State capable of acting against the immediate interests of capital, which is why later Marxists concede it a relative autonomy. The withering-away thesis has been refuted by every attempt to realise it — the transitional dictatorship became permanent, and the absence in Marx of any theory of political institutions *after* the revolution is the fatal gap; Bernstein's and Laski's warning that means shape ends is the standing rejoinder. And Ambedkar's objection is decisive in the Indian context: a theory that reduces all domination to class cannot explain caste, which is a graded inequality dividing the very class it should unite, so that economic emancipation without social reform leaves the worker still an untouchable.

Conclusion. As a critique of ideology the theory is indispensable and has permanently altered the study of politics; as prophecy it has failed. What survives, and survives well, is the question it forces on every constitutional description of the State: whose interests does this one, in fact, serve?

Explain Gandhi's conception of the ideal State and the doctrine of trusteeship. Examine the criticisms made of them.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Gandhi's politics follows from his metaphysics. Truth is God and *ahimsā* the only means of approaching it; and since means and ends are inseparable — the means are the end in process — no institution resting on organised coercion can be an unqualified good. The State, he says, represents violence in a concentrated and organised form; it depersonalises, and its growth is the individual's diminution. His ideal is therefore *Rāmarājya*, described frankly as enlightened anarchy, in which every man is his own ruler and rules himself so as never to be a hindrance to his neighbour. Since that is not attainable, the second-best is the least coercive State: power decentralised into self-governing village republics, authority arranged as widening oceanic circles rather than as a pyramid, and the individual at the centre rather than at the base. The instruments are *swaraj* in its double sense of independence and self-mastery, *swadeshi*, bread labour, *sarvodaya* — the good of all, against the utilitarian arithmetic of the greatest number — and *satyāgraha*, in which disobedience presupposes habitual obedience and a willingness to bear the penalty.

Trusteeship applies the same logic to property. Ownership is not to be abolished by force but transformed in character: the rich man holds his wealth as a trustee for society, drawing from it only what he needs, because violent dispossession would corrupt the order it created and State ownership would merely concentrate power in fewer hands. Its personal discipline is *aparigraha*, non-possession, and its political form is voluntary limitation supported by public opinion rather than expropriation.

Criticisms. Trusteeship depends on a change of heart and supplies no sanction if the trustee declines — the socialist objection, and Ambedkar's, that it leaves the poor dependent on the conscience of the rich. The village republic is romanticised: Ambedkar called it a den of localism and ignorance, and observed that the village was historically the fortress of caste, so that decentralisation would deliver the untouchable to his oppressors. Rejecting the modern State disarms the one instrument capable of abolishing untouchability by law — which is precisely why Ambedkar wanted a strong constitutional State. And a self-sufficient village economy cannot provide modern medicine, education or defence.

Conclusion. The criticisms are decisive against trusteeship as an economic programme and against the village as an administrative model. They leave untouched Gandhi's central claim — that the quality of the means determines the character of the order they produce, and that an unquestioned State becomes a machine. His decentralism survives in the Panchayati Raj amendments and in the ecological case against scale; trusteeship survives not as a law of property but as an ethic of stewardship, which is how the language of corporate and environmental responsibility now uses it.



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SOVEREIGNTY

Meaning • Bodin • Austin • Laski • Kautilya



1. WHAT IS SOVEREIGNTY?

- **Meaning:** Sovereignty is the supreme power or ultimate authority in the state.
- **Two dimensions:**
 - **Internal Sovereignty:** Supreme authority within the state over persons and institutions.
 - **External Sovereignty:** Independence of the state in external matters.
- **Key Features:**
 - ★ **Supremacy** – Highest power above all others within the state.
 - ✓ **Finality** – Final decision-maker in political life.
 - 🛡️ **Independence** – Not subject to any higher earthly authority.
 - 🌐 **Universality** – Extends over the entire territory and population of the state.
 - ⚖️ **Authority** – Legally and effectively commands obedience.



KEY TAKEAWAY: Sovereignty answers the question: who has the final authority in political life?



2. JEAN BODIN

- One of the earliest systematic theorists of sovereignty.
- Sovereignty is the absolute, perpetual, indivisible and supreme power of the state.
- It is above ordinary law but is associated with divine and natural law which sets moral limits.
- Sovereign law is the expression of the sovereign will.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT



Bodin wrote during the 16th century in France, a period of religious wars and political disorder. He argued for a strong central authority to bring unity, order and stability, laying the foundation of the modern state.



3. JOHN AUSTIN

- Austin presents the legal or analytical theory of sovereignty.
- Sovereign is a determinate human superior habitually obeyed by the bulk of society, and who does not habitually obey anyone else.
- Sovereignty rests on command, backed by sanction, and followed by obedience.
- Sovereignty is indivisible and legally unlimited.

CRITICISM



Too rigid and mechanical. Ignores constitutional democracy, plural institutions, public opinion and moral restraints. Unrealistic in modern complex societies.



4. HAROLD LASKI

- Laski offers a pluralist critique of monistic sovereignty.
- Society contains many associations – family, church, trade unions, economic bodies, local communities, etc. The state is not the only source of authority.
- Sovereignty is not absolute or indivisible in practice.
- The state is limited by social groups, public opinion, morality, economic forces and international relations.
- **Key Phrase:** “The state is one association among many, though an important one.”



5. KAUTILYA

- Kautilya (Chanakya) presents a practical and realist view of sovereignty in the Arthashastra.
- The king/state is the central authority, but sovereignty is tied to **rajadharma**, **danda** (authority), **artha** (material prosperity) and the welfare of the people.
- **Basis of Statecraft – Saptanga Theory (सप्ततन्त्र):** King (Swami), Ministers (Amatya), Territory (Janapada), Fort (Durga), Treasury (Kosha), Army (Danda/Bala), Ally (Mitra).
- Authority is practical, strategic and welfare-oriented, not merely legal.
- The ruler is powerful, but legitimacy depends on protection of the realm, order (vyavastha) and prosperity (yogakshema) of the people.
- **Mandala Theory:** Explains external sovereignty and interstate relations – neighbouring states as friends, enemies, allies and neutrals. Power must be balanced with strategy, intelligence and diplomacy.



6. COMPARISON AT A GLANCE

Thinker	Nature of sovereignty	Key idea	Limitation / Critique
👤 Bodin	Absolute, perpetual, indivisible.	Central authority of the state; above ordinary law but limited by divine and natural law.	Too absolute; underestimates social forces and moral constraints.
⚖️ Austin	Legal / Command-based.	Determinate human superior; command, sanction and obedience; legally unlimited.	Unrealistic in modern democracies; ignores constitutional and plural institutions.
👥 Laski	Pluralist / Limited.	Many associations in society; state is one among many; sovereignty not absolute or indivisible.	May weaken the authority needed for effective governance in crises.
🏰 Kautilya	Practical / Statecraft / Welfare-oriented.	Ruler and reason of state; tied to rajadharma, artha and welfare; uses strategy (Mandala).	Justifies strong state and realpolitik; ethical ideal depends on wise ruler.



7. WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- ✓ Central to political theory – defines power and authority.
- ✓ Helps compare Monism (Bodin, Austin) vs Pluralism (Laski).
- ✓ Bridges Western and Indian political thought.
- ✓ Essential for understanding state, power, law and legitimacy.
- ✓ Useful in essays, answers and interviews.



8. MEMORY BOX

“Bodin makes sovereignty absolute, Austin makes it legal, Laski makes it plural, and Kautilya makes it practical and welfare-oriented.”



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MARX : DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, FREEDOM, ALIENATION & REVOLUTION



Dialectical Materialism • Historical Materialism • Freedom • Four Types of Alienation • Class Struggle • Theory of Revolution

1 WHAT IS MARXISM?



- Marx combines philosophy, economics, and revolutionary politics.
- Reality is material; social relations shape consciousness.
- Philosophy must change the world, not merely interpret it.




KEY TAKEAWAY:

Marx turns philosophy from interpretation to transformation.

2 DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM



- Matter is primary; nature and society develop through contradiction and change.
- Dialectic is conflict, negation, movement and transformation.



- Marx adapts the dialectic in a materialist, not idealist, direction.




Hegel stood dialectic on its head; Marx set it back on its feet.

3 HISTORICAL MATERIALISM



- History develops through material conditions and mode of production.



- Succession of stages in history:



- Class struggle is the motor of history.

4 MARX'S CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM



- Freedom is not abstract choice but emancipation from exploitation, domination and alienated labour.
- Relation between necessity and freedom: freedom grows when human beings collectively control social conditions.
- True freedom means:
 - ✓ Abolition of exploitation and domination
 - ✓ Self-development of all individuals
 - ✓ Communal cooperation and solidarity
 - ✓ Human flourishing and full potential



5 FOUR TYPES OF ALIENATION



1. Alienation from the product of labour

The worker's product belongs to someone else; it confronts him as an alien power.



2. Alienation from the process/activity of labour

Labour becomes coerced, repetitive and enforced, not self-expressive.



3. Alienation from species-being / human essence

Humans are reduced to means of survival, losing creativity and species-nature.



4. Alienation from other human beings

Competition, indifference and exploitation destroy human bonds and solidarity.




Alienation is rooted in private property and capitalist production.

6 THEORY OF REVOLUTION



- Capitalism creates class polarization between bourgeoisie and proletariat.
- Exploitation occurs through surplus value (unpaid labour).



- The state is an instrument of class domination and will wither away in communism.



7 WHY MARX MATTERS



- Provides a critical framework to understand capitalism, class, ideology, labour and exploitation.
- Allows comparison with Hegel, liberalism, socialism and existential concerns about alienation.
- Essential for analysing social change, power, inequality and emancipation.
- Highly relevant for UPSC Philosophy Optional and Political Theory answers.

8 MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOKS



1. Matter over idea. Reality is material, not mental.



2. Class struggle drives history. Conflicts create new social orders.



3. Freedom means human emancipation. Freedom grows with collective control.



4. Capitalism produces alienation. In all four dimensions of human life.



5. Revolution aims at classless society. From exploitation to human flourishing.

For Marx, human liberation requires changing the material conditions of life.



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with Vikash Sir



8595269455



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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

Concrete Idealism • Dialectic • Three Triads • Real and Rational • Negation as Movement

CONCRETE IDEALISM



- Reality is not a mere collection of isolated facts.
- The Absolute unfolds through history, nature and spirit.
- The universal is concrete when it lives in particulars.
- Truth is the whole; each part gains meaning in relation to the whole.

KEY TAKEAWAY

Hegel's idealism is concrete because thought is embodied in reality, institutions and history.

DIALECTICAL MOVEMENT



Immediate position

Negation / contradiction

Higher reconciliation / sublation (Aufhebung)

Richer unity

NEGATION IS MOVEMENT

- Every stage generates its own contradiction.
- Negation is not mere destruction; it pushes thought forward.
- Aufhebung cancels, preserves and elevates the earlier stage.

“Development takes place through contradiction.”

THE REAL IS RATIONAL • THE RATIONAL IS REAL



- Reality is intelligible, not chaotic.
- Reason is realised in history, society and institutions.
- What is truly rational has objective expression.
- This does NOT mean every existing thing is automatically justified.

CAUTION

Hegel means that actuality reveals an inner rational structure, not that every passing fact is good.

THREE TRIADS

Important Hegelian Triads (illustrative)

TRIAD 1

Being
↓
Nothing
↓
Becoming

Meaning: Pure being and pure nothing resolve into becoming.

TRIAD 2

Subjective Spirit
↓
Objective Spirit
↓
Absolute Spirit

Meaning: Spirit moves from individual consciousness to social institutions to the realisation of absolute spirit.

TRIAD 3

Art
↓
Religion
↓
Philosophy

Meaning: Forms of absolute spirit, from intuitive (art) to conceptual (philosophy).

★ Hegel is associated with triadic development, though rigid formulae must be used carefully.

WHY HEGEL MATTERS



- Central to German Idealism.
- Influences Marx, existentialism and modern political theory.
- Helps explain history as development of freedom.
- Important for questions on state, spirit and dialectic.
- Useful for comparison with Kant and Marx.



For Hegel, reality is a living rational process in which contradiction generates development and the whole gives meaning to the parts.



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8595269455



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3(a) PAPER II · SECTION A · Q3(A) · 20 MARKS

Is Indian secularism better understood as ‘principled distance’ from religion than as strict separation between religion and the State? Critically examine.

WHY PROBABLE Secularism/multiculturalism is present in seven of the eight readable years, and ‘principled distance’ is the standard Indian formulation that the window has never used.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Secularism in its classical Western form means a wall of separation: the State neither aids nor hinders religion, and religion withdraws from public authority. Applied to India this model both mis-describes the Constitution and, more importantly, would frustrate the very ends secularism exists to serve.

Why strict separation fails here. Indian religions are not primarily matters of private belief but of social practice, and those practices have themselves been sources of grave *intra*-religious oppression — untouchability, exclusion from temples, denial of rights to women. A State that stood wholly aside would leave the individual defenceless against his own community. Hence Article 17 abolishes untouchability and Article 25(2)(b) explicitly authorises throwing open Hindu religious institutions to all classes: the Constitution intervenes *within* religion for the sake of equality. Conversely it supports religion — minority educational institutions under Article 30, personal laws, State administration of endowments. Neither aid nor hostility is uniform.

Principled distance. The model that fits is one of contextual, non-uniform engagement. The State keeps a distance from all religions but is not equidistant; it may engage or disengage, help or hinder, and it may treat religions differently — provided the ground is not religious preference but a set of secular principles: freedom, equality of citizenship, and protection against oppression. Distance is *principled* because the reasons are of this kind; it is *distance* because no religion is established. Thus differential treatment of personal laws or of minority institutions is not a departure from secularism but its application under conditions of deep diversity.

Objections. *First*, the model is indeterminate: without a clear rule it licenses whatever the government of the day calls principled, and unequal treatment slides into appeasement or majoritarianism. The reply is that the principles are specifiable and justiciable — the courts’ ‘essential practices’ doctrine is precisely such an attempt, however unevenly applied. *Second*, Gandhi’s *sarvadharmā samabhāva* grounds tolerance in religious sentiment itself, which secures deeper allegiance but risks making the State’s neutrality dependent on faith; Nehru’s more rationalist reading risks appearing alien to the believer. *Third*, Ambedkar’s warning stands: without reform of religion, political equality is a superstructure over social inequality — which is itself an argument for engagement rather than separation.

Conclusion. Principled distance describes Indian practice better and justifies it better. Its weakness is not that it permits engagement but that it supplies no algorithm for when to engage; that gap must be filled by constitutional morality and independent courts. Strict separation, imported unchanged, would protect religions from the State while leaving individuals unprotected within their religions.

MENTOR NOTE Article 25(2)(b) is the single most decisive piece of evidence in this answer — it is a constitutional authorisation to intervene inside religion, which no strict-separation reading can accommodate. Always give Gandhi and Nehru as two *rival* secularisms rather than one; and close with Ambedkar, since the examiner is usually testing whether the candidate connects secularism to caste.

Is retribution a morally defensible ground of punishment? Discuss.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Retributivism holds that punishment is justified because it is *deserved* — backward-looking, non-instrumental, and proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Kant's formulation is the strongest: the offender must be punished because he has offended, never merely as a means to social benefit, for to punish for deterrence alone is to use a person as an instrument and so to violate the humanity in him.

The case for. Three strengths. It *respects agency* — treating a man as punishable is treating him as responsible, and Hegel adds that punishment is the criminal's own right, the annulment of a wrong by which his implicit universal will is honoured. It *limits* punishment: desert sets a ceiling, whereas deterrence in principle licenses exemplary severity and the punishment of the innocent if useful. And it *captures* the moral intuition that the guilty should not flourish, which no purely forward-looking theory explains.

The case against. Retribution is charged with being institutionalised revenge, dressed in the language of desert; with resting on a libertarian free will that determinism, and much of criminology, put in doubt; and with being socially blind — where crime issues from deprivation, punishing desert punishes disadvantage. It also gives no account of *quantum*: proportionality tells us the order of severity but not the scale, and *lex talionis* is either barbarous or unusable. The reformatory theory answers these by making the offender's rehabilitation the aim, but risks indefinite detention in the name of cure and treats the criminal as patient rather than agent.

Conclusion. Retribution is defensible as a *limiting* principle but inadequate as the sole ground. The tenable position is a mixed one: desert determines who may be punished and how much, while deterrence and reform justify the institution and shape the sentence. Gandhi's insistence on hating the sin and not the sinner, and the Indian constitutional stress on reformation and on the death penalty as reserved for the rarest of rare cases, point the same way — retribution constrained by dignity.

Is capital punishment morally justifiable? Discuss.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The question is narrower than the justification of punishment as such: it asks whether the State may deliberately take the life of a person already in its power. **The case for** rests on four grounds. Retributive proportionality: for the gravest wrong nothing less than life is an equivalent, and Kant's *jus talionis* is explicit that the murderer must die. Deterrence: the unique finality of death is held to give it unique preventive force. Incapacitation and social defence, where no lesser measure secures the community. And denunciation — the penalty expresses the depth of society's repudiation, and its abolition may be felt as a devaluing of the victim's life.

The case against. First and strongest, irreversibility joined to fallibility: no judicial process is error-proof, and a wrongful execution admits of no correction. Second, its administration is arbitrary in fact even where the law is not — it falls on the poor, the unrepresented and the socially marginal, and depends visibly on the composition of the bench. Third, the deterrent claim is unsupported by comparative evidence; abolition has not raised murder rates. Fourth, it forecloses reformation, which modern penology and Indian constitutional jurisprudence both treat as punishment's principal aim. Fifth, it is argued that the right to life is inalienable — Beccaria held that no social contract could include the surrender of life — and that a State which kills teaches the very lesson it wishes to unteach; Gandhi's distinction between hating the sin and hating the sinner is the same objection in moral form. Camus adds that the premeditation and the long anticipation of the penalty exceed in cruelty anything found in most crimes.

The Indian position is a considered compromise. *Bachan Singh* upheld the penalty's validity while confining it to the rarest of rare cases and requiring special reasons, and *Machhi Singh* supplied the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the Law Commission's 262nd Report recommended abolition except for terror-related offences; and Articles 72 and 161, with the jurisprudence on inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions, keep the sentence under continuing review.

Conclusion. Retribution can justify severity but cannot fix this particular severity, since proportionality gives an order and not a scale; deterrence would justify it only if the evidence existed. The irreversibility objection is independent of both and is the decisive one, because it does not attack the principle but the competence of any institution to apply it safely. The defensible position is therefore abolition on institutional rather than absolutist grounds: a punishment that cannot be corrected should not be entrusted to a process that can err. Where it is retained, its scope must be minimal, its reasons stated, and its review real.



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CRIME, PUNISHMENT & CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

➤ Definition • Characteristics • Theories of Punishment • Thinkers • Capital Punishment: For & Against ➤

1 WHAT IS CRIME?

- Crime is an act or omission forbidden by law and punishable by the state.
- In the sociological sense, it is a socially harmful conduct recognized as an offence.



KEY TAKEAWAY:

Not every moral wrong is a crime; crime requires legal prohibition and state sanction.

2 CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIME



External act / omission



Mens rea or guilty mind (where required)



Harm to individual or society



Legally prohibited conduct



Punishable by the state



Public wrong, not merely private immorality



Evolving / relative across time and society

3 THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT

A. RETRIBUTIVE THEORY



- Punishment because the offender deserves it.
- Stress on moral desert and proportionate punishment.

Thinkers: Kant, Hegel

"If he has committed murder, he must die."
— Kant
"Punishment is the negation of the negation."
— Hegel

B. DETERRENT THEORY



- Punishment aims to prevent future crime by fear.
- General and specific deterrence.

Thinkers: Bentham, Beccaria

"It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them."
— Beccaria

C. PREVENTIVE / INCAPACITATIVE THEORY



- Protect society by disabling the offender from repeating crime.

• Examples: imprisonment, disqualification, confinement.

• Emphasis on social security.

D. REFORMATIVE THEORY



- Punishment should reform the offender and restore him to society.

• Thinkers: Gandhi, modern penology, criminological humanism.

"Hate the sin, not the sinner."
— Gandhi

E. MIXED / UTILITARIAN VIEW



- Modern systems often combine retribution, deterrence, prevention and reform.

• Seeks balance of proportionality + public safety + rehabilitation.

4 THINKERS AT A GLANCE

THINKER	CORE VIEW
Kant	Strict retributivism; punishment is deserved response to moral wrong.
Hegel	Punishment restores right through the negation of wrong.
Bentham	Utility and deterrence; greatest happiness of the greatest number.
Beccaria	Certainty over cruelty; law should prevent crime, not inflict suffering.
Gandhi	Reformative humanism; transform the offender, not destroy.
J.S. Mill	Defended punishment as necessary in the context of public morality and protection.
Ambedkar / Modern Constitutionalism	Justice with due process, equality before law, and human dignity at the core.

5 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: JUSTIFICATION FOR

- ★ Retributive justice in heinous crimes
- ★ Strong deterrent claim
- ★ Protection of society from dangerous offenders
- ★ Public sense of justice / moral outrage
- ★ Used in exceptional crimes: terrorism, brutal murder, treason in some systems

6 CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: ARGUMENTS AGAINST

- ★ Possibility of irreversible judicial error
- ★ Violates dignity and right to life
- ★ Deterrence not conclusively proven
- ★ Can be discriminatory / class biased / politicized
- ★ Reformative justice becomes impossible
- ★ Risk of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment

7 INDIAN / CONSTITUTIONAL NOTE



- In India, death penalty is constitutionally valid but restricted.
- Supreme Court: "Rarest of rare" doctrine.
- Balancing of justice, due process and mercy powers (Art. 72 & 161).
- Evolving towards greater judicial restraint.



8 MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOKS

- ① Crime = legal wrong + state sanction
- ② Punishment theories answer "why punish?"
- ③ Kant = deserve; Bentham = deter; Gandhi = reform
- ④ Capital punishment debate = justice vs dignity
- ⑤ Best exam conclusion: modern penology prefers a balanced, humane and constitutionally limited approach.



9 FINAL CONCLUSION

Punishment in a civilized society must defend justice, protect society, and yet remain compatible with human dignity.



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Retributive, deterrent, preventive and reformative theories • capital punishment, for and against.

4(a) PAPER II · SECTION A · Q4(A) · 20 MARKS

Do the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau yield incompatible accounts of political obligation? Critically discuss.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

All three derive authority from consent rather than from divine right or natural hierarchy, and so share a common form: a state of nature, a defect in it, a contract, and an obligation grounded in that contract. They diverge because each specifies the defect differently, and the account of obligation follows from the diagnosis.

Hobbes. The state of nature is a war of all against all where life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’; the defect is insecurity. Men therefore covenant with *one another* — not with the sovereign — to authorise a common power. Obligation is near-absolute, since the sovereign is not party to the contract and can commit no breach; resistance is permitted only when life itself is threatened, because self-preservation was the whole point. **Locke.** The state of nature is governed by natural law and has natural rights to life, liberty and property; the defect is the lack of an impartial judge. Government is therefore a *trust*, its powers fiduciary and limited to securing those rights, and breach of trust dissolves obligation — hence a right of revolution. **Rousseau.** Natural man is innocent; the defect is social — inequality and dependence produced by civilisation itself. The contract is not a transfer of rights to a ruler but the constitution of a moral collective in which each, obeying the *general will*, obeys himself and so remains free. Obligation is thus self-legislation, and freedom consists in it — which yields the notorious claim that one may be ‘forced to be free’.

Are they incompatible? On the *ground* of obligation they are compatible: all three make it consensual. On its *extent* they are genuinely incompatible — absolutism, resistance-with-limits, and identification of obedience with freedom cannot all be correct. On the *subject* of obligation they diverge most deeply: for Hobbes the individual owes it for prudential reasons, for Locke for the protection of pre-political rights, for Rousseau as a member of a moral body whose will is his own. Rousseau's general will, being neither the sum nor the majority of particular wills, permits a legitimate collectivism the other two exclude.

Common difficulties. The contract is historically fictitious; consent by descendants is tacit at best, and Hume's objection that allegiance rests on utility and habit rather than promise applies to all three. Feminist criticism notes that the contracting individual is tacitly the male householder, and the domestic sphere is left outside the contract. Rawls' response — the original position as a hypothetical device of justification rather than a historical event — preserves the theories' normative core while abandoning their history.

Conclusion. The three are variations within one tradition, not rival traditions: they agree that legitimate power must be traceable to the will of the governed, and disagree about what that will can be presumed to have surrendered. The disagreement is substantive, and the modern State inherits all three — Hobbesian in its monopoly of force, Lockean in its bill of rights, Rousseauian in its claim to embody a common good.

Explain Locke's justification of private property. Are the limits he places on acquisition consistent with his defence of unlimited accumulation?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Locke's problem is set by his own premise: the earth is given to mankind in common, and yet property must be shown to be legitimate without the universal consent that could never in practice be obtained. His solution is labour. Every man has a property in his own person, and therefore in the labour of his body; by mixing that labour with what lies in common he annexes it to himself and removes it from the common stock. Property is thus *natural and pre-political* — not a creation of the State — and this is the hinge of the whole political theory: since government is instituted to preserve what men already have, its power is fiduciary and limited, and its breach of trust dissolves the obligation to obey.

The limits are four. *Sufficiency* — enough and as good must be left for others. *Spoilage* — nothing may be taken beyond what can be used before it perishes. *Labour* — title extends only so far as one's own exertion. And the *subsistence proviso* — the needy have a claim in justice upon the surplus of the wealthy.

How they are dissolved. The introduction of money, to which men are said tacitly to consent, removes the spoilage limit, since gold and silver do not perish, and accumulation without waste becomes possible. The wage contract removes the labour limit: 'the turfs my servant has cut' are mine, so another's labour founds my title. And the sufficiency proviso is answered by an argument from productivity — enclosure raises output so much that the day-labourer in England is better provided than a king among the unenclosed. With these three moves unlimited accumulation is legitimated by the very theory that began with a common right.

Assessment. Macpherson's charge is that Locke has supplied emergent capitalism with its charter, complete with a differential rationality that fits the propertied for citizenship. The labour theory also proves both too much and too little: too much, because taken strictly it makes the labourer and not the employer the owner; too little, because mixing one's labour with a thing does not obviously give title to the whole of it — Nozick's tomato juice poured into the sea. Rousseau replies that property is the origin of inequality and Marx that the appropriation of others' labour is the essence of what Locke normalises, while feminist criticism notes that the proprietor is tacitly the male householder. Locke's defenders answer that the provisos are not abandoned but re-satisfied, commercial society leaving more and not less for others, and that the duty of relief survives as a genuine limit.

Conclusion. The premises are radical and the conclusions conservative. Taken seriously, the labour justification is an argument for the claims of those who work; taken together with money and wage labour, it becomes a licence for inequality. The tension is not merely historical: India's own constitutional history — Zamindari abolition, the successive property amendments, and the present debates over land acquisition — is a continuing negotiation between property as a natural right and property as a social institution answerable to the sufficiency proviso.

Examine the debate between Gandhi and Ambedkar on caste. Whose approach better serves social justice?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Gandhi condemned untouchability without reserve and early — a sin and a hideous excrescence upon Hinduism — and made its removal a national programme through temple entry, inter-dining and the Harijan campaign. But for much of his life he distinguished untouchability from *varṇa*, which he defended as a division of function without hierarchy, occupations hereditary yet equal in dignity, and sought the remedy in the reform of the Hindu conscience rather than in the destruction of the institution. His position moved: by the later years he endorsed inter-caste marriage, denounced *varṇāśrama* as actually practised, and said that caste must go.

Ambedkar denied the distinction on which Gandhi relied. Caste is not a division of labour but a division of labourers; it is graded inequality maintained by endogamy and legitimised by scripture, and untouchability is not an excrescence but the system's logical terminus. It follows that appeals to conscience are futile while the *śāstric* sanction stands: the annihilation of caste requires the destruction of that authority, and the instruments are law, education, political representation and the capture of State power — with conversion, in the last resort, as an exit from a religion he judged irreformable.

The concrete conflict was over political representation. The Communal Award's separate electorates for the Depressed Classes were, for Ambedkar, the guarantee of an independent political voice; for Gandhi they were a vivisection of Hinduism, and his fast produced the Poona Pact of 1932 — reserved seats within a joint electorate. Ambedkar accepted it under duress and never accepted the reasoning, as *What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables* makes plain; the quarrel over the word 'Harijan' was the same disagreement in miniature, over whether the untouchable was an object of Hindu solicitude or an agent of his own emancipation.

Assessment. Gandhi's achievement was to make untouchability a matter of conscience for the caste Hindu — no one else could have done it, and without that mobilisation the legal reforms would have met far greater resistance. His error was to suppose that a system whose principle is hierarchy could be purged of hierarchy while its scriptural warrant was left intact; and his idiom left the untouchable a beneficiary rather than a claimant. Ambedkar's diagnosis was structural and correct, and his instruments — Articles 15, 17, 25(2)(b), 46, 330 and 335 — are the operative ones. Their limit is that legal equality does not dissolve social practice: the persistence of endogamy, of atrocity and of everyday exclusion shows that a change of belief remains necessary even though it cannot be the strategy.

Conclusion. Ambedkar's approach better serves social justice, because it identifies the right object — the structure and its sanction, not the sentiment alone — and supplies enforceable means. In practice the two are complementary: law without conscience is evaded, and conscience without law is powerless. The Constitution is Ambedkar's instrument; its working still depends on the moral persuasion Gandhi attempted.

State the ontological argument for the existence of God. Examine the criticisms of Kant and Russell.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The argument is *a priori*: it seeks to derive God's existence from the concept of God alone. Anselm defines God as that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Even the fool who denies God has the concept in his understanding; but a being existing only in the understanding is less than the same being existing also in reality; so if God existed only in the understanding, a greater than the greatest conceivable could be conceived — a contradiction. Therefore God exists in reality. *Proslogion* III adds the stronger form: a being that cannot be conceived not to exist is greater than one that can, so God exists necessarily. Descartes restates it — existence belongs to the essence of a supremely perfect being as three angles belong to a triangle — and Leibniz adds the missing step, that the concept must first be shown to be possible. Modern modal versions (Malcolm, Plantinga) argue that if a maximally great being is *possible*, it exists necessarily.

Gaunilo's parody of the most perfect island shows the form of reasoning proves too much; Anselm replies that only for a *necessary* being does existence belong to the concept, and islands are contingent. Aquinas objects that we do not know God's essence and so cannot argue from it. **Kant's** objection is the decisive one: existence is not a real predicate. To say a thing *is* adds no determination to its concept — a hundred real thalers contain not one penny more of conceptual content than a hundred possible ones; all existential propositions are synthetic, so no existence can be extracted from a definition; and rejecting subject and predicate together involves no contradiction. **Russell** gives the point its logical form: 'exists' is not a first-order property at all but a quantifier, so 'God exists' is not of the form 'God is *F*' and cannot be true by definition. The modal versions escape Kant only by assuming the possibility of a maximally great being, which is precisely what is in dispute. The argument therefore fails as a proof, but it retains value as a clarification of the theistic concept — the God of religion is not a being that merely happens to exist. The Indian tradition avoided this route entirely: Nyāya argues from effects, and Advaita holds Brahman's being to be its nature rather than an attribute inferable from a definition.

5(b) PAPER II · SECTION B · Q5(B) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS**Present the cosmological argument for the existence of God and examine Kant's objection to it.****EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The cosmological argument moves *a posteriori* from the bare existence of a contingent world to a necessary being. Its two classical forms are the *causal* — every event has a cause, an infinite regress explains nothing, therefore a first uncaused cause (Aquinas' first and second ways) — and the *contingency* form: what exists contingently might not have existed, so its existence requires a ground outside itself, and the series of grounds terminates in a being whose existence is necessary (the third way; Leibniz's sufficient reason).

Kant's objection in the *Antinomies* and the Ideal of Pure Reason is twofold. Formally, the argument extends the category of causality beyond possible experience, where alone it has legitimate employment, and so is a transcendental illusion — reason mistaking a regulative demand for totality for a constitutive truth. More damagingly, the argument *collapses into the ontological*: having reached a necessary being, it must show that this being's essence entails its existence, which is precisely the ontological move Kant has already refuted on the ground that existence is not a real predicate. The cosmological argument thus borrows the very step it claimed to avoid. Nyāya's *kāryāt* inference faces an analogous difficulty — it too must move from effect to a uniquely divine cause — and the theist's best reply to both is that a necessary being is postulated as explanatorily indispensable, not deduced from a concept.

Does the theory of evolution destroy the argument from design? Discuss.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The teleological argument reasons *a posteriori* and by analogy from the order of nature and the adaptation of means to ends to an intelligent designer. Paley's watch found upon a heath is its classic statement: contrivance implies a contriver, and the eye is a more exquisite contrivance than any watch. Aquinas' fifth way is the same inference in scholastic form — things lacking intelligence act towards an end, and what lacks intelligence cannot direct itself. Hume had already weakened it before Darwin: the analogy between the world and a machine is loose, we have no experience of world-making with which to compare this case, a unique effect supports no causal generalisation, and the inference is in any event proportioned to the evidence — it would license a finite, plural or imperfect designer, while the disorder and suffering in nature count on the other side.

Darwin's contribution was not a disproof of God but the removal of the *inference*. Natural selection shows how cumulative small advantages, retained without foresight, produce precisely the adaptation Paley took to be inexplicable otherwise; apparent design therefore has a rival explanation of demonstrated power, and is no longer the best explanation. The 'intelligent design' response, which points to residual complexity, is a God of the gaps and shrinks as the gaps do. Two forms of the argument survive. The cosmological or fine-tuning form moves the question from biology, where selection applies, to the physical constants, where it does not — though the multiverse hypothesis and the observation that every possible set of constants is equally improbable blunt it. And the argument from the intelligibility of nature — that the world is amenable to mathematics at all — is more resilient, though it establishes rationality in the order rather than a designer outside it. Kant's verdict remains just: the physico-theological proof can at most establish an architect who arranges matter, not a creator, and to reach a necessary being it must borrow the ontological argument it was meant to replace. Theism's honest position after Darwin is design *through* law rather than design *instead of* law — the position the Nyāya Īśvara already occupied, ordering eternal atoms in accordance with *karma* rather than fabricating organisms.

State the chief characteristics of mystical experience. Can mystical experience be regarded as a valid source of knowledge?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

William James' four marks remain the standard: *ineffability* — the state defies adequate expression; *noetic quality* — it is felt as insight into truth, not mere emotion; *transiency*; and *passivity* — the subject feels grasped rather than grasping. To these are commonly added unity of the manifold, loss of the sense of ego, and a distinctive peace and blessedness. Stace's distinction between *extrovertive* mysticism, which finds unity in the world, and *introvertive*, which empties consciousness of content, is analytically useful; the Advaitic *nirvikalpa samādhi* belongs to the latter.

As a source of knowledge it has three claims: its noetic character, the convergence of testimony across traditions, and its transformative moral fruits. Against it: the *ineffability* that guarantees its depth also removes it from public checking, so there is no criterion to distinguish genuine insight from pathology or suggestion; the reported content varies with the mystic's tradition, which suggests interpretation is constitutive rather than incidental — Katz's objection that there are no unmediated experiences; and private certitude is not evidence, since the feeling of certainty accompanies error as readily as truth. The defensible verdict is that mystical experience is evidentially strong *for the subject* and weak as public warrant. It functions in the religious life much as *anubhava* does in Advaita — the confirmation of what *śruti* teaches, not an independent public proof — and its philosophical value lies less in what it proves than in what it makes intelligible.

THE IAS AKADEMIA

— We Are Because You Are —

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Ontological • Cosmological • Teleological • Moral • Aquinas' Five Ways • Nyāya Proofs

What is the issue?

- Philosophy of religion asks whether reason can establish God's existence.
- These arguments are classical rational proofs offered by thinkers.
- They seek to move from human experience or concepts to God.

Four Classical Arguments

A. Ontological Argument

- Meaning: argument from the very concept/idea of God to God's existence.
- Key line: God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived.
- Thinkers: Anselm, Descartes.
- Core logic:
 - God = greatest conceivable being.
 - If God exists only in the mind, a greater (real) being can be conceived.
 - But nothing greater than God can be conceived.
 - Therefore, God must exist in reality.
- Merits: purely a priori, logically elegant.

Limitations/Criticisms:

- Existence is not a predicate.
- Gaunilo's perfect island criticism.
- Kant's criticism: existence adds nothing to the concept.

B. Cosmological Argument

- Meaning: from causation, contingency, motion, or dependent existence of the world to a first cause/necessary being.
- Thinkers: Aquinas, Aristotle (unmoved mover), Leibniz.
- Key ideas: first cause, necessary being, sufficient reason.
- Core logic (typical form):
 - Everything in the world is caused/contingent/moving.
 - Infinite regress of dependent causes is impossible.
 - Therefore, there must be a first uncaused, necessary being.
- Merits: grounded in ordinary experience of causation and contingency.

Limitations/Criticisms:

- Who caused God?
- Regress problem (infinite chain).
- Hume: causation is habit, not necessary; Kant: transcendent causation unknowable.

C. Teleological Argument

- Meaning: from order, design, purpose, and harmony in the universe to an intelligent designer.
- Thinkers: William Paley, Aquinas.
- Watch Analogy (Paley): as a watch implies a watchmaker, so the intricate order of nature implies an intelligent designer.
- Core idea: adaptation, fine-tuning, and purposiveness indicate mind behind nature.

- Merits: intuitive, linked to order and adaptation in nature.

Limitations/Criticisms:

- Darwin/evolution challenge: natural selection explains adaptation.
- Problem of evil and suffering.
- Analogy is weak: universe ≠ watch; multiple designers?

D. Moral Argument

- Meaning: from moral law, duty, conscience, or summum bonum to God.
- Thinker: Kant.
- Core idea: God is postulated to make sense of morality and the highest good (union of virtue and happiness) in the world.
- Logic: practical reason demands an ultimate moral order and guarantor of the highest good.

- Merits: links religion with ethics and moral experience.

Limitations/Criticisms:

- Morality may be autonomous.
- Alternative secular ethics.
- Euthyphro-type concern: is good because God wills it or God wills because it is good?

Aquinas' Five Ways

- Motion → Unmoved Mover
- Efficient Causation → First Cause
- Contingency → Necessary Being
- Degrees of Perfection → Most Perfect Being
- Teleology / Governance → Intelligent Designer

Aquinas argues from the world to God *a posteriori*.

Nyāya Proofs for the Existence of God (10)

- Kāryāt – from effect: the world as an effect requires a maker.
- Āyojanāt – from combination/order of atoms needing an intelligent arranger.
- Dhṛteḥ – from sustenance/support of the world.
- Padāt – from words/language requiring an authoritative source.
- Pratyayataḥ – from valid cognition/trustworthy knowledge order.
- Śruteḥ – from the authority of the Veda pointing to a divine author or revealer.
- Vākyaṭ – from meaningful sentences and linguistic order.
- Samkhyā-viśeṣāt – from numerical/specific order in creation.
- Adṛṣṭāt – from unseen moral order/karmic dispensation requiring an overseer.
- Niyamāt / karma-phala-vyavasthā – from regulation and distribution of karmic fruits by an intelligent governor.

Comparison at a Glance

Type	Ontological	Cosmological	Teleological	Moral
Basis	Concept/idea of God	Causation, contingency, motion, dependence	Order, design, purpose, harmony	Moral law, duty, conscience, highest good
Nature	A priori (from concept)	A posteriori (from world)	A posteriori (from nature)	Practical reason (a priori but postulative)
Key Thinker	Anselm, Descartes	Aquinas, Aristotle, Leibniz	William Paley, Aquinas	Kant
Major Strength	Purely logical; no empirical observation needed	Rooted in common experience of causation & contingency	Explains order and adaptation we observe	Connects religion with ethics and morality
Main Criticism	Existence not a predicate; Gaunilo; Kant	Who caused God? infinite regress; Hume, Kant	Darwin challenge; evil; weak analogy	Morality autonomous; secular ethics; Euthyphro

Why this topic matters

- ✓ Central to Philosophy of Religion.
- ✓ Frequently asked in UPSC Mains (GS Paper I & Philosophy Optional).
- ✓ Useful for definition, critical analysis and evaluation questions.
- ✓ Enables comparative and balanced answers across thinkers.
- ✓ Helps in Essay, Ethics, and Religion related questions.

Memory Box / Exam Hooks

- Ontological = from idea to existence.
- Cosmological = from world to first cause.
- Teleological = from design to designer.
- Moral = from conscience to God.
- Aquinas = five a posteriori ways.
- Nyāya = inference-based rational theism.

“Reason seeks the Ultimate not to replace faith, but to understand reality more deeply.”

Conclusion

No single argument is universally accepted, but together they show how reason has tried to justify belief in God through concept, causation, design, and morality.



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Ontological • cosmological • teleological • moral • Aquinas' five ways • the ten Nyāya proofs.


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**5(e)** PAPER II · SECTION B · Q5(E) · 10 MARKS · ~150 WORDS

Does the view that morality consists in obedience to divine commands make moral obligation arbitrary? Discuss.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Divine command theory holds that an act is right because God commands it. The classical difficulty is the dilemma of the *Euthyphro*: is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good? On the first horn, morality is arbitrary — had God commanded cruelty, cruelty would be obligatory, and calling God good becomes empty, since it says only that He conforms to His own will. On the second horn, there is a standard of goodness independent of God, and the theory is abandoned along with divine sovereignty.

Three replies are made. The *essentialist*: God's commands flow necessarily from His nature, which is essentially good, so they are neither arbitrary nor answerable to an external standard — the dilemma's horns are not exhaustive. The *modified* theory: God's commands supply obligation while His goodness explains their content. The *epistemic*: revelation tells us *what* is right without making it right. Critics respond that grounding goodness in God's nature simply relocates the question, and Kant's objection remains decisive for autonomy — an act done from fear of command or hope of reward is heteronomous and so not moral at all. The Indian discussion is instructive: *dharma* is known through *śruti*, yet Mīmāṃsā treats the injunction as authoritative without a commanding deity, and the *Gītā*'s *niṣkāma karma* secures disinterestedness within a theistic frame — showing that obligation can be religiously grounded without collapsing into arbitrary command.

Explain the free-will defence as a response to the problem of evil. Does it adequately account for natural evil? Critically discuss.

WHY PROBABLE Evil is a standing cluster; 2025 took process theodicy, 2024 the 'offshoot of how God is conceptualised' formulation, 2023 Augustine. The free-will defence is the unused counterpart.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The logical problem of evil asserts an inconsistent triad: God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and evil exists. The free-will defence attacks the hidden premise that an omnipotent being can actualise *any* conceivable state of affairs. Its claim is modest but sufficient — not that we know why God permits evil, but that the coexistence of God and evil is not contradictory.

The argument. (i) A world containing significantly free creatures who freely choose good is more valuable than one containing automata. (ii) Freedom entails the genuine possibility of choosing wrongly; a being caused to choose rightly is not free. (iii) Therefore God cannot both grant freedom and guarantee its right use — this is a limit of logic, not of power, and omnipotence has never been held to extend to the self-contradictory. (iv) Moral evil is thus the price of a greater good. Augustine adds that evil is *privatio boni*, a privation rather than a positive creation, so God authors no evil; the Fall locates its origin in created will.

Natural evil — the hard case. Earthquakes, disease and animal suffering are not chosen by anyone, so the defence appears to lapse. Four responses are offered. The *Augustinian*: natural evil is consequent upon the Fall, a disordered creation following disordered will — but this strains credulity given that suffering long precedes humanity. The *free-will extension*: natural evil is caused by non-human free agents, which is logically available yet evidentially idle. The *lawlike-order* reply: a world of stable natural law is a precondition of responsible agency, since choice requires predictable consequences, and such a regularity will inevitably harm — this is the strongest line, but it must concede that a benevolent legislator could have chosen gentler laws. The *soul-making* reply, Irenaean rather than Augustinian: the world is not a paradise but a vale of soul-making, and an environment without hardship could not produce courage, compassion or maturity; hence 'epistemic distance' from God is itself necessary for free growth.

Critical estimate. Against the *logical* problem the defence succeeds: no contradiction has been demonstrated. Against the *evidential* problem it is weaker — the sheer quantity and distribution of suffering, especially of the innocent and of animals, appears gratuitous, and Dostoevsky's objection that no future harmony can justify a single tortured child refuses the calculus outright. The soul-making theodicy answers the distribution problem better than the free-will defence proper, but pays by making persons instrumental to their own perfection. The Indian alternative is worth noting: the *karma*-rebirth framework dissolves the problem of the innocent sufferer by denying that anyone is innocent, and thereby buys consistency at the cost of an unverifiable moral history.

Conclusion. The free-will defence secures logical consistency for moral evil and, through the lawlike-order argument, offers a plausible extension to natural evil. It does not remove the evidential burden. The theist's honest position is that God's coexistence with evil is defensible, while a full theodicy — an explanation of *this* distribution of suffering — remains beyond us.

MENTOR NOTE Distinguish *defence* from *theodicy* in the first paragraph — that single distinction is worth several marks and most candidates miss it. Distinguish also the logical from the evidential problem in the conclusion. The *karma* comparison is a reliable way to earn the cross-tradition credit UPSC rewards in this section.

Examine the arguments for and against the immortality of the soul. Is personal survival of death an intelligible notion?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Two questions must be kept apart: whether there are grounds for believing that persons survive death, and whether such survival is even coherently describable. The second is the harder.

Arguments for. Plato's are metaphysical: the soul is simple and therefore not liable to dissolution, it is akin to the eternal Forms which it knows, and it is the principle of life and so cannot admit its contrary. Aquinas argues from the immateriality of intellectual operations. Kant's is moral and explicitly a *postulate*, not a proof: the moral law commands us to seek the highest good, holiness requires an endless progress, and practical reason must therefore postulate an endless existence. Butler adds the analogy of nature and the continuity of personal identity through great bodily change, and a familiar argument from justice holds that desert is not proportioned in this life and must be settled elsewhere. To these the religious traditions add revelation, and psychical research adds mediumistic and near-death testimony.

Arguments against. The empirical dependence of mental life upon the brain — the effects of injury, disease, ageing and anaesthesia — is the strongest single consideration. Hume finds no impression of a simple self, so there is nothing simple to be immortal. Kant's own Paralogisms deny that the unity of apperception establishes a substantial soul. And the decisive difficulty is the *criterion of identity*: for a disembodied person, memory claims are the only evidence, yet memory can be delusive and there is no bodily continuity to settle disputes — Flew's objection that without a body there is no principle of individuation. The resurrection alternative avoids disembodiment but raises the replica problem: is the re-created person me, or a duplicate?

The Indian positions sharpen the issue. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya prove the soul's eternity and hence its survival; Jainism affirms individual souls eternally; Cārvāka denies survival outright. Advaita accepts that the Self is neither born nor dies, while denying that the *jīva* as a particular person survives — which is precisely the immortality most people want. Buddhism offers the most interesting alternative: rebirth without a soul, continuity carried by a causal series, which shows that survival does not logically require a substance.

Conclusion. Theoretical proof is unavailable in either tradition, and the empirical evidence tells the other way. The serious considerations are moral — Kant's postulate and the demand of justice — and they warrant hope rather than knowledge. Survival is intelligible if identity can be carried by something other than a body: memory-continuity, a karmic series, or divine re-creation. It is therefore the criterion of identity, and not the bare possibility of survival, that the debate is really about.

Are the traditional attributes of God mutually consistent? Discuss with reference to the paradox of omnipotence.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER


Classical theism ascribes to God omnipotence, omniscience, perfect goodness, eternity, immutability, simplicity, personality and creatorship. The difficulty is that these are drawn from two sources — the God of the philosophers, absolute and unchanging, and the God of worship, personal and responsive — and they pull against each other.

The paradox of omnipotence. Can God make a stone he cannot lift, or a creature he cannot control? Either answer seems to limit him. Aquinas' solution is that omnipotence extends to the logically possible only: a self-contradictory task is not a task, so the inability to perform it is no deficiency of power. Descartes takes the voluntarist road — God creates even the necessary truths — which preserves power at the cost of intelligibility, since we can then form no conception of what God cannot do. Mackie's sharper version is the paradox of sovereignty: can an omnipotent being bind himself irrevocably? The standard reply distinguishes first-order omnipotence, power over things, from second-order omnipotence, power over one's own powers, and denies that both must be held simultaneously.

Omniscience and human freedom. If God knows infallibly today what I shall do tomorrow, it seems that I cannot do otherwise. The classical answer, from Boethius and Aquinas, is that God is eternal in the sense of possessing all time at once, so that he *sees* rather than *foresees*; a further reply insists that knowledge is not causation. Molinist and Ockhamist devices attempt more, and open theism concedes the point by holding the future to be indeterminate and so not there to be known — again saving consistency by contracting an attribute.

The remaining tensions. Omnipotence with perfect goodness raises the problem of evil. Immutability sits badly with personality: a God who hears prayer and responds to repentance changes, and a simple being has no distinct attributes at all, which makes the whole language of praise problematic — hence the *via negativa* in the West and *neti neti* in Advaita. Process theology resolves the conflict by making God temporal, affected and persuasive rather than coercive, at the frank cost of omnipotence.

Conclusion. Consistency is purchasable: restrict omnipotence to the logically possible, read divine knowledge as timeless, and understand immutability as constancy of purpose rather than immobility. Each repair, however, moves the concept a little further from the God that worship presupposes. The Indian alternatives show the two available exits plainly — Nyāya's Īśvara is openly limited, working on eternal atoms under the constraint of *karma*, while Advaita's Brahman escapes every paradox by having no attributes at all. Theology must choose between a God who is limited and a God who is transcendent; the fully attributed personal absolute is the one option that will not hold together.



IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Indian & Western Proofs • Critiques • Comparative Insight

1. INTRODUCTION

- What is Immortality of the Soul?
 - Immortality is the view that the self/soul survives bodily death.
 - It matters in philosophy of religion and metaphysics—touching meaning, morality, and ultimate destiny.



KEY TAKEAWAY:

Debate turns on whether the self is a permanent, non-material reality.

2. WESTERN PROOFS FOR IMMORTALITY

- ★ Plato: Soul is simple and non-composite; argument from opposites; recollection theory; affinity of soul with Forms.
- ★ Descartes: Soul/mind (res cogitans) is distinct from body (res extensa).
- ★ Leibniz / Butler / Idealist line: Enduring spiritual substance or continuity of person.
- ★ Kant: Immortality is a postulate of practical reason, necessary for the highest good (moral order + happiness).



STRENGTH: Gives rational and moral basis for survival of the self.

3. INDIAN PROOFS FOR IMMORTALITY

- Upanishads / Gita: Atman is unborn, eternal, indestructible, beyond decay.
- Nyaya: Self is a permanent substance inferred from memory, recognition, desire, pleasure-pain, and moral continuity.
- Samkhya–Yoga: Purusha is eternal, conscious, distinct from prakriti.
- Vedanta: Atman is not destroyed by death; individuality may vary in interpretation, but self is not body.
- Jainism: Jiva is beginningless, enduring, and bearer of karma.



STRENGTH: Links immortality with karma, liberation (moksha) and moral order.



4. WESTERN CRITIQUES

- Hume: No impression of a permanent self; bundle theory of perceptions.
- Materialism / Physicalism: Mind depends on brain; survival after death doubtful.
- Empiricist objection: Immortality cannot be proved by observation or experience.
- Logical Positivist challenge: Statements about survival may be unverifiable.
- Problem of Personal Identity: What exactly survives—soul, mind, memory, or mere continuity?



5. INDIAN CRITIQUES



- Charvaka: Consciousness arises from bodily elements; no afterlife, no soul separate from body.
- Buddhism: Anatman / no permanent self; continuity is causal flow, not an enduring soul (kshanikavada).
- Some Advaita nuance: Empirical ego (ahamkara) is not ultimately real; immortality of individual self must be carefully qualified.
- Critique of naive literalism: Rebirth or survival may be interpreted differently across schools and contexts.

6. IMPORTANT THINKERS

- Plato • Descartes • Kant • Hume
- Upanishads / Gita • Gautama (Nyaya)
- Samkhya • Shankara (Vedanta)
- Jains • Buddhists • Charvaka

7. EXAM POINTERS / WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- ✓ Important in philosophy of religion.
- ✓ Useful for soul, self, rebirth, liberation, and personal identity.
- ✓ Helps compare Indian and Western metaphysics.
- ✓ Frequently useful in UPSC Philosophy Optional answers.

8. INDIAN VS WESTERN AT A GLANCE

TRADITION	KEY PROOF	MAIN BASIS	MAIN CRITICISM
WESTERN	Metaphysical simplicity, mind–body dualism, moral postulate	Rational arguments (Plato, Descartes), practical reason (Kant), moral order	Empiricism (Hume), Materialism (mind–brain dependence), unverifiability
INDIAN	Atman / Purusha / Jiva is eternal; inferred from experience & scripture	Scriptural authority, inference (Nyaya), karma & rebirth, liberation (moksha)	Charvaka (materialism), Buddha (anatman), nuanced non–dual critique

10. CONCLUSION

Immortality of the soul remains a central philosophical idea, defended through metaphysics, morality and scripture, yet challenged by empiricism, materialism and no-self theories.



Philosophy Optional with Vikash Sir



8595269455



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THE IAS AKADEMIA

— We Are Because You Are —

GOD—WORLD RELATION

• Deism • Theism • Pantheism • Immanence • Transcendence • Importance • Limitations •

1 WHAT IS GOD—WORLD RELATION?

- It is the philosophical problem of how God is related to the universe.
- Central in philosophy of religion and metaphysics.

★ KEY TAKEAWAY ★

Understanding the God—world relation helps explain divine attributes, creation, providence, and religious experience.

2 ATTRIBUTES OF GOD RELEVANT HERE

- Transcendence**: God is beyond and independent of the world.
- Immanence**: God is present within the world.
- Omnipotence**: unlimited power.
- Omniscience**: unlimited knowledge.
- Benevolence**: perfect goodness.
- Personality / impersonal absolute**: God may be personal or an impersonal ultimate reality.

← Different theories combine these attributes differently. →

9 WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- Central to philosophy of religion.
- Helps compare Western and Indian views.
- Important for questions on divine attributes, creation, evil, miracles, prayer, and religious experience.
- Useful in UPSC Philosophy Optional comparative answers.

3 DEISM

- Meaning**: God creates the world but does not intervene in its daily functioning.
- Key idea**: clockmaker analogy.
- God is mainly transcendent, not immanent.
- Nature runs by laws after creation.

Ⓢ Thinkers / Examples: Enlightenment deists, Voltaire, Thomas Paine.

★ Merits / Importance

- ✓ Supports rational religion.
- ✓ Encourages scientific outlook.
- ✓ Avoids superstition and priestly control.

⚠ Limitations

- ✗ Weak room for prayer, miracles, providence, or personal religious experience.
- ✗ God seems distant and uninvolved.

4 THEISM

- Meaning**: God both creates and continuously sustains / governs the world.
- Key idea**: God is both transcendent and immanent.
- Personal God, providence, prayer, miracles, moral governance.

• Examples: Christianity, Islam, many Hindu bhakti traditions.

★ Merits / Importance

- ✓ Explains devotion, worship, prayer.
- ✓ Accounts for moral order and providence.
- ✓ Preserves meaningful religious experience.

⚠ Limitations

- ✗ Problem of evil and suffering.
- ✗ Divine intervention vs natural laws.
- ✗ Freedom of will vs foreknowledge.

5 PANTHEISM

- Meaning**: God and the world are identical; all is God.
- Key idea**: strong immanence, weak or absent transcendence.
- God is often understood as impersonal absolute substance.

• Thinker / Example: Spinoza; also "all reality as divine".

★ Merits / Importance


- ✓ Unity of existence; all is interconnected.
- ✓ Ecological and spiritual harmony.
- ✓ Dissolves sharp God—world dualism.

⚠ Limitations

- ✗ Difficult to preserve divine personality.
- ✗ Weak space for prayer, miracles, freedom.
- ✗ Blurs distinction between creator and creation.

6 ASPECT	DEISM	THEISM	PANTHEISM
Basic idea	God creates and then steps back.	God creates and continuously sustains & governs.	God and world are one reality.
God creates world?	Yes	Yes	Creation is not separate; world = God.
God intervenes?	No	Yes	Intervention not distinct; all is divine process.
Transcendence	Very High	High	Low
Immanence	Low	High	Very High
Personal / impersonal	Impersonal	Personal	Usually impersonal
Prayer / miracles	Weak / not central	Central	Weak / not meaningful
Major strength	Rational, scientific, avoids superstition.	Explains devotion, morality, providence, experience.	Unity of existence, harmony, non-dual insight.
Main limitation	Distant God; weak for religion as lived experience.	Problem of evil; intervention vs laws; freedom vs foreknowledge.	Loses personality & freedom; no creator—creation distinction.

7 IMMANENCE vs TRANSCENDENCE AT A GLANCE



8 MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOK

- ★ **DEISM** = God makes the world and steps back.
- ★ **THEISM** = God makes the world and stays active in it.
- ★ **PANTHEISM** = God and world are one reality.

★ The debate turns on how far God is beyond the world, within the world, or identical with it.



★ EXAM POINTERS ★

- Compare and contrast clearly.
- Use thinkers and examples.
- Discuss merits and limitations.
- Relate to problems: evil, prayer, miracles, freedom, experience.
- Give balanced, critical evaluation.

**7(a)** PAPER II · SECTION B · Q7(A) · 20 MARKS

Distinguish between exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism as responses to the conflicting truth-claims of different religions. Which of them is philosophically most defensible?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Religions make claims that cannot all be literally true together — a personal creator and an impersonal absolute, one incarnation and none, rebirth and resurrection. The philosophical question is how to hold one's own faith rationally in the face of this.

The three positions. *Exclusivism* holds one tradition true and the others false where they conflict, salvation being available only within it. Its virtue is logical clarity — it respects the law of contradiction and takes doctrine seriously. Its costs are the moral difficulty of consigning the majority of humanity to error, and the epistemic arbitrariness noted by Hick: the tradition one affirms correlates almost perfectly with birthplace. *Inclusivism* holds one's own tradition to be the fullest disclosure while granting that others participate in it partially — the 'anonymous Christian', or the Vedāntic reading of other faiths as lower rungs of a single ladder. It preserves both commitment and charity, but the charity is patronising: the other is affirmed only on terms he does not accept. *Pluralism* holds the great traditions to be equally valid human responses to one ultimate Reality. Hick's mechanism is Kantian — the Real *an sich* is beyond description, and the personae and impersonae of the traditions are its culturally conditioned phenomenal appearances.

Assessment. Pluralism's difficulties are severe. If the Real is beyond all predicates, it is unclear that anything is being asserted, and the position becomes indistinguishable from agnosticism — the *anirvachaniya* problem in Western dress. Further, pluralism is covertly a fourth first-order claim: it says that all traditions are mistaken about their own uniqueness, so it is itself exclusivist about exclusivism. And it must dismiss as inessential precisely the doctrines believers hold most central. Exclusivism, conversely, is not irrational — Plantinga rightly argues that awareness of disagreement does not by itself defeat a belief — but it is under-motivated once the arbitrariness point is felt.

Conclusion. A chastened inclusivism is the most defensible: it retains truth-commitment, avoids the self-refutation latent in pluralism, and grounds tolerance in something better than indifference. The Indian formulations point the way — *ekam sat viprā bahudhā vadanti* and Vivekananda's universal religion allow a real hierarchy of insight without denying validity, while *sarvadharmasamabhāva* gives an ethic of equal respect that does not require the metaphysical claim that all doctrines are equally true. Tolerance, on this view, follows from humility about one's own grasp rather than from scepticism about truth itself.

Examine the relation between reason, faith and revelation. Can revelation be a source of knowledge?**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

Religion claims truths that argument alone does not establish, and three classical positions define the possible relations. Faith *above* reason but not against it — Aquinas' architecture, in which natural theology demonstrates what reason can reach and the mysteries are revealed, being beyond proof yet not contrary to it. Faith *against* reason — Tertullian's *credo quia absurdum* and, more seriously, Kierkegaard's leap: truth is subjectivity, Abraham's obedience is a teleological suspension of the ethical, and to demand rational warrant is already to have missed what faith is. And faith as reason's *completion* — Augustine's *credo ut intelligam* and Anselm's faith seeking understanding, in which belief supplies the standpoint from which understanding becomes possible.

Revelation is understood on two models. The *propositional* model treats it as a body of communicated truths — verbal inspiration in the Semitic traditions, and in India the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of *śabda*, where the Veda is authorless and therefore free of the defects of any speaker and self-validating. The *non-propositional* model treats it as divine self-disclosure in event and encounter, faith being the response rather than the assent — Barth, and Buber's I-Thou. Advaita occupies a careful middle position: *śruti* alone discloses Brahman, *anubhava* confirms it, and reasoning is a subordinate aid that may not contradict either. Nyāya is more modest still, grounding testimony not in the text's authorlessness but in the trustworthiness of its speaker.

Difficulties. Revelation cannot authenticate itself without circularity — the text is authoritative because divine, and divine because the text says so. Revelations conflict across traditions, so a criterion of choice is required, and the criterion cannot itself be revealed without begging the question. Fideism, by insulating faith from criticism, protects error exactly as well as truth. And Kant's autonomy objection stands: belief adopted on authority is heteronomous, and obedience from fear or hope is not moral. On the other side, evidentialism is too demanding — Clifford's ethic of belief would condemn most of the trust on which ordinary knowledge rests; Plantinga argues that belief in God can be properly basic, and James that where the option is forced and the evidence inconclusive, commitment is permissible.

Conclusion. Reason cannot supply the content of faith, but it can and must test its coherence, its moral fruit and its consistency with what else is known — Aquinas' relation rather than Tertullian's. Revelation is best read as self-disclosure calling for response rather than as dictation of propositions: so read, it is a source of religious knowledge for the believer without being public evidence, and it remains open to the criticism that a self-certifying authority would forbid.

How can religious language be meaningful if it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable? Examine the principal answers.

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The positivist challenge is the starting point: if the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification, 'God exists' is not false but senseless, since no observation counts either way. Five families of answer have been given.

(i) **Verification deferred.** Hick concedes that religious claims are factual and argues that they are verifiable *eschatologically* — his two travellers on the road, one expecting the Celestial City, show that the dispute is about a genuine difference which the end of the journey will settle. The objection is that post-mortem verification presupposes survival, which is part of the claim in question. (ii) **Falsification.** Flew's invisible gardener presses the sharper form: a claim qualified until nothing could count against it has died the death of a thousand qualifications and asserts nothing. Hare replies that religious convictions are *bliks* — unfalsifiable but far from senseless frameworks that organise all experience, as the lunatic's conviction about the dons organises his. Mitchell answers better: the partisan's trust in the Stranger is a belief held *against* apparent evidence but not immune to it, and the believer who admits nothing could count against his faith has turned it into a tautology.

(iii) **Analogy.** Aquinas holds that terms are applied to God neither univocally, which is anthropomorphism, nor equivocally, which is agnosticism, but analogically, the perfections of creatures pre-existing eminently in their cause. The objection is that analogy requires some prior knowledge of the second analogate. (iv) **Symbol and myth.** Tillich denies that God is a being at all — God is being-itself, and all religious language is symbolic, participating in what it symbolises. Braithwaite reduces religious assertion to a declaration of moral policy accompanied by stories, and Bultmann demythologises. These preserve meaning by surrendering the truth-claim, which is a heavy price. (v) **Language-games.** On the Wittgensteinian view religious discourse has its own grammar and its own criteria of appropriateness, and to demand empirical verification is a category mistake. The objection, pressed by Nielsen and Gellner, is that this makes religion unfalsifiable by construction and misdescribes believers, who plainly intend to assert something.

The Indian tradition met the same difficulty and answered by grading discourse rather than by abandoning cognitive content: Brahman is *anirvacanīya* and reached by *neti neti*, yet spoken of positively at the empirical level; the Advaitic exegesis of *tat tvam asi* uses a special theory of implication to secure a non-literal but determinate meaning; and the Buddha's refusal to answer the undetermined questions is a doctrine about the limits of assertion, not a denial that anything is asserted.

Conclusion. The positivist criterion was too narrow and has been abandoned even by its authors; but the non-cognitivist rescues concede too much, since believers do not take themselves to be expressing attitudes. The most defensible combination is analogy for content, the Wittgensteinian point about grammar for use, and Mitchell's insistence that a faith which nothing could count against has ceased to be faith and become obstinacy.

Explain the account of the *numinous* as the distinctive object of religious consciousness. Does it succeed in distinguishing religious experience from moral and aesthetic experience?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

Otto's problem is that theology had reduced the holy to the morally perfect, losing what is peculiar to religion. He isolates the residue by subtracting the ethical and rational from 'holy', and names it the *numinous* — *a priori*, sui generis, and knowable only by evocation, not definition. Its correlate in the subject is the creature-feeling: the sense of being nothing before an overwhelming presence.

Its structure is the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans*. *Mysterium* is the wholly other, that which falls outside all our categories. *Tremendum* has three moments: awefulness (*Scheu*, dread rather than fear), overpoweringness (*majestas*, correlate of creature-feeling), and energy or urgency. *Fascinans* is the counter-moment of attraction, grace and blessedness — which is why the numinous both repels and draws, producing the 'harmony of contrasts' that ordinary emotion lacks. Otto reads it across traditions: Job's whirlwind, Isaiah's vision, the *Kena* and *Bhagavad Gītā*'s theophany.

Does it succeed? Against the *moral*: substantially yes. Kant's reverence for the moral law is directed at a principle and is compatible with self-respect; the numinous annihilates self-worth and is felt towards a presence, not a principle. Otto's genealogical point is telling — the holy is progressively *moralised* and rationalised in history, which shows the two are distinct even where fused, and explains why the numinous can appear in morally indifferent or even terrifying forms. Against the *aesthetic*: less securely. The sublime is Otto's own analogy, and it too combines dread with attraction before what exceeds our measure. The claimed difference is that the aesthetic sublime remains within the world and leaves the self intact, whereas the numinous involves a claim of absolute worth and a demand upon the subject. But since the numinous is by definition indefinable and known only through its feeling-tone, the distinction cannot be argued — only pointed at, which is precisely the objection.

Further criticism. The account is psychological: it describes a state of consciousness and infers an object, which does not establish that the object exists — a felt wholly-other may be a projection, as Freud and Durkheim argue from different directions. It is also arguably parochial in reverse: the Advaitin's *brahmānubhava* is not an encounter with an Other at all but the collapse of the subject-object distinction, and Buddhist *nirvāṇa* has no numinous object; so the numinous may describe theistic experience rather than religious experience as such. Finally, the insistence on non-rationality makes the doctrine unfalsifiable.

Conclusion. The numinous succeeds as a phenomenology — it recovers a dimension of religion that moralising theology had lost, and it distinguishes religious from moral consciousness cleanly. It does not succeed as an epistemology, and its boundary with the aesthetic sublime remains porous. Its lasting contribution is negative and valuable: religion cannot be reduced to ethics without remainder.

Can there be religion without God? Discuss with reference to Buddhism, Jainism and Sāṃkhya.**EXAM-HALL ANSWER**

The answer turns on the definition of religion. If religion is defined by belief in a personal deity — as Galloway's definition tends to, making it man's faith in a power beyond himself by which he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gain stability of life — the question is settled by stipulation. Substantive definitions of that kind are, however, contested by functional ones: Durkheim's, which locates religion in the distinction of sacred from profane and in its social work, and Tillich's, which makes it a matter of ultimate concern; while family-resemblance accounts deny that any single feature is essential.

The Indian evidence is decisive. Early *Buddhism* has no creator, no eternal self and no efficacious sacrifice, and yet it has a diagnosis of suffering, a path, a goal in *nirvāṇa*, a monastic community and a rich devotional life; Theravāda is non-theistic without being irreligious, and Mahāyāna's celestial Buddhas show how devotion re-enters. *Jainism* denies a creator and holds the world eternal; the *Tīrthaṅkaras* are liberated souls, venerated as exemplars but incapable of granting favours, so worship is aspiration rather than petition. *Sāṃkhya* is explicitly *nirīśvara* and yet is wholly organised around liberation. *Mīmāṃsā* makes ritual efficacious by the force of the injunction with no commanding deity behind it. Even *Advaita* makes the personal God a feature of the empirical order, not the ultimate. In the West, Spinoza's God-or-Nature, Comte's religion of humanity and Dewey's common faith are the analogues.

What the cases show is that the invariant features of religion are not a deity but a structure: a diagnosis of the human predicament, a goal transcending ordinary welfare, a discipline for reaching it, a community and a ritual life, and an object of reverence — which may be a state such as *nirvāṇa*, a law such as *dharma*, an impersonal absolute such as Brahman, or a person such as *Īśvara*.

Objections. The theist replies that a religion without a personal object cannot sustain prayer, grace or love, and that the history of popular Buddhism — where the Buddha becomes an object of worship — shows devotion reasserting itself, so that non-theistic religion is parasitic upon theistic feeling. The opposite danger is dilution: if any ultimate concern qualifies, then nationalism and Marxism are religions, and the term ceases to distinguish anything.

Conclusion. Religion without God is not merely possible but historically actual, and the Indian systems are the standing proof. The concession required is methodological: religion must then be defined by function and structure rather than by its object, and one must accept that the boundary between a religion and a secular philosophy of life becomes a matter of degree rather than of kind.

Examine the philosophical significance of the doctrine of *karma* and rebirth. Does it provide a satisfactory account of moral desert?

EXAM-HALL ANSWER

The doctrine holds that every morally qualified act leaves both a disposition in the agent and a deserved consequence in the world, and that the unexhausted residue determines the circumstances of a further birth; the series is beginningless, and release from it is the highest end. It is common ground to the Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina systems, which differ only in the mechanism — *adṛṣṭa* administered by Īśvara in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, seeds ripening in the store-consciousness in Yogācāra, subtle karmic matter adhering to the soul in Jainism, *prakṛti*'s own teleology in Sāṃkhya, and Brahman's ordinance at the empirical level in Advaita.

Its philosophical merits are considerable. It answers the problem of evil without a theodicy: there is no undeserved suffering and no divine caprice to explain. It makes the moral order as objective and lawful as the physical, so that responsibility needs no external judge. It puts liberation within reach of effort rather than of election or grace. It explains the vast inequality of native endowment and circumstance without attributing arbitrariness to God. And, in making the present life one of many, it is a doctrine of hope rather than of finality.

The difficulties are equally serious. It is unverifiable: there is no independent access to a previous life, memory claims are unreliable, and a theory that accommodates every outcome is testable by none. The *identity* problem is worse — desert requires that the reaper be the sower, and Buddhism, having denied a persisting self, must make causal continuity do the work of identity. The *mechanism* is obscure: how an unintelligent residue allots proportionate fruit is never explained, which is precisely why Nyāya introduces God and Yogācāra the *ālayavijñāna*. There is a moral hazard, since a doctrine that every condition is deserved can rationalise inequality and blunt compassion — the standard and largely justified charge that *karma* lent legitimacy to caste. And the beginningless regress explains each birth by an earlier one while never explaining the series.

Replies and conclusion. The tradition answers that explaining suffering is not excusing it — the Gītā's *karma-yoga* and the Buddhist elevation of compassion make relief a duty irrespective of desert; that a beginningless series requires no first term; and that unverifiability is not refutation, since the doctrine functions as a postulate of practical reason much as Kant's immortality does. The reasonable estimate is therefore divided. As an ethical postulate *karma* is the most rigorous account of moral desert any tradition has produced, and it dispenses with a judge. As a theory it is unverifiable and its mechanism unexplained, and its social use has often been indefensible. Radhakrishnan's formulation is the one to close with: *karma* is a law of continuity and not of fatalism — it fixes the situation from which a man acts, never the act itself, and the whole point of the doctrine is that the future remains to be made.

THE IAS AKADEmia

— We Are Because You Are —

SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

Reason • Revelation • Faith • Mysticism • Counter-Arguments

1 WHAT IS RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE?

Religious knowledge concerns how humans know God, the divine, ultimate reality, salvation, moral order, and spiritual truth.

KEY TAKEAWAY: Debate centers on whether religious truth is known by reason alone, divine disclosure, personal faith, or mystical experience.

2 REASON

Meaning: Knowledge of religion through logic, argument, reflection, natural theology.
Examples: Proofs for God, moral argument, philosophical theology.

MERITS

- Universal, rational
- Debatable, systematic

LIMITATIONS / COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

- Reason is limited; cannot fully grasp the infinite.
- Hume and Kant raise limits.
- Rational proofs remain contested.

3 REVELATION

Meaning: Truth disclosed by God through scripture, prophets, avatars, divine word.
Examples: Vedas, Bible, Quran, Gita, prophetic revelation.

MERITS

- Gives certainty to believers
- Grounds doctrine, moral guidance, salvation

LIMITATIONS / COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

- Competing revelations
- Interpretation problems, authority questioned
- Dependence on prior faith

4 FAITH

Meaning: Trust, commitment, existential acceptance beyond mere proof.
Thinkers/Ideas: Kierkegaard, fideism, living commitment.

MERITS

- Central to religious life
- Enables surrender, devotion, moral transformation

LIMITATIONS / COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

- May seem subjective
- Can conflict with reason
- Danger of blind belief

5 MYSTICISM / RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Meaning: Immediate experience of the divine, unity, transcendence, direct awareness.
Examples: Saints, sages, bhakti, sufi, advaitic, contemplative experience.

MERITS

- Experiential, transformative
- Powerful for believers

LIMITATIONS / COUNTER-ARGUMENTS

- Ineffable, private, difficult to verify
- Psychological or neurological explanations possible

6 COUNTER-ARGUMENTS / CRITICAL VIEW

- Empiricist critique: religious claims lack sensory verification.
- Rationalist critique: revelation and faith need rational scrutiny.
- Pluralism problem: many religions claim conflicting truths.
- Psychological critique: experiences may arise from mind, emotion, or conditioning.
- Logical positivist challenge: if not verifiable, are such claims meaningful?
- Problem of subjectivity: private conviction is not universal proof.

7 COMPARISON AT A GLANCE

SOURCE	CORE IDEA	STRENGTH	MAIN CRITICISM
Reason	Knowledge through logic, argument, natural theology	Universal, rational, systematic	Limited reason; proofs remain contested
Revelation	Divine disclosure in scripture or prophetic word	Certainty for believers; moral guidance	Competing claims; interpretation issues
Faith	Trust and commitment beyond mere proof	Transforms life; enables devotion and surrender	Subjective; may conflict with reason
Mysticism	Direct experience of the divine	Experiential; transformative power	Ineffable; private; difficult to verify

8 THINKERS AT A GLANCE

- ★ Aquinas – reason and natural theology
- ★ Augustine – faith seeking understanding
- ★ Kierkegaard – leap of faith
- ★ William James – religious experience
- ★ Radhakrishnan – intuition / spiritual experience
- ★ A.J. Ayer – verification challenge
- ★ Hume – critique of miracles and reason's limits
- ★ Kant – limits of pure reason, moral faith

9 EXAM POINTERS / WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- Central to philosophy of religion.
- Helps compare reason, faith and experience.
- Useful for questions on revelation, mysticism, and verification.
- Important for balanced UPSC answers.

10 MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOKS

- Reason = rational theology
- Revelation = divine disclosure
- Faith = commitment / trust
- Mysticism = direct experience
- Critique = verification, plurality, subjectivity

★ CONCLUSION ★

Religious knowledge is understood through many routes—reason, revelation, faith and experience—but each source invites both philosophical defense and critical scrutiny.



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RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

Cognitive • Non-Cognitive • Analogical • Symbolic • Thinkers

1. What is Religious Language?

- Religious language refers to statements about God, faith, worship, revelation, salvation, sin, and ultimate reality.
- Central question: Is religious language meaningful, factual, symbolic, or expressive?

KEY TAKEAWAY: Religious language can be understood in different ways — truth, analogy, symbol, or commitment.

2. COGNITIVE vs NON-COGNITIVE

COGNITIVE (Truth-Apt)

- Religious statements are truth-apt; can be true or false.
- They make claims about reality.
- Example: "God exists", "God is loving".

Vs

NON-COGNITIVE (Non-Truth-Apt)

- Religious statements are not primarily factual claims.
- They express attitudes, commitments, forms of life, moral intentions, or symbolic orientation.
- They guide, inspire and shape life.

3. COGNITIVE VIEWS

- Religious language is fact-stating / truth-claiming.
- Traditional theism generally treats statements like "God exists" or "God is loving" as meaningful and truth-apt.
- Religion speaks about a real transcendent being and makes verifiable claims.

CHALLENGES: Verificationism (A. J. Ayer) & Falsification debates (Antony Flew) question this.

4. ANALOGICAL LANGUAGE – AQUINAS

- Literal / univocal language about God is difficult because God is infinite and transcendent.
- Ways of using terms:
 - ① Univocal: same meaning (not possible for God and humans).
 - ② Equivocal: totally different meanings.
 - ③ Analogical: neither same nor totally different.
- Aquinas: Terms applied to God and humans are used analogically — in a related but not identical sense.
 - Analogy Attributionis: We attribute to God perfections (goodness, wisdom) in a higher way.
 - Analogy Proportionalitatis: Relations in creation reflect God as the source in a higher degree.

MERIT: Preserves meaning while respecting divine transcendence.

LIMITATION: May still remain obscure and open to interpretation.

5. SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE

- Paul Tillich: Symbols participate in the reality to which they point.
- Religious symbols open up levels of reality and dimensions of the soul.
- SIGN vs SYMBOL:**

SIGN	SYMBOL
Arbitrary, conventional, points to something external. (e.g., word, traffic signal)	Participates in the reality it points to; reveals and opens meaning. (e.g., cross, light, sacrifice)
- Powerful in worship, myth, ritual and scripture.

LIMITATION: May seem too subjective or non-literal.

6. NON-COGNITIVE THEORIES

R. B. BRAITHWAITE	→ Religious assertions are expressions of moral intention / commitment to a way of life. Parables and stories guide conduct and sustain faith-community.
R. M. HARE	→ "BLIK" THEORY — Religious language is an unfalsifiable governing perspective (a "blik") which gives orientation and unity to a believer's life.
PAUL van BUREN / A. J. AYER	→ Challenge: Religious statements may fail empirical verification. If not verifiable, they may not be cognitively meaningful.
ANTONY FLEW	→ Falsification Challenge: If nothing counts against a belief, does it assert anything? → Is it meaningful?
BASIL MITCHELL	→ Response using the Partisan Parable: Faith and commitment make religious belief meaningful even if not verifiable or falsifiable.

7. THINKERS AT A GLANCE

THINKER	CORE VIEW
Aquinas	Analogical language — neither same nor totally different; preserves meaning.
Paul Tillich	Symbolic language — symbols participate in reality and open depth of meaning.
R. B. Braithwaite	Religious language as moral intention / commitment to a way of life.
R. M. Hare	BLIK — unfalsifiable governing perspective; non-cognitive orientation.
A. J. Ayer	Verification challenge — if not verifiable, possibly meaningless.
Antony Flew	Falsification challenge — if nothing counts against belief, is it meaningful?
Basil Mitchell	Religious belief remains meaningful through faith, commitment and the partisan view.

8. EXAM POINTERS / WHY THIS TOPIC MATTERS

- ★ Core topic in Philosophy of Religion.
- ★ Frequently linked with verification, falsification, analogy, symbol, myth and faith.
- ★ Helps compare cognitive and non-cognitive theories.
- ★ Important for UPSC Philosophy Optional answers.

9. MEMORY BOX / EXAM HOOKS

- COGNITIVE = TRUTH-CLAIM.
- NON-COGNITIVE = COMMITMENT / ATTITUDE.
- AQUINAS = ANALOGY.
- TILlich = SYMBOL.
- BRAITHWAITE = MORAL INTENTION.
- HARE = BLIK.
- FLEW = FALSIFICATION.

10. QUICK VISUAL MAP

COGNITIVE (Truth-claim) →

MEANING IN MANY WAYS →

CHALLENGES (Verification, Falsification) →

RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE

← ANALOGICAL (Aquinas)

← SYMBOLIC (Tillich)

← NON-COGNITIVE (Commitment / BLIK)

Religious language remains meaningful for believers in different ways — as truth-claim, analogy, symbol, or moral commitment.

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Cognitive and non-cognitive theories • Aquinas on analogy • Tillich on symbol • Hare's blik.



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
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