

Q8. (a) मुझे यह ज्ञान कैसे होता है कि मैं जानता हूँ? नैयायिकों, भट्ट मीमांसकों तथा प्रभाकरों के संदर्भ में इस प्रश्न का उत्तर दीजिए।

How do I know that I know? Answer this question with reference to the Naiyāyikas, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas and the Prābhākaras.

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(b) “एक अभ्यर्थी जिसे दिन के समय में कभी अध्ययन करते हुए नहीं देखा गया है, एक प्रतियोगी परीक्षा में उच्च स्थान प्राप्त कर लेता है।” भट्ट मीमांसक तथा नैयायिक इस अभ्यर्थी की सफलता की किस प्रकार व्याख्या करेंगे? विवेचना कीजिए।

“A candidate who is never seen to be studying during the day time secures a high position in a competitive exam.” How would the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsākas and the Naiyāyikas explain the success of this candidate? Discuss.

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(c) किन आधारों पर प्रभाकर तथा नैयायिक, स्मृति को प्रमाण के रूप में अस्वीकार करते हैं? विवेचना कीजिए।

On what grounds do the Prābhākaras and the Naiyāyikas reject memory as a source of knowledge? Discuss.

15

Prabhakara
Kumar

886 Prabhakara
M. K. S. 29/10/2020

Ans → To understand the validity of knowledge, one must first reveal the nature of valid knowledge as explained by Mimamsa philosophy.

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension (anubhava). All apprehension is direct, immediate and valid per se. A cognition which apprehends an object can't be intrinsically invalid.

Memory arises from impressions of prior cognition & therefore cannot be treated as valid knowledge.

Kumārila's gives a different account of nature of valid knowledge. According to him valid knowledge is apprehension of an object free from defects and which is not contradicted by subsequent knowledge.

Conditions of a valid cognition :-

- ① should not arise from defective cause (Kārandasārahita)
- ② It should not be set aside by subsequent knowledge (badhakajñanarahita)
- ③ Novelty is an essential feature of knowledge (agñitagrāhi) → Memory not valid
- ④ It must truly represent the object (yatheetha)

∴ The Mimāṃsikas uphold the theory of Svataḥpramāṇavāda or self validity or intrinsic validity of knowledge.

- ① All knowledge is valid from the very beginning
- ② Validity arises from the very causes from which knowledge arises.

it? ⑤ Validity is not due to any extraneous conditions
Prabhakara & Kumarila both uphold intrinsic validity
of knowledge.

Prabhakara says → All cognition is direct &
immediate and valid per se.

Kumarila → valid cognition is its apprehension
of an object free from defects
and not contradicted by subsequent
knowledge.

So what is invalidity of knowledge then?

Ans → Invalidity is the disagreement with
the real nature of object which is
either due to defect in the instrument
of knowledge or contradicted by later
knowledge. Invalidity is inferred by later
extraneous conditions [Prason Aparmanya]
⑥ A person suffering from jaundice sees
lunch as yellow

↓
defect in instrument of knowledge: vision
↓
Bite into
eye

⑦ A rope is mistaken for a snake,
the knowledge is invalidated by subsequent
knowledge of the rope //

Mimamsa support intrinsic validity of knowledge
both in its origin (upath) & ascertainment
(grah)

may - ad infinitum

Mīmāṃsaka - Naiyayika Debate

The debate b/w Nyaya and Mimamsa over validity of knowledge has become classic with both holding diametrically opposite view, atleast on the origin and ascertainment of validity of knowledge.

Nyaya advocate Extrinsic validity of knowledge i.e. Pratah Pramanyavada. According to it, knowledge is neither valid nor invalid in itself. It is neutral. The question of validity or invalidity arises only after knowledge has arisen.

The nature of knowledge is its Correspondence with the object and the test of truth is fruitful activity. Here Nyaya go beyond the limitations of ~~correspondence~~ correspondence theory.

The validity or invalidity is not intrinsically related with knowledge. Knowledge either simply as knowledge and becomes valid or invalid due to extraneous conditions. If knowledge leads to fruitful activity, it is valid, if it does not it leads to 'invalidity'

What are the extraneous conditions on which validity depends?

- (1) Excellence of (guna) in the causes of knowledge
- (2) Invalidity is due to defects (dosa) in the causes of knowledge.

Criticism of Nyaya's views by Mimamsakas →

- (i) Mimamsa agrees with Nyaya so far as extrinsic invalidity or pratah apramanyam is concerned because both regard it as due to extraneous conditions.

Nyaya's views on ^{However it criticizes the origin of valid knowledge or} validity of knowledge and supplements arguments against it:—

- (a) Nyaya's view that knowledge is neutral, neither valid nor invalid is absurd. ~~If knowledge is~~ because there can't be a third possibility to valid & invalid knowledge.

- (b) Excellence in the causes and freedom from defect (as given by Nyaya) are neither

extraneous has mere conditions not tests of the validity of knowledge →

why not extraneous →

- Excellence only means freedom from defect
- Fruitful activity means ~~non-contradiction~~ ~~from~~
subse absence from contradiction.
- Correspondence means conditions which give rise
- Correspondence means true representation of objects

These are the essential pre-requisites ~~for~~
~~valid~~ for valid knowledge and intrinsically
connected with the causes from which
knowledge is produced.

③ Nyaya theory of validity ends up in infinite regress →

If the validity of knowledge is due to external conditions like some excellence in the causes of knowledge or correspondence or fruitful activity, then this second knowledge of excellence would require a third knowledge extrinsic to it to validate itself & so regress ad infinitum.

∴ According to Mīmāṃsāka validity of knowledge is intrinsic and arises from the very causes from which knowledge has arisen.

whose theory is better?

Ans: Intrinsic validity of knowledge is presumably more logical because normal life runs smoothly on this belief. Truth is normal, error is abnormal. Belief is natural, disbelief is an exception.

validity of knowledge and knowledge of that validity are seen together.
The philosophical criticism of Nyayikas by Mimāṃsākas also seems logical ✓

Challenge to False Deme

Arthapatti

Q/ Can Arthapatti (postulation) / Implication be reduced to Anumana (Inference)? Discuss it from Mimamsa point of view

Q/ Arthapatti - comment

Q/ How are Arthapatti and Anupalabdhi independent sources of knowledge? Discuss this question in context of Nyaya & sources of knowledge

Ans → Prabhakara and Kumarila, both unlike the Naiyayika admit Arthapatti as a valid source of knowledge.

It is presumption or postulation or implication. It is assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two apparently inconsistent perceived facts.

E.g. If DevDutta is Alive & he is not in the house we presume that he is elsewhere

Here Being Alive is inconsistent with not being in the house.

Similarly DevDutta is fat if he does not eat in the day

This apparent inconsistency is removed by assuming the fact that he eats in the night

The Naiyayika reduces presumption to inference to which the Mīmāṃsaka disagrees and regard it as an independent source of knowledge.

Why not Inference -

Prabhakara holds that the element of doubt distinguishes presumption from inference. In presumption there must be an element of doubt regarding the truth of the two perceived facts, while in inference there is no such doubt.

Kumārila disagrees with Prabhakara on the view that element of doubt distinguishes Postulation from Inference. The basis is the mutual inconsistency of the two

perceived facts

The basis of inference is the middle term. However Kumārila & Prabhakara both agree in holding that in presumption there is no middle term at all which is the basis of inference.

Neither of the two perceived & apparently inconsistent fact can separately serve as a middle term. Taken together they appear to be middle term but then this combination also contains the conclusion, while a valid middle term should never contain the conclusion.

Naiyayika's response -

Naiyayika's point out that presumption is disjunctive reasoning which might be reduced to categorical form also.

If alive Devadatta is not at his house,
the fact of his being elsewhere is inferred
thus! —

Alive Devadatta is either in his house or elsewhere
Alive Devadatta is not in his house
Therefore Alive Devadatta is elsewhere

In Categorical syllogistic form it can be
expressed as

All alive persons ^{who are not in} are either in the house ^{or} elsewhere
Devadatta is an alive person who is not in house
∴ Devadatta is an alive person who is elsewhere

Conclusion: →?

Accepted by any other school →? —

The expression 'asthapati' is a combination
of two words namely 'artha' and 'apatti'. The
term artha would mean a fact and
apatti is supposition. This etymologically
speaking asthapati is that knowledge which
resolves the conflict b/w two facts

Postulation, according to Advaita proves falsity of the world - The scriptural statement "The knowledge of the self transcends sorrow" reveals falsity of the world by application of postulation

Why Brahman can't be known by postulation?
As in 2nd postulation, we presume something present elsewhere; there cannot be anything else to ascribe to Brahman by postulation.

Memory arises from impressions of prior cognition & therefore cannot be treated as valid knowledge.

680 Memory rejected
Keshav
28/2/2024
@Haisarabakshia

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Mimamsa support intrinsic validity of knowledge both in its origin (utpath) & ascertainment (grah)

What is knowledge?

Ans - knowledge is defined
as cognition (jñāna)

As knowledge or cognition
is defined as apprehension
(upalabdhi) or consciousness
(anubhava)

It is the manifestation
of object. Just as a
lamp reveals any
object presented to it,
similarly knowledge
reveals both subject &
object, both distinct
from each other - Realism

Different kinds of knowledge

→ knowledge is divided into anubhavo or presentative & smriti or memory i.e. representative

→ knowledge can be valid as well as invalid

→ valid knowledge is called Prama. Source of valid knowledge is called Pramana

→ Non-valid knowledge includes doubt, error

and Tarka.

Doubt is not certain knowledge. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to real object.

Tarka is also not valid knowledge because it is not real knowledge & only used as a proof. E.g. To prove smoke there is fire we can use Tarka but we have knowledge of fire based on inference.

Even Memory is not valid
because it is not presentative
but representative Cognition

Source of Valid knowledge
Nyaya accept 4 sources

① Perception →

- * Sphota's definition
- * Vishvanath's Modification
- * Ordinary vs Extraordinary
- * compare → Kant

② Inference →

- * Knowledge based on
previous knowledge
- * vyapti & lakshana
- * Constituents of Inference
Cognition, Hetu, Laksha

- * How Vyapti established
- * Type of Inference
- * Fallacy of Inference
- Hetvabhava.

- ② Upamanyu →
- * knowledge of relation
 - * Ganga
 - * Mīmāṃsā Debate
 - * Other Schools
Carvaka, Buddhist,
Vaisheshika, Jain

- ④ Śabda →
- * Statement of trustworthy person & understanding meaning of the words
 - * Logical Structure of Sentence




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
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