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CONSTRUCTIVE ACTIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMS TRADE TREATY AND OTHER RELATED INSTRUMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

DISCUSSION DOCUMENT PREPARED TO INFORM AND UPDATED AS A RESULT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR 'FACING THE CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: PREVENTING DIVERSION AND PROMOTING GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN LATIN AMERICA' IN FORTALEZA, BRAZIL

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A preliminary version of this discussion document was presented as a ‘Thought Paper’ at the International Seminar “Facing the Challenges in Implementing the Arms Trade Treaty: Preventing Diversion and Promoting Gender Integration in Latin America” organised by the Association for Public Policy (APP), together with representatives from Brazil, in Fortaleza, Brazil, which took place on 25, 26, and 27 June 2025. Representatives from the following countries attended the seminar and offered key perspectives and inputs: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay. As this document is intended to foster discussion at APP events, it should not be distributed beyond registered participants. Therefore, while it may be read and discussed during such events, it should not be cited. Based on the feedback received, the document will be revised and corrected where necessary, updated, and reviewed by an editor.

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PART 1: CONTEXT

1.1. ARMED VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The number of homicides in Latin America and the Caribbean, a region with only eight per cent of the world's population, accounts for almost a third of all homicides committed globally, according to the International Monetary Fund.^[1] This disproportionate relation illustrates the seriousness of the extent of violence in the region. Measured in another way, homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean are twice the global average, and up to ten times higher than in some countries in Europe and Asia, according to the New York University.^[2] Violence in the region, particularly armed violence, behaves like an epidemic, as it concentrates, transmits and spreads in a similar way to infectious diseases.^[3]

Most homicides in the region are committed with or are associated with firearms. For example, the Organization of American States (OAS) estimates that around 75 per cent of homicides in the Americas involve firearms.^[4] More than ten years ago, the Small Arms Survey estimated that firearms were involved in 60 per cent of homicides in South America, 61 per cent in the Caribbean, and 70 per cent in Central America, while the global average was 42 per cent.^[5] It is important to note that, unlike knives and blunt objects, firearms increase the lethality of violent events, thereby increasing the likelihood that tensions, fights, and violent encounters will become lethal encounters.^[6]

Armed violence has different impacts and risks depending on sex, gender, and age. While men and young people from disadvantaged communities tend to represent the majority of perpetrators and direct victims of armed^[7], this observation may conceal several other impacts and risks. For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, between 63 and 76 per cent of women report having suffered gender-based violence, according to data consolidated by ECLAC.^[8] This institution also estimates that, in the region, "at least 11 women are victims of femicide every day".^[9] Firearms play a role in these femicides, whether they are used to kill or as a means of coercion. In fact, small arms are involved in approximately one-third of femicides.^[10] It has also been documented that women face higher risks of lethal violence in domestic settings when firearms are present^[11] and, often, the perpetrators had already been reported and/or had a history of abuse.^[12] To address

[1] Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo Valdés "Breaking Latin America's Cycle of Low Growth and Violence", IMF Blog, 5 December 2024, <https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2024/12/05/breaking-latin-americas-cycle-of-low-growth-and-violence#:~:text=Violent%20crime%20and%20insecurity%20have,one%2Dthird%20of%20global%20homicides>

[2] Andrés Fernández Arauz & Camellie Ilie, *Cost of Violence Study: Costa Rica. A halving global violence report*, Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, December 2023, 6, <https://cic.nyu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Cost-of-Violence-Costa-Rica-2023.pdf>

[3] See, for example: Cure Violence Global, "Cure Violence Global — Stopping the Spread of Violence," n.d., <https://cvg.org/>

[4] Organization of American States (OAS), Programme of Assistance for Arms and Ammunition Control (PACAM), website: <https://www.oas.org/ext/es/seguridad/pacam>

[5] Small Arms Survey, "Chapter 1: A Fatal Relationship: Guns and Deaths in Latin America" en *Small Arms Survey 2012: Moving Targets* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 11, <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/Small-Arms-Survey-2012-Chapter-01-EN.pdf>

[6] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Global Study on Homicide 2023*, (2023) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf

[7] Amnesty International, "Violencia con armas de fuego", <https://www.amnesty.org/es/what-we-do/arms-control/gun-violence/>

[8] "Al menos 11 mujeres son víctimas de feminicidio cada día en América Latina y el Caribe," Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 22 November 2024, <https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/al-menos-11-mujeres-son-victimas-feminicidio-cada-dia-america-latina-caribe>

[9] "Al menos 11 mujeres son víctimas de feminicidio cada día en América Latina y el Caribe," Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 22 November 2024, <https://www.cepal.org/es/comunicados/al-menos-11-mujeres-son-victimas-feminicidio-cada-dia-america-latina-caribe>

[10] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and Control Arms, Fact Sheet: Gender and the Arms Trade Treaty, (UNIDIR and Control Arms, 2022), 1, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR_Gender_and_the_Arms_Trade_Treaty_Factsheet_2022.pdf

[11] IANSA Women's Network and the Centre for Women's Leadership, 'La Proliferación de las Armas Cortas y su Rol en la Violencia Doméstica', 1, <https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Domestic-Violence-Small-Arms-Spanish.pdf>

[12] IANSA Women's Network and the Centre for Women's Leadership, 'La Proliferación de las Armas Cortas y su Rol en la Violencia Doméstica', 1, <https://www.wilpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Domestic-Violence-Small-Arms-Spanish.pdf>

these realities, it is important to integrate a gender perspective into all arms control policies. It is also important to understand the different forms of violence as interrelated and to offer comprehensive solutions to address the transmission of violence, both in public spaces and in the 'shadows'.^[13]

The vast majority of firearms are produced in factories regulated by law. However, in some cases, at some point during their life cycle, they may be 'diverted' from the legal market to the illicit market.^[14] Once diverted, these firearms enter circles of illicit transfers and appropriations, which may include trafficking across borders.^[15] The impact of firearms diversion and trafficking affects multiple types of criminal activity. For example, the illicit proliferation of firearms and ammunition intensifies the destructive impact of organised criminal groups by fuelling armed clashes.^[16] In addition to homicides committed with firearms, these weapons can be used to intimidate and coerce. In other words, their impact is both lethal and multiple and reverberating.

Beyond the profound human cost of violence in the region, it also has economic costs. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that, in 2022, the costs of crime and violence will represent 3.44 per cent of Gross Domestic Product.^[17] In context, according to IDB estimates, the cost of crime in the region is approximately "twice the budget for social assistance programmes".^[18]

1.2. THE ARMS TRADE TREATY (ATT)

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force on 24 December 2014.^[19] This legally binding treaty regulates international trade in conventional arms.^[20] The purpose of the treaty is to contribute to peace and security, reduce human suffering, and promote cooperation and transparency among States Parties in the transfer of conventional arms, from small arms to warships.^[21]

The ATT highlights gender-based violence as a criterion for not authorising an international arms transfer.^[22] Indeed, Article 7(4) stipulates that the exporting State Party shall take into account the risk that the arms "being used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children."^[23] Article 7 (Export

[13] María-Noel Vaeza, "Violencia contra las mujeres: una pandemia en la sombra agravada por el COVID-19", UN Women, 26 March 2021, <https://lac.unwomen.org/es/noticias-y-eventos/articulos/2021/03/violencia-contra-las-mujeres-una-pandemia-en-la-sombra-agravada-por-el-covid-19>

[14] Alfredo Malaret Baldo et. al, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, *The Arms Trade Treaty Issue brief n° 3: Diversion Analysis Framework*, (UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, 2021), 5, <https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-issue-brief-3-diversion-analysis-framework/>

[15] For the purposes of this discussion document, diversion will be considered internal to a country, while illicit trafficking will be considered when firearms cross international borders in an unauthorised manner. For a more detailed discussion of diversion, see: Alfredo Malaret Baldo et.al, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, *The Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief 3: Diversion Analysis Framework*, (UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, 2021), 18, https://unidir.org/files/2021-08/ATT_Issue_Brief_3-Diversion_Analysis_Framework.pdf

[16] Guillermo Vázquez del Mercado, "Tráfico de Armas y Crimen Organizado. Comercio Mundial, Impactos Locales", Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, August 2022, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/SPA_GI-TOC-policy-brief_Arms-trafficking-web-1.pdf

[17] Inter-American Development Bank, "High Crime Costs Burden Latin America and the Caribbean", 11 November 2024, <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/high-crime-costs-burden-latin-america-and-caribbean>

[18] Inter-American Development Bank, "High Crime Costs Burden Latin America and the Caribbean", 11 November 2024, <https://www.iadb.org/en/news/high-crime-costs-burden-latin-america-and-caribbean>

[19] "The Arms Trade Treaty, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), n.d, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/att/>

[20] See Arms Trade Treaty: <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TratadosobreelComerciodeArmas/TratadosobreelComerciodeArmas.pdf?templateId=137280>

[21] See Arms Trade Treaty <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/TratadosobreelComerciodeArmas/TratadosobreelComerciodeArmas.pdf?templateId=137280>. Note: Article 2(1) addresses the 'Scope of Application' of the ATT, noting the eight categories of conventional arms.

[22] Brian Wood & Rasha Abdul-Rahim, "The Birth and the Heart of the Arms Trade Treaty," *Sur: International Journal on Human Rights* v. 12, no. 22 (2015): 19, https://sur.conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/01_SUR-22_ENGLISH_BRIAN-WOOD_RASHA-ABDUL-RAHIM.pdf

[23] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

and Export Assessment) together with Article 6 (which addresses Prohibitions) form what Amnesty International called the “Golden Rule” of the treaty.^[24] During the Fifth Conference of States Parties (CSP5), recommendations were adopted to strengthen the implementation of gender-based violence risk assessments.^[25]

Another objective of the ATT is to promote transparency. For example, Article 8(1) notes that the importing State Party “shall take measures to ensure that appropriate and relevant information is provided, upon request, pursuant to its national laws, to the exporting State Party, to assist the exporting State Party in conducting its national export assessment under Article 7. Such measures may include end use or end user documentation.”^[26] The same article, part 8(3), establishes that importing States may request information from another State Party regarding export authorisations that are pending or have already been granted, in which the former is listed as the final destination.^[27]

Actions against diversion represent another key aspect of the treaty, set out in Article 11. The article establishes that all States Parties involved in a transfer of conventional arms must take action to prevent diversion.^[28] According to this article, diversion shall be considered in risk assessments, mitigation measures must be taken, and States Parties must cooperate and exchange information to prevent it. Such is the relevance of this article that both the Fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4) and the Sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6) were focused on diversion as a central topic.^[29] During CSP6, the Diversion Information Exchange Forum (DIEF) was established.^[30] This forum is a space for the exchange of information in cases where a diversion of arms is documented. Meetings are confidential and only States Parties and Signatories may participate. The Tenth Conference of States Parties (CSP10) reviewed the usefulness of the forum and confirmed its importance and the validity of its design.^[31]

Another example of transparency and information sharing is Article 13(1), which requires States Parties to submit an initial report detailing measures taken to implement the ATT and to report on new measures, as applicable.^[32] Similarly, Article 13(3) requires States Parties to submit annual report “... for the preceding calendar year concerning authorized or actual exports and imports of conventional arms covered under Article 2 (1)”.^[33] In summary, among other important measures, the ATT promotes risk assessments prior to the authorisation of international transfers of conventional arms (including risks of gender-based violence), encourages transparency and information exchange between States Parties, and introduces measures to combat the diversion of conventional arms.

[24] Alberto Estévez, Balance de una década del tratado sobre el comercio de armas [‘Taking stock of a decade of the Arms Trade Treaty’], Amnesty International, 19 August 2024, <https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/blog/historia/articulo/balance-de-una-decada-del-tratado-sobre-el-comercio-de-armas/>

[25] Control Arms, Arms, *Monitoring progress on the Implementation of Gender and Gender-based Violence Considerations Adopted by the Fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty* (Control Arms, 2024), 1, <https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/ENG-Gender-Paper-Final-Abr-2024.pdf>

[26] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

[27] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

[28] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

[29] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[30] “Diversion Information Exchange Forum”, The Arms Trade Treaty, 2024, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/diversion-information-exchange-forum.html?templateId=1386528>

[31] “Diversion Information Exchange Forum”, The Arms Trade Treaty, 2024, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/diversion-information-exchange-forum.html?templateId=1386528>

[32] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

[33] See Arms Trade Treaty: https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253

It is important to note that, although the ATT covers eight categories of conventional arms, this discussion document will focus on firearms^[34] that can be used by a single person (also referred to, in some cases, as small arms). This is due to the destructive and cumulative impact that these firearms have in the region. In some cases, this discussion document will also refer to ammunition, always referring to ammunition of calibres corresponding to these small arms.

1.2.1. OTHER RELEVANT GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS

Among the global instruments for preventing illicit trafficking and diversion of arms, an important effort preceding the ATT is the 2001 *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* (PoA).^[35] This politically binding agreement seeks to improve laws on small arms and light weapons (SALW), stockpile management, and international cooperation, among other things. Another important effort is the *Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which complements the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime*.^[36] In addition, in 2005, the *International Tracing Instrument (ITI)* was also adopted, which promotes the marking of firearms, record keeping, and cooperation to facilitate tracing, and complements the PoA.^[37]

In 2023, the *Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management* was adopted^[38], presenting a set of political commitments to manage conventional ammunition throughout their life cycle. Through its 15 objectives, this framework seeks to reduce the risk of unexpected explosions and prevent the diversion, illicit trafficking and misuse of ammunition.^[39] This framework represents a milestone in the international sphere, as it is the first agreement to address conventional ammunition in a focused and exclusive manner.

[34] The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime defines a firearm in Article 3 as: "[...] any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. See: United Nations, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 3. https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/18-12_c_S.pdf

[35] "Programme of Action on small arms and its international Tracing Instrument, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), s/f, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/salw/programme-of-action/>

[36] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Firearms Protocol and the Arms Trade Treaty: Divergence or Complementarity? (UNODC, 2016), 3, <https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/SynergiesPaper.pdf>

[37] "Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument," United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), n.d., <https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/salw/programme-of-action/>

[38] United Nations, Open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management, Annex A/78/111, 2023, *Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management*, p.9, <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/111> ;

See also: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management*, (UNODA, 2023), <https://disarmament.unoda.org/global-framework-for-through-life-conventional-ammunition-management/>

[39] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), *Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management*, (UNODA, 2023), <https://disarmament.unoda.org/global-framework-for-through-life-conventional-ammunition-management/>

1.3. REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL EFFORTS

Before the ATT, the Americas were moving forward to establish regional controls and regulations on the manufacture and illicit trafficking of firearms. In 1997, under the Organization of American States (OAS), the *Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials* (CIFTA) was adopted.^[40] CIFTA is a legally binding agreement between countries in the Americas to address illicit trafficking in firearms, among other things. Of the 34 OAS Member States, 31 have ratified the Convention.^[41] To facilitate implementation of the Convention, the OAS offers model regulations, for example, *Model Regulations for the Control of International Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition*.^[42]

In addition to these agreements, efforts with more operational focus have also been made at the subregional level to combat illicit firearms trafficking. For example, since 1996, there has been a Tripartite Command in the Triple Frontier area, made up of the police forces of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, fighting, in part, against arms trafficking.^[43] Mercosur also created the *Working Group on Firearms and Ammunition* (GTAM) to promote the exchange of information on the illicit manufacture and trafficking of firearms and ammunition and to coordinate policies, meeting periodically.^[44]

In Central America, the Central American Integration System (SICA) has promoted efforts to build peace and security.^[45] For example, in 2022, the Central American Security Commission (CSC) of SICA approved a Strategic Framework for the Prevention of Violence (MEPV), seeking solutions to the challenges of violence and ways to address risk factors.^[46] In the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS) seeks to support states in the region by addressing the causes of crime and insecurity. This agenda includes projects such as a regional integrated ballistic information network and a digital platform with information on ships and cargo to strengthen border control systems.^[47]

In addition to the technical assistance it provides to states in the region, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) is, along with CARICOM IMPACS, co-custodian of a *“Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030”*.^[48] This roadmap presents

[40] Organization of American States (OAS), “Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)”, <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/cifta>. See also: Organization of American States (OAS), “Modificación al reglamento modelo referente al control de intermediarios de armas de fuego, sus partes, componentes y municiones”, (2006) <https://inecip.org/wp-content/uploads/Reglamento-Modelo-OEA-Cicad-Intermediarios-Armas.pdf>

[41] Organization of American States (OAS), “Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (CIFTA)”, <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/cifta>

[42] Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), Organization of American States (OAS), *Model Regulations for the Control of International Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition*, adopted in November 1997, https://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/cicad_traf_inter_sp.pdf

[43] Duarte Céspedes, L., & S. Martínez Fariña. ‘Labor del comando tripartito en la Triple Frontera.’ SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL UNE 5, number. 1 (2022): 41-55, http://revistas.une.edu.py/index.php/revista_une/article/view/163/87

[44] “Reunión del Grupo de Trabajo sobre Armas de Fuego y Municiones del MERCOSUR”, MERCOSUR, 27 November 2015, <https://www.mercosur.int/reunion-del-grupo-de-trabajo-sobre-armas-de-fuego-y-municiones-del-mercotur/>

[45] See, for example: Central American Integration System (SICA), website: <https://www.sica.int/iniciativas/inicio#SeguridadDemocratica>

[46] General Secretariat of the Central American Integration System, “En Cumbre de Presidentes SICA adoptan instrumento regional para la Prevención de la Violencia en la región,” 9 December 2022, https://www.sica.int/noticias/en-cumbre-de-presidentes-sica-adoptan-instrumento-regional-para-la-prevencion-de-la-violencia-en-la-region_1_131320.html

[47] The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), website: <https://www.caricomimpacs.org/about>

[48] United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) and Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), “Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030”, UNLIREC and CARICOM IMPACS, 2023, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/caribbean-firearms-roadmap/>

30 priority commitments to combat illicit firearms trafficking in the region.^[49] Similarly, in 2025, Central American States and the Dominican Republic adopted the “Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, supported by UNLIREC and the OAS, with a ten-year implementation period.^[50] This roadmap for Central America and the Dominican Republic has four fundamental pillars for preventing and combating the illicit trafficking and proliferation of firearms.^[51] The two roadmaps also include objectives, actions, and indicators.^[52]

At present, the OAS is also moving forward with the design of a Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA). This mechanism seeks to improve regional coordination during the transfer of arms and ammunition in order to reduce the risks of trafficking and diversion.^[53] To this end, the MCTA will provide a channel for communication between authorities that issue export, import, and transit licences, among other stakeholders.^[54] The system will facilitate the monitoring of transfers, display live statistics, and issue alerts when necessary.^[55]

While the various instruments, including the ATT, Firearms Protocol, CIFTA, PoA/ITI, and Global Framework on Ammunition, can be considered and applied independently, an approach that considers them complementary and synergistic can result in more robust national frameworks for the control of conventional arms (and/or SALW), their parts and components, and ammunition. This is because, taken together, they offer provisions to address challenges throughout the entire life cycle of these arms, their parts and components, and ammunition. In addition to the instruments, various efforts in the region, such as roadmaps, coordination and communication mechanisms, practical support in the implementation of agreements, and joint agendas, provide an important ecosystem for preventing diversion, combating illicit trafficking, and eliminating gender-based violence with firearms.

[49] United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) and Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), “Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030”, UNLIREC and CARICOM IMPACS, 2023, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/caribbean-firearms-roadmap/>

[50] Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), “Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

[51] Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), “Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

[52] United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) and Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), “Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030”, UNLIREC and CARICOM IMPACS, 2023, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/caribbean-firearms-roadmap/>

Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), “Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

[53] “Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)”, Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/mcta>

[54] “Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)”, Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/mcta>

[55] “Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)”, Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/mcta>

1.4. PROJECT'S OBJECTIVE

In this context, and considering various global and regional instruments, the Association for Public Policy (APP), as the implementing organization and within the framework of an initiative promoted by Senator Augusta Brito of Brazil, is carrying out a project to identify national and regional progress in the prevention of diversion, illicit trafficking, and gender-based violence involving firearms, in line with the ATT and other related instruments, in some Latin American countries. This project is financed with funds from the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) of the ATT Secretariat, allocated to Brazil as a beneficiary country.

The immediate objective of this discussion document is to present an overview of the region with the progress made in relation to the implementation of the ATT and other related instruments, generate debate based on this overview, and identify areas that warrant further study. The long-term purpose of this discussion document is to contribute to efforts to strengthen, where necessary and appropriate, measures to prevent diversion, illicit trafficking, and gender-based violence committed with firearms at the regional level, as well as to continue promoting the implementation of the ATT.

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THIS DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

This document is divided into five parts. The first part has provided a general context on the impact of armed violence and illicit arms proliferation, as well as some relevant instruments. The second part presents an overview of progress in national control systems. The third part breaks down general good practices on the prevention of diversion, illicit trafficking, and interventions to prevent gender-based violence committed with firearms. The fourth part presents conclusions and points for achieving a safer region. Finally, the fifth part offers discussion questions to stimulate dialogue on this document and the issues it addresses.

WORKING DOCUMENT

PART 2: MAPPING PROGRESS IN NATIONAL CONTROL SYSTEMS

2.1. METHODOLOGY

This working document is designed as a discussion document, with an illustrative, non-exhaustive analysis of the status of a sample of Latin American countries in terms of key elements of SALW control, such as national control systems. The information in this document was gathered from two main sources. The first source is an online mapping of progress reported by the countries in the sample, starting with the Initial Reports to the ATT. Official reports to the PoA, the database of legal frameworks available on the SHERLOC portal of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)^[56], reports from official websites and press releases were also consulted. As secondary sources, it has been considered publications and analyses by academics, experts, expert organizations, and UN agencies that research issues related to the ATT and arms control, offering practical guidance, interpretations, and perspectives on the subject. The second source was semi-structured interviews (and written surveys when preferred) with national representatives involved in the arms control policy-making process and experts from the region. This information was then shared and supplemented during the International Seminar in Fortaleza. It should be noted that this section and the document cannot, under any circumstances, be interpreted as a legal or exhaustive analysis. This document only provides a general description of constructive actions in the implementation of the ATT and other relevant instruments in the region, in order to provide a basis for discussion.

2.2. SAMPLE

In order to conduct a representative analysis of Latin America, this document adopts a regional perspective and case studies and is based on a sample of ten countries. These ten countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay. The selected countries differ in terms of institutional, political, and socioeconomic contexts, as well as in the types and rates of violence, providing a heterogeneous basis for an informative analysis of the region. Ratification of the ATT constitutes the common inclusion criterion. The interviews were conducted between February and May 2025. Representatives from the OAS, Argentina, Brazil (independent expert), Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay were interviewed.

2.3. INITIAL REPORTS TO THE ATT

As stated in Article 13(1) of the ATT, States Parties must submit an Initial Report to the ATT Secretariat. The Treaty requires States Parties to report on the measures taken to fulfil their commitments, such as national laws and control lists, and, where applicable, to report on updates. According to the Stimson Center, these reports offer several benefits, for example: they indicate how States Parties interpret their obligations, provide an opportunity to assess and improve national systems, identify good practices, facilitate the identification of needs that can be met with international assistance, and promote transparency.^[57] Recognising the many benefits offered by these reports, it is important to note that, as a limitation of the methodology, the information contained therein may be out of date. Of the 10 countries in the sample, only Colombia has not submitted its initial

[56] See: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), SHERLOC: Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime, <https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/en/st/home.html>

[57] Rachel Stohl, Ryan Fletcher, & Shannon Dick, "Taking Stock of ATT Initial Reports (2022)", Stimson Center, 2022, <https://www.stimson.org/2022/taking-stock-of-att-initial-reports/>

report, as it is not yet required to do so due to its recent ratification of the Treaty. Of the remaining nine countries, Chile submitted its report privately.^[58]

2.4. ILLUSTRATIVE PROFILES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE SAMPLE, INCLUDING SOME KEY NATIONAL REGULATIONS AND PROCESSES

The following section provides information on regulations and processes relevant to the control systems available in initial ATT reports, PoA reports, interviews, input from interviewees and participants, and media reports. The focus is on transfer control systems and arms control systems once arms have been transferred or assigned, which is why both reports (ATT and PoA) and efforts derived from both instruments are cited, understanding them as complementary. The intention is illustrative, not exhaustive. It is important to clarify that this section is a sample, as a comparative and exhaustive analysis of regulations and processes exceeds the scope of this discussion document. Furthermore, these profiles cannot, under any circumstances, be interpreted as a legal analysis. This sample only seeks to provide an overview of different processes and efforts in the region and to identify some positive practices. The inclusion of an effort in one country does not mean that others do not do so. Furthermore, if an effort does not appear in a country's profile, this does not mean that the country does not consider or apply that measure. As a limitation to the methodology, this document relies heavily on initial reports to the ATT, and the information may be out of date, as may the institutions mentioned. This methodological limitation also highlights the importance of keeping reports and records up to date. To help complete or correct each country's profile, this document offers a digital feedback mechanism (access on the back cover).

[58] Own mapping based on reports available on the ATT Secretariat website, see: <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/initial-reports.html?templateId=209839>

ARGENTINA

Sample of the regulatory framework:

- 1973 – National Weapons and Explosives Law (Law No. 20.429)^[59]
- 2004 – National Registry of Firearms and Controlled, Seized or Confiscated Materials (Law No. 25.938)^[60]
- 2014 – Law approving the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 26.971)^[61]
- 2015 – Law establishing the National Agency for Controlled Materials (ANMaC) (Law No. 27.192)^[62]
- 2022 – ANMaC Institutional Strategic Plan^[63]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: ANMaC, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship^[64], Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, among other participating entities. Note: as of July 2025, ANMaC will once again become the National Arms Registry (RENAR).^[65]

Sample of procedures: Argentina has a national control system that includes a national control list covering the eight categories of conventional arms set out in the ATT, including ammunition and parts and components. With regard to exports, Argentina follows a system of licensing, prohibition guidelines, and risk assessment procedures. It is important to note that the risk assessment procedure includes the criteria described in Articles 7(1)(a) and (b), as well as Article 7(4).^[66] To prevent diversion, the country provides end-use and end-user documents to the exporting country and requires end-use and end-user guarantees from the importing country, among other measures.^[67] Argentina also emphasised that *"the procedure for implementing the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty stipulates that the final step is to inform the country of destination about the exported material. This procedure includes ammunition (Article 3 of the Treaty)."*^[68] This final step of informing the destination country was highlighted in various interviews as a positive practice.^[69] In the case of imports, risk analysis and diversion prevention measures maintain a multi-stage control system, from document review to physical inspections.^[70] In fact, in its Initial Report to the ATT, Argentina stated that *"In the case of small arms and light weapons, the following measures are required: prior authorisation for importation before shipment in the country of origin; registration of the importing company; registration of the material; verification of importation by means of the corresponding documentation..."*^[71]

[59] Argentina, National Weapons and Explosives Law, No. 20429, of 5 May 1973 <https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/19953/norma.htm>

[60] Argentina, Law 25.938, National Registry of Firearms and Controlled, Seized or Confiscated Materials, 22 September 2004, <https://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/95000-99999/99933/norma.htm>.

[61] Argentina, Law No. 26.971, Arms Trade Treaty, Date of enactment: 27 August 2014, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/ley-26971-235354#:~:text=Ley%2026971/2014%20%7C%20Argentina.gob.ar>

[62] Argentina, Law 27.192, National Agency for Controlled Materials, 7 October 2015, <https://www.argentina.gob.ar/normativa/nacional/Ley-27192-253684>

[63] ANMaC, Institutional Strategic Plan 2023-2025, https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/plan_estrategico_institucional_2023-2025.pdf

[64] Control Arms, *Workshop report on increasing effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty through practical understanding of gender-based violence and violence against children criteria*, (Control Arms, 2024), 1, <https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/GBV-Regional-Workshop-Summary.pdf>

[65] Por decreto. El Gobierno apela a la "Ley Bases" para eliminar la ANMaC y reinstaurar el Registro Nacional de Armas", La Nación, 1 de julio de 2025, <https://www.lanacion.com.ar/seguridad/por-decreto-el-gobierno-apela-a-la-ley-bases-para-eliminar-la-anmac-y-reinstaurar-el-registro-nid01072025/>

[66] Argentina, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/589e3d90-00b8-3f34-ad09-00fb8f05a509>

[67] Argentina, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/589e3d90-00b8-3f34-ad09-00fb8f05a509>

[68] Argentina, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 2015), 20, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/589e3d90-00b8-3f34-ad09-00fb8f05a509> (own translation)

[69] Various national representatives, in discussions with the authors through an interview, between April and May 2025.

[70] National representatives, in discussion with the authors through an interview, April 2025.

[71] Argentina, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 2015), 7, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/589e3d90-00b8-3f34-ad09-00fb8f05a509> (own translation)

BRAZIL

Sample of the regulatory framework:

- 1997 – Creation of the National Weapons System^[72]
- 2003 – Disarmament Statute (Law No. 10.826)^[73]
- 2018 - Decree No. 9.607/2018^[74]
- 2019 – Decree No. 10.030/2019^[75]
- 2022 - Enactment of the Arms Trade Treaty (Decree No. 11.173)^[76]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: Ministry of Defence, in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^[77]

Sample of procedures: Brazil has a national control system that includes a national list covering exports, imports, ammunition, and parts/components. Prior to the approval of a transfer, there is a risk assessment procedure that includes the criteria described in Articles 7(1)(a) and (b), as well as Article 7(4).^[78] Brazil has measures in place to prevent diversion and requires documentation on end users to mitigate risks.^[79] End-user certificates must include detailed information and characteristics of the SALW, country of final destination, end-user information, and original signature. Brazil requires details of other parties involved in the transaction and has mechanisms in place to verify the authenticity of the end-user certificate from the importing state.^[80] Brazil marks all firearms for federal agencies with the seal of the Federal Republic and the name or initials of the organization, as well as the name of the manufacturer, country of manufacture, and serial number.^[81] Additionally, regarding SALW marking, in the PoA Report, Brazil notes that *“markings can be done in Brazil by an authorised company, as long as the importer previously requests and justifies this request to the Logistics Department of the Ministry of Defence”*.^[82] And TAURUS, *“Brazil’s main SALW producer, installs, upon request, a chip in the firearm’s frame that allows for the retrieval of essential data.”*^[83] Similarly, Brazil introduced the possibility for domestic manufacturers to mark ammunition manufactured and allocated to security forces.^[84]

[72] “Desarmar la violencia”, Christina Queiroz, Revista Pesquisa FAPESP, July 2019, <https://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/es/desarmando-la-violencia/>

[73] Brazil, Law No. 10.826, 22 December 2003, <https://www.gov.br/mj/pt-br/acao-a-informacao/atuacao-internacional/legislacao-traduzida/lei-n-10-826-de-22-de-dezembro-de-2003-esp-docx.pdf> Referenced in: Independent expert, through email correspondence with the authors, April 2022.

[74] Brazil, Decree No. 9.607, 12 December 2018, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2018/decreto/D9607.htm

[75] Brazil, Decree No. 10.030, 30 September 2019, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2019/Decreto/d10030.htm Referenced in: independent expert, through email correspondence with the authors, April 2025.

[76] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRESS RELEASE No. 135, Promulgation of the Arms Trade Treaty, 16 August 2022, https://www.gov.br/mre/es/canales_servicio/prensa/notas-a-la-prensa/promulgacion-del-tratado-de-comercio-de-armas

[77] Independent expert, in discussion with the authors through an in-depth interview, April 2025.

[78] Brazil, *Initial Report on the Measures Undertaken to Implement the Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 2023), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/4ac4fe69-34cd-30e9-ab0d-4a975e0f1b02>

[79] Brazil, *Initial Report on the Measures Undertaken to Implement the Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13(1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 2023), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/4ac4fe69-34cd-30e9-ab0d-4a975e0f1b02>

[80] Brazil, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs (2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/BRA-English-769-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[81] Brazil, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs (2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/BRA-English-769-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[82] Brazil, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs (2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/BRA-English-769-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[83] Brazil, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs (2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/BRA-English-769-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[84] Independent expert, in discussion with the authors during an interview, April 2025.

CHILE

Sample of the legal framework:

- 1972 – Law Establishing Arms Control (Law No. 17.798)^[85]
- 2005 – Law Amending Law No. 17,798 on Arms Control (Law No. 20.014)^[86]
- 2015 – Law Amending Law No. 17,798 on Arms Control and Other Related Laws (Law No. 20.813)^[87]
- 2019 – Decree Promulgating the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty (Decree No. 144)^[88]
- 2022 – Law Amending Various Legal Bodies to Strengthen Gun Control (Law No. 21.412)^[89]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: The Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Unit (DISIN-NPCA), which reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other institutions include the Coordination Board on Illicit Arms Trafficking, the Ministry of Defence Advisory Commission on Exports of Military Equipment, and the Interministerial Committee for Compliance with and Implementation of United Nations Council Resolutions, among others.^[90]

Sample of procedures: The risk assessment criteria for exports include: *"verifying that the country to which the export is destined is not subject to restrictions or prohibitions on such activity. In the case of small arms and light weapons considered to be military equipment, a meeting of the Advisory Commission on Arms Exports of the Ministry of National Defence is held to analyse the background in light of Article 7 of the ATT"*.^[91] In Chile, it is also important to note that end-user certificates are verified (to prevent counterfeiting) with QR codes.^[92] In the case of imports, the Research and Control Institute (Banco de Prueba de Chile) marks SALW with the country of manufacture.^[93] In addition, the Chilean Test Fire Registry (Banco de Prueba de Chile) is working on a *"project to implement the IBIS ballistics fingerprinting system"*^[94] for manufacturers to keep detailed records. A systematic ballistic fingerprint registry can facilitate tracing, which could be highlighted as a positive practice. Likewise, revolvers and pistols should be marked *"on the mechanism box, trigger guard and barrel chamber"*^[95], thus maintaining a comprehensive marking policy.

[85] Chile, Law 17.798 establishing gun control, 21 October 1972, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=29291>

[86] José Antonio Rojas Acuña, "Historia de las modificaciones a la Ley sobre control de armas hasta el año 2015" (Bachelor's thesis, University of Chile, 2017), 35. <https://repositorio.uchile.cl/bitstream/handle/2250/144442/Historia-de-las-modificaciones-a-la-ley-de-control-de-armas-hasta-el-a%C3%B1o-2015.pdf?sequence=1>

[87] Ibid, p.150.

[88] Chile, Decree No. 144, Promulgates the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty, 23 May 2018, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1127320>

[89] Chile, Law 21.412 amending various legal texts to strengthen gun control, 25 January 2022, <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1171705>

[90] "Unidad de No Proliferación y Control de Armas", Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, website updated on 4 October 2024, <https://www.minrel.gob.cl/ministerio/direcciones/direccion-de-seguridad-internacional-y-humana/unidad-de-no-proliferacion-y-control-de-armas#:~:text=Unidad%20de%20No%20Proliferaci%C3%B3n%20y%20Control%20de%20Armas%20%2D%20Minrel>. Note: This unit appears to have been discontinued in 2025.

[91] Chile, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 10, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CHL-Spanish-1452-SUBMITTED.pdf> (own translation)

[92] Chile, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 6, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CHL-Spanish-1452-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[93] Chile, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 6, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CHL-Spanish-1452-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[94] Chile, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CHL-Spanish-1452-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[95] Chile, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024),6, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CHL-Spanish-1452-SUBMITTED.pdf> (own translation)

COLOMBIA

Sample of the legal framework:

- 1991 – 1991 Constitution (Article 223)^[96]
- 1993 – Presidential Decree No. 2535/1993^[97]
- 2015 - Single Regulatory Decree for the Administrative Sector of Defence (Decree No. 1070/2015)^[98]
- 2022 – Presidential Decree No. 1563/2022^[99]
- 2023 - Law No. 2,289 approving the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 2.289).^[100]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: The Colombian Military Industry (INDUMIL).^[101] Colombia also established a National Coordination Committee for the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.^[102]

Sample of procedures: Colombia requires individuals or entities transferring SALW to obtain a licence or other form of authorisation to complete international transfers.^[103] In the case of exports, INDUMIL requires an end-use certificate that must include the contract number or order reference and date, as well as the country of final destination and a description of the end use and end user of the SALW, among other information.^[104] On the other hand, to obtain an import permit in Colombia, a letter must be submitted to INDUMIL, signed by the legal representative, with the following information: *"type and quantity (in volume) of the material to be imported, the port of shipment and arrival in the country, the final destination (storage location) ... name of the consignee, name of the exporting company, the use to which the material will be put ... description of the material."*^[105] Colombia marks SALW at the time of manufacture and notes that, "apart from the manufacturer's logos and trademarks, official entities sometimes request that the name of the entity that will use the weapon be engraved on it. For example, pistols purchased by the police bear the inscription *"Policía Nacional"* (National Police)."^[106] This factory marking policy helps prevent diversion and facilitates record keeping.

[96] Colombia, Political Constitution of Colombia 1991, art. 223 <https://pdpa.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Colombia/colombia91.pdf>

[97] Colombia, Decree Law 2.535 of 1993, art. 1, 17 December 1993. <https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=1540>.

[98] Colombia, Civil Service, Decree 1070 of 2015 Defence Administrative Sector, 26 May 2015. Title 4 <https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=76837>

[99] Colombia, Decree 1.563 of 2022 National Level, 5 August 2022. <https://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=126719>

[100] Colombia, Law 2.289, Law approving the 'Arms Trade Treaty,' adopted in New York on 2 April 2013, Year CLVIII No. 52.307 Bogotá, D.C., Monday, 13 February 2023, Page 9 <https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Leyes/30045235>

[101] Colombian Military Industry (Indumil), *Guide Authorisation of Import Permits and/or Permits for Acquisition or Transfer to Individuals*, (Colombia: Colombian Military Industry, 31 October 2019), <https://www.indumil.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Anexo-5.-GU%C3%8DA-AUTORIZACI%C3%93N-PERMISOS-A-PARTICULARES.pdf>

[102] Colombia, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/COL-Spanish-1440-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[103] Colombia, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/COL-Spanish-1440-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[104] Colombia, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/COL-Spanish-1440-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[105] Colombian Military Industry (Indumil), *Guía Autorización Permisos de Importación y/o Permiso de Adquisición o Traspaso a Particulares*, (Colombia: Colombian Military Industry, 31 October 2019), <https://www.indumil.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Anexo-5.-GU%C3%8DA-AUTORIZACI%C3%93N-PERMISOS-A-PARTICULARES.pdf> and *Guide to authorisation of import and export permits and samples with no commercial value*, (18 May 2022, Magazine number. 11), <https://www.indumil.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/ANEXO-3.3.-GU%C3%8DA-AUTORIZACI%C3%93N-PERMISOS-A-PARTICULARES-IF-001.pdf> (own translation)

[106] Colombia, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 6, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/COL-Spanish-1440-SUBMITTED.pdf> (own translation)

COSTA RICA

Sample of the legal framework:

- 1995 – Arms and Explosives Law (Law No. 7.530)^[107]
- 2013 – Approval of the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 9.164)^[108]
- 2018 - Establishment of the National Control System and creation of its Governing Body for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (Decree No. 41084-RE-MP-MSP)^[109]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: The Governing Body of the National Control System for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, which reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship.^[110] The Ministry of Public Security, through the General Directorate of Armament, also plays a role.^[111]

Sample of procedures: Costa Rica has a national control system and national control list covering the eight categories of conventional arms in the ATT, including their ammunition. Costa Rica's control system regulates imports of SALW, but not exports, as it is not an exporter of arms or ammunition (except in special non-commercial situations).^[112] The country stated that the control system seeks to prevent the diversion of SALW by conducting risk analyses, including during transit activities, and has measures in place to be taken when a diversion is detected.^[113] Costa Rica requires that SALW be marked at the time of importation by the supplier in the country of origin. The marking must include the country of importation, year, series, model, brand, and calibre.^[114]

It is important to note that Costa Rica participates in the “*Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives*”, with the support of UNLIREC and the OAS.^[115]

[107] Costa Rica, Law No. 7530 on Weapons and Explosives, 10 July 1995,

https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Costa_Rica/CR_Ley_7530_de_1995.pdf

[108] Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Costa Rica, Law No. 9.164, Arms Trade Treaty, published in La Gaceta No. 180 of 19 September 2013.,

https://www.imprentanacional.go.cr/pub/2013/09/19/COMP_19_09_2013.html

[109] Costa Rica, Establishment of the National Control System and creation of its Governing Body for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty, Decree No. 41084-RE-MP-MSP, (Costa Rican Legal Information System, 2018)

http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTEC&nValor1=1&nValor2=86461&nValor3=112188&strTipM=TC

[110] Ibid

[111] Costa Rica, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 24 de Agosto 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/80a3f246-fb62-3a95-85a0-14dbaa0a0896>

[112] Costa Rica, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 24 de Agosto 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/80a3f246-fb62-3a95-85a0-14dbaa0a0896>

[113] Costa Rica, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 24 de Agosto 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/80a3f246-fb62-3a95-85a0-14dbaa0a0896>

[114] Costa Rica, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, Junio de 2025), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/CRI-Spanish-1311-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[115] Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), “*Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives*”, OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

MEXICO

Sample of the legal framework:

- 1972 – Federal Firearms and Explosives Law^[116]
- 2004 – Draft Decree amending and adding various provisions to the Federal Firearms and Explosives Act^[117]
- 2013 – Decree Promulgating the Arms Trade Treaty^[118]
- Mayo de 2025 – Ruling that reforms various provisions of the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law^[119]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: The Secretariat of National Defence (SEDENA) carries out the licensing and transfer authorisation process. The Secretariat of Foreign Affairs accompanies the implementation of the treaty and supports risk analysis with, for example, gender approaches.

Sample of procedures: Mexico has a national control system and national control list covering the eight categories of conventional arms in the ATT, including their ammunition, parts and components. The national control system includes a licensing system for arms exports, guidelines for prohibitions, and a risk assessment procedure. The risk assessment procedure includes all the criteria described in Articles 7(1)(a) and (b), as well as Article 7(4).^[120] It is important to highlight at this point that Mexico has been one of the regional and international leaders in efforts to integrate a gender perspective into risk assessments.^[121] To prevent diversion, Mexico provides end-use and end-user documents to the exporting country and requires end-use and end-user guarantees from the importing country. It is also important to note that Mexico exchanges relevant information with other States Parties on measures to address diversion, as well as on illicit activities and actors.^[122] With regard to the marking of imported SALW, the manufacturing company and the Secretary of National Defence are responsible for marking them and must include: country of import, year of import, place of import, model, registration number and calibre. If the SALW do not have a unique marking at the time of delivery, Mexico notes in its 2024 PoA report that *"they are returned to the manufacturer for prompt marking by their own means."*^[123] This rigorous policy of requiring unique markings at the time of delivery can be highlighted as a good practice.

[116] Mexico, Federal Firearms and Explosives Law, 11 January 1972, <https://www.gob.mx/semar/documentos/ley-federal-de-armas-de-fuego-y-explosivos>

[117] Mexico, Draft Decree Reforming and Adding Various Provisions to the Federal Firearms and Explosives Law, 27 April 2004, https://sil.gobernacion.gob.mx/Archivos/Documentos/2004/04/asun_988388_20040429_1001286.pdf

[118] Mexico, Executive Branch, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Decree Promulgating the Arms Trade Treaty (Official Gazette of Mexico), 23 December 2014, <https://www.ordenjuridico.gob.mx/TratInt/Tratados2014/M5.pdf>

"México se convierte en el primer país latinoamericano en ratificar el Tratado sobre Comercio de Armas", Amnesty International, 19 September 2013, <https://www.es.amnesty.org/en-que-estamos/noticias/noticia/articulo/mexico-se-convierte-en-el-primer-pais-latinoamericano-en-ratificar-el-tratado-sobre-comercio-de-arma/#:~:text=19%20de%20septiembre%20de%202013.%20Tras%20la,vida%20de%20las%20personas%20por%20encima%20de>

[119] Chamber of Deputies, 'Publica DOF reformas que endurecen sanciones por uso ilegal de armas de fuego,' Note No. 2063, 29 May 2025, <https://comunicacionsocial.diputados.gob.mx/index.php/notilegis/publica-dof-reformas-que-endurecen-sanciones-por-uso-ilegal-de-armas-de-fuego>
[120] Mexico, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August del 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/a1c6c12a-d55e-358b-a1f3-25ef2ff20d8c>

[121] Various national representatives, in discussions with the authors through interviews, between April and May 2025.

[122] Mexico, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Sweden: The Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/a1c6c12a-d55e-358b-a1f3-25ef2ff20d8c>

[123] Mexico, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 11, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/MEX-Spanish-1387-SUBMITTED.pdf> (own translation)

PANAMA

Sample of the legal framework:

- 2011 – General Firearms Law (Law No. 57)^[124]
- 2013 – Law approving the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 95)^[125]
- 2021 – Resolution No. 21 of the Attorney General's Office^[126]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: Institutional Directorate for Public Security Affairs (DIASP) of the Ministry of Public Security.^[127]

Sample of procedures: Panama has a control system in place. In its initial ATT report, Panama indicated that, in 2015, it was “*working on perfecting the national control system, which will include the control list.*”^[128] Regarding transit and transshipment, Panama noted the following in the Initial Report of the ATT: “*The DIASP regulates the transit of conventional arms through the Certification of Goods in Transit procedure, as a measure adopted to comply with the instruments ratified by the Republic of Panama, and communicates with the institutions involved in control. The National Customs Authority, the ACP, and the Panama Maritime Authority regulate transit through their laws and regulations.*”^[129] Attention to traffic regulation during SALW transfers is a fundamental issue for the region. In the 2018 PoA report, Panama notes that it does not export arms. Regarding end-user certificates for imports, in cases where these are possible, the documents must be processed and approved only by the Ministry of Public Security DIASP.^[130] In the report, Panama details efforts to manage stocks, such as appropriate storage locations, physical security measures, control of access to stocks, inventory management and accounting control, staff training, and procedures and penalties in the event of theft or loss, among other practices aligned with the implementation of the PoA.^[131]

It is important to note that Panama participates in the “*Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives*”, with the support of UNLIREC and the OAS.^[132]

[124] Panama, Law No. 57, General Law on Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials, 27 May 2011, <https://www.minseg.gob.pa/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/LEY-57.pdf>

[125] Official Gazette, *Asamblea Nacional Ley N 95 por la cual se aprueba el Tratado Sobre el Comercio de Armas, Hecho en New York, el 2 de abril de 2013*, 14 November 2013, https://www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/pdfTemp/27414_A/GacetaNo_27414a_20131114.pdf

[126] Panama, Resolution No. 21, Regulations for the Control and Use of Firearms, Ammunition, and Related Items by Protection Personnel of the Office of the Attorney General, 19 August 2021, <https://www.gacetaoficial.gob.pa/pdfTemp/29356/86772.pdf>

[127] LICEN, Panama Law Search Engine, “Law No. 57, Art. 63 – General Law on Firearms, Ammunition, and Related Materials,” 28 March 2024, <https://www.licen.ai/articulos/articulo-63-Ley-57-de-2011-eypotb#:~:text=Rep%C3%BAblica%20de%20Panam%C3%A1&text=No%20podr%C3%A1%20autorizarse%20la%20importaci%C3%B3n,embarques%20importados%20al%20territorio%20nacional>

[128] Panamá, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/64204fc9-e28a-3f4f-9b9d-a613b507d2aa> (own translation)

[129] Panamá, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (The Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/64204fc9-e28a-3f4f-9b9d-a613b507d2aa> (own translation)

[130] Panamá, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/PAN-Spanish-887-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[131] Panamá, *National Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/PAN-Spanish-887-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[132] Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), “Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives”, OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

PARAGUAY

Sample of the legal framework:

- 2002 – Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives Law (Law No. 1.910)^[133]
- 2010 – Law on Firearms, Their Parts and Components, Ammunition, Explosives, Accessories and Related Items (Law No. 4.036)^[134]
- 2015 - Law Approving the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 5.398)^[135]
- 2024 – Law on Firearms, their Components, Ammunition and its Components, Controlled Accessories, Explosives, Explosive Accessories, Chemical Precursors of Explosives, Explosive-Related Items and Pyrotechnic Articles (Law No. 7.411)^[136]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: The General Directorate of Military Equipment (DIGEMABEL) is the agency responsible for.^[137] In addition, Paraguay *“has an Inter-institutional Working Group on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, created in 2001, which acts as a formal mechanism that meets regularly and is multidimensional in nature, because it brings together the different key actors in arms control...”*.^[138] This Working Group brings together key actors such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Directorate of Military Equipment, the National Customs Directorate, the National Police, and the Public Prosecutor's Office.^[139]

Sample of procedures: In Paraguay, a temporary presidential ban on the importation of arms and ammunition is currently in force, with the aim of preventing illicit trafficking.^[140] In the 2018 PoA report, Paraguay notes that *“NO exports of firearms are carried out, nor are there any companies engaged in the manufacture of this type of material and related items.”*^[141] In its initial report to the ATT, Paraguay notes that the national control system has a competent national authority. Furthermore, regarding the Inter-institutional Working Group on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, composed of key actors, Paraguay highlighted that *“it is also possible to invite representatives of civil society to participate in its meetings. Its work agenda has a focus that includes the fight against illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives, and the prevention of armed violence.”*^[142] The involvement of civil society is highlighted as a good practice.

[133] Paraguay, Law No. 1.910, on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, enacted on 19 June 2002, https://derechodelacultura.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/3_10_par_1_1910_2002.pdf.

[134] Paraguay, Law No. 4.036, on Firearms, Their Parts and Components, Ammunition, Explosives, Accessories and Related Items, enacted on 11 August 2010. <https://digestolegislativo.gov.py/ups/leyes/69999%20.pdf>

[135] Paraguay, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2019), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/PRY-Spanish-773-SUBMITTED.pdf>.

[136] Paraguay, Law No. 7411 on Firearms, Their Components, Ammunition and Their Components, Controlled Accessories, Explosives, Explosive Accessories, Chemical Precursors of Explosives, Explosive-Related Items and Pyrotechnic Articles, 3 January 2025, <https://dimabel.mil.py/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/LEY-7411-2024-PUBLICADO.pdf>

[137] Paraguay, Law No. 1.910, 'On Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives,' Article 2, enacted on 19 June 2002., <http://www.bacn.gov.py/Leyes-paraguayas/2411/Ley-n-1910-armas-de-fuego-municiones-y-explosivos>.

[138] *Intervención de la República del Paraguay, Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas, Tercera Conferencia de Estados Parte, Debate General*, 11 September 2017), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Paraguay_CSP3_11092017_General_Debate/Paraguay_CSP3_11092017_General_Debate.pdf. , (own translation)

[139] Paraguay, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, January 2017), 5, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/1fd19bb8-d93f-3b91-8dc8-5db16fea3480>.

[140] Press report: Gabriel Porfolio, InfoDefensa, “Paraguay suspende totalmente la importación de armas para intentar contener el flujo ilegal a Brasil”, 5 December 2023., <https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/4637145/paraguay-suspende-totalmente-importacion-armas-intentar-contener-flujo-ilegal-brasil>; National representatives, in discussion with the authors through an in-depth interview, in April 2025.

[141] Paraguay, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2018),8, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/PRY-Spanish-773-SUBMITTED.pdf>. (own translation)

[142] Paraguay, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, January 2017), 5, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/1fd19bb8-d93f-3b91-8dc8-5db16fea3480>. (own translation)

PERU

Sample of the legal framework:

- 2012 – Legislative Decree creating the National Superintendency for the Control of Security Services, Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives for Civil Use (SUCAMEC) (No. 1.127).^[143]
- 2015 – Law on firearms, ammunition, explosives, pyrotechnic products and related materials for civilian use (Law No. 30.299) and Regulations of Law No. 30.299 (Supreme Decree N° 008-2016-IN).^[144]
- 2016 – Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty (Supreme Decree N 004-2016-RE).^[145]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, National Superintendency for the Control of Security Services, Arms, Ammunition and Explosives for Civil Use (SUCAMEC) and Ministry of the Interior.^[146] Peru also has the National Commission against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials (CONATIAF) and the involvement of the National Superintendency of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT).^[147]

Sample of procedures: Peru has a national control system. In its initial report to the ATT, Peru notes that it has *"mechanisms, measures and legal provisions that regulate imports of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons, allowing them to be properly controlled. In this regard, Peruvian legislation distinguishes between two categories of weapons: [a] weapons of war, for military and police use only... [b] weapons other than weapons of war (for civilian use)..."*^[148] As a positive practice, Peruvian legislation defines the ammunition capacity, with precise limits, of weapons for civilian use.^[149] With regard to exports, the national control system requires an authorisation or licence for export, and includes guidelines for assessing prohibitions, criteria for assessing exports, and procedures for risk assessment.^[150] In the 2024 PoA report on marking and registration, Peru notes that *"In addition to factory marking, the seal or coat of arms of the Armed Forces, the Peruvian National Police or the Peruvian State and an internal (institutional) serial number are included."*^[151] As a best practice, records are kept indefinitely. Another good practice in Peru is that SUCAMEC publicly discloses the firearms licences issued through its open data portal.^[152]

[143] Peru, Legislative Decree 1127/2012, Legislative Decree creating the National Superintendency for the Control of Security Services, Weapons, Ammunition and Explosives for Civil Use (SUCAMEC), 7 December 2012. <https://leyes.congreso.gob.pe/Documentos/DecretosLegislativos/01127.pdf>

[144] Peru, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, In Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 21 December 2016), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1a9-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33>.

[145] El Peruano, Supreme Decree No. 004-2016-RE, Ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty, 14 January 2016, https://www2.trabajo.gob.pe/archivos/dgt/conveniossegsocial/2016/080716_Can_DS_003_2016_RERatificacion.pdf

[146] Peru, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, In Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 21 December 2016), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1a9-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33>.

[147] Permanent Representation of Peru to the Organization of American States, "Peru strengthens its national capacities to prevent and combat illicit firearms trafficking with OAS cooperation", 24 February 2022, <https://www.peruoea.org/el-peru-fortalece-sus-capacidades-nacionales-en-prevencion-y-combate-al-trafico-ilicito-de-armas-de-fuego-con-cooperacion-de-oea/>

[148] Peru, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, In Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 21 December 2016), 9, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1a9-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33>. (own translation)

[149] Peru, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, In Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 21 December 2016), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1a9-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33>.

[150] Peru, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, In Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 21 December 2016), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/ba34e1a9-4bee-3f3b-a5d3-920c86f7db33>.

[151] Peru, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)* (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), 21, <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/PER-Spanish-1348-SUBMITTED.pdf> (own translation)

[152] See, for example: 'Firearms Licences Issued – SUCAMEC', Peru Open Data Platform, website: <https://datosabiertos.gob.pe/dataset/licencias-de-uso-armas-de-fuego-emitidas-sucamec>

URUGUAY

Sample of the legal framework:

- 2014 – Law on the Classification of Crimes and Amendment of the Penal Code (Law No. 19.247)^[153]
- 2014 - Approval of the Arms Trade Treaty (Law No. 19.225)^[154]
- 2016 – Regulations of Law No. 19.247 on the possession, carrying, sale, and trafficking of firearms, ammunition, explosives, and other related materials (Decree No. 377/2016)^[155]

This sample does not exhaust the existing regulations; for a more complete overview of the national legal framework, please refer to the Initial Report to the ATT, the reports to the UN PoA, and the Annexes to this document.

Sample of institutions: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence and the Material and Armament Service.^[156]

Sample of procedures: Uruguay has a national control system and has a control list that includes all categories of Article 2(1), including ammunition and parts and components. According to the initial report to the ATT, Uruguay has a control system that includes measures to regulate the import of conventional arms; however, the report notes that internal regulations were in the process of being aligned with the provisions of the Treaty.^[157] Similarly, it has measures in place to prevent diversion, including cooperation and information sharing, and, as a matter of good practice, it keeps records for an unlimited period of time, but these were also in the process of being aligned with the provisions of the Treaty.^[158] In its 2022 PoA report, Uruguay indicates that it does not manufacture any type of SALW in the country and does not export arms.^[159] In its 2024 report, Uruguay indicated that it has established national laws to promote disarmament and the regularisation of small arms by the target year of 2025.^[160] Uruguay also notes, as a good practice, that imported SALW must be marked at the point of origin, which facilitates the documentation of a weapon throughout its life cycle.^[161]

2.5. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The following section presents some of the challenges raised by national representatives during interviews or during the seminar.

[153] Uruguay, Law No. 19.247, Classification of Crimes and Amendment of the Penal Code, 27 August 2014, <https://www.impco.com.uy/bases/Leyes/19247-2014>.

[154] Presidency of Uruguay, Law No. 19.225, Approval of the Arms Trade Treaty, 16 June 2014, <https://www.gub.uy/presidencia/institucional/normativa/ley-n-19225-fecha-14062014-aprobacion-del-tratado-sobre-comercio-armas#:~:text=Se%20aprueba%20el%20tratado%20sobre%20el%20comercio,Aprobaci%C3%B3n%20del%20tratado%20sobre%20comercio%20de%20armas>.

[155] Uruguay, Decree No. 377/016, Regulation of Law 19.247, Relating to the Possession, Carrying, Marketing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials and Repeal of Decrees 17/987 and 231/002, 13 December 2016, <https://www.impco.com.uy/bases/Decretos/377-2016>.

[156] Ministry of National Defence - General Army Command, 'Registration as an importer of arms, ammunition, hazardous substances and pyrotechnics,' last updated 9 June 2021, <https://www.gub.uy/tramites/inscripcion-importador-armas-municones-sustancias-peligrosas-pirotecnicos>

[157] Uruguay, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/259b8544-465c-3d30-a13b-9bd21cb8b89a>

[158] Uruguay, *Initial Report on Measures Undertaken to Implement the Arms Trade Treaty, in Accordance with Article 13 (1)*, (Arms Trade Treaty, 27 August 2015), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/download/259b8544-465c-3d30-a13b-9bd21cb8b89a>

[159] Uruguay, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2022), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/URY-Spanish-1298-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[160] Uruguay, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/URY-English-1314-SUBMITTED.pdf>

[161] Uruguay, *National Report on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)*, (United Nations: Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2024), <https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/URY-English-1314-SUBMITTED.pdf>

- **Legislation currently being updated:** Two countries mentioned challenges related to legislation currently being updated. For example, one country mentioned that its legal framework may not necessarily reflect the current dynamics of illicit manufacturing and trafficking. This representative emphasised the desire to delve deeper into 3D printing and address various recent advances in firearms manufacturing, technology, and design in order to prepare appropriate law enforcement responses.^[162] Another country mentioned the need to restructure the national legal framework to bring it fully into line with international commitments. During this interview, the authority emphasised that the increase in demand for weapons by the civilian population, motivated in part by the growing perception of insecurity and armed violence in the country, requires even more rigorous and specific controls on the civilian use of firearms.^[163] Finally, one expert, referring to a national regulatory framework, recommended using a more comprehensive definition of ‘parts and components’ and reviewing the licensing system so that the role of the agencies involved in risk assessments is binding, since if it is not binding, the control process may be weakened.^[164]
- **Procedural difficulties in risk assessments:** Some authorities highlighted procedural difficulties in risk assessments. One representative noted that a current challenge is maintaining rigorous, standardised criteria and detailed procedures for risk assessment for the authorisation of transfers. In addition, he emphasised the need to strengthen early warning systems and information sharing with other systems in the region.^[165] A second country also highlighted the challenge posed by standardising transfer risk assessment criteria, emphasising that internal procedures are still being adjusted in pursuit of greater rigour and effectiveness.^[166]
- **Practical barriers to implementation:** Offering a regional perspective, a representative from a regional organization noted the need to continue developing secure digital/electronic systems for managing and issuing licences, given that “half of the countries still use paper-based systems or Excel spreadsheets”.^[167] The representative also pointed out difficulties in verifying the authenticity of documents submitted by interested parties, due to the lack of standardised systems. Finally, the representative noted that it is important to improve communication and coordination between countries in order to keep transit states informed and to share information on denied licences.^[168]

An additional barrier noted by several countries was the fatigue and workload involved in reporting to various international instruments. One representative, for example, recommended that regional and international organizations promote synergies between instruments and coordinate reporting to alleviate the workload this represents for national authorities.^[169] Another representative noted a similar barrier in complying with reports and the work they represent for internal management mechanisms and possible differences between definitions.^[170]

[162] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in discussion with the authors during an interview, April 2025.

[163] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in discussion with the authors during an interview, March 2025.

[164] Independent expert, in discussion with the authors through an interview, April 2025.

[165] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in communication with the authors, February 2025.

[166] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in discussion with the authors during an interview, April 2025.

[167] OAS representative, based on research mapping with countries in the region, in discussion with the authors through an interview, February 2025.

[168] OAS representative, in discussion with the authors during an interview, February 2025.

[169] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in discussion with the authors during an interview, February 2025.

[170] Representatives of a confidential public entity, in written communication with the authors, February 2025.

PART 3: GENERAL GOOD PRACTICES

The third part is divided into: measures to prevent diversion, measures to prevent illicit trafficking, and measures to prevent gender-based violence with firearms and gender considerations in firearms control. These sections compile global good practices and should be understood as complementary and interconnected. This section of the document concludes by highlighting some important areas for international cooperation, assistance, and engagement.

3.1.A. MEASURES TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF FIREARMS

An Issue Brief from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), together with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, and the Stimson Center, as part of a research consortium, compiles and highlights a series of practical measures to prevent the diversion of conventional arms.^[171] This Issue Brief from UNIDIR and the consortium organises measures at three key points in the supply chain: “*before transfers are authorized or denied; during a transfer; and at importation and post-delivery storage*”.^[172] The ATT Secretariat also published a document with possible practical measures to prevent and address diversion in accordance with Article 11(1), broken down by stages of the conventional arms supply chain.^[173] Following the supply chain set by UNIDIR and the consortium, this document summarises some of the measures identified to prevent diversion.

- **Before transfers are approved:** One preventive measure, before a transfer becomes effective, is the use of diversion risk indicators, and the UNIDIR and consortium’s Issue Brief proposes four categories:

“[a] the importing State’s requirements and its capacity to control transferred conventional arms; [b] the risks associated with the type of conventional arms and related items; [c] the legitimacy and reliability of the intended end user/end use of the export; and [d] the legitimacy and reliability of other entities involved in the transfer of the proposed export.”^[174]

Furthermore, the Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, in its Objective 8, *Promote supply chain transparency to comprehensively minimize and mitigate the risks of diversion when authorizing conventional ammunition transfers*.^[175] In effect, the additional possible enabling measures in Objective 8(b)(iii) offer the following elements, cited verbatim, to mitigate risks:

[171] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[172] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[173] Arms Trade Treaty Secretariat, *Possible measures to prevent and address diversion*. Annex D to the Draft Report to the Fourth Conference of States Parties (CSP4)

(ATT/CSP4.WGETI/2018/CHAIR/355/Conf.Rep) presented by the Chair of the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI), 20 July 2018, <https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Article%2011%20-%20Possible%20measures%20to%20prevent%20and%20address%20diversion/Article%2011%20-%20Possible%20measures%20to%20prevent%20and%20address%20diversion.pdf>

[174] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, 17, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[175] United Nations, *Open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management*, Annex A/78/111, 2023, Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, p.9, <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/111>

- a) "Analyse the conventional ammunition in relation to the declared end user (for the purposes of identifying fraudulent end-user certification and equivalent documents) and, if bilaterally agreed, end use."^[176]
- b) "Consider the end user's bona fides through, inter alia, identity checking and intelligence reports (i.e. is the end user who they claim to be?)"^[177]
- c) "Consider all relevant parties involved in the transfer, which may include freight forwarders, brokers, consignees and other intermediaries."^[178]
- d) "Consider cases where the supply chain lacks transparency (parties do not produce sufficient documentation to enable adequate consideration of transfer risks) or where parties to the transfer have a history of diverting conventional ammunition previously."^[179]
- e) "Maintain registers and databases of transfers, manufacturers, brokers, vessels and aircraft, as well as end users, shippers and freight forwarders that have a history of diversion or poor security measures."^[180]
- f) "Consider the risks of diversion associated with transit, trans-shipment and the choice of route."^[181]
- g) "Analyse all relevant information from primary and open sources."^[182]
- h) "Verify and authenticate relevant documentation."^[183]
- i) "Consider using delivery verification certificates."^[184]

In addition, one expert proposes that, prior to approving a transfer, tracing requests originating from the destination country/importer should be studied in order to analyse trends (such as patterns involving firearms and ammunition used in crimes after their legal sale) and thus inform the risk analysis. The expert also recommends paying special attention to orders from newly established companies and requests with unusual purchase volumes before approval.^[185] Based on this set of criteria and considerations, risk indicators can be developed that are tailored to each context, thereby improving the effectiveness of existing systems. When developing risk indicators tailored to the local context, civil society should be involved in the deliberations, as it can contribute experiences and knowledge that reflect the reality of the affected communities and provide perspectives that complement the data provided by national authorities.^[186]

[176] United Nations, *Open-ended working group to elaborate a set of political commitments as a new global framework that will address existing gaps in through-life ammunition management*, Annex A/78/111, 2023, Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management, p.15, <https://docs.un.org/en/A/78/111>

[177] Ibid, p 15.

[178] Ibid, p 15.

[179] Ibid, p 15.

[180] Ibid, p 15.

[181] Ibid, p 15.

[182] Ibid, p 15.

[183] Ibid, p 15.

[184] Ibid, p 15.

[185] Independent expert, in discussion with the authors through written communication, August 2025.

[186] GENSAC and Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies. "Inclusive Ammunition Management: A Practical Guide for Gender and Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation in the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management", New York: GENSAC and Pathfinders, Junio de 2025, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/inclusive-ammunition-management-a-practical-guide-for-gender-and-multi-stakeholder-cooperation-in-the-global-framework-for-through-life-conventional-ammunition-management/>

- **During transfers:** Following the UNIDIR and consortium's Issue Brief, it is important to highlight that countries involved in transit and transshipment activities must also carry out risk assessments on this stage.^[187] Indeed, they have an obligation to regulate activities under their jurisdiction; and such assessments must consider all parties involved and the various modes of transport.^[188] The UNIDIR and the consortium's Issue Brief highlights a series of measures for the national control systems of the countries involved to fulfil this obligation: "[a] diversion risk assessment indicators for transit and transshipment States and [b] cooperation and information-sharing, including monitoring of shipments".^[189] During a transfer, the UNIDIR and the consortium's framework also emphasise the importance of completing pre-shipment or pre-departure inspections when transporting arms and ammunition in order to check the manifest and cargo against export documentation and end-user documents.^[190] The World Customs Organization has tools to support customs officers under the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (SAFE).^[191]
- **During importation and post-delivery storage:** In the import and post-delivery storage stage, the UNIDIR and the consortium's Issue Brief group together practical measures for the prevention of diversion as follows:

"[a] on-arrival inspections, border controls, and delivery verification; [b] safe and secure storage at arrival and by the end user, including record-keeping as part of inventory management and accounting; [c] post-delivery cooperation to ensure mitigation measures and assurances remain in place; and [d] detecting and investigating diversion of transferred conventional arms."^[192]

These measures are as relevant for preventing diversion in a national context as they are for preventing illicit trafficking (e.g., following an incident of leakage/diversion) across borders. In the region, secure storage and record keeping stand out as priority issues. It is also important to consider the role of factors that drive diversion, such as the demand for illicit firearms. While this document emphasises measures that seek to reduce supply and focuses less on demand, it is important to highlight demand dynamics for future research. In this way, efforts to understand and reduce demand factors can also contribute to the prevention of diversion, thus addressing the challenge of diversion with a comprehensive approach.

[187] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[188] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[189] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, 25, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[190] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, 26, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

[191] World Customs Organization, "WCO SAFE Package", https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/frameworks-of-standards/safe_package.aspx

[192] Brian Wood & Paul Holton, *Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief n°2: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson Center), 2020, 28, <https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/ATT-Issues-Brief-2-Formatted-v4.pdf>

3.1.B. PROGRESS IN THE REGION AND OPPORTUNITIES TO PREVENT DIVERSION

This discussion document presents three practical measures in greater detail, focusing on the post-delivery storage stage. These measures are inspired by advances already made in the region, in order to continue building on solid foundations.

- **Record keeping and improved inter-agency:** To begin considering the life cycle of a weapon, it is essential to have its initial registration. The initial registration for countries that are not manufacturers will be the moment of importation and subsequent assignment to the public entity, a store or commercial entity, or the authorised civilian carrier. After the initial registration, it is important to document each time the weapon changes hands, when such movements/transactions are permitted. The more detailed the records, the better the surveillance of the systems and prevention of diversion, and the easier it will be to document the last authorised user in the event of diversion. As part of the effort to keep records up to date, it is crucial to improve cooperation between institutions, as weapons may pass through different authorities. An example of inter-institutional cooperation in the region is Chile, where, since the adoption of the ATT, it is reported that the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have strengthened their cooperation and communication.^[193] However, one challenge for the region is the transition from physical paper to more modern digital systems, which could facilitate cooperation between agencies and the updating of records.
- **Improvements in the security of all arsenals:** A priority for preventing diversion in the region is to improve security at arsenals. According to press reports and civil society investigations, diversion from arsenals represents a significant source of leaks to the illicit market in the region.^[194] Arsenals include all stocks within the national territory and may occur in both state and private stocks. Stocks in private hands include those held by private traders, distributors, companies, or private end users, including armed private security companies.^[195] The diversion may be the result of corruption and/or insufficient security measures, among other factors.^[196]

In the region, a series of efforts have focused on improving the security of state and private holdings, for example, by strengthening stockpile management by private security companies. An example of control over private security can be identified in Peru, which launched a voluntary project, led by SUCAMEC, to offer secondary markings for firearms in the hands of private security companies.^[197] A second example, focused on strengthening the management of firearms in the hands of private security companies is in Costa Rica. This country has worked with UNLIREC to strengthen the management of private security holdings.^[198] Other efforts have focused on improving

[193] Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies, "The Arms Trade Treaty: Complementary and Crucial Regulations to Address the Crisis", 3 January 2025, <https://cnppchile.org/the-arms-trade-treaty-complementary-and-crucial-regulations-to-address-the-crisis/>

[194] Raquel Ballestin & Chris Dalby, "Arsenales militares son fuente de armas para pandillas y grupos criminales latinoamericanos", InsightCrime, 4 October 2022, <https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias/arsenales-militares-fuente-armas-pandillas-grupos-criminales-latinoamericanos/>. See also: Bruno Langeani & Natália Pollachi, "Less Guns, More Youth: Armed Violence, Police Violence, and the Arms Trade in Brazil", Instituto Sou da Paz, 2022, p. 78, <https://soudapaz.org/documentos/less-guns-more-youth-armed-violence-police-violence-and-the-arms-trade-in-brazil-2/>

[195] Alfredo Malaret Baldo et al, *The Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief N° 3: Diversion Analysis Framework* (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, y Stimson Center, 2021), https://unidir.org/files/2021-08/ATT_Issue_Brief_3-Diversion_Analysis_Framework.pdf

[196] Alfredo Malaret Baldo et al, *The Arms Trade Treaty Issue Brief N° 3: Diversion Analysis Framework*, Issue Brief 3, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Conflict Armament Research, y Stimson Center, 2021), https://unidir.org/files/2021-08/ATT_Issue_Brief_3-Diversion_Analysis_Framework.pdf

[197] SUCAMEC, 'Superintendency Resolution No. 1116-2015-SUCAMEC-SN,' 17 December 2015, <https://cdn.www.gob.pe/uploads/document/file/1699590/1116-2015-SUCAMEC-SN.pdf>

[198] United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) 'UNLIREC apoya el fortalecimiento de gestión de armas en el sector de la seguridad privada en Costa Rica,' UNLIREC, 21 November 2016, <https://www.unlirec.org/unlirec-apoya-el-fortalecimiento-de-gestion-de-armas-en-el-sector-de-la-seguridad-privada-en-costa-rica/>

the physical security and management of state stockpiles. For example, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) works with Paraguay's DIGEMABEL to improve the physical security of firearms and ammunition stockpiles in the country, strengthen staff capacity, and destroy surpluses in order to help prevent diversion.^[199] Similarly, to prevent diversion and support the objectives of the Roadmaps, UNLIREC has also offered and continues to offer technical training to authorities in countries in the region to improve the management of state stockpiles.^[200]

- **Post-diversion tracing investigation:** To take corrective measures, it is important to conduct post-diversion traceability investigations. In addition to record keeping, marking is essential to conducting post-diversion investigations. And the more detailed the marking (as well as the records), the more detailed the investigation can be in reconstructing the supply chain and identifying the point of diversion. An example of successful marking in the region is the case of Brazil and the ammunition marking process developed by the Brazilian Cartridge Company (CBC). CBC can laser mark the groove of ammunition intended for police and military forces, broken down by batches (batches of 10,000 rounds of ammunition).^[201] Under this system, ammunition boxes also retain their barcode markings.^[206] The combination of marking methods results in detailed records and, therefore, makes these small-calibre ammunition more traceable.^[203] One example of civil society research that has helped improve understanding of diversion is the research carried out by the Sou da Paz Institute, which managed to identify and analyse the origin of some of the ammunition seized in Rio de Janeiro between 2014 and 2017.^[204]

Emphasising the importance of cross-border tracing and cooperation, particularly in the Triple Frontier, 'Operation Dakovo', between Paraguay and Brazil, resulted in one of the most significant seizures and anti-arms trafficking operations in the region. The success of this operation highlights the importance of seizing illegally trafficked firearms, recovering 'erased' serial numbers, tracing seized firearms, alerting parties involved in international transfers, and advancing institutional and international cooperation.^[205] Also highlighting the importance of cooperation and information exchange between authorities in different countries, 'Operation Patagonia Express', with the support of US authorities, resulted in the largest seizure of illegally trafficked weapons in Argentina, preventing them from reaching organised criminal networks in both Argentina and Brazil.^[206]

[199] Mines Advisory Group (MAG), "US Government extends partnership with MAG to reduce armed violence in Latin America", 8 February 2024, <https://www.maginternational.org/whats-happening/us-government-extends-partnership-with-MAG/>

[200] See, for example: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), "Grenada: Strengthening Stockpile Security", 11 March 2025, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/grenada-strengthening-stockpile-security/>

[201] Sarah Grand-Clément & Robert Kondor, *Ammunition Marking: Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Calibre Ammunition*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2022, <https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-technical-feasibility-of-marking-small-ammunition/>

[202] Sarah Grand-Clément & Robert Kondor, *Ammunition Marking: Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Calibre Ammunition*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2022, <https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-technical-feasibility-of-marking-small-ammunition/>

[203] Sarah Grand-Clément & Robert Kondor, *Ammunition Marking: Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Calibre Ammunition*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2022, <https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-technical-feasibility-of-marking-small-ammunition/>

[204] Instituto Sou da Paz, *Arsenal Fluminense: Análisis de las Incautaciones de Munición en el Estado de Rio de Janeiro (2014-2017)*, Instituto Sou da Paz, September 2017, <https://soudapaz.org/documentos/arsenal-fluminense-analise-das-apreensoes-de-municoes-no-estado-do-rio-de-janeiro-2014-2017/>
See also: Rafael Soares, "Munição desviada de forças de segurança abasteceu criminosos em ações com 83 mortes," *O Globo*, 23 May 2021., <https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/municao-desviada-de-forcas-de-seguranca-abasteceu-criminosos-em-acoes-com-83-mortes-25030309>

[205] Bruno Langeani, "Operação Dakovo: Como um posto da PRF na Bahia iniciou o maior golpe no tráfico de armas", Brazilian Public Security Forum, Fonte Segura, EDITION N.263, 29 January 2025, <https://fontesegura.forumseguranca.org.br/operacao-dakovo-como-um-posto-da-prf-na-bahia-iniciou-o-maior-golpe-no-trafico-de-armas/>

[206] Merrit Kennedy, "U.S. Agents Announce Thousands Of Weapons Seized In 'Operation Patagonia Express'", NPR, 28 June 2019, <https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/737041530/u-s-agents-announce-thousands-of-weapons-seized-in-operation-patagonia-express>

For those interested in improving their small arms ammunition marking system, UNIDIR developed a guide “Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Calibre Ammunition”.^[207] UNIDIR also developed a “Handbook to Profile Small Arms Ammunition in Armed Violence Settings” that supports users in documenting ammunition flow dynamics.^[208] In addition to documenting flows, this manual can help to understand the role that small arms ammunition plays in facilitating different types of armed violence.

3.2.A. MEASURES TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN FIREARMS

The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) offers a Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), on which this section of the discussion document is based.^[209] Its Module 05.60, “Border Controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation”,^[210] offers practical measures to prevent and combat illicit trafficking. Among the measures highlighted in MOSAIC Module 05.60 are the following:

- **Assessments of border capabilities:** To prevent illicit cross-border movements of firearms, it is essential to conduct assessments of national capacities.^[211] Following MOSAIC Module 05.60, these should examine capabilities regarding firearms controls related to border management, including “a) the situation at border crossings; b) the situation between border crossings; c) an inventory and evaluation border control agencies; d) the effectiveness of existent border controls; and e) a needs assessment.”^[212]
- **Specific border controls:** To prevent the illicit cross-border movement of firearms, it is important to *carry out specific and targeted border controls*.^[213] To improve these controls, it is important to consider risk indicators. Following MOSAIC Module 05.60, also informed by the World Customs Organization^[214], risk indicators may include:

“a) Details of the carrier manifests; b) identification of a high-risk country; c) commodity and transportation factors that may indicate high-risk conditions; d) known high-risk commodities used for concealment purposes; e) list of dangerous goods... and f) and other factors that may reflect high risk (e.g., type of container and identity of importer/exporter and carrier)”.^[215]

[207] Sarah Grand-Clément & Robert Kondor, *Ammunition Marking: Exploring the Technical Feasibility of Marking Small Calibre Ammunition*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2022, <https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-the-technical-feasibility-of-marking-small-ammunition/>

[208] Alfredo Malaret Baldo & Manuel Martínez Miralles, *Handbook to Profile Small Arms Ammunition in Armed Violence Settings*, (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/20/ASC/19>

[209] For those interested, UN agencies, UNODA and UNIDIR in particular, are developing an updated version of the MOSAIC Self-Assessment Tool, which will enable States to check their compliance with the PoA implementation measures. See, for example: UNODA, *Small Arms and Light Weapons: Guidance and Assistance*, <https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/salw/>

[210] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), 8-9, <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

[211] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

[212] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

[213] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

[214] World Customs Organization, “WCO SAFE Package”, https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/frameworks-of-standards/safe_package.aspx

[215] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), 12, <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

In addition, the World Customs Organization also recommends establishing a joint inter-agency risk analysis unit.^[216] By carrying out specific border controls based on high-risk indicators, a country increases the likelihood of intercepting illicit firearms trafficking.

- **Cooperation and exchange of information between law enforcement officers:** As with many other measures, cooperation and information sharing among law enforcement officials is essential. According to MOSAIC Module 05.60, to prevent illicit trafficking, it is important to promote cooperation in the following areas:

“a) **intra-agency cooperation** (i.e. procedures in place to promote cooperation and exchange of information and resources within a single ministry or agency); b) **inter-agency cooperation** (i.e. procedures in place to promote cooperation and exchange of information and resources between different ministries or agencies of the same government) and c) **cross-border cooperation** (i.e. procedures in place to promote cooperation and exchange of information and resources with border agencies of a neighbouring State, including bilateral, subregional, regional and international cooperation agreements”.^[217]

To facilitate cooperation and information exchange, there are practical tools that help combat illicit firearms trafficking. For example, Interpol's iARMS offers a repository of information that its Member States can access to report and consult on lost, stolen, or trafficked firearms.^[218] Likewise, to enable its members to combat illicit trafficking, the World Customs Organization developed the Customs Enforcement Network (CEN).^[219] The CEN comprises a database and web-based communication tools that facilitate the exchange of information and includes information on items seized from illicit trafficking.^[220]

3.2.B. PROGRESS IN THE REGION AND OPPORTUNITIES TO PREVENT ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Among all the possible measures in the region to prevent illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition, this discussion document presents three practical measures in more detail. These measures are inspired by progresses already made in the region.

- **Improvements in communication between control systems, licensing, and cross-border cooperation:** Transfer control systems approve and/or deny transfers based on risk and information exchanges. However, communication between exporters, transit countries, and importers does not always function in the most effective or efficient manner. In response to this challenge, the OAS continues to advance its MCTA system.^[221] The objective of the OAS system is to establish a regional electronic mechanism for

[216] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

And World Customs Organization, “WCO SAFE Package”, https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/frameworks-of-standards/safe_package.aspx

[217] UNODA, *Modular Small-Arms Control Implementation Compendium 05.60: Border controls and Law Enforcement Cooperation*, (UNODA, 2012), 20, <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/MOSAIC-05.60-2012EV1.01.pdf>

[218] Interpol, *Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS)*, <https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Firearms-trafficking/Illicit-Arms-Records-and-tracing-Management-System-iARMS>

[219] World Customs Organization, *Customs Enforcement Network (CEN)*, <https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/instruments-and-tools/cen-suite/cen.aspx>

[220] World Customs Organization, *Customs Enforcement Network (CEN)*, <https://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/instruments-and-tools/cen-suite/cen.aspx>

[221] “Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)”, Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/mcta>

information exchange (including the issuance of licences) and real-time monitoring of flows, in a secure manner.^[222] Cross-border collaboration using this mechanism will help prevent large-scale illicit trafficking.

- **Specific border controls and focused police cooperation:** Just as it is important to tackle large-scale illicit trafficking, it is also important to combat the small-scale trafficking that affects the region. Small-scale trafficking is characterised by the illicit movement of firearms, one by one, but over time and along established routes, achieving a significant aggregate impact.^[223] To combat small-scale trafficking, specific risk profiles (based on research and risk analysis) and interdiction techniques tailored to those risk profiles must be developed. A tailor-made approach for each border point will enable the implementation of focused and more effective border controls. An example of this is the update of the Tripartite Command agreement in the Triple Frontier, comprising the forces of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, as it recognises the need to address specific risks in the area and establishes focused police cooperation.^[224]
- **Development of standardised processes and forms to facilitate tracing and address SDG Indicator 16.4.2:** As a means of reducing illicit arms flows, under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), indicator 16.4.2. identifies the *“proportion of seized, found or surrendered weapons whose illicit origin or context has been traced or established by a competent authority in line with international instruments”*.^[225] To determine or establish the illicit origin of a weapon in the context of trafficking, the competent authorities must collaborate and provide information. One way to facilitate tracing is to develop standardised processes and forms, accepted by partners in the region, in order to streamline tracing, determine the status of firearms, and commit to responding to all tracing requests. The examples of “Operation Dakovo” and “Operation Patagonia Express” (see section 3.1.b.) highlight the importance of tracing and international cooperation.

3.3.A. MEASURES TO PREVENT GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE INVOLVING FIREARMS AND GENDER CONSIDERATIONS IN FIREARMS CONTROL

To prevent gender-based violence, it is essential to integrate gender considerations and perspectives into the control of firearms and ammunition. Article 7(4) of the ATT requires that States Parties “take into account the risk” when conducting their assessments of the possibility that conventional arms may be “used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children”.^[226] Gender-based violence is understood by the Control Arms organization as “violence directed against a person on the basis of their gender or sex. This can include sexual, physical, economic, emotional, and psychological violence.”^[227] Several interviewees argued that

[222] “Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)”, Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/en/security/mcta>

[223] Mark Bromley & Alfredo Malaret, “ATT-Related Activities in Latin America and the Caribbean: Identifying Gaps and Improving Coordination”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), February 2017, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/ATT-related-activities-Latin-America-and-Caribbean.pdf>

[224] See, for example, “Argentina, Paraguay y Brasil anuncian un acuerdo para ‘blindar’ la triple frontera,” Europa Press Internacional, 31 May 2025., <https://www.europapress.es/internacional/noticia-argentina-paraguay-brasil-anuncian-acuerdo-blindar-triple-frontera-20250531130347.html>

[225] United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) y United Nations Office For Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “SDG Indicator 16.4.2”, 1, joint non-paper, https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/COP/Session_9/Other_documentation/ODA-UNODC_2018_joint_note_on_16.4.pdf

[226] United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research & Control Arms, *Fact Sheet: Gender and the Arms Trade Treaty*, (UNIDIR & Control Arms, 2022), 1, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/UNIDIR_Gender_and_the_Arms_Trade_Treaty_Factsheet_2022.pdf.

[227] Harvard Law School Human Rights Programme & Control Arms, *Interpreting the Arms Trade Treaty: International Human Rights Law and Gender-Based Violence in Article 7 Risk Assessments*, Control Arms, April 2019, 1, <https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Interpreting-the-Arms-Trade-Treaty-ver-1.pdf>.

that measures to prevent gender-based violence are an area in which more training is needed for officials responsible for assessing risks.^[228] In this context, this document presents a series of opportunities to further appropriate measures.

- **Strengthen data collection on gender-based violence involving firearms:** Improving data and access to data that can be used when completing risk assessments is a priority for the region. Improvement begins with systematically collecting violence data disaggregated by sex and gender and documenting the type of violence and the role of firearms. To this end, empowering an entity, such as a National Observatory, Gender Violence Observatory, or Femicide Registry, to generate reliable data and publish and distribute it at different levels of cooperation (whether intra-institutional, inter-institutional, or even with cross-border agencies) would be essential.^[229] It is also important to support independent research conducted by civil society, such as research by Sou da Paz that highlights the role of firearms in gender-based violence^[230] and a study in Argentina that explores the relationship between firearms and suicides and femicide-suicides.^[231] The work of civil society can be fundamental in documenting the reality of gender-based violence involving firearms, especially in marginalised communities, as this type of violence is often underestimated in many contexts. The collection, access, and distribution of reliable, standardised, and disaggregated data is essential for conducting risk assessments under the ATT commitments and for understanding the reality of gender-based violence.
- **Integrating guiding principles of prevention throughout the transfer control system:** MOSAIC 06.10, “Women, Men and the Gendered Nature of Small Arms and Light Weapons”, contains guiding principles for incorporating a gender perspective into small arms control.^[232] The guiding principles include:

“[a] engage early with expertise on gender... [b] build consensus among stakeholders... [c] collect and use sex-and-age disaggregated data... [d] conduct a gender analysis... [e] address identified gender patterns... [f] support the meaningful participation of women... [and] [g] track progress using gender-sensitive indicators.”^[233]

These guiding principles should be used as a guide to deepen gender considerations in arms control. In order to apply these guiding principles, representatives of civil society must also be included, as they have specialised knowledge based on the experience of affected communities and survivors that can complement the capacities of the State.

[228] Confidential interviews with the authors.

[229] Control Arms, ‘Seguimiento Del Progreso En La Aplicación De Las Consideraciones De Género Y Violencia De Género Adoptadas Por La Quinta Conferencia De Estados Parte Del TCA’ February 2024., <https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/ESP-Gender-Paper-Final-Abr-2024.pdf>

[230] Cristina Neme & Natália Pollachi, “Pela Vida das Mulheres: O Papel da Arma de Fogo Na Violência de Gênero”, Instituto Sou da Paz, 4th edition, 2025, <https://soudapaz.org/documentos/pela-vida-das-mulheres-o-papel-da-arma-de-fogo-na-violencia-de-genero-2025/>

[231] María Alejandra Otamendi, “Suicidios, femicidios-suicidios y armas de fuego en Argentina. La masculinidad hegemónica en debate”, Journal of Social Sciences, 2020, vol.33, n.46, pp.107-130, http://www.scielo.edu.uy/scielo.php?pid=S0797-55382020000100107&script=sci_abstract

[232] UNODA, *Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium* (MOSAIC) 06.10. Women, men and the gendered nature of small arms and light weapons, 2017, <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/MOSAIC-06.10-2017EV1.0.pdf>

[233] UNODA, *Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium* (MOSAIC) 06.10. Women, men and the gendered nature of small arms and light weapons, 2017, <https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/MOSAIC-06.10-2017EV1.0.pdf>

- **Examine legislative frameworks:** Another detailed document on this subject is the 'Guidelines for Gender Analysis of Legislation and Policies Relevant to Small Arms Control' from the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC).^[234] These guidelines offer practical guidance for reviewing legislative frameworks. To complete a comprehensive review, policies regulating small arms control must be reviewed, such as, citing examples from the SEESAC document,

"laws on weapons and relevant bylaws; laws on the export/import of weapons and relevant bylaws; laws regulating weapons manufacturing; small arms and light weapons control strategies and action plans; criminal codes/criminal procedure codes; legislation on security sector personnel and professional activities involving the use of firearms... legislation on protection against domestic violence and other related laws and bylaws... [and] budget allocation for the fulfilment of gender-related commitments...".^[235]

An example of the importance of reviewing legislative frameworks can be found in Brazil, where the domestic violence law was updated to include the obligation for the police to check whether a perpetrator of domestic violence has firearms (registered for carrying and/or possession only) and to seize them immediately if they exist.^[236] When reviewing legislative frameworks, it is also important to consider institutional practices, cultural norms, the relationship between gender and demand for firearms, and budgets.^[237]

- **Integrating gender perspectives into every stage of the firearms life cycle:** A guide by Small Arms Survey offers practical measures for incorporating gender perspectives into every stage of the firearms life cycle.^[238] For example, regarding 'possession and use', the Small Arms Survey guide highlights the importance of establishing "criteria for denying legal gun acquisition by those at high risk for committing DV/IPV, GBV, violent intimidation, and stalking."^[239] The Small Arms Survey cites legislation in Colombia as a good practice in this regard.^[240] The Small Arms Survey guide also highlights the opportunity to improve regulations on 'brokering and sales between individuals' in order to better control 'secondary transfers' and prevent their potential impact by circumventing restrictions on acquisition or possession.^[241] It is also important to highlight the role of civil society organizations in awareness campaigns to address gender norms that fuel the demand for and misuse of firearms.^[242] By dividing the life

[234] The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Guidelines For The Gender Analysis Of Legislation And Policies Relevant For Small Arms Control*. (SEESAC, 2022). <https://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-SALW/GUIDELINES-FOR-GENDER-ANALYSIS-IN-SMALL-ARMS-CONTEXT.ENG.pdf>

[235] The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Guidelines For The Gender Analysis Of Legislation And Policies Relevant For Small Arms Control*. (SEESAC, 2022). pp. 22–23. <https://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-SALW/GUIDELINES-FOR-GENDER-ANALYSIS-IN-SMALL-ARMS-CONTEXT.ENG.pdf>

[236] Presidency of the Republic, Brazil, "Law No. 13.880, of 8 October 2019", https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2019-2022/2019/Lei/L13880.htm#art1. Submitted by an independent expert, in discussion with the authors through written communication, August 2025.

[237] The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), *Guidelines For The Gender Analysis Of Legislation And Policies Relevant For Small Arms Control*. (SEESAC, 2022). <https://www.seesac.org/f/docs/Gender-and-SALW/GUIDELINES-FOR-GENDER-ANALYSIS-IN-SMALL-ARMS-CONTEXT.ENG.pdf>

[238] Emile LeBrun, Henri Myrtilinen, & Mia Schöb, *Gender-responsive Small Arms Control: A Practical Guide*, Edited by Emile Lebrun, (Small Arms Survey, July 2020) <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-GLASS-Gender-HB.pdf>

[239] Emile LeBrun, Henri Myrtilinen, & Mia Schöb, *Gender-responsive Small Arms Control: A Practical Guide*, Edited by Emile Lebrun, (Small Arms Survey, July 2020), 69, <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-GLASS-Gender-HB.pdf>

[240] Emile LeBrun, Henri Myrtilinen, & Mia Schöb, *Gender-responsive Small Arms Control: A Practical Guide*, Edited by Emile Lebrun, (Small Arms Survey, July 2020) <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-GLASS-Gender-HB.pdf>

[241] Emile LeBrun, Henri Myrtilinen, & Mia Schöb, *Gender-responsive Small Arms Control: A Practical Guide*, Edited by Emile Lebrun, (Small Arms Survey, July 2020), 70, <https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-GLASS-Gender-HB.pdf>

[242] GENSAC and Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies, "Inclusive Ammunition Management: A Practical Guide for Gender and Multi-Stakeholder Cooperation in the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management", New York: GENSAC and Pathfinders, 25 June 2025, <https://cic.nyu.edu/resources/inclusive-ammunition-management-a-practical-guide-for-gender-and-multi-stakeholder-cooperation-in-the-global-framework-for-through-life-conventional-ammunition-management/>

cycle of a weapon into general stages, and even sub-stages, points of intervention can be identified, along with how control measures can be integrated at these points to prevent gender-based violence with firearms.

3.3.B. PROGRESS IN THE REGION AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THE PREVENTION OF GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE INVOLVING FIREARMS

Among the measures to prevent gender-based violence involving firearms, this discussion document presents three practical measures and their implementation in the region.

- **Collection of gender-disaggregated data in national statistics:** Mexico is among the countries that have open statistics and indicators with a gender perspective. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) makes the Integrated System of Statistics on Violence against Women (SIESVIM) available to the public.^[243] In Argentina, the Women's Office (OM) of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (CSJN) collects data on femicides.^[244] Similarly, the Intersectional Circuit on Femicide in Chile produces an annual report on femicide in the country and also has mechanisms in place for collaboration between different state agencies to address gender-based violence.^[245]
- **Review of legislative frameworks to integrate gender considerations:** In addition to the examples (cited in section 3.3.a), such as the updating of the regulatory framework in Brazil and legislation in Colombia, Chile also prepared a bill in 2024 to prohibit the carrying and/or possession of firearms by persons convicted of or involved in domestic violence proceedings.^[246] Similarly, during the consultation with a representative, he described how his country has adopted measures to prevent and address gender-based violence, such as the creation of a specific ministry and a reform of the Penal Code to criminalise femicide.^[247]
- **Development of guidelines and forums for exchange to support the implementation of Article 7(4):** States Parties to the ATT are called upon to share their national practices for assessing risks. At the Ninth Conference of States Parties (CSP9), Argentina presented a proposal for the creation of a “Guide to Good Practices in Arms Control for the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence” in order to have tools available for conducting appropriate risk assessments.^[248] At the Tenth Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP10), countries in the region, such as Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and Uruguay, issued a joint statement underscoring discussions to “continue sharing best practices on the implementation of Article 7(4)”.^[249] To support efforts in this area, in 2021 the Stimson Centre created a questionnaire to assist export licensing agents in their efforts to gather reliable sources and information when

[243] INEGI, “Integrated System of Statistics on Violence against Women (SIESVIM)”, INEGI, last modified 16 May 2025., <https://sc.inegi.org.mx/SIESVIM1/paginas/inicio.jsf>.

[244] Argentina, Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation, Women's Office,

<https://www.oficinadelamujer.gob.ar/om/institucional#:~:text=Acerca%20de%20la%20OM,un%20servicio%20eficaz%20y%20efectivo>

[245] Ministry of Women and Gender Equality, *Circuito Intersectorial de Femicidios: Informe Anual de Femicidio 2022*, (2023),

<https://minmujeryeg.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Informe-Anual-de-Femicidio-CIF-2022-pdf-19.12.2023.pdf>.

[246] Juan Pablo Cavada, *Proyecto de ley que prohíbe el porte y/o tenencia de armas de fuego a personas en procedimiento o condenadas por violencia intrafamiliar: Observaciones de técnica legislativa* (Chile: Library of the National Congress of Chile, September 2024),

https://obtienearchivo.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=repositorio/10221/36535/1/Modificacion_porte_de_armas_VIF_rev_ptg_Edit_PA.pdf

[247] Representative of a confidential public entity, in discussion with the authors via email, February 2025.

[248] Argentine Delegation, *Working Paper Of The Argentine Delegation To Be Presented At The Ninth Conference Of The States Parties Of The ATT* (Geneva: Arms Trade Treaty), August 2023, [https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN.pdf)

[images/file/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN.pdf](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN/ATT_CSP9_Argentina%20Working%20Paper%20on%20GBV_EN.pdf)

[249] Gender Mainstreaming and Addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Joint Statement, (Geneva, Arms Trade Treaty), August 2024, [https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Mexico_Agenda_5_%20General_Debate_2024-08-](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Mexico_Agenda_5_%20General_Debate_2024-08-15_Joint_Statement_on_Gender_fv.pdf/Mexico_Agenda_5_%20General_Debate_2024-08-15_Joint_Statement_on_Gender_fv.pdf)

[15_Joint_Statement_on_Gender_fv.pdf/Mexico_Agenda_5_%20General_Debate_2024-08-15_Joint_Statement_on_Gender_fv.pdf](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/Mexico_Agenda_5_%20General_Debate_2024-08-15_Joint_Statement_on_Gender_fv.pdf) (own translation).

completing risk assessments that consider gender-based violence.^[250] Finally, just as it is important to use formal forums for exchange, such as the Conferences of States Parties and the DIEF, it is also important to maximise opportunities for sharing good practices and lessons learned with colleagues from other States Parties and civil society in more informal settings, such as the International Seminar in Fortaleza. As will be seen in section 4 of this document, these forums for exchange, organised by civil society, help to propose practical and joint solutions to shared challenges.

WORKING DOCUMENT - RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION

[250] Stimson Center and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, *The Arms Trade Treaty's Gender-Based Violence Risk Assessment: A Questionnaire for Information Sources* (Stimson and International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 2021), <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/GBV-Report-WEB-final1-1.pdf>

3.4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, ASSISTANCE AND INVOLVEMENT

This section presents a compilation of some sustained efforts at cooperation, assistance, and international engagement in the region. The efforts highlighted have focused on strengthening the implementation of the ATT and arms control. This section seeks to recognise various ongoing efforts, but it is only illustrative, as a comprehensive mapping is beyond the scope of this discussion document.^[251]

- **Global initiatives:** In 2016, the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) of the ATT Secretariat was created with the aim of financing projects that promote the objectives of the Treaty.^[252] With the support of the VTF, multiple efforts have been made in the region to promote the implementation of the ATT.^[253] For example, Costa Rica carried out a project, in conjunction with the Technological Institute of Costa Rica and the Technological Foundation of Costa Rica (FUNDATEC), to develop a digital platform that facilitates inter-institutional coordination of the control system.^[254] Another ongoing effort is the European Union Arms Export Control Programme (EU P2P Partner Export Control Programme for arms) and its EU ATT Outreach Programme.^[255] The programme, and its various phases/projects, have focused on disseminating the ATT and providing technical support to strengthen arms export control measures.^[256] This effort is supported by the German Federal Office for Trade and Export Control (BAFA), the Government of the Republic of France, and Expertise France.^[257] In the region, for example, Colombia has participated in several institutional capacity-building activities, such as regulatory coordination and modernisation, to address the provisions of the ATT.^[258]
- **Regional initiatives:** UNLIREC offers support to Latin American and Caribbean countries to align their practices and regulatory frameworks with the provisions of the ATT and other international instruments; a flagship example in the region is UNLIREC's "ATT Implementation Course" (ATT-IC).^[259] UNLIREC also offers other courses to states in the region, such as its "Course on Interception of Arms, Ammunition, Parts and Components" (ISAAPC).^[260] In addition to the assistance courses, UNLIREC, working with

[251] For a more comprehensive overview of assistance projects related to the ATT in the region, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) website offers a publicly accessible database, see: "Arms Trade Treaty: Mapping ATT-Relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities", (SIPRI), complete up to 2022. Website: <https://att-assistance.org/>

[252] See: ATT Secretariat, Voluntary Trust Fund, <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/voluntary.html>

[253] ATT Secretariat, *Report On The Work Of The ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) For The Period August 2023 to August 2024* (Arms Trade Treaty, 19 July 2024), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper->

[images/file/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN.pdf](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN.pdf)

[254] ATT Secretariat, *Report On The Work Of The ATT Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) For The Period August 2023 to August 2024* (Arms Trade Treaty, 19 July 2024), <https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper->

[images/file/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN.pdf](https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN/ATT_CSP10_VTF_Report%20on%20the%20Work%20of%20the%20VTF%20for%20the%20Period%202023-2024_EN.pdf)

[255] EU P2P Partner Export Control Programme for arms – ATT, European Union, website: <https://www.eup2p.eu/home-common>. See also: EU ATT Outreach Programme, (European Union and BAFA, 2014), <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/research/disarmament/dualuse/pdf-archive-att/pdfs/eu-the-att-outreach-project.pdf>

[256] EU P2P Partner Export Control Programme for arms – ATT, European Union, website: <https://www.eup2p.eu/home-common>

[257] EU P2P Partner Export Control Programme for arms – ATT, European Union, website: <https://www.eup2p.eu/home-common>

[258] "Foreign Ministry sponsors new national assistance workshop for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty", Colombian Foreign Ministry, 19 December 2023., <https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/newsroom/news/cancilleria-auspicio-nuevo-taller-asistencia-nacional-implementacion-tratado-comercio>

[259] See, for example: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), "UNLIREC provides assistance to the Dominican Republic in the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty", 15 February 2019, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/tag/building-state-capacity-to-implement-the-arms-trade-treaty/>

[260] United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), "UNLIREC realizó el Curso de Interceptación de Armas, Municiones, Partes y Componentes (CIAMP) virtual con la Autoridad Nacional de Aduanas de Panamá", 22 November 2021., <https://www.unlirec.org/unlirec-realizo-el-curso-de-intercepcion-de-armas-municiones-partes-y-componentes-ciamp-virtual-con-la-autoridad-nacional-de-aduanas-de-panama/>

partners in the region, supports the various Roadmaps (see Part 1).^[261] In the region, in addition to providing technical support materials to countries in the region, the OAS continues its efforts to establish a Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA) as a standardised system for information exchange.^[262] The MCTA will be fundamental in facilitating cross-border cooperation and streamlining the exchange of information, highlighting the importance of digitising processes and systems.

- **National initiatives:** To continue the implementation of the ATT, countries in the region have taken the lead in different ways. Some ways to advance the implementation of the ATT, which this document has identified, include participating in Governmental Expert Groups and Working Groups in multilateral processes, promoting the ATT by chairing Conferences of States Parties, offering South-South technical cooperation, establishing working groups to improve inter-institutional coordination, and sharing experiences with neighbouring countries. Other important efforts in the region come in the form of disaggregated data collection, from victimisation surveys to annual reports linking the illicit proliferation of firearms to impacts on gender-based violence. Finally, it should be noted that several countries in the region have worked with external entities to carry out independent evaluations and identify areas for improvement. These studies are, for the most part, confidential and offer recommendations for strengthening national systems in a comprehensive manner, resulting in useful and practical inputs.

[261] See: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) and Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), "Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030", UNLIREC and CARICOM IMPACS, 2023, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/caribbean-firearms-roadmap/>;

Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), "Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives", OAS and UNLIREC, 2025, https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

[262] "Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition (MCTA)," Organization of American States (OAS), Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, June 2025 (date accessed), <https://www.oas.org/ext/es/seguridad/mcta>

PART 4: CONCLUSION AND INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR THE FORTALEZA ACTION PLAN

CONCLUSION

Advancing the implementation of the ATT and other related instruments is key for security in Latin America and the Caribbean. The good news is that fundamental structures and mechanisms already exist in the region. Considering that this discussion document seeks to encourage constructive actions in the implementation of the ATT and related instruments, this conclusion proposes areas for accelerating positive impact. Therefore, this section offers points that should be understood as areas of progress and inspiration to build on the advances already present in the region, calling them green points or the initial proposal of the Fortaleza Action Plan (Fortaleza refers to the place where these issues were discussed during the referenced International Seminar). These points should be understood as interconnected and complementary. Based on the general points, a series of actions adapted to each national context could be developed, if interest is expressed, to further advance progress.

INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR THE FORTALEZA ACTION PLAN

The Action Plan proposal presented below (in its initial version) incorporates inputs discussed during the International Seminar 'Facing the Challenges in Implementing the Arms Trade Treaty: Preventing Diversion and Promoting Gender Integration in Latin America, held in Fortaleza, Brazil, from 25 to 27 June 2025, and develops them in greater detail.^[263] In particular, it is based on contributions generated during a final session in which concrete proposals were presented aimed at strengthening the implementation of the treaty and its objectives, with an emphasis on preventing diversion and its impact, and incorporating a gender perspective. The discussion in Fortaleza also considered issues addressed in related international instruments, such as the PoA/ITI, Global Framework on Ammunition, CIFTA, among others.

This initial version of the proposed action plan is based on input provided by government representatives, parliamentarians, and civil society representatives who contributed during the seminar. The initial proposal attempts to reflect the main issues and dimensions identified as priorities by the participants during the meeting and proposes measures to continue moving forward. It is important to clarify that, although the general issues were discussed at the International Seminar in Fortaleza, the Action Plan was not agreed upon or signed by the national representatives, and the proposed action plan reflected in this document was developed by APP in more detail after the Seminar concluded. The inclusion of a point does not necessarily mean that national representatives or their institutions have agreed to it or endorse it, nor that they will do so.

[263] It is important to clarify that, although the general topics were discussed at the International Seminar in Fortaleza, the Action Plan was not agreed upon or signed by the national representatives, and the version reflected in this document was developed after the Seminar. The inclusion of a particular point does not mean that the national representatives agreed upon it or endorse it.

The Fortaleza Action Plan proposal (initial version) is based on collective contributions shared during the International Seminar, which were then developed and organised by APP according to thematic approaches. The Fortaleza Action Plan proposal is consistent with many of the actions in the Roadmaps already in place in the region.^[264] This document recognises the importance of the Roadmaps adopted by participating States and the institutional endorsement they have from regional organizations and implementation partners. In addition to promoting security in the region, this initial proposal for the Fortaleza Action Plan also seeks to support the success of these Roadmaps. It is important to clarify that this proposed Action Plan does not seek to replace any international, regional, or national commitments, nor the aforementioned Roadmaps; it only seeks to promote constructive actions in favour of security in the region. For more details on two Roadmaps in the region, see Part 1.

This proposed Fortaleza Action Plan is in its initial version and is still being developed. Therefore, the points should be considered as a list open to changes, additions, corrections, and edits, as it is a 'living' plan, developed from collective input. All comments and contributions aimed at strengthening this proposal are welcome, with the aim of making it a useful tool for deepening regional commitment and moving towards a safer Latin America.

POINT 1: CONTINUE TRAINING STAFF AT THE RESPONSIBLE INSTITUTIONS

Focus: Personal

- Raise awareness among staff about the benefits and obligations of the ATT and other related instruments, particularly regarding the implementation of Article 7(4) of the ATT.
- Strengthen the technical capabilities of staff assigned to digital/IT systems, especially during the adoption of new technologies.
- Promote spaces for learning and discussion on advances in interventions (and the evidence that supports them) for the prevention of armed violence in all its forms.

POINT 2: CONTINUE TO IMPROVE NATIONAL INFORMATION CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Focus: Systems

- Review, where necessary, national control systems and the performance of their components, taking into account the results and recommendations of evaluations carried out by independent bodies (e.g. research institutes).
- Advance the digitisation of records and processes.
- Disaggregate statistics on armed violence, considering gender, sex, age, socioeconomic factors, location, time, associated risk factors, and the relationship between the affected party(ies), the perpetrator(s), the weapon, and its point of filtration/diversion (if in an irregular situation)

[264] See: United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) and Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (CARICOM IMPACS), "Roadmap for Implementing the Caribbean Priority Actions on the Illicit Proliferation of Firearms and Ammunition across the Caribbean in a Sustainable Manner by 2030", UNLIREC and CARICOM IMPACS, 2023, <https://www.unlirec.org/en/publicacion/caribbean-firearms-roadmap/>;

Organization of American States and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), "Central America and Dominican Republic Roadmap to Prevent Illicit Trafficking and Proliferation of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives", OAS and UNLIREC, 2025., https://www.unlirec.org/wp-content/uploads/Hoja-de-Ruta-CA-vf_EN.pdf

POINT 3: CONTINUE INCORPORATING ADVANCED MARKING AND TRACING MEASURES

Focus: Marking and tracing

- Implement measures to mark firearms and ammunition with detailed institutional or commercial assignment codes.
 - Consider adopting technological advances (e.g., chemical tagging technology in ammunition).
- Systematically cooperate with all tracing requests, at all levels.
 - Consider the differentiated gender impacts in documented cases of diversion.

POINT 4: CONTINUE WITH IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION STOCKPILES

Focus: Stocks

- Improve the management and transparency of state stockpiles, and the monitoring/oversight of stocks held by private individuals/civilians.
- Adopt standardized operating procedures for the destruction of firearms and ammunition.
- Control and document the distribution and allocation (and transport) of firearms within the national territory.

POINT 5: CONTINUE WITH REGULATORY REVIEWS CONSIDERING A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Focus: Regulations

- Review legislation on firearms, ammunition, and diversion considering a comprehensive gender perspective.
- Take measures to deny access to firearms to individuals convicted of domestic or gender-based violence.

POINT 6: CONTINUE TO IMPROVE INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

Focus: Institutions

- Consolidate formal inter-institutional spaces by integrating all actors that regulate trade and arms control (e.g., defence, interior, justice, customs, health, gender, economy, statistical units, among other offices).
 - Facilitate the implementation of agreed inter-agency procedures to ensure that information is shared in a timely manner.
- Consider the benefits of establishing multisectoral advisory bodies with the participation of civil society and academia.
- Establish procedures to ensure institutional memory in the event of officer/staff turnover.

POINT 7: CONTINUE PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION SPACES

Focus: Cooperation

- Use the OAS Regional Communication Mechanism on Licit Transfers of Firearms and Ammunition.
- Support and promote international and regional cooperation spaces, emphasizing strategies to prevent diversion and gender-based violence.
- Promote confidence-building measures among States Parties to the ATT.

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PART 5: OPEN QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

This section presents initial questions to encourage dialogue.

- This document focuses on SALW. Is there a need to reconsider this approach and focus on all eight categories of conventional weapons covered by the ATT?
- This document seeks synergies and complementarities between the ATT, the PoA and other relevant instruments. Do you consider this approach to be appropriate? If so, what else should be done to deepen synergies between instruments?
- What would you add or remove from the list of green points and the initial proposal of the Fortaleza Action Plan?
- Would it be advisable to jointly develop specific indicators to strengthen risk assessment processes in the region?
- Considering the different national contexts, what support is needed to continue strengthening the implementation of the ATT and other related instruments?
- Recognising that budgets are currently under review, could this be seen as an opportunity to focus even more on prevention?
- Are country profiles useful for identifying good practices? Could this help to exchange good practices and lessons learned?
- How can the “full life cycle” approach to arms and ammunition control be deepened?
- What other practical measures should be deepened in the region?
- Would a compendium of practical tools available in the region be useful?

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ANNEXES

The annexes are available by following [this hyperlink](#).

In addition to being available for consultation, the annexes are also available electronically so that comments, clarifications, corrections, criticisms, and additions can be collected. To enter your comments, you can highlight the text where you want to add the comment, select the 'Add comment' icon, or click on the comment button in the toolbar. The document is already accessible as a commentator.

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