


The English Conquest of
JAMAICA

CARLA GARDINA PESTANA



Oliver Cromwell's Bid for Empire

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For Drew Cayton, 1954–2015

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Note on Dates and Spellings

The English year began on March 25 until the mid-eighteenth century, long after January 1 became the start of the year in the rest of Europe. Dates between January 1 and March 25 have been assigned a split year: 1654/5, following the (erratically employed) convention of the time.

Quotations appear here as in the originals, although I have silently altered letters then considered interchangeable (u/v, i/j) to their modern usage. Quirky spellings can usually be deciphered phonetically, but where the intended word is doubtful I have supplied it parenthetically. Even the spelling of surnames varied. In those cases, I have chosen the spelling most commonly employed by the individuals in question, the name under which they published in their lifetime, or the simplest variant, in that order.



The Caribbean, circa 1660



Introduction

IN A BREATHTAKINGLY BOLD PLAN, Oliver Cromwell aimed to conquer all of Spanish America. England's Lord Protector sent a massive fleet manned by thousands of soldiers and sailors to the Caribbean. His audacious move took the European world by surprise: before this expedition sailed in 1654, England had been a minor player in the wider Atlantic world. After a decade and a half of internal upheaval—war, regicide, and revolution—England pivoted to confront the mighty Spanish monarchy. Wild speculations circulated about Cromwell's intentions, sustained by bogus news reports that broadcast fanciful information recounting stunning victories. Everyone, no matter what their sentiments about Cromwell, assumed he would continue to triumph, as he had done so frequently over the course of his storied military career. Observers in Europe and throughout the Atlantic waited with bated breath, eager to learn the purpose and the outcome of this colossal undertaking.

Cromwell's scheme had far-reaching consequences. The English succeeded in conquering Jamaica, an island far larger than any they held in the West Indies and one seated at its heart. Cromwell's government, the first in English history to mount a large-scale invasion in the Americas, deployed the state's newly expanded capabilities, which had swelled during civil wars and wars of conquest in Ireland and Scotland. The use of the navy and new modes of state finance anticipated Britain's role as a major naval power with a global empire. The state reversed decades of disregard to engage actively in the affairs of its Atlantic outposts. Henceforth, it pursued commercial policies to funnel colonial profits into English coffers, organized structures of imperial governance,

and directed contributions to its military and territorial agendas. The scheme, mounted secretly, earned its name as a result of efforts to keep its purpose hidden from view. Initially contemporaries gestured toward it as the “present design,” but once it became known that it aimed at an (as yet undefined) American target, they began to use the phrase “Western Design.”¹ The conquest reconfigured the geopolitics of the central Caribbean, opening it to non-Spanish colonizers and traders, pulling France into a contest for regional supremacy and ultimately—after over a decade of warfare—forcing Spain to accede to the English presence. Finally, the conquest moved the Caribbean to the center of the Atlantic economy, furthering the scope for slave-based production of tropical crops. An English Jamaica changed the Caribbean, the Atlantic world, and England’s imperial engagement irrevocably.

The Design aspired to large gains, but ultimately captured only Jamaica—and briefly the island of Tortuga. In the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, ending fifteen years of warfare, the English finally forced the Spanish to recognize their colonies and accept the presence of their ships in the Caribbean Sea. This acquiescence reversed the previous Spanish position that defined any English person in the West Indies as an intruder and a pirate. Jamaica was well placed to serve as a transshipment point for trade to Spanish ports, a future that seemed unlikely given endemic hostilities; yet James, the Duke of York, perceived Jamaica’s potential in this regard as a hub for trade in enslaved Africans and pursued it beginning in the 1660s. Decades before Jamaica emerged as a major sugar producer and market for slaves, it facilitated their sale elsewhere. The undertaking proved transformative, even though the campaign did not bring the end to Habsburg Spanish dominance in the Americas that Cromwell had envisioned.

Starting with the Design and ending with an English Jamaica that appeared likely to persist, *The English Conquest of Jamaica* charts how Cromwell’s grand vision narrowed to carving an island colony out of the heart of Spanish America. The book explores events from planning and preparation, through the attempt on the island of Hispaniola, to the invasion of Jamaica. It also considers the cultural conversation these events elicited—the expectations it raised, the efforts to understand the catastrophic defeat on Hispaniola, and the imaginings of a future for Jamaica under English rule. Later chapters probe the English island’s early history: its struggles over high mortality, the complex project of defining

and achieving military victory, and the work necessary to creating a settler society. On Jamaica, the men dispatched on the campaign gradually shifted from the work of conquest to the practicalities of launching a colony. While military and naval campaigns constituted familiar work for the revolutionary regimes of the mid-seventeenth century, the Design introduced unfamiliar elements. Distance, the tropical setting, and the unexpected exertions involved in establishing an English colony demanded different approaches. Jamaica came to the English as a result of the first direct state engagement in Atlantic expansion. This campaign represented the first attempt by any English government to conquer the colony of another power in the Americas or to oversee directly the creation of such a distant outpost. Previously such work had been farmed out to individuals or companies. While Cromwell had imagined a larger canvas for his Spanish American project, the laborious colonization of a single island became a priority.

A comparative wealth of sources makes this study possible. Anyone who has researched the mid-seventeenth-century English Atlantic knows that colonial records survive at wildly uneven rates. New England (particularly Massachusetts Bay Colony) occupies one end of the spectrum—replete with church, town, governmental, and even personal records—whereas the West Indies suffer from relative dearth. Yet the Western Design generated an exceptional range and depth of sources: journals, correspondence with governmental officials and family members, and official records of the army, navy, and colony. The abundance of such records signals the importance of these events to contemporaries. With attention turned on the English Caribbean as never before, more documents were produced, and more survived, flowing through official channels despite revolutionary disruptions.²

These sources have been largely overlooked or used without regard for their origins or context. Historians of the early Caribbean routinely quote Henry Whistler's derisive comment about the despicable character of Barbados inhabitants (as one of only a handful of such observations dating to the seventeenth century) but rarely consider how Whistler's association with the highly unpopular Design fleet shaped his assessment that Barbados was "the Dunghill wharone England doth cast forth its rubidg."³ That the early Caribbean was mired in social dysfunctionality continues to shape our understanding. This analytical lens helped distance the brutal slaveholding society from its parent country

in Europe, a comforting but misleading view that Susan Amussen has recently corrected.⁴ The record yields perspectives overwhelmingly male and European, an unremarkable fact given the time and place, but perhaps exacerbated by the military or naval origins of many records. Still, reading against its grain offers glimpses of the women and the African and Indian peoples involved. One example can illustrate this point. On the island of Hispaniola, the English army encountered an African man who spoke both English and Spanish. He told them he had been a servant of Sir Thomas Warner—governor of English St. Christopher until his death in 1649—until the Spanish captured and enslaved him. Was he the one who made the distinction between English servitude and Spanish slavery? It behooved him to claim a higher status under the English since he was about to throw his lot in with them, and it might affect how he was treated once they succeeded in taking the island. Perhaps the English writer introduced this variation, which aligned with the widespread assumption that subordination to the English was an improvement on oppression under the Spanish. Attending to such cases and the nuances they raise opens alternative perspectives.⁵ Throughout, my approach is to present the history as much as possible from the perspective of participants.⁶ While these actors could be brutal and arrogant, my primary aim is to understand their intentions and recount their experiences, rather than critique their prejudices and ethics.

The Design signified a major shift in the nature of English interactions with the wider world, one recognized at the time. News of it sent men throughout Europe and around the Atlantic basin scrambling, fearful that the potent Lord Protector aimed to attack them.⁷ To take one example, the governor of Spanish Florida, fearing an imminent threat from England, demanded that the Timucuan and Apalachee communities contribute military service to the Florida's defense; he did so with inept disregard for customary practices, prompting a native rebellion.⁸ Such unanticipated reverberations touched many communities. Coverage of these events reached remarkable levels, in print media and in both private and official correspondence. It led to the suppression of newsweeklies in England, as Cromwell attempted to control the flow of information.⁹ In taking Jamaica, the English heightened competition and international tensions in the Caribbean. The region has routinely been characterized as mired in constant warfare, a result

of a general policy of “no peace beyond the line,” but in fact that view simplifies a more complex reality. The English invaded the Caribbean motivated to correct what they perceived to be a geopolitical anomaly—the claim of Spain to exclusive control of a vast region—not because they perceived it as a place where international rules did not apply.¹⁰ Seizing Jamaica prompted a new phase in West Indian interactions, one of increased interimperial conflicts. It incidentally and temporarily increased the importance of privateering in the region, frequently treated as a distinct phenomenon rather than as a minor aspect of a larger geopolitical shift.

Jamaica’s conquest arose out of a revolutionary movement; it expressed the ambitions and prejudices of that moment. By the mid-1650s, the English Revolution had reached its height. Charles I had lost two civil wars and his head, executed under the authority of Parliament for his crimes against his people. The new government sent Oliver Cromwell to reconquer Ireland, which had been in rebellion against English rule since the uprising of 1641, and to subdue Scotland, which had been joined to England by a shared monarch since 1603 but never before conquered by its neighbor to the south. This string of military successes made England envied and feared throughout Europe, and Oliver Cromwell—once an obscure Cambridgeshire gentleman—gained a reputation as a brilliant general and an influential revolutionary leader. His success catapulted him into a leading role in English politics, winning him in 1654 the position of Lord Protector over not only England but also Ireland, Scotland, and “the dominions thereunto belonging.” His newly attained position gave him the power to send William Penn (father of the Pennsylvania founder) and Robert Venables (formerly Cromwell’s inferior officer in the campaign to subdue Ireland) at the head of a fleet and an army to Spanish America.

Cromwell’s government embraced the Design in a moment of optimism and seemingly unlimited opportunity. The king had been vanquished, and the former kingdoms and dominions of the Stuarts brought under the new state’s authority. The newly created position of Lord Protector, although controversial among revolutionaries dedicated to the republic it had displaced, seemed to offer a stronger central government poised to complete a workable revolutionary settlement. English negotiators had just concluded peace with the Dutch (forcing them to accept humiliating terms to end the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652–54);

Cromwell hoped they would also secure an elaborate alliance between his government and that of the United Provinces. Both Spain and France were vying for a pact as well, each eager to direct the Protector's power against the other. The state enjoyed better financing and commanded a mightier navy than the Stuarts ever claimed. Military triumphs and a colossal navy elevated Cromwell's England far above its reputation under Charles I, when a timid and inept foreign policy embarrassed many. As the naval historian N. A. M. Rodger points out, the republic and the early Protectorate "built the same tonnage of warships in four years (1651–55) as the monarchy had built in over half a century between 1588 and 1642."¹¹ To address needed social and religious reforms, Cromwell planned to appoint major generals charged with overseeing local government and to erect a system vetting men who staffed the nation's pulpits. As these elements of the revolutionary agenda came together, the idea that England could finally confront the Spanish in the Americas did not seem outlandish. What came later—the disappointments of the Design, the outcry against the major generals, and the collapse of the revolution after Cromwell's death—makes it easy to overlook this moment of optimism, when triumph in America and a permanent revolutionary settlement in England both seemed possible.¹²

The English believed that the object of the Western Design, the Spanish Empire in the Americas, offered the perfect combination of great wealth and endemic vulnerability. All English expansion into the Americas occurred under the shadow of Spain. As the first Europeans established there, the Spanish claimed most of both continents: since the late fifteenth century, they had conquered and settled its most valuable sections. By the mid-seventeenth century the Spanish monarchs financed a massive global empire with mineral wealth extracted from American mines. Great riches and the immense extent of Spanish holdings made it a tempting target, and any European state at war with Spain since the mid-sixteenth century dispatched ships to the West Indies to attack settlements and attempt the capture of the ships transporting silver back to Cadiz. Defending the empire's far-flung territory was an expensive proposition, and eliminating intruders entirely had long since proved impossible. Indeed, the imperial administration seemed ineffectual from two vantage points. England and others had founded a few small and comparatively insignificant colonies in the Americas, indicating that Spain could no longer maintain its monopoly; and some

Spanish colonists willingly engaged in contraband trade with interlopers despite prohibitions. In Europe during the 1640s, the Habsburg position appeared significantly weakened: in 1640 Portugal revolted against Spanish rule, in a contest that continued at the time of the Design (and would end in Portuguese independence in 1663), and in 1648 the Dutch concluded their long struggle to break away from Habsburg rule with a victory enshrined in the Peace of Westphalia. Encouraged by such cracks in the Spanish system, the English thought they saw a weak and vulnerable imperial power ripe for attack. Less awed than their predecessors had been by the Spanish, the men behind the revolution believed the myth of Spain's decline.

One man in particular advocated for the Design and plausibly supported the declension narrative.¹³ Thomas Gage had been born into an English recusant Catholic family in Surrey around 1603, schooled on the Continent, and eventually became a Dominican. In violation of various policies, Gage managed to live in New Spain for an extended period. Eventually he left his order, renounced his Catholicism, married, and became a Protestant clergyman.¹⁴ He advocated intervention in Spanish America, writing an account of his experiences, published in 1648 as *The English-American his Travail by Sea and Land: Or, A New Survey of the West-India's*. At that time his preface urged then-parliamentary general Sir Thomas Fairfax to champion the Protestant cause in the "West Indies." Once Fairfax retired, Gage shifted his persuasive skills to Cromwell. He depicted the Spanish as an easy target, indolent and debauched. Gage marshaled many of the arguments that informed the religious underpinnings of the Design: the need to thwart Spanish Catholicism, the bogus nature of the claims upon which Spanish dominion rested, the fundamental opposition between the Protestant and Catholic faiths, the need to protect not only Protestants but Indians and Africans from Spanish outrages.¹⁵ Gage helped to bring the scheme to fruition with his vigorous advocacy and his detailed knowledge. When his project finally succeeded, he returned to the Caribbean with the expeditionary forces to serve as General Robert Venables's personal chaplain.

The Design's long-term goal was nothing less than the complete conquest of Spain's Atlantic empire. As Cromwell explained, "Wee thinke, and it is much designed amongst us, to strive with the Spanyard for the mastery of all those seas."¹⁶ From the perspective of Cromwell and his

advisers, an attack on the Spanish West Indies had much to recommend it. Capturing the great wealth generated out of Peruvian and Mexican silver mines would not only strengthen the state but would undermine the king of Spain's ability to make war.¹⁷ A succession of revolutionary governments in England since the execution of Charles I in 1649 had calculated foreign policy in part on the likelihood that any course would foster an alliance for the displaced heir of the dead king (the future Charles II, whom they pointedly referred to as "Charles Stuart"); they expected Spain to do little in support of the ousted monarch. Indeed, the English thought that the Spanish were so weak that they would be unlikely to retaliate.¹⁸ The Design, were it to seize silver mines or at least the plate fleet carrying the mines' annual profits to Europe, would finance all the revolutionary state's needs, cement the reputation of the Protector's regime, and create suitable work for its naval forces.¹⁹ Although such prosaic concerns contributed to the decision, the Design appeared the proper culmination to years of effort that had gone into capturing control of England and pushing it in the desired direction.

The Design propelled the English into a new belligerence in the wider Atlantic, but in this course, as in much else in this era, they in some senses followed in Dutch footsteps. The Dutch West India Company had recently relinquished Brazil, after three decades of holding a portion of that Iberian colony. Dutch aggression in this case had been tied up with the Netherlands' own effort to win independence from the Habsburgs. The company grabbed Bahia in 1624, as part of the seemingly interminable Dutch war of independence; Portugal from 1580 to 1640 was under the Habsburgs' composite monarchy, which made Brazil a potential target. Working to cripple Spain's worldwide empire in various theaters through its two companies—the East and West India companies—the Dutch pursued a multipronged strategy of assailing holdings, interrupting trade, and capturing resources. Expanding the area under their sway into the next decade, the company eventually controlled half of the settled portion of Brazil. Portuguese colonists rose against Dutch rule and won the colony back by 1654.²⁰ In taking part of Brazil, the Dutch dispatched a sizable fleet—twenty-six ships—from Europe to conquer an established colony, and in both respects anticipated the Western Design. Going the Dutch one better, however, when the English took Jamaica, a European state not only captured but retained a rival European colony.

Although their prize represented a lesser achievement, the English kept it, eventually making it an important part of their imperial holdings.

The official position of the Spanish Habsburgs remained in 1655 what it had been a century before: England had no right to enter the Caribbean, much less trade or colonize there. This stance extended to all non-Iberians with the partial exception of the Dutch after 1648, as the treaty signed that year allowed the latter to continue sailing where they customarily had gone; although no mention was made of the colonies the Dutch West India Company held in the Caribbean, the provision might be taken to permit their presence on a handful of small West Indian islands. Otherwise any colony could meet the fate of the French in Florida (1564–65) or the English attempt at Providence Island off the coast of Nicaragua (1629–41). Both earned removal by the Spanish—the earlier Florida case with considerably more violence than the later case—on the grounds that these locations were dangerously proximate to Spanish sea lanes. Despite English occupation of half a dozen islands as well as Surinam by 1654, Spain in no way acknowledged these claims. Over a decade had passed since the Spanish had attacked an English-held colony, but they had not renounced their purported right to do so. Spanish claims to unoccupied territory rested in part, as Cromwell dismissively expressed it, on the “pretence of the pope’s donation.”²¹ Here he referenced the late fifteenth-century papal bulls granting the Spanish responsibility for the souls of the indigenous peoples of the Americas (save for Brazil, which came under the authority of the Portuguese). The Spanish officially closed their ports to outside traders, as indeed the English had recently done with their own Navigation Act. Spanish authorities enforced this policy by seizing ships and cargoes as well as by imprisoning crews. Cromwell had information on those incidents compiled, listing traders murdered, forced into hard labor, or denied the right to exercise their (Protestant and so in Spanish terms heretical) faith.²² Cromwell joined with many of his compatriots in finding many elements of Spanish West Indian policy objectionable.

The English had intermittently contested this state of affairs. Initial forays conducted contraband trade with willing settlers or sacked towns and captured ships. When trading voyages met with local intransigence, English ship captains might attempt to force trade. Sometimes these encounters staged the appearance of coercion to demonstrate that colonists

had no recourse but to engage in illegal transactions, but at other times they turned violent. Raids on Spanish America originated in Europe, and the vast majority of those who participated in depredations carried authorization. The most recent assaults (1642–43) had been the work of Captain William Jackson. Commissioned by England's then Lord High Admiral, the Earl of Warwick, to avenge the Spanish seizure of Providence Island, Jackson led a small force, including some island recruits, against lesser Spanish towns and islands, culminating in Jamaica.²³ Such campaigns did not match the more dramatic instance of English harassment associated with the likes of Sir Francis Drake in the previous century: his 1572–73 Panama expedition in alliance with the *cimarróns* brought more treasure, while the sweep through the region in 1585–86 embarrassed the Spanish militarily, persuading them to increase defenses of their major ports.²⁴ From the 1560s until the early years of the seventeenth century, English ships had undertaken countless voyages of plunder. Once the English turned to erecting their own colonies, however, English settlements and ships became vulnerable to Spanish attacks. As a result of Spanish aggression against the provocatively placed Providence Island Colony (1629–41), the company that led it obtained licenses to retaliate through privateering activities. When, on a third attempt, a Spanish expedition finally cleared the island of settlers, it affirmed the sense among English settlers elsewhere of the wisdom of avoiding confrontation.

When it came to settlement (rather than trade and plunder), Providence Island proved the exception, whereas the rule chose circumspection. To avoid directly confronting mighty Spain, would-be settlers carefully selected locations without a Spanish presence, and, usually, away from areas of active engagement. The Design expedition included some men, such as Andrew Carter, who had been in Providence and hoped to avenge its loss. Generally, however, the Dutch, French, Swedish, and English located outposts on the fringes of the Caribbean or in the inaccessible (and relatively unattractive) northern reaches of North America. Since the mid-1620s, English men and women had established a handful of colonies along the eastern rim of the Caribbean Sea: St. Christopher (shared with France) along with Antigua, Montserrat, Nevis, and Barbados. These colonies were small, and from the Spanish point of view, remote from their areas of central concern.²⁵ Embarking on the capture of Jamaica marked the first major departure from this

long-standing policy of nibbling away at the edges of Spanish America. The invasion and Jamaica's subsequent history thrust the English into the lives of the Spanish and African residents of that island, launching a guerrilla war and opening the way for unprecedented (on the English side) interactions with African-descended peoples in the Americas. The history of early English Jamaica is entangled with the Spanish, as Eliga Gould would have it, but also with the Indians and Africans in their colonies.²⁶

If Jamaica departed in the provocative nature of its genesis, it also did so in that the state launched it. Christopher Hill understated the case when he declared that the Design denoted "England's first state-backed grab for colonies in the New World."²⁷ The effort was not only performed with the state's backing (as had been the case with many colonies before) but was also state launched, financed, and managed. Before Jamaica, all colonies and trading posts, whether in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, or Asia, were the work of private individuals or companies. With royal permission to establish an outpost, these persons or groups organized financing, mounted voyages, recruited settlers or traders, supplied their initial needs (or, more likely, failed to do so), and accepted financial responsibility for the outcome. The monarchy directly controlled only one colony at the time of the outbreak of the English civil war, having acquired Virginia by revoking the ailing and bickering company's charter. While the English monarchs considered colonists to be subjects, and the lands they settled to be part of their dominions, they seldom dealt directly with them. Until 1655, the state itself made no effort to expand the reach of the nascent English empire. When the massive invasion force departed from Portsmouth in 1654, it inaugurated a new approach. With Jamaica, the state actively engaged in expansion for the first time. Future governments, especially the restored monarchy from 1660, interacted more fully and regularly with their far-flung possessions, increasing the reach of England's empire.

Although the English, as J. R. Seeley once quipped, preferred to think they had acquired their empire in a "fit of absence of mind," and although studies traditionally focus on nineteenth-century manifestations of the British Empire, all the basic components came into existence in the seventeenth century.²⁸ With the revolutionary regime soon to be displaced by the return of monarchy, the significance of the former's work has been easily overlooked. English history has traditionally been

organized around royal reigns and long-ago identified historical markers (such as the Restoration—1660—and the Glorious Revolution—1688). Despite being dismissed as a mere “interregnum,” this era—and the revolutionaries who guided it—brought lasting changes. When Parliament took charge of legislating trade restrictions for colonies, it began to treat them as a unit rather than as independent entities, each with its own negotiated relationship to central authority. It appointed bureaucrats to oversee colonial affairs, naming the first committees that would set the pattern for later Lords and then the Board of Trade. It began to create an imperial apparatus by systematizing the status of and policies governing colonies. These changes, usually identified as Restoration innovations, date from the 1650s. The monarchy would silently adopt such policies after the Restoration, as eager to accept various improvements in governance as it was loath to admit that its enemies had innovated where an ossified monarchy had been unable to do so. The Western Design marked the state’s biggest imperial undertaking to date, and it further stretched the state’s capabilities, effectively demanding that the emerging imperial apparatus expand.²⁹

Cromwell’s contemporaries recognized the monumental nature of the undertaking and appreciated the shift that an English Jamaica represented, so why has its importance been forgotten? Historians often label Jamaica a “consolation prize,” implying disappointingly modest results.³⁰ If we focus on the anti-Catholic rhetoric deployed by Cromwell and those around him, the Design can seem almost a latter-day religious crusade. Richard S. Dunn—author of an influential social history of the early English Caribbean—deemed the Design “an old-fashioned, Elizabethan-style freebooting search for Spanish gold” and a “Puritan crusade against the bloody papists.” The English historian John Morrill agreed, asserting that it arose from the belief that “God wanted the English Revolution exported so that the world could be rid of popery and the menace of the Antichrist.”³¹ For some, its religious elements prove it an unrealistic undertaking reminiscent of an outmoded Elizabethan Hispanophobia. Presenting the Design as backward-looking renders it inconsequential, leaving the origins of empire and an activist state to later historical moments that are more recognizably modern.³² Assuming a fundamental incompatibility between religious motivation and modernity reduces Cromwell (not to mention a revolution once labeled “puritan”) to a detour off the road to empire.

Early English Jamaica has been characterized—to the extent it has been studied at all—as an outpost mired in piracy until it was able to break free to pursue its destiny of sugar and slaves. Beginning with the assumption that the English seized Jamaica in order to spread the sugar regime that had recently emerged in Barbados, the long pause before that agenda began to shape the colony’s history appears anomalous. Dunn saw Jamaica as the preeminent example of a dysfunctional society, with a high death rate, “boisterous and disorderly” settlers, few English amenities, and fewer restraints on brutality. Originating in a misguided military campaign, English Jamaica was quickly overwhelmed by “freebooters” who sought to use the base for their ongoing depredations against the Spanish.³³ Although Dunn wisely avoided the label “pirate,” other authors have been less precise, collapsing various activities under that rubric.³⁴ Most agree that the island soon divided into two contending camps and that only when the planter faction finally won was Jamaica free to become a sugar-producing behemoth heavily reliant on enslaved labor. This paradigm, with its dismissal of the Design, its foregrounding of the early advent and uncontrolled nature of privateering, and its dichotomy between privateers and planters, dominates the island’s early English history. Other works on the first years, few as they are, do not generally challenge Dunn’s fundamental narrative.³⁵ *The English Conquest of Jamaica* questions all these verities about the colony’s first years. Neither pirates nor an overwhelming desire for sugar or a simple division over the island’s future will be found in what follows.

Mostly, however, the Design and the early history of Jamaica have been overlooked. This neglect conforms to a general tendency to ignore the more prosperous and valued Caribbean colonies in favor of the marginal mainland settlements that would eventually become the United States. The benefits arising from a Cromwellian Design sit uneasily within a British Empire of monarchy. The multivolume *Oxford History of the British Empire* dedicates a volume to the origins of empire, encompassing expansion to 1700. This organization intentionally grants the early period only a provisional place in the history of empire; even more significantly, the volume gives Jamaica a minor role in that emerging history. Editor Nicholas Canny’s opening essay rightly identified the Western Design as a major turning point, but the remainder of the volume reads as if he failed to persuade the other authors, who mentioned it

only incidentally or not all.³⁶ Whether for its overheated rhetoric, its outsized aims, or its relatively modest results, scholars tend to ignore the Design or drastically underplay its significance. Awareness of these events has increased, if only modestly, since 1927, when Roland D. Hussey pointed out that “the disgraceful fiasco of Penn and Venables at Santo Domingo in 1654, before they descended upon Jamaica, is still almost unknown to the English-speaking world, despite its crashing reverberations at the time.”³⁷ While Hussey’s scolding hit its mark, he put the invasion a year too early.

No one has appreciated how radically the Western Design altered English engagement in expansion, European geopolitics, and the map of the Caribbean. Cromwell failed to conquer Spanish America, but that fact should not obscure what his Design did accomplish. The Design introduced the challenges of conducting amphibious warfare in the tropics. If this would become the “quintessential warfare of European imperialism,” the learning curve proved steep and rocky, and future assaults on Caribbean possessions often ended little better.³⁸ Seizing Jamaica taught the state what a generation of private individuals had already learned about launching new colonies. While bringing England Jamaica, the Design also propelled the English state into the business of colonization; projected state power into the Atlantic arena, drawing on the newly gathered resources commanded by the Protectorate; established a permanent English beachhead in the Spanish sector of the Caribbean; and reshaped the region’s geopolitics.

Preparation

PREPARATIONS TO LAUNCH A major amphibious assault on Spanish America drew upon all the newly organized resources of the English state, demonstrating the unprecedented capabilities of the revolutionary government. The English revolutionaries, having expanded state power, moved to shape peripheral settlements using this increased state capacity. To contemporaries, the resources deployed and the secrecy maintained demonstrated the formidable reach of the Protectoral state. Only with hindsight (and a willingness to dismiss what was accomplished) can the planning phase be narrated as an exercise in futility. Successful reforms to the military, the navy, and state finance that had occurred during years of civil, archipelagic, and foreign wars made the campaign feasible. The enormity of the undertaking arose not just from the state's newfound confidence but also from its recently developed ability to deploy men, ships, and supplies. With the Western Design, England attempted to do this over vast distances, pointing toward an imperial future in which central authorities routinely commanded remote satellites to contribute to the realization of its policies. Envisioning and implementing the Design, its planners anticipated—and began to set the groundwork for—a future of British naval supremacy and global empire.

The goal of the expedition—conquest of the Spanish Empire in the Americas—was predicated upon two ideas widely held in mid-1650s England: that Spain only loosely grasped its New World possessions and that England's military capabilities far exceeded those of its chosen foe. Once the most powerful composite monarchy in Europe, the Spanish

Habsburgs were, by the mid-1650s, no longer as widely feared as they had once been. With a far-flung empire to defend, the monarch concentrated on protecting the treasure transported from silver mines at Potosí in Peru and from various locations in Mexico. The English perceived Spanish weakness as both systemic and individual—deeming not only the imperial defenses inadequate but also the character of Spanish colonists inferior. They routinely depicted the region's resident as lazy and decadent. Drawing on these perceptions, the English assumed that the conquest would be “easie.”¹ Schooled for many decades on the idea that the Spanish cruelly oppressed Indians and Africans, the English further assumed that these subjugated people would rise up in support of invading Protestant liberators. Supporting this tendency to dismiss the Spanish, the English also believed themselves able to field an army that would handily conquer Spanish America. This assessment was based on an arrogant view of their own superior character, as well as a more realistic appreciation of the potential created by the recent expansion of the English state's martial capabilities.

The plan dispatched a massive expedition to the West Indies, intent on conquering a succession of Spanish colonies. The fleet would transport an army of 7,000, along with all the needed materials—cannons, arms, ammunition, horses, victuals, and supplies—to sustain the campaign. Cromwell appointed a five-man commission with the requisite military, naval, and colonial experience to cover the range of duties such an undertaking entailed. Two highly accomplished men oversaw the military and naval components of the amphibious assaults. Three civilians supported the Design by recruiting additional men, organizing the further supply of the fleet, and serving as governor of the first colony seized. While England would yield up most of the needed men and materials, the existing West Indian colonies would provide additional recruits. Planners also calculated the constraints posed by hurricane season, aiming to fit the main work of the fleet into the months from December to May. The undertaking rivaled the most magnificent efforts of other European powers: larger fleets—including the famous Armada sent ineffectually against England in 1588—had been assembled, but rarely did they sail so far. The Dutch deployed fewer ships when they assailed Brazil; only the Spanish counteroffensive against that seizure marshaled more men (although in a similar number of vessels) to travel such great distances. For a minor state that had only recently achieved

standing as a naval power to attempt so much was remarkable.² The scheme addressed the challenges of distance by relying on a team of Commissioners (any three of whom could act in the absence of the others) and by including among them the governor of Barbados, England's most prosperous and populous Caribbean colony, to marshal local resources in support of the Design.

This bold scheme exploited newly achieved capabilities that emerged since the outbreak of civil war in 1642, the results of revolutions in finance, the military, and the navy. Prior to that, Charles I made modest strides toward building up the navy, which had been sorely neglected under his father. His vision for naval expansion ultimately floundered on the challenge of finance. Indeed, the effort to collect a tax from coastal and maritime towns to support the navy—so-called ship money—numbered among his subjects' grievances that led to war. The revolutionary state was freed from constraints that bound the king, and it adopted various innovative modes of finance, beginning with reforms launched by parliamentary leader John Pym in 1643. Parliament seized control of state finances and, aiming to increase income, took over the customs (the traditional support for the navy), expanded and regularized forms of direct taxation, and developed an excise tax. English taxpayers paid more in support of the state by the middle of the 1650s than ever before, and the expansion of the ability to raise funds—though unpopular—financed a standing army, the occupation of Scotland and Ireland, war with the Dutch, and the expedition to the West Indies.³ Looking at Europe as a whole, Jan Glete argues that the English Revolution sparked a naval arms race with vast consequences for the conduct of warfare throughout the region and in the wider Atlantic. The Western Design drew upon and furthered this revolution; it demanded massive expenditure and extensive planning. Long-distance amphibious campaigning in the tropics posed special challenges, and the Design marked the first such attempt in the history of the English state. Given the source of Cromwell's power within England itself—his role in and relation to the New Model Army—the fact that Europe feared him more for his navy was ironic, as N. A. M. Rodger has pointed out.⁴ With the anti-Spanish expedition, Cromwell deployed his strength in the service of expanding the power of revolutionary England.

Equally innovative was the reimagined relationship imperial officials behind the Design envisioned between the central state and distant

colonies. In their plans, England's scattered, embryonic colonial possessions figured as satellite locations where preparations could proceed apace and where a reservoir of English people awaited an opportunity to enlist in the scheme. Their vision—in which remote settlements contributed to imperial expansion by complying with numerous, varied, and often unexpected instructions from the center—reconfigured that relationship. Much of the work of expansion had been driven by investors in England and those who actually journeyed to the peripheries, a dynamic that shifted here. Already the republican government that ruled from 1649 until Cromwell came to power in 1654 had reimagined links between core and periphery, passing an innovative Navigation Act to harness colonial trade to benefit the English state and its merchant community. Cromwell as Lord Protector deputized William Penn to enforce the new economic policy, seizing any ships trading in contravention of the new regulations. Moving beyond this focus on trade, the Design further cast the settlements as active players in expansion, assuming both willingness and ability to contribute. This approach to empire building expected the colonial periphery to share the goals of the center and to assist in achieving them. Overseas expansion in this scenario became, if not self-replicating, at least able to generate resources toward its own growth. As the central government planned to extend its reach, it cast the periphery as lesser partners in this undertaking. Whether, as Jonathan Scott queried in his 2011 book, *When the Waves Ruled Britannia*, the empire built the state or the state created the empire, in this instance the center imagined an almost organic growth, with settlements generating wealth and people needed to spread English rule.⁵ The center devised growth but did not anticipate providing all that was needed to make it a reality.

This impressively bold project proceeded with the utmost secrecy. Cromwell's control over the military infrastructure in England was well demonstrated by his ability to keep the purpose of the Design from public view even while extensive preparations spanned many months and occupied many people. Collecting a fleet, men, and supplies to launch a large-scale amphibious invasion in the West Indies could not be hidden, as such a massive effort drew attention and comment. Not wanting to alert anyone to his intentions, the Protector ordered the few men who knew the nature and purpose of the Design to keep it absolutely quiet. At first, even senior officers were not told: "The Design was

too deep to be easily fathomed, being managed with such secrecy, that the chief Commanders both by Land and Sea, who were to put it in practice, knew not at first what they were about." Most who worked on the preparations—gathering arms and food stores or recruiting men—did so without knowing the fleet's destination. Not much more beyond the force's general destination was known for some time afterward.⁶ Similarly in the dark were those recruited or forced to participate. Wives of sailors and soldiers followed Cromwell's carriage through the streets, demanding to know where their husbands were bound.⁷

Whether or not the Protector remained undecided about whom to attack, the impression that the matter warranted debate enhanced security as well. A case could be made for assailing either Spain or France. Much speculation about the aim of the Design percolated through newsweeklies and personal correspondence within and beyond England. The king of Spain was suspicious and sent an envoy to investigate, but he had not determined what Cromwell intended by the time the fleet sailed. In fact, the Spanish would later complain that Cromwell launched what they viewed as an unprovoked war without any warning, in violation of diplomatic protocol.⁸ One Spanish spy inadvertently gained information needed to deduce the general target when he happened to see a map created for the Protector, and later learned that its seller had been told not to make other copies available. This suspicious circumstance—in itself prompted by the desire for secrecy—alerted him, in an incident that well illustrated the extent of the silence among those few who knew. A later critic further corroborated the clandestine nature of the enterprise when he asserted that secrecy was inappropriate in a godly commonwealth, preventing as it did soldiers from making an informed and prayerful decision about participating.⁹ Spanish ambassador Alonso de Cárdenas entertained suspicions but had difficulty convincing the King's Council based on the evidence he could garner.¹⁰ That a massive fleet could be dispatched with this level of secrecy indicated the extent of the control that Cromwell exercised over government officials but also the fact that the army, the navy, and government finance had grown in bureaucratic professionalism and sophistication over the previous decade.

Appointing the five-man commission represented an important first step to ensuring success. Cromwell named two military leaders (army general Venables, and naval "general" William Penn) and three other

men, all with colonial experience. This shared leadership was intended to resolve the problem of a campaign carried out far from England. While Penn would oversee the fleet, managing any seaborne elements and landing troops, Venables had charge of the land forces, which he would direct once Penn had delivered them safely to enemy territory. The other Commissioners were appointed for their local—or at least Atlantic—expertise. Edward Winslow, a former Plymouth Plantation governor, signed on to govern the new colony. Daniel Searle, governor of Barbados, received instructions to do all he could in support of the Design. Finally, Cromwell named a relatively obscure man, Gregory Butler, as the fifth Commissioner. Seemingly chosen for his colonial experience, Butler would recruit additional men once the fleet arrived in the islands. John Thurloe, Cromwell's secretary and not incidentally the chief of the government's network of spies, asked Winslow to pen independent assessments of the progress of the undertaking to help him keep apprised of events.¹¹

Years of war at land and sea gave Cromwell a pool of men with proven talent upon which to draw. William Penn, then in his mid-thirties, was the younger son of a merchant and mariner; he had served the parliamentary cause since the mid-1640s. Penn was stationed primarily off Ireland initially, but his assignments in the 1650s sent him to other European destinations. Having comported himself well in the Dutch War, Penn earned the recommendation of his superior, George Monck. Cromwell concurred, naming him "general at sea" and a Commissioner of the Admiralty. Penn's first major assignment after rising to this new post was the Caribbean expedition.¹²

Venables had similarly made his way up the ranks over the course of the wars. A gentleman's son in his early forties by 1654, Venables had promptly volunteered for service with Parliament at the outbreak of the first civil war. Having been involved in the prolonged siege of Chester, among other engagements, he went to Ireland in 1649 as a colonel to participate in its reconquest. While serving under Cromwell, he earned the general's respect at the brutal siege of Drogheda and later in subduing the north. He remained as part of the occupying army, becoming commander in chief of the forces in Ulster. In May 1654, he traveled back to England to advocate for the men who fought under his command; their salaries were in arrears.¹³ Cromwell indicated his continued good opinion of Venables by elevating him over the army sent to the Carib-

bean. Subduing Catholic Ireland would serve as a rehearsal for the assault on Catholic Spaniards in the Americas.

On the civilian side, Commissioners Searle and Winslow also came well recommended. Winslow, age sixty at the time the fleet set sail, was the son of a prosperous Worcestershire yeoman farmer. A youthful member of the English separatist community in Leiden, Winslow migrated to North America with that congregation. There he emerged as an important member of the struggling colony that became known as Plymouth Plantation, serving three times as its governor. In 1646 neighboring Massachusetts Bay Colony persuaded Winslow to return to England as its agent. In England from the time of the second civil war, Winslow worked through Parliament on behalf of New England. Increasingly he also served in other capacities, sitting on parliamentary committees. At the time of his appointment he was a well-regarded expert on colonial affairs, with excellent religious and governmental credentials to run a new colony.¹⁴

His compatriot in Barbados, Daniel Searle, had been governor of that prosperous and fractious island since 1651. Originally a London merchant, he apparently had no prior colonial experience when he traveled with the parliamentary fleet to “reduce” Barbados to the authority of the English government. Barbados had been one of a number of colonies to resist the creation of the new English republic in the aftermath of the execution of Charles, and Parliament had dispatched fleets to force their obedience. Searle, as one of three Commissioners over the expedition to Barbados, participated in the blockade that eventually won its submission. Like Winslow half a decade later, he was a man with no military background, sent as the civilian Commissioner who would take control of Barbados’s once the military commanders had done their work.¹⁵ Given that background and the intention to use Barbados for staging the present expedition, Searle was a logical choice. He would be actively involved in the collective decisions of the commission only in that period when the fleet visited Barbados, although he would be in a position to offer further assistance after it established a beachhead elsewhere.

A host of officers supported the work of the Commissioners. Among the naval men, Penn’s second in command, Vice Admiral William Goodsonn, brought both merchant and naval experience, the former in the Caribbean. In his mid-forties, he had most recently served under Penn as the vice admiral of the blue on the summer guard. A religious

separatist (who opposed all parish churches) and a reputed Anabaptist, Goodsonn's personal piety also recommended him. Rear Admiral George Dakins continued as a senior naval officer despite his radical republican sentiments, expressed in his support for John Lawson in the confrontation with officials the previous year. Although Dakins was also, like Goodsonn, derided as a "violent Anabaptist," his religious politics tilted toward the Independent position favored by Goodsonn's somewhat less radical wife. Jonas Poole came, as many ship captains did, from a seafaring family. He initially pursued a mercantile career, but when the Mediterranean trade was disrupted he used his kinship connections to Penn to gain a post in the navy. Penn chose him to captain the flagship *Swiftsure*. Commanding the thirty-six-gun *Heartsease* compensated Thomas Wright for the loss of a leg that he suffered in the Dutch War while fighting on a hired merchantman. All that is known of the steward-general of the fleet, John Carter, is that he left a wife behind him in England when he undertook his voyage.¹⁶

In the army Cromwell appointed experienced military men. The day-to-day leadership of Venables's regiment was the responsibility of his lieutenant colonel, Edward Doyley, who had fought in both England and, since 1646, Ireland. James Heane, head of a regiment and second in command over the army, had enjoyed a distinguished career. Of particular significance for the West Indian campaign, he commanded the force that had captured the Isle of Jersey for the Commonwealth in 1651; this successful amphibious effort was deemed similar to what would be required in the Caribbean. The oldest of the senior army officers, Colonel Andrew Carter brought direct experience not only of the Caribbean but of conflicts with the Spanish there; he had been acting governor of Providence Island when Spain reclaimed it in 1641. Returning to England, Carter served in the parliamentary army and possibly in the conquest of Scotland. Heading a third regiment, Carter received an opportunity to avenge his own humiliation at Spanish hands. Anthony Buller, in the army during the first civil war, governed the Scilly Isles in the late 1640s.¹⁷ Lieutenant Francis Barrington, who boasted experience in both England and Ireland, enjoyed stellar connection as a kinsman to Oliver Cromwell.¹⁸

Cromwell also intended to utilize a colonial colonel, leading planter Lewis Morris, to head another regiment. Although the details have not survived, preliminary arrangements had been made before the fleet

sailed. Morris, an obvious choice, possessed extensive maritime and military experience in both England and the West Indies. Arriving in the Caribbean in the 1630s as an indentured servant at Providence Island, he later became a settler, negotiator, and trader there until the colony fell to the Spanish in 1641. Morris then sailed as second in command to William Jackson during his 1640s privateering expedition. He eventually set himself up as a planter in Barbados. When royalists temporarily gained the upper hand in the early 1650s and banished parliamentary supporters, Morris returned to England to lobby for Barbados's subjugation. While there he apparently served in the army, which introduced him to various leading military men, including perhaps Cromwell himself. Along with other expelled planters, Morris accompanied the expedition to subdue Barbados in 1652. Because of his experience and local knowledge, the expedition's commander, George Ayscue, named him to lead raids on the island. After Barbados capitulated and accepted rule by the Commonwealth government, Morris resumed control of his lands. He combined everything needed for an officer in this campaign: military and naval experience, a history of fighting the Spanish, deep knowledge of the region, and an ideological commitment to the revolution.¹⁹ The Commissioners were to work out the details of the arrangements with Morris once they arrived in Barbados.

For some men, with less ideal credentials than Morris, service offered a chance to restore failing fortunes or mend political bridges. Joining a campaign that was intended to result in colonization offered an opportunity for a younger son such as Barrington to acquire land. Cornelius Burroughs, who had been profligate as a youth, used Design service as part of a long-term effort to pay off debts by "Honest Industry." For Richard Fortescue, participation in the Design revived his military career, which had ended in the late 1640s with his support of the Presbyterian faction in Parliament over the increasingly radical New Model Army. Since Fortescue accepted the Protectorate, Cromwell—recalling his term in the army of the Earl of Essex early in the first civil war and his subsequent successes in the New Model—appointed him colonel over one of the regiments. Others similarly perceived participation as a way to renew personal or family fortunes, including some who had previously fought for the king. Thomas, one of four younger sons of royalist Sir Baynham Throckmorton, could have been one such recruit; he served as a captain in Buller's regiment.²⁰

The magnitude of the royalists' presence in the expeditionary force has been exaggerated, helped along by later (politically useful) assertions of loyalty to the Stuart cause. At the Restoration, numerous men claimed to have been royalists driven into the force's ranks by a ruthless Cromwell who wanted to get rid of them.²¹ Clearly, from the Lord Protector's point of view, West Indian service presented a good opportunity to utilize skills gained in the civil wars while also removing men who might intrigue against the regime at home. Large numbers of openly disaffected men were not forced into service, however, their later (self-serving) allegations to the contrary notwithstanding. Sending many disloyal men would have invited disaster, as they might wreak havoc on the campaign or even take over the expedition in support of the exiled Charles II. More likely most royalist participants saw the Design as an opportunity either to pursue their livelihoods elsewhere or to earn credit with the regime that seemed to have the governance of England well in hand. Some may have even decided to fight for reasons of their own. Hostility toward Spanish domination, while particularly strong among the revolution's supporters, was not exclusively their purview; this English prejudice resonated widely. Circumstances of the moment might have motivated a few: much later, Jamaica historian Edward Long asserted that Cavaliers joined out of anger at Spain's shabby treatment of Charles II around this time. As the descendant of a Design soldier, Long had an interest in promoting the royalist association. Service in either army in the civil wars did not necessarily prove identification with its cause or dedication to its politics. As Ian Gentles noted, many who were recruited never showed up, and among those who did, commitment was often transitory; foot soldiers used a "revolving door through which they exited almost as quickly as they entered."²² For a variety of reasons and with a range of devotion to the Stuart cause, some men with royalist pasts sailed with the fleet.

Recruiting men to fight in Venables's army demanded that the state mobilize human resources on a grand scale. Six regiments were planned as well as a troop of horse. Using New Model Army practices as a standard, such a force would deploy over 6,000 men and hundreds of officers. The organizers initially intended to recruit half the men in England, sorted into six regiments, each at half strength. This fighting force would be augmented by additional recruits from colonies. Colonial recruitment was predicated on the idea that these outposts, and par-

ticularly Barbados, housed a surplus population eager to pursue the opportunity the Design offered. At home, the English government did not have as many available men as might be expected given that it had fought two civil wars and conquered both Ireland and Scotland. Some companies had been decommissioned—the number of men dropping steadily since 1652—while others remained to occupy Scotland and Ireland or keep the peace in England. Cromwell's regiment, for instance, had been stationed in London since 1651, a good position from which to support his political maneuvering.²³ Between regiments that had been disbanded and those still actively employed, the requisite numbers of soldiers could not be entirely recruited out of experienced men already in the field. Cromwell's government therefore used a two-pronged strategy to build up an army to dispatch to the West Indies. It ordered regiments to send superfluous men, and it raised new forces especially for the Design.

Some of these troops came out of the ranks of men already in active service. Aware of the importance of seasoned troops and hoping to use men he knew, Venables suggested that his own troops currently serving in Ireland be redeployed for this new campaign. Cromwell did not accede to this request, either because he did not want to stir up Ireland or because the process of switching out the Irish regiments would slow the preparations still further. Instead he ordered the standing regiments in England to draw out men. Whereas Venables hoped "only to have such as freely offered themselves," he suspected officers instead selected those they wanted to eliminate from their own companies, discouraging their more able men from volunteering. If the Tower regiment did send some Catholic soldiers—including a few Irishmen and a priest—this fact might support Venables's suspicion that officers used the campaign to an unknown but distant location as a way to siphon off troublesome men. When they learned of the Catholic presence, Design officers moved to squash the "devill's endeavours to have his chapel amongst us."²⁴

Other men were new recruits, enlisted specifically for the Design. Some former soldiers who had been released or officers who had lost their positions when their men had been dismissed joined, the latter appearing in the records under the term "Reformados."²⁵ One estimate put the number of experienced soldiers at 1,000 out of the 2,000 to 2,500 said to have shipped from Portsmouth.²⁶ The need for men with

experience might even recommend the use of those who had fought in the royalist forces, particularly those rank-and-file soldiers who might not have an ideological commitment to the Stuart cause. Others, raw recruits, were tapped in all the usual ways—through inducements of pay, coercion of indigent men or petty criminals, or encouragement from local patrons. Men with a choice were loath to enlist; many must have shared the experience reported by Lewis Ashton, whose friends advised him against going. Men who signed on to serve under Barington, for instance, knew and trusted him, and they were unwilling to sail until he joined them aboard ship. Fortescue's regiment agreed to a contract that laid out how pay was to be received and provisions charged, along with similar details. Those men "not cheerfully willing to go upon those terms are to be discharged forthwith and other fit persons to be listed in their rooms." Among these men and boys, as in any early modern army, numerous women also shipped.²⁷ Gathering so many men, especially with the largest "peacetime" army ever assembled already in the field, demanded all of the state's considerable resources.

The recruitment and dispatch of such a force drew upon the bureaucratic expertise that had been developed in managing the New Model Army (and the Commonwealth's navy) over the previous decade. In order to organize their pay, governmental officials drew up lists shortly before the fleet embarked in December, one of which survives. Its creation was prompted by a vote of the Protector's Council, which agreed to distribute one-quarter of the pay for an estimated sixteen months of service at the outset, with another quarter payable every four months thereafter. Receiving a fourth of their pay prior to their departure permitted the men to leave money with their families or purchase needed items (including clothing and, for the officers, other stores). Other lists that have since disappeared presumably enumerated the remaining recruits. From this initial record, the government maintained accounts of the further amounts due or disbursed either directly to the men themselves (should they subsequently return to claim their arrears) or to family members. Eventually a committee of the Council would take charge of this duty, assigning three other men to perform the tedious work.²⁸

"A perticular List of the Names of the persons allready paid their first Moneths pay for there Respective Qualities" enumerated only 471 men,

one-quarter to one-fifth of those who would depart from England. They were divided into the five—rather than six—regiments (under Venables, Heane, Fortescue, Buller, and Carter) and a troop of horse (Captain Jones). The roster, although partial, gives some insight into the expedition's force. It identified fifty-four additional senior officers across all these units: five lieutenant-colonels and as many majors, along with thirty-four captains (besides Jones of the horse). Although common soldiers appeared, the register disproportionately enumerated those of higher ranks—sergeants, ensigns, corporals, and lieutenants—or specialized tasks—drummers, surgeons, gunsmiths, wheelwrights, and chaplains. Others held positions on the support staff: a judge advocate, a marshal general, two provost marshals, a treasurer, an adjutant general, a quartermaster-general, controller of ordnance, commissary of stores, and their deputies. Numerous people labored to find the men to fill all these posts and more, while others would keep accounts relating to their service.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty needed sufficient skilled men to serve on ships' crews. The naval piece of this puzzle was easier to put into place, because the sizable navy at the Protector's command included an excessive number of ships. In the past, the state had relied more heavily on merchant ships to fight its wars, supplementing a smaller navy with many private ships specially fitted out. At the end of a conflict, the latter ships returned to private pursuits, and the state maintained (or neglected) its smaller naval force until the next war necessitated that private men-of-war again receive commissions. Since the 1640s the navy had expanded drastically, giving the Protector access to a force of unmatched size. The nucleus of the Protectoral navy originated in a rebuilding effort under Charles I, although some of those ships along with others built subsequently had been lost to the use of the Commonwealth when their crews went over to the king in the 1648 naval revolt. Far more important to the navy's extent by 1654 was the building program and the incorporation of captured enemy ships that had occurred since the king's execution in 1649. In the last year of the Dutch War, Bernard Capp reports, the English Republic had an astounding 180 ships in its navy. As much as Cromwell's own string of military victories (in England, Ireland, and Scotland), this mighty navy sustained the reputation of the Protector's regime in Europe. It went far toward explaining why both

the Spanish and the French negotiated to form an alliance with Cromwell's government: each hoped to turn this might against the other. The English took pride in their naval prowess, with newsweeklies happily touting "the English invincible Armada." In fact, some contemporaries believed that Cromwell felt compelled to keep his navy employed after the Dutch War, a compulsion that led him to attack the Caribbean.²⁹ It is certainly the case that England had more naval resources at its command than ever before—and no particular project besides the defense of the revolutionary state to undertake—when Cromwell conceived the Design.

Still, completing ship's crews amounted to no small task. During autumn 1654 thirty-eight of the state's vessels were readied for the voyage. The flagship, *Swiftsure*, was the largest, with sixty guns. Four others carried fifty-four guns. Nearly half had thirty guns or more, while four were as small as twelve. Although numbers must remain approximate, a fleet of that size would require thousands of men.³⁰ Able-bodied seamen already serving as the Dutch War came to an end were an obvious source. Unsurprisingly, these men were reluctant. They wanted their pay (which had to be borrowed by the government to meet its commitments) and to return to land to see their families and spend that pay. Mostly they wanted a choice about whether to join a new campaign. The government was loath to release them, since their absence rendered the task of assembling crews more onerous. Holding the men on board ship and forcing them to undertake another voyage was "inconsistent with the Principles of Freedom and Liberty." The Protector did hold them, however, despite their petition to the contrary; they went out on the Design without knowledge of the scheme, much less having given their consent. Such stratagems had been commonplace during the Dutch War, as the government struggled to fill quotas of seamen.³¹ Being forced into a Caribbean campaign committed sailors to a longer voyage in waters far from home.

The men already on board these ships had to be supplemented with additional recruits, if only because natural attrition required a regular influx of new crew members. The unpopular but necessary practice of impressment had recently been the subject of a number of protests lamenting "the violent pressing and carrying away [of] those poor men whose wages is so stopped without any care taken for their distressed families in their absence." Despite harangues such as that penned by

George Kendall, clerk of the survey of Deptford Yard in 1653, the government had no alternative but to force men into service. Compounding the problem of naval recruitment, the prospect was slim for adding many skilled mariners in the West Indies. Colonial society did not yet have large maritime populations that yielded up experienced recruits, while ships calling in Caribbean ports seldom carried extra hands. Unskilled men might be had, from among the same formerly indentured pool of workers out of which the army would also draw, but a ship could absorb only so many raw recruits at one time. In any event, partially completed crews could not make it to the Caribbean in the first place, so recruitment of necessity focused on England.³²

Finding men to send off to a distant location constituted only one step toward preparing the expedition, which also necessitated the creation of a massive physical infrastructure. In July 1654—half a year before the fleet finally departed—the Admiralty Commissioners ordered that the required number of “sails, cables, anchors, and other stores” be computed, along with the skilled men—“smiths, bricklayers, coopers, and glaziers”—needed to fit out the ships. Just before it departed, Captain Francis Willioughby wrote from Portsmouth to report that the last supplies needed for the fleet could not be obtained there. Particular vessels needed to be refitted for the work. The twenty-two-gun *Mari-gold* received special attention, after the Council ordered the Admiralty Commissioners to equip it “with special accommodation for transport of horses and provisions.” If vessels were sheathed to protect their hulls from the vagaries of warm Caribbean waters, as a few were, that increased expense.³³ Ships, once built, also cost a great deal to fit out, man, and victual. As Bernard Capp observed, “the new navy placed an immense burden on national resources.” In 1655 the navy employed 13,000 men afloat, excluding those on shore whose livelihoods depended on supporting its operations. Funding the navy during the Protectorate absorbed £50,000 to £75,000 annually.³⁴ A tenfold increase in taxation during the revolutionary era (as compared to rates under Charles I) allowed this expansion.³⁵ Substantial funds in theory at least went toward pay, although arrears reduced the amount actually paid as a short-term strategy to rein in the budget. Other costs of keeping the fleet afloat were considerable. In a detailed study of the Swedish navy, Jan Glete estimated that the price of building and maintaining the ships themselves was about four times that of keeping them in cordage, cables,

and sails. Victuals too were costly. J. S. Wheeler found that food and drink for the fleet accounted for the single largest recurring outlay.³⁶

Such an ambitious expedition also necessitated collecting additional ordnance, weaponry, and other supplies, beyond what a naval campaign would normally require. Infantry regiments consisted of musketeers and pikemen, the former needing firearms (usually matchlocks) and all the ancillary equipment (match, powder, and balls), and the latter requiring pikes and swords. The army also provided the soldiery with knapsacks and tents. One receipt listed 713 barrels of powder, a mortar piece, and shells loaded for "land service." On another occasion, the Admiralty Office provided "three mortar pieces of the larger size, with shells, &c., also 6 great battering guns with carriages." Some ships were dedicated specifically to the transport of ordnance. One observer remarked on "the multitude and magnitude of mortar pieces and cannons, as never the like went out of England."³⁷

Providing food for such a large force proved a formidable task. Provisions had to be sufficient to feed not only the fleet for an extended period but also the sizable army it transported. Beef, beer, and biscuit were prepared and stored on board each ship of war. Additional stores had to be shipped to supply the army while it campaigned. Although soldiers might forage for food to supplement rations, provisions of cheese, butter, oil, and peas were purchased and shipped. The need for more water casks delayed the fleet after too few had been constructed for the anticipated length of the voyage. No doubt the added requirement that all the casks be "iron bound" slowed the production process.³⁸ Already in August, Admiralty officials had begun collecting victuals. As the navy victuallers wrote toward the end of the month, the amount on hand did not scratch the surface of what was needed; further, they pointed out that the preparation of meat they had just received—repacking and pickling—would take three weeks at least. Much later, they wrote again to say that they were readying "5 months' new beef and 4 months' new pork" to send with the fleet. Getting it to Portsmouth presented an addition wrinkle, as the supply was "delayed for want of shipping." Anthony Buller expressed concern about the quality of provisions collected, prompting Venables to confront Admiralty Commissioner John Disbrowe over the issue. Disbrowe, Cromwell's brother-in-law, held principal responsibility for this aspect of preparation. Venables subsequently suspected him of colluding with the victuallers in an embezzlement



This simple engraving captured a mounted John Disbrowe (or Desborough). He held many offices while his brother-in-law was Lord Protector. As commissioner of the Admiralty and Navy, a role alluded to here by the ships in the background, he oversaw preparations for the Western Design.

"Major Generall Disbrowe," from James Granger, *A Biographical History of England* (London, 1769), illustrated by Richard Bull. The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, 28300.

scheme. Generally, supplying food to the navy appears to have been well managed in the face of grave difficulties, and little reason exists to suspect that the men charged with the task knowingly ill-supplied the fleet in this instance. More likely, Cromwell's impatience—his insistence on their "expeditious dispatch" and his awareness that the optimal season for the attack threatened to slip away—rushed preparations and encouraged corner cutting.³⁹

Undergirding the logistical demands associated with launching a great fleet were the enormous sums of money. Purchasing the ships' fittings, ordnance, weapons, munitions, miscellaneous tools, victuals, and other needed items consumed massive sums. Within the month before the fleet sailed (and after five months of work), another "large addition of tools, stores, &c." supplemented what had already been assembled. Goodsonn, who ran a business on the side supplying clothing to the navy, collected almost £5,000 for outfitting the fleet. Fortunately for the state's coffers, after these monies were paid to him, they were then deducted ("defalked") out of the pay of the men and officers who had received the garments. The records refer repeatedly to the £30,000 designated for the forces, including when an army committee ordered the treasurer-at-war to send more than half that sum to Portsmouth to be used in readying the expedition. Salaries and other additional funds for officers involved notable sums. Commissioner Winslow received £1,000 for his service, £500 as an advance prior to his departure. Between them, the rear-admiral and vice-admiral netted fifty shillings a day. Paying them from July when the figure was confirmed until the fleet's departure in December meant that the state spent about £425 for the two flag officers' salaries alone before they sailed.⁴⁰ Besides their own salaries, Penn and Venables both used the negotiations over their appointments to request additional financial assistance. Venables asked for his arrears (which were paid in the amount of £3,076 6s. 10d.), the payment of some debts in Ireland, promise of a portion set aside for his daughters should he die, and the surveying of lands he was promised in Ireland (or the equivalent in his native Cheshire). Penn broached his wife's Irish estate, petitioning the Protector and his Council to make up for the "unrecoverable" losses he had sustained.⁴¹ Other men also wanted monies owed before they left England; James Heane, for instance, received £500 for his former service. Lesser men similarly asked for their due, as did Captain Richard Bamford, owed £39 for surveying

delinquent lands. In August, the Council voted £6,514 13s.4d. a month for the “forces intended for special service,” a bill that may not have included the senior officers and that would in any case quickly exceed the £30,000 budgeted for the undertaking. Confident that the campaign would reap sufficient rewards to cover its expenses, Cromwell reduced taxes even as the state hemorrhaged these funds. If any element of this scheme earned him the charge of hubris, this ill-advised reduction in the face of such spending did so.⁴²

These massive preparations fueled speculation. The English press fomented fascination with this story, joined by spies, foreign observers, and scattered residents of the British Isles who added their theories about what Cromwell intended. As London and indeed all of western Europe buzzed about the expedition, the curious were reduced to grasping at shards of information. Some deduced a probable destination by watching supplies loaded on ships. Tropical climes required different food stores, which gave an indication of the region of the world being targeted.⁴³ Spain’s Council of the Indies met in November to discuss the prospect that the fleet would assail the island of Hispaniola, while the Portuguese feared that Brazil, a sector of which they had recently regained from the Dutch, would be attacked. For his part, the French ambassador, Antoine de Bordeaux-Neufville, concluded that France itself was not the target; although the West Indies seemed most likely, he noted that rumors had turned toward Holland as the intended objective.⁴⁴

For some reason, the London weekly news publication the *Faithful Scout* was especially eager to inform its readers about the purpose of the expedition, in spite of being clueless. Precocious in its coverage of the Design, the *Scout* noted as early as the 28 April 1654 issue that Admiral William Penn was traveling to the fleet to prepare for a major undertaking. At that moment, editor Daniel Border knew the Design to be “honorable; but the Instructions private.”⁴⁵ From April until the autumn, the *Scout* kept up its reporting; and despite the absence of real information, it had much to convey. In June it erroneously asserted that Penn had sailed with fifty-seven ships; August and September issues provided regular announcements of the imminent departure of the fleet. In late September, the *Scout* reported that in Holland the destination was “their great discourse”; although “men guess variously about it,” the editor expected that the English would be better informed shortly, once Parliament convened. The hope that the government would share

its plans with Parliament and therefore with the nation more generally proved chimerical, and the English were left to “guess variously about it,” along with observers across the Channel. The *Scout* resorted to almost weekly announcements about the pending departure well into December. Just before the fleet actually sailed, editor Border confessed: “If you ask whiether they are bound, I must be silent in my answer, for I know not.”⁴⁶ This lack of knowledge had not prevented Border from keeping up a steady drumbeat of news.

Pressured to get the fleet under way, the organizers scrambled to finish arrangements in December 1654. In one instance, John Disbrowe had to report to Thurloe that although he had collected regiments in Portsmouth, he could not ship them for lack of officers to command them. Barrington’s men were fearful that leaving port without their commanding officer indicated that the worst rumors they had heard were true—that they were being sold to “some foreign prince.” Once Barrington and the other officers joined them, they set aside their plans to rebel and force their way ashore at the Isle of Wight. The sense of urgency and the resulting chaos separated a few hapless officers from their possessions and servants. They reclaimed these off of other ships upon arrival in Barbados or, in the case of Thomas Lawes, tried to trace them back to England. At least one apothecary was left behind altogether.⁴⁷ Fueling the hurry, planners remained mindful of the hurricane season and the imperative to finish before the summer.⁴⁸ Allowing for a voyage of one month to six weeks, the fleet would ideally arrive in December and complete the conquest by May. Departing late in December, which it finally did, meant that a month or more of the six-month window had already elapsed. The compulsion to get the expedition on its way—and the fact that it was slated to spend some time in the West Indies collecting additional troops—led to a decision to dispatch the main body of the fleet without all the store ships. The organizers reasoned that time to finalize the supply of stores could be gained by sending those ships to meet the fleet at the Barbados rendezvous.⁴⁹

The fleet stopped at Barbados in late January to complete its complement of men, wait for its store ships, and confer with the fifth Commissioner. Cromwell’s instructions to General Venables anticipated that additional men would “be raised in the Island of Barbadoes, and other the English Islands and Plantations.” In August, the plan had been to send agents ahead to ready the islands for the arrival of the fleet. Major

General Heane and Commissioner Butler sailed away early in the *Marston Moor*, hoping to arrive in advance of the main body in order to put into effect special instructions from the Protector.⁵⁰ Cromwell's detailed instructions commanded Venables to organize the recruitment once he arrived on the island. During this phase, Commissioner and Governor Daniel Searle would play a key role, arranging temporary accommodations for the fleet while it tarried in Barbados and supporting the recruitment effort. Cromwell envisioned the five Commissioners meeting to confer as their underlings finished the work of recruitment and readied the expedition for departure. All should be accomplished when the supply ships arrived from England.

Once the fleet sailed, eager observers worked to digest the news that the aim was West Indian. The idea of a possible Caribbean goal had previously been bruited about: as early as October, the newsweekly *Several Proceedings* relayed that "many here are of opinion that one of the English Squadrons is destined for the West Indies, the King of Spain having refused the free Trade and navigation in those parts to the English, which the Lord Protector Cromwell had demanded of him." Within a few days of the fleet's departure, London merchant John Paige, who traded with the Canaries, was able to inform his business associate William Clerk that "now we know for certain they are bound for the West Indies against the Spaniards and carry such provisions of war as never did any fleet out of England before."⁵¹ As the royalist Sir Alexander Hume wrote to Charles Stuart's secretary, Sir Edward Nicholas, in February, the Caribbean rendezvous point implied an anti-Spanish move, but Hume found this difficult to fathom given the current geopolitical situation. Others among Nicholas's correspondents variously reported that the Design was intended for or indeed had already conquered Brazil, Guadeloupe, Saint Christopher, Cuba, the Bay of Mexico, Saint Dominique, and Hispaniola. This range of prospective enemies underscored not just the lack of information, but also varied reading of current tensions, since they brought the protectorate into conflict variously with France, Portugal, or Spain. Attempts to pin down details swung about wildly, with the usually well-informed Paige confidently declaring at one point that the "Bay of Mexico" was the focus of English efforts. On another occasion, the *Perfect Account* picked Mexico itself, "a place very famous for Silver and Gold, as also for jewels, and many other things of great value." Amid much speculation, one letter writer knew that the

rendezvous was Barbados, but still believed “the designe is secret, known to the designer onely, whoe saith if hee thought his shirt knew it hee would burn it.”⁵²

Chatter about the fleet was tinged with admiration for Cromwell’s impressive show of state power. The fleet had not yet reached Barbados when an account from the Netherlands declared that the English in the Caribbean had fought against sustained opposition to seize gold and silver mines. The massive extraction of mineral wealth that had enriched Spain over the last century elevated mines to the greatest prize to be had in the Americas. That spring, one newsweekly exulted that “England seemed never in any age to be more powerful then at this present; all the four parts of the world are ful of her greatness.” The first evidence cited was that “she hath sent forth a formidable fleet into America.” As one participant wrote home, they sailed “with a wind so fair and prosperous, that we might well say, we were not only bound to the Barbado’s, but sent.”⁵³ The residents of London could read with pride that as the fleet sailed through the West Indies “the Natives did in an abundant manner repair to the shore, to behold and admire that which they call ‘The English invincible Armada.’” With unusual restraint, *Certain Passages* confessed to having no news in March, but could not refrain from celebrating imagined success: “It is conceived that by this time they have accomplished some very notable achievements to the great amazement of the Indies, and the honour and profit of the English Nation.”⁵⁴ Such confidence was widespread.

Well before news could have arrived from the West Indies (and indeed long before the fleet’s work had begun), the London press reported fanciful tales of great victories. These early accounts endorsed the imperial vision promoted by Cromwell, anticipating easy triumph in the interest of Protestantism and the Protectoral state. A major West Indian merchant, Martin Noell, fueled elation, spreading the good news that Hispaniola had been conquered. Royal secretary Nicholas heard of the conquest of Guadeloupe, Cuba, and Hispaniola, but his correspondents were not alone in reporting nonexistent victories.⁵⁵ While the fleet lingered at its West Indian rendezvous, tales circulated about its taking gold and silver mines; in these fanciful accounts, African slaves owned by the Spanish flocked to join Admiral Penn. In April, the *Faithful Scout* had the English in possession of Martinique and attacking Saint Christopher. Meanwhile, another weekly corrected its previous (and

accurate) announcement that Penn was still in Barbados in order to reveal the invasion of “the continent beyond the Cariby Islands,” either Central or South America. The *Weekly Intelligencer* was happy to describe how “the Negroes do flock in multitudes unto [Penn], hating the violence and tyranny of their former Masters.” The “gallant Town” already seized would serve as a secure base for further operations.⁵⁶ The *Weekly Post* gleefully reported that “the last Post from Gen. Pen adviseth, that he now runs Rampant upon the coast of America, and hath taked severall gallant Prizes.” *Mercurius Fumigosus* described great victories and lucrative spoils, just the outcome the Protector anticipated. A story in the *Perfect Account* in July, said to have been carried on “ships that are newly com in to the Port of London from St. Christophers (which is the next place the English have unto Hispaniola),” confirmed that Santo Domingo had been taken, “with the loss of about 20 Officers and 200 souldiers.” The following month the *Weekly Post* announced, “From the West-Indies it is certified, that Gen. Venables hath mounted two Regiments of foot, and in pursuit of the enemy, took their Lieutenant General, and great Ferdinando King of the Indians.” This conclusion, according to the *Post* editor, was to be expected, for “What is there under Heaven to be attended with more Lawrels of joy, then the innocency of a just Cause?”⁵⁷

The government did little to remedy the confusion. The first of two parliaments to be called during Cromwell’s Protectorate was sitting at the time of the fleet’s departure in late December; but Cromwell waited to speak officially about the expedition for almost a month. Then, in mid-January, he did not visit the House of Commons, but instead met privately to inform at least some members of Parliament of the nature and scope of the Design. Bulstrode Whitelocke, an M.P. from Buckinghamshire who kept a record of public events, tersely recorded that “the Protector advised about sending a Fleet to the West-Indies.” An attentive news consumer, watching for any signs especially from the one official weekly of the state, might notice that around the same time, *Mercurius Politicus* offered its first, albeit rather indirect, mention of the Design. It printed a letter from a correspondent on the Continent which described the fear that the fleet had gone to the American territories of the king of Spain.⁵⁸ That *Politicus* finally nodded toward the existence of the massive undertaking, even in this oblique way, indicated that its editor, Marchamont Nedham, thought it acceptable to reference the story,

whether or not he had explicit permission from Secretary John Thurloe or another official to do so. With letters from the fleet, reports of sightings of ships, and other information in wider circulation, the Protectorate could not keep the plan quiet any longer. Yet the official breach with Spain was some way off, and Cromwell still hoped that his forces could retain an element of surprise. Therefore he did nothing to confirm his intentions publicly.

The news reporting evidenced the obvious: that the Design represented a momentous undertaking, unprecedented and remarkable. It both utilized new potential within the English state (and its nascent empire) and pushed its planners to stretch the state's capabilities even further. In all the areas the Design touched—finance, supply, and recruitment—the organizers faced a chaos of obstacles. An effort of this magnitude drew upon the state's considerable resources, and more. When the fleet sailed to the Caribbean to complete its preparations, it did so with the assumption that the colonies would bend to the will of the state. Confronted with a massive fleet, they would in fact do so, but their capabilities to comply with these unexpected demands would prove limited. The West Indian location added further difficulties: the distance hampered communication and minimized English awareness of conditions, while the climate demanded attention. However far down the road of fiscal and military transformation the English state had traveled, pulling recalcitrant colonies into that system complicated matters further. For these reasons, preparation strained the bureaucracy to the extent of its capacity even as it schooled the planners in the difficulties inherent in schemes to expand the empire. The Design both showed the government's greater reach and underscored that more would be needed to carry these new capabilities to the distant edges of its Atlantic domain.

The undertaking proved more ambitious even than its planners appreciated. Although contemporaries and later historians would lay blame for the outcome in various quarters, a major underlying cause was a somewhat understandable inability to appreciate the enormity of the task at hand. Previous English escapades in the Spanish West Indies had been mounted on a small scale, the most ambitious being the temporary capture of a colonial seaport by bands of marauders who pillaged or demanded a ransom. Knowledge of the dashing triumphs attributed to

the heroic Sir Francis Drake and others did not adequately prepare English planners to execute a scheme for the permanent conquest of the Spanish Americas. Even secrecy, meticulous planning, and wise leadership might not be enough to achieve success in this first attempt at a large-scale invasion in the tropical Caribbean.

Expectations

AS THE FLEET sailed to the West Indies, planners and participants carried expectations for that remote and exotic region. A few of those on board had journeyed there before, as traders or even settlers. Most had never ventured to the Caribbean Sea. All shared in common attitudes about the area and its residents. Even those who had never been there—or perhaps especially those—approached with a constellation of conceptions of the West Indies, which powerfully shaped their understanding of the undertaking. Along with the practical expectations of the expedition’s leaders—that the English islands would assist them in their preparations—these more ethereal if no less powerful conceptualizations went with the fleet. Their views encouraged hopes of eager welcome from the region’s much-abused residents as well as easy victory against a wealthy but dissolute Spanish Empire.

The Caribbean in January 1655, although the Spanish claimed it as their exclusive property, accommodated an increasingly complicated geography. Spain held the largest islands that made up the central core, the Greater Antilles—Cuba, Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica—while other European states occupied lesser islands, usually along its outer, eastern periphery. The Spanish similarly claimed, and in some cases actively held, the mainland abutting the sea. The eastern periphery of northern South America housed a few small settlements of interlopers as well. Native peoples living independent of Europeans clustered in the eastern islands. Communities in that area predated Columbus’s arrival but had grown as they absorbed refugees from the Spanish intrusion into the Greater Antilles. Dominica and St. Vincent remained indigenous strongholds, while they maintained a sizable presence on Guade-

loupe against French incursions. In 1655 the permanent settlement of non-Iberian colonists—Dutch and French as well as English—dated back fewer than three decades.¹ With the exception of the Dutch Republic, whose right to navigate these seas had been acknowledged in a 1648 treaty, all others held lands in clear violation of the Spanish policy of exclusion.

Despite these circumstances, an unofficial and fragile détente prevailed. Spain aimed to uphold an exclusive right to the region by removing all outsiders, deeming them *piratas* (or pirates), because their mere presence constituted seaborne theft. Yet continuously clearing small (and otherwise inconsequential) islands proved expensive and largely ineffectual. Most efforts to remove interlopers focused on newly occupied territories, especially those located in the heart of the Caribbean Sea. Tortuga, a small island off the coast of Hispaniola, had been swept of residents repeatedly. Most dramatic had been the successful assault—on the third attempt—on Providence Island (which the Spanish called Santa Catalina). Its proximity to the mainland rendered its occupation by non-Spaniards unacceptable even before it began serving as a privateering base. Small agricultural settlements on the eastern periphery had been tacitly accepted, as their residents focused on developing trade with Europe and generally avoided tangling with the Spanish. This détente contradicted the conviction of scholars that endemic conflict rocked the Caribbean, captured by the phrase “no peace beyond the line.”² The region had been the site of repeated raids from the mid-sixteenth century, but as settlement and trade shaped the agenda of non-Iberians, direct confrontation became less frequent, and tensions cooled slightly.

While Spanish claims were absolute, their literal hold on Caribbean islands faced serious limitations. Columbus initially made landfall in Hispaniola, and the islands remained centrally important for a time, as mining and agriculture emerged as economic activities. Receiving the full force of unchecked conquistador brutality, native populations had been rapidly depleted or displaced. The violence of initial contact, the introduction of disease, and the out-migration of island residents all contributed to a sharp drop in the population of the four major islands over the course of the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century, the largest West Indian islands housed more livestock—roaming freely in unoccupied areas—than people. Trying to control a small population

scattered over a large island, the governor of Hispaniola in 1605 ordered residents to live in a district surrounding the city of Santo Domingo on the south coast, a policy that left much of the island unoccupied, the purview of cattle and their hunters. Hunters included legal residents and, increasingly, foreign buccaneers (who gained their name from roasting livestock that they slaughtered). In the legally occupied areas of the island a mix of European, indigenous, and African residents grew food crops for local consumption and to sustain the fleet that sailed annually to Cadiz with silver extracted from mainland mines. Men, often of African descent, slaughtered cattle particularly for hides and lard. Selecting the magnificent natural harbor at Havana as the site for the fleet's annual rendezvous, the authorities ordered it fortified; it became the principal city in the islands, surpassing the early administrative center of Santo Domingo. If in general the islands "seemed to lack a purpose in the grander scheme of empire," Havana proved the "principal exception." Preparing for and protecting the *Flota de Indias* gave Cuba a strategic importance and propelled the growth of its population.

Overall, the Caribbean Sea and the islands that defined it came to serve primarily as a "portal to the Indies." Spanish settlements there were generally "poorer, less populated, more vulnerable than the richer and better-defended vice-regal centers" on the mainland.³ Wedded to the idea that all of the Americas (save for Brazil, which fell into Portuguese hands) were the exclusive property of the Spanish crown, the government was committed to protecting on principle its vast territorial claims. More immediately, it defended the islands in order to protect the fleet which carried the wealth that undergirded its global empire.

If the region overall served only an ancillary purpose to the larger and wealthier Spanish undertakings in Peru and Mexico, Jamaica occupied a minor place within the marginal mid-seventeenth-century Caribbean. The smallest of the major islands, Jamaica fit into general trends, with a shrunken population making its livelihood through agriculture and livestock. While Hispaniola played an administrative role (housing the oldest *Audencia*, or royal court, in the region) and Cuba served as the gathering point for the fleet, Jamaica and Puerto Rico played no particular part. Jamaica's population clustered on its south side, around the harbor Cagaua (today Kingston), and its mountainous central section limited overland access to the north coast. Jamaica stood out for being the sole remaining Caribbean possession of the Columbus family. Having once controlled multiple islands, the family had seen its

territorial claims reduced to just the one outpost. The heir's involvement with the island was minimal, limited to appointing an occasional governor and drawing a modest income.⁴ Jamaica's only other claim to fame was the pimento plant, native to the island, which it exported to other Spanish settlements. From the last decades of the sixteenth century, English mariners visited Jamaica—trading illegally and raiding—as they did other islands and mainland towns. The Western Design leaders, if they considered Jamaica at all, would have seen it as a minor side note to the major work before them: a smaller island that would be easily snapped up as part of a larger campaign to subdue the region.

Within the context of a Spanish-dominated West Indies, various interloping states (England among them) sponsored minor settlements in peripheral locations, outposts that the Spanish considered illegal. Of these, Barbados, the fleet's immediate destination, was both England's largest and, because of the recent development of the sugar industry, its most profitable. It sat at the southern tip of the chain of islands that make up the Lesser Antilles. English people out of Barbados had recently settled Surinam, on the adjacent mainland near the Surinam River, under the authority of proprietor Francis, Lord Willoughby of Parham. England also held four small islands to the north: St. Christopher (which it shared with the French) as well as Antigua, Nevis, and Montserrat. Total acreage of these islands did not achieve the extent of one of the smallest English counties. Other European states claimed other islands in the region. The French held half of St. Christopher (St. Christophe) as well as Martinique. The main outpost of the Dutch, Curaçao, began as a naval base during the Dutch war of independence but after 1648 shifted toward a regional trading hub (especially for contraband trade with the Spanish). Save for their clandestine trade activity, the Dutch stood on the firmest legal grounds, as the 1648 treaty granting their independence also permitted their navigation to any lands they then held, which could be taken to include Curaçao. During their long war to break free of the Habsburgs, the Dutch seized much of Brazil, which they lost in 1654 after a few decades' occupation. The exodus from Brazil increased the Dutch population in other colonies—if not the number of Dutch settlements—as settlers displaced by the Portuguese reconquest were sent scurrying to other locations.⁵

Among English colonies Barbados was an outlier in more ways than one. Sitting on the far eastern and southern edge of the arc of islands that bound the Caribbean Sea, Barbados (at 166 square miles) charted

a new (and portentous) path for a West Indian island. During the 1640s, leading landowners embraced sugar as their principal crop. The Spanish introduced sugar cultivation to the islands in the sixteenth century and, despite a drastic decline in island populations, continued to grow it on a small scale. Barbadians, following the example of Portuguese Brazil (but apparently not schooled, as was once thought, by displaced Dutch sugar planters from Pernambuco), learned to cultivate sugar, invested in the necessary infrastructure, and sought laborers to plant, harvest, and process the cane. Initially they relied on indentured servants from England, Ireland, and Scotland (including prisoners taken in the civil wars and the conquest of the latter two erstwhile kingdoms, condemned criminals, and displaced Irish people). Eventually they purchased enslaved Africans, either directly from Africa or from other colonies in the burgeoning intercolonial trade.⁶ Hence Barbados, when the fleet touched there in late January 1655, was crowded with people, nearly half of them slaves. Former indentured servants, another group within the population, eagerly sought more opportunity than the island afforded, and the fleet expected to recruit many of them to augment its force.

The other English islands, clustered in the northern reaches of the Lesser Antilles, held fewer people and produced a variety of export crops. St. Christopher, the longest-settled of the English islands, had been divided between the French and English since its inception in the 1620s. It, along with the other nearby islands (all of which had been settled out of St. Christopher over that island's first decade), pursued a more eclectic collection of crops, including tobacco, indigo, cotton, and sugar. Landowners employed more servants than slaves, not out of any qualms about slavery but simply because they lacked the market that would draw slave traders to their harbors. This reliance on indentured labor meant that these colonies had a pool of former servants seeking opportunity there or elsewhere. Those islands, the planners assumed, would also yield recruits.

These colonies traded primarily with England but freely with others as well, despite a recent Navigation Act intended to disrupt these new but vital interimperial trade networks. Europeans craved Caribbean crops, and demand for them supported the development of small island economies. The Dutch carried a sizable share of these products, but ships from other ports visited as well. Smaller vessels plied between islands,

moving passengers, draft animals, and foodstuffs. Europe offered manufactured goods, alcohols such as the then-ubiquitous brandy, and a wide range of foods. Barbados dedicated its land so completely to sugar cultivation that it imported food to sustain its laboring population. Wealthier residents sought specific edibles familiar from Europe (including wheat, which did not grow locally). In 1651, England's Parliament restricted colonial trade, the first such piece of legislation aiming to regulate the burgeoning economies of distant outposts. Various islands resisted, and Parliament sent one of two small fleets to the Caribbean to force compliance not only with the trade laws but with parliamentary authority as established in the republic that replaced royal government after the 1649 regicide. When Parliament's force departed in 1652, it left behind a newly appointed Barbados governor, Daniel Searle, with instructions to crush any signs of resurgent royalism and to enforce limitations on trade.⁷ Searle and his fellow governors demurred on the latter point. They faced vigorous opposition from island residents, held few tools to enforce the laws, and felt little compunction about failing to comply. Interactions, economic and otherwise, among the colonies of different nations within the region continued, and the English islands welcomed any trader from Europe who came with goods they coveted.

The Design participants grasped very little of the complicated and shifting Caribbean milieu they entered that January. A few had been to the West Indies previously, from Vice Admiral William Goodsonn and Colonel Andrew Carter down to anonymous mariners who had plied the waters in trading vessels or in support of colonization efforts.⁸ The vast majority in the Design force entered the area for the first time, and they brought only information gleaned from secondhand accounts or widely held cultural prejudices. Most shared a muddled grasp on Atlantic geography. Although a major surge in the English publication of geographies occurred in the seventeenth century, the availability of more detailed information on the Caribbean postdated the Western Design (and was in part fueled by it). In 1655 the most widely available work remained George Abbot's oft-reprinted *A Briefe Description of the whole World*. From 1617, it included a section on the West Indies, but Abbot focused on native customs and ignored geographic particulars beyond a list of the major Spanish islands.⁹ Since the English had begun acquiring colonies, no updated geography had appeared to provide a better sense of the terrain. For

this reason, one letter writer interested in the fleet's movements explained Cuba as being near Barbados; the former, 254 times the size of the latter, was located with reference to the most famous (albeit tiny) English holding in its general vicinity.¹⁰ "Cariby Islands" usually referred to the northern islands of the Lesser Antilles, but sometimes broadened to cover the entire region or narrowed to exclude such clearly eligible islands as St. Christopher.¹¹ Beyond serious difficulty locating specific places, many English observers had little sense of the time required to travel between them. The expedition was still crossing the Atlantic, for instance, when one London newsweekly announced that it had seized rich mines; basic knowledge of travel times would have inhibited such reporting.¹² The men who sailed, like those who stayed behind, commanded often hazy or even inaccurate information.

Popular conception that did circulate drew upon images of the Spanish: they enjoyed great wealth and shamelessly exploited the natives, indulging in infamous acts of cruelty. When they learned that the Design targeted a Spanish outpost, soldiers on the expeditionary force imagined they would gain rich spoils. One officer later reported that "wee did the day before the Gen^l landed wrangle about sharing the plunder that was in the city."¹³ The silver mines of Spanish America had transformed the world's economy, not only creating the lavish wealth of the Habsburg Empire but also funding its global dominance. Stories of Elizabethan sea dogs who captured treasure in the region cemented the English view. This massive wealth extraction was irrevocably associated in English minds with Spanish cruelty. In this they thought less about labor regimes in the mines themselves and more about the inhumanity of the conquest period as conveyed by the Dominican missionary priest and author Bartolomé de las Casas. His exposé, intent on correcting ills, used persuasive, at times hyperbolic language. His Protestant readers throughout Europe took his polemic as simple history—or even as current events—with little sense that he might have exaggerated or that the situation might have changed in the intervening century. Las Casas became a European best seller from the 1570s, translated into many languages and reprinted frequently, particularly at moments of international tension.¹⁴ Readers absorbed las Casas knowing that English mariners captured in the region were punished with death, imprisonment, or hard labor. Thus las Casas's narrative of cruelty carried contemporary resonance, casting the English as fellow

sufferers with the region's native peoples.¹⁵ With these tools, the English constructed the Hispanophobia that colored their expectations.

Drawing on las Casas and supplementing that information with knowledge of the burgeoning trade in African slaves, English people believed that the Spanish Americas offered them the prospect of close cooperation with various victims of Spanish cruelty. They understood the region as a site of particularly stark threats to liberty: a place where they might be enslaved and where others already suffered that fate. Some men on board the fleet had experienced a loss of liberty in the Caribbean, having been employed as convict labor to build Spanish fortifications after being captured for their illegal activities. The regional embrace of captivity also encompassed the English islands, especially Barbados. There planters similarly employed convicts, prisoners of war, and other English, Irish, or Scottish peoples, as well as African and Indian slaves. Arguably Indians in the English Caribbean in 1655 faced a greater potential for degradation, since legal protections by then in place under the Spanish did not apply. The labor regime and resultant slave system in Barbados was brutal, yet the English assumed that those who labored for the Spanish suffered beyond all others.

Slavery in the Spanish Caribbean was, by 1655, an entrenched institution with over a century of history. Initially *indios* experienced slavery, but they became officially ineligible for that status when the crown declared them royal "vassals," a designation intended to protect them from the most extreme exploitation. Throughout the Spanish Empire in the Americas, the status (and generally the treatment) of native people improved, in part through the efforts of las Casas. The shift away from Indian slavery increased demand for Africans, a demand initially met by Portuguese traders.¹⁶ Among the Spanish islands, Cuba became the primary importer of captive Africans, employing them to build fortifications and in agriculture toward provisioning the annual convoy to Seville. Especially on other islands, most slaves by the mid-seventeenth century were American- rather than African-born. In a backwater like Jamaica, imported slaves were few, since a lackluster economy and a dearth of fortification projects seldom drew slave ships. Spanish American-born enslaved Africans learned Spanish; instruction in Roman Catholicism was routine (and in fact required by law and supported by local custom). Numerous people of African or mixed-race descent gained freedom for themselves or for their children, while others, although enslaved, worked

away from the watchful eye of masters (as when they managed live-stock), enjoying some degree of autonomy.¹⁷

Although comparing the experiences of captive Africans across empires is fraught with difficulty, the English had no reason to assert that Africans under English control were somehow more fortunate than those on Spanish islands. Yet the English figured themselves as liberators of abused people, expecting them to prefer English masters over Spanish ones.¹⁸ This delusion was no idle fantasy, for it shaped military calculations: the English counted on alliances with the mistreated laborers held in thrall by cruel Spaniards. The perception of starkly contrasting English benevolence and Spanish abuse helped the English enter the region confident that they brought liberation. Wealth, cruelty, slavery: all these images circulated as the Design got under way.

With such ideas shaping expectations, the fleet arrived in Barbados in late January. There the expeditionary force observed a prosperous colony, with an unfamiliar climate and an alien social order. The extreme West Indian heat and humidity were the subject of much discussion, in part because contemporaries feared them as both unhealthy and likely to have a deleterious effect on an individual's character. With its new dedication to sugar cultivation and its heavy dependence on African labor, Barbados saw estate sizes soar and smallholders squeezed out. The African population grew at a sharper pace than the European. Residents relied on imported food, reluctant to waste prime sugar land on food production. As Henry Whistler declared when he first saw Barbados, "This Island is one of the Riches Spotes of ground in the wordell [world] and fully inhabited."¹⁹ In a speech delivered to island leaders, the Commissioners emphasized that Barbados—being, as Whistler noted, "fully inhabited" as well as intensively cultivated—would soon be "in a decaying condition." They argued that the island elite ought to welcome the acquisition of new colonies that could be cultivated once their own island's profitability fell.²⁰

Moving preparations to Barbados effectively pulled that island—and to a lesser extent other English Caribbean islands—under the sway of newly enhanced state power. In the future, imperial government routinely included colonies in military planning, asking them to provide men, money, and materials. In 1655 such a move was unprecedented. Not surprisingly, when the expedition arrived, it encountered islands that were unprepared. Planners held unrealistic expectations of what

even a very cooperative colony would be able to contribute. During the planning stage, government officials communicated with selected Barbadians, in particular the planter Thomas Modyford, who encouraged their expectations.²¹ With its booming economy, burgeoning population, and easily accessible location along the sea routes, the colony offered the logical stopping point in the West Indies. There ships could gather, the army could complete its recruitment efforts, and the Commissioners could finalize their plans, benefiting from the assistance of the fifth Commissioner, Searle. The fleet's time in Barbados was particularly well documented, since participants' reports left a paper trail.²²

The first act of the fleet revived the controversies central to the confrontation in 1651–52, when the Commonwealth government had subdued royalist rebellion in Barbados, and at the same time augmented the expedition's naval capacity. Upon arrival in January 1654/5, the force seized foreign ships that it surprised trading illegally. Among them, three ships under the command of Dutch Governor General Petrus Stuyvesant had come to the island hoping "to settle a faire trade between the Netherlands and this place." The seizure of the trading vessels declared unequivocally that the English state continued its opposition to interimperial commerce. In addition, Edward Winslow confided, they detained Stuyvesant for fear that he would reveal the "raw and defective" nature of their forces to the Spanish, with whom he also hoped to conduct business. Justifying the capture of peaceable merchant vessels, the 1651 Navigation Act limited colonial trade to English-owned and -manned ships. Except when Parliament sent naval squadrons to subdue the rebellious colonies, the act had gone largely unenforced for lack of anyone empowered (or motivated) to police commerce. The arrival of the fleet proved that the state intended to dictate the terms of trade in Barbados.²³ State intrusion had not been a temporary aberration aimed only at subduing the Stuart dominions to the Commonwealth government, but inaugurated a new relationship between the core and periphery.

The fleet put a stop to the illegal trade and seized the ships as if they were prizes taken in wartime. Wartime seizures entailed significant danger to the captain and crew but also brought the prospect of profit; Navigation Act seizures instead resembled uncontested police actions. Whether mindful of this distinction or simply concerned to finance his undertaking, Cromwell issued special instructions making ships so

taken the property of the Protectorate. Penn planned therefore to incorporate them into his fleet and to sell their cargoes to help finance the expedition. Among the cargoes seized the naval officers found 244 captive Africans, which the Commissioners sold without pausing over the legitimacy of their enslavement. Penn's men objected, not to the sale, but to the loss of what they regarded as their rightful share of these and other profits. Demanding the same terms adopted in the Dutch War to regulate the distribution of prizes, they asserted their expectation that individual captains and crew members would garner similar or even better benefits. They "apprehended y^e work of y^e present service harder, & more uncomfortable then y^t of the other war," by which they meant the recently concluded Dutch War. In this they revealed the propensity of mariners to cite the law in their own interest, as they advocated for the best possible interpretation of their due.²⁴ Penn committed himself to meeting the men's expectations, presumably sharing out portions of the profits from the cargoes, even as he incorporated the ships into the expeditionary force. He wrote to the Admiralty to plead their case.

The expedition benefited from the addition of numerous ships, but this gain was somewhat mitigated by how unpopular the seizures were among Barbadian planters. Penn had complied with the terms of the Navigation Act when he took ships and their cargoes, but the penalty struck some as excessive, appropriate as an act of war, not as a punishment for a trade violation. Governor Searle had been complicit in circumventing Parliament's act, telling the other Commissioners that the laws of Barbados prevented him from enforcing contradictory English laws. When Searle (possibly attempting to protect himself from the censure of his fellow islanders) empaneled a jury to decide the fate of the prizes, no attorney would represent the state. English merchants, who were present and eager to have the laws enforced, "pleaded the state's case [and] did it thoroughly, being sufficiently able." Still the jury found for the "strangers," that is, the foreign traders, whose case had been presented by Stuyvesant. Despite this legal outcome—which was met with "great joy and rejoicing" among the colonists—Penn kept his prizes. Between supply ships that had yet to depart and a few vessels forced to turn back to Europe, his force easily found uses for the additional ships. Later the Spanish traded stories that the supply ships had been lost in a storm, although the causes of their absence were more varied and prosaic. Meanwhile, rumors circulated that Searle was being sent to London under arrest, to answer for his intransigence.²⁵

If the planters saw the seizures as a major intrusion, for the visiting Commissioners they represented only a minor aside to the main work of recruitment. The newly acquired ships facilitated the transport of additional recruits. Cromwell understood that the islands housed men eager to leave for the opportunities that awaited them in a conquered Spanish territory. Penn, Venables, and Winslow went ashore the day after their arrival to meet with Searle and his council "about the Raising of souldgers." According to Whistler's account, "within 5 days it was agreed up[on], and Commissions granted to the Commanders to raise them." Shortly thereafter, Commissioner Gregory Butler left for the northern islands to begin the process there.²⁶

Having this expeditionary force swoop down on Barbados to scoop up soldiers created a number of problems within the island's social system. In a general sense, the idea of excess population was correct. The 43,000 residents in 1655, almost evenly divided between Europeans (23,000) and Africans (20,000), represented a dramatic increase, the population having more than doubled in the fifteen years since 1640.²⁷ Among those willing to leave were smallholders being pushed out by the more successful sugar planters as well as landless laborers released from indentures. Ex-servants faced unprecedented difficulties acquiring land; it was unsurprising that many were willing to start fresh elsewhere. Yet colonial defense depended on filling the militia's ranks with lower-status European men, so their mass exodus threatened to undermine island security. Some men eager to leave were not in fact free to do so: servants still laboring under an indenture to a planter might see the Design as a quick escape from drudgery, but their contracts bound them to their masters for a set term. One recruit later reported that terms of service were reduced by nine months to allow men to leave, but not whether or how masters were reimbursed for their loss.²⁸ Planters were as loath to lose their servants as these servants were eager to get away.

Meanwhile, many ostensibly free islanders were not at liberty to go because they owed money to other Barbadians. Local law prevented debtors from absconding, leaving their debts behind. Ships' captains posted bonds to ensure that they did not take passengers unless the latter had been cleared to leave; unpaid debts detained the debtor. The Barbados Council ordered captains to watch for stowaways and strictly forbade them from hiring as sailors any debtor. Planters complained that debtors, as well as servants, had been allowed to go on the Design, with no compensation to them as creditors and masters. The credit network snared

not only poor men, but the wealthy as well. Lewis Morris initially accepted a commission to lead a regiment of island recruits. Negotiations foundered over terms, particularly Morris's desire to have his considerable debts paid. The expedition leaders worked to keep his defection a secret, so that men who joined to serve under him would be on board ship before they learned that they would instead be under the leadership of an unknown English colonel, Edward Doyley.²⁹ The worries of his men aside, losing Morris, with his vast local experience, represented an unexpected blow to the expedition. West Indian realities complicated recruitment.

With so many men bound to the island by debt, labor contracts, and enslavement, recruitment efforts were complicated and frustrating. Although the council, with direct instructions from the Lord Protector, agreed to cooperate, few Barbados leaders tried to facilitate the process. In the end, nevertheless, the expedition drew its target figure of an additional 3,000 men from Barbados. Merchants who later petitioned the Protector for redress claimed that 4,000 had been taken, leaving only 1,000 free men to defend the island from "twenty thousand Negroes three thousand Irish & fower thousand Scotts hearetofore prisoners of war inclineing to mutinie & Rebell for theire owne enlargement, & readie to assist against theire patrons if an enemy should appeare before y^e Island."³⁰ While it behooved the merchants to exaggerate the contribution that absent recruits had previously made to the island's defense, some of the latter no doubt did have previous military experience, having fought in the recent wars at home. Still, many would have been raw recruits, similar to the majority of those raised in England.³¹ Barbados had men, and for the Commissioners the challenge was to cut the ties that bound them so that they would be free to join the expedition. During their stay, Penn ordered the creation of a regiment of seamen out of the naval force brought from England, to augment the army's numbers. Goodsonn commanded 1,100 men organized into ten companies, and "for neere 3 weekes exercis'd" them, "& soe fitted [them] for service."³²

While potential recruits roamed Barbados, few arms or other supplies awaited the Commissioners. According to Venables, they brought 2,500 men, only 1,600 of whom were armed. They expected to make up this shortfall with 1,500 arms that had been sent ahead by Martin Noell, a leading London merchant with interests in the Caribbean. Upon investigation, the Commissioners discovered that Noell's armaments had been

dispersed among the islanders, so that a purported 1,500 had been reduced to 190. Here was yet another instance of how intricate planning had not foreseen colonial conditions: ill equipped with firearms, Barbadians had no surplus out of which to augment the Design's cache, nor did they have local craftsmen to make weapons. After a month, Venables pointed out that if the troops had been supplied out of England they would have begun campaigning already. Gregory Butler found the other islands similarly lacking in weapons. He enlisted additional men, but they also came without arms. Venables, thrown on his own resources, oversaw the manufacture of half pikes for the infantry, hoped for the arrival of the supply ships, and fretted when he considered the contrast with the equipment granted to his men on the Irish campaign.³³

The Caribbean islands proved no better prepared to augment provisions. Since fewer victuals had so far arrived than planned, the Commissioners set about restocking the ships' and army's stores. If the planners of the Design had any expectation that the Barbadians could feed thousands of extra mouths, they were sorely mistaken. With most cropland given over to an export commodity, the island increasingly relied on imported livestock and foodstuffs from New England and elsewhere. Venables noted after he assessed the situation that the colonists could not replenish the fleet, "they buying all their own."³⁴ Among the provisions for sale locally were stores that (Venables suspected) the Commissioners had refused in England; naval victuallers then shipped the low-quality foods to the island for resale, possibly envisioning that masters would purchase them for slaves. Instead the Commissioners procured moldy bread, another indication of how little Barbados could provide. Rations were cut to stretch the provisions. One participant who published his criticisms claimed that rations for boys, "although not supernumeraries," were eliminated, which he decried as an injustice. Penn felt compelled to remind the Admiralty of the need to keep the fleet in good supply, observing that "the number of Eaters doth & will encrease daylie."³⁵

While these arrangements were under way, the four Commissioners remaining in Barbados debated the best location for the initial attack. Cromwell had instructed them to make the decision, on the assumption that they would acquire needed information once they arrived in Caribbean waters. In England various options had been proposed, including both islands and mainland locations. While in Barbados, naval

personnel carefully interviewed captains, merchants, and others for local news. John Hawkes, a peripatetic English “chirurgion” who had lived in various places throughout the West Indies, provided intelligence. Interviewed aboard the *Swiftsure* on 22 March (fewer than ten days before the fleet finally departed), Hawkes related that he had lived on Puerto Rico and Hispaniola for almost a year, until the previous December, and he had done so practicing as a surgeon, which allowed him to familiarize himself with both islands. Hawkes reported living in Barbados until 1647 or 1648, at which time he joined the attempt to settle Santa Cruz Island, which was cleared by the Spanish shortly thereafter. The settlement he then joined on Tortuga met the same fate some years later, at which time he was absorbed into the population of Hispaniola. Unfortunately, his interview does not clarify how he came to be accepted into Spanish society, since he appeared an unlikely candidate for such treatment as an Englishman and someone who had been sent away from Tortuga. When they spoke to Hawkes, the Commissioners had likely already settled on their destination—Hispaniola. They questioned him closely about the state of its defenses, numbers of men in arms, and its fertility. His information encouraged an attack by land, since “the town was fortified by sea but nothing considerable towards the Land, being only a pittifull wall (without ditch) of about 7 or 8 feet high.”³⁶ Hawkes provided just the sort of local knowledge the Commissioners desired, affirming their (still secret) decision to attack Hispaniola.

The fleet’s sojourn in Barbados unfolded as a tale of unwanted and greedy guests, however much the planners fantasized dutiful subordinates eagerly supporting their project. The expedition not only consumed the island’s food, but it took needed arms, horses, and men—including servants, debtors, and militiamen. The presence of large numbers of seamen and soldiers created additional problems. The former, “under pretence of going on shore to fetch water . . . wandered up into the plantations, and made spoil of the sugar-canes and provisions.” Planters were especially alarmed that they “carry fire, or take tobacco, nigh the place where any sugar-canes are” for fear that they would set alight the highly flammable cane. Soldiers created more trouble, as they billeted in the homes of colonists.³⁷ The fleet’s presence upset the precarious balance that the plantation elite sought to maintain on the island, bringing home the fragility of the new regimen’s dependence on coerced labor and its vulnerability to fires set by careless sailors or vengeful laborers.

On a larger scale, the expedition brought the looming authority of the state along with the will to exercise that authority. The Commissioners not only seized foreign ships, they also set up a Prize Office to punish future violations of trade restrictions. Venables reorganized the colony's militia. The Barbados elite, accustomed to governing the colony with little interference, objected to this meddling. As masters of slaves and servants and as creditors to numerous residents, they also balked at the loss of servants, debtors, or other men to staff the island's militia. The few leaders who cooperated fully—among them Modyford, who had corresponded in advance with the authorities in England, offering the island as a staging ground and promising assistance—faced criticism for having done so. They expected harassment after their powerful allies left. Venables eventually characterized the inhabitants as flatly opposed to the entire undertaking. Afterward Cromwell made a few small gestures to remedy the inconveniences, but the overall message of subordination and the need for obedience remained.³⁸

For their part, participants in the Design sympathized, or they dismissed the complaints, but they had few alternatives other than to impose upon the islanders. Edward Winslow, himself a longtime colonist, noted the hardships the Barbadians endured. He suggested reversing the Navigation Acts and allowing trade with the Dutch as compensation. Francis Barrington believed that taking servants with unexpired contracts constituted "a greate piec of cruelty" to masters who had invested in their labor. Penn ordered the fleet searched for runaway servants, but planters doubted the sincerity of such efforts. Others were dismissive. Some accused the colonists of opposing the Design out of ideological aversion to the government and the revolution that had brought it to power. John Berkenhead raised this issue, asserting that Barbados was full of "malignants," a term used for supporters of the king. Such suspicion evinced Berkenhead's sense of recent history, in particular the royalist rebellion that had been suppressed there a few years before. Venables, utterly exasperated, had little good to say by the end of his sojourn, dismissively labeling the planters "a company of geese." One expedition member (who signed his highly critical account with his initials, I.—or J.—S.) derided local recruits and opined that "these islands must be the very scum of scums, and mere dregs of corruption." Others were similarly flippant. Besides Whistler's oft-quoted insults, Thomas Lawes characterized residents as "vicious a people as can well be

imagined.”³⁹ The relationship between Barbados and the powerful but needy fleet that it hosted for two months was testy, and islanders applauded its departure. However unwillingly, all these men—everyone on the expedition and everyone it touched on Barbados—had been pulled into the orbit of England’s invigorated fiscal and military state. Barbadians heaved a sigh of relief at the fleet’s exit, but their recent experience would not become simply a disagreeable memory, since it nicely encapsulated their island’s future relation to empire.

From the Design perspective, the imperial dynamics of military expansion threw down unexpected roadblocks. While planners in England, encouraged by letters from a few planters and assurances of compliance from the governor, blithely assumed cooperation, the reality the Commissioners found in the Caribbean included settlers unwilling or unable to cooperate. From the moment the leaders of the expedition confronted the resistance to the seizure of trading ships, they began to learn that the realities differed from their expectations. Resident political elites enjoyed a great measure of local authority and were not simply awaiting the arrival of the Protector’s agents to instruct them on their duty. Expecting to be consulted and even asked permission, the planters balked at Venables’s high-handed manner. Such clashes did nothing to pave the way toward cooperation. Excess populations could not necessarily leave. Experienced military men like Morris were not always willing to participate on the terms offered. The Commissioners found food on the islands costly and in limited supply. Craftsmen were few, so that the expedition had to provide its own carpenters, blacksmiths, and other skilled workers. The challenges associated with climate and distance had to be added to the fact that the colonies were as unprepared for the fleet as the fleet was for what it found in the colonies. Except for the burgeoning (if sometimes unattainable) population, almost nothing in the English Caribbean was organized in 1655 to accommodate the newly activist state and its schemes. England’s leaders had much to learn before they could successfully incorporate the Caribbean colonists into plans for a new imperial future.

On the last day of March 1655, fully two months after sailing into Carlisle Bay, the expedition finally hoisted anchor. “Dispairinge of our reliefe from England,” the Commissioners agreed to leave without the stores, or, as Penn put it, to “depend on Providence for y^c rest.” Staying

in Barbados presented no viable alternative, as the longer they lingered, the more the men ate up their few provisions and strained the island's resources. The Design's initial Spanish target, recently identified, remained a closely guarded secret, known only to the Commissioners and a few others. Their exit from this southerly island was accomplished more smoothly than that from Portsmouth four months before, although they somehow managed to leave Colonel Richard Fortescue behind, and had to send a ship back to fetch him.⁴⁰ The fleet left Barbados with more ships and men than when it arrived from England. The exact number of vessels that sailed cannot be determined, for no comprehensive list of those under Penn's command exists after that created in Portsmouth in December. Some of those dispatched from England at the outset never arrived, reducing the number from the original thirty-eight; prizes swelled the fleet; and some disabled or otherwise deployed ships contracted it. Contemporaries gave the number at "about 60 saile" or alternatively "70. voiles [ships]."⁴¹ The fleet was impressive, the largest ever gathered within Caribbean waters. As it made its way north toward the Greater Antilles, passing various islands of the Lesser Antilles, European settlers as well as Kalinago (Carib Indian) inhabitants watched. According to Whistler, the fleet frightened colonists on French Guadeloupe; they fired off guns, "wee supposing it was to give an allarom to the Contary [country]." The Kalinago of Dominica proved difficult to cow: rowing out to the *Tulip*, they resisted an effort to "hicht their Boat" with "y^c Chaines." The men in the canoe "let fly their arrows," wounding three seamen. The English musketeers then fired after them, reportedly wounding one and killing another.⁴²

In contrast to the slow work of making ready in Barbados, the fleet concluded its last bit of preparation, at Saint Christopher, in short order. The site of the first English Caribbean settlement, this relatively small island (sixty-five square miles) housed both English and French colonies. Gregory Butler, the fifth Commissioner, along with two others (Colonel Richard Holdip and Captain Edward Blagg) had been in the area for almost two months preparing for this rendezvous. During his stay, Butler, acting as Cromwell's representative, participated in the renewal of the agreement that governed relations between the French and English colonies that shared the island. Unfortunately, little documentation of the recruitment effort there survives. As in Barbados, the

Design representatives went after illegal traders. Blagg (of the *Marston Moor*) and John Clarke, captain of the *Selby*, took numerous prizes. A Spanish pamphlet published later in the year recounting the events of the subsequent campaign misunderstood this interlude, describing it as a successful effort to reclaim the island from pirates.⁴³ On April 7, when the Barbados contingent arrived, 1,000 men were ready to join the army. The fleet's sojourn there was over in a moment. The naval captains, forewarned of Penn's impending arrival, embarked the new recruits on the prize ships. Final arrangements occupied little time, and they sailed again that day.⁴⁴ Any plan to sort out the island militia as they had done in Barbados fell to the wayside. A few men, among them John Daniell, stepped ashore to look around. He assessed the "adjacent plantations, which indeed I saw soe industrious neatly manured, that I thought I was in the French gardens, every acre affording a famelly subsistence, noe corne wasted, yet the ground decaying and over-stocked." He concluded that the island afforded "noe townes nor fit entertainment for our numbers."⁴⁵

Butler's sojourn in these northern islands yielded one great benefit: he located two men with local experience to serve as pilots or guides. Navigating the coasts of unfamiliar islands required specialized knowledge of a sort that most English sailors did not possess. Since the Spanish officially closed their trade to other Europeans, non-Spanish men with experience sailing into their shores were few. One man with some local knowledge was Frisian pilot Kempo Sybada. He had sailed Caribbean waters since at least 1640, serving first Providence Island and later William Blauvelt, who had established himself on the Moskito Coast in the wake of the English expulsion from Providence. Subsequently Sybada lived in New England, but continued to visit the Caribbean, possibly in part to trade clandestinely with Spanish residents. In any event, the expedition found him in Antigua, where he signed on.⁴⁶ Of still greater value, Butler located Captain Christopher Cox in St. Christopher. Cox had reportedly "lived twelve years amongst" the Spanish, having somehow managed to serve as a gunner at one of the island's forts. Knowing nothing of his origins, it is tempting to speculate that the Spanish accepted him because he was Irish and Catholic. Perhaps he had been among the Irish who fled Barbados in 1642, when word of the Irish Rebellion exacerbated anti-Irish animosities there. Such suppositions are difficult to square with the English willingness to rely upon

his advice. In any event, both Penn and Venables eagerly sought his assistance as a pilot and a guide.⁴⁷ The records identify two more guides, but little is known of either Bounty or Feames. Neither played a prominent role.⁴⁸

As the fleet finalized its preparations, two enterprising London pamphleteers conveyed elaborate and bogus news stories of the progress of the Design. Together these publications demonstrate the public's eagerness to know what was happening as well as the difficulty of acquiring accurate knowledge at a distance. Both professed to recount recent engagements in the West Indies undertaken by Penn's fleet and appeared while the fleet finalized its preparations in anticipation of assailing Hispaniola. Both *A great and wonderful Victory* and *Three Great and Bloody Fights* focus on a French foe, effectively generalizing the hopes and fears associated with the Spanish Caribbean by linking them to Cromwell's other possible adversary.⁴⁹ In doing so, these tracts transferred purportedly Spanish characteristics to a rising European power and played with West Indian tropes current in Protectoral England. Their grasp of Caribbean geography was typically tenuous. While *A great and wonderful Victory* placed its narrative in "another part of the Western Indies," also described as "the French Continents," *Three Great and Bloody Fights* was more precise, naming Saint Christopher and Martinique. Precision did not guarantee accuracy, as the latter identified both islands as recently seized from the English by the French (whereas both islands had a decades-old French presence by 1655 and were not newly taken, while the smaller St. Christopher had been shared between English and French more or less from its first settlement). Lacking though they were as news stories, taken collectively, these accounts documented the high expectations for English success.


The more elaborate of the two, *A great and wonderful Victory* conveyed a rousing tale of a great victory against daunting odds. As the title page announced, not only was the engagement "great, sudden, and valiant," but it involved Indian "Bow-men," a French general, large numbers of prisoners, many fatalities, the seizure of thirty-three mines, and the self-immolation of some of the French, who were determined to avoid capture at all costs. The text itself described the "rich and potent" French who, "by their extream predominancy, lamentably over awed the English; keeping them onely as meer vassels and slaves, to serve their insatiable wils." Despite the enormous advantage of the island's

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A great and wonderful VICTORY

H. Pen OBTAINED
By the English Forces, under the Command

of General *Pen*, and Gen. Venables, against the French, and others, in the West Indies: With the manner of this great, sudden, and valiant Engagement, the desperate Order given by the Indian Bow-men, the bringing up of the great Reserves by the French General, the total routing of them all immediately upon landing, the taking of 200 prisoners, and the number slain upon the place, the taking of three and thirty Gold and Silver Mines, and the filling of many places by the French, and sacrificing of their lives in the flames.



London, Printed for Humphrey Hutchings, 1655. *April 3*

Title page of a 1655 pamphlet misreporting events in the West Indies. *A Great and Wonderful Victory Obtained by the English Forces under the Command of Gen. Pen and Gen. Venables*, 1655.

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defenders, many (especially the natives) fled at the sight of “Englands stately Armado,” leaving behind vast wealth in their panic. Their leaders forced them back to fight, arraying Indian archers and enslaved English troops as the first line of defense. The author likened a heroic contingent of former royalist soldiers among the invading force to the defenders of Numantia in Spain who withstood ten times their number of Roman soldiers. Continuing the Numantian analogy (already strained given the equation of invaders with defenders), the author described defenders setting fire to all their wealth in order to prevent it coming into English hands, then throwing themselves onto the flames. Here the pamphleteer apparently confused the Numantia story with Hannibal’s capture of Saguntum, also in Spain. Luckily for the English, in this telling, the destruction of property was not widespread, as most of the islanders surrendered “and cried for mercy.”⁵⁰

The expedition thus proved lucrative, just as the Protector anticipated. The victorious invaders acquired multiple mines—which “will doubtlesse make our English Continent the most flourishing Commonwealth under the Sun, and eternize their never-dying-fame throughout all Ages.” Mines stood as the most prominent symbol of wealth associated with the Americas, since the Spanish benefited from the rich yield of the silver mines at Potosí in Peru and elsewhere. This great mineral wealth had been flowing into Europe (as well as Asia) for a century, reshaping economies and financing Spain’s empire. As Abbot explained to his English readers, “it is the plenty of Gold and Silver which is brought from this *America*, that maketh Mony to be in greater store, and so may more easily be given then it could be in the daies of our predecessors.”⁵¹ With sugar just emerging as a commercial powerhouse, mines continued to represent the best hope for achieving riches in the Americas. In this telling, the French rather than the Spanish owned the mines, a substitution that, however baseless in reality, spoke to France’s rising power in Europe.

The French stood in for the Spanish as exploiters of the American natives as well, giving the English another opportunity to reprise their fantasy role as liberators. According to *A great and wonderful Victory*, the island’s indigenous inhabitants greeted the triumphant English enthusiastically: “And by the tender respect, affability and clemency of the English towards the poor Natives, so great Effects have taken influence thereupon, that they are even sensible of their present condition

of Freedom, and so tractable, that upon the least motion or sign, they become serviceable in any thing." This statement captures a typical colonialist dream, that native peoples will be grateful and therefore compliant. While in this instance they are happy to be out from under the thumb of the French, the narrative in fact drew upon images of Spanish cruelty. It also indulged in the English fantasy that the ill-treated natives would eagerly embrace them, side with them against their oppressive masters, and adopt a subordinate position in a new colonial regime. Dating back at least to Drake's account of his interactions with the *cimarróns* of the Panamanian isthmus, this expectation lingered long after much evidence to the contrary had amassed.⁵² The fantasy would recur in *The Cruelty of the Spaniards in Peru*, a "kind of an opera" that the playwright William Davenant wrote the following year and staged in London in 1658. Davenant himself advocated for "moral representations" that presented "the Spaniards' barbarous conquests in the West Indies and of their several cruelties there exercis'd upon the subjects of this nation." He exploited the hatred of Spain and the appeal of the narrative of Spanish cruelty to leverage the reopening of the theater for his entertainments.⁵³ In the 1655 pamphlet, the attributes popularly associated with the Spanish became instead a French failing.

The other fanciful account—*Three Great and Bloody Fights*—offered a terse and somewhat constrained tale by comparison. According to the author, since the recent invasion by the French of the two supposedly English islands of Martinique and St. Christopher, their new masters kept English as "Vassals and slaves" and subjected them to "most inhumane cruelties and tortures." Now that God had delivered England, he turned to the rescue of "his people abroad," opening a way for the English state to right these wrongs in the Caribbean. The English force, led by the popular Major General James Heane, scored a complete victory in a mere seven hours. In Martinique, Heane was already "wholly Master of all that was held by the French, possessed their Plantations, and seized their Goods, secured the prisoners, which are said to be 735, and placed his Garisons." The English force faced another, perhaps more daunting, challenge in the conquest of Saint Christopher, the seat of the French lieutenant general Phillippe Longvilliers de Poincy. "Monsieur de Poince," resolved to fight off the invaders, prepared for the assault by ordering his men to erect "great Bulworks and Fortifications." Taking that well-defended island, although disheartening for most, was "feasible

enough to such heroic Spirits, who are brass within, and steel without; the English being thus characterized by the French prisoners." While the story ended inconclusively, the author anticipated a positive outcome.⁵⁴ The anonymous writer appeared unaware that the English held part of the island, although correctly identifying the French governor indicated some knowledge.

This tale of French foe and English valor creatively deployed common tropes. An enemy's unconscionable cruelty, abused Indians awaiting European rescuers, and valiant soldiers all conformed to popular imaginings about the West Indies and England's prospective role there. Some elements drew directly upon what Alexandra Walsham has called "reformed folklore," the tales Protestant English people told themselves about their Catholic foes; the Spanish had in fact been the prime example when this tradition was created.⁵⁵ The New World had long been depicted as a site of cruelty and heroism, so readers were primed for tales containing these elements. With the public vacillating between a French or Spanish target, the assertion that the fleet assaulted the French West Indies appeared plausible. Cromwell played the two monarchies off against each other, dangling the possibility of an alliance before each while hinting that he might attack the other; some observers saw France as the more serious threat and expected the Protector to strike there. If France as the enemy seemed plausible, the more interesting phenomenon occurred when the much-reported sins of Spain were reattributed to France. The French, who were currently rumored to be behind an assault on a minority Protestant sect, the Waldensians, in the Piedmont region of central Europe, seemed to deserve the ignominious mantle.⁵⁶ In any case, the two authors cast them without comment as cruel Caribbean tyrants abusing both native and English slaves. Gathering up broadly shared understandings of the West Indies and of England's role in the world, these tracts clad their news reporting in appealing and familiar apparel.

The English—whether they supported or opposed Cromwell—had high expectations. Indeed, all of Europe anxiously awaited word of the massive expedition that appeared destined to alter the configuration of the West Indies. Organizers in England and leaders of the expedition shared assumptions that the material needs of the campaign could be met in English colonies, especially Barbados. They further concurred

that they would find willing and capable assistance in the far reaches of the Atlantic. Their expectations for practical support proved nearly as illusory as the more elaborate imaginings that many shared about Spaniards who both held whole communities in thrall and lacked sufficient energy or valor to defend their lands. Initial reports of a great triumph confirmed (even as they reflected) widespread expectations for success that were based on popular stereotypes as much as geopolitical realities. Fears associated with the Caribbean—about the climate, about loss of personal liberty, about cruel Spaniards—were cast aside or tamed to support the narrative of English victory. The fleet left the English islands with pikes fashioned from cabbage palmettos, recruits whom some derided as the “mere dregs of corruption,” and participants who had in some cases already shown signs of growing ill from exposure to the Caribbean environment. Yet the buoyant optimism and a sense that they did the Lord’s work carried them forward.

Hispaniola

THE FLEET FINALLY assailed Hispaniola, the ultimate object of the preparation and speculation, in April 1655. Hispaniola offered numerous advantages. The second-largest island in the Greater Antilles, Hispaniola was both nominally defended and well placed as a base for future operations aiming to purge the West Indies of the Spanish presence. Participants understood Hispaniola as an easy target, well worth English attention; they believed that their own magnificent fleet could easily vanquish the islanders as it waited for artillery to arrive.¹ At the 17 March meeting in Barbados, when Penn, Venables, Searle, and Winslow settled on the expedition's target, they analyzed the choices they faced and the precedents they had in mind. Viewing Hispaniola as both a worthy goal and a cautious choice, they had good reasons for proceeding as they did.

The Commissioners' instructions enabled them to act within a broad framework. Cromwell established the ultimate goal—the conquest of the Spanish Americas—and suggested a range of possible first steps. He presented these options based on discussions with local experts, including the Barbados planter Sir Thomas Modyford, but the Lord Protector also believed his Commissioners (once they arrived in the West Indies) would be better able to make a propitious decision. They framed their discussion around three options: two large islands—Cuba and Hispaniola—and the major mainland port city of Cartagena, all falling within Cromwell's guidelines. What local knowledge they gathered went largely unrecorded, based as it was on conversations that took place on the island or verbal reporting from men sent out to gather intelligence.² Various potential sources of credible information would have been

available, although they probably limited their inquiries in the interests of maintaining the secrecy that had thus far been a hallmark of the Western Design.

Penn's secretary produced a packet for England reviewing the deliberations and the decision to choose Santo Domingo (on the island of Hispaniola) over Havana or Cartagena. While it does not survive, his notation of its contents does, and some elements of the discussion can be gleaned from that source. Having decided to proceed before the arrival of their major artillery, most of which had been carried by one of the ships that turned back, the planners sought a target they could take without the use of such equipment. Havana, populous and well defended, would be difficult to overwhelm under the circumstances, as it was the best-fortified harbor in the Caribbean. Cartagena would be more easily captured, yet it was rejected on other grounds. The Commissioners believed that the residents of Cartagena would make off with all their valuables before the force could land and pillage. Thus Santo Domingo offered the best location. Easily reached from England, it also granted access to other parts of the Spanish West Indies. Reinforcements and supply could reach an English colony there, and ships could beat a hasty retreat back to Santo Domingo if future attacks on other parts of the Spanish West Indies were rebuffed.³ Holding such a prize, the English could await the arrival of artillery, sustain themselves on the booty collected, and launch further efforts.

Covering a huge area (over 29,000 square miles) compared to tiny Barbados (166 square miles), Hispaniola appeared a worthy trophy, ripe for the taking. Today made up of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Hispaniola in 1655 was, in contrast to densely settled Barbados, sparsely populated. The island was not fully inhabited, because much of it had been officially designated off-limits in the early seventeenth century. Half a century before, the governor ordered all residents living in the vast uninhabited reaches of the northern and western sectors to move south and east, in order to eliminate illegal trade with passing ships. Semi-feral cattle roamed much of the island, hunted by men (both enslaved and free) armed with lances who brought hides and meat into Santo Domingo and other southern towns. Santo Domingo played no direct part in the conveyance of treasure out of the region, unlike the other two locations under consideration. Mineral wealth, coming through Cartagena as well as Panama, was transported to Havana, where im-

perial officials assembled and provisioned the treasure fleet before it sailed to Europe. Santo Domingo, though its trade with Havana helped supply the fleet, did not require the extensive fortifications boasted by Cuba's main city. Its role as a provisioning center meant that the island would be easily able to sustain the already hungry men, a fact that one interlocutor—an English surgeon who had recently lived in Hispaniola—affirmed in an interview with Penn shortly after the decision had been made.⁴

The planners envisioned a combined naval-military operation of a familiar sort. The army, once the navy set it down, would perform much of the work of conquest. With some luck and good planning, the troops would disembark undisturbed by the enemy; given the setting, they were unlikely to have to do so under enemy fire. Once the troops were on the move, the navy would be available to offer support, by guarding the shores against seaborne attack or reinforcements for the Spanish defenders and by firing on enemy fortifications. The navy was readily conversant with such troop transport, having most recently used it to convey soldiers to Ireland for the reconquest of that island between 1649 and 1651.⁵ The recently concluded war with the Dutch, fought entirely at sea, offered no opportunities to practice this type of action. Prior to Ireland, the parliamentary navy had frequently supported besieged urban strongholds, rather than landing troops in the midst of ongoing fighting. An assault using both naval and land forces on actively defended enemy territory—the sort of engagement today referred to as an “amphibious campaign”—was relatively rare, and for examples participants reached back into the collective memory, especially to the Elizabethan war against Spain. Robert Devereux, the Earl of Essex, served as one of the commanders when the English took Cadiz in 1596; with his son a parliamentary general (and victor at the civil war battle of Edgehill), Parliament's supporters revisited his father's triumphs. In 1600 a combined English and Dutch force invaded Flanders in a dramatic and well-known amphibious campaign, as part of the Dutch war of independence. Such anti-Spanish exploits became all the more resonant at this time of revitalized Hispanophobia. As one military historian notes, contemporaries remembered past campaigns in a highly selective fashion, with the successes at Cadiz in the 1580s and 1590s—or one might add Flanders in 1600—recalled, and the failures (such as Charles's deadly attempt on the French island of Ré in the 1620s) forgotten.⁶


In addition to drawing on general knowledge about successful combined naval/military actions, participants also knew that the English had in fact already taken Santo Domingo once. In his 1585–86 voyage to the Caribbean, Sir Francis Drake occupied the city. Looting it, his small force departed only after exacting a ransom and knocking down fortifications. Men on the Western Design knew Drake's deeds, recently broadcast as an upsurge in interest brought various accounts back into print. Just two years before the Commissioners sat in Barbados making their choice of invasion site, *Sir Francis Drake Revived* (London, 1653) gathered four accounts to promote his inspiring example. His successful foray into Hispaniola would have been familiar, therefore, not only to the expedition's leaders but to others as well. This incident—and the apparent ease with which Drake had accomplished it—recommended Hispaniola.

With a well-considered plan, the massive fleet left Barbados, Penn still on the watch for men who could supplement the information he had collected. As the force moved north and west through the Caribbean Sea, Penn attempted to capture another ship's pilot off Puerto Rico. He ordered John Lightfoot, captain of the *Grantham*, to enter the road to San Juan's harbor, disguising his frigate as a Spanish vessel. Flying "a spanish Ensigne one their poupe," they were to "hal up thayer sayles, and fier a gun, for that is the sine [sign] when any of thayer owne ships doth com home for a pilate to come ofe to them to carie them in." Whistler went on to explain that "by this trick wee did hop to get a pilat of, and soe to carrie him with us, and to make him give us intelligence of the state of the Iland." The subterfuge failed, and Penn remained dependent on the expertise of Cox and Sybada.⁷

A final preparation proved more significant still, for just before the assault on Hispaniola, Edward Winslow announced a highly unexpected policy having to do with plunder. In a shipboard meeting as the fleet neared its destination, Winslow conveyed the unwelcome news that Cromwell had ordered that the soldiers take no plunder, that is, seize nothing found for their personal use. Included in the Commissioners' instructions, the order stated that "such goods and Prizes as shal be taken" should be delivered into the hands of the Commissioners who should keep a "just and true account for the publique advantage." Read as a prohibition on plunder, this order violated the customary practices of armies on foreign campaign. One soldier later asserted that the pro-

hibition was not Cromwell's but rather Winslow's, whom he characterized as "feringe any to have spoile save himselfe." The policy further flew in the face of the expectations of the rank-and-file soldiers, who envisioned wealthy Spanish lands yielding riches. The announcement "put all the Commanders into a Great pachon [passion]: and thos that durst did fullie declare unto the t[w]o Genneralls and Comm^{rs}, that had not y^e Lord Protector promised them and Thayer Soulders free plunder whare soeur thay did goe, thay would not have come out of England." According to Whistler, both Penn and Venables—well aware of customary practices and worried about morale—were willing to be swayed by the officers' warnings. The civilian Winslow—who had little experience of martial affairs but great concern for the ethics of the campaign—refused to concede the necessity of permitting plunder to motivate the troops and to honor Cromwell's promises.⁸ They debated the matter for days, but ultimately the anti-plunder order stood as the official policy.⁹ The reception of this order, like the seamen's objection to the restrictions on prize money, hinted that any hopes of making imperial expansion self-financing faced serious obstacles. Poor men had no intention of funding empire out of their own pockets.

Hispaniola—"the object our Eies have soe long desioered to see"—came into view on 12 April, and on Friday the thirteenth members of the expeditionary force sighted Santo Domingo. A man aboard the flagship described the city, saying it "lieth in a bay, about 27 or 28 leagues to the westward of Savona [Isla Saona, a small island off the southeastern end of Hispaniola]; . . . The bay, we guessed to be about 8 or 10 leagues over, from point to point; and the town to be in the bottom of it, on the west side of a river [the Ozama] that comes down a great way out of the country."¹⁰ Their force, containing by one estimate sixty sail, including fifty-six great ships, "the like whereof in any degree they had never seen before," made an impressive sight. A Spanish account deemed it "the largest fleet, carrying the greatest number of men, which has crossed to these western seas." The island's newly appointed governor, the Count de Peñalva, had arrived only two weeks before. Informed that an English attack might be imminent, he brought 200 soldiers along with harquebuses to equip the defenders. The sight of the fleet sent the inhabitants scrambling to prepare. The beat of drums called the infantry and the battalion, "who were armed with spears, muskets and harquebus which were stored in the armory of the city."



The English forces aimed to take Santo Domingo, on the island of Hispaniola. This later depiction, published in John Ogilby's *America*, shows the fortified city as well as the various roads coming from the west, roads that the English hoped to traverse, as Sir Francis Drake had done previously. Ogilby lifted this image (along with a great deal of his text) from Arnoldus Montanus's *De Nieuwe en Onbekende Weereld* (Amsterdam, 1671).

"Urbs Domingo in Hispaniola," in John Ogilby, *America: Being the Latest, and Most Accurate Description of the New World* (1671), following 336. The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, RB2695.

The navy began shuffling men and materiel between different vessels, in preparation for landing. Venables held one last shipboard meeting of his officers.¹¹

The plan called for landing the main contingent of troops west of the city. Penn described the chosen landing site as only six or seven miles west of Santo Domingo, but it may have been a few miles further. The

English intended to land where Drake had in 1586. As the ships sailed toward that point, the watching Spanish noted that they seemed to be making for the coast of "Xayna" (Jayna or Haina), near the castle (or fort) of San Jerónimo.¹² Vice Admiral William Goodsonn took charge of this landing. High surf intermittently pounds that stretch of coast, a fact that was noted on the Drake expedition as well. As events unfolded, conditions forced Goodsonn to forego the site. Penn would later describe it as "being a lee shore, and very full of rocks, and the breeze being that day very great and the sea much grown." No one recorded a discussion of the possibility that they might pause to see if the surf would abate, an option that appears not to have been considered. With no guarantee that waiting would have helped matters, on the one hand, Goodsonn knew that doing so allowed the Spanish extra time to prepare their defenses, on the other. Given these choices, Goodsonn improvised, sailing further west in search of a usable landing.¹³

To the west, the first safe disembarkation point proved to be a "place, called Point Nicayo," or "Punto de Nizao," thirty or more miles from the city. Henry Whistler later wrote as if this were the intended landing point, but clearly no one planned to put the soldiers down another ten leagues to the leeward. They unexpectedly faced a march of over thirty miles.¹⁴ According to a detailed but anonymous account, 7,500 men "were landed very well, and without opposition of the enemy, in a good sandy bay." The force included six and a half regiments. Holdip's regiment had been divided, with part of it joining this force. In addition to these foot soldiers, the navy landed troops of horse and smaller companies of "foot troopers" and "fire locks." A fisherman observed their landfall, and he managed to elude Penn's ships to the eastward, escaping to report their presence to authorities.¹⁵

Meanwhile, Penn deployed the remaining ships to land the other contingent or to ply back and forth before the town, "thereby to amuse them & to divert them from the opposition they might have made at his going on shore." Those with Buller's regiment and the other part of Holdip's sailed east, toward "the coasts of Caucedo," which the Spanish regarded as inaccessible. Francisco Facundo Carvajal, who wrote an account of the defense of the city, described that shore as "full of rocks and very sharp terrain" and completely lacking in coves. When the ships commanded by Penn arrived along that coast, they learned what the Spanish already knew: alighting there was impossible. In this instance, Penn acknowledged an error of the guides, who had suggested that the

windward shore close to Santo Domingo would be appropriate. The much-valued Captain Cox apparently failed to convey this information. After “having searched the coast, and found it all along very steep and rocky, and altogether impossible to land on,” they deferred the attempt. The following day, Sunday, 15 April, they deposited the men near the mouth of the Rio Xayna or Haina, which ship’s captain Richard Rooth rendered in his log as the “Hind River.”¹⁶

Finally setting foot on Hispaniola to the west of Santo Domingo, this smaller contingent disembarked between Venables’s larger group and the city itself. Instead of being two to three miles from the town and marching toward it from the east, they faced, according to Penn’s calculation, a march of some twelve miles. This landing occurred at or near the place Drake used in 1586, more or less where Goodsonn had hoped to deposit Venables and his men the previous day. With both contingents coming from the west, tactics changed; the forces would not converge on the city from either side. Under these new circumstances, Penn ordered Buller to wait for the main body of the army so that the combined force could move onto Santo Domingo in unison.¹⁷

With these last-minute changes, the soldiers in the main force far to the west were less prepared than they otherwise would have been. They carried provisions to last for just three days of marching “(their meats ready boiled).” Given that Drake’s men had taken the city in a day, the planners readily concluded that three days’ rations would be sufficient. It was less than the troops in Ireland carried on the march, but their officers thought their circumstances differed. Design soldiers aimed at a nearby target; no one anticipated a long march or a delay in getting into the city; and all were confident Santo Domingo would yield up more than adequate stores of food. Not only did this allotment seem ample, but providing more would have strained the fleet’s limited resources. Three days’ worth proved insufficient. Delays in landing and the time involved to disembark so many men meant that some soldiers had consumed half their rations by the time they set out. With a day and a half worth of remaining rations, they faced a march that could be conservatively estimated to take two and a half to three days. The Commissioners would later realize their mistake in this regard.¹⁸

If the food situation looked potentially problematic, the soldiery initially appeared more concerned about the prohibition on plunder. Soldiers invading enemy territory expected personal benefit in the form


of goods or money that they would be allowed to seize after victory. Laws of war dictated limits on plunder—both how much soldiers could take and when they could take it. The experienced fighting men would have learned these rules in England, Ireland, or Scotland, but the inexperienced might have known about the practice without knowing of the constraints. In any case, everyone expected some personal benefit, especially when invading a presumably wealthy Spanish island. Before the main force of the army set out, Venables read the anti-plunder order which had previously caused friction among the officers. The men reportedly responded to the idea of foregoing plunder no better than expected.¹⁹ Well schooled in the idea of an opulent Spanish Empire, they anticipated gaining for themselves over the course of the campaign. However much they knew of the target at the time they signed on, by the time they reached Hispaniola everyone had contemplated the prospects for enrichment. Whether Cromwell envisioned all the plunder augmenting the state's coffers or whether this stance arose from Winslow's strict reading of the instructions, the soldiers keenly felt the disappointment of having this customary right withdrawn.

Despite their discontent, the men commenced marching at about four in the afternoon on Saturday, 14 April, to make their way north and east, paralleling the coast, toward the city. Over the next few days, they passed "through rough woods, some savannaes, and rich valleys." The first evening, they came to a "large sevanna or plaine," where a few mounted Spaniards faced the advance guard of Reformados. When the larger force caught up, these men fled. Camping on the savanna, the army burned the small dwelling—"a cowkiller's house"—they found there. That night infantry and horse that had been landed late came up to join them.²⁰ The second day they passed through more savannas, including one that they concluded had been burned to drive the cattle out of the ravenous army's path. Marching an impressive eighteen miles, largely through woods, they sighted occasional armed colonists, but engaged in only one "small incounter."²¹ The defenders tried but failed to mount an ambush, at the end of a long "lane" with dense trees on either side. The Spanish picked off a few men as they marched. One mounted Englishman went missing. Unbeknownst to his compatriots, he had been captured, and he enlightened his captors about the purpose of the invasion. According to one version of the intelligence gained, he described the presence of ships seized from Dutch and other illegal

traders as a loan, giving the Spanish the impression that they faced a joint Anglo-Dutch assault. The advancing army did manage to kill “a gigantike man.” The writer who related this incident claimed that large stature was typical of Hispaniola’s residents.²² The soldiers passed that night with little water, sleeping around a deserted plantation and into the highway.

Lack of water had by this time emerged as the major difficulty, more dire than the paucity of food. John Daniell found it “a plentiful island, but very scarce watered.” Visiting in the final months of the dry season, the troops occasionally found waterways that were “neare dried up”; this occurred on the second day of marching, at a time when a few men reportedly “dropt downe dead for want of water.” Others took what refreshment they could from the trickle. In England, soldiers did not carry water, finding it along the way. In the Caribbean, especially in May, water was at a premium, and the men suffered horribly. Some wells may have been dry; the islanders sabotaged others. They “stop’d up all their Wells,” or at least those they could get to before the English found them, in order to deprive the intruders. As a result, the men were often unable to drink even in the villages or plantations they found. Richard Holdip, who landed with the other contingent, found that marching without water for even two days led to much complaining; and Venables’s force went farther and longer with inadequate water. As the anonymous author of the *Perfect Politician* observed, they marched “thorow Woods of incredible thickness, receiving no opposition, except the excessive heat of the Sun, which caused an intolerable drought, that oppressed them sorely, having not one drop of water in many miles march.” Dehydration eventually causes serious health problems—headache, muscle cramps, constipation or diarrhea, and disorientation or listlessness; finally a stricken individual becomes unconscious. Death comes as soon as three days and as much as a week after the victim ceases drinking. To ameliorate their thirst, soldiers ate oranges that they found growing along the way; some consumed so much citrus fruit that their over indulgence made them ill, another cause of diarrhea. Venables described the ordeal for Cromwell afterward: “We march’d in a most sad and miserable manner in an unknown Country tormented with Heat, hunger, and thirst (my self enduring what the meanest suffered).”²³

The next afternoon (Monday the sixteenth) they reached their intended landing place, near the Haina River. Earlier that day they



The English hoped to land at the Haina River, but instead landed to the east at Nizao. Their march toward Santo Domingo included a detour up the river and multiple ambushes at Fort San Jerónimo. Their slow advance allowed reinforcements to arrive from other areas.

discovered that they had spent a miserable night camped a quarter mile from a small deserted village, which would have afforded better accommodations. They stopped to refresh themselves, took sugar to have with their oranges, tried unsuccessfully to force open an iron chest, and captured a colonist. They took the uncommunicative prisoner on their march. Along this stretch of their route they began to see abandoned habitations from which the colonists had removed what they could. Monday's march also satisfied the need for water, as they found a number of watercourses and a large lake, the latter full of waterfowl. When they finally arrived at the river that was to be their meeting point, they spied an Englishman on the far side. One of the few men who could swim crossed over to him, and learned that he had landed with Buller and Holdip. He reported that he had been left behind because he was ill, while the others had gone on ahead.²⁴

Buller and Holdip had come ashore the previous day, Sunday, with orders to wait for Venables. They camped at the river overnight; Buller then became anxious to get moving. First he dispatched a small group under Major Bland; guided by Cox, they went to reconnoiter a nearby fort. When they did not return, Holdip went ahead to check on them, and he found them waiting about half a mile from the fort. Bland reported that they stopped there in anticipation of the imminent arrival of the main force, since they heard that one of the company flags had been sighted on the far side of the river. When Holdip reported this, Buller then ordered the entire force under his command to move up to the fort or even somewhat beyond it, to a second, smaller, abandoned fort called Poco del Rey. Holdip later suspected that in doing so they alerted the Spanish to their presence. Spanish sources make it clear, however, that all three overland routes to the city from the west were being watched, indicating that this movement gave them no particular advantage. Rumors that later circulated among the English that the city of Santo Domingo had been entirely abandoned during this period, only to be reoccupied in a day or two, were also untrue; many people had left the city once it was agreed that women, children, and church personnel could be evacuated to the residences scattered around the countryside. Those who believed the rumor later would lament that Buller and Holdip had not pressed ahead immediately.²⁵

As a result, Venables did not find Buller at the landing site when he arrived later that day. One account states that the larger force arrived

an hour after Buller and Holdip left.²⁶ Venables, meanwhile, had to figure out where to ford the river. Based on his English and Irish experience, he looked upstream. Lacking a knowledgeable guide and gaining no useful information from the contact with the single soldier on the opposite bank, he granted a brief rest and then ordered the force to move up river. Only later would they learn that, at least at this time of the year, the most convenient crossing was at the mouth of the river, where a sandbar formed a shallow ridge. (In a Caribbean island with only seasonal rainfall, the dry season lowered the volume of water moving through the river, reducing the flow to the point that it could no longer push the silt out of the riverbed entirely. Once the torrential rains began, crossing at the mouth would become infeasible. English and Irish rainfall and therefore rivers were not similarly variable over the course of the year.) The army marched four or five miles after leaving the bay, losing its way and veering away from the river as they tried to penetrate the dense vegetation. Finally they spent the night without food or water on another savanna. Venables sent out the troop of horse to find the river and search for a ford; when they returned with a favorable report, he deployed 1,800 men to hold the crossing until the main body of the army could join them the next day.²⁷

Tuesday morning (17 April) the troops set off before sunrise, expecting to meet with Buller's force. According to Venables, they faced another three miles' march to the ford. After crossing they proceeded back toward the river's mouth and their companions. On this march they saw a cocoa plantation, more sugar works, and a chapel, as well as some houses. Feeling in desperate need of a guide, they attempted to get information from an elderly Spaniard. They decided to take the advice of an Irish resident who offered his assistance, despite some hesitation that he would betray them. They were also approached by two African men who sought to join their effort. One of them spoke both Spanish and English. He explained that he had been a servant to Saint Christopher's first governor, Sir Thomas Warner, but had been captured and enslaved by the Spanish. The other man raised false hopes, predicting that many other slaves would join their march.²⁸ Finally, at four in the afternoon, they met Buller and most of his force.

Having spent three or four days trudging along largely unmolested, the reunited English army walked directly into an ambush. As they moved along "a very large road where 20 men might march a brest" (the

very road near the shore that they would have immediately entered had they forded at the river's mouth), Venables and some other officers walked ahead of the advance guard to look at an overgrown fort which they believed to be abandoned. Described by John Daniell as a "strong fort" about three miles from the town, the castle of San Jerónimo was, in spite of appearances, ready for them.²⁹ Suddenly one soldier spied a Spaniard lying flat on the ground and fired at him. This discovery unleashed an ambush that caught the English force otherwise by surprise. They put up little resistance as the enemy "routed them totally." Twenty or thirty men were killed, including four officers, the highly valued guide Christopher Cox, and two secretaries—Venables's as well as one of the men serving the Commissioners. The staff members had been strolling along discussing the fortification with the army's leaders, which explained the unusually high casualty rate among men whose role would not typically place them in the thick of battle.³⁰

Despite the surprise and the initially ineffectual response of the English troops, they soon managed to bring the encounter to an end. The lead troop's retreat from the skirmish sparked a stampede among Captain Pawlet's firelocks, who "shamefully rann, and beate the Reformados into disorder." Luckily these more experienced soldiers rapidly regrouped, holding off the Spanish attackers while the "fainting army" moved out of danger. The Spanish, led by a longtime Irish resident on horseback, a Colonel Murphy (known to the Spanish as Don Juan Morfa), fired three volleys on the Reformados, killing the captain and one of his men, before retreating. Captain Manuel Gonzalez Pallano Tinoco, writing a report later, claimed that the Spanish retreat arose from their own exhaustion, not from any counterattack by the enemy. One English officer later offered an exaggerated description of this engagement, with 500 Spanish horsemen and Venables's whole regiment cut off from the rest of the army. In reality, the small number of defenders ran away, chased by the seamen's regiment; Goodson reported that his regiment got within gunshot of the city and waited for the rest of the force to catch up. According to one account, as they hurried along, the seamen came upon Venables. The ambushers had not recognized the general as he walked in the lead with a small group, a gun resting on his shoulder. As the charge swept passed him, he had stepped into the woods to make his way unseen back toward his own regiment. Fortunately avoiding death or capture, he was able to rejoin the army to fight

another day. Those who disliked the general made great use of this incident as evidence of his cowardice.³¹

The army made an effort to stay along that road for the night, but eventually gave up, returning inland to the sugar works that the larger contingent had located the previous day. Before they decamped, Fort San Jerónimo fired at them as they lay “without water, ready to perish, and of hunger and want of sleep, till about midnight.” The seamen who had charged ahead frightened defenders out of a small fort (apparently Poco del Rey) up the road and came to within a mile of the town. They might have pressed this advantage, and Spanish sources suggest that this would have been a wise move, but they did not. Most of the men never made it beyond the first fort. According to one account, at midnight most marched back to the sugar works, arriving on the morning of the eighteenth. They paused there, eating sugar and oranges and sleeping, until midday.³² Then they moved to the mouth of the Haina River, where Buller’s men had originally landed and Venables had missed the crossing. Here ships could reach them, so they were able to get provisions, the first sustenance some of the men had had in days.

While the army rested, the navy plied back and forth in front of the town exchanging fire with it. The soldiers “lay still” by the river from Wednesday (18 April) until the following Monday. During that time, they enjoyed “some kind of quiet, having the River Hinnum for our refreshment, and victuall at halfe allowance from the shipping that attended heer.” The landing spot continued to be rendered inaccessible occasionally by high surf, sporadically interrupting provisioning. When boats could reach the beach, the navy landed stores and artillery. The leaders of the expedition also shuttled back and forth, conferring. The council heard a proposal to change strategy, dividing the force and sending some “to fetch a compass and fall upon it [the city] to the east side.” According to Barrington, Venables rejected this idea despite widespread support, including from the “renowned” Major General Heane.³³

On Friday, 20 April, a “considerable partie” of Spanish launched a clumsy attack. While this group was able to kill some stragglers, their assault on the guard around the camp failed. They “were soone put to the runn, leaving their captaine, a gallant brave fellow, and 6 or 7 more behinde them dead.” As Pallano observed of the Spanish effort, “only the brave fought” during this encounter. It went so badly for the Spanish that they could not even retrieve the body of Captain Pedro Velez

Mantilla. Just one Englishman was killed. The man formerly “the negro of Sir Thomas Warner’s behaved himself stoutly in this work; killed one and wounded another, calling out to our men, ‘give the dogs no quarter.’” Such loyalty and bravery were both gratifying, and the man who recorded this account on board the *Swiftsure* took it as a promising sign. The naval leaders hoped that their continual firing on the town would also “encourage the armie.”³⁴

The men’s rest, however, was less than satisfactory. Barrington, writing to his nephew, noted many falling ill, which he attributed to paucity of food and excessive sun exposure. Daniell reported that they consumed bad biscuits; he also complained that the water of the Haina was befouled by a copper mine upriver. Spanish sources agreed that the water there was of poor quality (without mentioning the cause) and that the place was generally unhealthy. Even if the quality of the river water was not generally suspect, the dry season reduced the volume of water moving through it and increased its stagnation and pollution; and thousands of men, some enduring the flux (as diarrhea was then known), encamped along its banks presumably befouled it further. Rain, which was first remarked upon on Thursday, fell torrentially. The dry season dramatically ended, and the soldiers, camping without shelter, suffered miserably. One man who remained on board in relative comfort himself described the soldiers sleeping on the sand as the rain washed it away under them. Wondering what the English army was doing, the Spanish sent out a small group of men to sneak up on their encampment to gather intelligence, including by kidnapping one of the men if possible.³⁵ The recuperative potential under conditions of little food, some of it poor quality, access to unlimited water of questionable potability, and much rain proved limited.

On Tuesday (the twenty-fourth), eleven days after the main forces’ landing, the army—however rested and refreshed—set off again toward Santo Domingo. Now equipped with small artillery, the troops progressed slowly along the road “in that hott and little water’d country.” They carried six days of provisions at half allowance. They also dragged the mortar pieces. They considered sending the artillery by water, but that plan was rejected, possibly due to limited landing sites. The first day, moving very slowly, they managed to cover only two miles, by one estimate. While ships had been deployed beyond the fort at a sandy beach to supply the advancing troops with equipment, such as scaling

ladders, they waited that day in vain.³⁶ Only the next afternoon did the weary men arrive near the fort where they had been ambushed the week before.

This time the army approached San Jerónimo in formation. The major general put Adjutant General Jackson at the head of the first party of 240 (some said 400) men. Other troops, the Reformados, Pawlet's firelocks, Captain Carpenter's horse, and Heane's own men, followed. They marched up the broad road to pass the fort, "in a good full body, shoulder to shoulder and to swords point." According to one account Jackson ignored Heane's instructions, failing to establish wings on either side to sweep the area for signs of ambush. As the infantry approached the fort, the men could see that the brush between it and the road had been cleared. Led by a relatively inexperienced captain, whom Jackson had placed in that key position, they focused their attention on the now visible fort. After some of the men passed, the fort's seven guns began firing on them. Meanwhile, in the woods beyond, another ambush waited, apparently in generally the same location as the Spanish had used earlier. These watchers observed the men "marching in tens," as Captain Pallano put it.³⁷ Confronting this inexplicably unexpected ambush, the advance fired an ill-considered volley, discharging all their guns at once—possibly without taking aim.

This mistake led to a rout. As the enemy charged, the forlorn (as the men at the front of the advance were termed) had no time to reload; in panic, they turned and ran. The Spaniards thought that the English officer—possibly the inexperienced Captain Butler—ordered a retreat. Ordered or not, men fled in disorder. "Like a torrent in a narrow passage straitned, or a sudden or a furious wave in a rough sea, nay indeed lightninge, the whole forlorne tumbled into the reformade." The fleeing front line swept Pawlet's firelocks along with it, their captain having been killed. Accounts disagree, one indicating that the firelocks stranded Captain Pawlet, another suggesting that they fled when their captain fell. The Reformados, who were few but experienced, were left to stand alone. The Spanish mowed them down, slaughtering over two-thirds, or thirty-seven of fifty-five men. The troop of horse coming up behind the Reformados was overwhelmed by the surging men. The Spanish assault was the work of a small force, estimated at eighty. They "with their lances killed until they were weary of killing, falling chiefly among the bravest of our men." As Daniell explained in a letter to his brother,

who was also a soldier but had remained in Europe, they were “mixt like a masse in soe narrow a passe, not able to containe above six abreast (the close woods encompassing the sides where the enemy was lodged to flanke us) and the great fort gunnes loaded with small shot, bits of iron, broken pistol barrells, and all such mischiefe, had full power and sure ayme all alonge that narrow passe . . . Never was any thinge so wedged as wee, which made the enemy weary with killinge.” They threw down arms as they ran as well: the Spanish would later destroy or collect them. It took some time for “four files of well disciplined men of the Generall’s” or perhaps, once again, members of the sea regiment, to drive the Spanish soldiers away, but by that time their assailants were, as various participants stressed, “wearied with killing.”³⁸

As this oft-repeated phrase suggested, the English suffered many casualties. Numerous “prime officers” were among those slain. Major General Heane made a stand against the onslaught. Daniell said that he managed to step aside from the cascade of men teeming through the narrow passage to avoid being trampled. Then he charged in, “quitted his horse, and went on along on foot, being very ill armed, where he stood till he was killed.” He had only his “walking sword.” Some described him standing alone; others noted that a small number rallied around him. Francis Barrington recounted how he died “with his sword sheathed in his enemies bowels.” When Ensign Fowler detailed the events for William Penn, the youth made particular note of his fellow ensign, Thomas Boys, who died by Heane’s side, wrapping his colors around his body as he fell. Heane, all the prisoners taken by the Spanish later attested, “was the best soldier in England.” The English sorely felt the effect of his death. One of the Africans who had joined the English—whom the Spanish described as “a mulatto, a native of the island, who was their guide”—perished as well. More officers died in addition to the much-lamented Heane, among them George Butler, “a stout, but unexperienced soldier for such a design” who had led the charge; Pawlet of the firelocks; and both Heane’s major and his lieutenant colonel, the latter dying later of his wounds. A journal kept aboard the flagship tallied the loss in officers at one major, four captains, and five ensigns in addition to Heane. Many hundreds of foot soldiers also died.³⁹

Countless of the dead had been lanced in the back. Renditions of the rout (often written by naval personnel) mention this fact with disgust. Many of the defenders were armed only with long lances, usually used

in killing cattle. Men (and at least one woman) wielding these weapons had journeyed from the countryside to join with the soldiers sent from Spain or mustered in Santo Domingo in defense of the city. The English appellation “cowkillers” invoked this group, who were often individuals of African descent; in some instances they were runaway slaves who fought in exchange for manumission. One English informant on Barbados had alerted the naval commanders to the fact that many of the men on Hispaniola were armed only with such lances. The fact had seemed heartening at the time, yet the weapons proved deadly, and those who wielded them adept. English troops armed with guns they did not have time to reload or with shorter pikes (some of them made in Barbados from the cabbage palmetto tree) proved no match for these lancers, who inflicted a mortality rate well beyond their numbers. Spanish estimates for the English dead that day alone ranged from 700 to 1,500.⁴⁰

English humiliation was exacerbated by the loss of many flags. Taking the “colors” of one’s enemy indicated a sweeping victory; the colors, used to gather and rally the men in a particular regiment, would normally be retrieved by another soldier if the bearer fell. To leave colors behind to be fetched away by an opponent signaled a fighting force in serious disarray. The retreating “enemie carried off with them eight colours, vizt. The Reformados, the firelock volunteers, 5 of the Generall’s, and 1 of the Major Generalls.” Another observer put the count at nine, adding a second to Heane’s deficit. Other Spanish sources claimed ten. The number of men available to defend Hispaniola was modest: 400 initially marshaled, augmented by others who came in from the countryside subsequently. The first successful ambush near San Jerónimo had been laid by 150 men, whereas the second repulse employed double that number, although “of these not over 100 laid hands upon the enemy.”⁴¹ While the Spanish accounts probably exaggerated the disparity—and Venables was anxious to minimize his losses—the discrepancy between the two forces was striking.

The actions of two groups during the campaign also exacerbated the English army’s humiliation. Among the fighters on the English side, the sea regiment performed much of the best service. With Goodsonn as its colonel, the seamen stood their ground when others ran. The regiment pushed further into Spanish territory in each ambush, and even chased the fighters under Murphy almost to the city gate. Goodsonn volunteered

his regiment to join with that of Venables under Major General Heane to lead the advance, but his offer came to naught when Venables declined to give up command to Heane for the duration of the engagement. Although operational arguments could be marshaled to explain his decision, it might also indicate a concern that the naval men cease stealing all the glory; if that were the reason, it failed to protect the army from further embarrassment, as most of Heane's men ran and the sea regiment again performed notably better than its counterparts in the army. Women dressed in the guise of men who fought valiantly to defend the city brought further humiliation. Although the identity of cross-dressing women might have been hidden from view, disguise being one aim of those who engage in the practice, when one contingent of soldiers led by a female captain captured English soldiers it would have been hard to ignore. While the main contemporary Spanish texts focus on the men who fought well (and discuss the decision to evacuate the women from the city to protect their virtue from marauding godless Englishmen), the archbishop who wrote to get compensation for the defenders admitted the presence of women among the lancers who fought so effectively. Pallano mentioned only one, the wife of Don Juan Rosado, before adding, "Because she was unique she deserves this mention."⁴² Her status was not in fact unique, which Pallano, like the archbishop, presumably knew.

Once the Spanish lancers withdrew, the English army did not advance, but at first it appeared ready to hold its ground. A contingent—one hundred out of each regiment—was sent to a forward position near the fort that night, while others worked to drag the mortar pieces into place. Gunners directed the men as they set the artillery; the terrain rendered it difficult to place them so that they would hit the fort. The officers conferred about the advisability of storming the edifice. The Spanish meanwhile expected the army to advance toward the city, anxiously awaiting their appearance. The navy also waited beyond the fort, watching for the army's arrival on the open ground bordering the city. At this tense moment, Venables decided that his languishing army could not go on. He later complained, "Such was the terrour, or sloth, or both, that had possessed our Men, that not a man would work (for any rewards) to plant [the artillery pieces]." For his own part, Venables had been "troubled for a fortnight with a greivous Flux, which had so weakened me (besides the pains of the day) that I could not go except supported

by two." Nonetheless, he "went from place to place as the Cannon play'd to encourage the Men to stand and to plant the Mortar Piece; and at last fainting I was forc'd to leave the care to Major General Fortescue, who could prevail no more than my self had done." Confronted with this malaise, Venables called a council of war. The officers ("none dissenting") agreed to retreat if they could not place the mortars by the morning. Venables subsequently issued an order for his men to bury the shot and destroy the artillery in preparation for a retreat. The sound of digging reached the Spanish scouts, who reported that the army must be entrenching itself.⁴³

Having fired the artillery carriages, the army "stole away." Although "stealing away" implies a quiet retreat, the scene may have been far more chaotic. As one letter explained: "The whole armie except the rear guard marched away in all manner of disorder, hasting to get water, which they found not until they came to the bay where they lay, and there dranke to excesse, and soe having noe other nourishment, because they generally lost their vicutalls as well as their armes, shovels, pick-axes, and hatchets in the rout, they suddenly fell into the flux." At this miserable moment, it began to rain again. Later that day, the navy discovered the bedraggled troops huddled about the river once more.⁴⁴ It was 26 April, one day shy of two weeks since Venables's men had first stepped on the island.

This retreat marked the end of the effort to capture Santo Domingo; eight days later, the expedition departed. By the twenty-eighth, the Commissioners and officers agreed to abandon the attempt. Leaving was not the work of a moment, however, and the troops had to await escape. The fleet had to be readied to receive the men on board again, including taking on water. Boarding commenced only on the night of 2 May, and was concluded on 3 May. Fortunately for the departing English, a letter purportedly written by an officer dramatically describing the Spanish advancing on them as they fled the island was a fabrication. Shuffling men among ships and preparing to set sail kept the expedition at Hispaniola until the fourth of May.⁴⁵ Waiting to board, the army ate its remaining provisions and began slaughtering horses for food. Eventually, an exasperated Penn allegedly refused to provision them yet again, instructing them to live off the country. Efforts to do so were stymied by a variety of factors. The Spanish set guards on all the plantations and sugar works within miles and attacked parties that approached. Many

soldiers were too weak to venture out, and others were so jumpy that they fled at the sight of the army's "owne negroes." When the English did find cattle, they tended to shoot wildly and kill their fellow soldiers rather than the beasts. "Sixteen fell in one day after this heedlesse manner," according to one account.⁴⁶ Between minor altercations with the enemy, self-inflicted injuries, illness, and hunger, the death toll continued to mount.

According to observers, the army sank into demoralization and despair. Citing their ill health and lagging spirits, Venables concluded that his men could not be inspired to fight again. Rampant cowardice contributed to the defeat, and it foiled the leaders' ability to reinvigorate the soldiers' spirits. In the various routs, fleeing men threw down their arms; Venables admitted that his men had thrown away or otherwise lost "2 or 3000 armes in 20 dayes" on the island. Detailed descriptions survive of particular men who, in the final engagement, turned and ran. The military court singled out one common soldier for doing so. Amid the deluge of fleeing humanity, he distinguished himself by "crying out 'Gentlemen shift for yourselves, we are all lost.'" The officers ordered him hung, with "his fault written upon his breast." They disciplined a few others for cowardice; some observers believed the problem far more widespread than the court's limited punishments indicated. While the men camped by the river awaiting transport, soldiers continued to be easily terrified. They fled at the sound of crab claws clicking in the night.⁴⁷ Some men joined the Spanish rather than remain in the English camp with its pervasive fear and death. The Spanish welcomed some, including one who presented himself as a royalist supporter of the late Charles I, assuming him an ideological ally; others they greeted with suspicion.⁴⁸

Adjutant General Jackson won the dubious honor of exhibiting the most egregious cowardice. He was court-martialed while the army awaited its departure. Having responsibility for the first wave of troops on the day of the second advance, Jackson first placed a less experienced officer at the fore and himself to the rear. Then, once the stampede away from the attacking Spaniards was under way, he made no effort to rally his men, but rather "faced about, and most basely ran away." As Jackson came upon General Venables's regiment, the first group of men who stood against this onslaught, "with his hands [he] took hold of them that were before and thrust them aside, that he might make way for himself to be foremost in the retreat." In contrast to James Heane, who fought

to the death, "Jackson sneakt into the bushes, like an old fox, and saved himself." Venables claimed that Jackson had been foisted on him by his highly placed friends (possibly Cromwell himself). Feeling fully vindicated, Venables described how he found Jackson virtually unharmed, being fussed over by a camp follower: "My self Coming up saw him upon a Pillow with a Woman by him weeping for him. I supposing him wounded, asked him how he did, he reply'd sore bruis'd." The Spanish captured common soldiers who shared bizarre rumors that "Jansel" (an apparent reference to Jackson) had intentionally betrayed the troops and was possibly a Spaniard in disguise. The punishment meted out to Jackson, "so notorious an offender," proved less severe than might be expected. He was "only" cashiered, with his sword broken over his head. To add to the man's humiliation, he was assigned to care for the sick and wounded—"to bee swabber to hospital ships off sicke people." This humiliating duty forced him "to keep the Hospital Ships clean for the Health of those who by his evil conduct and cowardice were wounded." One observer noted that he was sent on board the hospital ship in irons.⁴⁹

Such spineless acts made the ignoble defeat even more difficult to accept. "It would," as Penn put it, "infinitely sadden the spirits of the men of spirit to depart so shamefully, without ever seeing an enemy." Many who had not been involved in the land campaign urged reengagement. Winslow came ashore to view the battered army and to press for another attempt. Even some in the army wanted to push on, despite Venables's decision to withdraw; they later described the retreat on the night after the second ambush as a serious error. Penn offered to batter San Jerónimo with ships' guns in order to prevent that fort from firing on the army on its third attempt. He further confided to his secretary that he had said he would bombard the city of Santo Domingo as well in order to ease the army's way into it. Various naval officers expressed outrage at the idea of withdrawing.⁵⁰ In the end, no other recourse seemed available. One eyewitness stated that all the officers agreed to leave. Penn, Winslow, and Butler jointly wrote to Barbados governor Searle, explaining the decision and the "great grief and anguish of Spirit" everyone felt. They expressed their certainty that "these People will never be brought to March up to that place again." The victorious Spanish only slowly accepted that the invaders meant to run away. When prisoners taken by the Spanish informed them that the English force intended

to leave for another island, the defenders assumed that this intelligence must be a ruse to cover a new offensive.⁵¹

Although exact numbers are elusive, the army experienced considerable losses. A roll call taken after the second ambush found that of 7,000 names called, only 4,500 men answered. Not all the absent men had died, however; some were simply too ill to muster. Venables himself put the death rate variously at 1,000 men or 700. He went on to note, however, that the extent of illness rendered only 2,000 of the survivors fit to serve by the end of the Hispaniola campaign. With few general musters extant, even the number of participants at any given stage of the expedition has to be estimated. Captain Pallano, who participated in the defense of Hispaniola, understood that 7,500 men had been landed. Eventually he inflated the figure to 10,000. He believed the invaders outnumbered the defenders twenty to one. The Spanish more commonly favored a somewhat lower 7,000 men. An Irish foot soldier on the English side writing to a countryman (who was a priest in London) estimated 6,000 infantry plus the companies of horse. An English officer cited 9,000. Venables placed the preinvasion force at 6,551 (excluding the seamen's regiment). This figure conforms with the assumption that 2,500 shipped from Portsmouth, another 3,000 were added at Barbados, and the smaller islands yielded up an additional 1,000. The seamen led by Goodsonn would have put the invasion force over 7,500, as the latter states that 1,100 men were organized into ten companies. Another contemporary but incomplete muster offered a somewhat higher figure. A general muster held ten weeks later on Jamaica listed 5,800 soldiers, and Venables (again excluding the sea regiment) concluded that deaths on Hispaniola could not have been more than 700.⁵²

Venables's estimate of the loss was the most modest mentioned. A participant who subsequently published an attack on Venables put the deaths at 1,700. English prisoners taken by the Spanish reported even higher numbers, suggesting that in the ranks of the demoralized army the extent of the devastation was amplified to as many as 2,000 fatalities during the three weeks on the island. Spanish claims also surpassed Venables's. Pallano, for instance, put the number killed just in the second ambush at 1,500, while Francisco Facuno de Torres estimated the overall English loss at 2,500. By the time word of the defeat reached nearby Jamaica, the loss had grown in the second rout alone to 3,000.⁵³

Illness apparently claimed more lives than did enemy lances, brought on by the conditions the men faced. Rather than Caribbean-borne sicknesses such as malaria or yellow fever, men suffered most from hunger and thirst. The fact that the men succumbed relatively quickly, some within a day or two of landing, makes malaria an unlikely culprit. In addition, little evidence exists to suggest that yellow fever was endemic at this time. Finally, the end of the dry season represented the least likely time for the appearance of mosquito-borne illness, lacking the standing water needed to sustain the mosquito population. Because there was relatively little sugar cultivation on the island, the Hispaniola residents had not created the ideal conditions for fostering mosquitoes, in any case, as described by the environmental historian John McNeill.⁵⁴ Bad diet and poor water quality seem the most likely causes of the high rate of illness among the troops.

The failure at Hispaniola struck a shattering blow. One letter writer captured the devastating truth: although Drake had taken Santo Domingo easily with few men, "God was not pleased to deliver it up unto us though with 9500, and 50 saile of great shippes and small vessels." Some navy men were so angry about the outcome that they abused the soldiers as the latter boarded to leave the island. Communicating their great disgust, a few even suggested that the army should be abandoned to fight or die on Hispaniola. Stricken with illness himself, even though he had spent comparatively little time on land, Edward Winslow died a few days after the fleet left Hispaniola. His servant asserted that Winslow confided that he died of a broken heart. Leaving Hispaniola, some men worried what the effect of this debacle would be on their chance to seize another colony and on England's position in the world.⁵⁵

The defenders were concomitantly overjoyed by their fantastic triumph. Governor Peñalva called the victory "great and miraculous." The defenders might be forgiven a degree of posturing, which Captain Pallano indulged fully when he wrote his account of the campaign. He crowed over Spanish success and ridiculed the "womanish fears"—not to mention the poor supplies—of his foes. He asserted that losing Hispaniola "would have jeopardized all the rest of this western world, because even if they attempted no invasion in this hemisphere (which they would have attempted inasmuch as ambition is an incurable ill, and victory raises the sprits and unbalances even the very level-headed), they would have infested its seas with great fleets and become its masters."

Capturing the bent of Cromwellian policy, Pallano went on to taunt the English about what would happen if they tried to invade his island again. Amid the posturing, the Spanish remembered to thank God for their deliverance. They observed an annual feast day to commemorate the date of the English departure. They also built up the city walls facing west, intent on blocking any future overland advance from that side. Goodsonn, sailing by the city the next year, would see the work that the English invasion prompted.⁵⁶

This signal defeat has been fodder for debate then and since. According to the Spanish participants, their own valor as well as the justice of their cause led to their victory. Blaming English cowardice begs the question. More pertinently, what caused the disgraceful performance under fire? Historians have tended to emphasize overarching problems: a divided command, bickering among the leaders, inexperienced troops, and errors in supply.⁵⁷ Some of these are evidenced in the surviving sources. Inadequate supplies bore some of the blame, both the failure to equip the force sufficiently out of England but also unrealistic reliance on the English islands for food and arms. The actual engagement showed few signs of troubles arising from rivalry between Penn and Venables. Evidence for their differences largely dates to the subsequent efforts to attach blame for the fiasco, relying heavily on Venables's long self-justification written while he was in the Tower.⁵⁸ Denunciations made with hindsight do not provide the best measure of the workings of the command. In general, contemporaries cited the quality of the troops as the single most significant cause; while Venables also criticized the recruitment process in England, he joined with many others to blame the islanders, who were both inexperienced and debauched. This interpretation posited that poor-quality troops first fought for the wrong reasons (especially personal gain) and then readily succumbed to cowardice. Ultimately, for many contemporaries, the failure was a moral one.

Two major deficiencies affected the outcome, one of them arising from a questionable but understandable decision in the moment, and the other one something the planners might have prevented had they recognized it as a problem. The navy's inability to land the main force at the proper site created inordinate difficulties. The most plausible explanation for the failure to come ashore at the site that Drake had used—that the surf ran too high on the appointed day—renders the problem unavoidable. The naval officer Goodsonn, responsible for the decision not

to set the troops down there, asserted that the landing could not be approached on that day; nonnaval men argued instead that he lacked a guide or acted on false intelligence that a boom blocking the entrance to the harbor prevented them from sailing to the river. Since that stretch of coast was susceptible to “great Surges of the Sea” and the navy readily sailed as if no boom were suspected, Goodsonn’s account is plausible.⁵⁹ Unable to land near the city, the navy might have waited a day to try again; instead it moved on to the first accessible landing. This decision condemned the army—as well as Goodsonn and the men in the sea regiment—to a long march. That circumstance introduced the hunger, dehydration, ill health, and consequent demoralization that proved so fateful. A nearer landing, even a day later, would also have allowed the Spanish less time to prepare for the ambush that greeted the army at Fort San Jerónimo on day four (but which appeared not to be laid when Buller’s men passed the site a day earlier).

The second problem—which the planners did not consider an impediment—was the excessive size of the force. The very scope of the undertaking worked against its success. The grand goal of conquering all the Spanish holdings in the Americas drove up the size of the fleet. The massive force gave the invaders a sense of self-confidence—perhaps excessively so. Penn noted its great size in explaining the outcome, but only in terms of the arrogance that such a large force encouraged: they failed because they had been “humbled for a wicked confidence in our numbers.”⁶⁰ Yet, such a huge expedition generated other pitfalls. Aiming to field a force of unprecedented size created recruitment and supply challenges, yielding mostly inexperienced soldiers, inadequately armed and poorly fed. More men required more time to land, and a full day was spent disembarking men once they arrived at the landing place. Simply moving so many men, much less foraging through the countryside to sustain them, extended and complicated the campaign.

A smaller force, easier to provision and deploy, would have been more than sufficient to confront the few hundred defenders the Spanish sent out against the invaders. A few disciplined men, such as Drake commanded, might enjoy the advantages of a swift and unexpected attack. The army officers later argued in favor of a smaller contingent, suggesting that victory might still be achieved by deploying an elite unit of well-trained men. They offered to pull together a small party, using the most able and healthy men, to launch a smaller but hopefully

effective attack. This suggestion has generally been cited to demonstrate the sorry state of the troops by the end of the campaign. Venables himself presented the offer not as a legitimate plan but only as evidence of the soldiers' cowardly lack of spirit. "The Officers universally declin'd leading up their Men, but freely offer'd to Regiment themselves [that is, to create a regiment entirely made up of officers] to live and die together."⁶¹ Implicit in the offer, however, was the idea that a drastically smaller number of men might succeed where a larger force had failed. So many men were not needed to take Santo Domingo; as Drake had shown, fewer men, moving quickly and decisively, would suffice.

Had Buller's force (which landed the second day and numbered about 1,000) pushed on toward Santo Domingo immediately rather than waiting, the Spanish sources indicate that it would have found the city poorly defended. They came up to the fort which later gave the combined force such difficulty without receiving any opposition, some of them moving beyond it. Instead of pressing this advantage, they fell back and waited, with plenty of men to overwhelm the city. As time passed, more island residents came in from outlying areas to augment the defenses, which meant that over the week Santo Domingo became progressively better defended. Buller, a well-disciplined professional officer, did not act the part of an Elizabethan captain (such as the Earl of Essex at Cadiz) who seized an initiative and gained a victory he could later cite to counter any charges of disobedience.⁶² He hung back, obediently relinquishing the element of surprise.

Cromwell had a grand scheme, and planned a Western Design to conquer the Spanish West Indies. Sending a large force, to be expanded upon its arrival in the Caribbean, he imagined that such a mighty expedition was necessary to achieve his goals. The comparatively modest initial aim—to take the poorly defended Spanish city of Santo Domingo—arguably neither required nor benefited from a massive but relatively ill-supplied force. Hispaniola marked the first defeat Cromwell experienced, and it shocked not only England but the European world. That his superior force fled from a few hundred defenders of the island represented "a serious blow at the prestige and authority of the Protector."⁶³ Understanding the meaning of this great defeat occupied many people long after the English expedition limped away from Hispaniola to the nearby island of Jamaica.

Failure

THE PEOPLE WHO CONFRONTED each other on the island of Hispaniola interpreted the meaning of events afterward, both sides amazed that the English had failed so spectacularly. The invaders, explaining their failure within a providential perspective, faced a more complicated conundrum than did the victorious Spanish. Triumph in a military encounter suggested that God favored the victors, endorsing their cause and smiling upon them personally. Failure raised various possible explanations. As the English survivors limped away from the island of Hispaniola and news of the outcome began its traverse of the Atlantic, they initiated the work of interpreting the fiasco. The framework they employed, that of divine providence, or the idea that God shaped the outcome of events, was widely accepted throughout Christian Europe. Using it to explicate occurrences, they sought to understand divine intentions as conveyed by shifts in human affairs. The ensuing debates over meaning revealed divisions over the current political situation within England, the trajectory of its revolution, and the godliness of the Western Design. In addition to accusations of fault based on practical considerations—lack of water and food, questionable decisions, guides missing at inopportune moments—numerous participants and observers focused on the greater causes behind the disastrous defeat at the hands of a minuscule and poorly armed force. Providentialism once again became politicized, as the failure of the Lord Protector's grand scheme opened the possibility of criticizing him and his regime. Critics jumped on this opportunity, challenging Cromwellian rule. This failure moved England a step closer to the demise of its revolution.

Definitive news of the outcome arrived in England in July 1655, stunning Cromwell and those around him.¹ The earliest account seemingly arrived through a series of chance encounters. Captain Henry Hatsell, just docked in Plymouth, wrote to the Admiralty Commissioners on 22 July. He recounted that Captain Vesey of the *Nightingale*, plying to the west, had met a Dutch ship with an Englishman on board; this unnamed man had been in the West Indies, where he learned that the assault on Hispaniola had failed and that the expedition had moved on to Jamaica. The traveler had heard the news from the captain of the *Grantham* (which his ship had encountered as the latter patrolled off Hispaniola). Penn had ordered Captain Lightfoot of the *Grantham* stationed there throughout the month of May and into early June, and it was during that time that the encounter took place. Having spoken to this interlocutor, Vesey in turn passed the information on to Captain Heaton, along with an account of the proceedings. Heaton gave it to Hatsell, and Hatsell enclosed the written account in his letter to the Admiralty with the understanding that it would go to the Lord Protector.² If Hatsell sent the packet on the twenty-second, it could have been in the Lord Protector's hands within a few days, perhaps as early as 24 July. Although the details of its contents do not survive, with it Cromwell would have seen his optimistic projections dashed.

Around the same time, he also had the dubious benefit of three first-hand accounts written in Jamaica in early June. Two of them were official dispatches authored by Commissioners, probably arriving on the same naval ship, the *Cardiff*, the first to sail back to England after the landing on Jamaica. One, authored by Robert Venables and Gregory Butler, addressed the Lord Protector himself, while the other Penn wrote to the Admiralty Commissioners. A third description of events, written by John Daniell and probably addressed to his brother, also traversed the Atlantic on a ship (quite possibly the *Cardiff*) leaving directly from Jamaica. It subsequently came to the attention of the government because of its detailed contents, at which time a copy was made for the use of Cromwell's chief secretary, Thurloe. The date of the arrival of the *Cardiff* with one or more of these official missives, and possibly with Daniell's letter as well, is not known. Whether from Hatsell's missive or the *Cardiff's* packet of letters, the Protector first learned of the details of the debacle on Hispaniola and the retreat to Jamaica during the last week of July.³ Charles Fleetwood, Lord Deputy of Ireland stationed in

Dublin, wrote speculating on the cause of the defeat on 1 August; he had been informed by the government in Westminster of the outcome and wrote immediately to offer troops. Bad news had reached the highest levels late in July. The optimism of the moment came crashing down with word of Hispaniola.⁴ Having gambled men, money, and his reputation on a swift and lucrative conquest in the Indies, Cromwell endured a humiliating and expensive defeat.

With the arrival of the news that his force had been ignobly repulsed, Cromwell promptly retired to his closet for a day of prayer, in keeping with the providential imperative that he seek the divine cause of “late rebukes we have received.” Those who believed that the Lord corrected his people by sending them suffering and disappointment found every such correction an opportunity for spiritual improvement.⁵ It overstates the case to assert that “providentialism afforded infinite scope for self-deception,” since—although success granted validation—failure demanded serious self-scrutiny. Participants had already begun the work of interpretation and, as word trickled out in England, more people mulled over the meaning of the “disgraceful fiasco” there. The discussion drew heavily on the language of godly Protestantism, since England’s revolution took place within a discursive field that centered on God’s plans and the individual’s obligations in relation to them. Mid-seventeenth-century English revolutionaries granted a central role to the doctrine of divine providence; indeed, they may have drawn upon it particularly in instances involving acts of violence such as this invasion.⁶ For Cromwell personally, Hispaniola represented the first experience of defeat. With his career built on his record of success—which to contemporaries testified not only to his martial ability but also to God’s favor—the implications of failure were deeply troubling.

Beyond the personal crisis of confidence that such a failure elicited, he faced it under the gaze of the nation and indeed all of Europe, an unaccustomed challenge to a man with a succession of celebrated victories. The exiled Joseph Jane—who wished for Cromwell’s demise and the return of royal authority to England—offered an analysis from his perch on the Continent. He understood that Cromwell was ill or troubled, “for he hath never felt a losse till now, and all agree it is very sharpe and that they tooke Jamaica for mere necessity, not knowinge else how to dispose of their sicke men and preserve themselves upon the losse received; for this strikes him in point of reputation with the vulgar in



This engraving of Oliver Cromwell appears to be based, as were many images of him, on the portrait by Robert Walker, today held in the National Portrait Gallery (London). The engraving's background differs, however, and the images of ships and soldiers were particularly apt to illustrate the man who launched the Design.

"Oliverus Cromwellius," from James Granger, *A Biographical History of England* (London, 1769), illustrated by Richard Bull. The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, 28300.

England, who believed him invincible, and the souldiery in regard of former successe thought themselves so too." In London, Lorenzo Paullucci also noted that failure would cause Cromwell "difficulty in satisfying the claims made by the numerous persons interested in the service of the fleet." Thomas Povey, who had helped to fit out the fleet and sent two brothers with it, described how "the frame of things is so discomposed by reason of the miscarriage of y^e great design."⁷ These circumstances guided Cromwell's decision to control the press, but he was unable to contain the information about the fiasco entirely.

News of the Design circulated widely somewhat later, after the return of a large portion of the expeditionary force. By early September, interested parties in London passed around a letter from a soldier in Jamaica to his wife, along with a second letter, this one from an officer, confirming the trying situation. The circulation of such unpublished firsthand accounts thwarted the government's wish to withhold the dreadful details.⁸ The return of most of the fleet (and the subsequent arrival of Venables and others) could not be hidden; and the return of the generals became all the more newsworthy when Venables's return prompted the imprisonment of Penn as well as Venables. Royalists on the Continent were soon writing that the two men would be executed or speculating that such aggressive punishment would be rejected for fear that Admiral Robert Blake would switch allegiance to the king should Cromwell prove too heavy-handed. Then, in late September, just as the last issues of the soon-to-be suppressed weeklies appeared, a detailed account by a participant (identified as I. S.) issued from a London press under the title *A brief and perfect Journal of the late Proceedings and Successe of the English Army in the West-Indies*. After an opening six-page justification of the undertaking, the tract contained twenty closely packed pages describing events from the fleet's departure until Penn's return.⁹ Any hope the government had of suppressing details of the disaster was effectively frustrated by its publication.

From Hispaniola to London, and beyond, English people vigorously lamented the embarrassing nature of the rout. One of his close associates described William Penn at the moment of defeat, "choked" with the urge to lambaste the ill and demoralized troops, struggling to give them the encouragement they needed instead of the scolding they deserved. Henry Cromwell, in Ireland, exchanged letters with many who scrutinized the Design. They described the "strange panick feare" that had

overtaken the army, bemoaned the “most saddest, sottish management” of the attempt, and reported that the troops acted “scarce like men.”¹⁰ For participant I. S., the soldiers were “sheep like . . . in courage, not innocence,” referring derisively to the symbolism of Christians as sheep to Christ’s shepherd. He further contrasted their “disability, weakness, and cowardice” to the “able, resolute” traits they ought to have shown. The “weak and feeble” who ran away when Major General James Heane made his final, valiant stand did so “unworthily and shamefully,” thereby demonstrating “vile cowardice and baseness of spirit.” The soldiers were “cowed and daunted.” As a pamphlet author later snidely remarked, the English army exercised its valor by slaughtering horses on the beach at Hispaniola. One anonymous observer bewailed the fact that “a few despicable Mongrel-Spaniards, Shepherds and Blacks” beat them.¹¹ Similar exchanges occurred endlessly among observers trying to make sense of what happened. The result was a shattering—and nearly inexplicable—blow.

Confronted with news that the Design had not proceeded as expected, numerous individuals expressed anew the widely held conviction that it nonetheless represented God’s plan. Cromwell concluded that, whatever else the fiasco on Hispaniola demonstrated, he could rely upon the knowledge that the original plan met with God’s full approval. In this he sounded remarkably like Philip II discussing the failure of the invasion of England in 1588. He wrote to Daniel Searle in October that he was so entirely confident that God intended him to pursue this project, no matter the cost, that he “dare not relinquish it.” In a similar vein, he assured Goodsonn, the naval commander at Jamaica: “The Lord himself hath a controversy with your enemies, even with that Roman Babylon, of which the Spaniard is the greatest underproper. In this respect you fight the Lord’s battles, and in this the scriptures are most plain.”¹² The clergyman Ralph Josselin found the debacle on Hispaniola “strange” since it might seem to indicate the impossible: that God intended the Spanish to retain control of their West Indian territories seemed outlandish to Josselin and many of his fellows. Josselin himself eagerly awaited a “religious war of Protestants against papists” and heartily approved the Design.¹³ Many others also remained certain that the Design had divine sanction.

Besides the obvious point that God loathed the false religion of “papists,” Design supporters knew that he endorsed their scheme because

he had fortuitously made it possible. In the providential worldview shared by these individuals, God's hand guided all events. Nothing happened without a purpose; nothing occurred that God had not arranged; nothing indeed ever took place fortuitously, that is, by fortune or fate. When the Anglo-Dutch war ended, rendering a large number of ships unemployed at a time when the English state could not afford to pay off their crews, no one viewed this circumstance as a sign of poor management or the unprofitable nature of war. Rather, Design proponents, confronted with ships sitting idle full of restive seamen, saw God setting up the conditions necessary to unseat Spain in the Americas. This convergence of desire and the means to implement it was taken as evidence that God judged England worthy to undertake this Design. Cromwell declared that it would have been "dishonourable and unworthy" not to have acted once God handed them the opportunity. Cromwell's Council purportedly discussed the matter in similar terms.¹⁴ Already convinced that the Lord abhorred Spanish Catholicism and approved of its destruction, advocates of the Design easily concluded that circumstances making the undertaking possible were no coincidence. God, they believed, had handed them the means, and they were obligated to utilize them toward his ends.

Pursuing a divine agenda made the need to implement it properly all the more compelling. Cromwell himself was excruciatingly aware of the obligation to conform fully to God's will in this undertaking. He expressed the tension between knowing he was doing the Lord's work and striving to deserve divine blessing upon that work when he commissioned the men to lead the Design. First he cited the obligation to respond to "the Cruelties, Wrongs, and Injuries done and exercised upon them by the Spaniards in those parts." Then he expanded the moral imperative, declaring that he had "a respect likewise in this our undertaking to the Miserable Thraldome and Bondage, both Spiritual and Civill, which the natives and others in the Dominions of the said King in America are subjected to and lye under by meanes of the Popish and cruell Inquisition and otherwise." Finally, he avowed his hope that God intended "to make us instrumentall in any measure to deliver them, and upon this occasion to make way for the bringing in the light of the Gospell and power of true Religion and Godliness into those parts." He concluded that should his scheme succeed, "wee shall esteeme it the best and most Glorious part of any Successe or Acquisition it shall please God

to blesse us with." Nothing accomplished over his entire illustrious career would compare. Cromwell saw the scheme as entirely in keeping with the divine agenda as he and his Commissioners understood it. Commissioner Edward Winslow concurred, envisioning the fleet as "instruments in [God's] right hand, to execute his determined vengeance upon that tyrannous and idolatrous and bloody nation."¹⁵ While trying to maintain a proper sense of humility, they found it hard to imagine the failure of a plan so entirely reflecting God's will.

The providential worldview offered much room for understanding the disjunction between God's clear goals and the vagaries of events, and these ideas structured the discussion. If God approved of the Design itself, two other lines of reasoning then opened. One potential explanation was that God tested his people, not out of anger at their sins or opposition to their goals, but because he wanted to give them an opportunity to prove their commitment to him. Charles Fleetwood was confident that, even though God sent trials and "sadde reproofes" to foil English plans, he would eventually allow "a blessed and gracious returne" on their labors. This possibility was the most comforting, for it meant that God approved of both the person and the plan. English observers generally did not see the fiasco in these reassuring terms, as representing a simple test. The other possibility—that the outcome was a punishment, a corrective affliction—was more widely accepted. Cromwell favored it. The musing of one Edward Worth captured this viewpoint. Analyzing a shipwreck off Ireland that took the lives of troops on their way to reinforce Jamaica, he concluded that it was "as if God had saide, since all my doeings at a distance will not humble you I wish to bring a judgement home to your very walls that that humble you."¹⁶ This more chastening view hardly ended the discussion, since the reason for the punishment awaited identification.

Why was God punishing the English by undercutting a plan that he obviously applauded? Three sources of divine censure would be offered in the ensuing discussion: national wrongdoing, the betrayal of the revolution, or sinfulness within the army itself. Cromwell encouraged the first idea, promoting national sin as the cause when he called the nation to hold a "Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation."¹⁷ He intended to direct the discussion, as did any leader who ordered such a day of humiliation. In asking God for help, those who prayed (or ordered others to pray) usually identified the cause of divine displeasure. They asked,

in effect, leading questions—even though all agreed that God’s will was inscrutable. Many people accepted this interpretation and applied themselves to the task of seeking repentance, just as Cromwell designated.

Some of his critics, however, saw Cromwell’s call as an opportunity to voice their hostility to his government, enlisting divine displeasure in support of their political position. Disliking the Protectorate because they saw government by one man as a betrayal of the republic that had guided England from 1649 to 1653, these critics believed God had disowned Cromwell for his misstep. To his credit, Cromwell himself considered this option, but concluded that the creation of the Protectorate had not offended the Lord. Three publications made the case that failure in the West Indies constituted a clear statement against what Edmund Ludlow would later label that “late erected tyranny.”¹⁸ Despite the effort at press censorship, one anonymous author penned a highly critical tirade. *Hypocrisie Discovered* challenged the decision to go to war with Spain (while entering an alliance with the equally popish and cruel France) as well as the regime that made that decision. *Hypocrisie* argued that Penn and Venables were capable of remarkable military success when their cause was just, which proved—to the author’s satisfaction—that their sorry performance on this occasion testified to the bankrupt nature of Cromwellian rule. Also in late 1655, an anti-Cromwellian statement originating in Wales (where it garnered 276 signatures) used the Design to build its case against the Protectorate: “We cannot without grief mention the sad effects of the secret designe of Hispaniola, to be the losse of so many mens lives, the expense of so much blood and treasure, and all the endangering of this Common-wealth by Invasion; as also thereby rendering us a scorn and snuffe to the Nations round about.” The primary instigator of the petition, Vavasor Powell, had long been Cromwell’s critic, but in this instance some of his fellow Welshmen joined him. Sir Henry Vane’s *A Healing Question Propounded and Resolved, Upon occasion of the late publique and seasonable Call to Humiliation* agreed: the Design proved that the Protectorate violated the will of God. While Powell seemed to have escaped imprisonment on this occasion and the author of *Hypocrisie Discovered* may have escaped discovery altogether, Vane eventually spent four months in prison for his openly critical stance.¹⁹

Using Cromwell’s fast day to mount their own elucidations of God’s perspective on the current state of affairs, these critics revealed the fundamentally political nature of such public exercises in communal

humiliation. Years after the event, Roger Williams pointed out that although Cromwell had asked for help in identifying the national sin, he was outraged when Vane named his own elevation to the status of Lord Protector. Another critic, who was less direct than Vane as well as less public with his views, still came under suspicion for suggesting that Cromwell might not have known God's design when he dispatched the forces to the West Indies. So much for the inscrutability of God's will, if such a statement earned the ire of Cromwell's secretary, John Thurloe, after the letter was intercepted. Others used the search for the cause of divine displeasure to offer pointed criticism, such as a Quaker who wrote to Cromwell explaining how his failure to defend liberty of conscience caused the fiasco.²⁰ The danger of enlisting the godly in one's cause was that they tended to hold strong convictions, unafraid of the consequences of speaking truth to power when they felt compelled to do so.

Design participant I. S. closed his highly critical pamphlet with a prayer that demonstrates the politicized nature of this interpretive process. He both aligned himself with the godly who sought after the Lord and criticized Cromwell, Venables, and others. In a classic example of politicized prayer, I. S. began by thanking "the Divine Creator, who hath dealt thus mercifully with us, the unworthiest of his Servants, giving us so large experience of his abundant goodnesse towards us, and bringing us once more unto the Land of our Nativity." He went on to implore "the Lord in mercy [to] so encline the hearts of this Nation, those grand sinnes of Presumption and Covetousnesse, may no longer reign amongst them, lest seeking after shadows, they lose the real substance; or coveting the good or Gold of others, they incurre the high displeasure of Almighty God upon themselves, and so become the scornes and derision of their Enemies, and a by-word to other Nations." Little wonder that, reading this passage, Robert Venables—a principal object of I. S.'s criticism—was consumed with rage and indignation. I. S. identified himself as blessed by God (though unworthy), and then laid blame for all the suffering previously detailed in the pamphlet squarely on others. As opposed to "us," who were blessed, "they" were presumptuous, covetous, and likely to "incurre the high displeasure of Almighty God." Interpreting God's will and attempting to act accordingly represented a challenge to all godly Christians, which they generally acknowledged to be difficult. To have the author—with what Venables viewed as a patina of false humility in declaring his status as the "unworthiest" of

God's servants—explain the Design's message short-circuited the careful process of self-examination and prayer in the interest of heaping blame on selected others. I. S. may have offered a particularly noticeable example of using prayer to promote one's own agenda, but he was far from alone in thinking he knew why God punished.

Appearing singularly unabashed by his critics, Cromwell appointed another day of humiliation in order to address the divisions his critics conveyed. At that time he specifically listed the sin of divisiveness, scolding those who used the opportunity opened by defeat to criticize the government. Cromwell's assertion that his opponents sinned when they challenged his policies offered another example of communal prayer used to equate one's own views with divine will.²¹ Cromwell offered his own interpretations, but so did I. S., Henry Vane, and many others. The politics of seeking after the Lord was fraught with disagreement.

Although a number of people saw the fiasco as their chance to broadcast their objections to a policy, a military leader, or the Protectorate as a whole, most commentary focused more narrowly on the army's sinfulness. William Stane stopped at attributing the inexplicable cowardice of the English troops to the "hand of the Lord," without further commentary. Cromwell urged stricter discipline to avoid similar rebuffs. Francis Barrington worried about it even before the defeat, noting lack of gratitude for God's favors, cruelty to the planters of Barbados, and other questionable actions that might deserve divine censure. Critics of army recruits noted how unfit they were—especially those soldiers gathered from the Caribbean islands. Sometimes these criticisms focused on lack of martial ability, but usually the lament targeted loose living or other immorality.²²

Many pointed to the controversy over plunder as indicative of the failure to field a godly army. Some wrote about the anti-plunder order, which was read out to the army before it set off on its march on Hispaniola, merely as a problem of morale. They believed that men who stood to gain from the seizure of their enemy's goods would be motivated to fight more aggressively. Many others, however, interpreted the reaction to the prohibition on plunder in light of the greed of the troops, as proof that they fought for the wrong reasons. Being motivated by avarice rather than the desire to glorify God tainted their efforts. Plunder itself seemed dishonorable to some of the godly: the last of the Ten Commandments strictly prohibited covetousness. Many observers

censured the greed and covetousness of the men—and even of their officers. One anonymous opponent of the Protector cited Cromwell's own greed. The common soldiers revealed clearly that they were at least as concerned with material benefit as with the Lord's cause. Francis Barrington joined numerous others in worrying over the obvious avarice of the participants. Before the anti-plunder order crushed their hopes, many soldiers had been swapping tales of Spanish wealth and longing for their share. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that God punished men for their greed. According to a letter written that autumn, reinforcements arriving in Jamaica still hoped for great wealth: "all their imaginary mountaines of gold are turned into dross."²³ Whether elite or lesser men, if they were hampered by covetousness, they were the wrong sort for a godly army.

Cromwell and many of his contemporaries agreed on the importance of fielding an army of the faithful, believing that God punished transgressions by bringing defeat or rewarded devotion with victory. The Design's secrecy had been criticized because lack of knowledge prohibited men from the prayerful reflection necessary to success. Whatever perils arose when secrecy forestalled godly decision making, the leaders of the expedition worked to support morality and godliness. Penn ordered ships' captains to set aside April 9, as the fleet traveled toward Hispaniola, "to seek the Lord in, for a blessing on our design." Having just spent the preceding day in Sabbath observance—with minimal labor and much prayer—the entire fleet paused again to offer "humble petitions" to God. After they fled Hispaniola, the leaders felt that another day praying was in order. Richard Rooth, master of the *Hound*, recorded his own petition: "The Lord, I hope, will pardon and amend all the imperfections and defects therein, and for His mercy and loving kindness sake own us, guide us and protect us. Amen."²⁴ With their attention to this matter, the Design fleet followed practices common in both New England and revolutionary England, where such ritual days of prayer were a recurrent part of community life.²⁵ When I. S. hoped that the defeated army would gain "a feeling sense of their presumptuous wickedness, and disobedience towards God" from the chastisements of "hunger, thirst, and the Sword of the Enemy," he expected that realization to improve their performance. Godly men, capable of such a "feeling sense" and striving to avoid wickedness, would create a victorious soldiery. The acclaimed Boston minister John Cotton informed

Cromwell that it was preferable by far to have a small force of deeply religious men: “better a few and faithfull, than many and unsound.” To be a highly successful commander accepting advice about military matters from a clergyman with no direct combat experience made sense to Cromwell, who had humbly sought out the great man’s guidance. A crack fighting force pursuing God’s work, the two men agreed, was built out of godly material.

The debacle brought to mind the biblical story of the Israelites’ defeat at Ai, where they were decisively routed by a smaller number of men. The English army’s experience paralleled that failure, another case when God allowed his people to be devastated when they wallowed in sin. After Hispaniola, Venables’s chaplain, Thomas Gage, preached on Joshua 7:7. Once news arrived in England, Josselin ruminated on the same verse. Failure to repent brought defeat, because a just God would not permit his people—whether Israelites or godly Protestants—to enjoy victory while mired in sin. Such a defeat of the godly would, army officer Robert Sedgwick worried, allow their enemies to castigate their religion even as they, like the Philistines with regard to the Israelites, rejoiced at their difficulties.²⁶

In keeping with their understanding of God’s punishment, the army identified and rebuked the sinful within its ranks after the second ambush on Hispaniola. The first order of business after the bedraggled men straggled back to the river was to purge the army of sin. Operating on the principle that this sad rebuff was God’s punishment, Venables and his officers identified causes of divine wrath and moved to eliminate them. Cashiering Adjutant General Jackson for cowardice, the officers also discussed his flagrant immorality. Venables characterized him as “a prophane Drunkard and Whoremaster, a Man that stood Charg’d (and the Charge prov’d) of Perjury and forgery.” He further noted that the man had been suspected of bigamy in England. Once the fleet arrived in Barbados, Jackson apparently succumbed to “whoring and drunkenness.” Although no formal charge was made at that time, strong circumstantial evidence marred his reputation further. It was alleged that “he and a Woman lodging in one chamber together and not any other person with either, enough to enduce a belief that he was an Offender.” Perhaps this woman accompanied the fleet to Hispaniola, there to weep over him after he ran away “sore bruis’d.” Venables chided her that “she ought rather to look after her Husband than a stranger.”²⁷

Besides Jackson, the leaders ferreted out other sinners. As part of a general sweep, "some women found in mens apparel were punisht, and all suspected whores (Barbados and those plantations yielding fewe else) narrowly sought after." The cross-dressers may not have intended to infiltrate the army so as to sell their sexual services but rather to escape servitude or poverty in another island colony. Early modern women disguised as soldiers often grasped for opportunities usually limited to men. The leaders imprisoned some soldiers and ordered others to "rid the Wooden Horse" (to humiliate them for their sins); "two who were notorious swearers were whipt, and burnt through the Tongue." Officers were commanded to correct all their men, to make certain that no further transgressions went unpunished. Venables hoped that, although his army was made up of many "very loose and debauch'd" men, strictly disciplining them would shield the army from liability for their faults.²⁸

Some observers criticized the effort as too little and too late, but those who expected vigorous attention to sins to have a salutary effect hoped that the fleet's subsequent activities would be blessed as a result of this belated effort to address the problem. Venables argued strenuously from his cell in the Tower of London that he had done all he could to deflect the punishment due to "loose" men in the army by reprimanding them for their sin. It chagrined him nonetheless that he had to admit, "I do not plead for the Armys Piety." Others worried that the Design could not succeed so long as the army or the English nation were full of the vile, the profane, and "corrupters of all good manners." Many concurred on the need to control sin in order to deserve "God's gracious assistance." The view that reformation would turn the army's fortunes was widely held, for one account noted with some surprise that despite the imposition of discipline, the army's ill health continued.²⁹

This concern was not limited to elite men who used it to discipline those beneath them in the military and social hierarchy. Usually the common soldiers and seamen appear only indirectly in discussions of the godly fighting man: either as objects of criticism for failure to live up to the ideal or as silent participants in Sabbath or prayer day services. In one case, however, a group of seamen fully endorsed the idea that God would prevent the Design from prospering if sin went unchecked. The crew of the *Selby* brought a complaint against its captain, John Clarke, alleging that he was notoriously sinful. His men found Clarke objectionable for a variety of reasons, including that he invited women

to sleep with him on his ship. In a passage well calculated to reach the devout Vice Admiral Goodsonn, they explained that they chose “to engage their lives & fortunes in these remote places of the world for y^e glory of God and y^e good and welfare of their owne Countrey.” They did not want to tempt the wrath of God by looking the other way while Clarke wallowed in sin. Their complaint proved successful. On the basis of the information the men provided, a court-martial found Clarke guilty. He was cashiered and sent home to a further inquiry into his conduct.³⁰ Although the men may have cynically used the language of the godly to rid themselves of an objectionable captain, they were at least able to deploy it convincingly to achieve their ends. Goodsonn found their concerns entirely plausible.

For many, the very confidence with which the Designers entered the project caused the resulting woes. Excessive confidence could make an army incautious, but that danger was not identified as the main problem. Rather, arrogance was sinful and therefore earned God’s disfavor. Barrington promoted this critique. He noted that the army had too much “confidence in the flesh,” even making jokes about “Jack Spaniard.” This arrogance caused God’s judgment. It also earned ridicule from the naval men who taunted the beaten, ill, and hungry soldiers as they straggled back on to the ships, saying, “Where are there cowardly Spaniards now?” John Daniell lamented how the army “concluded [it would enjoy] the certaine possession [of Hispaniola] without blowes.” God, he thought, took particular offense at the way participants debated dividing the spoils even before they raised a finger to take the island. Enemies of Cromwell thought the Protector’s own arrogance at fault.³¹ Robert Sedgwick, sent to take charge of the army on Jamaica, firmly believed that the “carnal confidence off our people” explained the poor progress to date.³²

Both the confidence and the aversion to it arose out of the ideology of godly Protestantism. The English knew that God endorsed their anti-Catholicism and wanted them to enter into this campaign; this knowledge bred confidence, which tempted the participants to abandon the meekness that fostered divine favor. Assurance of success led to overconfidence, which foiled the chances for success. The conundrum highlighted the careful balancing act that made up the interior life of the most devout of these men. They constantly tried to understand and act upon divine will, but they also endeavored to remain humble in the

face of their conviction that they expressed the will of an otherwise inscrutable God. Numerous victories in the civil wars and the wars in Ireland and Scotland had strained the godly commitment to humility, but the Western Design put an end to the assumption that God would endlessly smile upon the revolutionaries as they pursued his goals.

Even as the English worked their way through these various possible explanations of the meaning of the defeat, the Spanish undertook the converse interpretive work. The Spanish, like the English, were amazed by the outcome on Hispaniola: neither had expected the invaders to fall to a modest and ill-equipped defense. When the Spanish wrote about the victory, as a number of participants and some purveyors of news did, they too emphasized cosmic over practical explanations. Although some noted that their forces fought bravely, the bulk of the interpretive weight went toward providentialist and other forms of divine intervention. Despite their shared sense that they were irreconcilable foes, the two sides drew upon a common understanding of God's providential dealings with his people. For the Spanish, the logic of victory offered a simple rationale. Victory endorsed their cause, even as defeat proved the fallacy of the English sense that they fought for true Christianity. Their failed invasion underscored, for the Spanish, God's love for devout and loyal subjects and his censure of impious rebels who axiomatically could not enjoy his favor.³³ The politics of their position, while they escaped the complexities attendant on interpreting unwelcomed providences, simultaneously engaged in the deferential self-promotion of men aiming for royal patronage.

Spanish accounts gave credit to participants for their courageous role, just as English treatments identified those who failed most spectacularly. Captain Pallano, a participant writing a few years later, asserted (in contrast to the English), "We Spaniards are not the men to permit ourselves to be carried away by infamous fear." The author of an artful "Memorial," written from the point of view of the island itself, praised the valor of the defenders, characterizing them as alternately "invincible" and "ardent." Hispaniola's voice declared that, confronted with "ten or twelve thousand bellicose English warriors," the islanders marched out, "courteous and courageous . . . to meet them on the way, and in three interviews they had with them (neither urbane nor affable!) they took their life from about three thousand." The island-as-author inflated the numbers of invaders and dead, exceeding the figures in wide use among

the Spanish (9,000 invaders and 2,000 dead). Such hyperbole bolstered islanders' bid for royal favor. Pallano admitted that not every defender acted heroically: "Let us not amaze coming generations by insisting that we were all valiant; for there were all sorts." Conceding that some faltered before the invading force helped Pallano to draw attention to those who (like him) rose to the occasion and ought to be rewarded. At the same time he could not resist ridiculing the "womanish fear" of the English, though it undermined the case he was trying to build for a heroic defense deserving of favor.³⁴

Considering the role of Hispaniola's governor, the Count de Peñalva, gave the notary Francisco Facundo de Carvajal an opportunity to highlight the proper comportment of a leader. In his official report, the notary emphasized the vigorous response and vaunted status of Hispaniola's recently arrived governor. Peñalva performed all the work to be expected of an able governor, deploying and redeploying troops wisely as he learned of the enemy's plans, consulting with various lesser officials and the former governor, and generally overseeing the defense of his city. He exceeded such requirements, however, by personally visiting the field of battle to inspect the defenses and inspire the men. Carvajal thought this move remarkable, noting that "his lordship went in person" to perform these tasks. Spanish attention to the status of their leading men and careful descriptions of the ways in which those leaders upheld that status contextualized a remark regarding the English general Robert Venables—that he was just a soldier of fortune, but the English called him "excellency."³⁵ The English were led by lesser men, who lacked the Spanish elites' breeding, vigor, and bravery. The Spanish writers explicitly defended a traditional vision of society—Roman Catholic, monarchical, and aristocratic; although a vision intended to gratify their superiors and validate their own efforts, it was presumably no less sincerely held by those articulating it.

While not neglecting the contribution of individuals to the victory, most Spanish accounts, like most English explanations, focused on its larger meaning. Count de Peñalva, Don Bernardino de Meneses Brahamonte y Zapata, declared the outcome "great and miraculous," invoking the role of the divine. Pallano noted that unjust war led inevitably to "certain punishment." Similar sentiments were expressed elsewhere. The idea that God had saved Hispaniola became commonplace on the island. After the English had been sent away, the residents of Santo Domingo

held a massive religious celebration of the victory, complete with the singing of *Te Deum Laudamus*, in praise of God. With heavy symbolism, the army entered the church with English company flags: "Lutheran banners trailed in the dust, as trophies."³⁶ Eventually residents received permission to mark the day annually. They slipped easily from acknowledging the courageous defenders to invoking the language of divine blessing, confident that God wanted their enemies humiliated as a righteous judgment against all they exemplified.

As the Spanish narrated it, the victory represented a simple verdict on the religion of the two opposing forces. Confronting self-described godly soldiers, the Spanish also employed a religiously inflected understanding of the clash. Godly Protestants on a mission from their Lord Protector to vanquish the Catholic Spanish Empire in the Americas invited a counterinterpretation in which their opponents defended their homes and lands out of duty to God and their king. In the Spanish view, regicide followed from the earlier English abandonment of the Holy Mother Church, as those who cast off the one true faith slid into all manner of sin. Captured English soldiers conveyed the religious animosities widely felt among the invading forces, encouraging the Spanish understanding of the campaign as inspired by anti-Catholic motives. No piratical raid aimed at taking ransom, this effort sought nothing less than the elimination of the Spanish and Catholic presence on these islands (and in the West Indies more generally). The Spanish therefore cast their defense of the islands in terms of protecting the "Holy Mother Church" (Santa Madre Iglesia) from its enemies. Like the English, Spaniards confidently declared that on "our side we have God's true religion." They prided themselves on a tradition of fighting for their faith. They had long interpreted their successes—beginning in the Americas with discovery and conquest—providentially, arguing that God rewarded and relied on them as his instruments to further the work of extending and defending the Church.³⁷ Imperial expansion contained a providential component from the first. On Hispaniola, one writer carried forward that tradition of linking religion, war, and Spain's special role in the world—even as he equated Spanish Catholics holding Santo Domingo with Islamic Moors defending the city of Granada against a Spanish effort to reclaim it.³⁸

Aware that English heretics (who "lived like beasts") rejected all that was good, their opponents expected them to commit atrocities. For

instance, the Spanish understood the English practice of biting their bullets—necessitated by the fact that these projectiles would not fit into the muzzles of their guns unless gnawed down—as an effort to spread gangrene. Spittle of course does not cause gangrene, which was then a misunderstood medical phenomenon; but the Spanish assumption that the English would seize any advantage regardless of the ethical implications bespoke their deep distrust. The Spanish also feared that the English, should they gain access to the wives and daughters among them, would sexually assault them. During the invasion, the governor first ordered all women in Santo Domingo to remain inside their homes and convents to keep them out of the hands of the invaders should they enter the city. Later, after much debate, he sent them out of the city entirely.³⁹ Rape was a common part of early modern European warfare, especially when a population resisted (as in a siege), so the concerns of Dominicans had some basis.

Beyond war crimes, the Spanish expected (and witnessed) sacrilege, atrocities against God. Peñalva connected both types of offenses, describing his foes “profaning hermitages, mutilating their crosses and saints, waging war by fire and sword, using clipped bullets out of which they bit pieces, and advertising that they come to attack our holy Catholic faith.” The desecration of the statue of Saint Anne by the marauding English soldiers perfectly fit these expectations. Pallano lingered over the incident. “On this retreat, as though they had seen that the image of our lady, Saint Anne, had helped us to kill them, those sacrilegious dogs cut off her head and ears and nose and lips, and gave her two thousand wounds in her sacred face, at Don Juan de Mieses’ plantation, of which she is the patroness.” Pallano lamented that “these perfidious infidels” acted in such a fashion even though “their forebears shed so much blood,” in support of the one true Church. He then went on to cite such Anglo-Catholic saints as Thomas More, “holy martyr,” and “the most saintly Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury.” Despite this glorious past of faithfulness, “now, on the sole authority of Luther and of other infamous authors of heresies, they came to demolish them, by this abominable act condemning the holy and just actions of their predecessors.” However much the English had forgotten their own Catholic past, for Pallano, it formed a context for the clash between Catholic and Protestant (or faithful and heretic) in the Caribbean. The “heretic impiety” of the English came as no surprise, shocking though it was.⁴⁰ Such

disrespect demanded that the faithful defend the island even as it prompted the Lord to destroy the invaders.

These writers went beyond such providential constructions, however. They believed not simply that God guided all events toward particular conclusions with a sort of invisible hand, but that saints and angels also directly intervened in human affairs. Particular saints were associated with military engagements, such as Saint James (Santiago), who made the transition from Spain to the Americas; Saint George (a European-wide slayer of dragons before he became especially associated with medieval England); and, in much Christian iconography, Michael, the archangel. Pallano recorded the most remarkable evidence of this sort of thinking in his detailed account of the invasion of Hispaniola written in 1659. He referred to the patrons of the city interceding to help to save it. Calling upon this understanding to explain the ability of a handful of Spanish to rout a superior number of English, Pallano demonstrated the densely populated supernatural world in which he lived. Noting that the English captured after the rout all reported facing thousands of islanders rather than the handful who overcame them, Pallano attributed their exaggerated sense of the force they faced not to their "Pannick feare" but to assistance sent by God and Saint Anne. The English having earlier desecrated her statue, Pallano suggested that Anne "moved these lances to her revenge, with 3,000 angels whom God sent to our assistance." The extra warriors may "perchance" have been "the 3,000 souls to whom the countess [of Peñalva] promised 3,000 masses, if we should gain the victory."⁴¹ Angels and the souls of the dead joined the Spanish in the lane beside Fort San Jerónimo to drive away the heretics. Pallano's vision of the relationship between heaven and earth was one that a Protestant English man would abhor, and it measured the distance between the two faiths that clashed in the West Indies. Both expected supernatural intervention, but the Protestant viewed such intervention as distant or indirect: God shaped outcomes by affecting human actions, weather, or other material conditions. Catholics perceived a host of possible intercessors able to intervene intimately in human affairs.

As Spanish authors presented the defense of Hispaniola, the imperative to shield the Roman Catholic Church went hand in hand with serving the king. The English, by coming to take the king's property and to unseat the Church, reinforced the sense that monarch and religion

triumphed or fell together. Pallano described the Spaniards rallying to their king (who though he was thousands of miles away in Europe was symbolically present as his subjects defended his lands). When they declared their commitment to “faith, king, country,” they invoked a traditional viewpoint based on a mutually reinforcing relationship among religion, monarchy, and belonging. The routinely used phrase “Catholic and royal majesty” denoted the centrality of Catholicism to the identity of their ruler and to his relationship with his subjects.⁴² Personal loyalty to their king was central to their self-presentation, the acceptable frame for feats of martial valor.

In that regard, the Spanish defenders abhorred regicide, finding common ground with the English Revolution’s royalist opponents. The Spanish alleged that the English invaders had proved themselves incapable of acting honorably, having killed their king. One Madrid publication described Cromwell as having usurped the government of the English kingdom. Men who fought the English in the Indies dubbed them “traitorous” heretics, “inconstant, faithless to God and to its king.” Pallano thought an unprovoked attack during a time of peace—launched even as Cromwell pretended to negotiate with Spain—ought to have been foreseen, because of the obviously untrustworthy nature of the English revolutionaries who murdered their own king.⁴³ One Spaniard referred to England in the present tense as a kingdom, whether rejecting the revolutionaries’ view that it was now a republic or so habituated to the concept that he did not notice his technically incorrect use of the term. The Spanish entirely agreed with the royalist supporters of Charles II that regicide represented a gross violation of the duty of a subject to obey and revere his monarch. One English royalist thought Philip IV’s hatred of regicide guaranteed a vigorous response to the Design.⁴⁴ Most military encounters between Europeans in this era pitted men who acted on their obligations to their respective monarchs; this engagement diverged in that it witnessed a clash of two constructions of relationship to authority.

For their part, the English faced a novel problem when they tried to articulate their equivalent sense of loyalty and belonging. Those who rejected the revolution, the regicide, and the Protectorate longed for a return to subject status under the authority of the king. For those who endorsed the revolution, the framing of loyalty was uncertain. The men of England were not subjects to Cromwell, despite the fact that the Lord

Protector adopted some of the trappings of the defunct monarchy. Rather, Venables, Penn, and the others on the Design participated in a common cause with their leader. All these godly men ostensibly shared a commitment to the defense of England and the promotion of Protestantism. In their providential worldview, God smiled on Cromwell, giving him great victories and eventually the reins of power, because he followed God's will. Another pious and able man could (in theory) as easily occupy the Protector's place. What united men behind Cromwell was not personal fealty (although he did benefit from the loyalty of many of the military men he had led earlier in his career) but a sense that they together fought the Lord's battles. No Englishman fought for Cromwell in the same way that the Spaniards battled for Philip IV. As Robert Sedgwick later quipped, he remained in the West Indies out of a sense of duty but also because "my head or neck [was] in as much danger" leaving as staying. He feared the wrath and power of the Lord Protector; had he known, he might have dreaded even more the disease microbes that would soon kill him. A Spaniard writing to an official in Philip IV's government would never joke that his fear of punishment rivaled his sense of duty. While the Spanish gained glory, and hoped to gain reward, by acting on their personal obligation to a distant and magnificent monarch, the English more likely spoke of their support for England. They went out to the Indies for "the honour and profit of the English Nation" and hoped to succeed there to "advance the good and glory of Our Nation."⁴⁵ This collective, generalized basis for attachment, new to the English in this postmonarchical moment, altered the language of belonging, creating a stark contrast (albeit one that would prove temporary) to the Spanish construction.

The Spanish confronted the English army across the divide of regicide and religious animosities. The defenders thought of the invaders as upstart representatives of a radical regime, individuals who took on the trappings of status (such as referring to Venables as "Excellency") but were actually common and even poor. Pallano ridiculed the items taken from the English dead, mocking the departed troops for their poor supplies and joking that they should bring better loot next time.⁴⁶ Déclassé revolutionaries contrasted sharply with the status of the noble men who led the Spanish and with the magnificence of Spanish colonial material culture. That culture, to the Spanish American resident, embodied the splendor of Spain and the authority of its king. An inhab-

itant, speaking as Hispaniola, declared the islanders “doubly Spaniards” for their valor and dedication. It was a claim that peninsular Spaniards might reject, since they looked down upon New World inhabitants of Spanish blood. Yet, the impulse to be fully, even doubly, Spanish would have made sense to them. They shared the values of loyalty to the king, devotion to the Church, and respect for the established social and political order. In all these areas, they differed from the English who invaded their islands.

Contemporaries knew (eventually at least) that the Design suffered from flaws in its planning and execution. Robert Venables indicted the preparation in his own defense, in the “Relation” he penned while in the Tower. His detailed description of poor planning and false promises for supply and recruitment, although it circulated among elites, was not published, nor was it widely disseminated at the time. Other accounts were available, however. Although they differed from Venables’s in that they frequently blamed him (and occasionally also Penn) for inept leadership and even, in Venables’s case, cowardice, they also publicized other aspects of the failure. They discussed bad planning, poorly selected and prepared men, and personal cowardice. Yet, regardless of such problems, observers returned again and again to the religious framework in contemplating the Design. Even the inadequacy of the substitute lances constructed on Barbados for the ill-supplied soldiers denoted divine providence, so that the editor of the London newsweekly *Perfect Proceedings* remarked, “Thus God carries us out against our enemies with weapons of cabbage stalks.”⁴⁷ Although cabbage-stalk lances were hard to ignore, some of the practical problems had been discounted in the confident mood of the planners, who thought they knew God’s will and could depend on his wish to see the Spanish displaced. While participants and their critics did mull over practical failings, the discussion of cosmic meaning gained greater attention.

Both godly Englishmen and devout Spaniards understood the outcome on Hispaniola as more dependent on God’s plans than on the actions of men. Despite their differences, both saw the conflict in fundamentally religious terms. Their disparate views on the clash revealed other elements of their worldviews that were drastically opposed. The Spanish valued tradition and social hierarchy; they emphasized duty to monarch and to God. Daily life for them took place in a densely populated spiritual

world, in which guardian angels and saints came to the aid of the devout. The English embraced social and political change in the interest of promoting their Protestant cause; for that cause they were willing to overthrow monarchy, denigrate traditional elites, and create a new political system. Their comparatively depopulated spiritual world focused attention on the individual relationship with God. Piety and morality were the responsibility of the godly, who expected aid from no supernatural intercessors. Differently religious, as they were profoundly conscious of being, they nonetheless shared a common commitment to the idea that God shaped human events toward his own ends.

Whether English or Spanish, they explored the providential meaning of events. The Spanish rejoiced when divine intervention conformed to their prejudices, whereas the English were left to struggle to understand when it did not. The English had the harder time of this ideological battle, since their expectations were so thoroughly dashed. Barrington, who fully supported the godly Protestant perspective on the Design, became disillusioned that its implementation did not accord with that vision. He wrote to his brother complaining of the "pretended holy work." One critic of the proceedings came to see the entire scheme as a Jesuit plot to undermine England, calling on one ingrained anti-Catholic prejudice to explain why expectations based on another had proved illusory. What most of the godly did, however, was pray. When Gregory Butler implored that "God sanctify these sad dispensations of providence," and Sedgwick entreated "the presence of almighty God owne us," they responded to failure just as they ought.⁴⁸ Most continued to believe with Cromwell that God wanted the Spanish Empire in America pulled down. Their failure did not prove that God loved Catholics, but rather that he was disappointed in the people he did love: the godly Englishmen whom he had called to perform his work in the world.

Jamaica

JAMAICA BECAME the first colony acquired through capture in the history of English expansion into the extra-European Atlantic. That the expeditionary force limped away from Hispaniola to take this less-desirable colony has obscured the importance of this moment. In entering Jamaica, the English for the first time deployed the state's military and naval might to acquire an already-settled colony. Previous colonization attempts (in addition to being conducted by entities other than the state) avoided sites that Europeans actively held, instead seeking out unsettled places without residents under another imperial power. They usually proceeded cautiously in selecting a site, aware that the Spanish legally claimed all the territory eyed by English would-be colonizers. In a departure from precedent, the English arrived in Jamaica with the intention of seizing the island from those they acknowledged to be its owners and to retain it as a colony of their own. Their innovative scheme entirely surprised the residents, who expected nothing more than another in a series of raids. Allowing the inhabitants to flee before their advance, the army missed its best opportunity to remove them summarily from the island. This initial error delayed Jamaica's full conquest, foiled hopes of immediately extending the Design, and hampered the effort to establish a new English colony on the site of the old Spanish one.

The English state never previously attempted the conquest of an existing colony. Roanoke (1585), although it failed, set the pattern for activities on the North American mainland, in that it was launched in a location without a European presence. Native inhabitants did not oppose the landing, however much relations eventually soured between

indigenous residents and intruders. The English, late to commence colonization, generally occupied uninhabited islands, beginning with the extreme case of Bermuda, which had no history of human habitation. In choosing Antigua, they inadvertently settled an island that the Kalinago people (whom they knew as Caribs) regularly used; as a result settlers faced numerous raids aimed at reclaiming it. Far to the north, the 1654 seizure of French Acadia provided a partial exception. Massachusetts Bay Colony leaders launched that attack, using a small force out of England that had fortuitously become available when the end of the Anglo-Dutch War prevented a planned invasion of New Netherland. They justified the conquest partly with claims of prior right (although the legality of their authority to act on old Scottish grants in which they had no part could easily be called into question); in doing so, they implied that this seizure was not a new conquest but a restoration of former ownership. The state had not in any case either planned or directly authorized the undertaking.¹ As a general rule, would-be English colonizers did not come ashore under enemy fire. In this respect, the attempt on Hispaniola and the landing on Jamaica, with the aim of taking and keeping, marked a departure from their usual mode of expansion.

The Design had always—if rather cavalierly—aimed at colonization. The planners assumed that any new acquisitions would become a permanent colony. Expanding English territory in the Caribbean and displacing the Spanish would be achieved only through domesticating the newly seized land through English habitation. Conquest without a permanent English presence would have no long-term effect on the map of the Caribbean. That the fleet carried some women and children, subsequently cited as another indicator of arrogance, arose in part from the expectation that conquest would result in settlement. Although no evidence suggests that Robert Venables intended to make his home in one of the new colonies the Design acquired, his wife's presence on the voyage indicated that he considered a stay beyond the minimum needed to complete the conquest. Cromwell selected one of the five Commissioners, Edward Winslow, to serve as civilian governor of the first colony subdued; dead a few days before the landing on Jamaica, Winslow never reprised his role as colonial governor, a post he occupied in Plymouth Plantation on three occasions, beginning in 1633.² A new colony, or rather colonies, had been fundamental to the scheme.

Jamaica had not been the first choice for inaugurating this new approach. The Design planners in England and its leaders in America all envisioned a more substantial prize, either a larger island such as Hispaniola or Cuba, or Cartagena, a major city on the mainland. Only on leaving Hispaniola did the Commissioners settle on this more modest initial object. Far smaller than Hispaniola (at 4,200 as opposed to 29,000 square miles), Jamaica was similarly sparsely populated. At the time of the English landing, it housed perhaps 2,000 to 2,500 people, mostly Spaniards but also Portuguese, numerous Africans, and presumably some Indians (who had been listed in a 1611 survey as 74 persons “*naturales de la ysla*” descended from the island’s original inhabitants).³ As with the other islands of the Greater Antilles, Jamaica’s skyline included notable mountain peaks. The volcanoes, limestone deposits, and uplift that formed the island made it not only mountainous but also peppered with sinkholes, valleys, and canyons. Even less developed than larger neighboring islands, Jamaica had not experienced even a temporary sugar boom; nor did it service the Spanish fleet like Cuba or house administrative offices of the crown, as did Hispaniola. The last remaining possession of the descendants of Christopher Columbus, who collected rents and fees from the few inhabitants but otherwise had little to do with the outpost, Jamaica served no particular purpose within the Spanish Empire. Fulfilling no specific need, Jamaica nonetheless had to be kept out of the hands of others.⁴ The English initially considered Jamaica too minor to satisfy the expedition’s goals. But once the campaign began to go awry, the smaller island looked more attractive.⁵ Close at hand, it had the advantages of being virtually undefended and well placed for further attempts on other Spanish lands. In making this choice, the Commissioners rejected outright retreat—either to England or to another English settlement. Rather than return to Cromwell empty-handed or throw themselves on the limited resources of another English colony, the leaders chose to recoup their loss by snatching a lesser prize.

The expeditionary force arrived with the immediate goal of conquering the island. The easy landing, in the ample bay on the island’s south side, contrasted with the difficulties encountered at Hispaniola. Having sailed on Saturday, 5 May, the expedition sighted Jamaica on Wednesday. The next day, May tenth, as many as 7,000 men (according to a widely used estimate) landed, all of the soldiers without the sea

regiment that had joined them in the previous campaign. As the men came ashore in the same place where Captain William Jackson had previously done, they encountered "little force 3 or 4 guns at the landing with some breast works where the Martyn Gallie with a Ketch soone beat them from." The soldiers were resolute, even jumping into waist-deep water to gain the beach.⁶ Venables thought it helpful that the wind pushed them shoreward, but it cannot have hurt that their commanders threatened to have any man shot at the first sign of turning tail. A few ships ran aground navigating the unfamiliar harbor, but they were all retrieved successfully. The *Perfect Politician* noted the speed with which this invasion was accomplished.⁷ Faced with this unexpected onslaught, the defenders fled.

If this virtually unopposed landing gave the English forces an advantage, they relinquished it by pausing rather than marching immediately into the town. Even though Francis Barrington described the council of officers as prepared to follow the enemy into town that night, the order to march did not come until the following morning. On Friday (11 May) most of the force marched five miles to Villa (or Santiago) de la Vega without incident, arriving there by two o'clock. Along the way, they passed various abandoned breastworks. One letter writer thought that the Spanish might have offered a vigorous defense had they manned these fortifications. Since they did not, the English army walked into the town unchallenged. They entered so effortlessly that when Venables communicated word to Penn that they occupied the town, he was able to send along the gift of a parrot as well.⁸ After the humiliation of Hispaniola, he found this opportunity gratifying.

The night's delay proved significant. The residents had no advanced warning of English activities on Hispaniola, because Governor Peñalva had been unable to persuade anyone to carry word to the nearby islands. Surprised by the English arrival, the town's inhabitants scrambled to get away. By the time the army reached Santiago de la Vega, the residents had decamped. Strategically allowing all the residents to flee represented an error, for the English occupied some territory (the principal town and its harbor) but had no contact with the population, which stymied efforts at completing the conquest. At this time of year, many town residents retired to their farms to see to their livestock, sugar works, and cocoa groves, so the residential population would have been small. Probably fewer than a thousand people had been present in the town when the

fleet was first sighted on the ninth of May. Two days later, they were all gone.⁹ The Spanish scattered following a long-standing practice, removing their goods from the town immediately upon sighting a suspicious-looking force. Although the English had been aware of this possibility when they dismissed Cartagena as an initial target, they failed in this case to act as if the Jamaicans could abandon Santiago de la Vega. Instead, Venables, still unwell and none too sanguine about the soldiers' reliability, paused overnight, with fateful consequences.

The Spanish assumed that the English had arrived, as on previous occasions, to seize food, water, and any wealth they could extract from the town. Just as with Hispaniola, English raiders had attacked Jamaica first in the sixteenth century. Sir Amias Preston, cruising the Caribbean in 1595, "entred Jamaica with little loss, some profit, and more honour." In February 1597, on an ill-fated privateering voyage, Sir Anthony Sherley took the main town. He held it for forty days and burned some of the houses to persuade the residents to bring him the meat he demanded; he apparently found nothing of value to plunder, although the published description presented a narrative of welcome and bounty.¹⁰ Half a century later, Jackson briefly captured the town while on a plundering raid through the West Indies. Sent out by Robert Rich, the Earl of Warwick, Jackson attacked various Spanish settlements and held Jamaica for nearly one month. Jackson, like Sherley, found his time on Jamaica unprofitable.¹¹ Lewis Morris of Barbados, sought to lead a regiment for the Design, had participated in Jackson's voyage. Other men present in 1655 knew about it as well. The effort to recruit Morris, as an experienced West Indian raider, had been well known; indeed, troops from Barbados signed on to serve in Morris's regiment only to have another colonel (Edward Doyley) put over them after Morris withdrew. Whatever details the English who were present knew of previous raids, most recalled them as laudable instances of anti-Spanish provocation. Some English soldiers confirmed the Spanish expectation that they intended a simple raid. Barrington reported that as the boats bearing the men neared the fort, someone called out in English to ask why they came; one of the soldiers answered that they wanted "fresh meat and pieces of eight." Food was of course a high priority for the famished English, and this anonymous soldier's response indicated that the men still clung to hopes of plunder. Even without such an exchange, the Spanish not only recalled Jackson's raid, which had occurred only

a dozen years in the past, but were well aware of the many such attacks over the decades against various settlements within Spain's American domain. They were ready to believe that the English came after beef and coin alone.

The displaced residents may have been slow to understand the new circumstances they faced. To confirm the supposition that the English intended yet another short-term raid, two Spaniards met the army under a white flag, asking to speak to the expedition's leader. Venables may, as he later claimed, have immediately announced that they had come "not to pillage but to plant." If he made this assertion and it was translated accurately, the Spanish may not have believed it initially. This change in the usual terms of their interactions with the representatives of other states represented a startling shift that they may have found initially unfathomable. According to the most-detailed Spanish version, that written by Captain Julian de Castilla, at the first encounter, on 11 May, Venables demanded only that 300 head of cattle along with other livestock be brought the next day. The Spanish did not comply, claiming an inability to collect so many animals so quickly. Their efforts were hampered by the fact that the English slaughtered every sheep and goat that returned to its owner's corral in town at nightfall. They also devoured every dog, cat, colt, and donkey they could capture, according to Castilla.¹² Whatever the English intended to communicate at the outset, their hunger supported the assumption that they aimed simply to feed and enrich themselves.

Under the circumstances, both sides agreed to parlay. The Spanish, having mounted no resistance initially, claimed that they stumbled in that they were caught off guard by their own conviction that the English meant only to rob them. With a long history in the region of such visits by English (and other) "piratas," the Jamaicans might be forgiven for expecting more of the same. The residents, far outnumbered, saw little choice but to negotiate. According to letter writer John Daniell, the Spanish came "humbly begging for a treaty." Castilla later reported that they engaged in a contentious debate over whether their governor, Don Juan Ramirez, should participate in the negotiations at all. Some did not trust the English either to negotiate fairly or to treat him respectfully. In addition, the governor was ill—suffering from the "French pox" (that is, syphilis)—and therefore blind, lame, and covered with sores. Being carried back to the town would be painful and potentially fatal.¹³

The English realized that they had relinquished their advantage by allowing the inhabitants to flee, but hoped to remedy the situation through the treaty negotiations. With the residents dispersed, the army faced the task of ranging over the island to find them. Had they mounted a truly energetic initial foray, they would have captured the town with its inhabitants still in it and swept the district for those colonists who resided on lands nearby; Castilla noted many fleeing residents able to escape because the army “did not sally forth that day into the country.” The lackluster reaction of the invaders might be attributed to the poor health of the army, the bitter memory of its abysmal performance on Hispaniola, or failure to take into account the usual reaction of colonists to the arrival of an enemy. In support of the second option, an anonymous captain explained, “Wee had little incurragement to have any further dependence on the vallour of our souldjors, the sense of their former cowardice being fresh in our mindes.” Despite the soldiers’ energetic storming of the beach, Venables thought it wisest to wait until the next day to march. He cited a host of reasons: the lack of guides, the lateness of the hour (it was three o’clock), the well-known risks of marching without water, the fear of ambushes, and the men “being already with want and bad diet very weak.” As Daniell understood it, the decision to treat was made on the same grounds: “considering the weaknes off our army, unfixt and unserviceable armes, never a horse to pursue, our men faint and tired and much worse by pittifull usage on ship-board, the enemy horse all in full strength, and knowing the country.”¹⁴ The rampant sickness aside, the invaders acted as though unaware that Spanish colonists had learned to abandon their urban abodes to hide from intruders. Marching belatedly into the deserted town, the army made the more passive course—to parlay for the surrender of the colony—all but inevitable.

The surviving sources do not specify how the treaty terms were hammered out. Teams of men from either side were present, and their work was later endorsed by other signatories. Perhaps the English simply dictated terms and used their opposites to clarify details such as locations for meetings and other matters of local knowledge; the final terms suggest that the Spanish contributed little of substance. For the English, negotiators included Major General Richard Fortescue (who replaced Heane as major general after the latter’s death on Hispaniola), Vice Admiral William Goodsonn, and two colonels (Richard Holdip

and Edward Doyley). Involved in the meetings on the Spanish side were the maestro de campo, one of the sargento mayors, his nephew, who was an accountant, the commissary of the Holy Office, two captains (including Castilla), and others. According to their opponents, the English did not accord the enemy the dignity and respect that was their due. They found former Dominican priest and ex-Catholic Thomas Gage, who served as one of the interpreters, especially belligerent. One account noted that English negotiators laughed at Spanish speeches referencing their honor and duty to God and king.¹⁵ Although the English insisted that the governor participate in the negotiations from the outset, he initially hung back. Hesitating at first to present himself while he and his subordinates debated whether it was wise to put himself in English hands, he dispatched military officers to speak with the Commissioners.

Finalizing the treaty required the presence of the leaders on both sides: Ramirez as governor of Jamaica as well as the three available Commissioners, Butler, Penn and Venables. The governor's sluggish response to the summons slowed the conclusion of the process. After he finally set out, his ill health and also perhaps his hesitation to meet his foes hampered his progress, while others urged him not to enter the town without further assurances for his safety. Penn came ashore on Tuesday, 15 May, in order to be present at the signing, but it did not take place that day. The governor had not arrived, and the English rebuked the Spanish officers he had sent for failing to produce him. The following day, Penn "long considered the articles and left his approbation with the other commissioners" so that he could return to the fleet. The Spanish received the impression—perhaps because Penn rode in with an impressive escort or because Venables was minimally involved due to his own ill health—that Penn had charge of the entire undertaking.¹⁶ It was only after Penn departed—either late that day or on Thursday, the 17—that the Spanish signatories gathered, considered the document, and signed. Although the governor also came accompanied by a large group, only the most elite men endorsed the document: the sargento mayors Don Francisco de Carvajal and Duarte de Acosta as well as the governor.¹⁷ One week after the English stormed the beach, on 17 May, the treaty (or articles of capitulation, as the English preferred to style them) was concluded.

The terms—which indeed represented a capitulation to English demands—removed the Spanish presence and laid the groundwork for English settlement. That the English chose the exile of most residents heralded their intention to erect their own colony and their conviction that Spanish Catholics could not be incorporated into English society. Cromwell's instructions to Venables permitted him "to offer and give reasonable Conditions to persons as will submit to our government, and willingly come under our Obedience," but in Venables's view (and likely also Cromwell's), this category excluded the majority of the Spanish. The treaty granted them twelve days to bring back all the valuables they had carried away. At that time they were to appear with victuals for one month and their "wearing apparel" (which Castilla understood to mean two shirts and a suit of clothes). The English fleet committed to transport them to a port in New Spain or another Spanish American colony; Castilla expected either Honduras or Campeche. Any person with artisanal skill was welcomed to remain, as were "the meaner sort of Inhabitants," assuming they would agree to live under the new government and according to its laws. All priests and Catholic books were to be cleared from the island. The English also demanded that their foes compile a list of everyone on the island, citing the need to prepare ships to receive them. Finally, the treaty dictated that the island's "Slaves Negroes and others" present themselves for a meeting with Venables, "to receive some favourable concessions as are intended to be made unto them touching their liberty." The English held as hostages the governor and "other chief men" while these terms were communicated to the population. Delegates who had participated in the negotiations presented this package, "read at the Bunducu ranch in the presence of the *maestre de campo* and a great concourse of people."¹⁸

The invaders patterned the terms on those that the Spanish imposed when they drove their countrymen off Providence Island in 1641. Colonel Andrew Carter, who had been acting governor of Providence at the time, may well have provided the inspiration for replicating this treatment. The memory of his humiliation in Providence still stung, and Carter made a point of bringing up that parallel in the negotiations, relishing his opportunity for revenge. According to Castilla, "Never was such aversion seen as that which this heretic entertains towards Spaniards." But, he continued, Carter misunderstood the former case if he

thought it similar to the present instance. Whereas Carter believed the cases parallel, wrote Castilla, in fact "General Pimienta granted him and his sargento mayor such generous quarter and passage when their thieveries and cruelties did not merit consideration."¹⁹ In other words, the piqued English intruders on Providence Island deserved worse, whereas the law-abiding Spanish residents were entirely blameless. Beyond Carter's influence, other negotiators may have been guided by a desire to avenge their humiliation at Santo Domingo or by a sense that the Spanish could not be successfully integrated into an English colony. Expulsion of the bulk of the residents constituted a departure from the usual ways of war.

If the English believed this treaty pulled a satisfyingly vengeful victory from the jaws of the Hispaniola defeat, they soon faced new disappointments. According to the report Venables and Butler sent to Cromwell in early June, events unfolded in this way: "We made them to subscribe to the like articles with those they gave us at Providence. But though we have their governor and other chief men of the island in our custody, as hostages, they have nevertheless treacherously broken with us, and have driven away their cattle, putting us by that means to a hard shift, and cutting us out a great deal of work, but forcing us at once to provide for our selves, and pursue them." A record kept on Penn's flagship, the *Swiftsure*, indicated that after the signing of the treaty, Commissioners Venables and Butler returned to the relative comfort of the ships. Two days later they received word of "the Spaniards standing in defiance of the forces" and that they "contemned the articles agreed on; that they had removed themselves further into the country; made what strength they could; and had their wives and children away before them." In running away, they effectively abandoned the hostages, whom the English by rights could have executed. Such treatment was relatively rare, and the English did not act on that option in this case; the two Commissioners probably mention it more to assure Cromwell that they had adhered to treaty protocols. According to one member of the army, the news of Spanish defiance arrived two days before they were supposed to present themselves to the English to be shipped to another colony. He explained that one of the Spanish hostages, presumably a signatory to the treaty, "exclaimed against the treachery of the revolted Spaniards in the bushes, declaring them rebels, in that they submitted

not to the Articles."²⁰ His compatriots' failure to comply effectively abandoned him to the doubtful mercy of their enemies.

The Spanish refusal may have been a spontaneous decision on the part of the fearful settlers or a calculated choice on the part of leading men. Castilla claimed that the Jamaica residents categorically refused to comply with the terms. The outcry was nearly universal, with colonists saying "they would rather die in the bush than see their daughters and wives in the power of the heretics." Their fears echoed those of the Hispaniola residents who sneaked women out of Santo Domingo, except that the cases differed. To brutalize women being transported under the terms of a treaty would have been a gross contravention of the widely respected rules of war. Spanish suspicions in this circumstance revealed the depth of their wariness toward the English invaders. Castilla alleged that the negotiators could not prevent people from running away: "each person endeavoured to get away to the mountains and bush." At the same time, the Jamaican leadership had gathered information about English affairs that may have caused them to reconsider their decision. By the time the treaty was read aloud on the Banducu ranch, the inhabitants were better able to assess their own situation. Over the previous week, a number of them (in addition to the official delegation) had traveled into the town, carrying messages and observing the state of the army. They knew that despite overwhelmingly superior numbers, the force consisted of ill and hungry men. They were aware that Venables himself was not well.²¹


Further, they knew by the time the treaty was formally presented about the defeat on Hispaniola. They had captured an English youth who spoke Spanish, Nicholas (or George) Paine; Venables had hired Paine on Barbados, employing him as an interpreter. Paine told his captors all about the debacle on Hispaniola. He related "the glorious resistance which had been made in the island of Santo Domingo, to besiege which this fleet had come especially from England, in order, from there, to conquer all these islands and the continent. He declared that there remained in the fleet not more than four or five horse and two mares, which had not been landed, because they were so thin." These damaging revelations steeled Spanish resolve. Other English soldiers, ill and hungry, might have been equally willing to tell all, or so one participant in the Design later claimed: they would give information for

wine and food. One Spanish officer was so nervous that the English would similarly benefit from the use of spies that, in addition to routinely killing any English found lurking about, he ordered the execution of two Spanish hostages sent with messages.²² Whether the settlers spontaneously refused to comply or the leaders made a considered decision to violate the treaty provisions, they did not leave the island in compliance with the treaty terms. Neither would the enslaved peoples present themselves to learn Venables's offer "touching their liberty."

Instead, the island's displaced residents moved into the interior, away from the English army. They divided into two groups initially, or so it would appear from the available evidence: those who intended to flee to the neighboring island of Cuba and those who planned to fight. The process of sorting themselves out in this way took some time, but gradually many women, children, and the aged, joined by some adult men (both Spanish and African), made the 104-mile crossing in whatever crafts became available. English coastal patrols intercepted a few of them, and the naval men questioned the occupants and seized their goods before letting them continue on their way. Others made the journey undetected but in any event could carry very little with them. These refugees created a community of exiled Jamaicans at Santiago de Cuba, on the south coast of the larger island. The others, who stayed to mount a war against the intruders, facilitated the departure of their family and friends. They set up encampments from which to conduct guerrilla war against the invaders. At some point, many of the enslaved and free people of African descent among them broke off to form their own camps, although the evidence suggests that the split did not occur immediately.²³ Initially, those who elected to stay expected a brief exile in the wilds, until reinforcements arrived or attrition from hunger and disease among the invaders tilted the balance in their own favor.

When the English army realized that the Spanish would not cooperate, it belatedly roused itself to action. News of the Spaniards' defiance arrived on 19 May, a Saturday; after observing the Sabbath, Venables went ashore on Monday to address the problem. More than two weeks after reaching the island, the English finally took the second step toward conquering it. Venables dispatched Colonel Buller, at the head of a party of 1,500 men, to pursue the fleeing residents. Lieutenant Colonel Ward led a second party, of 700, which the navy transported six leagues to the leeward, to be put ashore "within two or three miles

Early English Jamaica



The English gained control of the south-central and southwest sectors of the island, but refugee Spanish and Africans occupied other parts of the island. Residents met at Banducú ranch to consider the treaty terms. The English later thwarted counterinvasion attempts on the north coast. Juan de Bola's community was located in Lluídas Vale.

where they understood the enemy's body lay." While 2,000 men would have been a sufficient show of force if it had been deployed promptly, the combined effort of Buller and Ward at this time proved ineffectual. They found that "the enemy was dispersed, and only a partie of about 300 faced our party awhile, being most horse, and so went their wayes, never endeavouring to engage but to fly from us, having secured most of their best goods." Castilla's account put the number of men sent out under Buller at 3,000 and incorrectly declared that Buller died in the altercation. Upon the return of the two parties, they reported their limited success, "being onely able to drive away the enemy."²⁴ With the collapse of the treaty and the failure of this belated incursion to round up the islanders, the situation entered a new phase, an effective standoff between the opposing forces.

The Spanish calculus rested on the reality of the English situation. Huddled around the town of Santiago de la Vega, the army continued to endure hunger, despite the arrival of a few supply ships. Available stores were not sufficient to feed both the seamen and the soldiers for any length of time. When the men foraged for food, they risked being killed by residents, and Venables believed that their habit of wounding many animals that they were unable to catch quickly depleted the stock on the island. Sickness continued to plague them. Those who went with Buller were drawn from a number of regiments, each sending its healthiest "souldjourns." With the settlers hiding in the woods and mountains, the military campaign would prove protracted and costly—in financial terms but also in terms of human life. One soldier likened it to fighting in Scotland or Ireland, where the enemy would "mischiefe our stragglers, but dare not face the smallest party."²⁵ In other words, they used guerilla tactics, taking advantage of their greater knowledge of the terrain and using stealth to make up for their lower numbers.

Confronting these challenges, the English forces adopted policies aimed at stanching their death rate while making the situation for the displaced colonists as untenable as they could. To block Spanish access to their scattered farms, Venables deployed regiments to settlements, dispersing many from the main town into the countryside. The men were to guard these farmsteads, thereby preventing colonists from returning to harvest the staple crop, cassava, or other produce. The leaders of the expedition also believed that dispersing the men might improve their vigor, on the assumption that the air in some locations

was healthier. The English further thought that occupying the residences in the interior would deny much-needed shelter to the refugees, forcing them to surrender and accept removal. The rains, it was hoped, would persuade them to comply with the treaty. In the meantime, a small number of island residents had either come in or been captured. Among the former was a man who had stayed when marauder William Jackson departed; in the intervening years, he converted to Catholicism and married the slave of a wealthy woman. He helped the invaders with information, perhaps in exchange for promises of freedom for his wife or to avoid punishment for his previous desertion for himself.²⁶ Perhaps he had called out the query about the fleet's purpose to the approaching boats at the time of the landing, although other Jamaicans may have also possessed English-language skills. Few surrendered to the army, however. Desertion alone would not alter the balance between the two forces.

In addition to guarding remote habitations, the dispersal envisioned soldiers planting crops that would eventually sustain them. Castilla described what the Spanish observed once this policy was put into place: "They planted beans and chickpease and other vegetables which they brought with them. They cultivated tobacco. They cleaned up the yucca fields, killing and curing meat, to send to sell in the town. They prize tallow and eat it as we do bacon. They brought branding irons, with which they branded the horses, marking them with what irons they chose, as though in ownership of them in England or Scotland! They eat green fruit as readily as ripe." Except for the ignorance (or hunger) displayed by the inability to wait for fruits to ripen, the army in Castilla's description gave every sign of settling into their new roles as soldier-farmers. They planted where they were garrisoned, combining this activity with guard duty. In this way, as James A. Delle demonstrated, initial English habitation replicated Spanish settlement patterns.²⁷ Whether they could produce enough, quickly enough, to feed themselves (not to mention the navy) would remain an open question for some time.

In the meantime, the army faced the continued possibility of starvation. Supply ships were few and inadequate, so Penn immediately dispatched three vessels to New England to buy provisions. He ordered the collection of the hides that had been found in the town when the army occupied it, with the idea that these could be bartered for food. Although the New England colonies were relatively new, they already

exported food that helped sustain Barbados as it turned its acreage to sugar cultivation. The expedition leaders therefore knew this plan to be a better prospect for augmenting the force's meager stores than seeking food from any West Indian island. Upon the arrival of the three ships, the Massachusetts authorities moved with alacrity to cooperate; yet the shipment had to await the late summer harvest before grain could be collected and baked into biscuit. With the sudden demand, prices shot up, and some men tried to profit by engrossing the grain and overcharging for the use of coastal trading vessels needed to collect it. They did so, "notwithstanding the Care of y^e magists. at their meeting at Boston the 6th of August & prejudice of that so desirable a designe and the lives of the Armye Endangered," as the Massachusetts Council fumed.²⁸ As a result of the various delays, the first of the ships did not return to Jamaica until November, over five months after it had been dispatched; and the last of the three was not in Cagway Harbor until January. Cromwell assumed food from New England had arrived much earlier.²⁹ Obviously, New England offered no panacea, and indeed Penn doubted that it would. Although the account of Jackson's voyage during the previous decade dubbed Jamaica a "Terrestrial Paradise," that assessment did not fit the initial experiences of the English army on the island. Little surprise that one man who had run away from servitude in England sought out Captain Daniel Howe to confess as much; he begged to be shipped back to England to his master.³⁰

Pausing to assess the situation within the first month, only the most generous and optimistic judge would deem the English undertaking successful on the expedition's own terms. The invaders aimed at conquest and the removal of most former inhabitants, but in Jamaica they had managed only a partial seizure. They held much of the territory that the previous residents had actively utilized, controlling the town of Santiago de la Vega, the harbor and landing place that had served as the main contact point with Atlantic trade and imperial networks, and some major habitations that provided residents with country abodes. They had displaced the island's inhabitants. Yet the Jamaicans had handily escaped; they had not been expelled in keeping with the English plan. Many had not given up the fight to reclaim their island. The Western Design scheme envisioned conquest followed (almost as an afterthought) by colonization. With the island only partially conquered, the army found itself taking halting steps toward settlement. Without

anyone explicitly acknowledging the shift, the army was subtly transforming into planters (or more accurately for the rank and file, plantation laborers). Hence the initial foray into Jamaica accomplished only a halfway conquest and a rudimentary step toward colonizing.

At this point the leaders of the expedition decided to decamp, leaving the army as well as a portion of the navy behind. This stunning reversal—which would be greeted with incredulity in England—unfolded over a period of weeks. Penn concluded that the scope for the navy's continued efforts would be limited until Jamaica had been fully conquered, and on those grounds he decided to return to England with those ships that were ill suited to the station. Shortly after his departure, Venables as well as the fifth Commissioner, Gregory Butler, quit the island as well. Venables, whose exit was most shocking since he commanded the army, claimed that his severely deteriorated health necessitated it. The more elusive Butler, always the least of the Commissioners, accompanied him without much fanfare. By the end of July the reduced expeditionary force was left under the command of men the departing leaders had deputized.

Penn easily justified sending naval vessels back to England. As he explained it, he did not see sufficient work for the fleet under the current circumstances. Short of another major amphibious campaign, the large number of ships made little sense. Many fewer could be used to harass the Spanish and monitor those who tried to slip away to Cuba. Departure of the fleet, or a part of it, had been discussed for some time before it was finally broached formally at a council of war on 24 May. The council enumerated eight reasons to split the fleet, leaving some ships behind and taking the rest home. They ranged widely, dealing with local circumstances but also noting the encouragement the return would give to those at home and the dangers of keeping such a large part of England's navy far from its shores. That Penn would accompany the returning vessels represented a separate decision, one that he reported caused "reluctancy & strugglings in myself." Penn, later chastised for leaving his post, asserted that others persuaded him to go. When Venables too came under scrutiny, he alleged that he entreated Penn to remain, although no records contemporaneous to the decision corroborate that assertion. At the time, he and Gregory Butler wrote rather that "we feare, that we should never be able to victual them all; so that we judged it best to retain only some of the swiftest sailors here with

us, sending the rest away.”³¹ As Venables and Butler averred, the navy also suffered from low provisions; such was clearly the case even though the soldiers probably rightly suspected that the seamen ate somewhat better than they did. Without such a large contingent of sailors to feed, the remaining provisions would last longer, hopefully long enough for overdue supply ships or the bread ordered from New England to arrive.

From this decision to the sailing of the bulk of the fleet was the work of a month. Between the 24 May meeting and the departure on 25 June, the fleet made many preparations. Penn determined which ships stayed and which went, and according to “A Journall of every dayes proceedings,” he consulted the army colonels on this question. Selected to stay were a dozen vessels, among them three of the five largest ships. Careening selected crafts began within days of arriving in Jamaica, and that work had to be completed. Captain Richard Rooth described the labor in detail, including that some of the prizes taken were stripped to provide materials for repairs to other ships. A major setback occurred when the thirty-gun *Discovery* blew up at anchor, as a result of an accident in which brandy being drawn out from a cask caught fire. At the time, *Discovery* carried the guns and provisions out of some of the careened ships, making the loss greater still. Added to the list of tasks was the work of salvaging the guns from the harbor floor, where they had sunk when the burning hulk went down. Finally, Penn commissioned and instructed his replacement, Goodsonn, to remain on the station in command of the remaining ships.³²

The chosen date for departure was 21 June, but contrary winds kept the ships in port four days longer; it proved an inauspicious start to a difficult voyage. They set out with provisions already low, a problem exacerbated by the loss of the *Discovery* and the delay in leaving. The men went on half rations. Three weeks into the voyage, on yet another day set aside for prayers of thanksgiving (a Friday the thirteenth), the fifty-four-gun *Paragon* blew up. Many of the hundreds of men on board, who had been mustered on deck for the prayer service, perished, the fire burning so intensely that the boats launching off nearby vessels found it difficult to effect a rescue. The rear -admiral, George Dakins, was among the survivors. Progress during the three weeks between leaving Jamaica and the *Paragon* conflagration had been so painfully slow that the force was still not far from Havana at the time. Another six weeks would transpire before they neared England. Finally, Penn’s flagship, the *Swift-*

sure, came to anchor at Spitshead on 31 August, a voyage of sixty-eight days. Three vessels were still unaccounted for, but most had arrived.³³

As Penn departed, he anticipated that his compatriots would be occupied with continuing the conquest and sustaining the army. William Goodson had twelve ships, which Penn directed him to use to patrol the waters around Jamaica, guard against attempted invasion, transport English troops as needed, and stop Spanish settlers as they slipped off the island. He would also keep an eye on the other Spanish colonies and capture any Spanish or French ships in the area. Finally, if occasion arose, he was instructed to continue with the enforcement of the Navigation Act, seizing foreign ships that traded in any English colony. The army, under the command of Venables, would pursue its new policy of garrisoning the island, planting crops to support itself while searching for the enemy. Until local crops were ready to harvest, the army and the navy awaited additional supplies from England—and Penn was to urge that they be dispatched promptly—as well as food from New England. The English hold on Jamaica remained precarious, but Penn reported that he had done his work and left the expedition in a condition to carry on. The anonymous letter writer who sent a detailed account from the island on 1 June was fairly sanguine about the prospects.³⁴

Shortly after Penn's exit, Venables followed. His decision to do so had perhaps also been in the making for some time. Richard Fortescue, who was left in command of the army with a commission signed only by Venables, believed that the subject had been broached when Penn was still present—at a time when he might have been commissioned by Butler, Penn, and Venables together, as required by their original instructions. Venables's departure was attributed to various causes, among them his ill health and the need for an advocate in England who would fight for the army's interests. The army worried, for instance, that it would be paid in Jamaican lands (in imitation of a policy in use in newly conquered Ireland) rather than receiving the wages that were already seriously in arrears. Feeling the need for a champion, at least some of members of the armed force thought that Venables would be uniquely able "to vindicate the army from some aspertions."³⁵ Colonel Buller went on a similar errand, instructed to present a petition from his fellow colonels outlining their needs.

Venables's departure sparked controversy. He apparently left without the approval of his colonels. One letter writer explained, "Our Generall

Venables with Collonell Buller are now taking their passage for England, full sore against the desire of almost every man, by what I understand." Some of his subordinates, Francis Barrington among them, objected that Venables routinely failed to consult with his officers, as was customary. At key points in the unfolding of the Design, Barrington thought that Venables was remiss, avoiding consultation and acting contrary to the wishes of his regimental commanders. The decision to leave was one such resolution. Barrington told Thurloe that while the ineffectual Venables's leaving was a mercy, it was nonetheless done improperly.³⁶

The animosities among the leaders that histories of the Design emphasize became visible only at this time. That Venables left quickly on the heels of Penn might indicate that he felt deep distrust toward his fellow Commissioner. Having failed so spectacularly in Hispaniola and fumbled the Jamaica conquest as well, Venables was understandably nervous about how his case would be presented. The "Relation" he compiled subsequently to defend his actions enumerated abuse that the navy perpetrated on the army, but the contemporary record does not support the idea of an open breach between Penn and Venables over the months of the Design. Trouble had arisen before the fleet sailed from England, when Penn objected that the wording of the commission and instructions muddled the delegation of authority over the land and sea service, an issue Cromwell labored to clarify. This difference was smoothed over, according to Winslow, and the two men's "demeanor mutually towards [each] other was sweet and hopeful." Subsequently the two men did have their differences, most obviously over the question of whether to continue the Hispaniola campaign. When Penn halted the provisioning of the land forces while his ships prepared to leave that island, it may have been a calculated ploy to rouse them to action by forcing them to forage for food; but the army saw it as a cruel policy that cost additional lives. Apportioning the meager food stocks was another source of friction, which Winslow had worried might prove the case and Venables complained of in late May. Relations between seamen and soldiers were testy, especially after the repulse at Hispaniola, when the naval men mocked the soldiers. Differences continued in Jamaica. In one alleged incident, soldiers of the guard beat up seamen who could not just then "carry some persons on board the ships."³⁷ With the army dependent on the navy for mobility and food and the navy dependent on the army to prosecute the Design effectively, tensions flared as the

campaign floundered. Yet few of these incidents relate directly to any difference between the two commanders, providing little direct evidence of their supposed feud.

Venables may have decided to leave when he did (assuming for a moment that the physician's order was not the true or at least the only reason) because he wanted to defend himself against the aspersions of his fellow Commissioner Butler. As far as the official records show, the two men worked together without open disagreement until they arrived on Jamaica. Others complained about Butler, his drunkenness earning special comment. Fortescue railed, "I know not of what use he is, unles to make up a nomber; if I may without offence speake it, he is the unfittest man for a commissioner I ever knew ymployed." By mid-May, Venables and Butler experienced serious differences. At that time, Venables wrote to Penn asking to be kept informed if Butler planned to go back to England, since Venables wanted to accompany him. "I have cause to believe he intends to cast dirt in my face, and to staine my reputation which I valuied dearer than my life." Venables intended to "goe hand in hand with him to justifie myselfe." He wrote to one Mr. Rowe subsequently, explaining a "jarr" between them as Butler was "setting the Officers in disgust against me." In the ensuing confrontation, Venables called Butler "drunken sot," citing the allegation that he had been so drunk while treating with the French governor of Saint Christopher that he fell from his horse and vomited. Worried over attacks on his character, Venables enlisted Penn's assistance to counter them, suggesting that relations with Penn remained strong.³⁸ While vindicating himself against detractors probably motivated his departure as much as the repeated bouts of dysentery, Penn may not have been numbered among those critics.

Whatever the flaws of the five-Commissioner system (and it did have some points to recommend it), the leadership openly fell out only once the Design miscarried. Over the months of preparation in England and Barbados, little evidence documents the five men squabbling. Winslow wrote that differences that divided Penn and Venables in England had been fully resolved and that their relations were "sweet and hopeful." Daniel Searle, Barbados governor and fifth Commissioner, had proved unable and perhaps somewhat unwilling to comply entirely with the fleet's demands. In the usual difficult position of a colonial governor, he navigated the interests of the local elites—who wanted to keep the

guns sent by Noell and the servants and laborers they depended upon—and those of the central authority, which the Design fleet represented in uncomfortably pressing form. While no open breach occurred, and Searle would be scolded for his apparent noncompliance, he defended himself as having done what he could, given his constraints. As noted, Butler's frequent inebriation earned censure. The three main Commissioners—the general Venables, the admiral Penn, and Winslow—worked together smoothly enough until the undertaking began to collapse. Men who bemoaned the army's cowardice used Winslow's death to criticize the failure on Hispaniola, circulating stories of Winslow's deathbed speech to that effect. Once in Jamaica, relations between army and navy remained tense, and these animosities may have affected the leaders as well. If Butler and Venables made them, Penn ignored their pleas that he stay. In justifying himself later, Venables did all he could to deflect criticism from himself and onto other targets; but even as he tried to render each difficulty outside his own control, Venables seldom describes himself and Penn differing directly.

With all five of the original Commissioners gone—either dead (in the case of Winslow) or absent (Searle still in Barbados, the others departed)—the initial phase of the Western Design ended. With a grand plan to conquer wide swaths of Spanish America, the Design expedition, six months after sailing from England, had a toehold on a single island. The fleeing Commissioners presented this state of affairs as well as they could. Venables grandly asserted that they had accomplished their goal of founding a colony, a highly optimistic definition of what he left behind. The Lord Protector was not impressed, and once both had returned, he ordered them imprisoned in the Tower of London.³⁹ While Penn would win release quickly, Venables stubbornly insisted that everyone bore fault for the debacle save him. He would pen his "Relation" to justify himself. In blaming others, he barely avoided directly accusing Cromwell himself. With new leadership and a narrower immediate goal—completing the conquest of Jamaica—the Design shifted. Conquering the Spanish West Indies was set aside for the moment, never again revisited in quite such capacious terms. A more modest version of the naval war continued first under Goodsonn and later under others.⁴⁰ The vision of a triumphal sweep of the Spanish West Indies that left a string of new English colonies in its wake proved a chimera.

Imagining

WITHIN WEEKS OF LANDING, participants in the invasion force wrote descriptions of Jamaica. Composed with little regard for the current situation—in which the army was barely functioning and the displaced population had not been subdued—this handful of accounts eagerly looked forward to the prospects for an English Jamaica. Their depictions partook of the tradition of colonial promotion as they tried to persuade Cromwell that the acquisition was worthy of the effort. At the same time, these early paeans to the island reveal the English anticipating a future for Jamaica. Embracing ecological diversity, these authors rejected the idea that Jamaica should become a replica of sugar-obsessed Barbados. Rather, they imagined an island producing numerous crops for local consumption and export. They expected to expand everything the island currently produced and to enhance the current bounty with other highly desirable crops. In describing this future, commentators elided the presence and labors of the current inhabitants, erasing them as readily as other colonizers had overlooked native peoples. As was typical of newcomers to islands, according to Greg Denning, they both inherited Jamaica (from its inhabitants) and invented it anew; and they too would come to see the end result of their interactions with it as “natural” and self-evident.¹ In their imaginings, Jamaica, under the English, would be developed to the fullest, creating an agrarian capitalist model for the West Indies. Rid of the lazy Spanish, controlled by the industrious English, Jamaica would be transformed.

The earliest surviving writings produced by the English on Jamaica include letters (both official and private) as well as a report commissioned by Venables. A lengthy anonymous letter divided its attention

equally between recounting the fleet's activities and describing Jamaica. A second missive, written by the auditor general of the expedition, John Daniell, to his brother William, undertook a similar task, sharing news of the expedition's progress and introducing the newly acquired island. Around the same time, the two Commissioners associated with the land forces (Venables and Captain Gregory Butler) penned a joint letter to Cromwell in which they offered a relatively brief judgment. The most extensive early description was enclosed in a letter that Venables sent to Cromwell's secretary John Thurloe on 13 June 1656, a month after the landing. This comprehensive assessment detailed the island's geography and prospects for development; it eventually found its way into print. Its author went unattributed, but may have been the successor to Venables's secretary, Mr. Temple, who had been killed on Hispaniola.² Other accounts seemingly circulated in manuscript, as various assessments surfaced in the following few years that appear to have been based on other early writings.³ Embedded in the factual reporting on the island's current state was a vision of what English Jamaica would become.

These accounts all work to present the acquisition as a major accomplishment. Of the partial seizure of a relatively small and inconsequential island, the earliest surviving letter asserted that "it is to be questioned whether any place in the world would have advantaged our nation more then this." Given that the reports were all penned by participants in the invasion force, it was no surprise that many mentioned Jamaica's location, said to be perfectly positioned for harassing Spanish territories and shipping. Commissioners Venables and Butler carefully noted its strategic placement in their first letter to Cromwell after the debacle on Hispaniola. Others made similar observations. One announced that "wee hope by God's gracious assistance to keep our station, maugre the enemie who is round about us from the maine and the Islands." Daniell gleefully declared that Jamaica "lyes in the very heart off the Spaniard to gall him." As Major General Richard Fortescue explained in a July letter, "Not a ship can stir for Carthagene or Cuba, but must come in view of this island."⁴ These observers envisioned the navy carrying forward its work against Spain, using Jamaica as a base, as indeed it would shortly begin to do. While military men hoped to persuade Cromwell of the benefits of Jamaica's location, such strategic

calculations, however frequently mentioned, contributed only a minor theme.

Of far greater importance was the assertion that Jamaica would make a highly desirable colony. As Daniell wrote to his brother, "This island farre exceeds all others in America for fertillity in all manner of thingse."⁵ Making a virtue of a necessity, Daniell argued that Hispaniola was too big for England to hold. Citing both population and military concerns, he concluded that Jamaica, more manageable in extent, could be both populated and secured. All judged Jamaica preferable to Hispaniola in every way. After about ten weeks in Jamaica, Fortescue confided to Thurloe that abandoning Hispaniola bothered him only because of the shame of defeat. He wished rather that they had come directly to Jamaica, since it was so obviously superior. Daniell claimed that, besides its more manageable size, the advantages of the smaller island far outstripped those of the larger.⁶ The sentiment that Jamaica was infinitely to be preferred was so oft repeated that it might be characterized as the party line.

Writers portrayed the island as a profitable future agricultural colony. Jamaica, according to these accounts, exhibited remarkable productive potential. Lists of current and future crops filled their assessments. The extended description that Venables enclosed in a letter to Thurloe enumerated the marketable woods growing on the island, followed by a catalogue of fruit and other crops. Such a focus was typical of early reports of tropical settings, according to the environmental historian Richard Grove. The man who drew up the description for Venables explained most of the items, from "Cawobena, a tree of six fathom about, a fine red, excellent good for beds, tables, or buildings," to "Avocatas, a wholesome pleasant fruit; in season in August, sold for 3 d. per piece." Either he gave up the project of elucidation toward the end of his list or he assumed that some items would be familiar. Not earning descriptive details were "limes, limons, oranges, guavers, bonanas, plantains, papas, melons of all sorts, and very good cucumbers, gourds, &c. and the largest potatoes my eyes ever beheld," as well as tobacco and indigo.⁷ Given the absence of cassava from this list, those enormous potatoes might have been an ill-informed reference to that ubiquitous and essential Caribbean tuber. In these exercises in commodification, Jamaica produced diverse valuable items, from woods to foods.

Other writers, without an official brief from Venables, compiled similar lists. The earliest surviving letter separated current crops (sugar, tobacco, cotton, chocolate), along with hides and wood, from those that might grow (indigo, wine, and oil).⁸ Daniell concurred about the wine, proclaiming that “the richest wines in the world may grow here, iff wee had plantes.” Daniell’s description bounced from what was currently available to feed the invasion force—not enough “casado for bread onely planted for their owne numbers”—through crops the Spanish actually or allegedly cultivated, to those he hoped would flourish. Whereas he heard that “cloves, nutts, and mace, and cinnamon” all grew on Jamaica, he further speculated that “silke wormes wold prosper bravely.”⁹

These lists, even though they were based partly on agricultural products currently under cultivation, expressed a long-standing desire for items that the English wished to supply themselves. Spices and silks, traded from the East, were expensive, and their supply dependent on distant markets and production processes controlled by others. Expansion-minded Englishmen sought direct access to cinnamon, silk, or tropical dyewoods. In promising to satisfy every need, these writings mimicked a well-established tradition of colonial boosters. As E. Brooks Holifield pointed out, colonial promotional publications constituted a “literature of promises.” Authors routinely listed commodities that they assured readers could be produced in a particular area. Writers typically declared desirable items—especially those that were acquired at great expense from the East Indies—either already available or easily cultivated. Thomas Harriott created “extensive descriptions of edible plants and other merchantable products” in his work about Roanoke, and promoters carried forward the wishful list making with future colonies. By the time the English arrived in Jamaica, effusive predictions of the crops that would grow had become a staple of colonial writing. Like many Englishmen before them, when those in Jamaica described the island, they saw boundless agricultural potential. They fully expressed the “fantasy of American commerce” that enthralled so many Europeans.¹⁰

Jamaica was depicted as bountiful, a place where they could live comfortably. Such claims did not begin with the English commentary, as Spanish visitors had noted the island’s “abundantísima de comidas.” The fantasy of plenty resonated with the newly arrived English, who had been on short rations or worse for months. Certainly “the largest potatoes my eyes ever beheld” must have gratified hungry soldiers, tired of

small servings of moldy bread. Daniell, in his private letter to his brother, identified one area of short-term dearth. Realizing that relatively thinly populated Jamaica was no more ready to feed thousands of starving soldiers and sailors than Barbados had been, he noted that cassava, from which the local bread was produced, was in short supply immediately after the invasion. Daniell's note of realism stood out, for the other early accounts—and in fact most of Daniell's own letter—described a veritable Garden of Eden. The island was “most plentiful of fowl and fish.” Amazingly, “salte all alonge the shore, most white and fine that ever I saw, makes itself.” Men compiled lavish lists of “all sortes of rare fruits in abundance” with one eye on trade, but writers also expected the bounty to succor the fortunate resident population. One participant recorded his hope that, with the peas and barley that he had seen growing, the English ought to be able to brew beer and ale.¹¹ Besides sheep, what would make Jamaica more English than ale?

Similarly comforting was the ready availability of livestock. Cattle and hogs roamed the island, introduced by the Spanish over a century before. When the English arrived, the main town, Santiago de la Vega, housed numerous animals that grazed nearby during the day and ambled back to their pens at nightfall. The starving soldiers in fact slaughtered these trusting creatures within days of arriving, thankful for fresh meat that literally walked into their waiting arms. Other livestock ranged over nine different “hatos”; the island's enslaved population as well as some free people of African or native descent slaughtered these animals, which were feral or nearly so, killing an estimated 80,000 of them annually during the 1650s, for meat but especially for their hides. The people who performed this labor were the Jamaican equivalent of the lancers who astounded the English with their skill on Hispaniola. One of the main products of Spanish Jamaica, hides were used locally and exported. Plentiful livestock struck the English invaders forcibly; all the early descriptions mentioned the “very great plenty of cattle.”¹² With meat and fruit available in profusion, even Daniell assumed that the English would easily weather the cassava shortage.

Such fantasies of effortless abundance suggested a corollary: that if residents failed to prosper, they were somehow flawed. The Americas as earthly paradise had emerged as a theme early in the era of European expansion. When Virginia underwent a “Starving Time,” the news partially displaced the optimistic portrayals of infinite bounty, but even

then, Virginia boosters attempted to place blame on the quality of the migrants in order to deflect the conclusion that the land itself was lacking. Jamaica too would undergo its own starving time, and blame would similarly fall upon the character of the wretched men. One commentator described them as “starving in a cooks shop,” suggesting that the soldiers would not expend the minimal effort required to feed themselves. When a new Commissioner, the New Englander Robert Sedgwick, arrived to witness the suffering in November, he sounded this well-worn theme, blaming the hungry men.¹³ The idea that Jamaica was an easy place to live, first asserted in these early writings, persisted even as evidence to the contrary accumulated.

Early observers knew that their readers might have one fear about any Caribbean island—that its climate would render it a miserable place for English residents—and they quickly addressed this concern. Venables and Butler immediately assured Cromwell that Jamaica’s climate was temperate. Daniell acknowledged “a little heat” but then reassured William that the heat was “finely tempered with coole breezes.” Early modern Europeans feared the deleterious effects of tropical climate on both health and character, and events on Hispaniola—where the English became ill and cowardly—supported such fears. If Jamaica, although located in the heart of the Caribbean, somehow escaped the dangers associated with the tropics, it would be all the more attractive as a prospective colony. Fortunately, it “excels the others [Caribbean islands] for the goodness both of the Ayr, and bounty of the soyl,” promised the author of *A True Description of Jamaica*. The long letter dated 1 June declared it “most pleasant and healthful to the utmost.” The correspondent further likened the temperature to that of Italy during the day, but cooler at night and into the early morning.¹⁴ No one mentioned hurricanes, even though Samuel Clarke’s *Geographical Description* would shortly single out Jamaica as particularly prone to them. A general description compiled almost a year after the island was invaded as part of the effort to attract settlers declared that “in fine, it is the most plentifull & hoalsomest Iland of all y^e Indyes.”¹⁵ Prospective settlers choosing Jamaica need not worry about the climate.

If the English had one specific fear, they also had one great hope associated with the Spanish West Indies: any conquest would yield mines. Spanish riches extracted from the American colonies rested overwhelmingly on mineral wealth. By 1655, mines in Peru and Mexico

shipped large quantities of silver in particular. The attraction of capturing the annual plate fleet—a goal that had drawn Dutch, English, and French attention for nearly a century—rested on dreams of treasure. With Spain's New World possessions known for their mines, the English expected to find them. Fictional accounts purporting to relay news the previous spring declared that the English had taken islands replete with mines. Early writers who had actually been to Jamaica did not disappoint on this score. The first letter announced that Jamaica definitely had silver and copper mines and then noted as-yet unconfirmed gold mines as well.¹⁶ Daniell had heard from others of gold and silver, which he thought probable, on the grounds of "nature denying in gross nothing here, which she hath scattered in all other places by parcels." Venables and Butler announced that "one of the chiefest and oldest inhabitants of the country" informed them of the presence of one silver and one copper mine. When the Venetian official Lorenzo Paulucci wrote to his colleague in France to convey the latest news about Jamaica, he mentioned silver and tin mines. The mines had never been worked by the Spanish to avoid advertising their existence and thereby prompting an invasion of the island.¹⁷ Such rumors helped make sense of the contention that mines existed even though no one worked them. The *True Description*, published in 1657 but rehearsing all the themes of the first writers, offered a different explanation for untapped mineral wealth: the Spanish planned to exhaust more distant and inaccessible mines before turning to those "nearer home, and of greater security."¹⁸ Mineral wealth loomed large in these early accounts, in keeping with English expectations of what the Caribbean had to offer.

In imagining an English Jamaica, these early commentators both dismissed the history of the island and built upon it. Even though the writings echoed promotional literature, Jamaica in 1655 differed in one marked respect from earlier colonization ventures. In landing on Jamaica, the English invaded a preexisting European colony. Whereas Roanoke and Virginia (and other places praised in the publications projecting colonial success) had no previous European settlement, in Jamaica the English seized an established colony. In describing current (as well as future) produce, authors acknowledged—often without attribution—that workers (many of them enslaved) toiled to bring those crops to fruition. Remarking on the hides and woods seized in the harbor, they hinted at the trade that already linked Jamaica to other

locations. When soldiers fell upon the goats that were returning to their pens at nightfall, they profited from established routines governing livestock. Accounts that listed sugar works and cacao walks implicitly recognized that residents had brought cultivars from other locations. Sugarcane, originally an Old World crop, came to Jamaica from the West Indian locations where it was first introduced soon after Columbus's arrival; and cacao, a New World plant, entered Caribbean islands from Central America. While Daniell's calculation about the limited cassava crop conceded the presence of residents who marshaled the resources of the island, even he was no doubt ignorant that the root had been introduced by the first inhabitants, the Taíno people, in the distant past.¹⁹ Newsweekly editor Daniel Border, reporting on the seizure of Jamaica, mentioned that the island once had a thriving Indian population before the Spanish massacred them; such an observation not only invoked the trope of Spanish cruelty but also demonstrated that the land was able to support a vastly larger population.²⁰ With the inhabitants already planting, harvesting, consuming, and shipping the produce of Jamaica, English accounts of its agricultural future were less fanciful than those colonial promotional pieces that superimposed intensive European agricultural practices onto less intensively cultivated lands elsewhere in the Americas.

The future Jamaica they envisioned owed a great deal to Spanish land use, as well as to earlier indigenous practices, although the English asserted quite the opposite. Spanish Jamaica boasted a diverse agricultural economy, with crops of both Old and New World origins supplemented by harvesting the island's forests for the woods (some of which was made into furniture) and capturing the feral livestock that roamed the island.²¹ Jamaica, like other Spanish Caribbean islands in the seventeenth century, was relatively lightly populated. In the previous century, the colonization of the mainland enticed island residents to other areas, while a precipitous decline in the number of native peoples further lowered the population. Remaining inhabitants—predominantly Spanish and African—cultivated diverse crops to consume locally, to provision any visiting ships, and to trade. Limited demand within the Spanish Empire for the island's products kept populations low and crops varied. The local economy demanded (and individuals could afford to purchase) relatively few African slaves, so most African-descended peoples resident in 1655 had been born there. They were *ladinos* (as the



The first English in Jamaica entertained high hopes for cacao. Before 1655, English consumers were unfamiliar with the crop, although it had long been popular with the Spanish. The acquisition of Jamaica prompted much writing about the plant. The great naturalist Hans Sloane produced these images showing parts of the tree based on information he gathered during his stay in the West Indies from 1687 to 1689.

Hans Sloane, *A voyage to the islands Madera, Barbados, Nieves, S. Christophers and Jamaica, with the natural history . . . of the last of those islands; to which is prefix'd an introduction, wherein is an account of the inhabitants, air, waters, diseases, trade, &c.*, 2 vols. (1707), 2:15, tab. 160. The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, RB95867.

Spanish terminology had it): they had become acculturated, especially mastering the Spanish language. Newly imported Africans (when Jamaica did receive them, as for some reason it did in relatively large numbers in the 1610s) were probably as likely to go on to other colonies, such as Cuba, which required slaves for fortification building.²² With a relatively small population and few opportunities for trade, Spanish Jamaica pursued a diverse if limited economic program.

That diversity largely replicated the extensive lists of colonial crops that English writers envisioned their own colonies producing; persistent, unmet English demand meant that when Jamaica shifted empires, its agricultural base found a ready market. Their own exploitation of the

island's bounty would occur within this very different commercial context. Producing virtually the same output as other Spanish Caribbean islands (save for the Jamaican pimento, which other Spanish consumers eagerly sought), Jamaica before 1655 found little demand. The English, who craved such products but had limited access to them, immediately improved Jamaica's commercial prospects by wrenching it into their own trade nexus. With the metropolitan government newly determined to close its trade, the first English Jamaican landowners imagined their island's success as the sole producer of an array of desirable crops. To that end, they prohibited the transplantation of any Jamaican plant to another colony. Having cornered the market on the export of its tropical produce, they sought to avoid replicating the process that had driven down the price of tobacco decades earlier, as its wide cultivation reduced profits.²³

These writers, all participants in the invasion force, never mentioned the prospect of using the island as an *entrepôt* for trade with the Spanish colonies. The island had already, in all likelihood, been used for the transshipment of enslaved Africans, and it would eventually resume that role under the English. Merchants eyed the potential for a profitable trade with Spanish America, and Jamaica was well placed to accommodate such an interchange. Before the war, Cromwell demanded that the Spanish open their ports to English traders. Such a trade would benefit the English not only because they could sell their own manufactures directly to the Spanish colonies (rather than to Spanish intermediaries in Europe) but also because they could supply Spain with enslaved Africans. London merchants wrote about opening trade (including that in unfree laborers) as offering the Spanish colonists release from the tyranny of their empire's restrictive policies, undeterred by the idea that the resulting traffic in human chattel represented a brutal form of oppression.²⁴ Focused on the project of conquest—with an unrealistic but still official brief to conquer the entire region, and little expectation of friendly relations with the Spanish—the invaders-turned-authors did not look ahead to a day when Jamaica would sit as a lone English island amid stubbornly unconquered Spanish territory. Before fully appreciating the prospects for Anglo-Spanish trade that Jamaica offered, they would need to concede the failure of the Design's loftier goals. Others would shortly take up that call.

In spite of a scholarly assumption that the English took Jamaica with the aim of capturing more land suitable for sugar cultivation, the first

to imagine Jamaica's future did not pursue that idea. They expressly avoided monoculture. Whether some were aware of tobacco's fate as an overly exploited crop of declining value, most knew the struggles faced by the only West Indian colony heavily dependent on sugar. Rather than feature sugar as the colony's main aim, these visionaries thought of sugar as one of a number of crops that would sustain Jamaica's English future. Promotional writers promised a mixed economic output, never advocating the preponderance of either tobacco or sugar. With such bountiful variety arrayed before them, why would they hold up one crop as the ultimate ambition? Jamaica's first English promoters did not look forward to making Jamaica into a bigger Barbados. That island had recently become highly profitable; but their three-month stint in Barbados left them unimpressed, and no one advocated focusing on sugar. Instead they pictured the Jamaica they saw before them, improved. The best blueprint for their vision was the very colony they had taken, not a Barbadian exemplar they hoped to replicate.

These early English authors characterized Spanish Jamaica in very different terms, however. Rather than praise its diversity and productivity, the English criticized the state of the island as indicative of all that was wrong with Spanish colonization. Daniell, for instance, breathlessly ticked off an abundance of crops, only to pause for this criticism: "The lazy Spanyard cares onely for himself, and improves no further, which I hope now will bee better manured, to the greater benefite of ourselves and nation." In Daniell's construction, the Spanish had selfishly looked only to their own needs, failing in their obligation to exploit the island. His view—that anything less than maximum productivity represented not just indolence but selfishness—revealed English attitudes about the land and their relation to it. The inevitably irreverent Henry Whistler observed that "the Spaniard doth call it the Garden of the Indges, But this I will say, the Gardeners have bin very bad, for heare it is very litell more then that which groweth naterallie."²⁵ The well-established trope of Spanish indolence may explain why so few authors paused to wonder that the Spanish had allegedly ignored potentially profitable mines.

The English generally avoided attributing to the displaced residents the effort that had gone into creating a varied and sustainable, if modest, local economy. They described crops growing as if these simply appeared without the work of any human agent. Using the passive voice, they discursively disavowed the effort that brought edible plants to maturity.

Daniell's staccato listing of almost a dozen food crops proceeded largely without acknowledging who had done the cultivating; only in the case of the inadequate supply of cassava for bread did he nod to the fact that some thought had gone into ensuring that the island's crop would feed its usual population. In the "Account of Jamaica," the writer referred directly to the Spanish elsewhere as consumers of the island's bounty, but not to the recently displaced population of Jamaican producers. For instance, the "Carthagene" residents "much esteemed" a liquid made of distilling the leaves of the Jamaican pepper plant.²⁶ He left unstated how the leaf came to be distilled (much less arrived at market in Cartagena) at the same time that he exposed his ignorance in that it is not the leaf of the plant but the unripe fruit consumed as allspice.

The sleight of hand whereby producers remained unacknowledged recurred throughout these writings. The "Account" described the prospect of shipbuilding in the future tense, failing to acknowledge the shipyard that already existed under the Spanish. It further explained that "the hato Ayala . . . hath much commodity of planting or erecting of sugar engines of water, by reason of two convenient rivers." The men who had acted on the fortuitous placement of the rivers to site these engines remained absent. Rather, the rivers themselves apparently organized the effort to tame water power to the processing of cane. Similarly, in describing the town, the writer noted that "heere wee have above 1000 houses . . . many of the houses of good brick and timber covered with tile made heere." Along similar lines, the English had "found" "but 7 sugar mills." Notably missing were the makers of tile, the former owners of houses, and the laborers who cut the cane and staffed the mills. "Account" elided even the act of conquest, with no reference to how the English came to "have" these 1,000 houses or why they happened to locate seven mills. A manuscript "description in parts what the Iland of Jamaco yeelds" based on these early accounts skirted the labor of Jamaican farmers and cattle wranglers, presenting the results of their efforts as if the island offered up crops and hides of its own accord. First the writer fallaciously declared that "their are Neither Spajards nor Indians left to Mollest such as goe to inhabit it," completely erasing the presence of, much less any role played by, people forcibly brought from Africa, although they made up nearly half of those with whom the English army had to contend. The account's compiler then extolled a bountiful island that (apparently by magic) yielded "groas abundance of Excellent

fruite, & potatos & other rootes, & sugar, ginger, tobacco, Indigo, Wyne, & many other things to Large to Expres heer."²⁷ Salt, explicitly said to "make itself," was only one of many useful items that appeared self-cultivating. Jamaica effectively stood as a magical isle. Islands in literature stood apart, offering environments where the usual rules did not apply; from Thomas More's island of Utopia—site of social experimentation—to William Shakespeare's *The Tempest*—home to a great magician seeking to control the environment—islands served as quasi-magical places.²⁸ Commentary on Jamaica's effortless bounty not only sidestepped the fact that former residents still "lurked" in its woods fighting a guerrilla war against the invaders; it also eliminated the presence of Spanish, indigenous, and African inhabitants who had worked to create the economy of the island the English seized.²⁹

Brought under the control of England, Jamaica would—all the writers assumed—become vastly more profitable. The letter that referred dismissively to finding "but" seven mills expressed the English opinion that the Spanish could have—and should have—done more. The English took it as an article of faith that they were (or ought to be) far more vigorous than the Spanish. They had been devastated by the failure on Hispaniola in part because it flew in the face of their conviction that the lazy Spanish could not stand up to the manly and energetic English.³⁰ Despite the fact that they were surrounded by men who had performed as cowards (and who were currently unable or unwilling to rouse themselves to complete tasks basic to their survival) the authors of these early accounts assumed that the English would outperform the Spanish. The vast potential they saw would build upon a Spanish agricultural base but substantially extend it. Every detailed description of the island noted underexploited areas. The clear implication was that much more could be done, that the island's potential had never been tapped, and that the Spanish (in their usual indolence) had squandered Jamaica.

A 1660 report repeated the assessment usual among the men of the invasion force that the "old Spanish plantations . . . are less considerable than those made by the English in other places." This description expressed a view typical of the would-be conquerors: the Spanish "luxuriously spent [their time] in their houses in y^e towne, never intending anything but easie lyfe and plentifully lyving, for on this large and fertile island was no manufacture or commodity made, only a very little sugar

and tobacco and cocoa.”³¹ The English, even as they celebrated Jamaica’s diverse economy and offered future English settlers a life of bounty, censured the Spanish for their failure. Rather than praising the island’s inhabitants for what they had created, which the English wanted to imitate and expand, these writers castigated them. They present the opportunity to increase the varied yield of the island as one of Jamaica’s most attractive features.

These early accounts encapsulate a host of English attitudes: about the Spanish and themselves, but also about how best to cultivate acquired lands. It is often noted that the English created an Atlantic empire based on commerce and colonization. Their approach contrasted with that of the Dutch, who favored commerce alone (supported by a minimalist presence on the land), as well as that of the Spanish, who emphasized colonization and mineral extraction. The English approach to its colonies encouraged a particular view of proper land use. From their perspective, the problem with the Spanish was not only that they claimed land they did not actively hold (such as the North American continent north of Florida), thereby failing to meet the requirement of possession.³² Even with the lands they occupied, Spanish use was figured as inadequate, even irresponsible. The reduced population of the Spanish Caribbean left those islands little occupied and minimally exploited. This situation encouraged the English to justify taking them on the grounds that they were not being properly developed.

What had been said of the inadequacies of native land use they transferred to the Spanish: their foes treated land improperly and inadequately; they therefore did not deserve to keep it.³³ The erasure of previous occupancy, usually accorded to indigenous peoples, here applied to the Spanish. While such criticism drew on deeply held prejudice, ignorance of the land itself exacerbated it. English lack of knowledge about such basic matters as local rainfall patterns would lead them into errors about what crops could be planted where and when. Their presuppositions about Spanish character masked the need to inform themselves about local conditions. The imperative to maximize profits created grounds for denigrating Spanish possession and use: lazy Spaniards did not deserve to hold these islands. They had behaved selfishly; the island’s new owners would selflessly work to realize Jamaica’s full potential. Rescuing Jamaica from the Spanish, they would remedy the situation by applying their energy and commercial acumen to its improvement.

Their goal for Jamaica was not, however, what it would become. No one projected the island's move toward a heavy reliance on sugar cultivation and the labor of African slaves. Even though Barbados had recently proved immensely profitable, and that small island no longer offered open land to aspiring planters, not a single author celebrated the prospects for making Jamaica into a bigger version of Barbados. Indeed, they were joined in this by the Barbadians themselves, who left their island home in large numbers in the coming decade, but not to establish themselves in Jamaica. To the extent that Jamaica advocates wrote to justify their acquisition, the authors must have expected Cromwell and others to endorse their goal of a diverse economy rather than a sugar-dominated one. Diversity suited Jamaica physically, because the varied terrain prevented a narrow focus on a single crop; Jamaica would never become as reliant on sugar as Barbados.³⁴ Having spent over two months on Barbados (or having lived there for a longer period prior to being recruited), the invasion force found little to love. The men of the fleet who recorded their impressions of that island criticized it vehemently for many reasons, not least the quality of its residents. The fleet learned by painful experience that Barbados could not feed itself, much less the hungry expeditionary force. Focusing on sugar to the exclusion of other crops appeared a problem, not an example to be emulated. Although it may seem obvious that the English took Jamaica because they sought to replicate the success of Barbados, an alternative possibility exists: that, at least initially, these English men did not desire the Jamaica that would later emerge. If they loved any cultivar above the others, they embraced cocoa as the island's hope.³⁵ The English knew little of cocoa in 1655; subsequent publications would explain the plant, the health benefits of consuming its fruit, and the best ways to do so. The first published advertisement for chocolate appeared in *Mercurius Politicus* in 1659, a testament to its rising popularity after Jamaica's acquisition brought it to English consumers.³⁶ Always, they imagined cocoa in conjunction with other crops, not as a singular product duplicating the status of Barbados sugar.

Writing early Jamaica's history as if the invaders aimed at sugar renders inexplicable the initial failure to pursue that option. Correcting the prevailing view that raiding Spanish possessions momentarily distracted residents from their true purpose, Nuala Zahedieh observed that sugar required capital investment that could only be slowly accumulated.

Whether seeing the inhabitants as temporarily lured by the riches of plunder or as bent on accumulating the capital needed to invest in sugar, scholars assume that nominal attention to sugar represented an incongruity.³⁷ No doubt some English investors (and perhaps men in Jamaica who did not write of their dreams) hoped otherwise from the start. Karen Kupperman is probably correct that Richard Ligon succeeded in getting his history of Barbados published only after the conquest of Jamaica because the unknown Englishmen promoting it wanted to advertise one possible future for Jamaica. That Ligon's volume included numerous diagrams of sugar-processing technology supports that point.³⁸ Yet Design participants and the earliest men with firsthand Jamaica experience to write about it did not follow that reasoning. If not these men, then their surviving compatriots would be among Jamaica's first English landowners, so their lack of interest in a big push for sugar had some effect.³⁹ Both in the way they reacted to Barbados and the fact that they failed to foreground sugar suggested that they intentionally avoided advocating that path. Nevertheless, we continued to assume that they must have sought sugar, an assumption that is at best teleological.

Although economic historians are generally unsympathetic to the idea that profit maximization was not always foremost in English imperialists' minds, contemporaries must have found two aspects of eighteenth-century Jamaica very difficult to imagine: marshalling the labor to make Jamaica a major sugar-producing colony and generating the massive increase in demand for the sweetener that such expansion necessitated.⁴⁰ Barbados, an island both small (166 square miles) and relatively flat, had been quickly brought into intensive cultivation; but Jamaica, at 4,500 square miles, with much of it rugged terrain, represented a daunting project, even for the industrious English. In 1655 the invaders were unable to penetrate very far into the interior, much less tame vast tracts for sugar cultivation. They favored valuable woods and other native plants, already growing and available for extraction. These early planners advocated expanding the few sugar works in only a limited way, not to an extent that would have vaulted sugar to the dominant crop. More English consumers currently enjoyed sugar, which had once been inaccessible; its desirability and modestly growing market brought a good price. Yet, while the Dutch held Brazil, the supply of sugar spiked and profits fell; an attentive observer may have seen the

promise of sugar as tarnished.⁴¹ Even if the price rebounded, the idea that demand would continue to rise indefinitely and exponentially, as would need to be the case for the much larger island of Jamaica to be profitably focused on sugar, would have challenged even the most visionary English imperialist. Sidney Mintz explicated the dramatic changes in the English (and European) diet that went along with the upsurge in sugar cultivation; such a profound transformation may have been beyond the wildest imaginings of the island's first boosters.⁴² Both of these issues—the difficulty involved and the lack of sufficient demand compared to that for some of the other items they extolled—may have fostered their disinterest in a big sugar push.

Not only did descriptions of Jamaica's future omit sugar, no one mentioned slaves.⁴³ Labor of any sort earned scant acknowledgment. Vague nods toward English industriousness represented the extent of the commentary on this topic. The only reference to actual laborers occurred when the ever-practical Daniell noted: "Wee have houses, lands, meate, water sufficient, and want servants to plant and manure it." Bounty without effort captured the mythic nature of early colonial promotional writing; in Georgia, those who explicitly opposed the introduction of slaves to that colony promoted the "Georgia myth" that imagined the earth yielding its resources with little human effort, while those who advocated slavery argued that grueling labor was needed to extract the land's bounty.⁴⁴ Certainly the early Jamaica authors sounded a similar note of effortless bounty that (at least in their rhetoric) rendered slaves superfluous. When it came to working the land, the first laborers would be soldiers or bound European servants, in keeping with Daniell's observation. The invasion occurred at a moment when the revolution ratcheted up the transportation of the residents of the former three kingdoms. Slaves, both costly and in relatively short supply, did not appear the obvious choice in that context. In coming decades, enslaved Africans and Indians entered the colony in small numbers. Larger shipments from Africa landed at Jamaica on their way to being sold in Spanish colonies. In the near term, Jamaica residents had to figure out how to extract the bounty of the island without the toil of a large enslaved labor force.

When the English, freshly arrived in Jamaica, described what they saw, they combined concrete details and optimistic projections to present an

island entirely suited to their needs. Given that members of the invasion force wrote these first imaginings, the only minor nods toward its defensibility or its location in relationship to other targeted Spanish possessions might have been surprising. Yet the purpose of these sketches was not strategic, despite being the work of military men on campaign. Rather, their end was envisioning the results of taking Jamaica and making it English, and their value lies in revealing that vision. They pictured a Jamaica that combined both ease and productivity. An English Jamaica would flourish, generating a huge variety of desirable products to be traded or enjoyed by the fortunate residents who would benefit from its natural bounty. By remaking the island into a busy and profitable one, the English expected to replace the indolent Spanish—whom they criticized for having ignored the island’s potential—with their own hard-working and energetic people. These initial accounts never described who would do the work of realizing the future their writers charted, but they implied that simply replacing Spaniards would set the island on the path to intensive, but varied and sustainable, development.

Surviving

WHILE IMAGINING AN ENGLISH JAMAICA came easily, creating it did not. The newly arrived forces struggled to maintain their foothold on the island. Simple survival proved difficult for the ill and demoralized army. Although military men on campaign, they faced many of the challenges that confronted any new colonial venture. Supplying food, adapting to the local disease environment, and mastering the despair that accompanied squalid conditions paralleled the situation in early Jamestown or other colonies. That the men on Jamaica arrived as soldiers meant that they lived under military discipline that might force them to work even under terrible conditions. The military structure also provided regular procedures for maintaining a leadership hierarchy even in the face of numerous ruptures. Yet in some respects their status as soldiers hampered their ability to address the problems of survival. The first years on Jamaica combined the worst of a botched military campaign and a badly conceived colonial venture. Slowly, the prospects for survival improved, but the process proved unexpectedly arduous.

Death ran rampant in the first years, rivaling or exceeding the worst early English colonization attempts. The weekly death rate during the first few months ranged from forty to as many as one hundred. By November 1655, one letter writer estimated that half the army had died since its arrival six months earlier. In January, despite reinforcements numbering at least 831 who had arrived the previous autumn, the army was down from as many as 7,800 to fewer than 3,000, with 50 more dying each week. Thomas Gage, who had advocated so intensely for the Design, died soon after arrival. When the Spanish inhabitants hiding

in the interior visited deserted farms, "thirty English were found dead, clad and booted," at one site, "and so were others found, on other farms, especially on the Guatibacoa ranches, where there were most troops, around the watering places." Sedgwick described similar scenes of desolation: "the soldiery many dead, their carcasses lying unburied in the high-ways, and among bushes to and again; many of them that were alive, walked like ghosts or dead men, who, as I went through the town, lay groaning and crying out, bread for the Lord's sake."¹ The army's withering away forced its commanding officers to manipulate its structure, reducing the number of companies in each regiment by two and repeatedly dropping the overall number of regiments. Neither reform went far enough to align the reduced force with common practice.² Little wonder that, in light of such figures, rumors circulated that everyone had died, and no English presence remained. In February 1656, William Stane, who was among the better informed, reported nearly one hundred dead officers and the men reduced by half since their arrival in the island.³

The first year was the deadliest. Those who had not contracted illness in Barbados or Hispaniola had ample occasion to do so in Jamaica. The high early death rate arose from exposure to diseases, exacerbated by poor diet and unhygienic conditions. Rations distributed in March 1656 gave the number receiving them (which included servants attending individual officers and other dependents not counted among the soldiers) at 3,094, confirming the huge drop (from 7,800). Living conditions for seventeenth-century armies were generally unhealthful, but the extent of the devastation on Jamaica elicited comment. William Godfrey, captain of the *Marmaduke*, wrote to Robert Blackborne of the "reaging furey of Mortality among our Army who are almost destroyed."⁴ A census prepared during the first winter distinguished the well and the sick, with the latter making up more than half of the total. Subsequently, the figure for those receiving rations crept down more slowly, hitting 2,598 seven months later. By then, the free fall had slowed, although a brisk 17 percent reduction indicated that the problem persisted.⁵ Since few men left and prospects for desertion were all but nonexistent, death explained most of the population loss.

The fates of the men in the army's upper ranks provide a measure of the overall ill health. As the elite, these men enjoyed the best accommodations and provisions, yet they too suffered. Before he bolted in the

throes of a debilitating ailment, Venables named Colonel Richard Fortescue as his successor. Fortescue survived the ill-fated campaign on Hispaniola, but succumbed to a “sudden & unexpected death” in October 1655 (after five months on Jamaica). Commissioner Robert Sedgwick, who arrived only days before Fortescue’s death, perished the following May (seven months later). Having declared “my constitution agreeing not wel with this climate,” he succumbed just as he received orders to assume overall command of the expeditionary forces.⁶ Later that year Cromwell dispatched William Brayne from Scotland; landing in December 1656, the colonel was dead in nine months (by September). With the exception of Venables, who recovered his health after leaving, three leaders in succession had died twenty-eight months into the occupation. Colonel John Humphrey arrived during the first autumn with Sedgwick and lived to depart one year later, after he had “long laboured with continuall sickness.” Fortunately for the undertaking, other high-ranking officers survived, most notably Colonel Edward Doyley. Despite occasional bouts of sickness, he assumed control over the army repeatedly upon the deaths of other men. Doyley lived to return to England in the 1660s, dying only in 1675.⁷

When Doyley ordered provisions issued to each of the seven regiments in August 1656, only two regiments—his own and that of the newly arrived Colonel John Humphrey—remained under the man who originally commanded it. Other leaders had risen to their positions: Philip Ward and Francis Barrington had replaced Venables and Buller after those men returned to England the previous summer, while Samuel Barry took James Heane’s regiment after the latter died on Hispaniola. Henry Archbould commanded Andrew Carter’s regiment subsequent to the colonel’s death in November 1655. Richard Wells led the regiment originally Fortescue’s, having been promoted from the rank of captain; his leadership was predicated on the death in Jamaica not only of Fortescue but of Henry Bartlett as well. Among the regimental commanders, death in battle killed one, departure removed two others, while three died on Jamaica.⁸ Of the original colonels, only Doyley remained, fifteen months after the landing.

The death rate rivaled the worst early colonial ventures. Half the army perished in the first six months, fully three-quarters within five years. The devastation exceeded that of early Virginia, where an estimated 65 percent died in the first year, and 80 percent in the seventeen

years of the Virginia Company. In Plymouth Plantation, half of the men succumbed during the first winter; among the smaller number of women in the group, the rate was higher still.⁹ South Carolina, founded in the 1660s, would have a comparably high mortality rate. In the English Caribbean islands, initial death rates varied widely, with some locations enjoying relatively low mortality. Barbados and Providence Island migrants apparently did not suffer unduly, but those in French St. Christopher as well as English Surinam did. Barbados and Providence Island seem to have been more like early Bermuda, where mortality rates were far lower than in its parent colony of Virginia.¹⁰ In this comparative context, early Jamaica tilted decidedly toward the deadly end of the range. It did so in spite of the fact that Jamaica was an already-established European colony, which offered some relief to the new arrivals, who had access to buildings and some food supplies. Still the first English in Jamaica died at overwhelming rates.

The reasons for the ubiquity of death were many, starting with the terrible condition of the first arrivals. The men (along with a few women and children) who sailed from Hispaniola to Jamaica had suffered already. Food had been scarce for some time. The commanders cut rations when the force left Barbados six weeks before (if not earlier), and during the Hispaniola campaign many went without food altogether for days. Some men left Hispaniola wounded, while many more were ill. Many of those transported off the island came aboard ship in a miserable state. The fleet's hospital ship was insufficient to take all the sick, and they lay moaning on the decks of numerous other vessels. As Venables and Butler wrote to Cromwell, ill health continued to be so widespread that very few senior officers could participate in meetings called in the first weeks on Jamaica. The Hispaniola debacle had taken a heavy toll, and prior to that, time spent on board ship, and particularly at Barbados, had augmented health problems.¹¹ When they arrived at Jamaica, many were already ailing.

Landing did not deliver the expected reprieve. Some men obtained shelter, moving into abandoned buildings in Santiago de la Vega. Others received a temporary boost in their diets when they slaughtered the livestock roaming in and around the town. Yet the rainy season soon arrived, bringing torrential downpours that worsened sanitation problems and immiserated men lacking adequate shelter. Exposure for some, recurrent hunger for all, and widespread illness prolonged the suffering. The

guerrilla war fought with the exiled residents caused relatively few casualties in the first years. Save for one daring raid launched by the Spanish in April 1656, which killed at least forty-five soldiers, most fatalities occurred in the early days, when hungry men roamed the countryside incautiously in search of food.¹² On Jamaica people died for reasons similar to those that claimed them on Hispaniola: disease, hunger, and (as a distant third) wounds.

A host of illnesses apparently combined to fell the hapless invaders (some also affecting their Spanish counterparts). Venables listed fevers, fluxes, and hunger as causes of the morbidity. Fevers (without reference to the black vomit that was a telltale sign of yellow fever) might indicate malaria or typhus; J. R. McNeill believes the former certainly and the latter possibly plagued early English Jamaica. Malaria fit the observation that the months of June through September were the most deadly, as the disease requires warm nights for mosquito incubation to occur.¹³ Flux (or dysentery) might arise from eating bad food or drinking contaminated water. Spoiled rations, intentionally infected wells on Hispaniola or sluggish rivers, and bad hygiene on Jamaica all fostered dysentery. That Robert Sedgwick died “swelled up like a barrel” suggested an intestinal disorder. Hunger increases susceptibility to all of these ailments, increasing the danger they posed.¹⁴ A “pestilence” may have contributed too. Castilla wrote that “the plague began to afflict [the enemy], and the people of this island, in the bush, with the contagion of fevers, cold pains and fevers, phrensies or madness, carbuncles, swellings . . . and almost none escaped dysentery.” According to Spanish accounts, the sickness lasted two years and claimed many lives—1,500 among the residents and twice as many among the invaders.¹⁵ The high mortality among the Spanish indicated that the ailment was not simply “that of the country” (as Lady Lyttelton, who resided on the island briefly before her own death in 1662, would later describe it); locals would have been immune to malaria or typhus. Cubans were also stricken, corroborating the prospect of an epidemic illness. Castilla was certain that nothing could be done to prevent the contagion besides praying to God for deliverance.¹⁶ With deaths due to encounters with the enemy nominal, disease—drawn from a heady mix of endemic ailments like malaria and perhaps typhus, bacterial infections from poor sanitation and spoiled food, and an unidentified contagious illness that also ravaged the Spanish refugee population—was the main culprit.

The English, in addition to prayer, pursued a few strategies to stop the spread of disease. Based on the prevailing wisdom of humoral physiology, they looked to the balance of “humors” in the body to explain good health or its absence. The theory postulated that air, moisture, temperature, or the qualities associated with particular foods influenced the balance. The environmental historian Linda Nash explored how this theoretical framework resulted in an “ecological” conception, in which the human body was seen as inseparable from the larger environment. In keeping with these ideas, Cromwell wrote to remind his underlings that because stench kills, it was imperative to bury the dead. Whether rotting corpses contaminated the air, as the Lord Protector thought, or the drinking water, as we would suspect, the advice was sound. Cromwell along with others recommended moving away from areas where bad air or other attributes unbalanced humors. Dispersing the army from its original landing site might have proved beneficial, removing men from sources of contaminated water or from close contact with those who were already ill. Unfortunately, rotten food rations followed them wherever they went, local water supplies quickly became contaminated again when practices did not change, and mosquitoes would put in an appearance wherever local conditions supported them. Efforts to master the geography of illness often met with failure. In July 1657, William Brayne set aside a place for the servants and overseers dispatched by investors Noell, Povey, and Watts to work their land, a location he declared himself “confident wilbe very fruitfull and I hope heathfull.”¹⁷ Many perished nonetheless. Morant, in the southeast of the island, was thought to be more healthful, until those sent there died. Other proposals targeted intemperate drinking habits or blamed trees; alternately some advocated moving to the (still heavily forested) mountains or to the north side of the island to avoid illness.¹⁸

While improved hygiene and dispersion effected some improvement, the incremental tilt toward survival owed more to the process known at the time as “seasoning.” To the extent that mortality arose directly from endemic diseases like malaria to which immunities could develop (or from other ailments made more deadly for individuals already weakened by such diseases), men who recovered from sickness enjoyed increased prospects for long-term survival. Doyley’s repeated bouts of illness in the first years suggest that he survived malaria and became immune. Lewis Ashton, who apparently came to Jamaica as a soldier

but survived to prosper on the island, wrote to England in 1657 to describe his ill health and subsequent recovery. In March 1656/7, Brayne contrasted the health of the “old soldiers” to the condition of those who had accompanied him from Scotland just a few months earlier, indicating that the former had acclimated to the disease environment. Around the same time, after ten months, Doyley concurred that the remaining soldiers were healthier. By the second year, numerous observers noted marked improvement. One of the earliest publications about Jamaica to acknowledge the prevalence of illness, 1657’s *A True Description* alluded to the need for seasoning with an upbeat “I need not inform you of . . . the healthfulness of the place, when a man hath some little time been acquainted with the Ayr.”¹⁹

The optimistic *True Description* neglected to mention the converse of this phenomenon, that later groups of new arrivals suffered as had their predecessors. Robert Sedgwick described Humphrey’s regiment, which disembarked in October 1655: starting with 831 “lusty, healthful, gallant men,” after a few weeks it was reduced by 50, losing “two captains, a lieutenant, and two ensigns, the colonel himself very weak, the lieutenant colonel at death’s door.” The unrelenting mortality continued after Sedgwick penned this letter, ultimately carrying him off six months later. Brayne’s regiment suffered a similar experience: arriving in December 1656, by March a third of the soldiers were dead; by September, Brayne himself and another third had perished. It reached a 66 percent fatality rate in ten months. Settlers sent out by merchant Martin Noell to start a plantation—the only substantial number of civilians to arrive directly from England in this early period—declined by half in a short time. As Doyley expressed it, the climate “raged over newcomers.”²⁰ Brayne himself wrote that death took many new arrivals; the anonymous author of “A View of the Condicon of Jamaica” agreed. Based on his observations, Cornelius Burroughs thought that new men sent to augment the ranks of the army should not come organized in a regiment (as was typical) but individually; rather than settle in a large group of susceptible bodies, they could be sorted into existing regiments among the men who had already spent time on the island. Another proposal, this one for “y^e more convenyent supplying of his Highness affaires in y^e West Indies,” suggested that troops be sent in smaller allotments to Barbados, spend time there to become acclimated, and then move on to Jamaica.²¹ The logic behind this suggestion was that seasoning in

the better-established colony of Barbados would make available amenities for the ill that were lacking in Jamaica and thereby increase the survival rate.

The major case to put this logic into practice—the recruitment of 1,600 settlers from Nevis who arrived in November 1656—revealed that it was not a foolproof strategy. As Caribbean residents of long standing, they were expected to flourish. The settlers died in droves, their numbers dropping to 400 in less than a year despite the optimistic predictions about their hardiness. Governor Luke Stoakes, who had organized the resettlement, died, as did his wife; other family members may have perished as well, but the couple left three young sons, at least one of whom lived to adulthood in Jamaica. While the leaders felt a special responsibility for these orphans, given their father's status and contribution, numerous other bereft families suffered similar losses. The cause of the extraordinary death rate was probably varied. Living in tents during the rainy season killed some through exposure or illnesses associated with inadequate hygiene, but settlers apparently also succumbed to other diseases that similarly struck newly arrived soldiers. Their supposed seasoning counted for little. Despite this outcome, Doyley maintained his conviction that those from other islands stood a better chance of survival than people brought from England, who could not people Jamaica "in this hundred yeares."²²

Exacerbating the population's susceptibility to illness was endemic hunger. Notwithstanding the much-extolled bounty, the English on Jamaica experienced severe malnutrition in the first year and chronic shortages thereafter. Rations were already depleted at the time of the invasion. Penn cited insufficient food stores, among other arguments, to justify the return of half the naval force in June 1655. Francis Barrington's letters described sampling horse, dog, and ass; the last of these he considered the best, but he feared that eating such odd flesh contributed to illness. Another writer joked that only those dogs that were well liked or had powerful protectors walked the streets unscathed.²³ Periodically, men sampled not only horse but boiled hide as well. In July 1656, Doyley issued a proclamation against falsifying musters to get a larger share of the scanty provisions. Brayne sent Spanish prisoners to England, in part because he could not feed them. With a touch of bravado, Doyley declared the next year, "We feare no enemie by hunger."²⁴ Ships that were otherwise needed had to be sent home at various times

between 1658 and 1661 for lack of rations. In June 1659, Doyley asked the men to “shift for themselves” because “pvisions is att p’sent very scarce.” If the native Floridian, on his return from a visit to England as an “ambassador,” did stop in at Jamaica at this time, the dearth might have given him a poor impression of the prospects for the island. A report written in March 1660 warned that starvation continued to pose a real danger for the army.²⁵ Hunger dogged early English Jamaica, mocking the predictions of bounty.

The ravenous men on Jamaica remained dependent on provisions supplied by the state, much to the consternation of authorities in England. Food represented a constant need, and Commissioners writing home routinely reported low provisions and the desperate demand for more.²⁶ A few “accompts of stores remaining” survive, having been prepared to document the need for resupply. Upon his arrival, Robert Sedgwick found provisions strewn about the beach. He ordered structures built to house them. Subsequently, the stores had to be closely guarded; they still fell victim to embezzlement, theft, rats, and wasteful management. “A Certificate in Relation to our Stores” (dating from January 1657) attested to the many and varied difficulties affecting the stores; it was drafted to protect the newly appointed keeper from liability for previous losses. Audacious soldiers assigned to guard the storehouse conspired with others to coerce the storekeepers to “stand back” while men broke open the casks and stole “Goods & provisions,” dragging them into nearby woods to hold an impromptu feast. They told the storekeeper not to watch the storehouse at night.²⁷

The Caribbean theater added a layer of difficulty. Communications of need made their way only slowly to the Admiralty offices at Derby House, Westminster. The government had to order, collect, and pay for these stores, which then spent a month or more traveling to the island. The first supply ship to succor Jamaica traveled 110 days to get there; the next, a private ship, the *Edward of London*, with a contract to carry needed items, chased the fleet from Barbados to Hispaniola before locating it in Jamaica. The supply chain moved haltingly, and men could starve while provisions made their laborious way through the system. As Commissioners Goodsonn and Sedgwick pointed out, “ships and provisions are subject to many miscarriages; and if your dependency be wholly on them, we perish for want.”²⁸ Penn asked that stores intended for one service or the other be clearly designated; this practice could lead

to its own problems, and in July 1658, Cornelius Burroughs reported that the army had provisions for only one month, while the fleet and troop of horse had enough to last until December. Later that year he noted that provisions loaned to the Nevis settlers had to be written off. Even when supply ships appeared, the quality could leave much to be desired. Goodsonn and Sedgwick informed Cromwell that provisions decayed more quickly in the West Indian climate. Medicaments had to be specially packed in lead or tin to prevent spoilage. Unscrupulous victuallers pawned off low-quality stores on the forces in the Caribbean, knowing that the distance and the climate would be blamed. One baker trying to sell bad bread in England told his disgruntled customers that if they were in Jamaica they would be glad of it.²⁹

The assumption that food needs must be lessening created another barrier to timely resupply. Many people found it difficult to believe that Jamaica still required provisions, encouraged in this complacent thinking not only by published accounts of bounty but also by reports of the men who returned. The subcommittee charged to report on the state of Jamaica in 1658 insisted on the need for continual resupply, well aware that such news was neither welcomed nor fully accepted. Letter writers knew they might hurt their cause by recording occasional moments of plenty. The dire situation the first autumn eased somewhat with the arrival of reinforcements (and provisions) in October, permitting Doyley to offer extra rations as an inducement to lethargic men to work. Rare references to (apparently short-lived) abundance such as occurred in February 1655 / 6 stood out against the backdrop of consistent complaints. Four years into the occupation, Cornelius Burroughs told Robert Blackborne that they had no food, that ships could not sail home unless they took on turtle meat to sustain their crews, and that such dearth happened every year.³⁰ Despite continual reminders to officials of Jamaica's need, provisioning of a sizable force over 4,000 miles away could not be sustained indefinitely.

Knowing that their reliance on England rendered them vulnerable, Design leaders looked for other sources for supplies. Buying provisions from other colonies represented a sensible solution, but it did not prove a panacea. Nearby islands could offer little help, as they produced little beyond their own needs, with agricultural efforts focused on export crops such as tobacco and sugar. New England, which had already begun to ship a surplus to other plantations and to Europe, offered an obvious


source. Initial efforts to furnish the force from Massachusetts proved disappointingly slow, but alerted to the need, merchants began to ship some food of their own accord. New England peas were particularly popular, preferred to those that could be acquired out of England. Stephen Winthrop's prediction that English expansion in the West Indies would benefit New England trade proved accurate over the long term, but the region's ability and willingness to supply Jamaica initially were decidedly mixed.³¹ Buying food required money in the coffers or credit acceptable to traders. The Jamaican treasury, although usually empty, enjoyed occasional infusions of funds, particularly from the sale of prize ships or their cargoes. Western Design leaders never sent prizes to England; rather, they absorbed any gains into their efforts on Jamaica, as their original instructions had dictated. This practice permitted occasional purchases.³² Salt harvested locally—from Corridon Point on Hispaniola and possibly other locations—could also be bartered for supplies occasionally; in 1657 there was no salt, "contrary to custome and expectation," and William Brayne had to find an alternative source of funds. Often the enterprise's leaders depended on credit, charging their purchases to the cash-strapped state. If merchants provided their goods on credit, they had to collect from the English government, a process that was time-consuming and uncertain. Eventually, they became less willing to comply.³³ Purchasing provisions directly may have offered a more efficient way to feed the army, but the system was far from flawless.

Given the unreliable nature of state supplies, Jamaica's leaders adopted other strategies, including taking any food they could find. This approach was consistent with Cromwell's advice: while he promised Robert Sedgwick that supplies would come, he also advised those on Jamaica to do what they could toward acquiring their own food. The enterprising Richard Race, master of the *Hunter*, stopped at Tortuga and found that the residents had been driven off; he stayed a fortnight, employing prisoners who knew local agriculture to harvest and bake the "cassado" bread that was an island staple.³⁴ Such opportunistic harvesting replicated the usual approach of European armies on campaign, requisitioning food from the local population, but adapted it to West Indian conditions.

The livestock population promised a steadier stream of protein, if managed properly. Yet the early killing spree seriously depleted the supply, leading Cromwell to admonish the expedition's new leaders to

preserve the livestock. Eventually a proposal was floated to restock Jamaica with cattle, a sad commentary on misuse of this once-abundant resource. Sedgwick believed that the cattle had become more difficult to manage as a result of initial mishandling, while Goodson thought all the domesticated livestock had been killed, leaving only the semi-feral animals that roamed savannas and woods. Horse entered the army's diet on Hispaniola and recurred as a feature of it during desperate times on Jamaica. In response, the officers mandated harsh penalties for anyone killing a horse, for whatever reason. Organized hunting parties that culled livestock became the norm, and permission to hunt had to be sought well into the 1660s.³⁵ Men in Jamaica worried that the authorities might expect too much from the local herds, fearful that they would use this food source to justify reducing provisions sent from England. To train hunters, William Brayne recruited a German man who had lived in Brazil, where he gained experience catching feral cattle. By 1660 efforts were sufficiently organized that ships deployed off of Cuba could be instructed to meet a hunting party scouring the north side of Jamaica to take on meat. When Doyley returned to England after leading Jamaica for most of the previous seven years, he dedicated a section of his lengthy report to the important issue of livestock.³⁶ By that time, "old soldiers" who had become adept hunters offered their services to others, selling meat to plantation owners and ships' captains. In the longer history of English Jamaica, these men anticipated the pen system of a later era, when livestock raising formed one sector of the Jamaica economy.³⁷

Turtling similarly augmented English diets, another case of exploiting a locally available resource. During nesting season, Doyley dispatched ships to nearby locations, especially the Cayman Islands to the south, where large numbers of turtles could be easily captured. The first order to exploit this local resource assumed that the naval ship would intercept a French ship harvesting turtle and seize that catch. The English soon found that gathering the creatures themselves was a surer way to ensure success. Turtling had been used opportunistically by earlier generations of English raiders in the Caribbean, including Captain William Jackson on his 1643 voyage. Green sea turtles that frequented the Caymans nested between May and September, and Doyley learned to issue his orders for turtling within those months.³⁸ Once the ship's crew had slaughtered the enormous animals, the meat could be used as provisions.



This French illustration captured a seaman flipping a sea turtle. Once on their backs, these animals could not escape, which allowed the sailors to slay them at their leisure. Early English Jamaica relied on turtle meat, readily available during nesting season, as an important component of an often skimpy diet.

Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre, *Histoire générale des Antilles habitées*, vol. 2 (1667). The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, RB139053.

Periodic turtle harvesting became an important component of the diet of the troops as well as of sailors, so much so that orders were issued to ensure the proper preservation of the meat.³⁹ Occasionally expedition leaders, lacking a naval vessel to send on the errand, purchased turtle from private ship captains. When he returned to England, Doyley explained the benefits of turtles. Turtling, while limited to summer months, dependably supplied protein seasonally, and the demands Jamaica placed upon the population contributed toward the depletion of the turtle population. Fishing, although no doubt in use, did not provide the same level of sustenance or ease of extraction that turtles did, and evidence for it is minimal.⁴⁰

Seized Spanish vessels represented another source of local food, however intermittent and unpredictable. Seizures occurred at random, and a local trading vessel's cargo might not include much food. Surviving records are sketchy on prize ships and particularly on their contents, rendering it difficult to identify occasions when prizes contributed toward feeding the men. Scattered evidence survives. A ship taken at

anchor in the harbor when the English arrived contained “chocolate,” by which the letter writer presumably meant cocoa beans. The navy took other Spanish ships laded with cocoa occasionally, and in at least one instance the beans were distributed to the soldiers.⁴¹ Cocoa, both captured and grown, quickly became part of the English diet on Jamaica. Thomas Gage, who until his death served as Venables’s chaplain, may have introduced his companions to its virtues and proper preparation, a subject on which he had previously published effusively. William Hughes, a ship’s physician who visited the island in 1660, devoted much of his subsequently published *American Physitian* to the preparation and virtues of cocoa. Henry Stubbe published a 1662 paean to the plant without having visited the island. Other food also came into English hands. Vice Admiral Goodsonn was pleased to report seizures that contained edible items, in a letter he wrote to Thurloe in January 1656. The next June, olives issued as part of the troop’s rations had presumably been taken from a prize. Aiming to prevent the resupply of the Spanish resistance force, English ships routinely cruised between Jamaica and Cuba. Despite scanty evidence of prizes yielding up food, they represented one occasional source of supply, along with livestock and turtles.⁴²

Growing their own food was an obvious (if laborious) solution, and one that fit into Cromwell’s general vision of Design conquests culminating in colonization. Some members of the invasion force perceived the need to plant from the beginning, mentioning the necessity in their earliest surviving writings. Cromwell envisioned Jamaica, once he knew it was in English hands, serving as a provisioning station for the fleet, which would thereby be able to carry forward the assault on Spanish territories.⁴³ Within a month of their arrival, the soldiers scattered to various locations radiating out from Santiago de la Vega, with instructions to establish combined garrisons and plantations.

Taking up residence in former sites of Spanish occupation, most regiments located in the south-central sector of the island. The army command and a notable military presence remained in Santiago de la Vega, today’s Spanish Town, which the English usually called St. Jago (or, in another effort to render the name, St. Angelo della Vega). Six regiments scattered.⁴⁴ Four were distributed to the north or west. A region known as The Angels, about five miles north, hosted the regiment under Philip Ward, once Venables’s own. Another, originally commanded by Anthony Buller and subsequently by Francis Barrington, centered in

Guanaboa, about twice the distance from St. Jago to the northwest. The third, in Guatibacoa (today northern Clarendon Parish, over twenty miles west of the town), housed the regiment of Richard Wells (formerly Richard Fortescue's). At least in the short term, Henry Archbould's regiment, which had been Andrew Carter's before the latter's death the previous year, garrisoned eighty-five miles west, at the Black River (in St. Elizabeth's Parish). East of St. Jago two additional regiments took up land. Liguanea (in St. Andrew's Parish, fourteen miles to the east) boasted the regiment once commanded by the late Major General Heane and later by Richard Holdip, which by autumn 1656 was overseen by Colonel Samuel Barry. Doyley's regiment, under the direct command of his lieutenant colonel, an arrangement freeing Doyley to remain in St. Jago to exercise authority over the entire army, established its garrison in Yallahs (in the original bounds of St. David's Parish), some thirty-three miles from the main town.⁴⁵ Instead of issuing land to the regiment that had come out almost a year earlier under Humphrey (who had by this time wheedled a pass to depart), the council assigned his men to guard various forts and other locations. Under a commander vigorously opposed to the whole Jamaica project, that regiment had made its unwillingness to plant well known.⁴⁶ All other regiments joined the scheme.

The mechanism for undertaking planting with an army had to be worked out. Immediately, officers assigned soldiers to work on regimental plots as part of their military duties. Spanish spies observing the garrisons noted morning and evening work details tending crops. With so many men ill, few of them familiar with the niceties of growing food on Jamaica, and a strong undercurrent of resentment at being forced to do this work, the first attempts were not promising. As Goodson explained, "They did once set themselves to plant some food, but of that little, what was not burnt up with the sun, was the most part spoiled for want of weeding." Once again holding the seamen up as an example, Goodson sent sailors ashore to plant a plot for the use of the fleet.⁴⁷ The decision to use the army in this fashion proved controversial. Soldiers across many regiments shared the objection that such tasks were inappropriate for an armed force, causing Cromwell to fume that the duty was analogous to other tasks soldiers routinely did to keep regiments functioning. English soldiers were more accustomed to requisitioning local food stores when rations dried up, an effort far removed

from the ongoing work of planting and tending crops. Colonel Holdip (who had previous West Indian experience as a planter) exacerbated complaints, as his men characterized him as “an oppressor” for how much work he demanded. Barrington, who appears to have maintained his men’s good opinion, shared Holdip’s enthusiasm to make the plantation scheme a success. For their part, the Spanish guerrilla fighters recognized that targeting these outposts for attacks would curtail planting, which they hoped would prevent the establishment of a viable farming praxis.⁴⁸

Recognizing problems in the initial efforts, Commissioners Goodsonn and Sedgwick worked to improve the situation between January 1656 and the latter’s death that May. To extend the acreage under cultivation and reduce the resentment of the soldiers forced to plant, Goodsonn and Sedgwick proposed a system of widespread private land ownership. In January they placed their plan before the army officers. As an inducement to plant, they suggested giving the soldiers thirty acres each, distributing seed grains out of the common stores, and promising to buy any affected crops in the event that the Lord Protector called a soldier away before he could harvest. Goodsonn and Sedgwick asked the officers to suggest other inducements that might encourage the soldiers in the work.⁴⁹

Officers objected on two grounds. Many of them had no wish to stay on the island, and they disliked the commitment to a long-term presence that the system augured, reminiscent of a similar land distribution policy in Ireland. They also opposed the idea of granting land to their men, thereby elevating them to the status of landowners. Officers thought the private soldiers would be more appropriately employed as laborers, working on plantations owned by elite men such as themselves. While Goodsonn and Sedgwick noted in their proposal that many of the soldiers were “planters”—referring presumably to knowledgeable men recruited on neighboring islands—the officers knew that the common soldiers had most likely been servants rather than landowners. From the viewpoint of such recruits, enlistment had seemed a way to escape their lowly station, and they hated the officers’ plan to relegate them to the ranks of laborers once again. Such tensions—along with the more practical difficulties of mastering the agricultural regime of a new location—explained the slow start at cultivating the land. The two Commissioners characterized their efforts as tardy, since they “cannot but

think, that his highness and council do believe much is done that way already."⁵⁰

Surviving records do not clarify how this impasse was resolved. William Beeston later heard that Colonel Brayne had gotten the soldiers organized to hunt and plant; while conditions may have improved under his tenure as commander (December 1656 to September 1657), plans were in place and efforts under way prior to his landing. Private soldiers received grants, as did numerous surviving officers. While there is reason to believe that Doyley's Journal is incomplete with regard to early land records, it does note common soldiers receiving land in groups and singly, for amounts ranging from ten to thirty acres each. These orders refer to men receiving "his pporcon [proportion] of land as a private souldier." Thomas Modyford later asserted that some former soldiers hunted livestock to build up enough cash to become planters, but other men had been cultivating their own tracts for the better part of a decade. In July 1658 Doyley confidently declared that the famine had been ended by planting, while the following November Cornelius Burroughs somewhat more cautiously wrote that the soldiers were supplying themselves to a notable extent (although he hoped that in saying so he would not give the impression that rations were no longer needed).⁵¹ The Liguanea region scored early success. This fertile area east of St. Jago sent its surplus to the new town on Point Cagway (later Port Royal). Food shortages still remained, especially at particular times of the year, but by year three the soldier-planters had made discernible progress.

If, in the high instances of disease and hunger, the first English in Jamaica followed other early colonizers, their hesitation to plant echoed most obviously the Jamestown experience. There the first arrivals lacked skills, their ranks including few agricultural laborers. In Jamaica, the West Indian recruits among the soldiers likely had tropical agricultural expertise, and their knowledge may have proved helpful. Although colonization had always been part of the Western Design vision, the majority of participants had not signed on to colonize. Those recruited in England had not known their destination, much less that they might be expected to reside in the Caribbean. In that respect they were analogous to the men who thought they went to the Chesapeake as latter-day conquistadors, similarly unprepared to plant.

Growing their own food on Jamaica was not, in any event, as easy as boosters suggested. Many English staples, including wheat and other

northern European grain crops, proved untenable. Most islands produced cassava, the “rootes of which they make very good bread and reasonable hearty,” according to Francis Barrington. Many unfamiliar foods, cassava among them, grew on the island, and harvesting or growing them, not to mention preparing and eating them, required experimentation. Doyley noted the greater knowledge and adaptability of the Africans living on the island, declaring them “able to lye in y^e woods and live on fruite, w^{ch} [neither] the Spaniards nor English can doe.” Eventually the work of naturalists made foodstuffs of Jamaica more accessible to the English. In 1660 a visiting ship’s physician traversed the island looking for edible plants (and deciding which to eat based in part on what the birds consumed). Before such interventions, the more intrepid consumers of Jamaican delicacies had to decide for themselves.⁵² Knowing what to plant and how to go about it on a tropical island required expertise, about conditions specific to a particular site (a point Goodsonn’s observation about plants that withered for lack of rain makes clear) as well as about tropical agriculture more generally. Even the Barbados ex-servants—to the extent that they brought knowledge of growing sugar for export from an island that imported most of its food—did not bring the requisite knowledge. Certainly Jamaica never produced the long list of familiar foods that boosters extolled (such as barley and wine grapes), and agriculturalists on the island had to become acquainted with unfamiliar plants.

Little wonder—with the steep learning curve and their dismay at being trapped on the island and forced to work its fields—that the soldiers shared with those in early Jamestown a demoralization that encouraged lethargy. Numerous observers remarked on the fact that the English did little to help themselves. Often these critiques were couched in terms of a failure of English manhood, since commentators found the expected vigor sorely lacking. Cromwell decided that God’s rebuke could be seen particularly in their sluggishness. Goodsonn, naval commander from June 1655 to January 1657, complained of the laziness of the army and held up the more vigorous seamen as an example to emulate. Even the naval force was not immune from accusations of lethargy, however. The Navy Commissioners suggested withholding a requested shipment of iron hoops, hoping to force the men to make their own. The Admiralty hesitated, noting that the deaths of skilled craftsmen might account for the failure to provide for naval needs locally. The causes of lack of energy

and initiative were probably the same as those that threatened the men's survival generally—hunger and illness, exacerbated by despair. The rout on Hispaniola and the sheer horror of the first months on Jamaica fostered a sense of hopelessness. As Sedgwick wrote to Cromwell, "The truth is, when I set my foot first on land, I saw nothing but symptoms of necessity and desolation." If Sedgwick struggled to avoid feeling overwhelmed, the men who had already endured such conditions for six months had all the more reason to lapse into despondency. Both typhus and malaria, the endemic illnesses most likely at work on Jamaica, cause feelings of fatigue; frequent references to this symptom suggest that one or both were in fact present. The first royal governor sent to Jamaica in the following decade experienced similar symptoms: "as soon as he left his genuine air, he found a flatness of his spirits, and an indisposition of his wonted action." Although Lord Windsor allegedly "most nobly withstood" the effects of his fatigue, other early arrivals, like those in Virginia, languished under the burden of physical ailments and hunger.⁵³ Despite these words of praise, Windsor decamped with unseemly haste.

That the men in Jamaica were part of a military force gave them some additional tools to address these challenges. With a regular command structure and the existence of a mechanism for replacing those in positions of authority when they became ill or died, the army could renew its leadership ranks despite the devastation. Before his irregular departure, Venables named his own replacement from among the colonels he left behind. Promoted to major general, the experienced officer Richard Fortescue led the army from Venables's exit in July until his own death in October. At that time the army's resilience came to the fore, as the surviving officers elevated senior colonel Edward Doyley. So selected, Doyley led the army and eventually the entire undertaking for years.⁵⁴ Similarly helpful was the practice of military discipline, which threatened punishment for those who failed to perform their duty. Before departing from Hispaniola, the men had been reminded of this prospect by watching what befell Adjutant General Jackson. Army commanders could threaten swift retribution, as they promised for any man who hesitated in the landing at Jamaica. When discipline functioned as it should, it discouraged infractions and therefore made little mark on the historical record.

The influence of military discipline can be seen most clearly in the policy of forcing men to remain on the island. Although desperate to

leave, officers and soldiers recognized the need to get permission to go. Otherwise they would be guilty of desertion and unable to return to England. Some evidence of men slipping off the island survives, but more worked through normal channels to get permission. They drafted petitions and begged their superior officers to let them follow the example of Robert Venables, who left his post (and who survived, apparently as a direct result). Goodson and Sedgwick joined together in January 1656 to instruct the officers to disabuse their men of the possibility of departing. They did not feel that the officers adhered faithfully to these instructions, but their policy of retaining men on the island continued until the army disbanded in 1662. Although the policy seems to have been the joint effort of the two men, the discontented soldiery associated it especially with Sedgwick. Unrest over the issue fermented during his eight months in Jamaica.⁵⁵

After the death of Sedgwick, the English government continued to back the policy, and relatively few men were able to return to England. Indeed, Cromwell wrote to the commanders on Jamaica instructing them to deal with the officers for their "unworthy carriages" in encouraging the soldiers' desire to flee. Those who managed to depart legally tended to be officers. They pressured their commander, who feared that their disaffection would negatively affect others. Except in the case of his peer, Colonel Humphrey, Doyley held out against the importuning, following Cromwell's order. After Brayne arrived in December 1656, he permitted the most malcontented senior men to go, judging their presence detrimental to the overall effort.⁵⁶ Some common soldiers sneaked off the island, risking being sold into servitude in Virginia by unscrupulous ships' captains who enticed them with promises of escape. Others were sent home too damaged to continue in the service: Doyley dismissed George Jones, who had been blinded, and Anthony Scales, who not only lost an eye but was "distempered in his brain." Only a small number of men appeared in person in England to seek payment of their arrears, including thirty-two officers, thirteen soldiers, and a drummer.⁵⁷ Most of the private soldiers, however, were kept in Jamaica, dying while still enlisted or surviving against the odds through the occupation period. Women who had come with the army faced no constraint on their departure, and a number booked passage to other West Indian islands to offer themselves as indentured servants, according to Robert Sedgwick. Sometimes the full force of discipline had to be brought to bear, as

when Brayne threatened Colonel William Moore with court-martial if he persisted in his demands to be released. Moore's use of the charged term "blood-guilt" incurred by those who sent or retained men on the Design echoed accusations against Charles I at the time of his trial.⁵⁸ Despite the desperation of many to leave, military discipline kept most of the men in the army on the island and working, however listlessly, toward the state's goals.

Other aspects of Jamaica's status as a military outpost hampered the goals pursued there. Being part of a military force caused the men to anticipate that they would be paid, fed, and assigned certain types of duties. Such expectations were often honored in the breach in England as well, but Jamaica witnessed an utter failure to fulfill them. The inability of the state to meet the needs of the men for food—and of the countryside to offer them sufficient opportunities to supplement official rations by foraging—meant that they often went hungry. Overcoming the dearth of rations, forage, and booty by investing in a long-term commitment to cultivate food crops violated men's understanding of what constituted proper military duty. Opposition to planting for the regiment's rations particularly aggrieved many soldiers, not just those who had signed on in the West Indies with the idea of escaping servile status and gaining access to land. Farming for their regiment or (what may have seemed worse) as servants to their regimental officers dashed their hopes and fomented further opposition to field labor as military duty.

The English government's ill-considered practices regarding the men's pay further exacerbated discontent. Paying the army, and more recently the navy, had proved one of the most pressing challenges confronting the Long Parliament and later the Protectorate. With taxation at an all-time high, the government still could not pay the forces it employed. Men sent on the Design were given a portion of their pay, with further payments promised according to a regular schedule. Many never collected another shilling. Not having sufficient funds to cover the arrears of those in Jamaica, the government took advantage of their absence to ignore its obligation. Being in the Caribbean, the soldiers could not bring significant pressure to bear on the government—as they sometimes did at home when unpaid. England's coffers lacked the funds needed to pay off the navy at the close of the war with the Dutch, and Cromwell hoped the Design would relieve his financial woes. Instead it increased the demands on the Treasury. Parliament reviewed

accounts in February 1659 showing that the almost 1,600 men still in arms in Jamaica were owed £53,990 6s. annually. For just the Western Design, overdue arrears may have amounted to more than £200,000 by that time.⁵⁹

Under the circumstances, the government simply declined to pay arrears of soldiers and sailors unless forced to do so. Widows or wives in England sometimes successfully sought funds owed their husbands, as did returnees seeking their own pay. When the *Marston Moor* carried Venables to England in 1655, the authorities tried to send the ship and its crew back again without paying the men or allowing them to set foot on shore. While the former strategy was a cost-cutting measure, the latter was intended to contain the spread of bad news as well as desertion. The uproar that ensued persuaded the ship's new commander, Christopher Myngs, to release most of the crew. He may have bribed the few who stayed as well as others who subsequently signed on. On the advice of a subcommittee appointed to deal with the petition of the wives and daughters of the officers and soldiers in Jamaica, the treasurer received orders to pay new recruits only one month of their first quarter's pay, holding the remainder until they were on board ship, fearful some might collect their advance and disappear. Myngs's later career seizing prizes in the Caribbean furthered the war effort, lined his own pockets, and repaid the loyalty of those who served under him. Finding out that returning to England—a prospect their leaders denied them—was the only way to get paid, added to the soldiers' resentment. After Brayne allowed some of the most discontented to leave, he indignantly reported that his aim of improving morale failed after returnees "blabbed" that in returning they received their arrears.⁶⁰

Men felt tempted to criticize the Lord Protector's policies under the circumstances, and a number of disciplinary actions had to be taken to stem the tide of complaints. Brayne stanchd the irascible Moore's claims of bloodguilt with a threat of court-martial, while Doyley ultimately decided that accusations against Lieutenant Colonel Archbould—who was alleged to have said that he would pay the men out of prize money if he had charge of the Design—were unfounded. Doyley agreed that the men ought to be paid. Writing frequently to beg for their arrears, in one 1657 letter he noted that paying them would be "an infinite advantage" for their morale. No one (other than the committee members in England who promoted the idea) was impressed with plans to pay

the officers with servants or the men with clothes and provisions.⁶¹ Sailors—who were more likely to get home and to benefit personally from any plunder their ships took—suffered less than the soldiers. Yet, as the *Marston Moor* case showed, seamen found their situation objectionable as well. Pay proved a challenge that neither the Protectoral government nor its immediate successors ever worked out.

Although no one wanted to be in Jamaica as either a soldier or a seaman in the first years of the English occupation, the latter faced somewhat easier circumstances in contrast to the men enlisted in the army. When William St. John, son of the Chief Justice, Oliver, came to Jamaica in 1655, his connections allowed him to choose between a posting in either army or navy; “seeing the state of y^e Army” he chose the sea. Life aboard ship exposed crews to fewer diseases, although seamen were not entirely immune.⁶² They also experienced hunger as a result of short rations. Letters to naval officials always discussed provisions: their lack, their inadequacy, their spoilage, and (not infrequently) the fact that bills of lading listed more than had been received. On one occasion, in September 1656, Goodsonn reported instances of scurvy among the men, some of whom had been subsisting on inadequate rations in the West Indies for eighteen months.⁶³ In addition, sailors confronted the routine dangers of shipboard life, with accidents causing most deaths on ships not engaged in armed conflicts. Many men died in an instant on board the *Discovery* and the *Paragon* when they exploded, whereas others suffered injury individually while performing their duties.

Records charting attrition in the navy to parallel the rosters compiled for the army regiments have not survived, but by January 1655/6, Goodsonn’s ships were sufficiently undermanned that the shortage hampered his efforts. He attributed this situation to a combination of deaths among his men and to the recent arrival of additional ships with too few sailors to carry on their work. Under normal circumstances, two dozen vessels would have received an occasional infusion of new men to replace those who were lost through injury or illness. In the West Indies, Goodsonn found few opportunities to press men off of other ships or out of port towns. The navy, like the army, needed its complement of men regularly renewed from England. Hence Goodsonn’s disappointment when Sedgwick arrived with ships that carried an overabundance of officers, their personal servants, and mere boys, but far too few able-bodied

seamen. Captain Mark Harrison complained to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and the navy that the ships were all inadequately manned by spring 1656, with crews that included 130 men in the Dutch War down to 80 on the Jamaica station. While such a steep decline was notable, it did not rival the death rates for landsmen over the same period. Not only did sailors have a better survival rate; they could also hope that their deployment might come to an end when their ships returned home. The few sick and wounded to receive care in England were overwhelmingly navy men.⁶⁴

In keeping with the condition of the army, complaints about the soldiers' suffering were exceedingly common. As Sedgwick and Goodson wrote to Cromwell in March 1655/6, "Upon this ship's going, and upon all or any the like occasions, they express fond desires to return to England, without regard [for] either the honour of our nation, publick interest, or the vast expence your highness hath made in the acquisition of this remote island." A petition submitted three months earlier survives. Signed by Samuel Barry and other senior officers, it laid out the plight of the army: "We are every day importuned both by our officers and soldiers of this army, representing their condition, and discouraged by their mortality, and continual sickness, that hath utterly disabled them from performing any service for the commonwealth, or to plant for their subsistence here." Admitting that they "commiserate their condition," the senior officers then suggested that Cromwell "use some speedy means for their removal hence, that so the handful of people yet remaining may be serviceable to his highness the Lord protector and the commonwealth of England."⁶⁵ The officers implied that unless they withdrew entirely, all would soon be dead. In January 1655/6 this argument was compelling. Although the senior officers attributed these sentiments to those below them, at least some of the regimental commanders shared these views. Such pestering recurred, especially in the first year of the occupation.

In the second year of the army's occupation, tensions rose so high that widespread mutiny was narrowly averted. Rumblings among the soldiers led to the executions of three in April, but the next month a more serious threat emerged around Major Thomas Throckmorton. A promising young man, Throckmorton served first under Buller and then under Barrington, rising from the rank of captain. Although his commander, Barrington, embraced the prospect of living in Jamaica and set

his men planting in the interior Guanaboa region where the regiment was stationed, Throckmorton did not relish it. Popular and persuasive, the major allegedly fomented mutiny among officers and soldiers alike, reaching many men beyond those in his own regiment. Although the evidence is somewhat sketchy, the authority of the military command in Jamaica was at issue, as were animosity toward Sedgwick's leadership. When Sedgwick arrived carrying Cromwell's commission, it signaled the Lord Protector's intention to hold Jamaica. Throckmorton apparently roused opposition to Sedgwick and to the idea of remaining. After Sedgwick died, Throckmorton challenged Doyley's authority and that of "the Court Marshall" (possibly responding to the executions in April of three soldiers). After Throckmorton was found guilty, various officers attempted to persuade him to back down, in order to "prevent his Blood." Refusing to relent and enjoying widespread support in the army, Throckmorton went stubbornly to his death in June 1656. The execution elicited discussion in England, sparking a duel and laments over the death of "the most unhappy, most ingenious and handsom man that ever was on Jamaica."⁶⁶ Throckmorton's execution, after thirteen months on the island, represented the nadir for both mortality and morale.

Although the change came slowly and incrementally, with many setbacks along the way, the situation in Jamaica did gradually improve. Death rates declined; a small but growing population of survivors worked to produce food; and men who had endured the seasoning period eased the trials of those who came later. As Burroughs declared in November 1658, the island at that time enjoyed great good health, so much so that it was "as strange now for a man to dye as formerly to live." He went on to report that of 557 men on five vessels, only 5 had died in the previous three months. This moment did not mark the end of illness and death by any means, as new arrivals—especially if they came in large groups that readily shared diseases and strained the island's limited ability to offer shelter and care—still succumbed in high numbers. Hunger, if not outright starvation, remained an intermittent problem. William Dalyson, who had charge of the storehouse in 1660, reported that there were no stores to care for (as well as no victuals to eat), and he hoped to be relieved of his duty as a result. Doyley identified a new cause of sickness that year: excessive alcohol consumption. Once traders set up shop to supply the men (often on credit), some succumbed from overindulgence where once they suffered only from dearth.⁶⁷ Yet with a core of well residents and a

more dependable supply of food, the situation for the sick became less bleak. Being able to offer food, shelter, and care, Jamaica had finally achieved a minimal standard to sustain life.

The first years on Jamaica offered unremitting woe. Most of those who survived Hispaniola died in the months after the landing, usually from causes having nothing to do with the guerrilla war against the island's inhabitants. The bountiful Jamaica so fulsomely imagined appeared a cruel joke to the men (and a few women) from the invasion force who struggled to stay alive. Effectively establishing an English presence posed the most basic challenge to the invaders. Peopling the island with seasoned Caribbean inhabitants provided no easy cure. Individuals eventually benefited from improving sanitation, shelter, and regular supplies of food, which reduced the incidence of death for new arrivals. As death rates leveled off, newcomers still faced a grueling period of seasoning.

Help from the state was always inadequate, hampered by distance and financial woes as well as distraction and eventual political crisis. Thomas Povey, an energetic advocate for Jamaica, fumed that it was "dishonourably neglected, and . . . left a Preye to the Revenge and Trymphe of a violent and bloodie Enemie." Little wonder that Doyley looked back on the challenges he had faced, summarizing the "Chaos confusion sicknesse & poverty."⁶⁸ For the men who came to Jamaica with the Western Design, their experiences in some respects followed a familiar pattern for early settlers: they were dependent on resupply from England far longer than expected (and that supply often proved inadequate), they confronted a disease environment that devastated their numbers, and they felt trapped and abandoned at a distant outpost with little chance for relief. Their experiences diverged from those of settlers elsewhere in that they were enlisted men. Obligated to follow orders and undergo punishment for disciplinary infractions, they were nonetheless without the nominal benefit of regular rations or pay. Like the participants in similar early efforts, they experienced despair and lethargy. After years of misery and loss, the survivors gradually gained a secure footing in Jamaica. By 1658 a corner had been turned, and the prospects for basic survival improved. It had taken far longer than anyone had expected.

Conquering

BEFORE THE ENGLISH INVADED the Spanish Caribbean, an unofficial truce reigned in the West Indies, but the Western Design renewed warfare in the short term and permanently shifted the region's geopolitics. While England primarily aimed to secure Jamaica, Cromwell's forces also carried the war beyond Jamaica to harass Spanish territories and seize shipping. The war for Jamaica splintered into two conflicts, one against a guerrilla force of African and Spanish men intent on regaining the island, and another against independent enclaves of "Spanish Negroes" seeking to live outside the bounds of English authority. The former conflict dragged on for five years and concluded only when the English coerced an African community to assist in the hunt for their foes. The latter conflict lingered, the English unable even with the aid of their new allies to subdue every autonomous enclave. After a decade, the Spanish departed, but the island remained divided between English colonists and the small community of quasi-autonomous Africans who lived in cooperation with them and one or two separate groups residing in the mountainous interior. This outcome contained a great irony: the English expectation that Africans and Indians would eagerly join them against their oppressive masters collided with the reality of their wish to be independent of all European overlords. Coercion proved necessary when the English anticipated grateful and helpless subalterns turning to them for succor. Both the fact that the Spanish West Indies largely repelled their onslaught and this realization upended English assumptions.

The Western Design prompted a war for Jamaica and a regional war, both of which have been misconstrued. In the standard account, the war


for Jamaica ended with the expulsion of the Spanish. In that telling, the campaign to root out remaining “Spanish Negroes” becomes part of the later story of maroons, unconnected to the English invasion or international rivalries. Equating these refugees with later runaway slaves who created similarly independent communities in the mountains domesticates African resistance. It renders all residents of autonomous villages as former slaves, and obscures their experience by designating what were collective acts of resistance as individual acts of self-liberation. The wider war in the region has been similarly misunderstood, attributed to pirates who purportedly flocked to Jamaica in search of official authorization for their ongoing depredations. In the standard narrative, these opportunistic raiders helped defend Jamaica initially but then could not be reined in by English authorities, encouraged by duplicitous local leaders who profited from their ill-gotten gains. In this narrative two elements are omitted: the English navy’s role in prosecuting the war and the counteroffensives of the Spanish, who sought to reclaim their island. Far from simply a local war fought by pirates deputized to pursue the aims of rogue governors who harassed a supine Spanish empire against the wishes of their superiors, the West Indian conflict reflected English policy goals, deployed its navy, sparked a substantial Spanish response, and permanently reconfigured the international situation.

Attacking two Caribbean islands incited wider war, both in the region and beyond. After news of the attacks on Hispaniola and Jamaica reached Europe, Madrid placed an embargo on English trade, to the detriment of those merchants involved in Spanish commerce. By the end of October 1655, Cromwell had declared war and issued a long statement justifying hostilities. He in fact argued that Spanish policy in the West Indies amounted to a perpetual state of warfare, so that the English invasion only reacted to ongoing aggression, rather than instigating conflict. The European war suppressed trade, and at the same time yielded few prizes to compensate for such losses. Although the English navy took one ship of the treasure fleet in 1656 off Cadiz, that did little to fill England’s coffers. France joined the war on the side of the English, and their combined force took the mainland European port of Dunkirk in 1658, which England received when France and Spain signed a treaty the following year. In the late 1650s, with Oliver Cromwell dead and England’s revolution sputtering toward collapse, Anglo-Spanish

hostilities in Europe ended unceremoniously and virtually without comment (and no formal treaty).¹

The war's Caribbean component raged longer, coming to an end only with the 1670 Treaty of Madrid. The challenge Cromwell mounted to the status quo in the Caribbean ended the stalemate that reigned in 1655—in which England held a few colonies on the eastern periphery that Spain considered unlawful but usually did not harass. The Western Design—which brought England to the center of the Caribbean Sea—forced a confrontation over their differences on access to West Indian space. In the Caribbean, the conflict included not only the invasion of Jamaica and two Spanish counterinvasions aiming to retake it, but also English naval assaults on Spanish towns and the seizure of prize ships on both sides. The Caribbean situation became more complex when another Anglo-Dutch War spilled over into the West Indies in 1664, drawing Dutch and French participants openly into the conflict.² From the English fleet's landing at Hispaniola in April 1655 until the treaty finally brought a cessation of hostilities in the early 1670s, the region remained in a state of war. England finally forced Spain to give up its claim to ownership of the entire West Indies, a direct result of the invasion authored by Oliver Cromwell.

The English navy stationed in Jamaica worked to “infest and annoy” the enemy. In keeping with Penn's instructions to Goodsonn, the navy cruised the region, harassing local Spanish vessels, sacking towns and watching for the fleet that transported treasure back to Cadiz. Above all, the navy (and Cromwell) hoped they would secure that elusive plum, the *flota de Indias*. The annual “fleet of the Indies,” more popularly known among the English as the treasure or plate fleet, carried the accumulated silver extracted from mines in Mexico and Peru. Traveling in a convoy to repel marauders, the fleet gathered at Havana, which was both fortified and well provisioned for the purpose. Dreams of Spanish riches flowing into Cromwellian coffers had revolved around the seizure of the fleet, a feat performed only once (by Dutch admiral Pieter Heyn) in its long history of traversing the Atlantic. When an undated planning document probably from the 1650s proposed various “Considerations for the better carrying on of y^c Designe in y^c West and the ord'ing our Fleete for interrupting y^c Spanish fleet,” it revealed the centrality of the hope that the navy would capture the *flota*. Certainly such a success would



The English navy used Jamaica as a base from 1655, carrying out a sea war against the Spanish for the next decade and more.

resolve the government's financial difficulties, not to mention fully justifying the Design. Although much effort was expended in the search, and the fleet was sighted on one occasion by a pair of ships that could do frustratingly little against such a massive force, the dream of its capture remained unfulfilled. All William Dalyson could report was that they managed to kill a few men and blow the legs off of one galleon captain, precious little to show for a ten-week patrol.³

In the meantime, regular cruising brought prizes—Spanish vessels seized as acts of war. No accurate accounting of the ships taken on either side survives, but scattered references appear in the records. English seizures invariably involved vessels deemed small, indicating local crafts that linked Spanish ports throughout the Caribbean Sea.⁴ Penn facilitated the force's commitment to this work by assuring that crews would reap the same benefits from seized prizes as had been enjoyed in the Anglo-Dutch War. The inventory of the goods in one small prize, the *Star*, made it into John Thurloe's files in June 1656. Goodsonn wrote of a captured barque in August.⁵ Goodsonn took two more near Cartagena, one of them full of wine. Peter Pugh, the newly appointed auditor, recorded the attestation of the seizure of two vessels—possibly this pair—in January 1657. In December 1658, Dalyson wrote to Blackborne that a small prize with cocoa had been taken on the main, and he hoped for a share of the cargo. Christopher Myngs's expedition in 1659 took three prizes, among other booty. During the same year, Doyley asked how to deal with Dutch traders carrying supplies to Spanish colonies. While attacks on ships of the United Provinces violated England's confederation with that government, if they aided the Spanish they nevertheless courted seizure. In 1660, Steward General Cornelius Burroughs mentioned a prize, renamed the *Hound*, put into service of the state. In the absence of the local Admiralty records prior to the early 1660s, such scattered references reveal the persistence of this activity. Captain Archibald Henderson, certain that profits from many prizes were being diverted from the king's coffers, petitioned for permission to set up a twenty-four-person commission to oversee the prizes.⁶

The navy's most notable accomplishments, the occasional attacks on coastal settlements, followed seaborne raiding practices with a long history in both Europe and the Americas. Censorious remarks from Sedgwick that such activities were beneath the dignity of Cromwell's

godly project have been read as a condemnation of a certain style of warfare endemic to the West Indies. In fact the strategy was used everywhere, not just in the Caribbean, and Sedgwick's comments might also be read as criticizing the limited objectives to which the Design's grand scheme had been reduced. He concluded, "Neither was it I thinke the worke designed, though perhaps it may be tolerated at present." Goodsonn led a raid on Santa Marta, near Cartagena, during the first autumn. Finding little of value, he unsuccessfully attempted to extract a ransom. Torching the town after two weeks, the English carried off a large number of ordnance, some of which would later be mounted at Fort Cromwell. Goodsonn reported that two men ran away to the enemy. Neither was English (he was quick to point out), and both probably hoped for better food than the squadron enjoyed at the time.⁷ In May and June 1656, Goodsonn, after cruising outside the harbor at Cartagena with ten ships, launched an assault on Rio de la Hacha (or "Riall de Hash," as one ship's captain styled it), which was the site of one of Drake's raids. They took the fort in half an hour against its twelve defenders, but the seizure yielded even less booty than the Santa Marta effort, and once again the settlers chose the destruction of their town over the payment of a ransom.⁸ Goodsonn, after an unsuccessful blockade of Havana in August aimed at catching the treasure fleet, left the West Indies in January 1656/7 without organizing any further actions. Upon his departure, Lewis Morris made another bid to use the Design to resolve his financial insolvency, asking William Brayne to give him charge of the naval forces in Goodsonn's stead. Brayne demurred.⁹

Christopher Myngs subsequently became the senior naval captain and led further raids. In 1658, Doyley sent him to attack the mainland. His forces assailed settlements on the north coast of South America, Tolú and Santa Marta (which John Aylett, captain of the *Coventry*, called Traloo and St. Marks). In 1659, Myngs orchestrated another attempt, this time with results both spectacular and controversial. In January, again under orders from Doyley, he took three ships and struck a number of settlements. Working further east than Goodsonn had previously done, Myngs succeeded in surprising the inhabitants. In Coro (in modern-day Venezuela) he found numerous chests of bullion. These riches (the presence of which in Coro is somewhat inexplicable) never made it back to Jamaica, however—or at least did so in the pockets of others and not in chests sealed for the state's inspection. Suspecting

embezzlement, and fearful that he would be blamed, Doyley sent Myngs home to stand trial. Still, Cornelius Burroughs lauded the campaign as profitable and victorious in his pamphlet *Rich Newes*.¹⁰ Controversies that such actions sparked revolved around the fate of prize money. No one doubted the propriety of harassing the Spanish. That Myngs's career straddled the Restoration—treated in English historiography as a radical break with the past—showed how ultimately inconsequential that regime change proved for the Anglo-Spanish struggle over the West Indies.

The wider war between England and Spain having ebbed without official denouement in the late 1650s, the conflict in the Caribbean persisted for a decade after the 1660 restoration of the Stuart monarchy. Spain did not accept the English conquest of Jamaica, or indeed any English presence in the region, until after the 1670 Treaty of Madrid. Despite extensive negotiations through the 1660s aimed at resolving these differences, the two took the entire decade to officially conclude hostilities. When Charles II dispatched Thomas, Lord Windsor to govern the island, the Spanish seized a ship traveling in consort with his, imprisoning the captain and other leading men. Later Windsor's deputy governor, Sir Charles Lyttelton, had additional causes to complain of the "insolencies of the Spaniards," which he believed necessitated continued belligerence. Under orders from successive Jamaican governors, Christopher Myngs, by this time the beneficiary of extensive West Indian experience, led assaults on Cuba (twice) and Campeche in 1662 and 1663. Charles II admired the "vigour and resolution" of Myngs's 1662 foray, but also worried that such undertakings might undermine the island by drawing off residents who otherwise would defend it or plant. Further marauding increased the "jealousy and offence [with which] the Spaniards look upon our Island of Jamaica."¹¹ During the latter Cuban action, Myngs lost some men who, although they surrendered to quarter (which should have spared their lives), were slaughtered on the spot. In October 1663, Lyttelton reported intercepting Spanish letters that suggested they planned to retake Jamaica. Little wonder that they wanted to do so, since he acquired these missives off prizes seized by an English ship's captain. Sir Thomas Modyford, who took over the governorship in June 1664, similarly had intelligence of a planned assault. The oft-targeted Santa Marta received another visit in 1664, and Richard Fanshaw, laboring over treaty negotiations in Madrid, praised the assault for encouraging Spanish compliance. Among the points under discussion

was the fate of prisoners held in Spain captured in the West Indies on one of Myngs's raids. Island resident Thomas Lynch thought the opposite: that the continued depredations pushed the Spanish to oppose peace.¹²

The expense of prosecuting a drawn-out naval war against the Spanish in the West Indies proved prohibitive, and Jamaica leaders deployed more private ships over time. Schemes to privatize or partially privatize the naval war had been contemplated since it became clear that Jamaica would drain the Treasury rather than fill it. Although Charles II carried on the naval policy inherited from his revolutionary foes, he limited ships sent to the Caribbean to two or three. Keeping vessels afloat in that environment was especially costly, a lesson the navy quickly learned after its arrival in 1655. In addition, the station was distant from naval shipyards that could repair and resupply vessels.¹³ Considering these concerns, Charles prosecuted the war with few naval ships, a strategy that effectively passed on costs to private contractors. James, Duke of York, innovated by leasing state ships to merchants who were required to carry people and supplies for the new colony, along with their own goods.¹⁴ Until 1660 the navy provided the preponderance of vessels that participated in these campaigns against Spanish settlements, but afterward the balance shifted toward private ships (known as private men-of-war, or eventually as "privateers"), commissioned out of Jamaica but financed privately. Myngs, as a naval captain, oversaw the actions in Cuba in 1662 and 1663, with a force that combined private and naval vessels. The following year the Santa Marta raid used only private men-of-war. Official support for continuing this policy into the Restoration was firm. The first royal governor dispatched to Jamaica brought along his own private vessel, fitted out to join in the depredations against the Spanish. When Windsor returned to England, he left his ship and its captain behind to carry on the work (and to send him a share of the profits), which Captain Swart did until the ship became too damaged to sail home.¹⁵

As Doyley learned, private ships proved difficult to control, especially far from home and in the midst of an increasingly multinational and contentious sea. Private ships fitted out for warfare or contraband trade sought commissions, not only from Jamaica but from other authorities as well. It behooved the English officials both before and after the Restoration to grant those commissions, which brought assurances that

the vessels would not attack English shipping (captains posted bonds guaranteeing that they would comply with the terms of their commissions) and that Jamaica would receive a share of any booty. In 1663 at least eighteen vessels—both boats and small ships—were operating in the area, calling Jamaica their home port in the vast majority of cases. With their commissions, they went out on specific assignments (for instance, as part of one of Myngs's campaigns) or simply cruised for enemy ships. Commission in hand, they might be away from port for an extended period. Governors who commissioned them rarely minutely guided their activities. As many explained, private ships were both essential to prosecuting the war and protecting the island and difficult to direct precisely.¹⁶

The Restoration government similarly found privateering useful and hard to control. Authorities complained that the men who pursued this trade were "libertine and dissolute." Whatever their character, Deputy Governor Lyttelton believed "few of w^{ch} will take order but from stronger men of war, and as it hath bine almost allwayes theyr trade & livelihood and they being of Severall Nations if you forbid them yo^r porte they will goe to others and find themselves welcome enough." As if to illustrate the point, one captain indirectly approached Governor Thomas Modyford seeking a promise that if he presented himself and his commission he could keep his latest prize.¹⁷ Such was the state of affairs confronting Modyford that he quickly decided that eliminating private ships was not only unattainable but also ill-advised. With the outbreak in 1664 of the Anglo-Dutch War, their usefulness increased.¹⁸ James, Duke of York, hoping to establish a trade in slaves with the Spanish in the West Indies, prompted war with the Dutch by taking trading outposts in Africa. When the Second Anglo-Dutch War spilled over into the Caribbean, it halted tentative efforts to pursue peace with Spain in order to develop that trade. In the Duke's scheme, Jamaica would become a transshipment hub for captive Africans on their way to Spanish America. Modyford's orders to end the war and promote the trade were rendered moot by the Duke's own efforts to capture that trade from the Dutch.¹⁹ More complex hostilities, involving French and Dutch as well as Spanish, gave an added boost to privateers.

If the English strategy favored limited harassment of the Spanish rather than any real effort to extend the conquest beyond Jamaica, the one

exception—the only other sustained effort to claim further territory—involved the small island of Tortuga, off the coast of Hispaniola.²⁰ Shortly after his arrival in December 1656, William Brayne, acting in the capacity of governor general over all the English forces in the region, dispatched Elias Watts to govern the small uninhabited island. Tortuga, technically a Spanish territory, had been intermittently occupied by non-Spanish interlopers over the previous three decades. Spanish forces repeatedly drove them away, most recently in 1654. After that sweep, Hispaniola's governor deployed a small contingent of soldiers on the island to repulse any attempt to retake it. With the arrival of the English fleet, however, he recalled the soldiers to aid in the defense of Santo Domingo. Aware that the island would be snatched up again by a rival if the English failed to act, Brayne moved to establish an English governor there. Watts would hold the island in England's name over a small and eclectic population until superseded by another governor sent by Doyley in 1660. This bid for Tortuga demanded little in the way of resources, requiring only a small party to occupy the island and the occasional visit of one of the state's ships. As an effort to extend English rule, it represented an easy opportunity. The governor of Tortuga sat by virtue of English authority until the early Restoration, at which time Watts's successor (the Frenchman Jeremy de Champs or Champney) declared for the French. When Doyley learned that de Champs carried both English and French commissions and had chosen to renounce the former, he sent Colonel Cham Arundell to reclaim Tortuga. The son-in-law of Watts, Arundell failed. He died after being captured by the Spanish and imprisoned in Cuba. In the near term, however, Brayne's installation of a governor in Tortuga and Doyley's ongoing attention to it represented a modest and singular extension of the Design's aim to take additional Spanish territory.²¹

Later royal governors also attempted ineffectually to regain Tortuga. English authorities concurred with Doyley (and William Brayne before him) that it represented a desirable possession and that removing it from French hands would insulate Jamaica from possible attack. With such concerns in mind, Charles ordered Governor Windsor to retake it. Windsor passed on the task to his deputy governor, Lyttelton, who dispatched a ship in December 1662. An uncooperative ship's captain doomed the attempt, the only result being that Abraham Langford took charge of the adjacent island of Petit Goave for a short time. Instructions

to the next royal governor, Sir Thomas Modyford, in 1664 similarly required him to reclaim Tortuga. The English launched no further expeditions, despite the fact that Langford continued to advocate for another attempt. Tortuga became not only a French possession but their point of entry into western Hispaniola, which they finally wrested away from the Spanish at the end of the century.²²

While pursuing this belligerent policy, the invasion leaders—acutely conscious of Jamaica's location amid major Spanish islands (and far from the eastern Caribbean, with its minor outposts held by the English and other Europeans)—labored to enhance fortifications. As soon as he learned that Jamaica had been taken, Cromwell instructed the Commissioners to build forts. Soldiers should perform the work, as part of their duty "to secure the common quarters." At the same time, he also recommended that the army maintain a troop of horse, to serve as a further deterrent to invasion. English records mention four fortifications undertaken during the first five years: Passage Fort, at the landing place of the English forces, in what is now Kingston Harbor (then Cagway), where the Spanish had a minor breastwork; Cagway Fort, also known as Fort Cromwell, built on the point at Cagway Harbor, later the site of Port Royal; Fort Henry in the main town, St. Jago (today Spanish Town), described as "buylt of stockadoes, and circumference with a dry trench"; and a fort at Point Morant. Men began work on Passage Fort "at the seaside" almost immediately. In July 1656, it boasted four bronze, thirty-six-pounder cannons and two iron eighteen-pounders, according to Spanish spies.²³ By July 1657, the encampment—the nucleus of the future Port Royal—around Cagway Fort had grown so much that William Brayne moved the stores and supplies there, where they could be secured in the fort (and would be accessible from the sea). A fort for the harbor at Port Morant, on the eastern end of the island, became essential when William Brayne decided to settle families from Nevis there; a garrison guarded the colonists and fortified the landing place to protect them from attack.²⁴

Improving island defenses remained a need for decades and indeed beyond. Fortifications were expensive. Brayne wished that he had the power to collect what Barbados planters owed to the state, since those funds would help to fortify Jamaica. Eventually Cromwell sent £2,572 17s. 11d. to finance these essential projects. By that time, Brayne was dead, but others oversaw the work. Doyley, writing in 1659, stated that

the inability to make bricks hampered construction. He suggested the Admiralty send them as ships' ballast.²⁵ At the time of the Restoration, as Fort Cromwell became Fort Charles, England's new leaders affirmed the need. Properly fortifying proved a long-term project, with authorities in England ordering attention to the undertaking and local leaders allocating resources to the project, including prize money.²⁶ Fortifications protected the island from the expected Spanish invasion, while sheltering ships in the harbors as well.

Even as the English prepared for an expected Spanish counterattack, they looked toward the island's interior to prosecute war against the remaining refugees turned guerrilla fighters. In the first weeks, once the English realized that, as a result of "the treachery of the revolted Spaniards," they would be prosecuting a war against the inhabitants, they roused themselves for a first inconsequential foray. The war then settled into a stalemate in which the English slowly fortified the island, ineffectually searched for the escaped residents, and doggedly held scattered outposts against raids and ambushes. They hoped to find the refugees or at least to cut off their access to food and shelter, with the ultimate aim of forcing their removal. A game of cat and mouse developed, with the English trying to surprise Spanish refugees at small, makeshift settlements, and the Spanish attempting to ambush the English soldiers. Eventually the former inhabitants abandoned most homes—some of which garrisons reoccupied—and the displaced residents fled to the mountainous interior and other less-accessible areas. By mid-1656, the resistance lacked adequate clothing and shoes, and Doyley, if he had the needed items, recorded that he ordered those who were captured to be supplied out of English stores.²⁷ While the English contended with great distance, slow response time, and the state's increasing indebtedness in obtaining provisions and supplies, the Spanish struggled with problems of their own. Neither side possessed sufficient food or materials to support their campaigns as they wished.²⁸

Scattering the regiments aimed to subdue the Jamaican population. When the English invaded, many residents fled initially to dwellings in the countryside, where they could stay in relative comfort with access to food and water. By occupying Guanaboa Vale, Liguanea Plain, and other locations (and by patrolling other sites), the English expelled the former inhabitants. Driven from their homes and cut off from trade, the Spanish depended on hunting, gathering, planting, and the occasional

relief shipment from neighboring colonies. The English efforts to make their lives miserable aimed to drive residents off the island. A few surrendered, among them a group that came in once rains began.²⁹ Women, children, the elderly, and some able-bodied men fled to Cuba. Many of them settled around Santiago de Cuba, near the southern coast and therefore proximate to Jamaica.³⁰ The ninety-mile trip could be treacherous on the small vessels used to evacuate the settlers. Boats had to slip in to embark evacuees who of necessity waited in locations exposed to English naval patrols. Captain Don Francisco de Leiva Ysassi built a boat at his own expense in order to transport his wife and others off the island. At least for a time thereafter his small vessel plied back and forth in support of those who remained on Jamaica. The Cuban governor also provided transportation, but his practice of charging the refugees for the cost of evacuating them (as well as for food) elicited indignation. Boats captured by the English were crowded with people and their scanty possessions. When the English intercepted these craft, they permitted the settlers to continue on their journey. They did, however, seize their goods (as Castilla complained); and they did occasionally take men for questioning. Whether they kept any Africans traveling on these boats, effectively treating them as “goods” with which the fleeing residents were attempting to abscond, the surviving documents do not clarify. Nor are they precise about the extent or timing of the evacuation, although Captain Sybada heard that eighty families had left by February 1655/6.³¹ Out-migration markedly reduced the population of former residents. Departing people, although predominantly Spanish, included some of African descent. Comparatively more of the latter, of both sexes and all ages, remained on the island. The ethnically Spanish men who remained were generally those who intended to fight.

The resistance utilized the tactics of guerrilla warfare. One perceptive observer anticipated the nature of the conflict that the English army faced. The displaced inhabitants first took the offensive by killing English stragglers. To prevent the deaths of hungry rambblers, the army council ordered hunting limited to organized parties. Although these remained subject to attack, the casualty rate among ambushed hunters declined. Orders issued to hunting parties often combined taking livestock with ferreting out the enemy. Some English troops tried to join the Spanish, in order to escape the deadly conditions in their own camps or

to pursue an ideological commitment to the other side. One of these turncoats was Venables's young guide, who allegedly provided much information to the enemy. While he persuaded the Spanish of his sincerity, they doubted that of others and killed as spies some who attempted to enter their ranks.³²

Both sides conducted raids. The English endeavored to determine where the Spanish hid. Locating encampments offered benefits even if the displaced settlers ran away, for the troops destroyed shelters and crops, rendering the location less useful in the future. The resistance more easily found English targets, since the army was not hiding but openly occupying the town and a number of posts around the island. The Spanish aimed to surprise the enemy so that they could score a victory despite their inferior numbers. Cristóbal Ysassi wrote two accounts detailing one daring raid, which took place in spring 1656. A combined force of Spanish and Africans killed forty-five or forty-six soldiers, burned a number of buildings, including two houses in Santiago de la Vega (where according to their reports Colonel Doyley lived with 500 men), and ambushed a company transporting rations. The English attributed this campaign to the Africans rather than the Spanish, although Ysassi describes a combined force.³³ Taking a cart of rations benefited the resistance as much as it dealt a blow to the English, since both suffered from food shortages. Ysassi happily reported that the raid temporarily forced the English to curtail some essential activities, such as hunting. A subsequent attempt ended less well for the resistance, as in the course of the altercation the English located one encampment (made up mostly or entirely of Africans) where they killed seven or eight and captured one, a woman. Reporting this encounter provided Sedgwick with his first opportunity to relay news of success.³⁴

For the first year or more, the English stubbornly clung to the hope that the "Spanish Negroes" would side with them. Assuming that any African or Indian residents would abandon their cruel masters to support English liberators, the invaders closely watched for indications that they were ready to do so. Signs that the geography of the island had become more complex were already evident in 1656, when the English discovered that some Africans lived apart from the men commanded by Ysassi. That February, the English captain Kempo Sybada encountered a mounted African man who informed him that he and others lived on their own. While those Africans—aiming as they did at an autonomous existence

away from all Europeans—disclaimed any intention to pursue the war, they were prepared to defend themselves against anyone who challenged them, as Sybada's mounted interlocutor explained. Their reasons for adopting an independent existence, although never clearly laid out in the archive, arose out of a consideration of their options. They could fight with the Spanish or they could flee the island for Cuba with other refugees. In the first case, they risked death or capture, and in the second they faced the prospect of returning to their former status (whether enslaved or free) within Spanish society, assuming the English did not take them as they passed to Cuba. All options held out a real possibility of entering or returning to life as a slave, which recommended making an attempt at an independent existence on Jamaica.³⁵ When they broke off, not only did the geography of conquest and ouster become more complex, but this news gave the English clear evidence challenging their long-cherished belief that people of African descent longed to live under their benign rule.

The English were nonetheless relatively slow to grasp this situation. Complicating their interpretation was the fact that not all Africans followed this trajectory. Some fought with the guerrillas, later to leave the island as part of the exodus to Cuba. Ysassi continued to claim that he commanded the allegiance of all the refugees on the island, but he clearly overstated the extent of his influence.³⁶ Only in 1657 did the English leadership finally accept that the Africans had no intention of joining them, but were in fact "enemies to them as well as to us." By March 1657, Francis Barrington abandoned his hopes for an alliance, writing to his well-placed nephew, Sir John Barrington, asking for bloodhounds to track down the Africans so that they could "clear the black rogues from this place."³⁷ Hence, almost two years after the English arrived, the Africans had scattered over one sector of the island. As the English sought out the remaining former inhabitants, they did so aware that the latter lived divided into distinctive groups.

While the English ineffectually attempted to rid Jamaica of the resistance movement, they watched for attempts to regain the island. Immediately, Spanish authorities discussed a counterinvasion that would wipe out the intruders. In September 1655, Cromwell's secretary, John Thurloe, acquired a Spanish letter referencing plans to retake Jamaica and to deploy a force that would "Scower the Indias" to remove the English threat altogether. Rumors of a fleet on the way to the island circulated

intermittently.³⁸ The Habsburgs never dispatched a force directly from Spain, stymied by financial woes that worsened with the advent of a wider war with England—itsself an outcome of the invasion—and with the resulting delays to the plate fleet that normally carried regular infusions of treasure into the monarch's coffers. The crown instead delegated that work to local governors, who received repeated orders to drive the English out of Jamaica.³⁹ While in theory the Spanish enjoyed an advantage over the English, given the contested island's proximity to numerous Spanish settlements that could aid the Jamaican inhabitants in their effort to retake the island, local officials were nevertheless slow to respond. Along with other obstacles, patrolling English naval ships, for which they had no counterpart, hampered their ability to ferry men and supplies to Jamaica.

On two occasions, local Spanish authorities roused themselves to attempt Jamaica. The first reinforcements came only in summer 1657. Numbering about 400, these troops landed on the north side of the island, far from English-held areas, in the region dominated by the Spanish resistance. This remote location permitted the reinforcements easy access to the guerrillas but necessitated a long march through the heavily wooded and rugged interior. Predictably, marching without horses or sufficient food over difficult terrain, the men eventually turned back. Regaining the northern shore, they built a small palisade to protect their supplies, receiving further shipments on two occasions. Some months passed before the English learned of their presence, having grown suspicious because of a sharp increase in raiding. Doyley sent a troop of horse inland to investigate. It fell into an ambush in which men under Don Cristóbal Arnaldo Ysassi killed two officers (one of them Captain James Butler, brother of departed Commissioner Gregory) and twelve men; another ten were wounded. Still, the English, far from being routed, killed about forty of the enemy.⁴⁰ Shortly thereafter, an English ship cruising north of the island captured a vessel that had come to supply the forces encamped at Las Chorreras. Among the men on board who were questioned, a Portuguese man conveyed information about the reinforcements and their activities to date.

Responding to this intelligence, Doyley prepared an expedition. Officers, telling Doyley they longed to participate in an action, volunteered. Ordering the *Indian* to transport the troops, Doyley joined with

other officers and a contingent of “Stout, Well and Willing” men who sailed around the island to attack the Spanish camp. The Spanish noted their landing, and Captain Juan de los Reyes, commander of the reinforcements, sent men to ambush the English as they marched. The ambush did not succeed, and the surviving men fled back to their stockade. Fast on their heels, the English fought their way into the newly erected structure, routing the Spanish defenders after a sharp engagement. Doyley reported English casualties: just four killed and ten wounded. The Spanish losses were far greater, with 120 killed. Many were taken prisoner either in the stockade or after they had been tracked down in the surrounding area. Doyley sent one, the maestro de campo, Don Francisco de Proenza, to England, asking that he not be released until the English secured a better hold on Jamaica. The victors also seized some small watercraft as well as ammunition, provisions, and other supplies. Doyley wrote to Cromwell relating an account of the victory. His *Narrative* was published in London to encourage public support of the Design.⁴¹

The following year the Spanish tried again. On this occasion, the English were better prepared, having timely news of an impending invasion. Rather than months transpiring from the landing to its discovery, the English detected Spanish ships plying the north coast within less than two weeks of the start of the counteroffensive. The ships apparently entered into a minor naval engagement before English vessels carried news to Doyley. He collected a force of 750, which sailed on 11 June and landed near Rio Nuevo (east of the previous engagement at Los Choreras) on 22 June. On that day his men chased some of the Spanish into their partially constructed fortification, slaying one captain and twenty-three men. After one day's pause, in which the commanders exchanged messages stating their own government's right to Jamaica and the intention of each to fight in support of it, the English attacked again. Victorious with relatively few losses, Doyley claimed to have killed 3,000 of the enemy, including many captains, their sergeant major, and two priests. In addition, the English captured a hundred soldiers as well as six officers. Spanish casualties contrasted sharply with English losses, which Doyley reported as five officers, twenty-three soldiers, and a few additional wounded, who subsequently died. Once again, they seized a cache of ammunition as well as other supplies. Doyley was gratified to

report that they took “the King of Spain’s Standard, and ten Colours,” all of which he sent home along with the officers who had been made prisoner.⁴²

Although Doyley privately belittled the Spanish effort in a letter to Thomas Povey—noting that they bragged of deploying armies of 30,000 but sent far fewer and inferior Indian recruits from the mainland to boot—the victory was considered a great triumph. News spread rapidly after Colonel Samuel Barry arrived in England carrying Doyley’s account and the Spanish company flags. Cromwell had just died, and Barry presented his report to the council of Cromwell’s son Richard, the new Lord Protector.⁴³ An account was again published, this time in both London and Edinburgh. The Spanish widely discussed and bemoaned these failed attempts.⁴⁴

Doyley wondered what to do with the prisoners taken, other than the officers, who were shipped to England. The Spanish refused to swap them. Doyley believed that they sent prisoners of war to labor in their mines. Much evidence reveals captured men working on fortifications in Cuba and elsewhere. He wondered if he might sell them as laborers to other English islands, an adaptation of the use of British and Irish prisoners of war as indentured servants throughout the English Caribbean. No records indicate whether he eventually sold them away or employed them locally. A possible exception is the hint that he may have consigned Indian men from the mainland captured as soldiers to labor for landowners on Jamaica.⁴⁵

In 1658, despite the army’s success in repulsing the second and far more ambitious counterinvasion, the guerrilla war did not end. Their numbers depleted, the few remaining Spanish fighters held on, hoping for further assistance. By this time, the English force on the island was sufficiently recovered from its long bout of ill health that the guerrilla fighters could harass them only by picking off stragglers. The latter’s hopes that hunger, disease, and despair would end the occupation faded. Without a sizable Spanish invasion force, the resistance had no realistic chance of eliminating the English. They remained determined, however, to maintain a presence on the island, knowing that even a toe-hold underscored their claim and encouraged the authorities to mount a third attempt. The English army remained dispersed in various locations in the south and east; two or more African villages still flourished in the mountainous interior; and a modest mixed group led by Spanish

governor Ysassi camped in the north or northwest. The navy continued to patrol the north coast and to seek intelligence. Occasional attacks occurred opportunistically as well.⁴⁶ This situation became the status quo for eighteen months from June 1658.

The situation shifted when, as part of a winter 1659–60 patrol, Lieutenant Colonel Edward Tyson located one of the African villages, that led by Juan de Bola. Part of Barrington's regiment, the soldiers had been stationed in Guanaboa, in the central section of Jamaica, near the mountains frequented by both Spaniards and Spanish-speaking Africans. Doyley ordered a campaign to seek out the African encampments in response to recent acts of aggression. Rather than continuing the policy of nonengagement articulated by the previously mentioned mounted African man in 1656, some (whom Doyley believed came from these independent villages) captured English officers and killed others. Doyley believed that the lack of English activity (a decline attributable to a dearth of shoes that rendered patrolling difficult) had emboldened them. He therefore instituted an unpopular tax on liquor sales, in order to fund a counteroffensive.⁴⁷

Commanded to take out a company to "infest" the enemy in late December 1659, Tyson traveled up the gorge of the Mountain River, a prolonged march that ultimately brought results.⁴⁸ Locating a heretofore unknown valley (Lluidas Vale), Tyson and his men discovered a village complete with a massive garden of some 200 acres. These food crops were of signal importance, probably making this the best-fed community (Spanish, English, or African) on the island. Able to threaten the destruction of this food source, the English gained an advantage. De Bola's community entered into negotiations. Along with the men who journeyed down the mountain to enter into negotiations, the English took women and children to serve as hostages. De Bola's village exacted promises that they would remain free and in possession of their land under their own leaders. In exchange they would help ferret out pockets of resistance—both Spanish and African. As negotiations progressed, tensions rose so high that a jittery sentry shot and killed Barrington as he returned one night to his garrison. Having survived the whole course of the Design, he died at the hands of his own soldier at this moment of impending victory.⁴⁹ As soon as the Spanish learned that this village had been discovered and its inhabitants persuaded to support the English, they realized that their own resistance had been rendered untenable.

The ground shifted once the English gained their long-sought African allies, and Ysassi's men decided to end their resistance.

This denouement proved ironic, given English expectations that Africans would voluntarily support their efforts. Thinking ahead to the Design, the English had envisioned Africans and Indians flocking to them as soon as they appeared, motivated out of love of the English and eager to escape the cruelty of their Spanish overlords. On Jamaica, when the English first realized that the Africans were abandoning the Spanish, they greeted the news with joy. Letter writers anticipated that these men would shortly present themselves in English quarters to join their cause.⁵⁰ When they did not, the English conveyed amazement and vexation. Goodson and Sedgwick reported with mortification that "those few Blacks that we had amongst us, that did formerly belong to the Spaniards, are run from us, even all but seven or eight, that are now kept with shackles to prevent them." William Goodson in 1656 still held out hope for the voluntary submission of some, for he asked for guidance on how to deal with "Negros and Mulattos, being slaves and coming in freely to us of their own accord," as opposed to those who were taken while leaving the island or captured in active opposition.⁵¹ The Africans' potential status as property had not been directly addressed when the English planned the Design. Although it seems preposterous that they envisioned slaves meekly submitting to English masters after having escaped Spanish owners, this fantasy shaped their thinking. The irony—at least from the English perspective—was that they finally got African help only with coercion.

After nearly five years of stasis, the extirpation of the Spanish tumbled toward a rapid conclusion. De Bola and Tyson, leading a combined force, attacked a Spanish settlement. Ysassi, aware that de Bola had switched sides, called a council of war. Knowing that "the negroes are so experienced and acquainted with the mountains that . . . we are all exposed to the known risk of being murdered, without escape," the Spanish immediately concluded that continued resistance was impossible. While the English on their own had long been unable to inflict sufficient damage, de Bola would easily locate the Spaniards and cut off their food supplies. Shortly thereafter troops led by de Bola and Tyson found and assaulted Ysassi's camp, killing sixty and taking a few prisoners. Tyson then offered terms to the Spanish, who continued in hiding. Negotiations, although begun, floundered over terms.⁵²

One obstacle involved the island's remaining "Spanish Negroes." Ysassi commanded relatively few of them, despite claims to exercise authority over every individual still in Jamaica who had resided there before the invasion. Doyley was aware of this situation as early as 1658 when he penned his *Narrative* recounting the first victory. As he explained, "The Negroes, formerly their Slaves, using them roughly and denying them Provisions, so that I saw a Letter from Don Francis de Liva, the Deputy-Governour, to one of his former Slaves, wofully bemoaning the conditions of his Majesties Infantry, and giving him the Title of Worship at every word: to such a necessity are they reduced." When an English emissary sent to one of the other African villages was put to death, the English nonetheless held Ysassi responsible. Despite shared European expectations that Africans were naturally subordinate, Ysassi had to admit that he did not rule them. Later English commentators found the independence of these African enclaves similarly inexplicable, and they occasionally wrote this history as if "Spanish Negroes" remained only because they were under orders from Ysassi to continue harassing the enemy.⁵³

Another impasse occurred over whether non-Spaniards were allowed to leave the island. Ysassi wanted the "Indians, Negroes, and Mulattoes" who made up the majority of his diminished force treated as fellow soldiers, free to depart with the other resistance fighters, whereas Doyley's offer extended only to those who were ethnically Spanish. Whether he considered them to be property with which the Spanish were attempting to abscond (and Ysassi himself later designated some as slaves or "Coloured domestic servants" attached to individual Spanish men), Doyley did not say. The English soldiers, were they to capture any "Spanish Negroes" in arms against them, treated them as booty. Under a 1656 decree, the soldiers retained the labor of any captured African for three years. Presumably they were free to sell them for the same term to another as well.⁵⁴ Doyley wanted these people of color to remain on the island, to contribute in some capacity to the development of an English Jamaica. Contemplating these terms, Ysassi and his men built two small boats, which proved able to carry two-thirds of the remaining men. Seventy-six people escaped to Cuba in May 1660, leaving another thirty-six or thirty-seven behind temporarily. The independent African villages persisted. They would grow by natural increase, and eventually their numbers would be augmented by a steady stream of escaped slaves

from English plantations. The British authorities would not succeed in removing them for over a century.⁵⁵ But with the departure of the Spanish, the international context for retaking Jamaica shifted. Although invasion plans would in the future be floated, the likelihood of a further effort declined drastically once the Spanish no longer had any presence on Jamaica. Five years had transpired since the arrival of the English army.

The anticlimactic end of the inhabitants' struggle to reclaim Jamaica followed from the circumstances of the war itself. Once the English allowed the island residents to slip into Jamaica's inaccessible interior, the stage was set for a long war of attrition. The resistance killed more English by picking off stragglers or surprising small groups of hunters or men accompanying baggage carts than it did in the few battles that occurred. The two battles, both fought only after the island received reinforcements, brought no closure despite a pair of English victories. Rather, the war of attrition persisted, with the English patrolling the shore for supply boats and reinforcements, guarding their outposts against raids, and proceeding cautiously when traveling through the island. Only in gaining the knowledge that came of coercing de Bola's community was the English army in a position to root out the Spanish, gaining an advantage for the first time. William Hughes, visiting Jamaica as part of an English ship's crew in 1660, thought it remarkable that "the Chief Governour of the Blacks" had a house in St. Jago de la Vega.⁵⁶ He may not have been sufficiently well informed to realize that the agreement with Juan de Bola and his activities as a colonel over his own regiment made possible the ejection of the Spanish. In any case, the English did not like to admit the key role played by the Africans, which flew in the face of their own self-image as "protectors of the Atlantic world," not to mention of the emerging discourse of African inferiority.⁵⁷

Opposite: Appearing soon after John Ogilby's 1671 map of Jamaica, James Moxon's map introduced additional cartouches. While the cannons and other military accoutrements invoked the conquest of the island, the dark-skinned figure of indeterminate ethnicity carrying sugarcane alluded to a crop of increasing importance, but one that even as late as 1677 had yet to dominate Jamaican agriculture.

J. Moxon, "A New Mapp of the Continent and Islands According to the Last Survey" (1677). The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, 105:459 M.

The exit of the last of the Spanish residents did not end the prospects for a counterinvasion of the island or the regional war of which it was a part, but it did change the dynamics. The English continued to fear, and occasionally to hear of, further attempts to oust them. In 1660 Doyley believed some foes had landed and ordered his men to capture any they found. In the years that followed, after the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy, these fears persisted. In 1662 the king's secretary wrote to discount rumors of the Spanish amassing ships in Amsterdam to dispatch to Jamaica. When Charles II instructed the first royal governor, he guided Lord Windsor on handling the expected invasion. When Windsor departed after only a short time, leaving a deputy governor in his stead, Lyttelton collected intelligence documenting the latest Spanish campaign to reclaim Jamaica.⁵⁸ As late as 7 April 1667, rumors circulated in Europe that the Spanish had retaken Jamaica and massacred everyone there.⁵⁹ Until Spain finally conceded that England could keep Jamaica, in the 1670 treaty, the English feared that the Habsburgs would reclaim their prize. Yet after 1660 the Spanish no longer had a resident resistance movement with which to coordinate such efforts, but rather had to mount a straightforward invasion. Despite Ysassi's assertions that he controlled every African, the Spanish authorities did not consider the remaining "Spanish Negroes" as a fifth column that would assist with Jamaica's reconquest. As the Spanish settlers in the resistance movement realized, their absence reduced the compulsion to reclaim Jamaica and made doing so more difficult.

The departure of the Spanish did not signal the end of the war for Jamaica. Knowing they had not yet fully laid claim to the island, the English turned their focus to subduing the remaining African enclaves. At the time that Tyson's patrol located the Lluidas Vale village, the English knew of the existence (but not the locations) of multiple villages. The de Bola treaty specifically committed him and his men to pinpointing other communities. Doyley's journal records forays in the following months that aimed at the "Negroes yet abroad," including a group in Yallahs, along the island's south coast between Cagway Harbor and Port Morant (St. David's parish). Not only did de Bola and his men take part in such expeditions, they brought knowledge to the task that identified the areas targeted. According to Burroughs, de Bola and his men campaigned vigorously against their former fellows, "more violent and fierce" than the English. The English wanted uncontested control of the island,

but they realized that they might be forced to settle for negotiated agreements patterned on that achieved with de Bola. As much as they might like to capture these people and incorporate them into the modest but growing servile labor force, they knew that voluntary submission on terms might be the only recourse. When Charles II finally instructed Jamaica in February 1661 / 2 (twenty-one months into his rule), he ordered Doyley to encourage “Negroes, Natives and others” to submit to his government.⁶⁰ Accommodation could be achieved only through a combination of force and persuasion, so the established policy of incorporation remained an option.

In keeping with the agreement reached with de Bola, the English and their African allies pursued other “Spanish Negroes” for at least another decade. One major push occurred in 1663, during Sir Charles Lyttelton’s stint as deputy governor. In April, the Jamaica Council ordered “Lubolo” (meaning de Bola) to drill his militia company. In the campaign that followed, de Bola himself was killed in an ambush as his force neared the community under Juan de Serras in “Vermexales,” to the north and west of his own village. After this effort, Lyttelton complained of continued troubles with the Vermexales Africans, who continued to “ramble & hide.”⁶¹ Like other recently returned imperial officials who wrote reports far from those able to contradict their self-serving accounts, Lyttelton falsely claimed to have entirely subdued these enclaves before his departure in May 1664. Yet, only three months later, the council proposed terms to Serras and his followers. Should they persist in their independent course for another three months, the English government threatened, they would be attacked. This strategy did not succeed in subduing the community, although it eventually pushed them to move east, where they joined another group around 1670.⁶² Raids and intermittent attempts to suppress the growing population—which was augmented by the addition of runaway slaves from burgeoning English plantations—occurred in the 1680s as well.

By the 1680s, these enclaves were becoming what contemporaries and later scholars refer to as “maroon” communities, made up of runaway slaves attempting to live beyond the reach of their enslavers. From their origins in the population of African-descended refugees who fled the English invasion—a community not simply made up of runaway slaves but including individuals born free or subsequently liberated—these communities gradually came to be dominated by escapees and

their descendants. Although scholars have deemed them “maroons” from the first, these communities—despite living apart from European society—were not initially classic maroon villages. Many residents had been free people, and most were ladinos (the term for Hispanicized others, covering language and religion, among other cultural attributes). Most significantly, few were runaways in the usual sense, although some presumably took the opportunity of the refugee status they shared with their masters to liberate themselves. Others won freedom for fighting the English. As late as 1677, a commentator distinguished the “Spanish negroes . . . some yet remaining free there” from the runaway slaves who found the woods “inviting receptacles . . . who, by reasons of the miseries they continually suffer, will never be unwilling to improve such opportunity.”⁶³ The two groups eventually merged, but initially their origins, languages, and experiences separated them. Unfortunately, little is known of the transition as Spanish-speaking ladino enclaves incorporated runaways who likely spoke English or an African language. Those who recalled life on Spanish Jamaica (or who learned of it from their parents) brought a distinctive perspective.

The first evidence of actual maroonage—in the sense of enslaved persons escaping to live beyond the control of European society—in this period came in 1664 (again without the records employing the term), when planters from Barbados settling in Jamaica brought slaves who promptly escaped. Their ability to do so was perhaps facilitated by sickness on board a ship that transported numerous Barbadians as well as by the fact that the English actively controlled so little of this far larger island. The council ordered the reenslavement of this group, eager to reclaim them as absconded property but also concerned about allegations that they were committing crimes, including murder, on the island’s north side. The outcome of the search is not recorded, but it is unlikely that the English party under Captain Abraham Rutter was able to capture all of them. Whether any of them succeeded in winning acceptance in the Spanish-speaking African enclaves already on the island is unknown. At the time of the “first maroon war” in the early eighteenth century, low-level warfare between colonists and these independent enclaves had been a regular feature of life in the Jamaican interior for over sixty years.⁶⁴ The English would not in fact achieve complete victory in this intermittent campaign until the end of the eighteenth century.

The year 1660 was thus a watershed of sorts, not because of the Restoration or because the conquest of the island was completed, but because English goals shifted from removing the Spanish resistance force to striving to force the inclusion of the Spanish-speaking African population into the English regime. The king's return to the throne in England had nothing to do with this shift, which arose entirely from changes within Jamaica itself: the fortuitous discovery of and subsequent forced alliance with the Lluidas Vale community. The English were willing to negotiate terms of inclusion, but first they had to win the upper hand. This policy necessitated armed forays into the interior, which continued—without notable success—for decades. Even if the ladino communities mostly sat out the war between the English and the Spanish, happy to build their own lives separately, the English perceived them through the lens of that conflict, as an indication that the conquest remained partial. Despite the English sense that completing the conquest required subduing these outposts, their independent existence became the new status quo. This reality discomfited the English. They considered the war for Jamaica only partially won when the Spanish finally left, but the remaining work proved beyond their grasp. Major efforts to conquer the “Negroes yet abroad” in 1660 and 1663–64 failed. Although the English settlers never accepted the idea that these Africans would remain at large and independent, they could not effectively put an end to their autonomous communities either.

The Restoration of the monarchy changed little in terms of the aims or prosecution of either the land war against the Spanish African enclaves or the sea war against Spain. At one point in his exile on the European continent, the future Charles II pledged to return Jamaica and Dunkirk in exchange for Spain's aid in gaining his father's throne. Yet in the event, Charles did not rely on Philip IV, and—despite rumors to the contrary—he chose to restore neither Jamaica nor Dunkirk (instead selling the latter to the French in 1662). Initially he ordered Edward Doyley to declare an end to hostilities and to organize a prisoner exchange. The Spanish understood these initial moves as steps toward the return of the island, but soon they realized that Charles did not intend to restore it, much less accept a return to the situation authorized in the last treaty between the two kingdoms (that of 1630, which the Spanish read as disallowing any English activity in the Caribbean). The English

failure to capitulate brought a return of hostilities. Lord Windsor, assuming his post as governor in 1662, brought the first Admiralty Court judge employed in any English colony, intent upon condemning Spanish prizes above all else.⁶⁵ Treaty negotiations ground on, and hostilities in the area surged and ebbed over the next decade. Repeated efforts to scale back on tensions were inevitably reversed, when new causes for concern surfaced, not the least the “insolencies of the Spaniards.”⁶⁶

Retaining Jamaica, Charles II also adhered to most of the prevailing practices with regard to both the sea and land wars. By the time he addressed Jamaica—beginning in 1661 and more seriously in 1662—the army, with the help of its new allies, had evicted the Spanish and turned to subduing the unaligned Spanish-speaking Africans. Charles reiterated that policy goal to various governors. As of 1662, the community headed by de Bola included an estimated 150 men who were described as “Lanciers & Archers.” De Bola, Anton Rodriques and others had homes in town, but the community’s center remained the inland location that Tyson found three years before.⁶⁷ Imposing English authority on all the inhabitants of Jamaica—while continuing to fortify it against a possible Spanish assault—shaped Restoration policy, as it had interregnum policy.

The Restoration did bring one significant change (albeit an alteration that had been discussed under previous regimes), when in 1662 Charles II disbanded the army. Discharging the army in Jamaica fit with his larger policy of dismissing the standing army in England, an unpopular (and costly) innovation associated with the revolutionary regime. In Jamaica the army ceased to exist, after almost seven years on the island and after two inconclusive mutinies aimed at ending the men’s prolonged enlisted status. The king paid the surviving men a “donative” that he intentionally categorized as not constituting their arrears (and which did not in fact fully cover them anyway), in order to avoid appearing to accept responsibility for the debts of previous regimes. Four regiments and a troop of horse remained to benefit from the king’s gift. Charles ordered that his governor, Thomas, Lord Windsor, immediately organize the former soldiers and other men into a militia. According to his report, he “modelled y^m into a Military discipline, sufficiently armed all y^e late Soldiers under the comand of the y^e soberest men y^t could be found.”⁶⁸ The resulting militia shortly came to consist of five regiments, centered more or less where the army had been stationed and where

the population concentrated as a result. Charles Lyttelton's "Briefe Account of the state of Jamaica," produced in 1664, listed the regiments: Thomas Lynch had charge of that at Port Morant; John Man, although only a captain, took over the Port Royal regiment at the departure of Lord Windsor; Samuel Barry led the men at Liguanea; Thomas Fuller commanded at Spanish Town and Passage Fort; while Guanaboa looked to John Cope's leadership. In all, the militia numbered about 2,500 men in arms and 150 mounted men, not counting some hunters and other "unsettled persons" who might contribute to the island's defense. Hidden within this enumeration was a company of 150 militiamen under de Bola. Early English Jamaica effectively adopted the Spanish policy that selectively armed African militiamen, but it did so without commentary. Incorporating this community seemingly required no conversion to Protestantism, in contrast to the Spanish, who demanded Catholic conversion for those seeking freedom and a place in their society. The English realized the unusual nature of this arrangement, however: when deputy surveyor Henry Rede laid out the house and lot of Anton Roderiques he added "Negroe soldier of the English Army" to the usually formulaic plat description.⁶⁹

Although advocates for the demilitarization of Jamaica argued that civilians would defend the island better than "poore dissatisfied & mutinous Sould's," responsibility for the island's protection after 1662 remained largely in the same hands. Windsor named his deputy governor and his Admiralty judge as two of five colonels in 1662, but the other three had all been Cromwellian officers. The officers serving under them were overwhelmingly army veterans. Two years later, when Deputy Governor Lyttelton was departing (and Judge Mitchell had died), every leading militia officer save for John Man had come with the invasion force: Fuller as a mere sergeant, Cope and Lynch as captains, and Barry as a major. Man, a surveyor, had been in Jamaica before 1660, but probably arrived there as a civilian, since he was listed as a merchant at that time.⁷⁰ In 1664 as in 1662, the militia included many seasoned fighting men. It carried forward the work Doyley pursued at the head of the army in 1660, the defense of the island against possible Spanish attack and the extirpation of the autonomous African enclaves. The army's dismissal, the result of a pointed royal policy change, was also a goal that many men involved in Jamaica prior to 1660 agreed was long overdue.

Correspondents from Jamaica had been asking that the army be released for years by the time Charles addressed the matter. Had the late interregnum not been plagued by financial and governance crises that both distracted officials and prevented them from paying the army its arrears, the army might have disbanded earlier. That Charles ordered an end to its existence marked his sole major departure from pre-Restoration policy for Jamaica.

The Restoration prompted those with any plausible connection to the royal family to declare it. Doyley proclaimed the king with language, toasts, and ceremony meant to invoke the royal past, assiduously avoiding mention of Jamaica's revolutionary origins. Some of the men who had served on Jamaica without comment (and certainly without leaving any trace that they attempted to obstruct the undertaking) stepped forward to declare their commitment to the Stuarts. Some alleged that they had been sent to Jamaica for their royalism, with the intention of removing them from England, if not of ending their lives. Such claims assumed that the Lord Protector anticipated the massive death rate—which he did not—and that he used that prescience to arrange their demise under the cover of service. Doyley, who had previously asserted his loyalty to the Protectorate and attempted to dispel any cause to doubt it, underscored his own familial connection to individuals in positions of authority in the king's administration.⁷¹ To further demonstrate their commitment to the Stuart cause, men undertaking or advocating assaults on Spanish settlements in the 1660s frequently referenced the possibility that a given mainland town housed elite English prisoners, possibly Prince Maurice, the king's cousin, who had perished in a hurricane in the Caribbean in 1652. Maurice became the royal equivalent of the lost colonists of Roanoke, as rumors flew of his survival, capture, and purported whereabouts. Charles II was sufficiently hopeful that he instructed his ambassador to inquire about Maurice specifically in treaty negotiations.⁷² With such gestures to Stuart concerns, the men connected to Jamaica repositioned the island's conquest and the continued hostilities in the region under a royalist rubric. Just as Charles sought to deny that the revolution had drastically re-created his Atlantic holdings in ways he fully intended to retain and from which he would benefit, so too did men on Jamaica reconfigure its past and its concerns within a royalist framework. The common assertion that the

Western Design was staffed largely by royalist soldiers owed more to these Restoration-era revisions than to the realities of 1655.⁷³

The military side of the Western Design after May 1655, when the expedition established its base on Jamaica, took on an unexpected character. The original scheme envisioned a triumphal sweep through the Spanish West Indies, with the English armed forces easily vanquishing minimal opposition, aided by indigenous and African allies. The imagined result would have England acquiring numerous (perhaps all) Spanish colonies. These musings became hazy around the details of how it would hold or people these new possessions. In reality, the force stalled on Jamaica, unable to subdue the island's small population or to launch further conquests of Spanish territory. Arriving with a sizable army, they allowed far fewer residents (including women, children, and the elderly) to slip away, and proved unable to excise all of them from the island for five years. The army and the navy attempted—in the face of disease, death, and dearth—to overwhelm the island's former residents, to strengthen their hold in the region, and to harass the Spanish in ways that would harm the enemy and sustain their own war effort. The invasion inaugurated a continual state of war on land as well as sea, a state that persisted over the next decade and more. The biggest geopolitical impact of the Western Design for the Caribbean—besides England's acquisition of Jamaica—awaited the 1670 Treaty of Madrid, in which the Spanish crown finally accepted the English presence not only in Jamaica but on the other Caribbean outposts as well. Achieving this long-held policy goal, although it dramatically changed the situation in the West Indies, represented a disappointing outcome when laid alongside the initial vision of the Design.

Neither easy conquest nor the ready cooperation of Jamaica's oppressed laborers materialized, in striking contrast to English expectations. Many contemporaries found it hard to accept that the army would do nothing more than secure Jamaica—and no one expected the effort to be only minimally completed after five grueling years. Cromwell, even after he learned of the ignominious defeat on Hispaniola and Penn's assessment of the army's prospects, posited that the force might soon secure Cuba or Providence Island. Venables naively expected the Africans on the island to come in to the English to be informed of the

terms the invaders would offer them. They demurred, and Venables never made his offer (nor, unfortunately, have its details survived). Men on Jamaica failed to learn from this setback, but continued for at least another year to watch the movements of the Africans in the hinterland with the expectation that they needed the English as protectors. Such dreams died slowly. In the context of such expectations, the invaders and contemporary observers found it difficult to accept the slow process of capturing Jamaica, the limited extraterritorial successes of the English forces, and the persistent preference for autonomy among the African population.

The original vision assumed that the enslaved people residing under Spanish rule would eagerly join the invading English, and that they would do so as grateful underlings who looked to the superior English for rescue and guidance. Although these reveries correctly focused on the importance of African aid, they erred on every other aspect of unfolding events. The island's "Spanish Negroes" were better able to flourish on Jamaica than were the invaders. They knew the land and could exploit its bounty. Competent to live on their own, organize their communities, and defend themselves, the African enclaves stood apart from both groups of Europeans, as the mounted African had informed Kempo Sybada. Only when forced to do so by the need to protect their community did they enter into an alliance with the English. They negotiated from a position of strength, ensuring their own continued autonomy and gaining a recognized status as free individuals within English society. Fantasies of rescuing Indians and Africans foundered on the reality that greeted the English in the Atlantic world. In Jamaica, neither easy triumph nor the gratitude of the victims of Spanish cruelty materialized to fulfill English dreams.

Settling

WHEN PARTICIPANTS FIRST WROTE of the future they imagined for Jamaica, they envisioned a bountiful place inhabited by industrious men and women who effortlessly rendered it productive and familiar. Ignoring such pressing matters as the need to survive and conquer, they anticipated introducing all the trappings of Englishness—patriarchal households consuming accustomed foods and producing items for trade while contentedly living under familiar religious and civil institutions. Creating this imagined Jamaica in the context of continual warfare and disease proved daunting, not least because the presence of the army suppressed civil society. When Charles II disbanded it in 1662, people on Jamaica had already begun creating the institutions associated with colonial success: privately owned land, local law and courts to uphold it, opportunities for trade, and institution for worship. Only with the dissolution of the army was Jamaica able to complete the transition. Hence, the settlement of Jamaica proved a two-part process, with most of seven years spent striving toward that goal while the military dominated the island, followed by the completion of the project after the dissolution of the army. The history of early English Jamaica affirms Karen Ordahl Kupperman's observation that successful colonies required civil institutions.¹ Jamaica flourished only after it departed from garrison status.

Contemporaries realized that Jamaica's circumstances suppressed its settlement. Beyond the high death rate, the biggest impediment to achieving an English Jamaica was the persistence of the army. It forestalled the creation of a civil society that would attract settlers and investors. Contemporaries widely perceived garrison status as a problem

to be solved rather than a model to be adopted. In October 1658, the committee assigned to oversee the state's affairs in Jamaica criticized the continued reliance on the army. "It seems to be evident that the Collonie cann neither bee looked upon as an Army, in a Condition of Strength and defence, nor as so many Planters, who are likely to subsist and ymprove, for whilst the whole Number is of mixt Capacities, and almost every man depended upon, is both a Sould^r, and a Planter, neither the Military Duty is orderly or severely preformed, nor the Method or necessary Course of planting effectually prosecuted." The reason this situation so damaged the island's prospects lay in the incompatibility of the two roles. "It being an [experimental] truth, that the Sould^r, as he wants a [broad] Inclination, and meanes, and Servants, and other [Essentials?] to become a right Planter, soe those that are Planters being scattered more then 60 Miles from each other, and busily intent upon their worke which requires a Countynuall application, becomes Careless and almost useless to Comon safetye, and cannot easily provide against the suddaine Allarrum and surprize of an Enemy."² As a result, the island could not rely upon soldiers but needed to attract men and women dedicated specifically to the work of settling and planting. The strange situation that had arisen over the first years—in which soldiers neither completed the conquest nor planted effectually—had to be overcome, so that Jamaica could prosper. The difficulties of the first three years fostered this unfortunate circumstance, which the soldiers loathed so much that they mutinied. Jamaica's hybrid status, being neither a garrison nor a colony, impeded its success. The committee advocated addressing it energetically.

This hybrid state—in which Jamaica was neither a garrison nor a colony but something strangely in between—arose despite the aims of the Western Design's planners. That Jamaica (or any Spanish colony seized by the expedition) would be settled was not so much a goal of the Design as one of its presumed outcomes. Planners expected settlement to follow naturally from the acquisition of land. Cromwell sent former Plymouth Plantation governor Edward Winslow to step into the position of governor when the expedition gained its first conquest. Spanish observers eyeing English preparations noted that the numbers of women on the expeditionary force indicated not a military campaign but rather a colonization scheme. Extant records do not relate the numbers of women, although they contain scattered references to them on the

campaign or attached to regiments in Jamaica. The men with the expedition who first saw Jamaica similarly envisioned it filling up with English people and becoming a productive and prosperous island. The regiment sent out under Humphrey later in 1655, when the authorities in England had a more somber view of the undertaking, included no women or boys, an acknowledgment that the road ahead was rougher than first imagined.³ Yet, over the years that followed, and despite the difficulties of life on the island, some officers sent for their wives, augmenting the numbers of women working toward colonization. Boosters in England also collected women to ship to Jamaica, with the idea that wives for soldiers would commit them to Jamaica.⁴ The goal of settlement was thus widely shared.

As soon as Jamaica was in the hands of the English state, the Lord Protector implemented plans to attract settlers. He issued a proclamation in October announcing its acquisition, describing its “Goodnesse, Fertility, and Commodiousness for Trade and Commerce,” and offering attractive terms to those who paid the costs of their own transportation. Cromwell promised military protection, land, freedom from taxes for three years, and the right to claim ownership of the free-ranging livestock for a period as well. His offer was predictably limited “to all such professing the Protestant Religion.” The impact in England itself, although difficult to gauge, appears to have been modest.⁵ In addition to being broadcast in England, this proclamation went out to every colony, with directives to local authorities to encourage prospective settlers. Various men connected with the Design received instructions to recruit settlers. Expecting colonies to generate population for new settlements enjoyed a long history. John Pym advocated it as early as 1641, arguing that “their bodies [were already] seasoned to that climate.” Men on Design business encouraged settlers in the Leeward Islands, Barbados, Bermuda, and various New England colonies.⁶

Believing New England would send many people, Cromwell named an agent specifically to recruit there. Having heard complaints about Dutch encroachments on the Connecticut and New Haven colonies, the comparative infertility of the soil, and the harshness of the winters, Cromwell understood that residents would welcome an opportunity to transplant their families and communities out of that “hard Country into a Land of Plenty.” He calculated that selecting first Winslow and later Robert Sedgwick as leaders would attract New Englanders ready

to accept the authority of familiar men. He appointed Daniel Gookin, a former resident with experience in Ireland and Virginia as well, to recruit in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven, and perhaps Rhode Island, seeking families and churches willing to start anew in the Caribbean. Gookin went armed with terms intended to attract New England's godly. The broadside survives, issued from the Cambridge, Massachusetts, printing press on the first day of 1656 (by English reckoning at the time, 25 March). Attesting to his highness's "special affection to the people of New England; and being very desirous to have the said place [Jamaica] inhabited by a stock of such as know the LORD, and walk in his Fear," the advertisement promised free transportation, land near good harbors, and a share of the livestock roaming on the island, among other "Privileges and Immunities" that Gookin would convey to any interested colonists. Cromwell clearly intended the New England transplants to set the tone for the new colony, telling Gookin that he anticipated that among them would be found "persons fitt for Rulers and Magistrates who may be an encouragement to the good and a terror to the eveill doers."⁷ Not only were the colonists primed to pick up and leave—as far as Cromwell had been informed—but the recruitment scheme bore all the hallmarks of the optimism of the first reports from Jamaica, which praised the island's bounty and underestimated (or misrepresented) the struggles that lay ahead.

Gookin's efforts opened to a mixed response and deteriorated over the next six months. Before leaving England, he hinted that the scheme might not proceed as smoothly as anticipated. By the time he arrived in January, word of the challenges facing Jamaica had spread. From ships seeking desperately needed food and other vessels that had touched at the island before sailing to the northern colonies, New Englanders knew the flaws in the rosy initial accounts. Nonetheless, Gookin reported upon his arrival that the governor and a few other leading men in Boston or the immediate vicinity expressed appreciation for the Protector's special regard and promised to promote the effort. When Richard Leader wrote to John Winthrop Jr. shortly after Gookin's arrival, he conveyed enthusiasm for the undertaking.⁸

Gookin, after waiting six weeks for the winter weather to ease sufficiently to allow the Governor's Council to meet in early March, issued the broadside laying out the terms and began collecting subscriptions.

In April he visited Connecticut and New Haven. Three men from that area traveled to Jamaica on behalf of a larger group to assess the situation. Even before they had returned, however, a flood of disheartening news—about hunger, disease, and continuing warfare—dampened enthusiasm. Any prospect of large-scale migration effectively ended with these reports. Gookin had to admit the failure of his enterprise, although he did so in cagey terms, holding out hopes for a reversal of local opinion. While a few settlers from the region did venture south, nothing like the influx needed to set the colony on a secure footing under zealous New England recruits ever occurred. Cromwell's sense of the mood of those dwelling in the region had never been entirely accurate, but even the minority that had communicated its discontent to him chose not to participate. Gookin did suggest that if England could seize a healthy island (naming Hispaniola and Cuba), settlers from the northern outposts might change their minds. Jamaica had earned a bad reputation.⁹

Outreach to other locations bore somewhat more fruit. In April 1656, almost a year after the landing, the number of settlers attracted to the island was so minuscule that William Godfrey declared no one had yet arrived. No record of individuals voluntarily traveling from Ireland or Scotland from the time of the invasion to the end of the Protectorate in 1658 has come to light. Some passengers made the journey from England, although one scheme to encourage the younger sons of the gentry came to naught. Doyley reached out to Virginia, but whether he managed to convince anyone cannot be determined. In December 1656, when settlers in the Bahamas (having been previously exiled from Bermuda when they lost a dispute over religion and politics) were reportedly in distress, state ships evacuated them to Jamaica, where it is doubtful that their situation improved.¹⁰ As many as 157 came from Bermuda itself the following year, despite William Phillips's disparaging remarks, for which he was punished. Ships that stopped on the voyage to Jamaica tried to persuade Barbadians to migrate, but apparently without success. Various false rumors about conditions there—including that anyone who migrated owed a year's service laboring on fortifications—hampered the effort. The comparatively small islands of St. Christopher and especially Nevis generated the biggest cache of settlers—sending 1,400 to 1,600 in fall 1656. Luke Stoakes, the governor of Nevis, organized the

migration, first deputizing three men to reconnoiter and then leading the recruits to take up land in the Port Morant region on the south-eastern end of the island.¹¹

Although not the godly New Englanders of Cromwell's imaginings, the Nevis settlers had much to recommend them. They came in a sizable group which was male-dominated but included some families—among them the governor's "lady" and at least three sons. They brought their own governor, a man they had already proven willing to follow in this venture. They numbered 800 men able to bear arms, men designated for an important role in the transition from army to settler militia. Besides the Stoakes family, the majority of migrants were of modest means: the few large planters on Nevis elected to stay there, so Stoakes recruited smallholders and recently released servants. Those who came still bound to labor were predominantly servants rather than slaves. Assuming they would first build homes and plant, William Brayne ordered tents delivered to them for their temporary shelter and assigned newly arrived troops to guard them until they could patrol for themselves. Once they were established, Goodsonn and Stoakes agreed, the men would help build fortifications. In the meantime the soldiers furthered that work alone. Stoakes and the other leading men among the Nevis contingent set up institutions of local governance.¹²

This propitious start did not blossom. To the surprise of many, the supposedly seasoned settlers experienced death rates rivaling those of the soldiers of the year before. The institutions of governance collapsed, so that Brayne scrambled to rejuvenate them after Stoakes's demise. Planting made few gains, and the men never turned to work on fortifications or organizing a militia. Once it was widely known that most of these settlers died, the news dissuaded others. The island's reputation as an unhealthy place, earned initially with the deaths of so many soldiers in the first year, was solidified with the loss of numerous settlers the next. Settlement needed first and foremost colonists who could survive and prosper. As Thomas Modyford would later observe, the early arrivals bore the brunt of the suffering: "the first Setlers, and old Soldiers," by "having borne the heate of the day, and rann through all the hazards, and difficultys to make it Easie and Safe for the new commers."¹³ Little wonder that despite inducements, settlers found the prospect unattractive.

English Jamaica nonetheless took on its initial shape under this strange hybrid regime, and, despite the peculiarity of its early devel-

opment, it adopted features typical of an English colony. The population dispersed according to the decisions of military commanders thinking of both defense and planting. The authorities assigned land first to regiments, then to individual officers, soldiers and settlers. The early land records are imperfect, and efforts beginning in earnest in 1662 to document ownership only partially filled that gap. By 1664, just before numerous land-hungry Barbadians arrived, hundreds of allotments were in private hands.¹⁴ Some of the areas assigned to regiments became bountiful. The Angels, for instance, boomed into the 1670s, with many large landholdings amid this populous parish. The settlement in north Clarendon Parish, launched originally by the Fortescue / Wells regiment, also prospered.¹⁵ That most inhabitants scattered to plantation sites reflected English practice in other colonies, but here military planning replaced the individual decisions of Virginia tobacco farmers who chose sites along navigable waterways that could carry their crop to market.

The dispersal altered the island's human geography yet again. In Jamaica, as elsewhere, Spanish colonizers gravitated toward urban spaces. Central plazas lined with religious and government institutions were surrounded by numerous residential streets, creating vibrant city life. Residents returned occasionally to outlying ranches and farms, which might be closed up or staffed by a small number of slaves and servants in the interim. The English distributed themselves more widely and permanently. The main town contracted. By 1660, one anonymous account described St. Jago de la Vega as "having in itt about 800 ruynous houses, 2 churches, 2 chappelles and an abbey, all buylt by the Spaniards." Neglect, vandalism, and the use of building materials in structures put up elsewhere ruined these houses.¹⁶ In contrast to the Spanish, the English had a decidedly less urban orientation. While typical of Anglo-colonial settlement patterns generally, dispersion was initially furthered by the need to hold Spanish farms against possible incursions.

The English did not entirely eschew urban living, however, as they built a new town on Point Cagway, a narrow spit of land that reached out into the main harbor. English colonies typically featured a port town, by far the most common spaces of concentrated population. Cagway (renamed Port Royal in 1664) owed its origins to the decision to move the army headquarters to the point, with its easier access to the sea. By 1660 it boasted "200 houses, all buylt by the English, with some publique houses, and that wherein the Lt. Generall constantly dwells."

The desirability of real estate on this peninsula made “houses so deare, that an ordinarie house in this towne is worth 40 or 50 pounds per annum.”¹⁷ A number of civilian inhabitants sought licenses to sell liquor. Doyley saw various problems with the trade, including that seamen accrued debts they could not pay tipping in the ordinaries, but he also exploited it by laying an impost on sales to fund a military offensive he could not otherwise finance. The attraction of the portside location outweighed even the lack of potable water. The same 1660 survey remarked that “their water . . . is infected (by the intrusion of the Neighbour-seas) with a brackish taste; and therefore they make use of none but what is fetch’d three or four leagues in Boats and *Canoues*.”¹⁸ The crowded new town on Cagway point was poorly laid out and compressed compared to urban centers that followed guidelines promulgated by the Spanish monarchy. Even taking into account the rising concentration of people on the newly settled point, English Jamaica’s inhabitants lived far more dispersed than had the Spanish.

If creating a port town fit English settlement patterns elsewhere, the beginning of a settler elite similarly reflected expectations, in this case for a hierarchical society. Officers who took up land of their own became some of English Jamaica’s first major planters. Fragmentary evidence indicates widespread landownership by officers. Of 986 men conclusively identified as serving in the army, 122 later owned land. Sixty-eight of them were officers (fifty of them commissioned officers) or staff members, while another fifty were certainly soldiers or troopers. Henry Archbould, for instance, began as a captain in the regiment of the valiant James Heane, rose to command his own regiment, and by the time of the 1670 survey owned over 2,000 acres in St. Andrew’s Parish. Francis Barrington, before his accidental death in 1659, had accumulated an estate and revealed his talents as a planter; had he lived, he presumably would have joined other former Cromwellian officers as a substantial landowner elected to the Assembly. John Harrington, who arrived as a lieutenant in Buller’s regiment, owned a plantation that favorably impressed the naturalist William Hughes when he visited the island in about 1660.¹⁹ Samuel Long, once Doyley’s lieutenant, rose to rank as a major landowner, Assembly member, and later Chief Justice. Lewis Ashton, who began as a mere ensign under Philip Ward, received his own land and took over the lands of his lieutenant colonel when the latter returned to England for a time. He too became a notable land-

owner, elected to the Assembly. Even John Humphrey, who stayed only a short while in Jamaica, led troops that loathed planting, and badgered his superior officers to permit him to leave, had a small plantation in Liguanea. Given his short stay, and by 1664 his long absence, its characterization as “no great one, nor anything well improved” may have been accurate, although the man disparaging it sought to have it taken from Humphrey’s widow nonetheless. John Colbeck rose probably from the noncommissioned ranks, arriving with the invasion fleet in 1655 and earning his ensign commission the following year. A quartermaster in August 1656, after the advent of civilian government in 1662 he served as a colonel in the island’s militia and as a representative in the Assembly. He steadily accumulated land, eventually building the famed edifice known as Colbeck’s Castle in St. Catherine’s Parish.²⁰

Coming—or rapidly attaining rank—as an officer and surviving in Jamaica all but assured a man land. The death rate was undoubtedly the biggest impediment to officers becoming landholders. The lucky survivors accumulated substantial holdings and formed the core of the elite. By the 1670 survey, forty-seven people held over 1,000 acres apiece, as former officers were joined by other large landowners to form a nascent planter class.²¹

Soldiers too acquired land, having been granted a “proportion” as part of their service. While the records of early ownership are incomplete, individual cases are well documented. No record exists that troopers Hugh Mitchell and Jeffrey Reeves owned a plot, but they were issued agricultural tools of their own that indicated as much in 1661. Three miles from St. Jago, at a plantation called Half Moon, ten soldiers from Captain Thompson’s company together received 145 acres. Without knowing the quality of the land, it would seem that the three soldiers from Ward’s regiment fared less well when they shared thirty acres near Lewis Ashton’s plantation in May 1660. In the latter case certainly and in the former case quite possibly, land went to soldiers who planted there as part of their regimental duties. In another group distribution, in 1659, Sergeant Augustus Cesar Sinkter and fourteen soldiers received 540 acres “att a place called Sowersopp plantacon next unto Ensigne vezeis quarters.” Sinkter had sailed with the fleet in 1654, serving initially in Doyley’s company of Venables’s regiment.²² These grants reveal enlisted men who worked the land as soldiers shifting to planting for their own livelihoods and profits. Plats for the future St. David’s Parish occasionally

mention landowners receiving plots because they were soldiers, and the same was doubtless true of others whose status won no mention.²³

With planting for the army flowing into farming on one's own, it comes as little surprise that those serving in the navy proved far less likely to acquire land. Of 558 men known to have served on board the state's ships, only a dozen received land. Overwhelmingly ships' captains, most of them received allotments in town. Captain Shaw was given an acre, "outside the palisades to set up a carpenter's yard for the repair of ships, for which there is much need." This land was apparently intended as his private property, and the notation bestowing it added the caveat that the grant was contingent on the king's approval. Captain Abraham Langford received sixteen square feet, "between the states forge and that that was the Indians house." The lot, in St. Jago, may have abutted a residence for Indians associated with one of the Spanish monasteries. John Young, carpenter of the *Hound* and later the *Chestnut*, received a lot in Port Cagway in April 1660; it was sixty feet wide, and its placement suggested that he intended to pursue his trade in this growing port town.²⁴ John Wilgresse came to Jamaica first as the captain of the *Falmouth*, but resigned his commission rather than stand trial for drunkenness and swearing. He returned to the region eventually, there to take up land on Point Cagway. Cornelius Burroughs, appointed to oversee the naval supplies and therefore resident on land rather than serving aboard ship, accumulated a notable holding. He wrote to his cousin, patron, and investor Robert Blackborne that he owned a plantation, house, and stock valued at £1,400, which he deemed the "foundation of a good estate." He appears in the extant record only as receiving a house lot in Point Cagway adjoining houses built for Doyley and Peter Coveney. In this case, as doubtless in others, the record of other lands received has not survived. Navy men, more likely to spend shorter stints stationed in Jamaica and unlikely to pass much of that time on shore, did not often benefit from land distribution schemes. The servicemen who became residents were by and large army personnel, trapped on the island by the orders restricting their departure and already planting as part of their duties.²⁵

Sprinkled among the army personnel who were planters and laborers was a small but slowly growing number of civilians. Documents chronicling the arrivals of settlers after the Nevis debacle are few, and many people must have come for whom no trace survives. Two men sharing

a surname—George and John Evans—received a license to settle in 1656, and John persisted until 1662, when his land plat was recorded. Humphrey Freeman may have been a military man, but given that the only appearance he made in Doyley's Journal was as the recipient of a land grant in 1657, he was probably a settler. Bartholomew Harvey received special permission to settle in Liguanea (which had been previously set aside for the army). He employed so many servants that, "there beinge nott land sufficient att Port morant for his settlem^t," he required a grant elsewhere.²⁶ In March 1658, Doyley ordered Captain Wilgresse of the *Blackmore* to take Mr. Povey, along with his wife and servants, to Port Morant. Brother to the influential colonial backer Thomas Povey, Richard came to own land at Morant and in Cagway by 1661.²⁷ Peter Beckford apparently arrived in 1660, started with pen and livestock management to build up his estate, and owned more than 2,000 acres in Clarendon Parish alone by 1670. A Mr. Sommers, who arrived from Barbados in 1659 apparently as a settler, earned an incidental mention in a letter written by Burroughs. Edmund Hickeringill, though he did not ultimately make his home in Jamaica, reportedly lived on the island prior to the Restoration in 1660. While the surviving records do not reveal much about the numbers and deployment of the first settlers, these references represent only a small portion of the arrivals. William Hughes, who visited the island on a naval ship in about 1660, worried about the deforestation of Jamaica, believing that even that far larger island was bound to follow Barbados in this, "more people coming daily thither."²⁸ If Hughes correctly observed an influx of population, he did not take into account the high death rate (or the effects of mountainous terrain in protecting at least some of Jamaica's forest from rapid exploitation).

The first imaginings of Jamaica had concealed this fact, but planters—whether civilian or military—needed laborers. Officers' use of soldiers to work their land offered only a short-term (and controversial) solution. As land was distributed, it created the usual insatiable demand for workers. Letters written from and plans made for Jamaica regularly reiterated the need for servants.²⁹ In 1656 the army council agreed that any soldier who captured a "negro or mulatto" could employ the individual as his servant for a three-year term. This scheme, possibly Goodson's idea, aimed to motivate both planting and the capture of the remaining inhabitants from the Spanish era. Servants with an

opportunity to choose their destination declined to go to Jamaica, presumably privy to the same bad press that kept free settlers away. Schemes to pay the officers in servants had the dual purpose of satisfying the obligation to provide their long-overdue arrears and tying them more firmly to the island as planters.³⁰ Colonial investor Martin Noell sent thirty servants in 1657 to staff his new land grant and intended to send more. When Captains Thomas Lynch and Epemetus Crosse happened to be in England at the opportune moment to advise the Restoration government on Jamaica, they benefited by receiving free passage back for themselves, any servants they managed to collect, and up to one ton of goods each. Lynch fared the better of the two, having also secured the lucrative post of provost marshal for life. Parlaying this windfall into a large estate, he cultivated his connections to gain the post of governor a decade later. As the colony gradually developed, a trade in servants grew as well, although its success required residents in a position to receive them (and ideally but rarely to pay for them outright) when they arrived. In 1664 Sir Thomas Modyford cautioned against simply dumping servants, as they needed to be housed and fed immediately in order to increase the likelihood that they would survive.³¹

The authorities quickly instituted the usual colonial strategies for forcing troublemakers to labor for others. In October 1656 the officers' council ordered that anyone who killed a horse be sentenced to serve the animal's owner for three years. This punishment superseded the usual English penalty of death, no doubt because executing horse thieves in the context of a high death rate and a major labor shortage was patently counterproductive.³² As in other colonies, Jamaica's leaders decided that insolvent debtors ought to serve their creditors, with sentences up to four years. Anyone impregnating a servant had to serve her master along with her, as her term was extended another three years. When the master was the culprit, her extra time instead benefited the parish. On one occasion twenty-seven suspected pirates were put to hard labor on the island until English authorities determined their fate.

Transporting felons from Europe to Jamaica offered a second standard colonial strategy, and one that was soon adopted. The authorities ordered hundreds of women being held in the Tower sent during the first year, the first of many shipments of involuntary sojourners to the island.³³ Such women served a dual purpose, as they might work as servants or marry soldiers, and either way they contributed to settlement.

After the Restoration, when the government cracked down on Quakers, it ordered transportation as a punishment for repeatedly attending meetings. In 1661 a barge on the Thames carrying seventy-two condemned men and women who were sentenced to transportation to Jamaica was hijacked, and most of the prisoners escaped. Escapees subsequently caught were hanged. Were it not for this dramatic turn of events, their sentences of transportation would have been lost to the historical record, suggesting the unknown numbers subjected to the punishment in this period.³⁴

As was typical during the first years of any colony, Jamaican planters bought relatively few slaves. Most discussion of laborers revolved around servants, who sold more cheaply and were more readily available. The Committee on Foreign Plantations thought slaves too difficult to control on a newly settled island—"such treacherous, and unsteadie People"—and advocated a labor force built on Scots servants instead. Laws passed to manage labor overwhelmingly regulated servants, and mentions of enslaved persons, when they were made at all, were often contained in subordinate clauses of those guidelines.³⁵ Enslaved Africans and Indians made their way into the labor pool—brought by others, especially the wealthier migrants from Barbados in 1664, captured on raids, or sold on the island by the very rare slave ship. It seems doubtful that privateers brought forty-eight slaves to the island in 1659, stolen off a wrecked Dutch slaver. They more likely disposed of their booty in more lucrative markets.³⁶ Allegedly a Dutch trader sold 130 enslaved Africans to Edward Doyley in 1661, and he in turn divided them between a local buyer (planter and fellow army officer John Cope) and a foreign purchaser (said to be a Spanish vessel that came into Cagway Harbor in accordance with a recently proclaimed but ultimately short-lived truce). Over the next few years, some slave sales occurred on the island, but the numbers, although difficult to determine precisely, remained low. Among those who did arrive, some came as a result of a contract for 300 that Lord Windsor signed with the Company of Royal Adventurers. Having little money to spend, planters may have benefited from the cheaper subterfuge of kidnapping laborers, and an order to return Indians to the mainland suggests that some may have been snatched for that purpose.³⁷ Enslaved laborers, although desirable, remained out of reach to most of those who acquired land in the first decade.

As the army, against the wishes of many of its members, took the lead in planting Jamaica, the island straddled the line between garrison

and colony. This situation proved untenable, and not only because, as Goodson once quipped, "I heartily wish, that they do not plant, as they have fortified." On one hand, success as a planter required latitude to see to one's own affairs, which hindered the collective work of the army. Victory, on the other hand, necessitated a readiness to march on patrols or campaigns, the men effectively absenting themselves from their farms. Soldiers ready to go out at a moment's notice could not attend to the needs of their crops and to the consistent management of their labor force. Scattered planters mounted a poor defense, while concentrations of soldiers were ill equipped to plant. A contemporaneous experiment in Ireland, using soldiers to settle lands seized from the Irish after the New Model Army reconquered that island, similarly pointed to the flaws in such a strategy. As they came to straddle the line between soldiers and planters, their status fashioned the contradiction that so worried the Jamaica subcommittee in 1658. As Edward Doyley revealed in a July 1660 letter, many of the men had no particular talent for the work either. He and many others were "so little acquainted with y^c Nature, or [benefit] of planting, as will make it appeare, our obedience, and selfe preservation, rather than profit, or delight, hath perwaded us to intermeddle therein."³⁸ While William Beeston would later allege that Doyley actively opposed planting, little else in the record suggests that he worked to undermine the effort. While planting by the army was "not well Relished," failure was all but assured by the contradictions between the roles of soldier and settler.³⁹

The dominance of the army on Jamaica, while it hampered planting, also discouraged settlers. The presence of soldiers and sailors made settlers anxious, as Doyley would later remark on the latter's "Apprehensions of an Arbitrary harsh usage where Seamen and Souldiers are." Prospective settlers avoided living under garrison government, preferring access to civil institutions that protected their rights and privileges. Naval captain Christopher Myngs, as early as 1657, argued that migration would be facilitated by a two-pronged strategy: attracting gentlemen planters—whose willingness to come would communicate confidence in the colony even as they filled government positions appropriate to leading men—and reassuring common settlers that they would not be subject to martial law.⁴⁰ The preliminary efforts to establish civil institutions for the settlers at Port Morant depended on the leadership of Governor Stoakes and fell apart when high mortality

swept away the governor and many settlers. Brayne stepped in and tried to revive the institutions of governance, although details of his effort do not survive.⁴¹ Jamaica's poor reputation as an unhealthy location was compounded by its status as a garrison colony, which further discouraged prospective settlers. Using soldiers to plant set up a vicious cycle: soldiers planted for lack of settlers, who did not migrate in part because the island was dominated by the army. English planners and local leaders knew that this situation must be reversed. Disbanding the army would send a message to prospective settlers that the conquest phase was over and the island secured.

Long after officials recognized that demilitarization was a precondition to creating a viable settler colony, the goal remained elusive. While the Spanish finally fled in the spring of 1660, the soldiers remained in arms for another two years. Ostensibly working to subdue the remaining "Spanish Negroes," the soldiers resisted their continued (and unpaid) military duty. Lack of action arose in part from the uncertainty of the times. Before 1660 the English government had been distracted from Jamaica by a host of other issues. Once the Restoration brought Charles II and a new contingent of upper-level governmental officials to power, that shift created further uncertainty. No one knew initially if Charles would return Jamaica to Spain. The central government did not consider the matter for over six months, finally hearing reports in January 1661. With a hazy sense of the situation on the ground, some expected future defense to be handled by the militia alone, while others argued for maintaining a small garrison in the fort recently renamed for the king. Another year and a half would pass before a royal governor finally arrived (in August 1662) to take the reins from Doyley and to disband the army.⁴² By this time men who, like Doyley, had signed on in December 1654 had served for nearly eight years.

This delay, even as it forestalled settlement, enraged some of the soldiers. Many of the men had been detained against their wills in the first years of the occupation. While many survivors made their peace with Jamaica by the time of the Restoration, they did not care to continue as soldiers any longer than necessary. At the same time, the authorities in England eyed them cautiously, worried about the effects of releasing so many "rude and necessitous Persons" into the modest settler population. Some men drifted away from their military assignments, prompting Doyley to order them back to their duties. A few well-placed men both


fulfilled their obligations and pursued other options. The young Thomas Fairfax began as a captain, earned promotion to major, and oversaw fortification building in St. Jago. While continuing with these duties he came to own a vessel. He would leave Jamaica in 1662, to follow in the footsteps of his more famous cousin (and namesake) by pursuing a successful military career elsewhere.⁴³

For others the delay in disbanding—and the restrictions that accompanied service in the army—sparked a second mutiny. In 1660, after the Spanish departed, “poore dissatisfied & mutinous Souldrs” demanded to be released from military duty and freed to participate fully in the exploitation of Jamaica.⁴⁴ They wanted land of their own to cultivate and freedom to leave if they chose. They too desired civilian government and an end to the garrison status that made Jamaica an unacceptable anomaly within the Atlantic world. Edward Tyson, flush from the success that followed after he and his men located the remote village, led the mutiny, along with a lesser officer who was said to have tempted him into it. Tyson and his men doubtless felt elation at the realization that the resulting exodus of Spanish fighters heralded the end of the army’s work. The delay in disbanding fueled their discontent. Wine inadvertently provided by Lieutenant Edward Morris fanned the flames. Their demands expressed the desire of many soldiers for a demilitarized Jamaica, in which they would enjoy land, personal autonomy, and the protection of the law. They too objected to their hybrid state, neither fully soldiers nor fully planters. Tyson and his fellow conspirator, John Raymond, died for attempting forcibly to solve this impasse. A military tribunal ordered their execution on the eve of the Restoration. While Raymond’s death sparked no protests, many observers as well as Tyson’s relations at home were dismayed by his death. At the time, his wife and servants were en route to join him in Jamaica.⁴⁵ Clearly Tyson intended to make Jamaica his home and to pursue planting as a private gentleman, a status he tried to precipitate through his ill-conceived uprising. The mutiny signaled the willingness of many of the survivors in the army to commit to Jamaica, but did little to hurry the process of shifting to a civil colony.

The demands of Tyson and the others for civil government were addressed first in a serious way in 1661, after Tyson’s death and indeed over six years after the army arrived and penned the first accounts of a

prosperous English Jamaica. A November report advocated rapidly establishing civil government. Possibly guided by this recommendation, the king wrote to Doyley in February (with instructions that would not arrive until late spring), ordering him to set up civil government. After officially proclaiming the king, he was to create a council of twelve, to establish both civil and Admiralty courts, to encourage Church of England clergymen, and to survey the island and record land grants. Doyley complied with these instructions, creating a council, establishing courts, commissioning a map of the island, and registering grants.⁴⁶ His journal charts a surge in land records, some no doubt new grants, but much of it confirming earlier allocations. His opportunities to support the Church of England were few, given the dearth of clergy of any sort on the island. Doyley made strides toward creating the infrastructure basic to a settler colony.

While Doyley solidified the basis of civil governance, it was left to his successor to disband the army. The first governor sent out by Charles II, Thomas, Lord Windsor, arrived in August 1662 carrying extensive instructions, not only to establish civil government but to see to the development of the island in other respects as well. Most importantly, he carried the “donative,” money and goods that Charles provided to pay off the army. Demobilizing the army and blending the men into the civilian population would add to the numbers of settlers, and these men had already survived the seasoning period that so often killed new arrivals. In addition, they enjoyed local experience and—in the case of the officers and the more fortunate of the enlisted men—had already begun cultivating land. Presented as a gift, the funds were intended to provide payment to each surviving soldier. In practice, Windsor skimmed off a large share of the approximately £20,000 for himself and favored some recipients over others. Converting the funds into goods (or even chattel) that would further planting aimed to keep former soldiers tied to the island, in hopes of cementing their commitment. Once released from their military duty, they became part of militia units Windsor organized, appointing three army officers to join him and newly arrived Vice Admiralty Court judge William Mitchel to head the five regiments. Subsequently, under Deputy Governor Lyttelton, the government confirmed the position of Juan de Bola as head of his own regiment, in effect endorsing the earlier policy of accommodating the *Lluidas Vale*



A New Description of Jamaica
By Wm. Meade Esq.
Surveyor General
1662

The Royal Society
1662

community on terms evocative of Spanish practice.⁴⁷ Windsor's major contribution, then, was disbanding the army and establishing the militia. It was arguably the most important prerequisite for the move to civil society.

He and the men who followed him claimed to have inaugurated the transformation of Jamaica from garrison to colony in every respect, giving the long-suffering Doyley little credit. Windsor speciously asserted that he found the island without any government and created it in its entirety—"regulated (as much as the nature of a Plantation allow) to the Lawes and Government of England"—in the few months he stayed at his post. Samuel Pepys expressed well-founded skepticism when recording these claims upon the aristocrat's hasty return. Windsor left Sir Charles Lyttelton, his lieutenant governor, to manage his office, and Lyttelton did so until Windsor's commission was recalled in favor of a new royal governor, Sir Thomas Modyford, in 1664. Like Windsor, Lyttelton made vast claims as to his own accomplishments upon returning to England. The last component, and an essential element of a properly constituted colonial government as far as settlers were concerned, the Assembly—called in November 1663 (under Lyttelton)—probably sat in December.⁴⁸ Sir Thomas Modyford did not replicate the claims of his predecessors in taking credit for launching the civil courts. Rather, he declared them in need of reform. The second Assembly, elected soon after Modyford's arrival, repassed all legislation (with some key modifications) after declaring the first Assembly's work null and void.⁴⁹ Through the work of all four men between 1661 and 1664, Jamaica achieved colony status. One decade after the arrival of

Opposite: In August 1661, Colonel Edward Doyley ordered Jamaica's Surveyor General John Man to survey the island. The resulting map is the earliest Jamaica rendering produced after the English conquest, and it served as the basis of the map published by E. Hickeringill in his *Jamaica Viewed* (1661). The vellum original went home with Doyley the following year, to be bequeathed years later to his godson. While that copy disappeared, this version, also made by Man, eventually made its way into the collections of the British Library. Man dedicated this copy to the island's new governor, Thomas, Lord Windsor, during his brief stay on the island (August to October 1662). The map focuses on geographic features—rivers, bays, points—and omits the few towns.

© The British Library Board (Additional MS 16371.i).

the English, Jamaica had a fully constituted civil government, complete with governor, council, assembly, and a judiciary.

Falling into place by the end of 1661 and fully functioning by 1665, civil government represented one necessary ingredient in the creation of an English Jamaica and an important one for recruiting settlers. Civil courts were especially significant, as individual settlers wanted redress for conflicts over land and goods. Under Windsor, the Admiralty functions that Jamaica's naval and military leaders had performed previously were regularized. He appointed William Mitchel, brought for the purpose, to sit as judge over the Vice Admiralty Court. While not as significant to settlers as civil courts of law, Admiralty helped the island's economy run smoothly, by regulating maritime trade and the ongoing war with the Spanish.⁵⁰ An assembly promised planters a hand in the making of laws, giving landowners an opportunity to shape the legal environment. As the mutineer Edward Tyson declared, these civil institutions created a context in which men could make a firm and lasting commitment. The end of garrison government, although not a panacea, did address one major complaint.

Charles II and many of his contemporaries believed that only an elite man could govern such a colony and adequately represent royal authority. An anonymous text offering "Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica" (attributed to army officer Thomas Lynch) advocated sending an eminent and unbiased leader who would inspire confidence. Charles believed aristocratic stature to be essential. Although he named Doyley as his first official governor, finally sending him a commission that arrived in June 1661, Charles preferred a more distinguished man like Lord Windsor. The island responded to his eminence by appointing a horse guard for him, which it promptly disbanded when he left. Doyley ordered that a house be renovated to make ready for Windsor's arrival. Happily for the local lot holders, a scheme to grant him all of Point Cagway seems to have come to naught.⁵¹ Modyford, who officially followed Windsor, received his appointment only after aristocratic alternatives had been rejected.⁵² When he learned that his lieutenant governor commanded only modest means, Modyford asked that the king supply Edward Morgan slaves sufficient to elevate his status. Whether the king complied is unknown. A new governor, upon arrival, participated in rituals of visiting with the "gentlemen of the island," a ceremonial event that acknowledged him as representing the king's au-

thority. Rituals, beginning with the celebration of the king's birthday, helped to mark Jamaica as part of the royal domain, erasing its radical past and integrating it into the Stuart realm.⁵³ While the island had sorely lacked men of noble birth for most of its first decade, the officers endorsed the impulse to create a hierarchical society. Under Charles that drive continued.

The governor and his council, sitting first in June 1661, initially administered the new government. The first council was elected, largely comprised of the same men who had previously sat on the officers' council that advised Doyley. Subsequently the king appointed council members. Doyley and his council named civil officers and set basic governmental policies. For instance, the council chose its own members (with the addition of Major Richard Hope) as justices of the peace and established fees clergy could charge for services. Such rudiments of governance occupied the council's attention in its initial meetings, with appointments for positions from judges to water bailiffs and policies from weights and measures to imposts on alcohol. The agenda included setting a budget and providing for public buildings: prison, courthouse, and church joined the storehouse, the sole public building since the days when army rations offered the only meager sustenance. In the absence of an assembly, the council acted in a legislative capacity, enacting a wide variety of policies. Regulating servants garnered more attention than any other issue. To launch Jamaica with workable labor laws, the council took the shortcut of adopting a number of laws already in force in Barbados, having to do with terms of service, violence against masters, and pregnancy.⁵⁴ As councils always did (even when a legislature was present), the body responded to short-term issues as well, ranging from minimizing the damage from bad sugar on the market to deciding on the best use for copper guns gained in a successful assault on nearby Cuba.

An assembly augmented the work of the governor and council, beginning in 1663. Dating the first sitting of the Jamaica Assembly in 1664 overlooks the gathering authorized under Deputy Governor Lyttelton the year before. Lyttelton, governing after the departure of Lord Windsor, called for elections in November, and polling apparently took place in the month following. Rules for the sitting of the Assembly were drawn up in December, presumably just as (or perhaps just before) it was convened. A compilation of all the laws enacted by the council from 1661

through 1663 guided the work of this body, just as a subsequent compilation seems to have done for the legislature that sat under Modyford in November 1664. Lyttelton, recalled to England in May, reported on this Assembly. While he claimed credit for a number of innovations adopted under Doyley, the legislative body did indeed date from his term. When Sir Thomas Modyford assumed the post of governor in 1664, he reformed the court system—drawing upon his own legal training—and ordered another election. The body that sat in November 1664 passed twenty-seven laws, most of them based on previous enactments of the council.⁵⁵ With the addition of an assembly in these years, Jamaica achieved the structure common to English colonial governments, and one which it would maintain—despite a late seventeenth-century challenge—for centuries.

Functioning religious institutions were another necessary component of a successful settlement, although scant record survives of the details of their existence. The English government had been concerned to provide ministers for the island from the first, but how well these good intentions translated into ecclesiastical personnel and regular religious services is difficult to determine. Only two chaplains appeared on the muster in 1658, and three in 1659. Clergymen died along with other migrants. Even Thomas Gage, Venables's chaplain, who had lived in the region previously, did not survive long on Jamaica. One of the first forms of assistance that the Council of State organized after the island was seized sent bibles, on the assumption that enhancing godliness would bring success. "Several ministers" worked on the island in October 1661, as the council called on them to bring in their accounts. In the same year, the council divided Jamaica into parishes (initially called precincts), an administrative unit in use to the present day, and it ordered public funds to be used toward churches, among other edifices. Charles II not only ordered Doyley to encourage Church of England clergy, he also commanded that a warrant be issued to Thomas Povey to send five ministers or four ministers and a schoolmaster.⁵⁶ Ministers' maintenance was a recurring issue, addressed in 1661, 1663, and 1664.⁵⁷ By 1664, five ministers served in Jamaica. In addition, newly arrived Mr. Nicholas had recently died of the ailment that afflicted many of the *Westergate* passengers. George Johns had been on the island since at least 1660; "an old Army Preacher not yet in Orders," he agreed nonetheless to work within the established church (having officiated at the king's

birthday the first time it was celebrated on the island in 1661), and he was accepted in that capacity despite his lack of ordination. Parish names, which came into use by 1664, paid tribute to contemporary figures while at the same time invoking saints, a practice that sacralized the landscape as a Church of England outpost. Cromwell and his cronies avoided references to saints in this sense, so the usage both asserted Anglican establishment and honored individuals for whom the parishes were named.⁵⁸

Besides promoting the official state church after 1661, Jamaica also joined other colonies in offering relatively greater accommodation of alternative faiths. To the extent that Charles supported toleration beyond what Parliament would endorse in England, some colonies, including Jamaica, more closely adhered to the policies he announced in the Declaration of Breda than to the legislation passed by the Cavalier Parliament. The impulse to welcome religious minorities arose less out of an ideological commitment to religious liberty, however, and more from a desire to recruit people. A proclamation allowing religious diversity in 1662 welcomed Quakers and Jews, among others, and again in 1664 the king issued instructions in support of liberty of conscience.⁵⁹ Modyford worked with leading Quaker John Perrot to encourage recruitment of his coreligionists from Barbados and perhaps other islands, although the results of these efforts were not specifically reported. Whereas the authorities permitted religious diversity, they frowned upon linguistic difference: all the "Spanish Negroes" who lived free under English governance were required, by a 1663 ruling, to teach their children English.⁶⁰ Save for the reference to the flexible Mr. Johns, the surviving records are mute on the process whereby the remnants of a godly invading army adjusted to new religious reality. Accommodating alternatives to the official Church of England surely eased the transition.

Even with the creation of civil government, the removal of the resident Spanish threat, and various inducements, settler recruitment failed to make dramatic gains. Captain William Poole of the ship the *Great Charity* received authorization to recruit settlers by beat of drum in London, Westminster, and the suburbs in May 1661. This effort presumably generated the 200 he transported to the colony later that year. The *Diamond* brought at least as many from Barbados and possibly other English islands the following spring. Lord Windsor recruited more settlers in Barbados, using a high-handed approach that angered the local elites. The number he attracted appears to have been modest. Quakers

seemingly settled in Jamaica in 1662, soon to be augmented by those being forcibly transported in accordance with the Cavalier Parliament's legislative assault on sectarians.⁶¹ Modyford, who had been a planter in Barbados for seventeen years, enjoyed more success recruiting there. The current offer to settlers—free trade, liberty of conscience, and thirty acres—shared much in common with Cromwell's initial gambit; only free access to livestock was omitted. Continuing earlier practices, the king waived customs and imposts for five years from 1664 as well.⁶² Citing the basic benefits package, Modyford brought his own household of eighty, which included the enslaved persons he owned—a number that would instantly bring him 2,400 acres. Accompanying him when he took over the governorship in 1664 were another 900 Barbadians, most of them of modest means.⁶³ He thought more Barbados poor would follow with the right inducements. Beyond these occasional influxes of settlers, the arrival of free individuals occurred in smaller numbers that can no longer be documented.⁶⁴

The island's bad reputation helped explain the low rates of recruitment, as did competition offered by other colonial destinations. The dismal initial news from Jamaica took a continued toll. In early 1660, William Dalyson attributed failure to attract settlers from other islands to the presence of the Spanish, hoping their removal would turn the tide. The authorities during the Restoration, like those in the Interregnum, expected recruits to flow in from other colonies. This strategy Lord Willoughby (governor of Barbados) likened to taking out of one pocket to put into another. Governing an island that persistently refused to send as many settlers as expected, he advised thinking of Europe rather than the colonies as the "magazine of the people." While Jamaica's leaders and advocates often blamed the opposition of Barbadian elites, that small and densely settled island disgorged numerous settlers. They went to a variety of colonial locations, especially Willoughby's own Surinam, but also to the new venture in the Carolinas, advocated by Barbadians including Modyford before he was named governor of Jamaica. Yet migrants chose Jamaica relatively infrequently.⁶⁵ Prospective destinations being weighed in the balance, Jamaica often came up short. Its reputation slowed its growth, as those with a choice often avoided it.

An unknown number of unfree persons journeyed to Jamaica, the result of a variety of mechanisms used to funnel workers into any colony. Very few of the many servants who signed indentures and left Bristol

for a colonial port chose Jamaica as their destination in the colony's first years. Coerced migration yielded more people. The king permitted Sir James Modyford to collect all reprieved felons for transport to Jamaica for five years in fall 1664 as Modyford prepared to return to the island at the start of his brother's governorship.⁶⁶ Investors—such as the Earl of Carlisle or Martin Noell and Thomas Povey—sent their own servants to work land they acquired, on terms that have not been recorded. Numerous Quakers, falling afoul of Restoration-era laws, found themselves toiling in Jamaica. In one case, a captain refused to take Quakers consigned to his ship, having deemed them undeserving of forcible transportation, being instead godly and inoffensive.⁶⁷ Needless to say, Charles II's government was displeased. How many laborers ultimately went against their will in the first decade cannot be known, but coerced migration contributed people.

These strategies only slowly advanced the population of English Jamaica. Desultory recruitment, a continued high death rate among new arrivals, and some out-migration minimized growth. In 1660 the inhabitants had been generously estimated at 4,400, counting half of that number as “y^c reliques of y^e 6 regiments” with “planters, merchants, sailors, and others” as possibly amounting to as many more. Among them were 200 free Africans in their own community but acknowledging English rule. In 1662 “An Accompt of the Inhabitants on the Island of Jamaica” listed 3,653 people designated by gender and age, of which the vast majority were men (2,600), along with another 702 “Negroes” living alongside the English (552) or residing separately in their own “Pelince” (150) but acceding to English authority. Lyttelton estimated the adult male population at 3,000 in 1664, and women and children may have increased that number by another thousand or more. Around the same time, Lynch gave the overall population as between 4,000 and 5,000, noting that a survey was then under way.⁶⁸ For his part, Modyford felt ambivalent about surveying the population, fearful that low numbers, if they became known, would encourage the Spanish to attempt another invasion. With the population slowly reaching and then gradually surpassing 4,000, the efforts of the Restoration government to attract people met limited success. The modest flow barely offset the losses to death and departure. If the army landed 7,000 in 1655, more than a decade would pass before that figure would be attained again, much less surpassed.⁶⁹

With civil institutions outlined and population finally at least holding steady, the inhabitants took small steps toward realizing the island's economic potential. Planting was the basis of the settlement's future, as all observers knew. The king praised planting, declaring that it "alone can render y^c Island considerable." By August 1661, Jamaica hosted at least one well-established market on Saturdays at Colonel Barry's storehouse in Lygonea, and eighteen months later held additional quarterly market days as well as designating a place at Point Cagway for the regular purchase of fish and flesh. Planters pursued the initial vision of agricultural diversity. By 1660 residents grew sugar, cocoa, cotton, tobacco, and provisions. At this time, indigo grew readily as well, but "for want of hands," little was processed. A decade later, the major commodities remained the same, except that tobacco had been deemphasized in favor of the others.⁷⁰ In addition, the settlers harvested some of the "innumerable kinds of several *Fruits* that have scarcely found a name in *English* with which the Woods are so universally *crowded*." Some planters harvested annatto (or anchiote) as well as vanilla, china root, cassia fistula, tamarinds, and the Jamaica pimento. Salt making, which had begun under William Brayne in 1657, continued, and "great quantities" of hardwoods "were daily exported" from the forests. Livestock—not only cattle but also sheep, goats, and hogs—roamed the savannas, having been replenished after the initial decimation of the cattle population in the first years of the English presence. In 1659 Burroughs described the "Livelyhood in y^c Comon way of y^c island" as "by planting and stock of Cattle."⁷¹ Save for the harvest of wood and other minor items for export, he well summarized the repertoire.

The planters did not rely heavily upon sugar cultivation initially, although later it would emerge as the principal crop. The Spanish had grown some sugar, and as of 1658, two of their sugar works remained in operation. Richard Fortescue died too soon to realize his hopes of raising another, according to Mary, his widow, who was still trying to claim his estate five years later.⁷² According to a "Committee on American Affairs" report written to the Lord Protector, a few tried sugar cultivation, but had little to show for it. In 1660 William Dalyson was able to send his cousin Robert Blackborne a small pot of sugar produced on Jamaica to have with his "morning draughts." Island visitor William Hughes anticipated that Jamaica would eventually produce the best sugar of all the islands, but not much was accomplished toward that goal

when he touched at Jamaica around the time of the Restoration. The move occurred only later, furthered by an influx of displaced sugar planters (and their labor force) who arrived after the English loss of Surinam to the Dutch later in the century.⁷³


The English pinned their hopes far more on cocoa. The Spanish had grown cocoa, and upon their arrival the English found “cocoa walks.” Since cocoa trees flourish in shade, farmers planted rows of larger trees alternating with those bearing cocoa to provide cover. Banana plants served this function in seventeenth-century Jamaica as elsewhere. Officers, among them Barrington, received land grants containing established walks. According to Hughes, who visited the island briefly around 1660, Long Walk and Barrington’s plantation grew the best cocoa. The inferior officers under Thomas Fairfax received a cocoa walk in 1661. While his untimely demise prevented Barrington from enjoying the benefits of his Jamaica estate, other officers who had received land grants including cocoa saw these confirmed by vote of the Jamaica Council in 1663.⁷⁴ In drafting instructions for Lord Windsor in 1661, English authorities deemed cocoa worthy of encouragement. No other crop earned special mention. When Charles Lyttelton advised the king to invest in Jamaica agriculture to generate the funds the royal treasurer would put toward the island, he thought a cocoa plantation the best option. While Dalyson sent a pot of sugar as a novelty, he consigned numerous cargoes of cocoa on board England-bound ships to pay off his debts. By 1662 planter Peter Beckford had a warehouse in England to receive his cocoa shipments. If any single crop appeared especially promising in the first decade, cocoa did.⁷⁵

Moving Jamaica from the Spanish to the English imperial network meant that its tropical crops instantly gained a market among eager English consumers. With all Spanish islands producing much the same crops, the Spanish consumers sought only one uniquely Jamaican crop, the pepper out of which a spicy condiment was produced. English planters enjoyed more opportunities to provide crops that were not otherwise available, and they hung their hopes for Jamaica’s economic future on meeting this demand. Londoners quickly developed a taste for the Jamaican pepper, “w^{ch} some heere doe fancie to be a pleasant, wholesome and a useful spice.” In an effort to restrict competition from other growers for this and other tropical produce, Jamaica planters legislated that no plant could be removed for cultivating in another colonial location. They

A catalogue of the severall Precincts, with the most Eminent Sett

Princt.	Cocoa Indigo Sugar Soyers	Precincts	Cocoa Indigo Sugar Soyers	Precincts	Cocoa Indigo Sugar Soyers
PoRoyal		Coll Burnes Gulley Bowers Gulley		St Andrews	
1 The Ca		St Johns		1 Coll Archbull	
2 The Id		1 Coll John Cope	1	2 Livet ^e Coll Hope	
3 The F		2 Maj. Ayscough	2	3 Maj. Whitfield	
Suthernes		3 Cap. Ashme	3	4 Livet ^e Brayne	
1 St. Thaddis	1	4 Cap. Gray	4	5 M. Shuife	
2 St. Joadisford	1	5 Cap. Taylor	5	6 M. Bennet	
3 Maj. G. Buddiford	1	6 M. Lym. Dod	6	7 Judge Vallet	
4 Coll. Ballard	1	7 Livet ^e Price	7	8 Maj. Shallet	
5 Judg. As	2	8 M. Coniers	8	9 Thornes store house	
6 Royalowany	2	9 Cap. Gaywood	9	10 M. Howel	
7 Col. Aey	1	10 Cap. Langher	10	11 Cap. Keene	
8 Judg. As	1	11 Cap. Oldfield	11	12 M. Coniers	
9 Juice. Pan	1	12 M. Bragg	12	13 C. Archbole	
10 Ch. No	1	13 Cap. Nelson	13	14 M. Barry	
11 Whe. Chel	1	14 Cap. Mayworth	14	15 Joh. Lewis Esq.	
12 Juice. Pman	1	15 Fran. Imans	15	16 E ^t de L. Aree	
13 Co. Bitts Fme	1	16 Livet ^e Whites Farms	16	17 his Farms	
14 Ma. Full	2	17 M. Holmes	17	18 M. Long	
15 Cap. Valt	2	18 M. Stiles Farms	18	St Davids	
16 Livet ^e He	2	19 Livet ^e Charnock	19	1 Livet ^e Coll. Freeman	
17 Cap. Free	1	20 Livet ^e Gilbert Cope	20	2 M. Reeves	
18 Par. W	1	21 Livet ^e Anderson	21	3 M. Scoakes	
19 Cap. Ward	1	22 M. Trigg	22	4 M. Richardson	
20 Greeneths Esq	1	23 Livet ^e Gregory	23	5 M. Hobby	
21 Col. No. L	1	24 Livet ^e Barefield	24	6 M. Alexander	
22 Col. No. L	1	25 The. Beacon	25	7 Maj. Lloyd	
23 Live. Ver.	1	26 The. Church	26	8 M. Burton	
24 Enst. Hunt	1	27 M ^{rs} Reade	27	9 Smithys hill	
25 Cap. Ch. W. Ford	1			10 M. Fox	
26 Sale in H	1			11 Coll. Fremans stores	
				12 The. Church	

Ten years after the first published map from English Jamaica, John Ogilby produced one for his *America* (1671). It presented information gathered by order of Governor Sir Thomas Modyford the previous year. An inset table listed the



Settlements therein, marked and numbred as followeth

Cocoa				Indigo				Sugar				Cotton			
Precincts				Precincts				Precincts				Precincts			
St Thomas				St Elizabeth				St Georges							
1	1	1	1	21	21	1	1	1	1	1	1				
1	1	1	1	St Elizabeth				St Georges							
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				
1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	1	1				
1	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	3	3	1	1				
1	1	1	1	4	4	1	1	4	4	1	1				
1	1	1	1	5	5	1	1	5	5	1	1				
1	1	1	1	6	6	1	1	6	6	1	1				
1	1	1	1	7	7	1	1	7	7	1	1				
1	1	1	1	8	8	1	1	8	8	1	1				
1	1	1	1	9	9	1	1	9	9	1	1				
1	1	1	1	10	10	1	1	10	10	1	1				
1	1	1	1	11	11	1	1	11	11	1	1				
1	1	1	1	12	12	1	1	12	12	1	1				
1	1	1	1	13	13	1	1	13	13	1	1				
1	1	1	1	14	14	1	1	14	14	1	1				
1	1	1	1	15	15	1	1	15	15	1	1				
1	1	1	1	16	16	1	1	16	16	1	1				
1	1	1	1	17	17	1	1	17	17	1	1				
1	1	1	1	18	18	1	1	18	18	1	1				
1	1	1	1	19	19	1	1	19	19	1	1				
1	1	1	1	20	20	1	1	20	20	1	1				
1	1	1	1	21	21	1	1	21	21	1	1				
1	1	1	1	22	22	1	1	22	22	1	1				
1	1	1	1	23	23	1	1	23	23	1	1				
1	1	1	1	24	24	1	1	24	24	1	1				
1	1	1	1	25	25	1	1	25	25	1	1				
1	1	1	1	26	26	1	1	26	26	1	1				
1	1	1	1	27	27	1	1	27	27	1	1				
1	1	1	1	28	28	1	1	28	28	1	1				
1	1	1	1	29	29	1	1	29	29	1	1				
1	1	1	1	30	30	1	1	30	30	1	1				
1	1	1	1	31	31	1	1	31	31	1	1				
1	1	1	1	32	32	1	1	32	32	1	1				
1	1	1	1	33	33	1	1	33	33	1	1				
1	1	1	1	34	34	1	1	34	34	1	1				
1	1	1	1	35	35	1	1	35	35	1	1				
1	1	1	1	36	36	1	1	36	36	1	1				
1	1	1	1	37	37	1	1	37	37	1	1				
1	1	1	1	38	38	1	1	38	38	1	1				
1	1	1	1	39	39	1	1	39	39	1	1				
1	1	1	1	40	40	1	1	40	40	1	1				
1	1	1	1	41	41	1	1	41	41	1	1				
1	1	1	1	42	42	1	1	42	42	1	1				
1	1	1	1	43	43	1	1	43	43	1	1				
1	1	1	1	44	44	1	1	44	44	1	1				
1	1	1	1	45	45	1	1	45	45	1	1				
1	1	1	1	46	46	1	1	46	46	1	1				
1	1	1	1	47	47	1	1	47	47	1	1				
1	1	1	1	48	48	1	1	48	48	1	1				
1	1	1	1	49	49	1	1	49	49	1	1				
1	1	1	1	50	50	1	1	50	50	1	1				
1	1	1	1	51	51	1	1	51	51	1	1				
1	1	1	1	52	52	1	1	52	52	1	1				
1	1	1	1	53	53	1	1	53	53	1	1				
1	1	1	1	54	54	1	1	54	54	1	1				
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1	1	1	1	57	57	1	1	57	57	1	1				
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1	1	1	1	60	60	1	1	60	60	1	1				
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1	1	1	1	62	62	1	1	62	62	1	1				
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1	1	1	1	65	65	1	1	65	65	1	1				
1	1	1	1	66	66	1	1	66	66	1	1				
1	1	1	1	67	67	1	1	67	67	1	1				
1	1	1	1	68	68	1	1	68	68	1	1				
1	1	1	1	69	69	1	1	69	69	1	1				
1	1	1	1	70	70	1	1	70	70	1	1				
1	1	1	1	71	71	1	1	71	71	1	1				
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1	1	1	1	73	73	1	1	73	73	1	1				
1	1	1	1	74	74	1	1	74	74	1	1				
1	1	1	1	75	75	1	1	75	75	1	1				
1	1	1	1	76	76	1	1	76	76	1	1				
1	1	1	1	77	77	1	1	77	77	1	1				
1	1	1	1	78	78	1	1	78	78	1	1				
1	1	1	1	79	79	1	1	79	79	1	1				
1	1	1	1	80	80	1	1	80	80	1	1				
1	1	1	1	81	81	1	1	81	81	1	1				
1	1	1	1	82	82	1	1	82	82	1	1				
1	1	1	1	83	83	1	1	83	83	1	1				
1	1	1	1	84	84	1	1	84	84	1	1				
1	1	1	1	85	85	1	1	85	85	1	1				
1	1	1	1	86	86	1	1	86	86	1	1				
1	1	1	1	87	87	1	1	87	87	1	1				
1	1	1	1	88	88	1	1	88	88	1	1				
1	1	1	1	89	89	1	1	89	89	1	1				
1	1	1	1	90	90	1	1	90	90	1	1				
1	1	1	1	91	91	1	1	91	91	1	1				
1	1	1	1	92	92	1	1	92	92	1	1				
1	1	1	1	93	93	1	1	93	93	1	1				
1	1	1	1	94	94	1	1	94	94	1	1				
1	1	1	1	95	95	1	1	95	95	1	1				
1	1	1	1	96	96	1	1	96	96	1	1				
1	1	1	1	97	97	1	1	97	97	1	1				
1	1	1	1	98	98	1	1	98	98	1	1				
1	1	1	1	99	99	1	1	99	99	1	1				
1	1	1	1	100	100	1	1	100	100	1	1				

major landowners in each parish (here called "precincts") and noted which of the four major crops each grew: cocoa, indigo, sugar, and cotton.

"Novissima et Accuratissima Jamaicae," in John Ogilby, *America: Being the Latest, and Most Accurate Description of the New World* (1671), following 336. The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, RB2695.

prefaced their restrictive policy with the observation that “Allmighty God of his great Providence has wonderfully Blest this his Ma^{ties} Island with Div^{rs} & Sundry excellent commodities not to be found in any Islands or other parts of his Ma^{ties} Domions in America.”⁷⁶ Some enterprising local merchants attempted to expand the volume of tropical products passing through Jamaica, in effect extended the island’s range, by purchasing hardwoods (especially mahogany) from independent cutters working on the mainland. The Spanish objected to this resource extraction as further violating their territorial rights, but the highly profitable industry was quietly permitted to pass through Jamaican ports.⁷⁷ Jamaica became an emporium for tropical agricultural products desired in England, just as the first arrivals had imagined.

A few people in Jamaica and more in England envisioned the island fitting into the regional economy in a different fashion. They desired trade directly with Spanish America in order to gain access to the silver that flowed out of mines on the mainland. They hoped to capitalize on the prime location of Jamaica not by harassing the Spanish but by using it as a hub for regional trade. A first effort along these lines dated from the 1650s and aimed for commerce not with the enemy but rather with native peoples on the Florida coast. The effort of London merchants to set up a base floundered, however, partly due to the incompetence of the drunken Dutch captain the investors employed. Through his negligence he lost one of their vessels to the Indians of Virginia.⁷⁸ Given that Jamaica produced nothing (save for its pepper) that Spanish America lacked, the trade these developers envisioned of necessity minimized the role of Jamaican agriculture (and with it the potential profits to local landowners) in favor of transshipping other goods. By the laws of both England and Spain, that trade could not be conducted: English Navigation Acts (reaffirmed at the Restoration) restricted trade to English ports, while Spanish policy blocked any foreign commerce with its American holdings. Such policies did not mean that American residents could not consume items produced by other empires, but those items had to pass through the metropole before coming (on ships of their own country) to the colonies. To break open these barriers on the Spanish side, English planners discussed the need to force trade locally. The strategy recalled Elizabeth sea dogs who “forced” willing governors to allow them access to local markets while giving them plausible deniability when confronting higher officials enforcing restrictions.

Sir Charles Lyttelton, when he left the island in 1664, reported that trade could otherwise only be effected by order from Spain, an unlikely prospect.⁷⁹

Enslaved Africans, which the Spanish chronically sought, offered the best prospect for such a trade. Both the Dutch and the English wished to gain legal access to this trade and pursued it illegally when they could. The Privy Council in 1663 excluded slaves from the Navigation Acts, making it legal (on the English side) to establish exchanges between Barbados or Jamaica and the Spanish colonies, and England's new Royal African Company (RAC) entered into an agreement with the Genoese agents (Domingo Grillo and Ambrosio Lomelin) who held the *asiento* (or contract) to broker slaves in Spanish America. This trade envisioned using Jamaica as one site for transshipment, bringing little direct benefit to residents.⁸⁰ As a result, the Duke of York (Lord High Admiral as well as chief shareholder in the company) advocated peace with Spain. He eventually started the Second Anglo-Dutch War over the trade (by ordering attacks on Dutch slave-trading stations on the coast of Africa). The RAC sent a few shipments of enslaved Africans through Jamaica (and probably on to the Spanish mainland) from 1663 to 1666. Sir Thomas Modyford, who had served the RAC in Barbados toward the end of his time there, may have been chosen governor in part because of this work, in the hopes that he would develop the trade through Jamaica as well.⁸¹ Shortly after he arrived, however, the trade collapsed, in part as a result of the Dutch War. From London, tying Jamaica's economic future to such a trade held out promise, but on the island it offered little to residents, either planters or local merchants.

Sir Thomas Modyford assumed the governorship at a moment when Jamaica appeared to be moving toward success as a settlement. Assessing progress a decade after the launch of the Design, two accounts, dating from 1663 and 1664, surveyed the circumstances and needs of the infant English colony. Jamaica boasted seven parishes, organized around clusters of population: St. Catherine's (site of the original Spanish town, known in the 1660s as St. Jago, and of Angels); St. John's (inland from St. Catherine's, centered on Guanaboa); Port Royal; Clarendon (immediately to the east, housing Seven Plantations); St. David's (the site of Yallahs); St. Andrew's (Liguanea); and St. Thomas (Morant Bay). These seven parishes—all in the south-central to eastern part of the island—had

five “good & Large” militia regiments, which grew out of the original regimental deployments to such locations as Angels, Guanaboa, Yallahs, and Liguanea. All enjoyed access to civil institutions, with justices of the peace throughout the settled sectors and courts held in a few central locations. Five ministers served them. Only St. Catherine’s, which encompassed St. Jago, had a church edifice—a “faire Spanish Church ruined by the Old Souldiers & Lately in some measure repayrd by Sir Charles Littleton”—although fund-raising to erect buildings in most of the others was under way. One settlement in the interior, the Pelinco under Juan de Bola, whose name was here rendered “Don Hall Bolo,” stands out not only in Jamaica but in the English Atlantic. It represented the only case in which English colonizers cohabitated with an organized community of free African-descended people. It bore striking similarities to a town in Spanish Florida inhabited largely by former slaves of the English colonies to the north, who enjoyed similar autonomy under Spanish rule. Both cases were prompted by interimperial rivalries and, for the English, hinted at the possibility of a different path for relations between English and African. The text’s author noted the remarkable arrangement by describing the inhabitants as “much our friends” as well as “having their freedome as other planters.”⁸²

Just as the first English on the island had imagined, the residents produced a wide variety of agricultural products for export and local consumption. They grew sugar, ginger, indigo, cotton, tobacco, and cocoa, the last singled out as “excell’ good.” Dyewoods for export and a variety of timber grew, as did pimento, china root, aloe, rhubarb, “salsa periglo” (sarsaparilla), tamarind, cassa, and vanilla. They had sufficiently restocked after the devastation of livestock herds in the first years that residents again traded hides and tallow. Provisions flourished too, “in great plenty,” including corn, cassada, potatoes, yams, plantains, “bonnets” (apparently the Scotch bonnet pepper), and “Peas of all sorts.” The island also offered various fish and fowls, and some sheep. In short supply, however, were horses and asses, needed for the eighteen sugar works that one account enumerated.⁸³ The bounty anticipated in 1655 had not yet been realized, but starvation had become a thing of the past.

These two accounts assessing progress in 1663–64 glossed over the larger geopolitical situation in which Jamaica existed—and which the English conquest had done much to create. They touched upon the militia and on the fortifications, including their condition and the number

and quality of their armaments. The new Fort Charles on Cagway (or “Gangway”) point took pride of place, with its tower and guns of various sizes, including some made of brass. Passage Fort, in contrast, was much decayed. The ongoing hostilities with Spain received no mention, however, nor did either report foreground the presence of the occasional naval vessel or the more numerous but smaller private men-of-war that used the island as a base. Guns in Fort Charles had been taken from distant Spanish towns in various raids. Others—including five copper guns seized in November 1662 at Santiago de Cuba—had been sold to help finance the fort.⁸⁴ Amid Spanish colonies that generally refused to trade—or to accept the existence of an English Jamaica—the islanders continued to live with the reality of hostile neighbors unwilling to accept their presence. Preying on Spanish shipping and settlements remained a viable option for those with the means to do so. The king had ordered his new governor, Sir Thomas, to try to open trade with the Spanish and to rein in the privateers as a gesture of goodwill. Modyford would find these instructions difficult to follow even before multinational war engulfed the region in 1665.

Conclusion

THE WESTERN DESIGN and the invasion of Jamaica brought numerous innovations to England and its Atlantic dominions. For the first time, the state became directly involved in the business of expansion instead of delegating that work to individuals or chartered companies. The assault on Spanish America also marked the first seizure of a colony held by another “Christian Prince,” thereby replacing the previous policy of taking only lands inhabited by native peoples. The Design fleet rivaled any that a European power had sailed across the Atlantic, and introduced the English navy—as opposed to privately financed ships—into American waters. When their Spanish foes complained that the English dominated the seas around Jamaica, they identified an obstacle that would vex later foes facing British imperial power. Within the context of Cromwell’s own career, the move to the West Indies shifted the balance from army to navy, a rather surprising alteration for the brilliant military leader. The occupation of Jamaica prompted the English state to initiate a new centralized imperial administration, with William Brayne appointed governor general over all the English colonies.¹ The Design era also witnessed the first Admiralty activity in the colonies and bespoke the state’s commitment to regulating the trade of its far-flung possessions. In the context of administering Jamaica, English policy makers created committees to oversee distant outposts, recognizing and working to meet the demands of imperial management.² The Western Design formed a template for England’s and later Britain’s imperial future.

The English capture of Jamaica shifted the geopolitics of the Caribbean. For three decades before 1655, the English and others made inroads with small colonies rimming the Caribbean Sea’s outer reaches.

In 1655 the English returned to the center of Spanish activity, and did so in a far more dramatic way than had been the case at Providence Island two decades before. Taking a major Spanish island, one proximate to sea lanes and to Havana, where the *Flota de Indias* gathered, the move threatened central Spanish concerns, prompting war and repeated counterinvasion attempts. Vast territorial acquisitions or regional domination never materialized, but the Design signaled the advent of a more activist state, one with aspirations to enter the competition among other states; underscored the centrality of naval power to England's increased engagement in the Atlantic and the wider world; and schooled the English in tropical warfare and expansion. The English presence drew others to the heart of the Spanish West Indies, as France made a sustained push to hold Tortuga and to colonize the adjacent sector of Hispaniola. Henceforth Caribbean warfare shifted, from violence aimed at capturing Spanish wealth to multinational conflicts pitting various powers against each other. War elsewhere invariably spilled over into the region, and the new level of violence far exceeded the small-scale raiding that had characterized the decades prior to settlement of the eastern Caribbean.

Although 1660 has been routinely treated as a sharp reversal of various revolutionary policies, nothing could be further from the truth. After the Restoration in 1660, Cromwell's project and policies remained firmly in place. Retaining Jamaica, passing a Navigation Act patterned on previous legislation, pushing Spain to meet the demands laid out before the Design fleet sailed, and embracing the concept of a centralized imperial organization and a state able to project power through its naval might, the Restoration government pretended it had taken nothing from its predecessors. If innovation occurred immediately at the Restoration, it was limited to the Duke of York's push to increase England's capacity to trade slaves in order to break into the Spanish American markets. Although the Company of Royal Adventurers would prove ineffectual in the short term, English would-be slave traders would ultimately achieve their aim of dominating the transatlantic trade in human cargo. A major (if deferred) commitment to human trafficking represented the primary accomplishment of the Restoration, which in most other respects closely followed Cromwellian blueprints.

While Cromwell's grand Design launched many aspects of the future imperial agenda, contemporaries nonetheless deemed it a disappointment. England never dominated the West Indies as Cromwell had intended. Jamaica exponentially increased the extent of West Indian

territory under England's control, but its early history was fraught with difficulties. Thomas Povey, who cared passionately about the outcome although he never visited the island, offered his assessment within the year before Charles II gained the throne. Completely frustrated, he fumed that "noe Affaire of consequence was even in any age engaged in by this Nation undertaken with less Councell, conducted with less prudence, attempted with less Courage, prosecuted with less Success, and attended from time to time with less care and assistance from the State, then this Expedition." What particularly annoyed him was the fact that the authorities rendered "the undertaking perfectly ridiculous, by withdrawing all manner of Countenance or Succours from it," while at the same time refusing to allow private adventurers (such as himself and his patron, Martin Noell) to take over its management. The root of the problem arose after the initial attempt on Hispaniola failed, because Cromwell and his council felt both "ashamed" and "soe vexed and busyed in encountering those numerous ill Consequences w^{ch} have arisen out of it" that they "wholly did cast of[f] the thoughts of it and so . . . deserted it as unprofitable and of a remote and hopeless consideration." It did nothing for Jamaica's prospects that the republican regime that briefly replaced the Protectorate saw it as Cromwell's project and felt little desire to support it. Thus Jamaica drifted, not even improved sufficiently to make it "worth buying [back] by the Spanyard" on terms that would benefit England and the island's current residents. Having sent a younger brother on the Design and labored to get the authorities to contribute more to the undertaking, Povey despaired. He would be happily surprised when the Restoration eventually reinvigorated the central government's commitment.³

Povey correctly noted that the defeat on Hispaniola had been embarrassing. It marred the Protector's reputation for military achievement, the low point in an otherwise remarkable career. Providential interpretations became the order of the day in part to explain the unexpected outcome: God's hand had to be behind such a stunning defeat. Once the revolution had been overturned, references to Hispaniola openly indulged in a mocking tone. In 1670, in an effort to disgrace the son of Admiral Penn, one pamphleteer ridiculed the father for having done "eminent service for the English nation at Hispaniola, when he delivered up the Flower of the English Souldiers a Sacrifice to the Cow Killers." His association with Cromwell and with ignoble defeat both

tainted the senior Penn. When a Restoration-era judge ordering prisoners transported to a colony mentioned Hispaniola, a bystander corrected him, saying, "Oliver did not get that for you." The pamphlet author noted with disgust that the ignorant judge cited "a place that never yet belonged to England."⁴ Little wonder that Jamaica became similarly damned by association.


Povey also rightly perceived that England lacked the basic ability to pursue such a scheme. With the Western Design, the state deployed resources on a monumental scale, part of new capabilities developed in a time of revolution and continual warfare. Yet Cromwell's ambitious agenda was not yet matched by a commensurate ability to fulfill its goals. England had only begun to erect the systems that would pool the necessary expertise. A bureaucracy dependent on a few—one that was seriously hampered when a handful of key players in the naval administration withdrew from government employment in opposition to the Protectorate—lacked the level of elaboration offered by an interchangeable professional class. The English state had no experience mounting campaigns in the tropics, and it faced a steep learning curve when addressing challenges of scale and distance. Povey's conclusion that only privatization would allow the undertaking to flourish gained little ground with England's rulers either before or after the Restoration, however. They remained wedded to Cromwell's vision, that the state would be central in the creation as well as the management of empire. Povey's own nephew and ward, William Blathwayt, became a key imperial bureaucrat, pursuing his uncle's agenda under the auspices of a better-developed central state more able to pursue a global empire. The commitment required to make Jamaica flourish asked more of England than Cromwell had anticipated or than a revolutionary state limping toward its denouement had been ready to give, as Povey knew.

Cromwell, Povey, and others understood the military campaign as the major work of the Design, but Jamaica threw down unexpected challenges typical of early colonization attempts. In a mockery of early writings about its bountiful future, few of the original arrivals lived to see what the English would make of Jamaica. Dying proved as central to the experience of inhabitants initially as it would in the eighteenth century.⁵ Settlers chose not to migrate, labor was scarce and expensive, and the army held by force on the island grew restive. Even conquering this lightly defended island occupied much time and effort. Anticipating

the eager support of Jamaica's exploited people, the invading army was stunned that the island's laborers did not greet them as liberators. Almost five years after the invasion, the English army finally rooted out the guerrilla fighters, and they did so as a direct result of assistance from the Lluidas Vale community, but that aid had to be coerced. In a remarkable development, the English agreed to permit that community to remain distinct and its residents free, in exchange for a pledge to assist in eradicating other concealed villages. Nowhere else in the Atlantic world would English and African enter into this sort of arrangement, evocative of Spanish colonial strategy, especially in contested borderlands.

The difficult of Jamaica's beginnings, combined with the defeat on Hispaniola and the later hostility to the Cromwellian Protectorate, meant that Jamaica's origins were better forgotten. The leaders of Restoration England chose both to keep the island and to erase its connection to the revolutionary regime of Oliver Cromwell. In this act of erasure, Charles II and the men around him could enjoy Jamaica's fruits and cultivate the newly activist state without acknowledging their debt to their predecessors. The Restoration project of denial found willing allies among many participants in the Design forces who eagerly claimed the status of persecuted royalists sent to Jamaica to rid Cromwell of the king's supporters. While some claims contained a kernel of truth in that they reflected an individual's royalist proclivities, many were entirely opportunistic efforts to align themselves with the winners. Jamaican elites followed the lead of their erstwhile commander in chief, Edward Dooley, depicting themselves as the beneficiaries of their king's gracious care. Decades later, former Cromwellian army captain and royal governor Thomas Lynch invoked this narrative, citing the "donative" sent to pay off the army as one sign of that care.⁶ Later scholarship has been colored by the idea of Jamaica as royalist haven (or hell), citing these belated pledges of long-standing dedication to the Stuart cause to show that Cromwell used the Design as a dumping ground for his opponents. This interpretation assumes that he knew of the shockingly high death rate that would greet the men in the West Indies and that he drastically stretched his government's resources in order to fit out a fleet to facilitate this purpose. Both assumptions run counter to much contemporary evidence.

Historians have been almost entirely complicit in the project of forgetting. Accepting royalist claims, they reduce the Design to an ex-



Produced sometime in the 1680s, this collage of maps indicated the rising importance of Jamaica. The depiction of Jamaica, disproportionately large, dwarfed the North American seaboard as well as the West Indies as a whole. The title continued the theme, designating the other areas as “the Continent and Islands . . . Adjacent to Jamaica.”

Philip Lea, “Generall Mapp of the Continent and Islands which bee Adjacent to Jamaica” (ca. 1680). The Huntington Library, San Marino, California, 105:322 M.

travagant effort to eliminate a domestic threat. At the same time, they tend to follow Cromwell and his compatriots in minimizing the impediment posed by Spain, seeing its exclusionist policies in the Caribbean as inconsequential and the Spanish ability to respond to the Design as nonexistent. Doing so, they then suggest that the war fought out of Jamaica over the next decade and a half arose not from state policy but

from privateers run amok. In the usual reading, Jamaica needed no defense, as no sustained war effort existed. Raiding arose from cunning locals invoking the excuse of Spanish hostilities as a cover for their depredations. Jamaica is thus reduced to a pirate haven that mattered little to the history of the British Empire until it became the sugar-producing and slave-brutalizing powerhouse of the mid-eighteenth century.

The scheme, far from being the delusion of a small circle around Cromwell, actually embodied views held across the political spectrum—by English and other Europeans and by Cromwellian supporters as well as opponents, both royalist and republican. Expectations of easy victory aided by grateful Africans and Indians eager to throw off the Spanish yoke captured a host of widely shared attitudes: that the Spanish were weak as well as cruel, that Cromwell was all but invincible, and that the people abused in Spain's American domains awaited English rescuers. Fantasies about the Atlantic that shaped Cromwellian policy built upon an Elizabethan obsession with Spain embellished with more imaginative associations that had grown up around distant colonial spaces since that time. When the English interpreted the island's limited development and stunted population as the result of Spanish character flaws, and thereby bolstered their confidence that they would easily improve this new land, they indulged in common reveries of effortless fecundity and potential profitability.

The religious prejudices evinced in the campaign were also commonplace. Eager to consign a crusading "puritan" Cromwell to the wrong side of history, we might be tempted to present his anti-Spanish rhetoric as an anachronistic return to Elizabethan Hispanophobia. Overheated fears of Spain and Catholicism, joined with the ubiquitous providentialism, mark the participants as backward-looking, suggesting to some scholars that anyone holding such views could not contribute in any meaningful way to the future British Empire or modernity. In trying to make the case for the Western Design's importance, the great nineteenth-century historian Samuel Rawson Gardiner felt compelled to circumvent such assumptions. He minimized the undertaking's religious significance in order to make the case for its centrality to empire.⁷ Yet treating religion and modernity as antithetical categories misconstrues the process of historical change. In the seventeenth century (as in our own),

religious frameworks inform action, motivate actors, and bring about outcomes beyond the realm of belief.

Nor should Jamaica be dismissed as a mere pirate haven, the most common popular association with Jamaica today (although not in its own day). In our imaginations and much of the literature, privateering looms large. Yet its presence in early English Jamaica was modest. The navy dominated the sea war in the first five years and continued as a minor presence thereafter. The role of private men-of-war, nominal initially, grew slowly after 1660. Few men pursued a full-time livelihood as privateers. Instead landowners and other free men on Jamaica joined assaults, drawn by the prospect of quick gain. The appeal was sufficiently great that the government in 1662 announced that no undertakings were currently planned, and ordered everyone to return to their usual employment. Regulations to prevent planters from leaving permanently to take up a marauding life attempted to restrict participation in future campaigns to those who maintained a commitment to the island. Privateering, both its appeal and its prospects, increased with the advent of the Second Anglo Dutch War at mid-decade and peaked with the offensives planned in the late 1660s. Henry Morgan's dramatic assault on Panama, although not *sui generis*, stood out for its ambition and impact.⁸ It did not represent either the usual business of Jamaica or a viable option for the island in the future. Scholars persist in the use of the more provocative term "piracy" for this activity, adopting the Spanish interpretive framework in which everyone in these seas was a *pirata*, while assuming that Spanish territorial claims and efforts to defend them represented no real threat.

Yet if pirates were few and inconsequential, and privateering played only a modest role, the significance of "Spanish Negroes," although routinely overlooked, can hardly be exaggerated. From England through Hispaniola to Jamaica itself, leaders expected Africans and Indians to contribute substantially to an English victory. Not only impressed by Spanish cruelty but imagining themselves free of all taint of colonialism, the English expected to find grateful subordinates awaiting their appearance. Although these people never acted as anticipated, the English continued to hope. Finally in Jamaica a community of Africans aided them, but only when coerced. Their assistance brought an end to Spanish resistance. Understanding this history as a simple case of maroonage

ignores the more complex story: of African refugees (some of them free), seizing an opportunity offered by the geopolitical situation to attain autonomy and a promise of liberties. International rivalries created an opening, and they exploited it with alacrity.

England's empire of commerce depended equally on building a settler society and fighting imperial wars, both fundamental components of the emerging imperial landscape. The Western Design and the invasion of Jamaica pointed the way toward both elements of England's imperial future, even as they demonstrated the challenges involved in realizing the Cromwellian vision. Jamaica, because its seizure was deemed a consolation prize, has not been appreciated as the innovation it in fact represented. Long before it was the most valuable colony in the British Empire, however, Jamaica pointed the way toward that future.

ABBREVIATIONS

NOTES

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

INDEX

Abbreviations

ADD	Additional MSS, British Library, London
AGI	Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain
AHR	<i>American Historical Review</i>
Barrington to [Barrington?]	Francis Barrington to [Sir John Barrington], 17 July 1655, St. Jago in Jamaica, Egerton MS 2648, 245–49, British Library, London
Beeston, Journal	William Beeston, “A Journal kept by coll. William Beeston from his first comeing to Jamaica,” 27 April 1660–6 July 1680, Additional MS 12430, 22–40; published in <i>Interesting Tracts relating to the Island of Jamaica</i> (St. Jago de la Vega, 1800), 271–300
BL	British Library, London
Capp, <i>Cromwell’s Navy</i>	Bernard Capp, <i>Cromwell’s Navy: The Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648–1660</i> (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989)
Castilla, <i>English Conquest</i>	<i>The English Conquest of Jamaica: An Account of What Happened in the Island of Jamaica, from May 20 of the Year 1655, when the English laid Siege to it, up to July 3 of the year 1656, by Captain Julian de Castilla</i> , trans. Irene A. Wright, <i>Camden Miscellany</i> 13, 3rd ser., 31 (1924)
Clarke Papers	C. H. Firth, ed., <i>The Clarke Papers: Selections from the Papers of William Clarke</i> , vol. 3 (New York: Longmans, Green, 1899)
CO	Colonial Papers, The National Archives, Kew, England

- Columbus Petition Pedro Nuno Colón de Portugal, "El memorial colombino de don Pedro Colón de Portugal y Castro, duque de Veragua y de La Vega, marqués de Jamaica, a su alteza real doña Mariana de Austria, reina regente por D. Carlos II de España sobre la isla de Jamaica," translated by Jeremy Lawrance as *The Columbus Petition document of Don Pedro Colón de Portugal y Castro, duke of Veragua & al Vega, marquis of Jamaica, to her royal highness Mariana of Austria, queen regent of Charles II of Spain for the island of Jamaica, 1672* (Kingston: Mill Press; San Francisco: Custom and Limited Editions, 1992)
- CSPC W. Noel Sainsbury, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, [vol.1], 1574–1660; [vol. 5], 1661–1668; [vol. 7], 1669–1674; [vol. 9], 1675–1676. Also *Addenda, 1574–1674* (London, 1860, 1880, 1889, 1893)
- Cundall, *Governors* Frank Cundall, *The Governors of Jamaica in the Seventeenth Century* (London: West India Committee, 1936)
- Daniell to [Daniell] J[ohn] Daniell [to William Daniell], "A letter from Jamaica," 3 June 1655, in *A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq.*, 7 vols., ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1742), 3:504–8
- Doyley, Journal "Coll. Edward D'Oyley's Journal of his proceedings," Additional MS 12423, British Library, London
- Egerton 2395 Egerton MS 2395, British Library, London
- Firth, *Regimental History* C. H. Firth with G. Davies, *The Regimental History of Cromwell's Army*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), vol. 2
- HCA High Court of Admiralty Records, The National Archives, Kew
- HSP Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia
- I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal* I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal of the Late Proceedings and Successes of the English Army in the West-Indies* (London, 1655)
- JA Jamaica Archives, Spanish Town, Jamaica
- Jamaica under the Spaniards* *Jamaica under the Spaniards: Abstracts from the Archives of Seville*, ed. Frank Cundall and Joseph L. Pietersz (Kingston: Institute of Jamaica, 1919)
- JHR *Jamaican Historical Review*

Kupperman, <i>Providence Island</i>	Karen Ordahl Kupperman, <i>Providence Island: The Other Puritan Colony, 1629–41</i> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
NMM	National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
ODNB	<i>Oxford Dictionary of National Biography</i> , revised online edition (2004)
Pallano Relation	“The Relation of Captain Pallano,” in <i>Spanish Narratives of the English Attack on Santo Domingo, 1655</i> , ed. and trans. I. A. Wright, <i>Camden Miscellany</i> 14, 3rd ser., 37 (1926): 1–46.
Penn, <i>Memorials</i>	<i>Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir William Penn</i> , comp. Granville Penn, 2 vols. (London, 1833), vol. 2
Penn Letterbook	William Penn Letterbook, Wynne 18, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England
Perticular List	A perticular List of the Names of the persons allready paid their first Moneths pay for their Respective Qualities under the Command of Generall Veneables in the West Indies, 16 November 1654, CO1 / 32: 56–57v
Pestana, <i>English Atlantic</i>	Carla Gardina Pestana, <i>The English Atlantic in an Age of Revolution, 1640–1661</i> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004)
“Rooth’s Sea Journal”	“Richard Rooth’s Sea Journal of the Western Design, 1654–55,” ed. John F. Battick, <i>Jamaica Journal</i> 5 (December 1971): 3–22
1670 Survey	Survey [1670], in Noel B. Livingston, <i>Sketch Pedigrees on Some of the Early Settlers in Jamaica</i> (Kingston, 1909), 111–32
SP	State Papers, The National Archives, Kew
SP25	Interregnum Entry Book, State Papers 25, The National Archives, Kew
SPD	Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., <i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of Charles II</i> , 7 vols. (London, 1860–66)
SPDC	Mary Anne Everett Green, ed., <i>Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, [during the Commonwealth]</i> , 13 vols. (London, 1875–1886)
SPT	<i>A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq.</i> , 7 vols., ed. Thomas Birch (London, 1742)

- Taylor, *Western Design* S. A. G. Taylor, *The Western Design: An Account of Cromwell's Expedition to the Caribbean* (Kingston, 1965; London: Solstice Productions, 1969)
- TNA The National Archives, Kew
- Venables, *Narrative* *The Narrative of General Venables*, ed. C. H. Firth (London: Longmans, Green, 1900; reprint ed., Royal Historical Society, Publications, n.s. vol. 60, 1965): 3–105.
- "Whistler's Journal" "Extracts from Henry Whistler's Journal of the West India Expedition," in *The Narrative of General Venables*, appendix E, 144–69
- WMQ *The William and Mary Quarterly*
- WPP William Penn Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England
- Writings and Speeches* Wilbur Cortez Abbott, ed., *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937–47)

Notes

Introduction

1. For early uses of the name “Western Design,” see “The book of warrants beginning the Eight day of June 1653 & ending the fifth of December 1655,” WO 55/462, 6 June 1655 and 9 June 1655, TNA; and Robert Sedgwick to [the Navy Commissioners], 6 September 1655, CO1/32:88–89.
2. Paradoxically, no scholar has fully plumbed this embarrassment of evidentiary riches to produce a history worthy of these transformative events. A partial exception, the 1965 work exploring the details of the military campaign, benefited from the detailed knowledge of the physical landscape of its Anglo-Jamaican author, Captain S. A. G. Taylor; Taylor, *Western Design*.
3. “Whistler’s Journal,” 146.
4. The seminal work in this regard is Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (New York: Norton, 1972), but also see Carl Bridenbaugh and Roberta Bridenbaugh, *No Peace beyond the Line: The English in the Caribbean, 1624–1690* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972). Susan Dwyer Amussen integrated the Caribbean into English history in *Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society, 1640–1700* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
5. The Spanish invaded St. Christopher in 1629, and it is possible the African man had been taken at that time. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, in “Letters Concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 130; “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 84; Michael A. LaCombe, “Sir Thomas Warner (c.1580–1649),” *ODNB*.
6. This sort of reading might be termed “anthropological.” Numerous scholars concerned to reach beyond the archive’s own focus have enriched my thinking about these issues, even as I here uncover little-understood but still

- basically Eurocentric aspects of this history. See the especially insightful work of Ann Laura Stoler, *Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
7. Jonathan I. Israel, "The Emerging Empire: The Continental Perspective, 1650–1713," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, vol. 1, *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century*, ed. Nicholas Canny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), noted that all of Europe was on alert (422).
 8. John E. Worth, *The Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida*, 2 vols. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), 2:45–51, 55–58.
 9. Carla Gardina Pestana, "English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design," *Early American Studies* 3 (Spring 2005): 8. Nicole Greenspan made it one focus of her study of the circulation of information, in *Selling Cromwell's Wars: Media, Empire and Godly Warfare, 1650–1658* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012).
 10. The idea that Cromwell thought anything could be done in the region has been supported by a misattribution of a quotation to him. A comment in which a French ambassador paraphrased New England colonists' justification for their seizure of Acadia has been attributed to Cromwell. See Francis G. Davenport, *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917–1937), 2:42, misattributed in Ian K. Steele, *The English Atlantic, 1675–1740* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 190. Eliga H. Gould follows him in this, although somewhat skeptically; see "Lines of Plunder or Crucible of Modernity? Toward a Legal History of the English-Speaking Atlantic, 1660–1825," in *Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges*, ed. Jeremy Bentley, Renate Bridenthal, and Kären Wigen (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), 106.
 11. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain*, vol. 2, *1649–1815* (New York: Norton, 2005), 32; Michael J. Braddick, "The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688," in Canny, *Origins of Empire*, 289.
 12. On disappointment, see the seminal essay by Blair Worden, "Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan," in *History, Society and Churches*, ed. Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 125–45.
 13. Other experts also played a role, such as the Barbados planter Thomas Modyford; "A paper of col. Muddiford concerning the West Indies," n.d., *SPT*, 3:62–63.
 14. Allen D. Boyer, "Gage, Thomas (1603?–1656)," *ODNB*.
 15. Thomas Gage, *The English-American his Travail by Sea and Land: Or, A New Survey of the West-India's* (London, 1648), unpaginated Epistle Dedicatory, "To His Excellency Sr. Thomas Fairfax"; the case for conquest was subtly made throughout the narrative with references to social lethargy and weak defenses (see, for instance, 9, 57, 70, 86–87, 105, 136, 140). One prescient

- cleric thought Gage must be an English spy even as he moved through the colonies as a Spanish-speaking Dominican (117). Also see the case made in Thomas Gage to Oliver Cromwell [1654], *SPT*, 3: 59–61.
16. Oliver Cromwell to Richard Fortescue, *SPT*, 4: 634. The instructions clearly envisioned starting with one of a number of locations (all of them more substantial than Jamaica); see “Instructions unto Generall Robert Venables,” [9 December 1654], in *Writings and Speeches*, 3:535–37. John F. Battick, “A New Interpretation of Cromwell’s Western Design,” *Journal of Barbados Museum and Historical Society* 34 (1972): 76–84, argues to the contrary that the aims of the Design were quickly reduced.
 17. *Certain Passages* 98 (11–18 May 1655): 6–7. For a similar sentiment in Jackson’s expedition, see Anon., “A Briefe Journall or a Succint and True Relation,” in *The Voyage of Captain William Jackson (1642–1645)*, ed. Vincent T. Harlow, *Camden Miscellany* 13 (1923): 15–16.
 18. Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 72. For a critical assessment, see John Battick, “Cromwell’s Diplomatic Blunder: The Relationship between the Western Design of 1654–55 and the French Alliance of 1657,” *Albion* 5:4 (1973): 279–98.
 19. Cromwell raised these points in “Edmund Montagu’s Notes on the Debates in the Protector’s Council concerning the Last [West?] Indian Expedition,” in *Clarke Papers*, 207. The very perceptive Spanish ambassador Cárdenas compiled a similar list in less flattering terms: greed, wish to enter the West Indian trade, and a conviction that the Spanish would lose, along with an aim to garner support for the Protector to be crowned king; see Alonso de Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa (1638–1656) / The English Revolution (1638–1656)*, ed. Ángel Alloza and Glyn Redworth (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011), 147–48. Bernard Capp notes that Spanish gold could be used to pay off both the army and the navy; see Capp, *Cromwell’s Navy*, 87. Also see R. C. Thompson, “Officers, Merchants and Foreign Policy in the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell,” *Historical Studies: Australia and New Zealand* 12 (April 1966): 152; an intercepted letter, June [1645], *SPT*, 2:413–25; “A Letter concerning the Expedition of Pen and Venables against the Island of Hispaniola,” in *A Collection of Letters, and State Papers From the Original Manuscripts of several princes and great personages . . .*, comp. L. Howard, 2 vols. (London, 1756), 1:1–21.
 20. Henk den Heijer, “The Dutch West India Company, 1621–1791,” in *Riches from the Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585–1817*, ed. Wim Klooster and Benjamin Schmidt (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 86–91; Cornelis Ch. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580–1680* (Assen, the Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1971), 148–51, 211–13, 299, 314–20; Charles Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624–1654* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). In an interesting reversal, both the Dutch and the Portuguese launched fleets from Brazil to attack the other’s holdings in Angola. See C. R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686* (London: Athlone Press, 1952).

21. Commission to General Venables, 4 December 1654, in *Writings and Speeches*, 3:533. Later Cromwell referred to the “certain ridiculous gift of the pope”; Cromwell, *A Declaration of his Highnes, By the Advice of his Council; Setting forth, On Behalf of this Commonwealth, the Justice of their Cause against Spain* (London, 1655), 334.
22. “The Spaniards taking the English plantations,” n.d., and “Notices of attacks made by the Spaniards upon the English plantations and traders in the West Indies; c. 1629–1650,” [October] 1655, MS Rawlinson A31:121–24, Bodleian Library, seem to have been compiled for Cromwell’s “Speech at the Opening of Parliament,” 17 September 1656, in *Writings and Speeches*, 4:261–79.
23. “A Briefe Journall.”
24. Kenneth R. Andrews, *The Spanish Caribbean: Trade and Plunder, 1530–1630* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), 139–41, 150–53.
25. Shifts encapsulated in the title of K. R. Andrews’s *Trade, Plunder, and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). See also Hilary McD. Beckles, “The ‘Hub of Empire’: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century,” in Canny, *Origins of Empire*, 235–36.
26. Although Gould’s insights aimed at illuminating interactions at the imperial level, his terminology readily fits this case. See “Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery,” *AHR* 112 (2007): 1415–22.
27. “Bourgeois Revolution?,” in *The Collected Essays of Christopher Hill*, 3 vols. (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1985), 3:102.
28. J. R. Seeley, *The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1902), 8. For the standard view, finding reactive policy and “no formidable, activist imperial state,” until later, see Jerry Bannister’s “The Oriental Atlantic: Governance and Regulatory Frameworks in the British Atlantic World,” in *Britain’s Oceanic Empire*, ed. H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 151–76.
29. Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1990), 64.
30. Taylor, *Western Design*, 35; Ronald Hutton, *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658–1667* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 12. For its negative consequences in English history, see the treatment in Ian Gentles, *Oliver Cromwell: God’s Warrior and the English Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 168–69.
31. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, 152. John Morrill, “Postlude: Between War and Peace, 1651–1662,” in *The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland, and Ireland, 1638–1660*, ed. John Denyon and Jane Ohlmeyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 315.

32. This effect can be achieved by ignoring the religious elements of later events, as in Steven C. A. Pincus's *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).
33. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, 149. For a corrective, see Carla Gardina Pestana, "Early English Jamaica without Pirates," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 71 (2014): 321–60.
34. For the latest example, see Mark G. Hanna, *Pirate Nests and the Rise of the British Empire, 1570–1740* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2015).
35. Nuala Zahedieh's excellent series of articles explores the economics of plunder and the slow transition to a different basis for wealth. See especially "Trade, Plunder and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655–1689," *Economic History Review*, 3rd ser., 39 (1986): 205–22; "The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 43 (1986): 570–93; "A Frugal, Prudential and Hopeful Trade': Privateering in Jamaica, 1655–89," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 18 (1990): 145–68. Also see her book, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
36. Nicholas Canny, "The Origins of Empire: An Introduction," in Canny, *Origins of Empire*, 20–21. As mentioned above, Beckles notes Jamaica's significance as the first outpost seized by the state; Braddick links the rising effectiveness of the fleet to the conquest; and Israel, "The Emerging Empire," 423, 427, explains that the Design alarmed leaders all over Europe, particularly the Dutch. Another half dozen authors mention the conquest incidentally. Looking from the Spanish side, Ida Altman sees its importance: "The Spanish Atlantic, 1650–1780," in *The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 1450–1850*, ed. Nicholas Canny and Philip Morgan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 185. Similarly, only the essay by David L. Smith, "English Politics in the 1650s," in the new *Oxford Handbook of the English Revolution*, ed. Michael J. Braddick mentions the Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
37. "Spanish Reaction to Foreign Aggression in the Caribbean to about 1680," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 5 (1927): 298.
38. D. J. B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel, introduction to *Amphibious Warfare, 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion* (Boston: Brill, 2006), 4.

1. Preparation

1. B. J. to Captain John Pyle, "A Copie of the originall designe upon which Cromwell sett out the Fleet for the taking the Island of Hispaniola," n.d., ADD 10410, 35. For lazy, decadent colonists, see Thomas Gage to Oliver Cromwell, [1654], *SPT*, 3:60.

2. Wim Klooster, "The Geopolitical Impact," in *The Legacy of Dutch Brazil*, ed. Michiel van Groesen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 31, 34. The Dutch took forty-one ships and 4,700 men; the Spanish sent fifty-six sail and 12,463 men (and 1,185 cannons). Jan Glete, "Warfare at Sea, 1450–1815," in *War in the Early Modern World, 1450–1815*, ed. Jeremy Black (London: UCL Press, 1999), 19, notes that projecting state power through the use of the navy was relatively new, and that early cases were limited to "eccentric operations against a peripheral enemy area such as a transoceanic colony."
3. Kenneth R. Andrews, *Ships, Money, and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10–12, chap. 6. James Scott Wheeler, *The Making of a World Power: War and the Military Revolution in Seventeenth-Century England* (Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1999), 18, 106, 109; and see chapters on customs (6), excise (7), and assessment (8) for details on each form of taxation. Michael J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550–1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 213–21, 252–54. Richard Harding, who argues for a gradual development of naval power, nonetheless emphasizes the radical innovation represented by Parliament's financial organization; see *The Evolution of the Sailing Navy, 1509–1815* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 83. And see David Loades, *England's Maritime Empire: Seapower, Commerce, and Policy, 1490–1690* (London: Longman, 2000), on London's role (but not Jamaica's), 179.
4. Jan Glete, *Navies and Nations: Warships, Navies, and State Building in Europe and America, 1500–1800*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), 178–80. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Penguin, 2004), 32.
5. Jonathan Scott, *When the Waves Ruled Britannia: Geography and Political Identities, 1500–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 27.
6. Quote: Anon, *The Perfect Politician; Or A Full View of the Life and Action (Military and Civil) of O. Cromwel* (London, 1660), 274. Venables later claimed that the plan was "vulgarly discovered"; see his *Narrative*, 5.
7. Recounted by J. W. Fortescue in "The Expedition to the West Indies, 1655," *Macmillan's Magazine* 69 (1894): 188. The secrecy may have increased the concern of the families and friends for their loved ones; although written in Henry Whistler's usual flippant style, the account of exceptionally tearful farewells at the time of the fleet's departure suggests as much. "Whistler's Journal," 144.
8. For a debate in Cromwell's Council over the target, see *Clarke Papers*, 203–6. Peter Gaunt questions Edward Montagu's authorship in "'The Single Person's Confidants and Dependents': Oliver Cromwell and His Protectoral Councillors," *Historical Journal* 32 (1989): 550n35. This is Sir Bulstrode Whitlocke's view; see his *Memorials of the English Affairs* (London, 1682), 602. Reports that Spain was targeted circulated in diplomatic circles after the fleet's departure: see Lord Jermyn to the King, 5 February 1654/5, in *State*

- Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1768, 1773, 1786), 3:264. Pallano Relation states that warnings were disbelieved because it was a time of peace (2). *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 55, states that Cromwell's trickery was seen as evil.
9. Alonso de Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa (1638–1656) / The English Revolution (1638–1656)*, ed. Ángel Alloza and Glyn Redworth (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011), discusses secrecy and some aspects of preparation, 147n79, 147–49. For the map story, see John Oldmixon, *The History of England during the Reigns of the Royal House of Stuart* (London, 1730), 428. Robert Venables, in his "Relation concerning the expedition of the West Indies," ADD 11410, 56–143, ridicules this view, responding to I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 6; see Venables, *Narrative*, 90. Although secrecy arose for geopolitical reasons, it did allow the authorities to avoid the mutinous opposition that had arisen around the 1649 Irish campaign; see Chris Durston, "'Let Ireland Be Quiet': Opposition in England to the Cromwellian Conquest of Ireland," *History Workshop* 21 (1986): 107.
 10. Council of the Indies, "Consulta del Consejo de Indias," Madrid, 4 November 1654; Alonso de Cárdenas summarized all the information he had previously gathered, down to the number of water pumps: "20 bombas de mano para sacar agua," "Memoria," dated 2 January 1655; both printed in *La Gran Expedición inglesa contra las Antillas Mayores*, vol. 1, *Plan . . . (1651–1655)*, ed. J. Marino Incháustegui (Mexico City: Gráfica panamericana, 1953), appendices, 28-4, 28-13, CLXIV–CLXVII, CLXXVIII–CLCCIX. Also see Frank Moya Pons, *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo*, 2nd ed. (Santiago, Dominican Republic: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra, [1976]), 173.
 11. Venables was in negotiation for the post by June; see *SPDC*, 7:312–14. Two letters of Winslow to Thurloe survive, dated 16 March 1654/5, *SPT*, 3:249–52, and 30 March 1655, in *Hutchinson Papers*, 2 vols. (Albany, NY: Printed for the Society by J. Munsell, 1865), 1:300–302. Firth commented on Winslow's role in conveying information in the preface to Venables, *Narrative*, xi.
 12. C. S. Knighton, "Penn, Sir William (*bap.* 1621, *d.* 1670)," *ODNB*.
 13. John Morrill, "Venables, Robert (1612 / 13–1687)," *ODNB*.
 14. Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 74, 78–81; G. E. Aylmer, *The State's Servants: The Civil Service of the English Republic, 1649–1660* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 218–19; and Len Travers, "Winslow, Edward (1595–1655)," *ODNB*.
 15. See Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 93–110; Mary Anne Everett Green, comp., *Calendar of the Proceedings of the Committee for Compounding, etc., 1643–1660*, 5 vols. (London, 1889–92), 2:714–15.
 16. Bernard Capp, "Goodsonn [Goodson], William (b. 1609 / 10, d. in or after 1680)," *ODNB*. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 56–57, 170, 181n126, 272, 303, 335, 345, 351, 358. R. C. D. Baldwin, "Poole, Jonas (*bap.* 1566, *d.* 1612)," *ODNB*. Capp describes the relationship as that of brothers-in-law. "Rooth's Sea Journal," 20, 22. Carter: Order dated 2 October 1655, *SPDC*, 8:547. William

- Penn to [unknown], 29 September 1655, George M. Conarroe Autograph Collection (0146), HSP.
17. Firth, *Regimental History*, 2:707, 710, 718–20; Heane's reputation in Carla Gardina Pestana, "English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design," *Early American Studies* 3 (Spring 2005): 24–26. Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 286–94, 336–338. Buller had been irregularly appointed by the outgoing governor, Nathaniel Butler, and was about to be replaced when the Spanish took the island.
 18. Firth, *Regimental History*, 2:708. Barrington wrote letters both to Sir John Barrington and to Cromwell's secretary, John Thurloe. John, Francis's nephew, succeeded his brother Thomas as baronet in 1644. See G. Alan Lowdes, "The History of the Barrington Family," *Transactions of the Essex Archaeological Society*, n.s., 2 (1894): 24, 36, 45. For the family connection to Cromwell, see Sean Kelsey's essay about his mother, "Barrington [*née* Williams or Cromwell], Joan, Lady Barrington (c.1558–1641)," *ODNB*.
 19. See order in *SPDC*, 7:411. His lieutenant-colonel Robert Rous was apparently the son of Anthony Rous; see the mention of him in his native Cornwall in 1672: Sean Kelsey, "Rous, Anthony (c.1605–1677)," *ODNB*. A partial biographical treatment in Barbara Ritter Dailey, "Morris, Lewis (1613?–1691)," *ODNB*, can be supplemented by Kristen Block, *Ordinary Lives in the Early Caribbean: Religion, Colonial Competition, and the Politics of Profit* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012), 149. For the subjection of Barbados, see Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 94–99, 101–10.
 20. Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne], 10 June 1659, Jamaica, CO1 / 33:147. Andrew J. Hopper, "Fortescue, Richard (d. 1655)," *ODNB*. Jan Broadway, "Throckmorton Family (*per. c.*1500–1682)," *ODNB*. Firth, *Regimental History*, 2:709, links him to that family.
 21. See Doyley to Charles II, 1661? Officers and soldiers petition to the king, read 27 November 1661, CO1 / 15:178. An allusion to the royalist version of the story is in Anon., *An Exact Collection of the Choicest Poems* (London, 1662), 298–99. Given the low survival rate for those who went on the Design, some of them later alleged that Cromwell intended to kill them. See, for instance, Edward Doyley to Sir Edward Nicholas, 11 September 1660, CO1 / 14:100. Three hundred forty-one making a case for their loyalty got back to England at the Restoration to petition the king for their pay; see Michael Bland et al., *Petition to the King*, 24 June 1661, Whitehall, SP29 / 38:8.
 22. Venables described them as present, but suggested they mostly joined in Barbados; see Venables, *Narrative*, 34. "A.B. to the King of Spain," January 1655 / 6, in *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 1, Historical Mss. Commission, 13th Report, appendix, pt. 1 (1891), 679. Anon., *A History of the Commons Warre of England. Throughout these Three Nations* (London, 1662), 126. Edward Long, *History of Jamaica*, 3 vols. (London, 1774), 1:223. Long descended from Samuel Long, who came as a secretary to the Commissioners.

- Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645–1653* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 40.
23. New Model Army regiments numbered 1,200. See C. H. Firth, *Cromwell's Army: A History of the English Soldier during the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth, and the Protectorate*, rev. ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 34–35, 43. But the "Instructions given unto General William Penn, Commander-in-Chief of a Fleet of Ships into the parts of America," in Penn, *Memorials*, 26, listed the aim as "3000 land souldiers in 6 Regiments and 100 horse." Firth, *Regimental History*, 2, chap. 7; for Cromwell's regiment, 481–84.
 24. Venables, *Narrative*, 5, 6. J[ohn] Berkenhead to John Thurloe, [17 February 1654], in *SPT*, 3:158. Discovered in Barbados, the men were discharged; what became of the priest is not known. For one Irish and Catholic man who remained in the ranks, see letter reprinted in Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa*, 177–78.
 25. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, in "Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655," Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 131.
 26. Firth, *Regimental History*, 2:699. Daniel Howe, "These are to certifie those whom it may concern," n.d., in Venables, *Narrative*, 44.
 27. Ashton to W. Langl[ey], 8 January 1656/7. Barrington to [Sir John Barrington?], 14 July 1655, Egerton MS 2648, 245, BL. For quote: Anon., "contract made with Coll. Fortescue's Regim.," n.d., Egerton 2395, 166. Unfortunately, records of women in the army are few, and their presence is known mostly from incidental mentions. See Venables, *Narrative*, 11; Firth, *Cromwell's Army*, 262–63, 298. For accusations of prostitution, see Daniell to [Daniell], 507. For criticism of the presence of so many women, see I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 378–79.
 28. Particular List, 56–57v. The order for issuing the pay is in *SPDC*, 7:404, 8:158.
 29. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 4–6. *Perfect Account* 229 (23–30 May 1655): n.p. Contemporaries cited this motive; see An Intercepted Letter, June [1654], in *SPT*, 2:414–15. This view has become the common wisdom, reiterated in Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 20.
 30. See list of ships given in "Rooth's Sea Journal," appendix, 22. When three ships were converted to men-of-war in Jamaica subsequently, each was given ninety to one-hundred men; these were not the largest ships, having fewer than thirty guns apiece. See Penn, *Memorials*, 108.
 31. *To his Higness the Lord Protector: The Humble Petition of the Sea-Men* ([London, 1654]); the collector George Thomason dated this as acquired 4 November 1654. The petition reports rumors that "some numbers more of us are designed abroad, as we hear."
 32. George Kendall to Commissioners of the Admiralty, 13 July 1653, reprinted in *Letters and Papers relating to the First Dutch War, 1652–1654*, vol. 5, ed. C. T. Atkinson ([London]: Printed for the Naval Records Society, 1912), 276. For

- one seaman who transferred in Barbados from a merchant's to a state's ship, see *SPDC*, 9:438.
33. Order dated 1 July 1654; see *SPDC*, 7:515. On the problem of naval resupply in the Caribbean in particular, see Carla Gardina Pestana, "Early English Jamaica without Pirates," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 71 (2014): 352–54. Willoughby to the Navy Commissioners, 9 December 1654, *SPDC*, 7:583; Order dated 29 August 1654, *SPD*, 7:339. The *Swiftsure* was sheathed as early as 28 April 1654, which suggests a very early decision for a Caribbean undertaking; see *SPDC*, 7:483. For others in May (*SPDC*, 7:487) and in November 1655, *SPDC*, 9:403; *SPDC*, 11:406, 408.
 34. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 9–10. Also see Maurice Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate*, 2nd ed. (New York: A. M. Kelly, [1962]), 48.
 35. Rodger, *Command of the Ocean*, 37–42.
 36. Jan Glete, *Swedish Naval Administration, 1521–1721: Resource Flows and Organization Capabilities* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 459. J. S. Wheeler, "Navy Finance, 1649–1660," *Historical Journal* 39:2 (1996): 462–63.
 37. See Firth, *Cromwell's Army*; for weaponry, see chap. 4, especially 74–87. Stores, dated 19 December 1654, *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 2, Historical Mss. Commission, 13th Report, appendix, pt. 2 (1893), 88. Order dated 1 July, 29 August 1654, see *SPDC*, 7:339, 515. Edm. Harvey, Custom House, London, to Navy Commissioners, 24 November 1654, *SPDC*, 7:576. Anon., "Intercepted Letter," *Clarke Papers*, 12.
 38. Disbrowe to Thurloe, 7 December 1654; the order for ironbound casks: "A particular estimation of the present expedition as follows," 17 February 1654/5, in *SPT*, 3:204. Penn discusses the need for more casks or the iron with which to bind them in William Penn to [Honored Gent^l], 17 March 1654/5, Dreer Collection (0175), HSP.
 39. Navy Victuallers to the Admiralty Commissioners, 28 August 1654; Navy Commissioners to Admiralty Commissioners, enclosing a letter from the Navy Victuallers at Tower Hill, 2 November 1654, *SPDC*, 7:549, 567. Accusations: Venables, *Narrative*, 4–5. Assessment of victualing generally: J. D. Davies, *Pepys' Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649–1689* (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2008), 202. Capp warns that fraud was a recurrent problem in the early modern English navy generally, however: *Cromwell's Navy*, 235–41. Order dated 29 [unknown] 1654, "The book of warrants," 8 June 1653 to 5 December 1655, WO 55 / 462n2, TNA.
 40. Order dated 2 December 1654; 1 October 1654; 2 December 1654; 12 December 1654; July 1654; *SPDC*, 7:241, 404–5, 410, 558.
 41. Venables, Petition to Oliver Cromwell, 19 June 1654; Penn, Petition to Oliver Cromwell and his Council, September 1654, *SPDC*, 7:213–14, 351. He was granted Irish land worth £300 per annum in compensation; see Lucie Street, *An Uncommon Sailor: A Portrait of Admiral Sir William Penn; English Naval Supremacy* (Bourne End, Buckinghamshire: Kensal Press, 1986), 67–68.

42. 21 November 1654, *SPDC*, 7:398; 2 December 1654, *SPDC*, 7:404. Wayne Neil Hammond explains the massive rise in naval building and finance as well as the problems peculiar to the Protectorate: not only these tax cuts but also the loss of administrators who had expertly managed matters for the republic. See “The Administration of the English Navy, 1649–1660” (Diss., University of British Columbia, 1974), esp. 92, 98, 101–3.
43. For stores read to determine destination, see *Certain Passages* (4–11 August 1654): 235, which described stores being boarded on Admiral Robert Blake’s fleet and speculated on its ultimate destination.
44. Council of the Indies, “Consulta del Consejo de Indias,” Madrid, 4 November 1654. Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, “Genealogy of the South Atlantic History,” paper presented at the Iberian Globalization Conference, William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, UCLA, Los Angeles, 28 February 2014; Antoine de Bordeaux-Neufville’s missives dated 14 December 1654 [n.s.]: Bordeaux to Mazarin, *SPT*, 3:7–8; and to the count de Brienne, 5–7.
45. *Faithful Scout* 177 (28 April–5 May 1654): 1404. *Certain Passages* evidenced an early interest, remarking that a fleet was said to be in preparation to “go further off.” See *Certain Passages* 17 (12–19 May 1654): 139.
46. *Faithful Scout* 184 (16–23 June 1654): 1454; 193 (18–25 August 1654): 1552; 195 (1–8 September 1654): 1554; 200 (6–13 October 1654): 1600; 203 (27 October–3 November 1654): 1628; [no number] (17–24 November 1654): 1656; 205[?] (8–15 December 1654): 1678. *Several Proceedings* 266 (26 October–2 November 1654): [4220]. This constant effort to announce the departure should modify the assertion by Nicole Greenspan that it received “only slight coverage”; see “News and the Politics of Information in the Mid-Seventeenth Century: The Western Design and the Conquest of Jamaica,” *History Workshop Journal* 69 (2010): 4. Border quote: *Faithful Scout* 206? (15–22 December 1654): 1679, mispaginated.
47. John Disbrowe to John Thurloe, 7 December 1654, *SPT*, 3:11–12. See Cromwell’s order to the ordnance officers at the Tower, telling them to hurry, dated 29 November 1654, WO 47 / 3:56v, TNA. Barrington to [Sir John Barrington?], 14 July 1655, 245. Thomas Lawes told Robert Blackborne that his possessions that had been put on board the *Crowe* never arrived; see 17 March 1654 / 5, *SPDC*, 8:415.
48. Frank Strong, “The Causes of Cromwell’s West Indian Expedition,” *AHR* 4 (1898–99): 236n, notes that Thomas Modyford’s advice was to land in Barbados in November; indeed, it was his very first piece of advice: see “A paper of col. Muddiford concerning the West Indies,” n.d., *SPT*, 3:62. Edward Winslow to John Thurloe, 30 March 1655, *SPT*, 3:325, cites the issue from Barbados.
49. Richard S. Dunn calls forty days “very good time by seventeenth-century standards” in his *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (New York: Norton, 1972), 5. Goodson left with a squadron on 19 December 1654. Some accounts treat the nineteenth as if it

- were the date of the full fleet's departure; for instance, Anon., *Perfect Politician*, 274. But Cromwell wrote to Penn on 20 December mentioning a first squadron that he hoped had already gone, and Penn's impending departure. *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 2, appendix, pt. 2, 89. "Rooth's Sea Journal," 4, states that the flagship (with Venables aboard) left Stokes Bay, southeast of Plymouth, on 25 December, with the remaining ships coming up to join it at Helen's Road the next day. For the various difficulties with the actual departure, see William Penn to [Honored Gentlemen], 29 December 1654, Admiral William Penn Letters, 1650–1667, Penn Papers, HSP. Venables, *Narrative*, 6. Winslow to Thurloe, 30 March 1655.
50. Cromwell, "Instructions unto Generall Robert Venables," n.d., 534. Mention was also made of the idea in a letter of 3 December 1654, Disbrowe to Thurloe (in *SPT*, 3:4). Penn to [Honored Gentⁿ], 17 March 1654/5.
 51. *Severall Proceedings in Parliament* 266 (26 October–2 November 1654): 4220. John Paige to William Clerke, 25 December 1654, in *The Letters of John Paige, London Merchant, 1648–1658*, ed. George F. Steckley ([London]: London Record Society, 1984), 118–19.
 52. Sir Alexander Hume, 4 February 1655, in *The Nicholas Papers: Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas*, ed. George F. Warner, vol. 2, *Jan., 1653–June, 1655*, Camden Society, n.s., 50 (1892): 180; 2:204–5, 231, 270–71, 323; vol. 3, *July, 1655–Dec., 1656*, Camden Society, n.s., 57 (1897): 14, 16, 20–21. John Paige to [William Clerke], 8 March 1655, *The Letters of John Paige*, 121; *Perfect Account* 213 (31 January–7 February 165[4/5]): 1696. Anon., "An Intercepted Letter," in *Clarke Papers*, 12–14.
 53. *Faithful Scout* 211 (9–16 January 1654/5): 1670 (mispaginated); *Weekly Post* 210 (16–23 January 1654[/5]): 1665, 1672. *Weekly Intelligencer* 1[00] (10–17 April [1655]): 230. *Perfect Diurnall* 283 (7–14 May 1655): 4344.
 54. *Perfect Account* 229 (23–30 May 1655): n.p. By the term "natives" here the writer seems to mean residents generally rather than Indians. *Certain Passages* [71] (2–9 March 1655): 236.
 55. *Perfect Account* 208 (27 December 1654–3 January 1654/5): 1659, and 213 (31 January–7 February 1654/5): 1696; *Faithful Scout* 212 (26 January–2 February 1654/5): 1683. *Several Proceedings of State Affaires* 281 (8–15 February 1654[/5]): 4454–55. Noell according to Wilbur Cortez Abbott, editor of *Writings and Speeches*, 3:754. For an optimistic assessment circulating in London diplomatic circles in September, when Penn had returned, see W. Nieuport to the States General, 17 September 1655, *SPT*, 4:19. Lord Hatton, 1 March 1655; Joseph Jane, 9 July 1655, Hague; Sir Alexander Hume, 12/22 July 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, 2:231, 3:14, 16. The last report was of the conquest of "Saint Dominique," which must have been Santo Domingo, since the French section of Hispaniola did not exist at the time.
 56. *Faithful Scout* 211 (9–16 January 1654/5): 1670 mispaginated, 222 (6–13 April 1655): 1770; *Weekly Intelligencer* 99[?] (3–10 April [1655]): n.p.; [no number] (3–10 April 1655): n.p. (entry dated 9 April).

57. *Three Great & Bloody Fights* (London, 1655); *A Great and wonderful victory* (London, 1655). *Weekly Post* 228 (29 May–5 June 1655): 1817. *Mercurius Fumigosus* 58 (27 June–4 July 1655): 452; 63 (1–8 August 1655): 492. *Perfect Account* 235 (4–11 July 1655): 1880. *Weekly Post* 240 (15–21 August 1655): 1915.
58. [Sir Bulstrode Whitelocke], *Memorials of the English Affairs, or, An Historical Account . . .* (London, 1682), 592 (entry dated 17 January 1654). *Mercurius Politicus* 241 (18–25 January 165[4/]5): 5082. This report did not state a location, although it may have been “Gaunt” (or Ghent), the origin of the previously printed item. A month later, *Politicus* reported similar fears from Brussels, framed in terms of the problem the Design would cause for merchants there: 246 (22 February–1 March 165[4/] 5): 5160–61.

2. Expectations

1. For the native presence in the Lesser Antilles, see B. W. Higman, *A Concise History of the Caribbean* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 87–89, 97; and Philip P. Boucher, *Cannibal Encounters: European and Island Caribs, 1492–1763* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 31, 33–36. For early settlement, see Boucher, *France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics of Discontent?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 69–80.
2. Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 336–39. For a discussion of the phrase’s origins in treaty negotiations, see Garrett Mattingly, “No Peace beyond What Line?,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (December 1963): 145–62. The Spanish policy of clearing islands has not been systematically studied, but some examples are cited in Carla Gardina Pestana, “Early English Jamaica without Pirates,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 71 (2014): 346–48.
3. For the significance and development of Havana, see Alejandro de la Fuente, with César García del Pino and Bernardo Iglesias Delgado, *Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 6–10. Quotations: Higman, *History of the Caribbean*, 82; Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from Columbus to Katrina* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016), 35. For debates over Indian status, see Rolena Adorno, *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
4. Francisco Morales Padrón, *Spanish Jamaica*, trans. Patrick E. Bryan, with Michael J. Gronow and Felix Oviedo Moral (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2003), 64, 67–68.
5. For this context, see Gert Oostindie and Jessica V. Roitman, Introduction to *Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680–1800: Linking Empires, Bridging Borders*, ed. Oostindie and Roitman (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 1–12; and Stuart B. Schwartz, “Looking for a New Brazil: Crisis and Rebirth in the Atlantic World after the Fall of Pernambuco,” in *The Legacy of Dutch Brazil*, ed. Michiel van Groesen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 41–58.

6. Larry Gragg, *Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627–1660* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 3.
7. Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 95–112.
8. See, for instance, the case of Nicholas Ridsen of Wapping, *SPD*, 11:498; Captain Powell, mentioned by Goodsonn, “Vice Admiral Goodson’s abstract of y^e West India expedition,” n.d., ADD 11410, 45, had local knowledge. He may be the man who later commanded the *Selby*, but what position he occupied at the start of the expedition is not noted. See his letter to Col. Clarck, [October 1656], CO1 / 33:31–33.
9. George Abbot, *A Briefe Description of the whole World*, 2nd rev. ed. [said to be “4th”] (London, 1617), unpaginated, chapter entitled “Of America, or the new World.” More recent publications imparted no specific geographical knowledge, save that Thomas Gage’s *The English American* (London, 1648) described parts of the mainland in some detail. The bulk of the works published on the area to date focused on the recent political infighting in Barbados.
10. *Weekly Intelligencer* 79 (20 December to 2 January 1654 / 5): 155. In terms of the distances involved, this statement is equivalent to saying London is a city near Rome.
11. See *Weekly Intelligencer* 9 (1–8 May 1655): 230 (mispaginated)–433, quoted below, for the latter case.
12. *Weekly Post* 210 (16–23 January 1654 [/ 5]): 1665, 1672.
13. Barrington to [Barrington?], 247.
14. It first appeared in Dutch, at the time of the war for independence, under the title *Seer cort Verhael vande destructie van d’Indien* ([Antwerp?], 1578), followed by a French edition in the following year and the first English edition in 1583. For a discussion of this work’s impact on English discourse, see Carla Gardina Pestana, “Cruelty and Religious Justifications for Conquest in the Mid-Seventeenth-Century English Atlantic,” in *Empires of God: Religious Encounters in the Early Modern Atlantic World*, ed. Linda Gregerson and Susan Juster (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 37–57.
15. Cromwell’s *Declaration* linked the two explicitly; see *A Declaration of His Highnes, By the Advice of his Council; Setting forth, On the Behalf of this Commonwealth, the Justice of their Cause against Spain* (London, 1655), 4–5. Las Casas would soon receive another English printing: *The Tears of the Indians Being An Historical and True Account Of the Cruel Massacres and Slaughters of above Twenty Millions of innocent People; Committed by the Spaniards In the Islands of Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica, &c.: As also in the Continent of Mexico, Peru, & other Places of the West-Indies, To the total destruction of those Countries* (London, 1656), prompted by the Western Design and the resulting Anglo-Spanish War.
16. Linda A. Newsom and Susie Minchin, *From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

17. Ann Twinam, *Purchasing Whiteness: Pardos, Mulattos, and the Quest for Social Mobility in the Spanish Indies* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 84–104.
18. Michael Guasco, *Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), chap. 3. In support of their own self-image, the English did arrange the liberation of five unjustly enslaved natives, and wondered why the Barbadians had not seen to their religious education. See Berkenhead to Thurlow, 17 February 1654[/ 5], *SPT*, 3:159.
19. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, “The Fears of Hot Climates in the Anglo-American Experience,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 41 (1984): 213–40; “Whistler’s Journal,” 145.
20. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings in the Expedition,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 61. This unattributed journal kept aboard Penn’s flagship was apparently written by his secretary, for the author mentioned writing out orders for Penn. His biographer identifies the secretary as William Burrows, who was later Penn’s chief clerk; see Lucie Street, *An Uncommon Sailor: A Portrait of Admiral Sir William Penn, English Naval Supremacy* (Bourne End, Buckinghamshire: The Kensal Press, 1986), 74.
21. “A paper of col. Muddiford concerning the West Indies,” n.d., *SPT*, 3:62–63.
22. In addition to the various letters cited in this chapter, one by Daniel Searle (dated 26 March 1655) survives only because it was intercepted and printed in a French pamphlet in Paris in 1655; later it was retranslated into Spanish and published as “La llegada de la Flota . . . (1655),” in “Invasión Inglesa en 1655,” ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Boletín de Archivo* 20:92 (1957): 7–9.
23. On Stuyvesant, see Edward Winslow to John Thurloe, 16 March 1654[/ 5], *SPT*, 3:251. “Examinations taken upon y^e High Spaniola Expedition, 1654,” WPP, Wynne 16, NMM, used by kind permission of the owner.
24. Taylor, *Western Design*, 15. Venables was more worried that the ivory elephant tusks be accurately recorded; see his “Narrative,” 10. Lauren Benton, “Toward a New Legal History of Piracy: Maritime Legalities and the Myth of Universal Jurisdiction,” *International Journal of Maritime History* 23:1 (2011): 227, 231–33; I here extend Benton’s point about legal savvy to other seamen, not just those accused of piracy. William Penn to [Honored Gent^l], 17 March 1654 / 5, Dreer Collection (0175), HSP, 10. On the new system, see N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Penguin, 2004), 54. Venables later claimed that Penn’s kinsman who had charge of the process of securing the ships embezzled from them; he may have meant to imply that Penn and others were getting around the restrictions on profiting from prizes by this stratagem. Venables, *Narrative*, 10–11.
25. Excessive: Berkenhead to Thurloe, 17 February 1654[/ 5], 158. On Searle: Winslow to Thurloe, 16 March 1654[/ 5], 249. *Grandiosa Vitoria* (Seville, 1655), reprinted in *Invasión inglesa de 1655*, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi

- (Ciudad Trujillo: Montalvo, 1957), 136–37. Ships turned back: “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 4, 7. On the absence of both *Great Charity* and *Little Charity*, see I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 9. The *Pelican* never completed the voyage, and efforts to send the *St. Augustine* instead were stymied by uncooperative officers and men. See Petitions of John Bray, dated March? 1655; Anthony Archer to the Admiralty Commissioners, 6 January 1654/5; same to same, 26 January 1654/5; same to same, 24 February 1654/5; Archer et al., Certificate, 23 January 1654/5, *SPDC*, 8:110, 414, 420, 422, 434. Anon., “An Extract out of severall letters from Barbados dated 12 & 14 March [1655],” Harley MS 6845, BL, 198.
26. “Whistler’s Journal,” 145; “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 5, describes two ships leaving on 7 February for the other islands.
 27. Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (New York: Norton, 1972), 87, 55.
 28. Anon., “An Extract out of severall letters,” 198; Barrington to [Barrington?], 245. Interrogation of Thomas Joseph, 25 April 1655 (n.s.), on Hispaniola; see Montemayor de Cuenca, “Carta S.M., Santo Domingo, 30 de Mayo 1665,” in *Invasión ingles de 1655*, ed. Demorizi, 70n52.
 29. Anon., “An Extract out of severall letters,” 198. Regarding Morris, see Berkenhead to Thurloe, 17 February 1654[/ 5], 158–59, and Winslow to Thurloe, 16 March 1654, 250.
 30. Venables gives the number 3,000 in his letter to George Montagu, Barbados, 28 February 1654/5, in *A Collection of Original Letters and Papers, Concerning the Affairs of England*, ed. Thomas Carte, 2 vols. (London, 1739), 2:46. It was repeated in England, such as when Arthur Annesley relayed news of the fleet to Charles Fleetwood, 8 May 1655, in *The Correspondence of Henry Cromwell*, ed. Peter Gaunt, Royal Historical Society, Camden, 5th ser., 31 (2007): 52. Dunn says 3,500 in *Sugar and Slaves*, 75n57, on what authority I am uncertain. Quote: Barbados Merchants, “The humble Overtures of Divers persons neerely concerned in the present posture and Condition of the Island of Barbados,” [1655], CO1 / 69:2.
 31. Out-migration in the 1640s and 1650s was weighted toward the losers in the civil wars, putting more former royalist soldiers in the colonial population. Certainly those sent as prisoners of war to labor as indentured servants fought for the king. See Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 188–89. For the objection to them not on ideological grounds but because they previously lost, see Venables, *Narrative*, 34. The early twentieth-century historian Cesáreo Ferdinándiz Duro declared them all pirates (*flibusteros*); no evidence supports that allegation, which is based on persistent popular stereotypes of English Jamaica. See *Armada Española . . .*, 9 vols. (Madrid, 1895–1903), 5:37.
 32. Goodsonn, “Vice Admiral Goodson’s abstract of y^e West India expedition,” 45, and see orders commissioning naval men as regimental officers, starting with Goodsonn as Colonel: Penn, Order to Goodsonn, dated 19 March 1654[/ 5], in Penn Letterbook, 48.

33. Venables, *Narrative*, 8. Venables to Montagu, 28 February 1654/5, 46–48. On obstructing, Berkenhead to Thurloe, 17 February 1654[/5], 158. For an inventory of all island weapons ordered, see Barbados Minutes of Council, Lucas Transcript, vol. 1: 7 February 1653/4 to 21 December 1658, and from 5 June 1667 to 15 October 1667, microfilm copy, 95–96. Venables, *Narrative*, noted arms lacking at the St. Christopher muster as well (13).
34. After he took command of his own ship, Rooth first addressed repairs to the prize, then provisioning; “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 7. For victuals that were left behind in England, see *SPDC*, 8:425. “Buying”: Venables, *Narrative*, 8. On the developing New England trade, see Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 159–60. The Commissioners eventually learned that New England could not produce enough to supply the fleet fully. William Penn to Oliver Cromwell, 17 March 1654, in Penn, *Memorials*, 72–73.
35. After the fact, Venables complained that the seamen had full rations; the landsmen had half rations four days a week, and on the other three they were made to eat fish; Venables, *Narrative*, 13. In fact, Penn ordered reduced rations for seamen; see Instructions to the captains, 6 February 1654[/5], in Penn Letterbook, 19. Boys: I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 378. Eaters: Penn to [Honored Gentⁿ], 17 March 1654/5, 2–3.
36. Examination of John Hawkes, 22 March 1654[/5], in “Examinations taken upon ye High Spaniola Expedition, 1654,” 45–46.
37. William Penn, order dated 1 February 1654/5, in “Journal of every day’s Proceedings in the Expedition,” 62.
38. Reaction: Berkenhead to Thurloe, 17 February 1654/5, 159, names Thomas Modyford and Mr. Noell, secretary to the island’s council; also see “Journal of every day’s Proceedings in the Expedition,” 61. Modyford wrote to his brother about the unreasonable reaction of Barbados, July 1655. Venables to Montagu, 28 February 1654/5, 46. For instance, on 24 July 1655 Cromwell ordered carbines and swords with belts given to Colonel James Drax and Mr. Thomas Kindall for Barbados; see “The book of warrants beginning the Eight day of June 1653 & ending the fifth of December 1655,” WO5/462, TNA.
39. Winslow to Thurloe, 16 March 1654, 251. Berkenhead to Thurloe, 17 February 1654/5, 157, 158. 2 March 1654/5, Penn Letterbook, 28–29. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 11. “Whistler’s Journal,” 146. Thomas Lawes to Robert Blackborne, 17 March 1654/5, 2, Dreer Collection.
40. Edward Winslow to John Thurloe, 30 March 1655, *SPT*, 3:325; William Penn to John Thurloe, 17 March 1654, in Penn Letterbook, 33. William Penn to [unknown], 31 March 1655, from on board y^e *Swiftsure* at Barbados, Stauffer Collection, 1:59, HSP. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. All were informed just before the landing; see “Whistler’s Journal,” 149. Fortescue: “A Journall of every dayes proceedings in the expedition,” WPP, WYN/10/2, n.p., under April 1.
41. The estimate “about 60 saile” is in Daniell to [Daniell], 505; 70 in “Extrait d’un Lettre de Saint Christophle, de 14. Juin 1655,” in *Relations des Missions*

- des PP. de la Compagnie de Jesus dan les Isles, & dans la terre ferme de l’Amerique Meridionale* (Paris, 1655), unpaginated (following 2:121). Secrecy maintained once the fleet arrived in the Caribbean: see letter printed in *Perfect Proceedings* 294 (10–17 May 1655): 4667.
42. “Journall of every dayes proceedings in the expedition,” 5 April 1655, 4. Also reported with less emphasis on English aggression in “Whistler’s Journal,” 148. Rooth heard about the Indians from Captain Fenn of the *Gillyflower*; “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 9.
43. The commission appointing them to this work (dated 6 February 1650, an error for 1654/5), can be found at CO1/66:14[n4]. The French-English treaties up to this point are cited in Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 278–79n33; for this incident, see Taylor, *Western Design*, 18. Robert Venables to Mr. Rowe, 14 June 1655, in Venables, *Narrative*, 50. In this garbled account—*Grandiosa Vitoria*—pirates had taken St. Martin and St. Christopher, which the navy reclaimed in order to add their ships to the expeditionary force.
44. For the men on the prizes, see William Penn to Oliver Cromwell, 6 June 1655, in *Memorials*, 109–10. Naval men who left records of these prizes gave the number variously as seven or fifteen such ships taken: “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 9; “Whistler’s Journal,” 149. The unknown author whose letter was quoted in “An Extract out of several letters” wrote of fourteen taken by those sent ahead to Saint Christopher, 198; and see Gregory Butler to William Jessup, 18 January 1655/6, SP84/161:105–6, State Papers, Foreign, Holland, TNA; and Report on ships taken in the islands of America, 18 January 1655/6, 103–4. My thanks to Evan Haefeli for bringing these items to my attention.
45. Militia: *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 2, Historical Mss. Commission, 13th Report, appendix, pt. 2 (1893), 95. Quote: Daniell to [Daniell], 505. Thomas Southey follows Du Tertre in describing Penn as coming ashore to visit with the French governor; since Daniell briefly disembarked, it is possible Penn did so. *Chronological History of the West Indies*, 3 vols. (London, 1827), 2:2; “Journall of every dayes proceedings,” 4–5; and “Whistler’s Journal,” 149.
46. J. Franklin Jameson, *Privateering and Piracy in the Colonial Period: Illustrative Documents* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 13–15; Cornelius Burroughs, [Certificate of the services of Capt. Kempo Sibada], 16 July 1658, CO1/33:117–18; and Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 175–76; Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 350. When Sybada died in 1659, his will left land in England, Holland, other parts of the Low Countries, Jamaica, and New England; see *New England Historical Genealogical Register* 49 (1985): 135–36.
47. Venables, *Narrative*, 18, 19, 23, 96; “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 132. On fleeing Barbados, see Kristen Block and Jenny Shaw, “Subjects without an Empire: The Irish in the Early Modern Caribbean,” *Past and Present* 210 (2011): 38–44. Cox could have spent twelve years on the island before removing to St. Christopher had he arrived with this contingent.

48. Venables, *Narrative*, 19, 20. Feames was referred to in a Spanish report of the interrogation of captured soldiers as Enrique Ferme or Ferne, who died toward the end of the campaign, and whom the Spanish referred to as a “pirate.” That term in Spanish parlance covered many activities, including illegal trading. See Montemayor de Cuenca, “Carta S.M., Santo Domingo, 30 de Mayo 1665,” in Demorizi, *Invasión inglesa de 1655*, 72n52.
49. According to the note scrawled on his copy, the indefatigable book collector George Thomason acquired *A great and wonderful Victory obtained By the English Forces, under the Command of General Pen, and Gen. Venables, against the French, and others, In the West Indies* on 3 April 1655. One week later, he obtained a similar tract, *Three Great and Bloody Fights Between the English and the French* (London, 1655).
50. *A great and wonderful Victory*, 5–6; Roman examples were much in use in this era, especially around Cromwell; see David Norbrook, *Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric, and Politics, 1627–1660* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 302–9.
51. Abbot, *A Briefe Description of the whole World*, n.p., citing as his source Jean Bodin (1529, 30–96), the sixteenth-century French lawyer and political theorist, author of *The Six Books of the Commonwealth* (*Les Six livres de la République*, 1576).
52. *A great and wonderful Victory*, 7. The classic treatment placing Drake in this narrative can be found in Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975), 9–24. For “fantasies of colonial dominance”; see Susan J. Wiseman, “‘History Digested’: Opera and Colonialism in the 1650s,” in *Literature and the English Civil War*, ed. Thomas Healy and Jonathan Sawday (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 202.
53. C. H. Firth, ed., “William Davenant and the Revival of the Drama during the Protectorate,” *English Historical Review* 18:70 (1903): 319–21. Janet Clare notes that the reputation of Spain helped to get the piece staged; see “The Production and Reception of Davenant’s ‘Cruelty of the Spaniards in Peru,’” *Modern Language Review* 89:4 (1994): 840.
54. *Three Great and Bloody Fights*, 3–5.
55. Alexandra Walsham, “Reformed Folklore? Cautionary Tales and Oral Tradition in Early Modern England,” in *The Spoken Word: Oral Culture in Britain, 1500–1850*, ed. Adam Fox and Daniel Woolf (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), 173–95.
56. For issues dividing England and France at the time, see Ruth Kleinman, “Belated Crusaders: Religious Fears in Anglo-French Diplomacy, 1654–1655,” *Church History* 44:1 (1975): 34–46. Cromwell later concluded that the French were not implicated. Cromwell found an alliance with France helpful (and royalists saw it as a disaster) because it prevented Charles Stuart from seeking aid from the French.

3. Hispaniola

1. B. J. to Captain John Pyle, n.d., under the heading “A Copie of the originall designe upon which Cromwell sett out the Fleet for the taking the island of Hispaniola,” ADD 11410 30–40. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 12.
2. A major exception was the Examination of John Hawkes, 22 March 1654, in “Examinations taken upon y^c High Spaniola Expedition, 1654,” WPP, Wynne 16, NMM. In addition, see William Penn to John Thurloe, 17 March 1654, Penn Letterbook, 33; also, Penn sent William Vessey to steal a boat (of a sort indistinguishable from other Spanish vessels) so that he could cruise the main for intelligence, 28 March (45). And see “A Journall of every dayes proceedings in the expedition of the fleet sent into y^c West Indies under the Command of Gen^l William Pen.,” 7 April 1655, WPP, Wynne 10, unpaginated, used by kind permission of the owners. (Partially published as “Journal of every day’s Proceedings in the Expedition,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 56–132, and cited in manuscript only for material omitted therein.)
3. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 70–71.
4. Hawkes, Examination, 22 March 1654.
5. Micheál ÓSiochrú, *God’s Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 72–74.
6. Mark Charles Fissel, “English Amphibious Warfare, 1587–1656: Galleons, Galleys, Longboats and Cots,” in *Amphibious Warfare, 1000–1700: Commerce, State Formation and European Expansion*, ed. D. J. B. Trim and Mark Charles Fissel (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 219, 221, 223, 232. Essex is described as “the late and ever-famous” on the title page of Edward Harwood, *The Advice of that Worthy Commander* (London, 1642). For Flanders, see David Trim’s essay on its English commander: “Vere, Sir Francis (1560/61–1609),” *ODNB*. On the fiasco at Ré, see Thomas Cogswell, “‘Published by Authoritie’: Newsbooks and the Duke of Buckingham’s Expedition to the Île de Ré,” *Huntington Library Quarterly* 67 (2004): 21–23.
7. “Whistler’s Journal,” 150–51. Goodson mentions another man, Captain Powell, who also served as a pilot; what role if any he played went unnoted. See “Vice Admiral Goodson’s abstract of y^c West India Expedition,” ADD 11410, 45.
8. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. “Whistler’s Journal,” 149–50. The order is in Cromwell, “Instructions unto Generall Robert Venables” [9 December 1654], in *Writings and Speeches*, 3:534–36. See also Venables, *Narrative*, 14.
9. When the policy was announced to the common soldiers, it caused murmuring; see Anon., *The Perfect Politician* (London, 1660), 278; I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 12–13.
10. “Whistler’s Journal,” 151; “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 81. Then-current versions of place-names taken from the 1639 “Map of the islands of Hispaniola and Puerto Rico” in the Library of Congress collection, which is attributed to Joan Vinckeboons, labeled in English, and dated provisionally.

11. Pallano Relation, 3, for the numbers; Edward, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion*, 6 vols., rev. ed., ed. W. Dunn Macray (Oxford, 1888), 6:8; “Memorial,” in *Spanish Narratives of the English Attack on Santo Domingo, 1655*, ed. and trans. I. A. Wright, *Camden Miscellany* 14, 3rd ser., 37 (1926): 71; this document is written from the point of view of the island. Count de Peñalva to Gregorio de Leguia, 24 May 1655, Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 48. For the 200 soldiers and weapons, see Frank Moya Pons, *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo*, 2nd ed. (Santiago, Dominican Republic: Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra [UCMM], [1976]), 173–74. [Francisco Facundo Carvajal], *Relacion de la Victoria* (Madrid, 1655), 1; the lances were mostly brought into the city by the hunters who used them to kill cattle. “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 10, for shuffling. “Whistler’s Journal,” 151, suggested that this meeting was inconveniently timed and slowed the landing process; but he seems to imply that they would have landed on the thirteenth if this had not been done, which seems unlikely.
12. Penn conveyed the same description of the intended landing site (and other particulars of the events on Hispaniola) in two letters, both dated 6 June, one to Cromwell, and the other to the Admiralty Commissioners; Penn, *Memorials*, 110; and Penn Letterbook, 63. The location described appears to be ten to eleven miles from the city, which fits the reference to Drake’s use of the same site. The account of Drake’s attempt gave the distance as nine or ten miles to the west of the city; [Walter Bigges], *A Summarie and True Discourse of Sir Francis Drakes West Indian Voyage* (London, 1589), 22. His men marched to the city in four or five hours. [Carvajal], *Relacion*, 1. Xayna—or as some Spanish sources at the time spelled it, Jayna—is today rendered as Haina.
13. Penn to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 6 June 1655. Venables, *Narrative*, 20, on Goodsonn’s refusal to land without orders to do so or a guide. Their only guide was “an old Dutchman that knew no place but that” (Robert Venables to George Montagu, 28 February 1654 / 5, in *A Collection of Original Letters and Papers, Concerning the Affairs of England*, ed. Thomas Carte, 2 vols. (London, 1739), 2:48, presumably a reference to Kempo Sybada, who was probably in fact Frisian but whom the English generally referred to as Dutch. The lack of a guide became a major point of contention, as the most experienced man was either retained by Penn for no good reason or was delayed by the seas in returning to Goodsonn’s ship while scouting. See Robert Venables and Gregory Butler to Oliver Cromwell, 4 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:510; Daniell to [Daniell], 505; William Goodsonn, “A Short Acc^t of the Hispaniola’s Undertaking,” n.d., ADD 11410, 45. No evidence supports Paul Sutton’s suggestion that if Venables had the authority to order Goodsonn, the landing could have been effected that day. Sutton’s detailed account lacks a variety of sources that help clarify the situation, and he favors conspiracy theories in analyzing the information he uses. See *The Jamaica Campaign: Oliver Cromwell’s West Indian Campaign, 1654–55* ([Leigh on Sea, Essex]: Partizan Press, 1990), 54, 70–71.

14. Penn to Cromwell, 6 June 1655, 110. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, in “Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 127. Daniell to [Daniell], 505, called the site Cassado Bay, possibly confusing the name with a bay near Point Causido to the east. “Whistler’s Journal,” 151; “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 81, also states that Venables’s force went eight to ten leagues to the leeward. A league was most commonly used by the English as a nautical measurement (with one league the equivalent of three nautical miles or 5,556 meters). Ten leagues equaled over thirty-four statutory miles.
15. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 127. This number, which is rather high, does not include the other regiment and a half, dropped elsewhere, but does include the sea regiment. See Barrington to [Barrington?], 246. The addition of a second full troop of horse is not well documented; they seem to have left Barbados with one. The two smaller companies were under the scout master general and Captain Pawlet. Diego de Saria Pardo, “The Treasurer’s Report,” in Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 64.
16. Penn to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 6 June 1655, 63. [Carvajal], *Relacion*, 1. Penn to Cromwell, 6 June 1655, 110. Rooth was one of the captains landing Buller and Holdip; see “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 10, where he refers to the “Hind” River. Barrington, among the army captains under Buller, described it as well, in his letter to [Barrington?], 246. *Perfect Politician*, 279, understood this river to be only two leagues from the city. Unaccountably, this location (“Hanya River”) appears on the 1639 map as east of the city.
17. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. Pardo, “Treasurer’s Report,” 64, mentions Boca de Jayna, “by way of which harbor Drake took, and sacked, this city in 1585.” The Drake sources gives ten miles to the city; Bigges, *Summarie*, 22.
18. They would grant an extra day’s rations during the landing at Jamaica; see “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 15. Three days’ rations: “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 81. Searle contracted with the master of the *Recovery* to sail with provisions to Hispaniola early in April, but it is unclear whether the ship arrived there in time to help; see Sarah, widow of Capt. Thos. Webber, of the *Recovery*, Petition to Admiralty Commissioners, 12 May 1656, *SPDC*, 10:455. Shortages generally in Daniel Howe, “These are to certifie those whom it may concern,” n.d., in Venables, *Narrative*, 43. C. H. Firth, *Cromwell’s Army: A History of the English Soldier during the Civil Wars, the Commonwealth, and the Protectorate*, rev. ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), 222, for one week’s rations on campaign in Scotland and Ireland.
19. Reaction to plunder in multiple sources: Venables, *Narrative*, 25; Daniell to [Daniell], 505. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 12–13. Anon., *Perfect Politician*, 277–78. Reports in Barbados emphasized the plunder issue, as summarized by Thomas Noell to Martin Noell, 5 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:514. Also see “A Journall of every dayes proceedings,” Wednesday, 11 April. For the rules and the efforts to teach them to English troops during the civil wars, see

- Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 146, 149, 239.
20. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. “Reformados” literally means officers whose troops were decommissioned but who remained in the army; such spare men had been tapped to participate. The term in the context of the Design seems to be used for experienced, veteran soldiers to distinguish them from raw recruits. See Wright’s definition in the introduction to *Spanish Narratives*, xi. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 127; the following account is based, unless otherwise noted, on this source, the most detailed extant version of events.
 21. Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” in *Clarke Papers*, 54, which gives the number of armed colonists they encountered as sixteen, with two English deaths and one on the other side. Firth suspected that the author, identified only as a captain in the document, was Thomas White.
 22. In the English sources, a trooper and his horse were simply lost; Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 128. The Spanish interrogated Thomas Joseph on 25 April (n.s.), 15 April by English reckoning; see Montemayor de Cuenca, “Carta S.M., Santo Domingo, 30 de Mayo 1665,” in *Invasión Inglesa de 1655*, ed. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi (Ciudad Trujillo: Montalvo, 1957), 70n52. Not in the interrogation source reprinted therein, but in other accounts, authors posit the alliance idea; see [Carvajal], *Relacion*, 1; Pardo, “Treasurer’s Report,” 64. For an even more garbled account, in which some leeward islands had to be reclaimed from French and Dutch pirates whose ships were then added to the Design, see *Grandiosa Vitoria* (Seville, 1655), 137. The giant killed Captain Allen, kinsman of Venables, along with a number of unnamed scouts before he was himself killed. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 128.
 23. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 128. Anon., *Perfect Politician*, 278. For want of water, see Holdip to Venables, 14 March 1655/6, 22; Barrington to [Barrington?], 246. Venables, *Narrative*, 17, 25–26. Filling wells, see Pallano Relation, 20n82. Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” 55, described an incident of befouling a well with “rubbish.”
 24. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 129.
 25. See the hand-drawn maps of the defenses in Sutton, *The Jamaica Campaign*, unpaginated. Holdip to Venables, 14 March 1655/6, Venables, *Narrative*, 22–23. For Poco del Rey, see Wright, introduction to *Spanish Narratives*, xi. The fort’s location is not currently known. Pallano Relation, 5–6; and see Wright, introduction to *Spanish Narratives*, x. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, reported this rumor (24–25), attributing it to a captured Spaniard. Spanish sources make clear that a full evacuation never occurred. On evacuating the women and religious, see Montemayor, “Carta S.M.,” 63–65. Men escorted the women, which may have made the city appear abandoned.
 26. “Whistler’s Journal,” 153, also says that Buller got a Negro guide, which encouraged him to set out. But he had the much-sought-after Cox, so why he would need another guide is not obvious.

27. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 129–30. The anonymous author of “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” 55, stated that Jackson led the party that found the ford, and that Venables sent 150 men out of each regiment to hold it. Both figures cannot be correct, because it would take a dozen regiments to make up the total by sending 150 each.
28. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 130. Venables, *Narrative*, 26, 27; he describes the debates over the Irishman (and with hindsight at least his hesitation about him) (27). On Warner’s former slave (or servant), see also “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 84.
29. [Carvajal], *Relacion*, 3. Daniell to [Daniell], 505. The fort had six cannons on carriages that had been recently added; see Moya Pons, *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo*, 174.
30. The officers were Captain Catts (or Watts) of the sea regiment, Captain Jennings of the Reformados, Adjutant General Thomas Walters (listed as Walker by one source), and Cox; Mr. Temple, Venables’s secretary, and Mr. Mumford, assistant secretary to the Commissioners, also perished. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 131; Daniell to [Daniell], 506; “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 85–86. The last of these put the total overall (thirty) higher than the first (twenty). Pardo claims 200; “Treasurer’s Report,” 65.
31. Kristen Block and Jenny Shaw, “Subjects without an Empire: The Irish in the Early Modern Caribbean,” *Past and Present* 210 (2011): 44–48. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 130–31. Pallano, 10 June 1655, in Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 11. “Relacion que hace un official inglés en una carta . . .,” 18 June 1655, enclosed in a letter dated 12 August 1655; reprinted in Alonso de Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa (1638–1656) / The English Revolution (1638–1656)*, ed. Ángel Alloza and Glyn Redworth (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011), 175. Goodson, “Short Acc^t,” 45. This is basically the “Journal of every day’s Proceedings” version (85), as well as that of Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 131. Whistler is negative on motives; see “Whistler’s Journal,” 154. Compare this overall description to Carvajal’s version, *Relacion*, 2.
32. “Whistler’s Journal” calls it only a “small fort” (154). Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 131–32 (quote 131). Venables’s later version omits this movement, saying only that they returned to the landing place after being attacked; he states that they had been intending to go there to renew their supplies and rest when the Irishman led them astray. Venables, *Narrative*, 28. It was presumably about this time that the Irishman was executed for duplicity; Venables does not mention it, and the anonymous letter writer states only that he was killed for tricking them, not when (130). The Spanish would use this delay to continue collecting men from the countryside; see Pallano Relation, 18–19. The anonymous author of “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo” questions the decision to pull back at this time, describing it as generally unpopular (56), a view that Barrington affirms— [Barrington?], 246.

33. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 132; inaccessible on the twenty-first, as per “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 86. The Spanish knew of the artillery landing because they heard chanting; Pallano Relation, 19. Barrington to [Barrington?], 246v. To “fetch a compass,” meaning circle around, appears in Acts 28:13.
34. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, first quote, 134; last quote, 132; also see 130–31. Barrington noted a few casualties on the English side, in his to [Barrington?], 246. Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” describes this incident as well (56–57). Pallano Relation, 18. See also [Carvajal.] *Relacion*, 2, which puts the death toll a little lower (five). For Warner’s “Negro,” see “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 86.
35. Barrington to [Barrington?], 246. Daniell to [Daniell], 506. Pallano Relation, 33. “Whistler’s Journal,” 56–57. Venables to Montagu also mentions (undated) rains as a cause of ill health (51–52). See order of Captain Damian del Castillo Vaca to Alferrez Torra, dated 2 May 1655 (n.s.), in Rodriquez Demorizi, “Invasión Inglesa en 1655,” 41. No record of another disappearance has come to light, but the rising death rate through various causes might have prevented the bedraggled army from noting such an incident if it occurred.
36. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 132. Daniell to [Daniell] mentions dragging artillery (506). Also “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” for the debate but not the reason for the ultimate decision (87). “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 14.
37. “Sword’s point,” which describes a standard marching formation (with distance measured from the shoulder to the tip of a sword with arm outstretched), from Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 133; for wings, Daniell to [Daniell], 506. Venables and Butler in their letter to Cromwell say 400. “Whistler’s Journal,” 158. Pallano Relation, 21; he noted too that the fort waited until some passed to begin firing (23).
38. Daniell to [Daniell], 506; he included some details that differ from Anon., letter of 1 June 1655, including that the survivors were one fewer (seventeen). Pallano Relation, for the order (24); praising lancers (25). Barrington to [Barrington?], 246v (states that the information came from a soldier given quarter who was with the Spanish as they left the area, and who later returned to the English); Pallano Relation, 25, 30. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 132–33. For sea regiment, “Whistler’s Journal,” 158. Pallano Relation used the same term (24, 42).
39. Prime officers: Venables and Butler to Cromwell, 4 June 1655, 510. Daniell to [Daniell], 506. Barrington to [Barrington?], 246. Ensign Fowler’s account in “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 89, 90; and see 91. A walking sword is usually distinguished from one wielded two-handed (as with a broadsword), but here the import may be rather that he lacked a firearm. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 133; reiterated by *Perfect Politician*, 281. “Whistler’s Journal,” 158, says that Heane stood with three others. Pallano Relation,

24. [Carvajal,] *Relacion*, 3, said that 800 men died. Pallano, 29, put it at 1,500, which was probably high for the actual engagement; he also mentioned mass graves (29). This Captain Butler is not to be confused with Commissioner Gregory Butler. Whether they were related does not appear in the records
40. For lancers, see especially “Whistler’s Journal,” 159; also Barrington to [Barrington?], 246. Montemayor never gives a total, but mentions 400 coming into the city in one day, and throughout notes their key role; see his “Carta S.M.,” 66, 69; Moya Pons, *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo*, 175, concludes that there were 1,300 lancers. Roberto Cassá, *Historia Social y Económica de la República Dominicana* (Santo Domingo: Alfa y Omega, 1986), notes the reliance on lancers and others of the poorer sort, in the context of demographic decline that hampered defense. Pardo, “Treasurer’s Report,” for 700 (65). Pallano, 29–30, reports that prisoners captured that day put the number at 1,500. Moya Pons states over 600; see *Historia Colonial de Santo Domingo*, 177.
41. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 132–33. Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” 57, agrees on the number. Daniell to [Daniell], 507, for the higher number. *Perfect Politician* stated that there were seven (282). Pallano Relation: for 10, see p. 30; for 400, see p. 5; coming in, see pp. 18–19 (quote, 26). Also see “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 89.
42. For the offer, see Goodsonn, “Short Acc^t.” Francisco, “Cartas de Arzobispo de Santo Domingo a su S. M. Santo Domingo, 1662,” in Rodriquez Demorizi, “Invasión Inglesa en 1655,” *Boletin de Archivo General de la Nación* 20:92 (January–March 1957):19; and the “Relacion sumaria del estado presente de la Isla Española,” in *Boletin de Archivo General de la Nación* 5(1942): 26. For decision to evacuate women, see Diego Carbadillo y Losada, *Noticia de las Invasiones que las Armas de Inglaterra han hecho en las Indias* (Madrid, 1655), reprinted in Rodriquez Demorizi, *Invasión Inglesa de 1655*, 152; also in Montemayor, “Carta S.M.,” 63–65. Pallano Relation, 37.
43. For the forward position, see Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” 57–58, commander of one unit sent ahead. Daniell to [Daniell], 507, says they would not play. Anon., *Perfect Politician*, 282, notes they set up the artillery, then retreated. Also see Anon, letter dated 1 June 1655, 133–34. Venables, *Narrative*, 29. Whistler, “Journal,” 159. Pallano Relation, 27–28.
44. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 134. Barrington to [Barrington?], says they camped all night, then were told to retreat (246v). “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” records finding them at the river (88).
45. “Relacion que hace un official inglés,” 175. Cardenas sent the letter to his superiors before he left England. The Spanish reported night boarding, continuing into the next morning. See [Carvajal,] *Relacion*, 4, and Pallano Relation, 33. Goodsonn wrote that the army was almost fully boarded on Thursday morning, 3 May. See “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 96. Rooth did not take men from shore but rather got them off other ships. It

- seems from his account that they boarded on the second of May and that he received his allotment and the fleet sailed away on the fourth (“Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 14–15).
46. Barrington to [Barrington?], 246v. Venables, *Narrative*, 32, says for the final day. “Whistler’s Journal,” 160, suggested (approvingly) longer. Pallano Relation, 33. [Carvajal,] *Relacion*, 3. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 134.
 47. Venables, *Narrative*, 33, 34, 135. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 17. Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” *Early American Studies* 3 (2005): 1–31. Crabs in “Whistler’s Journal,” 160; Morell de Santa Cruz makes much of them in “Invasión Inglesa de 1655,” 13.
 48. For the royalist coming under a white flag, see Pallano Relation, 33. The Spanish also acquired three youth (one Genovese and two English). A lame Irishman was left behind when the fleet sailed. He claimed to have been a prisoner of the English; see Pallano Relation, 33–34; [Carvajal,] *Relacion*, 4. Montemayor includes the interrogations of thirteen prisoners, some of whom were tortured; see his “Carta S.M.,” 70–73.
 49. Quotations and description from Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 134, and Venables, *Narrative*, 33. For the interrogated prisoners’ rumors, see accounts by Juan Jansen, dated 11 May (which would be 1 May 1655 o.s.), and by David Sal, 12 May, in Montemayor, “Carta S.M.,” 72n52. Nothing in the English record corroborates these rumors. Swabber: Daniell to [Daniell], 507. Hospital ships, expensive to fit out, were first used in the recently concluded Dutch War; one was sent on the Design, according to J. D. Davies, *Pepys’s Navy: Ships, Men and Warfare, 1649–89* (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2008), 61–62.
 50. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 93–4. Venables, *Narrative*, 34. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 15 mispaginated, Barrington to [Barrington?], 246v, and Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” 58, concurred. On the constitution of the sea regiment, see Thomas Lawes to Robert Blackborne, 17 March 1654/5, 2, Dreer Collection, (0175), HSP. Daniell to [Daniell], 507, singled out Rear Admiral George Dakins as outraged and ridiculing the army; also see “Whistler’s Journal,” 159. Similar views expressed, purportedly in a conversation with Penn (presumably by Penn’s secretary), in “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 92.
 51. Anon., “A brief Description of the Island of Jamaica, and a Relation of possessing the Town of St. Jago de la Vega,” in *A Book of the Continuation of Forreign Passages* (London, 1657), 48. William Penn, Edward Winslow, and Gregory Butler to Daniel Searle, 28 April 1655, in Venables, *Narrative*, 31–32. [Carvajal,] *Relacion*, 3; Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 107n.
 52. The number 4,500 was reported by men who came into the Spanish; see Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 31n107. Venables, *Narrative*, 97, 97n2, 135. Barrington endorsed the figure 1,000 “at least”; see his to [Barrington?], 246v. *Relacion de Lo Sucedido a la Armada Inglesa* (Seville, 1655), 1, used 9,000; Pallano Relation, 5, 26, 38, stated 7,500, then 10,000; for 7,000, see Peñalva to

- Leguia, 24 May 1655, 48; the Irish estimate is in “Copia de carta de un irlandés . . .,” dated 10 June 1655, enclosed by Cárdenas in a letter dated 12 August 1655, reprinted in Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa*, 177; and the English officer: “Relacion que hace un official inglés,” 175. A muster dated 21 March 1654[/ 5], in *Manuscripts of his Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 2, Historical Mss. Commission, 13th Report, appendix, pt. 2 (1893), 90, puts the total private soldiers at 5,702, with 720 officers, 60 staff officers, excluding Heane’s troop (of horse, presumably) and a few others, adding up to at least 7,000. A 21 March muster would not have included either the sea regiment or the men added from St. Christopher and the other islands. For the sea regiment numbers, see “Vice Admiral Goodson’s abstract,” 45–46.
53. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 16. [Carvajal.] *Relacion*, 4. Pallano Relation, 29. “Copy of a testimony drawn up in the city of Santo Domingo, May 24, 1655,” in Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 62. *Relation de Lo Sucedido*, 1.
54. J. R. McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 52–62. The twenty-four-year-old Irish Catholic man who stayed behind to be found by the Spanish referred to the disease as the bloody flux, “camaras de sangre.” See Montemoyer, “Carta S.M.” 72n52.
55. For the quote, see Anon., letter of 1 June 1655, 136. Abuses reported in Daniell to [Daniell], 507. Venables, *Narrative*, 87. This had been a repeatedly expressed fear of the army. Broken heart: “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 98; [Gregory Butler] to General Disbrowe, [1655], *SPT*, 3:689; “Whistler’s Journal,” 161. Wider effect: “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 92.
56. Peñalva to Leguia, 24 May 1655, 48. Pallano Relation, 26, 45 (quotes), 42 (supplies), 41 (taunting). Commemoration: Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, xii. Goodson to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 9 July 1656, Jamaica harbor, ADD 18986, 249.
57. See, for instance, Arthur Percival Newton, *The European Nations in the West Indies, 1493–1688* (London: A and C Black, 1933), 216–17. Taylor enumerates other problems but favors above all the leadership; *Western Design*, 21–22, 37. Sutton focuses on lack of food and of other needed items (including water bottles, which were in fact little used and not an obvious omission); failure to land at the best site; and failure to follow up on the advantage when they had it. See Sutton, *The Jamaica Campaign*, 70–73. For a more detailed discussion of contemporary analysis, see Chapter 4.
58. While incarcerated, Venables wrote his “Relation concerning the expedition,” which survives as ADD 11410, 56–143 and has been reprinted as *The Narrative of General Venables*; an exercise in self-justification, it does much to deflect blame onto others, including Penn; see, for instance, 10. Interestingly, Penn wrote nothing that contributed to this interpretation, which relies on critical accounts by others, especially I. S. and Whistler.
59. On the boom, for which the naval accounts provide no information, see Venables, *Narrative*, 18. Richard Holdip stated that the boom was cited in

- the council meeting when the landing was discussed; see his letter to Venables, 14 March 1655/6, in Venables, *Narrative*, 22. Surges: Penn to Admiralty Commissioners, 6 June 1655, Penn Letterbook, 64.
60. Penn to Admiralty Commissioners, 6 June 1655, Penn Letterbook, 64; Venables concurred; *Narrative*, 32.
 61. “Whistler’s Journal,” 160; also “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 94. Venables, *Narrative*, 34.
 62. Sutton makes a similar point, less concerned with size but noting that Buller’s men were fresher and able to move in a timely fashion. See Sutton, *The Jamaica Campaign*, 72. Robert Lacey, *Robert, Earl of Essex* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 157–59. Also see Paul J. Hammer, “Myth-Making: Politics, Propaganda and the Capture of Cadiz in 1596,” *Historical Journal* 40:3 (1997): 621–42; he finds that many similar problems plagued that campaign, including divided command and tensions over plunder.
 63. Lorenzo Paulucci to Giovanni Sagredo, 8 August 1655, *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts . . . in the Archives and Collections of Venice*, vol. 30, 1655–1656, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London, 1930), 91.

4. Failure

1. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate*, vol. 4, 1655–56 (1903; Gloucestershire: Windrush Press, 1989), 142–43, gives the date as 24 July; and others have followed him in this.
2. Penn’s orders to Lightfoot and others, dated 30 April, in Penn Letterbook, 55. Henry Hatsell to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 22 July 1655, *SPDC*, 8:508.
3. Robert Venables and Gregory Butler to the Lord Protector, 4 June 1655, Jamaica, *SPT*, 3:509–11; William Penn to the Commissioners of the Admiralty, 6 June 1655, Penn Letterbook, 63–65; Daniell to [Daniell], 504–8.
4. Charles Fleetwood to John Thurloe, 1 August 1655, Ireland, *SPT*, 3:690. Some observers had begun to get nervous during the long wait, as is suggested by the undated “Some proposalls touching Spayne and England as the state of things now stand,” which advocated a negotiated settlement (State Papers of Thurloe, MS Rawlinson A39:24, Bodleian Library).
5. Oliver Cromwell, *A Declaration of His Highness, with Advice of his Council inviting The People of this Commonwealth to a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation* (London, 1655), dated 21 November. Blair Worden, “Oliver Cromwell and the Sin of Achan,” in *History, Society and Churches*, ed. Derek Beales and Geoffrey Best (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 135.
6. Blair Worden, “Providence and Politics in Cromwellian England,” *Past and Present* 109 (1985): 97. On the concept generally, see Ronald J. Vander Molen, “Providence as Mystery, Providence as Revelation: Puritan and Anglican Modifications of John Calvin’s Doctrine of Providence,” *Church History* 47 (1978): 27–47; and Alexandra Walsham, *Providence in Early Modern England*

- (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an interesting corrective on Cromwell's providentialism: Rachel Foxley, "Oliver Cromwell on Religion and Resistance," in *England's Wars of Religion, Revisited*, ed. Charles W. A. Prior and Glenn Burgess (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 209–30. On violence, Andrew R. Murphy, "Cromwell, Mather, and the Rhetoric of Puritan Violence," in *The Blackwell Companion to Religion and Violence*, ed. Murphy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 524–37.
7. Jane to Nicholas, 24 September 1655, in *The Nicholas Papers: Correspondence of Sir Edward Nicholas*, vol. 3, *July 1655–Dec. 1656*, ed. George F. Warner, Camden Society, n.s., 57 (1897): 58. Lorenzo Paulucci to Giovanni Sagredo, 8 August 1655, in *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts . . . in the Archives and Collections of Venice*, vol. 30, *1655–1656*, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London, 1930), 91. Thomas Povey to Mr. Richard Povey, at Jamaica, 17 November 1655, ADD 11441, 5v. Thomas sent both William (who stayed on in Barbados) and Richard with the fleet. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Penguin, 2004), 23, argued that Hispaniola seriously harmed the New Model Army's reputation.
 8. Paulucci to Francesco Giustinian, 3 September 1655, in *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts . . . Venice*, 102. There is no record of this letter having been published; it probably circulated in manuscript. Paulucci may not have seen the first letter, but he stated explicitly that he did see the second one, from a captain confirming the dire situation.
 9. Sightings: see *SPDC*, 8:523, 530, 536. Royalists: letter of 27 September / 7 October 1655, *SPDC*, 8:356; 2 / 12 October 1655, 364; 19 / 29 October 1655, 388. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*; George Thomason dated the tract 25 September.
 10. "Whistler's Journal," 161. Fleetwood to Cromwell, 5 February 1656, 101; William Stane to Henry Cromwell, 28 September 1655, in *The Correspondence of Henry Cromwell*, ed. Peter Gaunt, Royal Historical Society, Camden, 5th ser., 31 (2007): 65–66.
 11. F. B., *Considerations and Proposals Presented to his Late Highnesse Oliver, Lord Protector of England* (London, 1659), 2.
 12. Cromwell to Goodsonn, [30] October 1655, and to [Luke Stoakes?], October? 1655, in *Writings and Speeches*, 3:859–60, 874. The recipient of the latter was likely Stoakes, rather than Daniel Searle, as editor Abbott suggested. Philip wrote: "If this were an unjust war, one could indeed take this storm as a sign from Our Lord to cease offending Him; but being as just as it is, one cannot believe that He will disband it, but rather will grant it more favour than we could hope." Quoted in Geoffrey Parker, "The Place of Tudor England in the Messianic Vision of Philip II of Spain," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 6th ser., 12 (2002): 208. Cromwell to Goodsonn, 1655, *SPT*, 4:130–31.
 13. *The Diary of Ralph Josselin, 1616–1683* (London: British Academy, Oxford University Press, 1976), 351, 359. Samuel Morland, *The History of the Evan-*

- gelical Churches* (London, 1658), praises Cromwell as the defender of the Protestant faith, picking up where Elizabeth I left off—that effort having been interrupted by “the long Reigns of two unhappy Kings” ([A4v]). Spain, seen as the “natural protector” of Catholics across western Europe from Ireland to Bohemia, served as the opposite; Ronald G. Asch, “War and State-Building,” in *European Warfare, 1350–1750*, ed. Frank Tallett and D. J. B. Trim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 334.
14. *A Declaration of His Highnes, By the Advice of his Council; Setting forth, On the Behalf of this Commonwealth, the Justice of their Cause against Spain* (London, 1655), 117. “Edward Montagu’s Notes on the Debates in the Protector’s Council concerning the Last Indian Expedition,” in *Clarke Papers*, 207.
 15. The Commission of the Commissioners of the West Indian Expedition, in *Writings and Speeches*, 3:538; Edward Winslow to John Thurloe, 30 March 1655, *SPT*, 3:325.
 16. Charles Fleetwood to Henry Cromwell, 5 February 1656, in Gaunt, *Correspondence of Henry Cromwell*, 101. Cromwell, *A Declaration of a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation*; and his to Goodsonn, [30] October 1655, 859. Edward Worth to [unknown], 31 October 1656, in *Clarke Papers*, 79.
 17. Cromwell, *A Declaration of a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation*, dated 21 November, calling for 1 December to be dedicated to this purpose.
 18. *The Memoirs of Edmund Ludlow . . . 1625–1672*, ed. C. H. Firth, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1984), 385–86. Ludlow shared Vane’s perspective and as a result he championed Vane (by then executed for his part in the regicide) in his account; see 338–39. Others who stated a similar perspective include Ro. Bl., *A Letter from a Christian Friend in the Country to another in the City* ([London, 1655]), 6; John Canne, *The Time of the End* (London, 1657), 88; and the anonymous authors of *To the honest souldiers of the garrison of Hull* (n.p., 1656), broadside; *Some considerations By way of Proposals and Conclusion* ([London], 1657), 2, 7; and *The Old Leaven purged out. Or the Apostacy of this Day further Opened* ([London], 1658), 4. John Donoghue believes that Robert Blackborne, the naval administrator, wrote the first of these; but since he continued as secretary to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Navy, rather than quitting in protest, as other radicals did, his opposition to the Protectorate’s policies is nowhere apparent. See “‘Out of the Land of Bondage’: The English Revolution and the Atlantic Origins of Abolition,” *AHR* 115 (2010): 966.
 19. Anon., *Hypocrisie Discovered: Or, a Further Manifestation of the Secret Design of the Protector, so called, to seat himself in, and be vested with the Power and Office of chief Magistrate in this Nation* ([London, 1655]). [Vavasor Powell], *A Word of God* ([London, 1655]), 5. Sir Henry Vane, *A Healing Question Propounded and Resolved, Upon occasion of the late publique and seasonable Call to Humiliation* (London, 1656), published 12 May, according to Thomason’s notation. Vane was imprisoned, but not until August, when he refused to give bond for good behavior; see *The Proceeds of the Protector (so-called) and his Council* ([London, 1656]), 5.

20. Both the anonymous author of *Hypocrisie Discovered* and Powell mentioned responding to the fast called in November 1655 for early December, while Vane was inspired by the call in March 1655/6 (Oliver Cromwell, *A Declaration of His Highness, inviting the people of England and Wales to a Day of Solemn Fasting and Humiliation* [London, 1655]), dated 13 March. Roger Williams to John Leverett, 11 October 1675, in *The Correspondence of Roger Williams, 1629–1682*, ed. Glenn W. La Fantasia (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988), 704, 706nn7, 9. Anon., “Intercepted Letter,” in *Clarke Papers*, 12. George Bishop, *The Warnings of the Lord to the Men of this Generation* (London, 1660), 3. For other critics using the defeat, see Anon., *The Picture of a New Courtier, Drawn in a Conference* (n.p., 1656); [Thomas Povey] to Edward Doyley, n.d., ADD 11411, 88v. Slingsby Bethel, *The World’s Mistake in Oliver Cromwell* (London, 1668), 9, 13, 14–15; [William Berkeley], *A Discourse and View of Virginia* ([London, 1663]), 11.
21. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 27; Venables responded to I. S. in the “Relation” he penned in the Tower. See his *Narrative*, 88–100. Cromwell, *A Declaration . . . inviting the people of England and Wales*.
22. Stane to Cromwell, 28 September 1655, 65–66. Oliver Cromwell to Richard Fortescue, 1655, *SPT*, 4:633. Barrington to [Barrington?], 245, 245v. Anon., *A Dialogue, Containing a Compendious Discourse concerning the Present Designe in the West-Indies* (London, 1655), 14–15, favors either the nation or the specific men sent. Sir Henry de Vic to Sir Edward Nicholas, 8 October 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, 3:70; I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 6.
23. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 13; Barrington to [Barrington?], 247; Robert Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 5 November 1655, *SPT*, 4:153. Greed: Anon., *The Perfect Politician* (London, 1660), 277, 284–85; [Gregory Butler] to [John] Disbrowe, [1655], *SPT*, 3:689. Whistler blamed Venables’s personal greed; “Whistler’s Journal,” 166; and see Anon., *Dialogue*, 15–16, 23. For Cromwell’s greed: Anon., *The Picture of a New Courtier*, 5, 8, 13; Sir Marmaduke Langsdale to Sir Edward Nicholas, 9 September 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, 3:40. Dross: letter dated 5 November 1655, “Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” in Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 141–42.
24. Anon., “The new designe discovered,” March 1654/5, written after the fleet departed, concluded that the soldiers so recruited became mercenaries, killing for money. The authorities prevented this text from going into print, but it survives in manuscript; see MS Rawlinson A24: 17–30, Bodleian Library. For examples of legislating morality, see Barbados Minutes of Council, Lucas Transcript, 1:107, 112, 7 February 1653/4 to December 21, 1658, and from 5 June 1667 to 15 October 1667, microfilm copy. A general rise in this sort of legislation occurred in this era; see Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 131–39. “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 9, 15.
25. For England praying specifically for the Design, see Earl of Norwich to Sir Edward Nicholas, 4 June 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, vol. 2, *Jan., 1653–June*,

- 1655, Camden Society, n.s., 50 (1892): 325; Sir John Reynolds to John Thurloe, 25 September 1655, *SPT*, 4:54; *Certain Passages* 2 (7–14 September 1655): n.p. For Cromwell praying with his Council, see Joseph Jane to Sir Edward Nicholas, 13 August 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, 3:33.
26. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 19. John Cotton to Oliver Cromwell, 28 July 1651, in *The Correspondence of John Cotton*, ed. Sargent Bush Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2001), 461. Anon., “Briefe notes of a Sermon preached before the L: Protector at Hampton Court, by the Minister of Hampton, about the latter end of Aug: 1655,” MS Ashmole 826:254, Bodleian Library; see note regarding Gage at the end of the document. Macfarlane, *Diary of Ralph Josselin*, 350. The parallels were especially striking because the Israelites also asked God why he allowed them to enter the battle if it would lead to stunning defeat. Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 154.
 27. Venables, *Narrative*, 33, 92. Writing this account to justify himself, it seems likely that such accusations could be corroborated.
 28. Daniell to [Daniell], 507. Women trying to improve their circumstances, argued by Rudolph Dekker and Lotte C. van de Pol, *The Tradition of Female Transvestism in Early Modern Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1989), 99–103. Daniel Howe, “These are to certifie . . .,” in Venables, *Narrative*, 45. Venables, *Narrative*, 92.
 29. Venables, *Narrative*, 92, 91. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 6. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, “Letters concerning the English Expedition,” 139. Daniell to [Daniell], 507.
 30. William Goodsonn, Records of Court marshals on board the *Torrington* at Jamaica, June 1655 to June 1656. MS Rawlinson A295:1, entry dated June–July 1655, n.p. This case gives cause to question Kristen Block’s assumption that the common men had reformed religion foisted on them by the Design leaders. See her *Ordinary Lives in the Early Caribbean: Religion, Colonial Competition, and the Politics of Profit* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2012), chap. 7.
 31. Barrington to [Barrington?], 245v, 246v. Daniell to [Daniell], 505, 507. Anon., *Hypocrisie Discovered*, 13–14.
 32. Robert Sedgwick to John Winthrop Jr., 6 November 1655, *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 5th ser., 1 (1871): 380–81; to Cromwell, 1 September 1655, 4; and to Navy commissioners, 6 September 1655. Also see Anon., *A Letter from a Person in the Countrey to his friend in the City* (n.p., 1656), 23; William Godfrey, in his to Robert Blackborne, 30 April 1656, CO1/32:184.
 33. Spanish providentialism has been explored in various registers. Among them, see Claude B. Stuczynski’s on ideas of inclusive versus exclusive providentialism: “Providentialism in Early Modern Catholic Iberia: Competing Influences of Hebrew Political Traditions,” *Hebraic Political Studies* 3:4 (Fall 2008), esp. 388–90; and Victor Zorilla, “Providentialism as an

- instrument for Moral Instruction in Bartolomé de las Casas and José de Acosta," *Philosophy and Theology* 25:1 (2013): 33–41.
34. Pallano Relation, 42, 45. For similar comments, see Anon., *Relation de lo Sucedido a la Armada Inglesa* (Seville, 1655), 1; and Castilla, *English Conquest*, 29. "Memorial presented on her own behalf, and on behalf of her sons and inhabitants, by the most noble Island of La Española, to her king and master, Philip IV, great monarch of the Spains and lord of two worlds," in *Spanish Narratives of the English Attack on Santo Domingo, 1655*, ed. and trans. I. A. Wright, *Camden Miscellany* 14, 3rd ser., 37 (1926): 70, 71.
 35. Francisco Facundo de Carvajal, The Notarial Account, in Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 51–62, quote on 54. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 3.
 36. Count de Peñalva to Gregorio de Leguia, 24 March 1655, in Wright, *Spanish Narratives*, 48. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 4, 25. Pallano Relation, 3, 35; Carvajal, Notarial Account, 60. Also see the published pamphlets such as Diego Carbadillo y Losada, *Noticia de las Invasiones que las Armas de Inglaterra han hecho en las Indias* (Madrid, 1655), reprinted in Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, *Invasión Inglesa de 1655* (Ciudad Trujillo: Montalvo, 1957); Anon., *Grandiosa Vitoria* (Seville, 1655).
 37. Carvajal, Notarial Account, 60. Castilla, *English Conquest*, uses "Holy Mother Church" (16). Pallano Relation, 43. Pauline Moffitt Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery: On the Spiritual Origins of Christopher Columbus' 'Enterprise of the Indies,'" *AHR* 90 (1985): 73–102.
 38. Pallano Relation, 13. Granada, a Moorish city, was lost to the Spanish during the Reconquista.
 39. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 3; Peñalva to Leguia, 24 March 1655, 48; Pallano Relation, 17. Discussed in Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 68, 183n71. Indeed, men who chewed bullets endangered their own health through lead exposure. Carvajal, Notarial Account, 1; Carbadillo, *Noticia*, 152.
 40. Peñalva to Leguia, 24 March 1655, 48. Pallano Relation, 14. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 8. This emphasis was typical of the Counter-Reformation, which brought increased attention to Mary and, through a rising interest in her childhood, to her mother.
 41. Pallano Relation, 8, 9, 26–27. On Santiago's transition, see William B. Taylor, "Santiago's Horse: Christianity and Colonial Indian Resistance in the Heartland of New Spain," in *Violence, Resistance, and Survival in the Americas: Native Americans and the Legacy of Columbus*, ed. William B. Taylor and Franklin Pease (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994), 155–62.
 42. Pallano Relation, 21. This phrase was used in the "Memorial presented on her own behalf," 71. See also Peñalva to Leguia, 24 March 1655, 45. For duty to king, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 26, 27; Pallano Relation, 38. A peculiar historical moment for the English, who were usually in the camp

- of monarchy; see Sabine Klein, “Shires and Sachems: Languages of Political Theory in Dutch and English Narratives of Contact,” *Early American Literature* 49:3 (2014): 535–55.
43. Carbadillo, *Noticia*, 147: “tiene usurpado el goveirno de aquel Reyno.” Castilla, *English Conquest*, 8; Pallano Relation, 2. Cromwell would later assert that the region was in a perpetual state of war as a result of Spanish belligerence, and therefore no declaration was necessary. See his *A Declaration of His Highnes, . . . the Justice of their Cause against Spain*, 115–18.
 44. Carvajal, Notarial Account, 1. Percy Church to Sir Edward Nicholas, 6 August 1655, in *Nicholas Papers*, 3:26.
 45. Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 152. *Certain Passages* 71 (2–9 March 1654/5): 236. B. J. to Pyle, “A Copie of the originall designe upon which Cromwell sett out the Fleet for the taking the Island of Hispaniola,” n. d., ADD 10410, 30.
 46. Pallano Relation, 42.
 47. *Perfect Proceedings* 294 (10–17 May 1655): 4667. David L. Smith agrees on the centrality of the religious framework in “The Western Design and the spiritual geopolitics in Cromwellian foreign policy,” *Itinerario* 40:2, Special issue on Spiritual Geopolitics in the Early Modern World (2016): 279–92.
 48. Barrington to [Barrington?], 145v. F. B., *Considerations and Proposals*, 5. [Butler] to Disbrowe, [1655], 689; Robert Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 6 September 1655, *SPT*, 4:12.

5. Jamaica

1. On Acadia (Nova Scotia), see John G. Reid, *Acadia, Maine, and New Scotland: Marginal Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).
2. A later brief treatment is in Elizabeth Venables, “Autobiographical Memoranda or Diary . . .,” in *Chetham Miscellanies* 4 (1871): 28; and see Carla Gardina Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” *Early American Studies* 3 (Spring 2005): 27–29. Len Travers, “Winslow, Edward (1595–1655),” *ODNB*.
3. The figure of 2,000 to 2,500 is proposed by Veront M. Satchell, *Hope Transformed: A Historical Sketch of the Hope Landscape, St. Andrew, Jamaica (1660–1960)* (Jamaica: University of West Indies Press, 2012), 37. An undated but early account gave a figure of “about 3000”; it bears no formal title beyond the heading of the first section—“The Scittuacon”—but has been variously titled by others. See “The Long Report,” CO1 / 14:125–40, figure: 133v; another contemporary copy is called “A briefe survey of Jamaica” in Harley MS 3361, BL, 37–47, 46. Forty years earlier, the population was said to be about 1,500, including 74 Indians; see Carta del Abad de Jamaica a Su Magestad, Jamaica, 14 julio 1611, AGI–Santo Domingo 177, 5:78; and the discussion in David Wheat, *Atlantic Africa and the English Caribbean, 1570–1640*

- (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2016), 272, 276.
4. Raye R. Platt et al., *The European Possessions in the Caribbean Area* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1941), 9–10; and Wendy A. Lee, “Notes on the Natural History of Jamaica,” in *The Earliest Inhabitants: The Dynamics of the Jamaican Taíno*, ed. Lesley-Gail Atkinson (Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2006), 89–92. Columbus Petition. “The Long Report,” 133, linked the low population to the fact that the Columbus family retained it.
 5. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 88, had the Jamaica plan arising only on 27 April, after the second repulse. Prisoners captured around the time mentioned it to the Spanish. (See [Francisco Facundo Carvajal], *Relacion de la Victoria* [Madrid, 1655], 3; Pallano Relation, 34.)
 6. Dates from Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, in “Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 136 (7,000); repeated by I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 20; “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 99–100. Venables in “Whistler’s Journal,” 163. “Vice Admiral Goodsons abstract of y^e West India Expedition,” n.d., ADD 11410, 45v. Julian de Castilla’s account stated that the landing occurred in Jackson’s place (see *English Conquest*, 2). Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137; Daniell to [Daniell], 507, also praises the vigor and states that it made the Spanish run.
 7. Venables, *Narrative*, 35; Anon., *A History of the Commons Warre of England. Throughout these Three Nations* (London, 1662), 127. “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 115. Anon., *Relacion de lo Sucedido a la Armada Inglesa* (Seville, 1655), 1, states that four ships ran aground. Anon., *The Perfect Politician: Or A Full View of the Life and Action (Military and Civil) of O. Cromwel* (London, 1660), 283.
 8. Barrington to [Barrington?], 247v. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 20. The English often spelled the town’s name as St. Jago de la Vega, and eventually St. Jago. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137. Penn to Venables, 12 May 1655, in Penn, *Memorials*, 101.
 9. Although Frank Cundall and Joseph L. Pietersz printed (in *Jamaica under the Spanish*, 51) a letter from the governor of Jamaica to the king said to be in the AGI, in which he is quoted as saying that the invasion scattered 8,000, I have been unable to locate that 24 May 1655 letter or to find any such estimate in the relevant file (now classified as AGI–Santo Domingo 1126, libro 1). In any case, that figure would constitute a gross exaggeration of the island’s pre-invasion population. I. S. put the number in that part of the island at the arrival of the English at 500 (*A brief and perfect Journal*, 20), but Daniell ([to Daniell], 507), counted the number in the fort at 500. If he was correct, then the other townsfolk (women, children, and infirm men) would have raised the number to perhaps 1,000. For many already in the countryside, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 2.

10. Thomas Fuller, *The History of the Worthies of England* (London, 1662), Somersetshire, 27; also see 107. “A true relation of the voyage undertaken by Anthony Sherley Knight in Anno 1596 . . .,” in Richard Hakluyt, *Principal Navigations*, vol. 10 (Glasgow, 1904), 273–74. For the forty days (in February of that year), see Don Fernando Melgarejo de Cordova, 15 August 1597, in “Cartas y expedients del distrito de la isla de Jamaica vistos en el Consejo desde el año de 1536 a 1634,” reprinted in Irene A. Wright, “The Spanish Version of Sir Anthony Shirley’s Raid of Jamaica, 1597,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 5:2 (1922): 238–39; for a narrative of the campaign, see W. Davies, *Elizabethans Errant: The Strange Fortunes of Sir Thomas Sherley and His Three Sons* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 51–53. For other attempts, see K. R. Andrews, “Notes and Documents: English Voyages to the Caribbean, 1596 to 1604: An Annotated List,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 31 (1974): 252, 253. Later Thomas Philipot (*The Original and Growth of the Spanish Monarchy* [London, 1664], 95) summarizes the history of the English in Jamaica in one paragraph, from Anthony Sherley to Edward Doyley (omitting Venables).
11. *The Voyages of Captain William Jackson (1642–1645)*, ed. Vincent T. Harlow, Royal Historical Society, Camden 3rd ser., 34 (1923), contains a contemporary account entitled “A briefe journall; or, A succinct and true relation of the most remarkable passages observed in that voyage undertaken by Captaine William Jackson to the westerne Indies or continent of America.” For Jamaica, see 16–20.
12. Barrington to [Barrington?], 247v. Venables, *Narrative*, 36, stated that the first substantive exchange occurred on the next morning, and at the time he demanded food and informed the enemy of their intentions. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 4–6.
13. Daniell to [Daniell], 507. That the Spanish initiated negotiations was also the understanding of the unnamed author (described as an English officer) who wrote a letter that came into Cárdenas’s hands; see appendix 2, “Two Letters . . .,” in Alonso de Cárdenas, *La Revolución inglesa (1638–1656)/The English Revolution (1638–1656)*, ed. Ángel Alloza and Glyn Redworth (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2011), 176. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 8–9. For the governor’s illness, see 9–10. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, used “pocky” (137).
14. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 4. Anon., “Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo,” in *Clarke Papers*, 59. Venables, *Narrative*, 35. Daniell to [Daniell], 507.
15. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 6.
16. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 6, 7, 9. He identified Sargento Mayor Duarte de Acosta Noguera and Sargento Mayor don Francisco de Proenza, and stated that the general, who was very ill, scolded them. The “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 103, written by a man who accompanied Penn to the town, identified the negotiator at this time as Major General Fortescue; also see

104. Anon., *Relacion de lo Sucedido*, described the army as Penn's to command and every action as his doing, Venables's name never appearing.
17. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 9. English negotiators from Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137. The treaty as it appears in *JHR* 1 (1945): 112–15 was dated 16 May; Penn's absence through his departure on that day is mentioned in "Journal of every day's Proceedings," 104. The treaty copy states that the governor agreed to it, and he and his deputies signed it (115). It seems that Penn left a signed copy on the sixteenth, which others subsequently subscribed.
18. Cromwell, "Instructions unto Generall Robert Venables," appendix A, in Venables, *Narrative*, 114. Partial copy (omitting dates) therein, 36–39. Castilla's summary, *English Conquest*, 12. For the hostages, see Venables and Gregory Butler to Cromwell, 4 June 1655, 511. In his letter to George Montagu, St. Jago de la Vega in Jamaica, 26 May 1655, in *A Collection of Original Letters and Papers, Concerning the Affairs of England*, ed. Thomas Carte, 2 vols. (London, 1739), 51, Venables stated that they had one other man besides the governor. Banducu ranch was near present-day May Pen, on the Rio Minho, about twenty-five miles east of Santiago de la Vega. Taylor, *Western Design*, 60.
19. Castilla, *English Conquest*, identified Carter as a colonel and "former governor of Saint Catherine" (6, 12). General Francisco Díaz Pimienta led the expedition; see Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 336.
20. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137. He stated that the Spanish were given one week from the fifteenth; according to "Journal of every day's Proceedings," 104, word arrived on the nineteenth rather than the twentieth, as Anon. suggested. The copy of the treaty that Venables included in his "Relation" left dates blank.
21. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 12–13. Whistler thought this was key; for the treaty, see "Whistler's Journal," 164; for their assessment, see 165. I. S. also makes this accusation in *A brief and perfect Journal*, 21.
22. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 11, 21. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 21. For the handling of an unidentified "souldjour" who conveyed similar news, see Anon., "Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo," 59.
23. For refugees in Cuba, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 27; for the African enclaves, see Chapter 8; the earliest evidence of a split comes from 1 to 17 February 1655/6, "The Journal of Capt. Sybady," in William Goodson, Records of the Court marshals on board the *Torrington* at Jamaica, June 1655 to June 1656, MS Rawlinson A295:79, Bodleian Library.
24. "Journal of every day's Proceedings," 105. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 137–38. Both Buller and Ward appeared in the records subsequently. Venables wrote to Penn that Buller had come back on 1 May 1655. See in *Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Portland*, vol. 2, Historical Mss. Commission, 13th Report, appendix, pt. 2 (1893), 91. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 13–14.

25. Barrington mentioned the ships' arrival but also the continued lack of food; to [Barrington?], 248v. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 13. Venables, *Narrative*, 39. Also see I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 22–24. Anon., "Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo," 59. Venables later claimed that the navy kept all the biscuit for itself and noted 3,000 ill: to George Montagu, 26 May 1655, 50–51. When he wrote to Thurloe in June, he put the number at 2,000; *SPT*, 3:545. Daniell to [Daniell], 508.
26. Venables, *Narrative*, 35; Anon., "Letters concerning," 15 July 1655, 141; Anon., "Narrative of the Expedition to San Domingo," 59–60. Richard Fortescue to Mr. Taylor, 15 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:650–51. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 16.
27. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 15. Numerous individuals wrote about this system, and Irene Wright quoted many of them; see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 14n1. For seventy residents deposited at Campeche in August, see Irene A. Wright, "The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655–1660," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., 13 (1930): 123n1. Also Anon., letter dated 15 June 1655, 140, and Anon., *Perfect Politician*, 283. James A. Delle, *The Colonial Caribbean: Landscapes of Power in the Plantation System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
28. The three ships were the *Adam & Eve*, the *Falcon* fly-boat, and the *Golden Falcon*, as per "Journal of every day's Proceedings," 107; for hides, see Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 138. William Penn and Gregory Butler, Commission to Captain William Crispin, Robert Wadeson Treasurer of y^e Army & Thomas Broughton gent, 9 June 1655, *Swiftsure*, Jamaica, MHS Photostat Collection, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. Council order, 7 September 1655, 81; for the Commissioners' complaint, see Robert Wadeson, Will Crispin, Thomas Broughton to Governor and Council of Massachusetts, 7 September 1655, 80.
29. Goodsonn to Thurloe, *SPT*, 4:453. Cromwell to Fortescue, n.d. [1655], *SPT*, 4:633–34. Provisionally dated to late September (or perhaps early October) 1655 by its reference to Fortescue's leadership (known to Cromwell in September) and to the recent dispatch of Daniel Gookin to New England (26 September).
30. Penn to [the Admiralty and Navy Commissioners?], 17 March 1654/5. Harlow, *Voyages of Captain William Jackson*, 18. Howe, in Venables, *Narrative*, 41.
31. "Journal of every day's Proceedings," 106–7. Also "Rooth's Sea Journal," 18. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 23. Penn to Disborow, 31 August 1655, in Penn Letterbook, 93. Venables, *Narrative*, 51. Venables and Butler to Cromwell, 4 June 1655, 511. The slow ships were deemed "heavier sailing"; Penn to Cromwell, 6 June 1655, in Penn, *Memorials*, 111. Despite this effort, Goodsonn voiced similar complaints, associating this flaw with his "Flemish ships": to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 20 October 1656, ADD 22546, 208.

32. I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 23; “Rooth Sea Journal,” 16, 18, 19; for his command, 6. Penn, *Memorials*, 104, 107–8. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings” says that the colonels, meeting in Santiago de la Vega while Venables was on board the flagship, compiled a list of suggestions that would match those that ultimately remained. Penn, Commission and Instructions to Goodsonn, 21 June 1655, in Penn, *Memorials*, 112–14, 114–18. And see 107, 108, comparing to “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 22, (appendix), for number of guns.
33. “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 20–21, for the voyage’s half-allowance (21). See Penn, *Memorials*, 126–31 (129 for the *Paragon*). I. S., *A brief and Perfect Journal*, 26–27, stated that 140 perished. This incident was later recount by P. Gibson to William Penn (the son), in a letter dated March 1711 / 2, included in Penn, *Memorials*, 612–16. Penn to Cromwell, 31 August 1655, in Penn, *Memorials*, 131. Also see journal entry (130) regarding the date of arrival. Missing at that time were the *Heart’s-ease*, *Tulip*, and *Gilliflower*.
34. Penn, *Memorials*, 114–18, reprints his instructions. According to Castilla, the departing Spanish were robbed of their goods but not prevented from going to Cuba (*English Conquest*, 16). For this work begun before Penn’s departure, see Penn Letterbook, 61, 62, 69, 81, 84. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 139.
35. Fortescue to Thurloe, 16 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:650; and 20 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:674; he blames especially Butler, who might have served as the requisite third along with Goodsonn and himself. Ill health in Venables, *Narrative*, 29, 47, 52; also see Fortescue to Mr. Taylor, 15 July 1655, 651. On land for wages, see Anon., “Letters concerning,” 15 July 1655, 140–41; for the quote, 16 June 1655, 140. The date vindicates Fortescue’s view that the idea was discussed with Penn. Also see “Whistler’s Journal,” 168; he departed with Penn.
36. Anon., “Letters concerning,” 15 July 1655, 140. Barrington to Thurloe, 14 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:646–47.
37. Oliver Cromwell to William Penn, 20 December 1654, in *Manuscripts of His Grace*, 2:88–89. Venables to Montagu, 26 May 1655, 50–51; and his letter to Martin Noell, 13 June 1655, Venables, *Narrative*, 49. Winslow to Thurloe, 16 March 1654[/ 5], *SPT*, 3:249. Penn to Venables, 22 May 1655, in Penn, *Memorials*, 105.
38. On alcohol abuse, see John Wentworth, 20 October 1655, in Venables, *Narrative*, 61; Fortescue to Thurloe, 16 July 1655, 650; also same to same, 20 July 1655, 674. Venables to Penn, 23 May 1655, in *Manuscripts of His Grace*, 2:92. Venables to Mr. Rowe, 14 June [1655], in Venables, *Narrative*, 50.
39. Winslow to Thurloe, 16 March 1654[/ 5], *SPT*, 3:249; Venables, *Narrative*, 93.
40. Carla Gardina Pestana, “Early English Jamaica without Pirates,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 71 (2014): 326–33.

6. Imagining

1. Greg Dening, *Islands and Beaches: Discourses on a Silent Land; Marquesas, 1774–1880* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 32. See also Roland

- Greene, "Island Logic," in *"The Tempest" and Its Travels*, ed. Peter Hulme and William H. Sherman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 140–41.
2. Daniell to [Daniell], 504, describes being named to this post in Barbados; signing J. Daniell, his first name and that of his brother are supplied by Venables, *Narrative*, 46. Anon., "Account of Jamaica," enclosed in Robert Venables to John Thurloe, 13 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:545–47; the bulk of "A brief Description of the Island of Jamaica," in *A book of the Continuation of Forreign Passages* (London, 1657), reproduced this account. Anon., Letter dated 1 June 1655, in "Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655," in Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 131, lists Mr. Temple as among those killed. If he survived, Temple's replacement was presumably among the retinue of twenty-eight that Venables brought back to England on board Edward Blagg's ship, the *Marston Moor*; see letter dated 9 September 1655, *SPDC*, 8:326–27.
 3. Anon., "A description in parte what the iland of Jamaco yeelds," in MS Rawlinson A37:45–48 [April 1656], Bodleian Library. Anon., *A True Description of Jamaica* (London, 1657); Samuel Clarke, *Geographical Description* (London, 1660), 182. "Long Report," of a later vintage, appears to have been written by a participant and in much the same vein; see CO1 / 14:125–40.
 4. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 139. Robert Venables and Gregory Butler to Oliver Cromwell, 4 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:510. Daniell to [Daniell], 507. "Maugre" in the sense of "to show ill-will, to defy, oppose" (*OED*, s.v. "maugre"). Richard Fortescue to John Thurloe, 20 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:674.
 5. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. Years later, at the Restoration, the Council for Foreign Plantations, July? 1661, CO1 / 15:137, would report to the king much the same assessment, to make the case for keeping the island: "considering its fruitfulness, situation, and capacity of being made the most eminent plantation of all his Majesty's distant dominions."
 6. Daniell to [Daniell], 507. He thought that England would never produce enough settlers to hold Hispaniola (in contrast to the more populous Spain) and also that such a sizable island would be impossible to patrol and defend. Fortescue to Thurloe, 20 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:674.
 7. "Account of Jamaica," 13 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:547. Richard Grove, *Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion, Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1860* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39. For similar early paeans about Providence Island, see Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 32.
 8. Anon, letter dated 1 June 1655, 138. An official Spanish report bemoaning the English seizure of the island listed its products as "tobacco, yuca, maize, millet, plantains, cocoa, sugar, cotton and divers grains, Brazil wood, red ebony, pepper (*pimienta*), timber for ship-building, cattle and small stock, a lot of horses and beasts of burden." Licentiate Don Fernando de Guervara Almirano, Declaration by Don Francisco de Leiva Ysassi, dated 21 July 1659,

- printed in *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 84. In making a claim of the loss of the island, its putative owner (who as Columbus's heir held a dukedom associated over it) enumerated the exports as cocoa, sugar, skins, meat, lard, fat, and cotton. See Columbus Petition, 29.
9. Daniell to [Daniell], 508.
 10. E. Brooks Holifield, *Era of Persuasion: American Thought and Culture, 1521–1680* (Boston: Twayne, 1989), 24, 25. David B. Quinn has pointed out that these enumerations began with Columbus; "European Perceptions of American Ecology, 1492–1612," in *Visions of America since 1492*, ed. Deborah L. Madsen (London: Leicester University Press, 1994), 4. Gesa Mackenthun, *Metaphors of Dispossession: American Beginnings and the Translation of Empire, 1492–1637* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), 143. Emma Rothschild, "A Horrible Tragedy in the French Atlantic," *Past and Present* 192 (2006): 83.
 11. The abundance of its food supplies: A. Vazquez de Espinosa, *Compendio y descripción de las Indias Occidentales*, ed. Balbino Velasco Bayón, 2 vols. (Madrid: Historia 16, 1992), 1:115 (para. 324). Daniell to [Daniell], 508. For the early emphasis on abundance in Jamestown, see Rachel B. Herrman, "'The 'Tragical Historie'?' Cannibalism and Abundance in Colonial Jamestown," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 68 (2011): 47–74. For peas and barley, Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 138.
 12. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 5. For hunting on the island under the Spanish, see Francisco Morales Padrón, *Jamaica Espaniola* (1952), translated as *Spanish Jamaica* by Patrick E. Bryan with Michael J. Gronow and Felix Oviedo Moral (Miami: Ian Randle, 2003), 162. Veront M. Satchel, *Hope Transformed: A Historical Sketch of the Hope Landscape, St. Andrew, Jamaica, 1660–1960* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2012), 29–30. "Account of Jamaica," 13 June 1655, 546. This account distinguishes the cattle on the savannas, which are described as "well stored with cattle," and those "abiding in the woods, which the Spaniards call ganados simarones, or wild cattle."
 13. Herrman, "The 'Tragical Historie,'" 61–63. More generally on early periods of dearth and the writing about it, see Kathleen Donegan, *Seasons of Misery: Catastrophe and Colonial Settlement in Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). Robert Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 5 November 1655, *SPT*, 4:153. For starving in a cook's shop, see I. S., *A brief and perfect Journal*, 24.
 14. Venables and Butler to Cromwell, 4 June 1655, 510. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. Anon., *True Description*, 2. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 138.
 15. Clarke, *Geographical Description*, 182. Clarke briefly mentioned that the English had just taken the island but otherwise offered little information about it. Beyond hurricanes, he only supplied the fact that it had been a site where the Spanish slaughtered the natives. He may have been following Vincent le Blanc in this, as his *Les Voyages fameux* appeared first in Paris in 1648, with an English edition to follow only in 1660 under the title *The World Surveyed*;

see page 334 of the latter edition for Jamaica's particularly violent "Vraccans." Jamaica went for some time after the English conquest without an incident, and many commentators hoped the island was immune. See, for instance, "Long Report," 125v. "A description in parte what the iland of Jamaco yeelds," 45.

16. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 139.
17. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. Venables and Butler to Cromwell, 4 June 1655, 510. Lorenzo Paulucci to Francisco Giustinian, the Ambassador in France, 22 August 1655, in *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and Collections in Venice*, vol. 30, 1655–1656, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London, 1930), 97–99.
18. Anon., *True Description*, 4. The author seems to attribute this to Columbus: "he that first discovered these Countries, and best knew to make his choice, was only a Suitor for this Island; and when afterward he was asked by the Portugal why he did not cause the mines there to be wrought; he made answer . . ."
19. Lesley-Gail Atkinson, "The Exploitation and Transformation of Jamaica's Natural Vegetation," in *The Earliest Inhabitants: The Dynamics of the Jamaican Taíno*, ed. Atkinson (Kingston: University of the West Indies, 2006), 97–112. On the early sugar industry in the Spanish Caribbean, see Lynne Guitar, "Boiling It Down: Slavery on the First Commercial Sugarcane Ingenios in the Americas (Hispaniola, 1530–45)," in *Slaves, Subjects, and Subversives: Blacks in Colonial Latin America*, ed. Jane G. Landers and Barry M. Robinson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006), 39–82.
20. *Faithfull Scout* 242 (24 August–1 September 1655): 1933; Nicole Greenspan points out that Daniel Border used Heylyn's figure but increased native residents by a factor of ten; "News and the Politics of Information in the Mid Seventeenth Century: The Western Design and the Conquest of Jamaica," *History Workshop Journal* 69 (2010): 10. English residents speculated that the savannas of the west and south had once boasted extensive fields of maize; see "Long Report," 125v.
21. Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica*, 3 vols. (London, 1774), 1:238–40. Wooden furniture and cocoa in ships riding at anchor contained island exports ready for shipping; Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, 139.
22. Based on statistics provided by David Wheat in a private communication, dated 16 June 2015, and used with his gracious permission. The rise in slave imports in the 1610s related to an overall increase during the Twelve-Years Truce (1609–21); possibly traders brought some ill people to Jamaica, attempting to avoid the medical examiners awaiting their arrival in such slave ports as Cartagena. Vazquez de Espinosa, *Compendio y descripción*, 1:194 (para. 328), notes that Portuguese slavers stopped en route to their intended ports to refresh their human cargoes.
23. "Account of Jamaica," 13 June 1655, 547. This reference to the Jamaican pimento (or allspice) indicates the early advent of the spice in Jamaican

- cuisine. Jamaica Council Minutes, [1663?], CO139/1:46-v, 57-v, TNA, voted to “prohibit the transporting of sev^l Commodities out of the Island in a Plantable or growing Condition.”
24. Martin Noell and Thomas Povey, “Overtures touching a Councell to bee erected for Foreign Plantations” (draft), n.d., Egerton 2395, 270–71.
 25. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. This theme appeared later in “Long Report,” [1660]. “Whistler’s Journal,” 169.
 26. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. “Account of Jamaica,” 13 June 1655, 547.
 27. “Account of Jamaica,” 13 June 1655, 546; see Columbus Petition, 32, for shipbuilding. Anon., “A description in parte what the iland of Jamaco yeelds,” 45.
 28. Stephanos Stephanides and Susan Bassnett, “Islands, Literature, and Cultural Translatability,” *Transtext(e)s Transcultures 跨文本跨文化: Journal of Global Cultural Studies, Special issue: Poésie et insularité* (2008): 10–13. Only at the Restoration did *The Tempest* gain the subtitle “The Enchanted Isle”; R. S. White, “Introduction: Prospero 2000,” in *The Tempest: William Shakespeare*, ed. White (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 2.
 29. Beeston, Journal, 22.
 30. Carla Gardina Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” *Early American Studies* 3 (Spring 2005): 1–31.
 31. “Long Report,” 127v, 133v.
 32. Anthony Pagden has noted that the French and the British favored trade and agriculture over the Spanish emphasis on mineral extraction; *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 66–73. Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), presents the English as focused on occupation as the main criterion for possession. According to Barbara Arneil, “Trade, Plantation, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55 (October 1994): 591–609, Locke would articulate this view later in the century, advocating colonization and agricultural development as the method whereby England should expand; he would speak specifically against the Spanish emphasis on mining (599).
 33. Eva Botella-Ordinas, “Debating Empires, Inventing Empires: British Territorial Claims against the Spaniards in America, 1670–1714,” *Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies* 10:1 (2010): 142–68, makes a related point with regard to a later British criticism of how the Spanish used logwood in the Yucatan.
 34. Justin Roberts has argued that Barbadians had a model to export and identified Surinam as the major site for its further development; see “Surrendering Surinam: The Barbadian Diaspora and the Expansion of the English Sugar Frontier, 1650–75,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 73 (2016): 225–56. For Jamaica’s later somewhat mixed regime, see Trevor Burnard, *Planters, Merchants, and*

Slaves: Plantation Societies in British America, 1650–1820 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 166–67.

35. Examples of this construction of the historical trajectory toward sugar are legion. For one, see Sidney W. Mintz, *Three Ancient Colonies: Caribbean Themes and Variations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 47–48. The few already-established cocoa walks were considered highly desirable; the invaders quickly shipped cocoa, and many future commentators focused on its virtues. See discussion in Chapter 9.
36. William Hughes explained cocoa in *American Physitian* (London, 1672). *Mercurius Politicus* (16–23 June 1659): 521. The advertisement promised that consumers who came to the shop in Queens-head alley, Bishopgate, could be “taught the use thereof.”
37. Nuala Zahedieh, “Trade, Plunder and Economic Development in Early English Jamaica, 1655–1689,” *Economic History Review*, 2nd ser., 39 (1986): 205–22.
38. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, introduction to *A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados by Richard Ligon* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2011), 33.
39. While documentation for membership in the army is uneven, early land records indicate that survivors of the invasion force made up a sizable portion of owners. For instance, at least half of those listed as officers in the 1662 militia (all of whom would have been local landowners) were identified in other records (especially Doyley, *Journal*) as having been in the army. “An Accompt of y^e Officers & Soldiers of y^e Militia of Jamaica raised by Ord^r of His Ex^{ty} Tho L^d Windsor Govern^r of that Island,” ADD 11410, 8.
40. Carole Shammas charts the rising demand over centuries; see “The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical Goods,” in *The Early Modern Atlantic Economy*, ed. John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 163–85.
41. Stuart B. Schwartz, “Looking for a New Brazil: Crisis and Rebirth in the Atlantic World after the Fall of Pernambuco,” in *The Legacy of Dutch Brazil*, ed. Michiel van Groesen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 43.
42. Sidney Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1985).
43. This omission might be related to the tendency to omit laborers in descriptions of eighteenth-century Jamaica, save that, coupled with no particular emphasis on sugar, it seems somewhat different than the refusal to acknowledge them that Jill H. Casid describes. See her *Sowing Empire: Landscape and Colonization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 12.
44. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. “Long Report,” produced some years into the occupation, also admitted the need (122v, 129v). Yet at the same time it described the island itself effortlessly yielding products, as in earlier writings. For Georgia: Betty Wood, *Slavery in Colonial Georgia, 1730–1775* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 10.

7. *Surviving*

1. Venables, *Narrative*, 67. William Goodsonn and Robert Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 24 January 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:455. On the same date in a letter to Thurloe, Goodsonn put the number of officers and men (excluding women and children) at 2,600; 4:453. Gage's widow, Mary, received another four months of his pay, indicating that he died in July; *SPDC*, 10:28. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 20. Guatibacoa, at the north end of a large plain nestled against the mountains, was in the vicinity of present-day Clarendon Park and Four Paths. Robert Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 5 November 1655, *SPT*, 4:153.
2. Doyley, *Journal*, 4v, 5. William Brayne to John Thurloe, April 1657, *SPT*, 6:235–36. Brayne does not state directly that he had reduced the number of regiments, but he discussed the prejudice to the career of Henry Archbould that came of losing his regiment. Firth, *Regimental History*, 721, overstated the drop, asserting that they went to four in October 1657. Doyley's records of rations listed five in November 1657 and six a year later, in one case combining and in the other splitting the Irish and Scottish regiments that came with Moore and Brayne; Doyley, *Journal*, 39v, 56v–57. In January 1659, a muster listed only 1,541 privates for the entire army, so that the remaining regiments were still too many—easily twice as many—as appropriate. See Firth, *Regimental History*, 710; two regiments would have been closer to the mark.
3. Ralph Josselin heard all were dead as of January 1655 / 6; *The Diary of Ralph Josselin, 1616–1683*, ed. Alan MacFarlane (London: British Academy, Oxford University Press, 1976), 361. Also see *SPDC*, 8:384–85. John Hull in New England heard 6,000 dead, but thought the number higher (April 1656); “Some Observable Passages of Providence toward the Country,” *Archaeologia Americana: Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society* 31 (1857): 177. William Stane to Henry Cromwell, 19 February 1656, in *the Correspondence of Henry Cromwell*, ed. Peter Gaunt, Royal Historical Society, Camden, 5th ser., 31 (2007): 110–11.
4. William Godfrey to Robert Blackborne, 30 April 1656, *Marmaduke*, Jamaica, CO1 / 32:184. Taking death rates for the army invading Ireland earlier in the same decade as an example, figures in Micheál OSiochrú, *God's Executioner: Oliver Cromwell and the Conquest of Ireland* (London: Faber and Faber, 2008), 205–6, show the approximately 52,000 troops in Ireland from 1649 to 1651 reduced by about one-third by 1652. Francis Barrington mentioned his personal servant Dick in a letter to his nephew, [Sir John Barrington], 245.
5. “List of men, well and sick, women, and children . . .,” n.d. [1656?], CO1 / 32:123. Dating to the winter months seems likely, as Humphrey's regiment (which arrived in October) was present but had been there long enough for more than half of the men to fall ill. “Edward D'Oyley's Journal,” transcribed by F. J. Osborne, S.J., ed. S. A. G. Taylor, *JHR* 11 (1978): ap-

- pendix, 112. The opening figure may be somewhat high, as some regiments falsified their lists to get additional rations; as per proclamation, 26 July 1656 (Doyley, Journal, 8, from the reverse of the volume). This period falls between the reinforcements with Sedgwick (October 1655) and those with Brayne (December 1656).
6. For Fortescue, Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 153, describes him as dead within four or five days after their business was settled; his ship came to anchor on October 1. Quote: Francis Barrington to John Hawkins, 5 November 1655, Egerton MS 2648, 257. Funds were ordered paid to Fortescue's widow the following year; see order dated 21 October 1656, SPDC, 10:137. For Sedgwick, see Edward Doyley to Oliver Cromwell, 20 June 1656, SPT, 5:138; to John Thurloe, 20 June 1656, SPT, 5:139. Quote in Robert Sedgwick to Council of State, 6 November 1655, AGC/XII/26, MS 974914, NMM.
 7. Sarah Barber, "Brayne, William (d. 1657)," ODNB. Edward Doyley to John Thurloe, 6 October 1656, SPT, 5:476. Will of Edward Doyley of Saint Martin in the Fields, Middlesex, 15 May 1675, PROB 11 / 347 / 538, TNA.
 8. Firth, *Regimental History*, 699–727, reviews this history.
 9. With at least 7,000 arriving initially and another 2,000 in the reinforcements sent in three allotments in the first two and a half years, the resulting 9,000 had been reduced to 2,000 according to Committee of the Councill of foreign Plantations, [Minutes,] 10 January 1660, population figures, Egerton 2395, 289–90. Assuming minimal numbers of departures, a death rate of 75 percent would be a conservative estimate. For arrivals, see Doyley to [Committee on America], September? 1657, Egerton 2395, 144. Karen Ordahl Kupperman, "Apathy and Death in Early Jamestown," *Journal of American History* 66 (1979): 24. Plymouth: William Bradford's list of "Decreasings and Increasing," in *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647*, ed. Samuel Eliot Morison (New York: Knopf, 1952), 443–48, and "A Register of Governor Bradford's in his own hand, recording some of the first deaths, marriages and punishments at Plymouth," in Thomas Prince, *A Chronological History of New-England, in the Form of Annals*, vol. 3 (Boston, 1736; Edinburgh, 1887–88), 8–39.
 10. Gary A. Puckrein, *Little England: Plantation Society and Anglo-Barbadian Politics, 1627–1700* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), appendix, 183, discusses the apparent health of Barbados; also see Larry Gragg, *Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627–1660* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 166, 188–89. Kupperman noted no evidence of widespread death in *Providence Island*. Philip Boucher states that 850 of 1,200 had died in French St. Christopher by 1629; see *France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics of Discontent?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 122. Alison Games notes two-thirds lost in one year in early Surinam; *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 190. Michael J. Jarvis, *In the*

- Eyes of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680–1783* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 19, 33.
11. Robert Venables and Gregory Butler to Oliver Cromwell, 4 June 1655, *SPT*, 3:510; also on illness in this period, see “Vice Admiral Goodsons abstract of y^e West India Expedition,” n.d., ADD 11410, 45v. Rooth mentions deaths in Barbados, coming toward the end of the fleet’s stay there; “Rooth’s Sea Journal,” 8.
 12. Cristoval de Ysassi, “Two Spanish Documents of 1656,” ed. J. L. Pietersz and H. P. Jacobs, *JHR* 2:2 (1952): 24–25, 30, 33.
 13. Venables, *Narrative*, 67. J. R. McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 102–4. Kenneth F. Kiple and Brian T. Higgins probably erred in thinking that yellow fever was briefly present at the time; see “Yellow Fever and the Africanization of the Caribbean,” in *Disease and Demography in the Americas*, ed. John W. Verano and Douglas H. Ubelaker (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 240–41. “A View of the Condicon of Jamaica,” October 1664, attested by Thomas Modyford, CO1 / 18:260; another copy, attributed to Modyford, is “A View of the Condition of Jamaica,” 1? October 1664, ADD 11410, 19–21.
 14. Sedgwick’s symptoms reported among the Spanish refugees on the island; see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 28. For hunger’s exacerbating effects, see Noble David Cook, *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492–1650* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 166.
 15. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 19–20; Don Fernando de Guervara Altamirano, Declaration by Don Francisco de Leiva Ysassi, dated 12 July 1659, in *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 83; also see 93–94. Deaths among the refugees in June 1656 from John of Cartagena, n.d., State Papers of Thurloe, MS Rawlinson A39:218; A63:284, Bodleian Library.
 16. Katherine Lyttelton to Christopher, Viscount Hatton, 3 September 1662, in *Correspondence of the family of Hatton*, ed. Edward Maunde Thompson, Royal Historical Society Publications, n.s., 22–23 (1878), 1:27–28. Her husband recorded her death in his letter of 26 February 1662 / 3. Jeffrey Dare and Mark Harrison (aboard the *Beare*) to John Thurloe, 10 October 1656 (*SPT*, 5:482), for the Cubans. For Spanish on Jamaica, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 19.
 17. Linda Nash, *Inescapable Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 11–12. Cromwell to Chief Commanders in Jamaica, 17 June 1656, in *Writings and Speeches*, 4:194. William Brayne to Thomas Povey, Martin Noell, and William Watts, 8 July 1657, Egerton 2395, 129–30. No record of this grant survives, because all save one grant made by Brayne cannot be documented, that one known through mention in Doyley’s Journal (98).
 18. Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 9 January 1656[/ 7], *SPT*, 5:770–71. On humoral theories, see Mary Lindemann, *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe*

- (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9–10, 12–18. James Modyford, “Description of Jamaica,” [1663], *CSPC*, 5:177, retrospectively cited trees and intemperance, while his brother endorsed the idea of getting away from the lowlands and into the mountains. See “A View of the Condicon of Jamaica.” For north side, see William Clayton et al., “Certaine Proposals humbly offered,” [1661?], CO1 / 33:214.
19. Lewis Ashton to W. Langley, 8 January 1656 / 7; Ashton apparently received a commission as an ensign in 1659, rose to captain, later holding the same rank in the militia, and sat in the Assembly. Doyley, *Journal*, 363–64, 417, 496; *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, CO140 / 2:1; “An Accompt of y^e Officers & Soldiers of y^e Militia of Jamaica,” ADD 11410, 8. Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 6:110. Doyley to John Thurloe, 12 March 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:602–3. Brayne to Povey, Noell, and Watts, 8 July 1657, 130. Willoughby reported that the island was healthy in late January 1656 / 7 (*SPDC*, 10:544). Anon., *A True Description of Jamaica* (London, 1657), 4.
 20. Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 153; Brayne to Cromwell, 12 March 1656 / 7. Doyley to [Committee on America], September? 1657, 144; Doyley called the Noell settlers “lately sent.”
 21. William Brayne to John Thurloe, 9 July 1657, *SPT*, 6:391–92; “A View of the Condicon of Jamaica,” October 1664, 261v. Cornelius Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne], 15 July 1658, CO1 / 33:112; this advice was not implemented, since no new recruits went. Anon., “Considerations for y^e more convenyent,” n.d. [1655–56?], Egerton 2395, 96–98.
 22. Goodsonn and Stokes to Oliver Cromwell, 18 October 1656, *SPT*, 5:500–501; Brayne to Cromwell, 9 January 1656[/ 7], 770; William Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 9 January 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 5:771. Goodsonn blamed rains. Jacob Stoakes owned land and a cocoa walk in St. David’s parish; St. David Plat Book, 1B / 11 / 2 / 12, 125, 127, 121, JA. James Moxon, *A New Map of Jamaica* (London, 1677), table. Doyley to [Committee on America], September? 1657, 145.
 23. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” in Penn, *Memorials*, 24 May 1655, 106. Barrington to [Barrington?], 14 July 1655, 248; also see 249. Hunger had of course dogged life in Europe for centuries, but the degree of the dearth in Jamaica still impressed contemporaries. For the general phenomenon, see Piero Camporesi, *Bread of Dreams: Food and Fantasy in Early Modern Europe*, trans. David Gentilcore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). Letter dated 5 November 1655, “Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” in Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 142.
 24. Horse: Goodsonn to Thurloe, 24 January 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:453. Boiled hides: Ysassi, “Two Spanish Documents (30 April 1656),” Ysassi to brother (31). Proclamation, 26 July 1656, Doyley, *Journal*. Some evidence suggests that men ate horse even when provisions were comparatively available. See Doyley, *Journal*, 6v. Prisoners (whom he also worried would spy): Brayne to John Thurloe, 10 January 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 5:778. Fear: Doyley to [Committee on America], September? 1657, 144.

25. For the *Bristol*, see January 1658 / 9, *SPDC*, 12:512; for the *Diamond*, see Doyley to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 24 January 1659 / 60, CO1 / 33:158; for the *Beare*, Doyley to Commissioners of Admiralty, 13 April 1661, CO1 / 15:78. Quote: Doyley, Journal, 63v. In an undated letter probably from late 1659, Povey to Edward Doyley, Old Jury, “concerning the floridan trade,” 28 March 1658, ADD 11410, 141, asks Doyley to receive the ambassador well. Committee of the Council, “The State of Affaires of the English in Jamaica,” 27 March 1660, Egerton 2395, 241–42. Burroughs to the clerk of the Survey at Deptford, 10 April 1660, CO1 / 33:172, stated that the *Hound* had to be victualed for the homeward voyage with the aid of merchants.
26. For a sampling of such letters, see Sedgwick to John Thurloe, 30 April 1656, *SPT*, 4:749; Goodsonn and Stokes to Oliver Cromwell, 18 October 1656, 500–501; Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 18 April 1657, *SPT*, 6:211–12. “An Accompt of such provisions as were sen[t],” n.d. [1655], Egerton 2395, 141. In June 1659, Doyley sent home the *Marston Moor* to get provisions (Journal, 62v). William Penn wrote in a letter of 17 March 1654 / 5, from Barbados, presumably to the Admiralty and Navy Commissioners, that the expedition would need constant supply. See William Penn to [Honored Gent^{rs}], 17 March 1654 / 5, Dreer Collection (0175), HSP. Plenty: Doyley to John Thurloe, 7 April 1657, *SPT*, 6:180–81; Brayne to Thurloe, 9 July 1657, 391–92.
27. “An accompt of Stores remaining,” 21 June 1656, CO1 / 32:211, is one of a number of surveys sent to the Admiralty. For similar compilations, see CO1 / 43, CO1 / 47. Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 153. Samuel Barry et al., “A Certificate in Relation to our Stores Committed to Commisary Poveys Charge by us whose names are underwritten,” Jamaica, 16 January 1656 / 7, BL312, Blathwayt Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Although the document references court-martial proceedings, no records of these actions survive.
28. “Journal of every day’s Proceedings,” 19 May 1655, 104. *SPDC*, 9:6. The *Edward of London* received a certificate from Daniel Searle on Barbados on 2 May 1655, presumably departing shortly thereafter. *SPDC*, 9:354. Orders for provisioning: *SPDC*, 8:414, 475, 477, 524; *SPDC*, 9:43, 329–30, 405, 554. On the location of the Admiralty in this era, see *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, vol. 10, *Companion*, comp. and ed. Robert Latham (London: Bell and Hyman, 1983), 4. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to the officers of Jamaica, 4 January 1655 [/ 6], *SPT*, 4:390. For a store ship taken by Dunkirkers (that is, privateers out of Dunkirk), see *SPDC*, 10:525.
29. Penn to Thomas [Alderne], n.d. [March 1655], Penn Letterbook, 42; Burroughs to [Blackborne], 15 July 1658. Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne], 28 November 1658, CO1 / 33:123. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to Cromwell, 24 January 1655 / 6, 457. Bad provisions: see Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty, 24 June 1656, CO1 / 32:192-v, was willing to suppose they were improperly packed; see also Thomas Wilkes to Commissioners of Admiralty

- and Navy, 22 August 1656, CO1/33:15; Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 23 September 1656 Navy, CO1/33:23. Medicines: in Admiralty Commissioners to Navy Commissioners, 27 August 1657, *SPDC*, 11:416. Bad bread: April 1657, *SPDC*, 10:551.
30. Povey to Doyley, 28 March 1658, 61-v; Edward Doyley to Council of State, 27 February 1657, *SPT*, 6:853–54. Thomas Povey et al. to the Committee for the Affairs of Jamaica, “Concerning the State of Jamaica,” 17 October 1658, Egerton 2395, 157–58. Doyley, Journal, 2v, 6v. Sedgwick quickly wrote to the Admiralty Commissioners to alert them of the impending need (14 November 1655, CO1/32:35v). Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne], 9 June 1659, CO1/33:145.
 31. For one case of debts the state owed on Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Christopher for food for soldiers, see James Butt and James His, “His Highness and the Commonwealth’s Accompt,” [July 1656], MS Rawlinson A40:426. New England: January 1656/6, *SPDC*, 11:451; peas arrived March 1656, Doyley, Journal, 8v, 11v. Stephen Winthrop to John Winthrop Jr., *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections* 5th ser., 8 (1882): 216; Samuel Maverick to the Earl of Clarendon, n.d. [1660s], *New York Historical Society Collections* 2 (1869): 36, noted New England provisioning Jamaica.
 32. When Goodsonn used pieces of eight to reimburse himself for his outlay, it was presumably prize money; see Goodsonn to Commissioners of the Admiral and Navy, 24 July 1655, CO1/32:67. Also see Cornelius Burroughs, Account of Provisions bought of New England men, n.d. [1657], State Papers of Thurloe, MS Rawlinson A36:382–83v; note payment with prize goods. Some suggestive evidence can be found for 30 April through 31 May 1659, Doyley, Journal, 61v–62.
 33. Brayne to Richard Hutchinson, 17 June 1657, CO1/33:67; it is not clear from his letter where the salt was collected. Doyley’s Journal mentions Corridon, 7 March 1659/60, 84-v. At least once it was also seized from the enemy (and in that case distributed to the men); see Goodsonn to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 24 July 1655. No further mention appears of self-producing salt of the first months. Credit: Brayne to Cromwell, 18 April 1657 (211–12), and to Thurloe, 9 July 1657 (391–92). Brayne wished he could demand debts owed to the state in the Caribbean, because it would provide cash that could be used to buy provisions. The problems were larger than Jamaica, as by 26 May 1658 Commissioners of the Navy wrote to the Admiralty Committee to explain that they had “almost lost credit of this office” through their inability to pay; in *British Naval Documents, 1204–1960*, ed. John B. Hattendorf et al. (Aldershot, Hants: Scolar Press, for the Navy Records Society, 1993), 237.
 34. Cromwell to Fortescue, 1655, *SPT*, 4:633. “The de[c]la[ra]son of Richard [Race], M[aste]r of the Hunter, aged 35 yeares or thereabouts,” in William Goodsonn, Records of the Court marshal on board the *Torrington* at Jamaica, June 1655 to June 1656, MS Rawlinson A295:78.

35. Livestock: Cromwell, Instructions to Richard Fortescue et al., n.d. [1655], *SPT*, 4:635. Sedgwick to Navy Commissioners?, 14 November 1655, CO1 / 32:112. For restocking, see [Thomas Modyford], Proposals [1664?], CO1 / 18:3v; also see Committee for the Affayes of Jamaica, 7 November 1664, CO1 / 18:298. Penalty of death replaced eventually by sentence to serve the horse's owner for three years as a servant. See Doyley, Journal, 6v, 28. Hunting parties appear frequently; see, for example, 79v; for an entire company permitted to hunt hogs but not cattle, 68. Picking off hunters: Ysassi, "Two Spanish Documents," 33–34.
36. Jeffrey Dare and Mark Harrison to the Admiralty Commissioners, 10 October 1656, *Beare*, Jamaica, CO1 / 33:27v, criticized the idea that they could live off the island's cattle. German: Brayne to Cromwell, 12 March 1656 / 7 (110). Doyley, Journal, 83v; The Relation of Colonell Doyley upon his re- turne from Jamaica, n.d., ADD 11410, 11v–12.
37. Old soldiers: "A View of the Condiscon of Jamaica," October 1664. Verene A. Shepherd, *Livestock, Sugar and Slavery: Contested Terrain in Colonial Jamaica* (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2009), 3–9, 77–79.
38. Order to Capt. Saunders of the *Dover*, 7 June 1655, Penn Letterbook, 70. Anon., "A briefe journall; or, A succinct and true relation," in *The Voyages of Captain William Jackson (1642–1645)*, ed. Vincent T. Harlow, Royal Historical Society, Camden, 3rd ser., 34 (1923): 21. Richard Ligon, *A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados* (London, 1657), 4, considered green turtles the most wholesome, although smaller. And see F. Wayne King, "Historical Review of the Decline of the Green Turtle and the Hawksbill," in *Biology and Conservation of Sea Turtles*, rev. ed., ed. Karen A. Bjorndal (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995), 184. *The Present State of Jamaica* (London, 1683), 18, lists the three months of May, June, and July as the season for taking turtles, and notes that they were preserved by "pickling."
39. Goodsonn to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 24 July 1655; also in Doyley, Journal, 17, 18, 63, 64, 67, 67v. Proclamation to preserve turtle in time of scarcity: see Doyley, Journal, 11 August 1656, 8 (reverse). Buying turtle from a private ship for the *Marston Moor*: see 16 July 1657, *SPDC*, 11:399; and John Francis (24 July 1662) reported having to buy turtle to victual the *Diamond* before sailing home; *SPD*, 2:446.
40. Brayne to Hutchinson, 8 August 1657, reports that he contracted with Mr. Wm. James for 50,603 pounds of turtle costing £632 10s. 3d.; and Burroughs [to Commissioners of the Admiralty], 24 April 1659, CO1 / 33:139. For money paid for turtle, see Doyley, Journal, 72v. Recommending turtle: Relation of Colonell Doyley, 11v–12; John Gadbury, *The West-India or Jamaica almanack 1674* (London, [1673]), 15. Fishing: Doyley, Journal, 49v; Cornelius Burroughs, Certificate of the services of Capt. Kempo Sibada, 16 July 1658, CO1 / 33:117.
41. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, "Letters concerning the English Expedition," 139; Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty, 24 June 1656 (also

- wine); Dalyson to Blackborne, 2 December 1658, Port Cagway, CO1 / 33:127; “Extract of a letter from Lt. Generall Doyly att Jamaica dated 7 June 1659,” CO1 / 33:143; Doyley, *Journal*, 69-v.
42. W[illiam] Hughes, *The American Physitian* (London, 1672), 102–55, 79, described cocoa’s preparation on board ship in water and bread, 109–10. Thomas Gage, *The English-American His Travail by Sea and Land* (London, 1648), chap. 16. Stubbe recommended cocoa prepared with sugar and pepper; *The Indian Nectar: or, a Discourse concerning chocolata* (London, 1662), 45. Other foods: Goodsonn to Thurloe, 24 January 1655 / 6, 452. Olives: Doyley, *Journal*, 13v–14. In fact, assuming the Spanish ships were better provisioned (having access to the agricultural base offered by numerous nearby colonies), taking just the food on board intended to feed the crew would have represented a boon in hard times.
 43. Barrington advocated planting right away; see his to Sir John Barrington, 6 June 1655, Egerton MS 2648, 242. Cromwell, Instructions to Fortescue et al., 635.
 44. “A Briefe Accompt of the Island Jamaica,” n.d., and Modyford’s “Jamaica survey’d,” 1663, ADD 11410, 3v, 3–5. All the information about deployment given here is taken from the Council Meeting Minutes dated 13 October 1656, in Doyley’s *Journal*, 26v–27. It conforms to the “The Long Report” (CO1 / 14:125–40). Secondary sources differ slightly, generally reflecting a different time frame; see Taylor, *Western Design*, 69–71; David Buisseret, *Historic Jamaica from the Air* (Barbados: University Press, 1969), 46–49.
 45. Angels, in St. Catherine’s Parish, would become densely settled. Guanaboa the council called “Chimanaes” (meaning fire place or pit); its location is determined by the fact that the Buller/Barrington men were stationed there. The Black River deployment may have proved unsustainable, as the region was remote and the regiment would be reduced (with the men sent to other regiments) within the year. Liguanea: According to Firth, *Regimental History*, 720, Holdip took over Heane’s after his St. Christopher regiment was quickly reduced (maybe in June 1655), and that regiment later passed to Barry. In spite of the Holdip/Barry regiment being stationed here, Humphrey, who left in 1656, retained land in the area, which a royalist petitioner (and former soldier) sought to get away from his widow; see Thomas Nicols, petition to Charles II, n.d. [1664?], CO1 / 18:32. Yallahs, where the lieutenant colonel was eventually Robert Freeman, future speaker of the Assembly in 1664. See *Journals of the Assembly*, 1; St. David Plat Book, 34, 42, 45, 46.
 46. For guard duty, see Council Order, 3 October 1656, in Doyley, *Journal*, 26. For Humphrey’s departure, see Doyley to Thurloe, 6 October 1656, 476; while the regiment may have passed briefly into the hands of Captain Fleetwood (who seems to have returned to England shortly thereafter), the men guarding the town and the landing soon became the responsibility of

- Edward Tyson; see Doyley, *Journal*, 14v reverse, 29v. For loathing planting, Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 25 June 1656, *SPT*, 5:152.
47. Domingo Rodriquez de Vera to Albuquerque, 24 July 1657, in *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 57. Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 24 January 1655[/6], *SPT*, 4:453. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1655/6, *SPT*, 4:601. Around that time, Sedgwick reported that little planting had so far taken place, to John Thurloe, 12 March 1655/6, *SPT*, 4:605.
48. Cromwell to Chief Commanders, 194. They were happy to see Holdip sent home on charges of embezzlement and dismayed to learn he had won a pardon and hoped to return to Jamaica. Goodsonn to Thurloe, 25 June 1656, 152; Brayne to Thurloe, 9 July 1657, 392; Francis Barrington to [unnamed cousin], 1 July 1657, Jamaica, *SPT*, 6:376–77. Targeting: Burroughs to [Blackborne], 15 July 1658.
49. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to the officers, 4 January 1655[/6], 390, suggested a scheme for planting and a distribution of thirty acres per soldier; Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 13 April 1656, *SPT*, 4:695, agreed to thirty (not fifty as previously) acres per man.
50. Goodsonn to Thurloe, 25 June 1656, 152. It is clear from Brayne to John Barrington, 9 July 1657, *SPT*, 6:390, that Francis Barrington used his regiment as workers. He had also received a gift of servants from the Lord Protector by that time. See Barrington to cousin, 1 July 1657 (*SPT*, 6:376–77). Tardy: Goodsonn and Sedgwick to the officers, 4 January 1655[/6].
51. Beeston, *Journal*, 22. Goodsonn to Thurloe, 25 June 1656, suggests that a resolution was found, but does not explain (152). See for private soldiers Doyley, *Journal*, 64, 83v, 84v, 86, 88 (quote), 91v; officers appear more frequently throughout. J. G. Young suggests that the common soldier got about ten acres. See “The Beginnings of Civil Government in Jamaica,” *JHR* 1 (1945): 52. For hunters saving to buy land, see “A View of the Conditon of Jamaica,” October 1664. Edward Doyley to Thomas Povey, 12 July 1658, Egerton 2395, 169; Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne], 28 November 1658.
52. Barrington to Barrington, 6 June 1655, 242. Africans: Doyley to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 28 April 1659, Frederick L. Gay Family Papers, 1374–1822, Box 1, Massachusetts Historical Society. Foraging for fruit: see Hughes, *American Physitian*, 44.
53. Cromwell to Chief Commanders, 193. Navy Commissioners to Admiralty Commissioners, 13 March 1656/7, *SPDC*, 10:527; Robert Blackborne to the Navy Commissioners, 14 March 1656/7, 10:527. Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 153. Richard Povey to [unknown], Point Cagway, 27 October 1662, reprinted in Edward Long, *The History of Jamaica*, 3 vols. (London, 1774), 1:216. Carla Gardina Pestana, “English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design,” *Early American Studies* 3 (Spring 2005): 1–31. On specific diseases: Cook, *Born to Die*, 174; Mary J. Dobson, *Contours of Death and Disease in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 329–30.

54. Fortescue's involvement went back to the army of the Earl of Essex, prior to the new modeling; Firth, *Regimental History*, 716. He died in late October, at which time Richard Holdip became commander for one week (he being the only healthy colonel). Once Doyley recovered, he assumed command; Sedgwick to Cromwell, 5 November 1655, 153. For his commission as governor many years later, see Charles II, commission and Instructions for Edward D'Oyley, 8 February 1660 / 1, BL321.
55. A petition erroneously dated May 1654 stated that the previous August the petitioner reported men who were taken from the service in the West Indies but then sold at Virginia or Barbados; the dating must be an error, because only after mid-1655 would there have been men in the military in the Caribbean who could have been duped into indentures. See Petition of Robert Tilghman to the Lord Protector, May 1654, MS Rawlinson A14:92. Detaining: Barry et al. to Edward Doyley, 4 January 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:390–91; Doyley to Thurloe, 12 March 1655, 602–3. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to the officers, 4 January 1655, 389–90. Carla Gardina Pestana, "Mutinies on Anglo-Jamaica, 1656–60," in *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 66–71. The exception occurred under William Brayne, who let some of the most disaffected officers leave.
56. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to Cromwell, 12 March 1655 / 6, 601; Cromwell to Chief Commanders, 195. Povey et al. suggested formalizing this, with restrictions on returns below the rank of ensign as well as among planters. Thomas Povey et al., "Concerning the State of Jamaica," 158. Doyley to Thurloe, 20 June 1656, 139. For officers importuning again, see Dare and Harrison to Thurloe, 10 October 1656, 482. For Humphrey to go, see also Doyley to Thurloe, 6 October 1656, 476; Brayne to Cromwell, 9 January 1656 / 7, 770–71.
57. Doyley to Thurloe, 7 April 1657 (180); The Relation of Colonell Doyley, 13. Order, 13 October 1656, *SPDC*, 10:143. Arrears for years 1656–58 in *CSPC*, 1:454, 462, 472.
58. Out of 986 who can be identified as having served in the army, the names of those who died are known in only 191 cases, of which a mere 41 were private soldiers. The latter died at much higher rates but were less likely to appear in the records by name. Sedgwick to John Thurloe, 24 January 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:454. Brayne to Thurloe, 9 July 1657, 391–92. Moore earned a seemingly derisive mention in a letter penned from Ireland at the time of his departure; see Eliza Blennerhassett to Lady Eleanor Hastings, 30 October 1656, Hastings family papers, HA 840, Huntington Library. My thanks to Amanda Herbert for calling this letter to my attention.
59. M. P. Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), 107–9. Paying off the naval forces that returned under Penn and Blake used all the funds; see 12 October 1655 (*SPDC*, 8:382). Samuel Barry, who as an officer was as well placed as any to

receive his pay, reported getting only half of the first installment of a quarter of his salary and nothing further as of November 1658, *SPDC*, 12:179. Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army: In England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645–1653* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 268–69, 315. Barbara Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 238–39, 264–65. Leo F. Stock, ed., *Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments respecting North America*, vol. 1, 1542–1688 (Washington, DC, The Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1924), 263.

60. Anon., *Relation de lo Sucedido a la Armada Inglesa* (Seville, 1655), 4. Anon., “Second Report of [the Committee of America],” 29 October [1657], William Blathwayt Papers at Colonial Williamsburg, 1631–1722, vol. 41, folder 7, reel 9; Edward Doyley to [Committee on America], September? 1657, 145. For one example, see Petition of Jane Balden to [the Lord Protector], August? 1657, SP25/93, Minute. Capp, *Cromwell’s Navy*, 285, 263. Order to Francis Hodges, 15 November 1655, *SPDC*, 9:24. “Blabbed”: Brayne to Thurloe, 9 July 1657, 391. Identifying the particular men is not possible; seeking arrears in February were Lieutenant Colonel Francis Mercer, Captain Henry Potter, Lieutenant Thomas Huddleston, and the chaplain, John Barrow; *CSPC*, 1:462. Colonel Anthony Buller, also among them, had departed much earlier, in 1655.
61. Taylor, *Western Design*, 122–23; William Staynoe, “Articles exhibited . . . against y^t Collonel Henry Archbould,” [April 1656], MS Rawlinson A37:327–28; “The information of capt. John Colebourne given to the secretary the 9th of June, 1656,” *SPT*, 5:102; and President and Council at Jamaica to Goodsonn, 17 June 1656, 127–28. Edward Doyley to Martin Noell, 5 July 1657, Egerton 2395, 128. Tobias Bridge et al., “Report Concerning the Affaires of America,” 2 June [1657], 123; Thomas Povey et al., “Concerning the State of Jamaica,” 158.
62. William Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 13 March 1655/[6], State Paper of Thurloe, MS Rawlinson A37:35. Oliver St. John sat on Cromwell’s Council of State and served as Lord Chief Justice; William, born in 1637, would have been eighteen at the time. See William Palmer, “St John, Oliver (c.1598–1673),” *ODNB*. Since nothing is known of him after that time, he may well have died despite the choice assignment. For references to ship-board illness, see Harrison to Admiralty and Navy Commissioners, 12 March 1655/6, stating that the illness among some meant that “without which we are but in pore Capacity to make use of the Rest.” Ja[mes] Tarry, captain of the *Indian*, to the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, March 1655/6, CO1/32:161, gives the number of sick (thirty) and notes one death. Francis Parke to Robert Blackborne, 19 August 1656, *Mathias*, CO1/33:9, sickness and death, provisions bad and few. Cornelius Cole to the Navy Commissioners, 21 August 1656, CO1/33:13, enclosing muster books and mentioning the crew of the ship *Success* as “indifferent well recovered.”

63. Burroughs to Commissioners of Admiralty, 6 January 1656/7, CO1/33: 34–35; Brayne to Hutchinson, 7 February 1656/7; and Burroughs to [Commissioners of Admiralty], 8 March 1656/7, CO1/33:43. Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 23 September 1656.
64. Goodsonn to Thurloe, 24 January 1655/6, 451–52. Sedgwick to Thurloe, 30 April 1656, 748–49, described the seamen as “indifferently well in health; yet some few are sick, and god is dayly shortening them.” He also provided information that supports the figure of two dozen. Harrison to Admiralty and Navy Commissioners, 12 March 1655/6. N. A. M. Rodger, *The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815* (London: Penguin, 2004), 47–49. See reference to an ill former midshipman, not yet recovered; *SPDC*, 9:434. Some of those ill in the army lived to return home with Penn or with Venables in summer 1655; Captain Blagge mentioned many sick on board, *SPDC*, 8:326–27. Also see complaint about destitute soldiers returned from Jamaica and given care, the cost of which was not reimbursed (*SPDC*, 12:300–301), and Francis Saunders, Petition to the Lord Protector, 8 March 1658/9, SP18/202:46, seeking reimbursement for men in Chatham in 1657.
65. Sedgwick and Goodsonn to Cromwell, 12 March 1655/6, 601–2. Barry et al. to Edward Doyley, 4 January 1655/6, 390–91.
66. The soldiers’ death preceding this more infamous incident is recounted only in Godfrey to Blackborne, 30 April 1656. For more detail on Throckmorton, see Pestana, “Mutinies on Anglo-Jamaica, 1656–60,” 64–71. Doyley to Cromwell, 20 June 1656, 138; Doyley to Thurloe, 20 June 1656, 139; Goodsonn to Thurloe, 25 June 1656, 152–53; “A letter from Jamaica,” 2 September 1656, 5:374. Anon, *Present State of Jamaica* (London, 1683), 33.
67. A new type of entry in Doyley’s journal began to appear, paying one man for the care of another, as on 15 November 1661, Lieutenant Orchard received compensation for care provided to Lieutenant John Frampton, “very sick & weak and in a nessesated Condition,” CO140/1:35. Burroughs to [Blackborne], 28 November 1658. Dalyson to [Blackborne], 11 April 1660, CO1/33:174; Burroughs, describing him as “Lady Dalyson’s son,” thought he would depart, to Blackborne, 10 April, CO1/33:171. Doyley to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 1 June 1660, CO1/14:7.
68. Povey to Doyley, n.d., ADD 11411, 193; Doyley to the Commissioners, 22 January 1660/1, case of *St. Peter*, HCA 1/9.

8. Conquering

1. Cromwell, *A Declaration of His Highnes, By the Advice of his Council; Setting forth, On the Behalf of this Commonwealth, the Justice of their Cause against Spain* (London, 1655), probably published first in Latin, then English, and later Dutch, German, and Spanish; a French version appeared in Paris’s *La Gazette*, no. 172 ([1655]): 1441–52. For Cromwell’s thinking and the advent of

- wider war, see Timothy Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 77, 102–6. Ian Gentles summarizes events in *Oliver Cromwell: God's Warrior and the English Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 69–70; for the immediate impact, see Luke Whittington to Charles' Secretary Nicholas, 27 September / 7 October 1655, *SPDC*, 8:356. J. F. Routledge explained peace negotiations in the complex English context; *England and the Treaty of the Pyrenees* (Liverpool: University Press, 1953).
2. We lack a good study of the Caribbean theater of the later Anglo-Dutch wars; J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars* (New York: Longman, 1996) covers the general outline.
 3. For various naval deployments, see Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 24 July 1655, CO1 / 32:67; to Navy Commissioners, 13 March 1655 / 6, CO1 / 32:167v; [Goodsonn], "Disposall of the flecte," n.d., enclosed in his to Admiralty Commissioners, 24 June 1656; CO1 / 32:194–95; Thomas Wilkes to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 22 August 1656, CO1 / 33:15; Burroughs to [Robert Blackborne?], 26 April 1657, CO1 / 33:49. "Considerations for the better carrying on . . . Egerton 2395, 101–2. Encounter in Carla Gardina Pestana, "Early English Jamaica without Pirates," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 71 (2014): 329–30. Dalyson to Robert Blackborne, 2 December 1658, CO1 / 33:127.
 4. Anon., "Ye Cost and Charges of [blank] shipes to Remyne Their," Egerton 2395, 295, lists ships in Jamaica at an unknown date, including six small prizes. Doyley mentioned the *Bahama Frigat*, formerly the *Jamaica Factor*, a small barque that was apparently a prize, in May 1658; Doyley, Journal, 49v; other cases from November 1658: 59, 64, 69, 72v, 90v–91, 98v. Multiple prizes, 28 February 1658 / 9, in *SPDC*, 12:300; also Doyley to [?], 25 April 1659, Frederick L. Gay Family Papers, 1374–1822, Box 1, Massachusetts Historical Society; and 28 November 1655, *SPDC*, 9:37, 1655?; 9:434; July 1656, 10:20.
 5. Prizes: June 1655, *SPDC*, 8:206; William Penn to [Honored Gentⁿ], 17 March 1654 / 5, Williams Ethnological Collection, MS 2009–30, Box 19, folder 48, John J. Burns Library, Boston College. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy*, 260. Undated inventory filed in Thurloe's unpublished papers under June 1656; MS Rawlinson A40:33, no. 2, Bodleian Library; see also Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 14 July 1656; and Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty, 24 June 1656. Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 23 August 1656, CO1 / 33:19-v.
 6. Burroughs to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 27 January 1656 / 7, CO1 / 33: 19-v; Dalyson to Blackborne, 2 December 1658. Burroughs, *Rich Newes from Jamaica: Of Great Spoyl made by the English* (London, 1659); and Myngs's prize issues in his [to Commissioners of the Admiralty], 2 March 1657 / 8, CO1 / 33:100–101. Burroughs to [Blackborne], 9 June 1659, assessed the influx of funds as a positive development; see CO1 / 33:145. Doyley to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 28 April 1659, Gay Family

- Papers. Burroughs to the clerk of the Survey at Deptford, 10 April 1660, CO1/33:172. Petition to the king [1661?], CO1/15:98.
7. Sedgwick to [the Commissioners of the Admiralty], 14 November 1655, Jamaica, CO1/32:110. Goodsonn to Council, 7 November 1655, *SPT*, 4:159–60; Sedgwick to John Winthrop Jr., 6 November 1655, in *Massachusetts Historical Society Collections*, 5th ser., 1 (1871): 380–81. Goodsonn's account printed: *Public Intelligencer* 18 (28 January–4 February 1655/6): 296–98. For a report, see [Hum. Robinson] to Jos. Williamson, Saumur, 4 February 1655[16], *SPDC*, 9:161. On targetting the Cartagena region, see Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 24 July 1655.
 8. Harrison to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 30 April 1656, *Gift*, CO1/32:186; Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty, 24 June 1656; to John Thurloe, 25 June 1656, *Torrington*, *SPT*, 5:151–52. Contrast the unenthusiastic account by William Powell to Col. Clarcke [Clerke], [24 October 1656?]
—in which the town was defended by only ten men (not Goodsonn's twelve) and he implied that the booty may have gone missing; see CO1/33:31–33—with the more buoyant William Godfrey to Robert Blackborne, 30 June 1656, CO1/32:212, who emphasized guns and prizes brought back with no loss of life.
 9. Bernard Capp, "Goodsonn [Goodson], William (b. 1609/10, d. in or after 1680)," *ODNB*. Brayne to John Thurloe, 9 June 1657, *SPT*, 6:391–92.
 10. Aylett to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 30 November 1658, CO1/33:125. Burroughs, *Rich Newes*. See Doyley, *Journal*, 60v–62v–63, 63v. For Burroughs's immediate reactions, see his to [Blackborne], 23 April 1659, 137; and [to Commissioners of the Admiralty], 24 April 1659, 139. Myngs originally came to Jamaica in the *Marston Moor* in January 1656, serving under Goodsonn until the latter's departure and then under Commander Brayne until he returned to England in spring 1657. He returned in March 1658, remaining until Doyley sent him back in June 1659. He would return in January 1660 (cleared of all charges despite the allegedly missing bullion) and would pursue a dashing career in the Restoration. Unfortunately, the *ODNB* entry contains errors: C. S. Knighton, "Myngs, Sir Christopher (*bap.* 1625, *d.* 1666)."
 11. Dame Marina Hurlock, Petition to the king, [1664?], CO1/33:231. For other Spanish seizures in the early 1660s, see Doyley, *Journal*, 90v–91, 108. "An Extract of Seve^{ll} Papers Received from Sir Charles Littleton, dated Feb. 1, 1663/4," CO1/18:30–31. For Myngs, Council meeting, September 1662, CO139/1:18–19; Myngs to [Lord Windsor], 19 [October] 1662, *The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq.* (Norwich, UK, 1889), 34–35. Also Florence E. Dyer, "Captain Christopher Myngs in the West Indies," *Mariners Mirror* 18 (April 1932): 168–87; C. H. Haring, *The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1910), 105, 107–8. Quote: Charles II to [Lyttelton], April? 1663, Draft; interestingly, the letter offering the strongest

- praise may have been revised so that the official version dated 28 April 1663 emphasized caution.
12. John Haynes Deposition, 25 January 1663 / 4, CO1 / 18:22v. Lyttelton to Henry Bennet, 23 October 1663, Jamaica, CO1 / 17:215–17. Fanshaw to Henry Bennet, Madrid, 25 July, 13 July, 4 November 1664, n.s., in *Original Letters of his Excellency Sir Richard Fanshaw* (London, 1701), 153, 173–74, 269–71. Thomas Lynch to Bennet, 25 May 1664, Jamaica, CO1 / 18:155-v.
 13. For such schemes, see Anon., “Whereas we are persuaded . . .,” n.d., Egerton 2395, 89; Anon., “A Proposition for the Improvement of the English Interest in the West Indies,” n.d., Egerton 2395, 110; “A Designe for the serving of the West Indies with a Fleet in order to the Weakening the Spaniards the settling of Jamaica and the Promoting the English Interests there,” n.d., Egerton 2395, 167–68. Charles’s adoption of previous policy: see I. R. Mather, “The Role of the Royal Navy in the English Atlantic Empire, 1660–1720” (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1995), 79, 88–89. Challenges of naval finance and the logistics of distant supply: see Wayne Neil Hammond, “The Administration of the English Navy, 1649–1660” (Diss., University of British Columbia, 1974), 98, 101–3, 141–42, 259–62, 268. An estimate for the cost of fitting out two ships (£15,000) can be found in Anon., “Charges that will aryse on y^e Two shipes you intend for y^e Island of Jamaica,” Egerton 2395, 294v. The costs of victualling one vessel with twenty men for four months enumerated by Burroughs, dated 7 June 1660, BL313, Balthwayt Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
 14. For two of 63 naval ships assigned to Jamaica, see *SPD*, 4:57, November 1664. Contrast this figure to earlier: July 1659, 73 ships, 8 for Jamaica; in November, 104 ships, 7 in Jamaica; in February 1659 / 60, 81 ships, 7 in Jamaica (*SPDC*, 13:459, 504, 516) For a slightly earlier assessment of what was needed to secure Jamaica, see [Committee to the Council of Foreign Plantations], “Proposals about the Speedie settling and securing of Jamaica,” 23 January 1660[/ 1], Egerton 2395, 291; costs totaled £30,000. Duke of York to the principal Officers, 3 April 1661, in *Memoirs of English Affairs, chiefly Naval from the Year 1660 to 1673* (London, 1729), 19–20.
 15. Pestana, “Early English Jamaica without Pirates.” Vandiemian Swart to Lord Windsor, 26 June 1664, Jamaica, SP29 / 99:216, explaining turning the ship over to the governor for use of the state.
 16. See the early case of a French commission gotten from the governor of St. Christopher, Examination of Peter Jacobson, 15 July 1655, Penn Letterbook, 84; some ships received them in England itself, as in *SPDC*, 11:30, 37. Anon., “An Extract out of a L^{re} from Jamaica,” [1664], CO1 / 18:262. Kendall, agent and kinsman for Modyford, presented proposals about privateers, November 1664(?): “It is humbly Offered,” n.d. [November 1664?], CO1 / 18:304. Also see his to Lord Arlington, [9 November 1664], CO1 / 18:229.
 17. Libertine: Wm. Coventry to [Sec. Bennet], 17 November 1664, Plymouth, SP 29 / 105:2, 4; or “a desperate people,” as Kendall had it in “It is humbly

- Offered,” 304. “Account of the private ships of war belonging to Jamaica and Tortuga in y^e year 1663,” CO1 / 17:268. The vast majority hailed from Jamaica, with only four identified with Tortuga. For the developing association, see Thomas Andrews to Heneage, earl of Winchelsea, 8 April 1664, in *Report on the Mss of . . . Finch* 1 (1913): 306. Lyttelton, “A Briefe Account of the state of Jamaica,” [1664], ADD 11410, 18v; earlier he had been ordered to put a stop to the use of private ships; see Sir Henry Bennet to Lyttelton, 29 September 1663, CO1 / 17:62. Morris Williams to Sir Thomas Modyford, 21 November 1664, CO1 / 18:321.
18. Charles II to Sir Thomas Modyford, 15 June 1664, CO1 / 18:163. Also see “The Council Book of Jamaica, “18 June 1661 to 2 July 1672,” June 1664, CO1 / 140:92–93. Joseph Martyn to Sir Henry Bennet, 26 June 1664, CO1 / 18:173; Edward Morgan to Sir Henry Bennet, 28 June 1664, CO1 / 18:177. Outlining the problems with suppression, see Sir Thomas Modyford to Sir Henry Bennet [Lord Arlington], 30 June 1664, CO1 / 18:178. Committee for the Affayres of Jamaica, 7 November 1664, recommended private men of war be turned to Curaçao, CO1 / 18:298; Modyford attempted to do so; see his to Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, 5 March 1665, 5 June 1666, MS Clarendon 84, 80–81, Bodleian Library.
 19. Steven C. A. Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 246–48. Pincus attributes this policy to a particular constellation of ideologically motivated men in the Royal African Company. For one complicated case which Modyford did not prosecute to the full extent, instead pardoning the culpable men and licensing them against the Dutch, see Modyford to Privy Council, August? 1666, CO1 / 20:243-v, and Don Juan Ximenes de Bohorques to Sir Thomas Modyford, 10 April 1666, CO1 / 20:95–96.
 20. This generalization omits Providence Island, which was retaken without orders, by a group carrying Modyford’s commission. They did not hold it long, although Modyford was supportive when he heard it was seized. See Modyford to Clarendon, 5 March 1665, 5 June 1666. Regaining Providence Island represented a long-standing goal; see Oliver Cromwell to [Richard] Fortescue, [1655], *SPT*, 4:633–34.
 21. See Haring, *Buccaneers*, 113–19. See “The Cape of Turtudos,” ADD 11410, 9. He appears to be the man later captured by the Spanish, taken to Havana, and there murdered; see Deposition of Charles Hadsell, *Prosperous of London*, n.d. [January or February 1663 / 4], HCA 49 / 59:53v. Haring cites a later account alleging that Watts launched an assault on Hispaniola as retribution for harassment of a Tortuga ship in 1658, and that (without any naval ships under his command) he did so with a collection of private men-of-war. Yet a Spanish account dated the incident in 1661, after Watts was displaced, which suggests that his source (Jean-Baptiste Du Tertre) erred.
 22. “Order of Council for y^e L^d Windsor concerning Tortudos,” 19 February [1661 / 2?], ADD 11410, 148. Also see “A Briefe Accompt of the Island of

- Turtudos," n.d., ADD 11410, 6–7, discussing taking the island with two ships. Also an order to reduce Tortuga, Council Meeting, 5 September 1662, CO139/1:17v, 27v. Langford et al., Certificate of service of Major Clement de Plenneville, 14 February 1662/3, CO1/17:104; Abraham Langford to Clementt de Plenneville, "from Littell Guave," 16 May 1663, CO1/17:93. *Acts of the Privy Council*, 14 September 1664, 385. [Abraham Langford?], "The benefitts which will accrue in Tacking the planters off High Spanola in to his Maj^{tie} Protection," n.d. [1664?], CO1/18:273; Langford, "Proposals . . . to his returne for Jamaica and Hispaniola without a Shipp of yo^r Majesty," n.d., CO1/18:274; Petition to the King, 1665?, SP29/142:2, 22, TNA.
23. Oliver Cromwell, Instructions to [Richard] Fortescue et al., n.d. [1655], *SPT*, 4:633–35. "The Long Report," CO1/14:128–29, lists all four (as well as two others intended but not yet built at Cagway). The Morant fort may have been that mentioned by Brayne in his letter to Cromwell, 12 March 1656/7 (*SPT*, 6:110). References to the other three all appear in Doyley, *Journal*, 53: Fort Henry at St. Jago; Passage Fort; Cagway. Michael Pawson and David Buisseret, *Port Royal, Jamaica* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 9, mention the first three, describing soldiers working to enclose the town in a palisade in November. Passage Fort: Simon de Casseres, "a note of what things are wanting in Jamaica," n.d. [1655], MS Rawlinson A30:299, recommends building a fort with Captain Hewes, a mathematician, in charge; and by January of the next year, Hughes's fort was mentioned; Doyley, *Journal*, 4. In February Doyley recorded spirits sent to the soldiers building seaside fortifications (6). The ensign who defected to the Spanish to avoid the death penalty for stabbing his captain provided intelligence, including about forts, in June 1656; Castilla, *English Conquest*, 29.
24. Brayne to Thurloe, 9 July 1657, 391–92. Later the location's appropriateness would be affirmed; see Committee of the Council of foreign plantations, minute, 10 January 1660/1, Egerton 2395, 289–90, utilizing a new map, presumably that commissioned by Doyley. Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 9 January 1656/7 and 12 March 1656/7 (*SPT*, 5:770–1; 6:110). Doyley, *Journal*, 40.
25. Brayne to John Thurloe, 10 January 1656/7 (*SPT*, 5:778–79). Doyley et al. to Peter Pugh, 26 February 1657/8, signed a warrant to receive £2,572 17s. 11½d. (CO1/33:98[n36]). See also on this concern Bridge et al. (Committee for Jamaica), "Report," 2 June [1657], Egerton 2395, 123; and Thomas Povey et al. to the Committee of the Council for the Affairs of Jamaica, "Concerning the State of Jamaica," 17 October 1658, 157–58. Doyley to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 28 April 1659.
26. [Thomas Lynch], "Considerations about the peopling and settling the Island Jamaica," n.d. [1661], Egerton 2395, 283–86; Charles II Instructions to Edward Doyley, Feb? 1661, CO1/15:22–23; Instruction for Thomas, Lord Windsor, 21 March 1661/2, CO1/16:84–88; Anon., "Overtures for the better providing for Jamaica before the Lord Windsor's going," 10 July 1661, Egerton 2395, 301–2. [Committee of the council of Foreign plantations],

- “Consideracons to move the Councell to send the money ordred,” [1661?], Egerton 2395, 292; “The Condition of y^e Island of Jamaica at y^e Ld Windsors departure,” 28 October 1662, ADD 11410, 5v, included in Modyford’s “Jamaica survey’d,” 1663, ADD 11410, 3–5. On prize money insufficient, see Lyttelton, “Case,” [1663?], CO1 / 17:181.
27. Anon., letter dated 1 June 1655, in “Letters concerning the English Expedition into the Spanish West Indies in 1655,” Venables, *Narrative*, appendix D, 137. A group of soldiers captured “long since” returned without clothes, August 1656 (Doyley, *Journal*, 22v); on another occasion a Spaniard was supplied off the back (and feet) of an English officer, who was later reimbursed, October 1656 (27v).
 28. Dying of hunger: see *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 86. By 1657, Doyley characterized the Spanish effort hampered by lack of provisions. See his *A Narrative Of the Great Success God hath been pleased to give His Highness Forces in Jamaica* (London, 1658), 2.
 29. For one shipment in the first year, which Castilla declared was the only time Cartagena’s governor sent relief, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 21 and 21n2. Sybady, “Journal,” dated February 1655 / 6, learned of supplies from Cartagena (81). Surrenders: Anon., letter dated 15 July 1655, in “Letters concerning the English Expedition,” 141. Taylor says about fifty; *Western Design*, 73.
 30. It was clearly the port of call for those fleeing Jamaica; see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 27. Those with Myngs in 1662 recounted meeting some familiar fighters at Santiago. See Myngs to [Windsor], 19 [October] 1662.
 31. For Ysassi, not to be confused with his younger relation, who led the resistance, see Castilla, *English Conquest*, 27; and Irene A. Wright, “The Spanish Resistance to the English Occupation of Jamaica, 1655–1660,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser., 13 (1930): 118n1, 121. For Cuba’s governor, see Don Francisco de Leyba, 6 June 1659, declaration prepared for the Council of the Indies, in *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 83–84. Capt. Kempo Sybada, *Journal*, dated 1–17 February 1655 / 6, in William Goodsonn, Record of the Court marshals on board the *Torrington* at Jamaica, June 1655 to June 1656, MS Rawlinson A295:79–81.
 32. Daniell to [Daniell], 508. Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 5 November 1655, *SPT*, 4:151–55. Doyley, *Journal*, 17. Castilla, *English Conquest*, 11, 21.
 33. For one such raid, see Taylor, *Western Design*, 80–85. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1655 / 6, *SPT*, 4:601, for “Negroes” firing. Cristoval de Ysassi, “Two Spanish Documents of 1656,” ed. J. L. Pietersz and H. P. Jacobs, *JHR* 2:2 (1952): 24–25, 30, 33. Also see Robert Sedgwick to John Thurloe, 30 April 1656, *SPT*, 4:748–49. For a summary, see Taylor, *Western Design*, 104–8. For Africans, see Godfrey to Blackborne, 30 April 1656, *Marmaduke*, Jamaica, CO1 / 32:184; later Jeffrey Dare and Mark Harrison repeated the assertion that most Spaniards were gone and that the resistance was largely Africans; see to the Admiralty Commissioners, 10 October 1656, *Beare*, Jamaica, CO1 / 33:27.

34. Ysassi, "Two Spanish Documents," 33–34. He further reported that they were eating boiled hides (31). Harrison to the Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 30 April 1656; Sedgwick to John Thurloe, 30 April 1656, *SPT*, 4:749.
35. Sybada, "Journal," 79. James Robertson, "Cromwell and the Conquest of Jamaica," *History Today* 55:5 (2005): 21, recognized the prospect for enslavement on Cuba but not the possible danger for those captured while fleeing.
36. Ysassi to Duke of Albuquerque, 29 August 1657, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 60–62. One account has the Africans entertaining then turning away the Spanish who came seeking their ex-slaves; see "John Morrino and Lawrence Lopus," 19 February 1655/6, in Goodsonn, "Record," 77.
37. "Examination of John Rodorigoe," in Goodsonn, "Record," 76. Barrington to Sir John Barrington, 9 March 1656/7, in "The Manuscripts of Geo. Alan Lowndes, Esq. . . .," in *Seventh Report of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts* (London, 1879), 575; reiterated by Brayne to John Barrington, 9 July 1657, *SPT*, 6:390. Doyley later similarly noted this need, to Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy, 28 April 1659; and in Doyley, *Journal*, 79v.
38. State Papers of Thurloe, MS Rawlinson A30:123–26. The counterinvasion was to involve 800 men from various colonies joined with all the men in Cuba who had fled Jamaica. Rumors of a Spanish fleet: see Information of Richard Owen and Simon Trankmore, master of the *William and Elizabeth of London*, 2 March 1655/6, *SPDC*, 9:208.
39. The legajo (or file), AGI–Santo Domingo 1126, libro 1, contains numerous letters to governors ordering their support for the effort; see from 43. An example is printed in Wright, "The Spanish Resistance," 121–22.
40. Instructions captured by the English laid out a different plan of attack, focused on Port Morant, which the forces did not attempt; Bayona to de los Reyes, 26 June 1657, n.s., *SPT*, 6:540–41. Doyley describes the opening incident in part, [to the Committee on America, September? 1657], Egerton 2395, 144–46.
41. The action apparently took place in October, when (from the thirteenth to the thirty-first) no journal entries were recorded, presumably because Doyley was with the expedition. Taylor, *Western Design*, 159, concludes that the battle occurred on 23 October. [Doyley], *Narrative Of the Great Success*, 1. Doyley dated his account February 1657/8, probably writing it in anticipation of a ship's departure.
42. In March 1658, Doyley prepared: see *Journal*, 45–46. In England, even as those on Jamaica were countering this attempt, well-informed men fretted that one was impending. See Povey et al. to the Committee, "Concerning the State of Jamaica," 17 October 1658; perhaps responding to rumors of the previous summer; see June 1658, *SPDC*, 12:45, 51, 68, 423. Doyley states that reinforcements landed on 8 May, that their ships were seen "about" twelve days later, and that he took the fort on 24 June. *A brief relation of a*

- victory, obtained by the forces under the command of Gen. Edward Doyley, commander in chief of his Highness's forces in the island of Jamaica (Edinburgh, 1659), 1, 2, 6–7; 7–8 for statistics.
43. Doyley to Thomas Povey, 12 July 1658, Egerton 2395, 169. Also see Wright, "The Spanish Resistance," 135. [Charles] Fleetwood to Henry Cromwell, 5 October 1658 (*SPT*, 7:423); *SPDC*, 12:178; Francesco Giavarina to the Doge and Senate, 18 October 1658, *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts . . . in the Archives and Collections of Venice*, vol. 31, 1657–1659, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London, 1931), 253; also included in Dionisius Petavious, *The History of the World . . . Together with A Geographical Description of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America* (London, 1659), 608–[9].
 44. Doyley, *A brief relation of a Victory*; presumably it was first published in London, which would explain the Edinburgh title page's reference to a second edition. See Gregorio M. de Guijo, *Diario, 1648–1664*, vol. 2, 1655–1664, ed. Manuel Romero de Terreros (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, 1952), 31, 82, 92, 98, 104.
 45. Doyley to Thomas Povey, 5 August 1658, Egerton 2395, 170. Years later Doyley would order Indians freed and sent to the mainland, without saying how they came to be on Jamaica; Proclamation, 18 August 1661, Journal, 108. For prisoners shipped to England and later exchanged, see *SPDC*, 12:172–73.
 46. For example, see Dalyson to Blackborne, 2 December 1658. For his commission, see Philip IV to Christobal Ysassi, 23 December 1659, n.s., AGI–Santo Domingo 1126, L.1, 124r–28r.
 47. D. J. Buisseret and S. A. G. Taylor, "Juan de Bolas and His Pelinco," *Caribbean Quarterly* 24 (March/June 1978): 1–7. His name appears variously in English sources. Doyley to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 1 February 1659/60, CO1/33:164.
 48. The enemy was found by the time Dalyson wrote to Blackborne, 31 January 1659/60, CO1/33:162 (mentioning hostages). They were in a parlay for some days thereafter; see Doyley to Admiralty and Navy, 1 February 1659/60; and Cornelius Burroughs stated that they were still out three weeks later. See his to [Blackborne, 22 February 1659/60], CO1/33:167.
 49. Doyley, Journal, 80, 81, 83, 83v; Burroughs to Blackborne, 10 April 1660, CO1/33:168–69. Also see Taylor, *Western Design*, 185–86. Council of War, dated 22 February 1659/60, recommended abandoning the island; and on 27 February, Tyson wrote to Ysassi and the other Spanish officers demanding surrender; see *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 94–95; and, in the same source, statement of Francisco de Almaquera de Balenzuela, dated 28 April 1660, 99–100. Ysassi reported that "Juan Lubolo" was key; *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 100.
 50. For Africans in rebellion, see testimony of "John of Carbaigne aged 44 years or thereabouts," in Goodsonn, "Record," 78. Also see the early report that the Africans "would not suffer any to come unto them" although "they

- are not declared Enemies of y^e Spanyard,” in “John Morrino and Lawrence Lopis,” 19 February 1655/6, 77.
51. Goodsonn and Sedgwick to Cromwell, 24 January 1655/6. Also see “The Examinacon of John Rodrigoe,” in Goodsonn, “Record,” 76, and Thomas Hoskins, “Journall of y^e Ensigne, under Capt. Forster,” 79. Goodsonn to Thurloe, 25 June 1656, 153.
 52. *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 98, 101–2. Whether the guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Spanish qualified them to be treated according to the rules of war was debated; see Burroughs to [Commissioner of the Navy], 20 June 1660, CO1/14:24. Burroughs also stated that the only resistance left was some thirty to forty Negroes.
 53. [Doyley], *Narrative of the Great Success*, 4. E. H[ickeringill], *Jamaica Viewed* (London, 1661), 43–44. John Ogilby dealt with the incongruity by declaring that all the Africans immediately submitted themselves to English authority; *America: Being the Latest, and Most Accurate description of the New World* (London, 1671), 341–42.
 54. Ysassi to the king, 10 August 1660, *Jamaica under the Spaniards*, 100. See 94–102 for relevant sources dating from the February council of war to this final report. Doyley to Secretary Edward Nicholas, March? 1661, CO1/15:73. For the decree, see Doyley, Journal, 17.
 55. Although their fate was not specifically recorded, since the boat escape was partially intended to avoid English involvement, presumably most if not all made it to Cuba. For the later history of maroonage, dating its development from the invasion, see Mavis C. Campbell, *The Maroons of Jamaica, 1655–1796: A History of Resistance, Collaboration and Betrayal* (Granby, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1988), esp. chap. 2.
 56. W[illiam] Hughes, *The American Physitian* (London, 1672), 55. Thomas Southey, *Chronological History of the West Indies*, 3 vols. (London, 1827), knew enough to be impressed; see 2:23–24, 32. For the arrangement bringing de Bola’s people under royal authority (and granting his commission), see CO139/1:27v–28.
 57. Melanie Perreault, “‘To Fear and to Love Us’: Intercultural Violence in the English Atlantic,” *Journal of World History* 17:1 (2006): 93; for the emerging discourse in the early Jamaica context, see Michael Guasco, *Slaves and Englishmen: Human Bondage in the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 195–99.
 58. Doyley, Journal, 92; this fact seems to be supported by the entry in Guijo’s diary, referencing soldiers sent to relieve the island (and killed by the “negros y mulatos de la isla”); *Diario, 1648–1664*, 2:136. Philip Ward, Deposition about news from Jamaica, 16 October 1660, CO1/14:107. Sec. Nicholas to Lord Rutherford, 1 June 1662, Hampton Court, SPD, 2:396. Charles II, Instructions for Thomas, Lord Windsor, 21 March 1661/2. Lyttelton to Bennet, 23 October 1663.
 59. Richard Watts to Williamson, 7 April 1667, SPD, 7:17.

60. Doyley, Journal, 26 March 1660, Pass to Major de Campo & others to go to Yallah after Negroes only for 20 days (84v); quotation (98v). Burroughs [to Commissioners of the Admiralty?], 27 May 1660, CO1 / 33:192. Charles II, Instructions to Edward D'Oyley, Governor of Jamaica, February? 1661[/ 2], CO1 / 15:22.
61. De Bola (Lubolo), "The Council Book of Jamaica," 79, April 1663; David Buisseret, *Historic Jamaica from the Air* (Barbados: University Press Limited, 1969), 56; Buisseret and Taylor, "Juan de Bolas and His Pelinco," 5–6. For quote, see Lyttelton to Bennet, 15 October 1663. This community existed from at least 1657; see Wright, "The Spanish Resistance," 131.
62. "The Council Book of Jamaica," 91–92, 9 June 1664; Lyttelton, "A Briefe Account of the state of Jamaica," 18v. To give Lyttelton his due, the group may have recently been augmented by the "Barbados runaways" mentioned in the minutes. Yet various specious claims made in his report have been accepted by historians and repeated in the new *ODNB* entry. Campbell, *Maroons of Jamaica*, 28–32; Buisseret, *Historic Jamaica from the Air*, 56.
63. Philip IV to Ysassi, 23 December 1659, ordered liberty for any who supported the military campaign to remove the English. "The Present State of Jamaica, In a letter from Mr. Nevil to the Earl of Carlisle" [1677], in *Interesting Tracts relating to the Island of Jamaica* (St. Jago de la Vega, 1800), 105, 109. This case involved what Sylvaine Diouf called "hinterland maroonage," in which communities aimed for subsistence and minimal contact with the slave society they escaped; see *Slavery's Exile: The Story of American Maroonage* (New York: New York University Press, 2014), chap. 5.
64. Order of Governor Sir Thos. Modyford and Council to Abraham Rutter, 9 June 1664, Council orders, CO140 / 1, 91–92. On the sickness, see "A view of the Condition of Jamaica," October 1664, CO1 / 18, 260v, 261v; and Modyford to Lyttelton, 2 May 1664, CO1 / 18:65v. Orlando Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Socio-historical Analysis of the First Maroon War, Jamaica, 1655–1740," *Social and Economic Studies* 19:3 (1970): 289–325.
65. Doyley to Sir Edward Nicholas, March? 1661, CO1 / 15:73v. Francis G. Davenport, *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1917–37), vol. 2, 1650–1697, 248–49, 305–6; also see 187, 189. Thomas, Lord Windsor, Commission to William Mitchel, 23 October 1662, MSS / 82 / 105, NMM. The volume of High Court Admiralty papers dealing with Jamaica's court in this era has been preserved; see HCA 49 / 59.
66. Quote: "An Extract of Seve^{ll} Papers Received from Sir Charles Littleton." The war in 1662 can be followed in the Admiralty Records (HCA 49 / 59); and also see CO139 / 1:17v: 30 August 1662, Spanish refuse to trade; Spanish prisoners, 24 October 1662, 20; guns taken at Cuba, 19 November 1662, 20v, 26; another assault planned, 11 December 1662, 21. Orders to forbear can be found in CO139 / 1:22v, 11 August 1663; CO140 / 1:92–93, 9 June 1664. On 19 August 1664, the council ordered restitution to the Spanish for one

- seizure in particular, and those in the future; *CSPC*, 5:228. See the analysis of the difficulties: Lyttelton, “A Briefe Account of the state of Jamaica,” 17v. Ronald Hutton noted that Spain resumed hostilities widely, including in the Mediterranean, in 1663 due to Charles’s perceived betrayal; see *The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 1658–1667* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 214.
67. Charles’s instructions for Windsor, 21 March 1661/2; “Instructions for Coll. Mudiford appointed by his Maj^{tie} to be Generall & Govern^r of his Island of Jamaica in America,” [18 February 1663/4], CO1/18:52–58. Despite ambiguous wording, the number seemingly refers to men only; it seems unlikely that “many” of these men also served on “y^e Private men of War,” although the notation might be read as saying so. See “An Accompt of the Inhabitants on the Island of Jamaica,” 28 October 1662, ADD 11410, 8v.
68. Taylor, *Western Design*, 207. “The Condition of y^e Island of Jamaica at y^e Ld Windsors departure,” 28 October 1662.
69. Lyttelton, “A Briefe Account of the state of Jamaica,” 16v–17; Anon., “An Accompt of y^e Officers & Soldiers of y^e Militia of Jamaica,” 2 September 1662, ADD 11410, 8; the men were separately enumerated instead in “An Accompt of the Inhabitants,” 28 October 1662. For the Spanish case, see Herbert S. Klein, “The Colored Militia of Cuba: 1568–1868,” *Caribbean Studies* 6:2 (1966): 17–27; Jane Landers, *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), chap. 9; Ben Vinson III, *Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). For Rodriques’s home ownership, see 1 June 1664, St. Catherine Plat Book, 1B/11/2/6:35, JA.
70. [Lynch], “Considerations about the peopling and settling the Island Jamaica,” n.d. [1660 or 1661], 283v. Anon., “An Accompt of y^e Officers & Soldiers” 2 September 1662. John Man, merchant, petition to Charles II, [1660], CO1/33:209[n87], mentions his recent return from the island. Carla Gardina Pestana, “The Mutinies of Anglo-Jamaica,” in *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 63–84. Doyley, *Journal*, 103–v.
71. Indeed, “One tonne of Brandy” was distributed to enable toasting; see Doyley, *Journal*, 96. Doyley to Sir Edward Nicholas, 11 September 1660, CO1/14:100, postscript, notes that Sir Oliver Nicholls and Doyley’s mother were siblings.
72. Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 120–21. Charles II Instructions to Fanshaw, 14 January 1663, in *Original Letters*, 20. For Maurice, see Dudley Pope, *Harry Morgan’s Way: The Biography of Sir Henry Morgan, 1635–1684* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1997), 147, 149; Cundall, *Governors*, 58.
73. For a representative example of these oft-repeated claims, see Veront M. Satchel, *Hope Transformed: A Historical Sketch of the Hope Landscape, St. Andrew, Jamaica, 1660–1960* (Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 2012), 55. For an excellent discussion of revising the conquest, see James Robertson,

“Re-writing the English Conquest of Jamaica in the Late Seventeenth Century,” *English Historical Review* 117:473 (2002): 813–39. Among the first was Doyley to Nicholls, 11 September 1660.

9. *Settling*

1. Kupperman, *Providence Island*, x. For a seemingly contrary view (although one more focused on empire than settlement), see Stephen Saunders Webb, *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569–1681* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, published for Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979).
2. Thomas Povey et al., “To the Right Hon^{ble} to Committee of the Council for the Affaires of Jamaica,” 17 October 1658, “Concerning the State of Jamaica,” Egerton 2395, 157–58.
3. Anon., “Discurio sobrelas dos Armados inglesas,” Junio 1655, Phillippis Collection PHB / 1, NMM. Robert Thomas Fallon asserted that colonization was no part of the Design; “Cromwell, Milton, and the Western Design,” in *Milton and the Imperial Vision*, ed. Balachandra Rajan and Elizabeth Sauer (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999), 133–54. References to women: Mrs. Staynes, presumably wife of Deputy Advocate William Staynes; Christian Rust, wife of Ensign Thomas Rust; Anne Ashford, whose husband, a carpenter, was “imploied att the fort”; Doyley, Journal, 8, 3v (reverse of volume), 64v. Anon., “List of men, well and sick, women, and children,” n.d. [1656?], CO1 / 32:123, gives numbers of both in each regiment, with zero in Humphrey’s.
4. In addition to the cases of Hope, Tyson, and others mentioned elsewhere, see Admiralty Commissioner order to send two women to husbands who were a trooper and an artillery train carpenter, 4 December 1655 (*SPDC*, 9:45); men appointed to look into how to send wives to their husbands, 28 July 1657 (*SPDC*, 11:43); monies paid to wives of soldiers and officers who are going, 15 July 1658 (*SPDC*, 12:95). In July 1656, one of the reinforcements, Christopher Doyton, brought his wife and two children (*SPDC*, 10:21). 4 March 1655 / 6, *SPDC*, 9:209–10.
5. “By the Protector. A Proclamation Giving Encouragement to Such As Shall Transport Themselves to Jamaica,” 10 October 1655, reprinted in *British Royal Proclamations relating to America, 1603–1783*, ed. Clarence S. Brigham, American Antiquarian Society, Transactions and Collections 12 (Worcester, MA: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 96–99; quote, 99. In 1656, Martin Noell contracted with Captain Watts to take 120 men to Jamaica, presumably as settlers or laborers; difficulties arising with the voyage, Noell appealed to Cromwell to help settle their differences. The men may never have sailed. See *SPDC*, 10:57, 252.
6. J[ohn] P[ym], *A Speech Delivered in Parliament, By a worthy Member thereof. . . concerning the grievances of the Kingdome* (London, 1641), 38. Cromwell to

- Fortescue, October 1655, although he refers to the islands to the leeward as windward; *Writings and Speeches*, 3:558. Also see copy of Cromwell's undated and unsigned instructions to Fortescue, Goodsonn, Sedgwick, and Searle, from the same period, *SPT*, 4:634–35. This may well have been the "printed paper concerning Jamaica," in the Barbados Minutes of Council, Lucas Transcripts, vol. 3:7 February 1653/4 to 21 December 1658, microfilm edition, UNESCO Mobile Microfilm Unit, 1960, under January 1655/6, which was defaced at the time of the Restoration (176).
7. "Instructions given unto Mr. Daniell Gookin," 26 September 1655, SP25/304–5. For the long-term planning around this expectation, see Cromwell, "Conversation with Captain John Atwood," August 1654, in *Writings and Speeches*, 4:948. Also see John Leverett to John Endicott, 20 December 1656, 4:345. *To all Persons whom these may concern, in the Several Townes, and Plantations of the United Colonies of New-England* ([Cambridge, MA], 1656).
 8. Gookin to Thurloe, 10 May 1656, 24 January 1655[/6], 24 July 1656, *SPT*, 4:449, 5:7, 147–48. Richard Leader to John Winthrop Jr., 26 January 1655/6, Boston, *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 1886–1887*, 2nd ser., 3 (1888): 193–94. It is possible to follow Gookin's efforts and the eventual decline of his hopes in his letters to Thurloe; see 21 January, 24 January 1655[/6]; 10 May 1656; 27 July 1656; 20 June 1657, *SPT*, 4:440, 449, 5:148, 6:362.
 9. Whether the group from Long Island discussed in "Order by his Highnes the Lord Protector, and his Councill," 19 August 1656, SP25/77:340, went is unknown. Gookin to Thurloe, 10 May 1656.
 10. William Godfrey to Robert Blackborne, 30 April 1656, *Marmaduke*, Jamaica, CO1/32:184. Thomas Gould to the Admiralty Commissioners, 25 April 1656, *SPDC*, 9:543. Doyley, Journal, 52. For younger sons, see "Proposition for the Erecting a West India Company," n.d., Egerton 2395, 87–88. The undated "Proposition for the speedy settling of Jamaica," in Noël B. Livingston, *Sketch Pedigrees of Some of the Early Settlers in Jamaica* (Kingston: The Educational Supply Co., 1909), 93–94, advocated Scottish migrants. Henry Laurence to Commanders in Chiefe of the English Fleete in America, 23 December 1656, SP25/77:949.
 11. "Passengers that went from Bermuda," 5 January 1657/8, appendix 5, in *Memorials of the Discovery and Early Settlement of the Bermudas or Somer Islands, 1515–1685*, ed. J. H. Lefroy, 2 vols. (London, 1877), 1:718, 2:99. Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 1 December 1656 (*SPT*, 5:668). Four months later he was not optimistic; see William Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1656/7 (*SPT*, 5:110). The rumors, of slightly later vintage, are recounted in "The Relation of Colonell Doyley upon his returne from Jamaica," n.d., ADD 11410, 14-v. For three men, see Goodsonn to Commissioners of the Admiralty, 24 June 1656, *Torrington*, CO1/32:192v. Goodsonn reported picking up 1,400 settlers in St. Christopher (which presumably included those

- from nearby Nevis); see addenda of 19 and 20 October to Goodsonn to Commissioners of Admiralty and Navy, 23 September 1656, CO1 / 33:23; Stoakes told Thurloe (7 January 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 5:769) that the number totaled 1,600 from Nevis and other islands. For clearing Morant to prepare for settlers, Doyley, Journal, 12 reverse.
12. William Godfrey to Robert Blackborne, 30 June 1656, CO1 / 32:212; Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1656 / 7. William Goodsonn and Luke Stokes to Oliver Cromwell, 18 October 1656, *SPT*, 5:500–510. William Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 9 January 1656, *SPT*, 5:770; William Goodsonn to John Thurloe, 9 January 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 5:771. Presumably Brayne issued the order Goodsonn mentions. Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (New York: Norton, 1972), 121–22. For a critical reading of Stoakes’s record as governor on Nevis, see H. P. Jacobs, “Luke Stokes in Nevis,” *Jamaican Historical Society Bulletin* 4:8 (1966): 168–73. Yet Stoakes nonetheless persuaded others to migrate.
 13. William Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 18 April 1657, *SPT*, 6:212. “Additional Propositions to the right Hon^{able} His Maj^{tie} Privy Council about y^e affaires of Jamaica,” 12 September 1670, CO1 / 25:172.
 14. Doyley’s Journal contains grants, a handful prior to 1658 and more than fifty from 1658 to May 1662; see 22v, 39, 41; with an entry every few months and then more often from June 1659, 44v–111. Patents (usually for new grants) were filed regularly from 1662. See Jamaica Patents, vol. 1, 1661–1665. In the first patent Sir Charles Lyttelton granted himself land when he took over as deputy governor in October 1662 (n.p.). Plat books for various parishes contain records from 1661, and these often list owners of neighboring plots whose land grant appears in no record. See for St. Andrew’s, 1B / 11 / 2 / 1–2; St. Ann, / 4; St. Catherine, / 5–7; Clarendon, / 8–10; St. David, / 12; Port Royal, / 28; all in JA.
 15. Population centers listed in “A Short Account” generally followed the original regimental deployments, at Port Morant and Yallahs, Liguanea, around Port Royal, around Spanish Town (including Angels), and “Guanna Boa.” Also see “Jamaica surveyed by Sir Thomas Modyford,” 1663, ADD 11410, 151–55, which was apparently prepared by his brother Sir James in advance of his arrival as “Description of Jamaica [1663],” *CSPC*, 5:177. “A Briefe Accompt of the island Jamaica,” n.d., ADD 11410, 3–5, adds Port Antonio on the north coast, where Carlisle’s people recently occupied his plantation.
 16. “The Long Report,” CO1 / 14:127–28. Anon., “A Briefe Accompt of the island Jamaica,” n.d.; it can be dated to the early 1660s: Port Royal remained “Port Cagway,” although the fort had been renamed for the king, and Carlisle’s plantation was mentioned. Colonial Spanish urbanism is a much-treated topic. See Richard L. Kagan, *Urban Images of the Hispanic World, 1493–1793* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), esp. 34–36; Jeremy Ravi Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of the Indians in the Colonial*

- Andes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), chap. 1. For contrasting uses of Spanish Town, see James Robertson, “Re-imagining Public Space: Jamaica’s Main Square, 1534–2000,” *Caribbean Quarterly* 55:2 (2009): 116.
17. Quote: “Long Report,” 128. Port Cagway in 1663, Port Royal by early 1664: see Jamaica Council Minutes, 22 March 1663/4, at Port Royal, CO139/1:23v. Plats date from after 1660, but reveal a vigorous land market in an area already crowded with people; Port Royal Plat Book, 1B/11/2/28. E[dmund] H[ickeringill], *Jamaica Viewed*, 2nd ed. (London, 1661), 35, presumably exaggerated in saying 500 houses. See also Matthew Mulcahy, “‘That Fatall Spott: The Rise and Fall—and Rise and Fall Again—of Port Royal, Jamaica,” in *Investing in the Early Modern Built Environment: Europeans, Asians, Settlers, and Indigenous Societies*, ed. Carole Shammas (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 191–218.
18. Doyley, Journal, “Licenses granted unto severall persons to be Settlers in y^e Towne & att y^e Forte at y^e Seaside, signed by the right Honor^{ble} Co^{ll} Doyley Comander in chiefe of the Army,” 9 April 1656: to Thomas Colins to sell liquor and provisions; same to John Berry; to Richard Searle, 3v reverse. Impost: 1659, 14. Debt of sailors not to exceed £4; Journal, 31 May 1659, 2. H[ickeringill], *Jamaica Viewed*, 37.
19. Statements based on a compilation of references in the extant records to individuals (especially Doyley’s Journal and *SPD*) and to records designating early land ownership (Doyley’s Journal, plat and patent records, and the 1670 Survey). Officers, more likely to be named, were therefore more likely to be identified and linked to later land ownership. Firth, *Regimental History*, 707–8, 711, 722; 1670 Survey; Doyley to Cromwell, 12 September 1657, *SPT*, 6:512; W[illiam] Hughes, *American Physitian* (London, 1672), 51, 112; if, as he states, he traveled on a royal ship (55), he departed from England after May 1660.
20. Andrew J. O’Shaughnessy, “Long, Samuel (1638–1683),” *ODNB*. Ashton to William [Langley], 8 January 1656/7, *HMC 14th Report*, appendix, pt. 4, *The Manuscripts of Lord Kenyon* (London: HMSO, 1894), 66; Doyley, Journal, 5, 80; also *Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica*, 1 (Jamaica, 1811), 1. Thomas Nicols petition to Charles II, n.d. [1664?], CO1/18:32. Although there is no evidence he got the plantation, he may have been recommended to Modyford as a minister; Charles II to Sir Thomas Modyford, 15 February 1663/4, CO1/18:47-v. Colbeck’s commissions are in Doyley, Journal, 12 April 1656, 2 August 1656, 5 reverse, 6v reverse. For his property, see H. P. Jacobs, “The Colbeck Papers,” *JHR* 3:3 (March 1962): 38–67.
21. Frank Wesley Pitman, *The Development of the British West Indies, 1700–1763* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1917), 44; those with political positions, especially governorships, also acquired land or distributed it to family. See, for instance, Sir Thomas Modyford to Lord Arlington, 23 September 1670, in Livingston, *Sketch Pedigrees*, 107.
22. Doyley, Journal, 84v, 88, 93v, 107v. Half Moon not to be mistaken for that on the north side, which was not yet settled; this area was designated as

formerly the quarters of Captain Finche (presumably Abraham Finche or Fincher), who had been part of the Carter / Archbould regiment. Ashton lived in Angels; see *Journals of the Assembly*, 1:1. Peticular List. Soursop is a tropical fruit that the Spanish call guanabana. The fruit grows in Jamaica, and presumably the region northwest of St. Jago called Guanaboa (in St. John's Parish) was named for it. Ensign Henry Vesey owned land in St. Catherine's Parish, which would be consistent with his deployment in Ward's regiment.

23. In the first plat book for St. David's Parish, of nineteen grants naming twenty-eight neighboring owners, sixteen had at the time no plat, indicating that their ownership of adjoining land was accepted even in the absence of documentation in the extant records. See St. David Plat Book, 1B / 11 / 2 / 12, 1661–63. Other early parishes show similar results.
24. Doyley, *Journal*, 67, 86, 108v. This intriguing reference to the "Indians House," although it might be a tippling house, was in the past tense, suggesting an older use for the structure. It is unclear how the English would have known it had been a residence for monastery Indians, although someone with knowledge of Spanish practice (such as former Dominican Thomas Gage) could have supplied it. Naval men identified largely through naval correspondence; Doyley's *Journal*; *SPD*; the Wynne Papers; NMM; and "Rooth's Sea Journal."
25. Goodson to Navy Commissioners, 13 March 1655 / 6, CO1 / 32:167v. Burroughs to Blackborne, 19 January 1659 / [60], Jamaica, CO1 / 33:150v. The only surviving land records are for one or two parcels on Point Cagway; see Doyley, *Journal*, 14 September 1659, 75; Port Royal Plat Book, 15, 149, 152. If naval actions elsewhere employed soldiers, they were to be returned to the island, as they were desperately needed as settlers; see Lyttelton, Instructions to Christopher Mings, 8 January 1662 [/ 3], HCA 49 / 59:13v.
26. William Brayne released some highly productive planter-soldiers, with the expectation that they would work toward creating the colony; his to John Thurloe, 7 August 1657, *SPT*, 6:453. Evans: Doyley, *Journal*, 496; Port Royal Plat Book, 46. Freeman received land in St. Jago, 5 February 1657 / 8; Doyley, *Journal*, 51; also see Randolph House, who received land near Captain Massey's men in 1657 (March 1658, 47v). Harvey (41) seems not to have survived (or persisted), as he was not listed as a landowner in subsequent records; other Harveys (possibly his heirs) are, however—see St. Catherine Plat Book, 7.
27. Doyley, order to Commander John Wilgresse, 16 March 1657 / 8, in *Journal*, 47v. Whether the man taken to Morant was Richard Povey, brother of Thomas, who had accompanied the Design fleet (and been employed as commissary of stores), or James, possibly another brother of Thomas, is not clear. Doyley mentions James (*Journal*, 15 September 1657, 37), but Thomas's correspondence does not. For Richard's land, see Doyley, *Journal*, 9 January 1660 / 1, 100v.

28. Verene A. Shepherd, *Livestock, Sugar and Slavery: Contested Terrain in Colonial Jamaica* (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2009), 6. 1670 Survey, 127. Burroughs to [Blackborne], 10 June 1659, CO1 / 33:147-v. Letter dated 31 May 1703, in *Letters of Eminent Men, addressed to Ralph Thoresby*, 2 vols. (London, 1823), 2:13–14. Hickeringill is not in Doyley's Journal or in any surviving land record. Hughes, *American Physitian*, 140. Jamaica, given its mountainous interior, retained some of its forests, in contrast to the flatter Barbados, which was more easily cultivated.
29. Requests for: field officers to Oliver Cromwell, 18 July 1655, *SPT*, 3:661; Edward Doyley to John Thurloe, 10 November 1658, *SPT*, 7:499–500; Burroughs to Secretary [Blackborne], 28 November 1658, CO1 / 33:123. Plans to provide: [Committee to the Council of Foreign Plantations], "Proposals about the Speedie settling and securing of Jamaica," 23 January 1660, Egerton 2395, 291; [Thomas Lynch], "Considerations about the peopling and settling the Island Jamaica," n.d. [1660 or 1661], 283–86—attributed to Lynch in CO1 / 14; Committee, "Certaine Propositions for the better accommodating," n.d.; Anon., "The conveniencyes that will aryse are many at First," undated, Egerton 2395, 293. Lewis Ashton had a plan to get servants, to make him "a considerable fortune" if they lived; see his to [Langley], 8 January 1656 / 7.
30. Doyley, Journal, 7. Of 5,000 servants between 1654 and 1663, only 12 went to Jamaica; *Bristol and America: A Record of the First Settlers . . .*, compiled by R. Hargreaves-Mawdsley (London, R. S. Glover, [1929]), 90, 92. Bridge et al. (Committee for Jamaica), "Report," 2 June [1657], Egerton 2395, 123, recommends that Highlanders "and others as may bee best spared" be sent as servants at public charge, to be distributed to the officers as pay, calculated at £10 per head; [Lynch], "Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica."
31. Noell: Thomas Povey to Richard Povey, 7 April 1657, ADD 11411, 31. Lynch: *Acts of the Privy Council of England, Colonial Series*, vol. 1, A.D. 1613–1680 (London: Anthony Bros., 1908), 30 November 1660, 301. Presumably at this time Lynch wrote "Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica." On paying arrears with servants, see also Anon., "The conveniencyes that will aryse are many at First," n.d. Trevor Burnard, "Lynch, Sir Thomas (d. 1684)," *ODNB*. Sir Thomas Modyford to [Edward] Morgan, 2 May 1664, CO1 / 18:143; he refers to an early case in which newly arrived servants were allowed to languish for lack of an organized market. As early as 1661 islanders were deciding how long servants who arrived without a contract would serve, which was another element of regularizing arrangements; see 3 July 1661, CO139 / 1:3.
32. Doyley, Journal, 28. The move away from the death penalty fit broadly into the law reforms then being promoted in England; see Nancy L. Matthews, *William Sheppard, Cromwell's Law Reformer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), chap. 4. In Jamaica, the penalty was also used for thefts of

- lesser magnitude, with a shorter term of service; see Matthews, *William Sheppard*, 222. For laws to force criminals to labor, see Pestana, *English Atlantic*, 186–87.
33. Council Order, 15 July 1662, CO139/1:11v–12; Jamaica Council Minutes, 2–3 July 1661, CO140/1:18–19. For the women, the plan was to ship 4,000, but extant records indicate that only hundreds met this fate. See 21 February/March 2, 1655/6, *SPDC*, 9:196; 4 March 1655/6, *SPDC*, 9:209–10. For other shipments and proposals, see Kenneth E. Jermy, “Jermy, Robert (1600–1677),” *ODNB*; Anon., “Certaine Queries,” n.d. [1655 or 1656]; “A Designe for the serving of the West Indies,” n.d., Egerton 2395, 167; Lord Protector and Council of State, 14 August 1656, SP25/77:329–31; *SPDC*, 10:71, 86; Admiralty Commissioners to Navy Commissioners, 9 August 1656, *SPDC*, 10:404. Order, 29 April, 17 August, and September? 1662, August 1663, 26 July 1665: *SPD*, 2:353, 461–62, 502; 3:229, 230; 4:491. Also see William Clayton et al., “Certaine Proposals humbly offered,” [1661?], CO1/33, 214.
 34. Sending women who might become wives was a common strategy for developing colonies, proposed for Jamaica by aspiring governor James Ley, third earl of Marlborough; see “Propo: concerning Jamaica,” Nov.? 1660, CO1/14:123–4. Anon., *Voice of the Innocent* (London, 1665), 4, 5; W[illiam] S[mith], *A Second Relation from Hertford* ([London], 1664), 17–18; Anon., *Another Cry of the Innocent* (London, 1664), 10, 17, 18; Steven C. Harper, “Harris, Elizabeth (fl. 1655/6–1663),” *ODNB*. The names of escapees were published in hopes of locating more; see Anon., *A Great Plot Discovered, Or the notorious and wicked Design upon the River Thames* (London, 1661).
 35. Committee of the Council of Foreign Plantations, minutes, 10 January 1660/1, Egerton 2395, 289–90. Jamaica Council Minutes, 3 July 1661, for the decision to adopt Barbados orders, CO139/1:3, 6–7; further orders included 27 February 1662/3, 21; Windsor, Order, 20? [10] October 1662, CO139/1:24v; and Margery Weblinge, petition, setting maidservant Joan Sedison’s term, 16 July 1662, CO140/1:46. For a law specifically addressing “mutiny” by “Negroes” (without stating their status as slave or servant), 23 October 1663, CO139/1:22v, 32v.
 36. Transatlantic Slave Trade Database (TSTD), Voyage 21566, *S Jan* (1659), lists forty-eight slaves arriving in Jamaica, on what grounds is unclear; <http://www.slavevoyages.org>. Governor Matthias Beck of Curaçao suspected that some of the privateers who took eighty-four slaves off the wreck *St. Jan* were in Jamaica by the following year, but makes no mention of forty-eight slaves; in Charles T. Gehring and J. A. Schiltkamp, *Curaçao Papers, 1640–1665: New Netherlands Documents*, vol. 14 (Interlaken, NY: Heart of the Lakes Pub., 1987), 158. The privateers sailed toward the mainland upon leaving the wreck.
 37. The figure comes from TSTD, Voyage 21196, *S Marteen van Rossen* (1661); see Anon., “A particular Narrative off y^e buying, & forfeiture of y^e ship of

- Negroes—Jamaica,” CO1 / 15:123-v. Yet the petition of Guy Molesworth to the king, 1663, states that he sold only forty-seven. The RAC imported slaves from 1663, to supply their own plantation, to sell to local buyers, and to send to Spanish colonies via the Genoese merchants who held the *asiento*. Of 2,664 landed in Jamaica, 860 were apparently sold there; see George Frederick Zook, *The Royal Adventurers Trading into Africa* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 85. Company of royall Adventurers unto affrica, contract, dated April 1662, enrolled Jamaica Patents, 1:[1v], 14 October 1662. Doyley’s order to return Indians might be read that way: see Proclamation dated 18 August 1661, Journal, 108. This would fit Modyford’s later claim that the only Indian laborers were prisoners of war; he cited the then-current Carib war. Copy of the above propositions of Sir Thos. Modyford to the Privy Council, with additions, [28 September 1670], *CSPC*, 7:128.
38. Goodson to Thurloe, 13 April 1656, *SPT*, 4:695. For the Irish project, see Karl S. Bottigheimer, *English Money and Irish Land: The “Adventurers” in the Cromwellian Settlement of Ireland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 133–42; and Ian Gentles, *The English Revolution and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms, 1638–1652* (Harlow, UK: Pearson/Longman, 2007), 410–11. [Lynch], “Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica,” makes the connection between the two. Doyley to Admiralty Commissioners, 26 July 1660, CO1 / 14:51–51v.
39. Beeston, Journal, 272, 274; Harrison to Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Navy, 30 April 1656, *Gift*, CO1 / 32:186. Doyley owned thirty acres in Guanaboa, which he sold after his departure to John Man; see Jamaica Patents, 1:46, 47; and for a house in Port Royal, see Plat Book, 44. Whether he owned or only had the use of his house in St. Jago cannot be determined by the surviving sources.
40. The Relation of Colonell Doyley, n.d., 14. Myngs to [Admiralty Commissioners], 2 March 1657/8, CO1 / 22:100–101. David Thomas Konig noted that peripheries were often ruled by conciliar justice, despite the expectation that the common law would prevail; see “‘Dale’s Laws’ and the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal Justice in Virginia,” *American Journal of Legal History* 26:4 (1982): 354–75.
41. Brayne to Cromwell, 18 April 1657. Brayne’s efforts may have created the court of judicature, which functioned for a few years. See Dalyson to Blackborne, 22 February 1659/60, CO1 / 33:166. On settler abhorrence of martial law, Kupperman, *Providence Island*, 188–90, 217–19.
42. Committee of the Council of Foreign Plantations, minutes, 10 January 1660 / 1, recommended caution. Anon., “Overtures for the better providing for Jamaica before the Lord Windsor’s going,” 10 July 1661, Egerton 2395, 301–2. Also see the apparently contemporaneous [Lynch], “Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica.” “Overtures for the better providing” recommends gradual disbandment, leaving a garrison of less than

300. Lyttelton, "A Briefe Account of the State of Jamaica," ADD 11410, 16v., argues for "Garrison Soldiers" at the fort being built at Port Royal, because "the Inhabitants are not to be relied on, nor were enough to defend it." It is possible that some men were kept in arms, or more likely brought from England to serve in the garrison; see Webb, *Governors-General*, 215–18. William Morice for Charles II, "Further Additional instructions for Thomas Lord Windsor," 23 April 1662, ADD 11410, 149; army disbanded under Windsor, see "The Condition of y^e Island of Jamaica at y^e L^d Windsors departure being y^e 28 Octo: 1662," ADD 11411, 5v; Sean Kelsey, "Windsor, Thomas, first earl of Plymouth (c.1627–1687)," *ODNB*.
43. Committee of the Council of Foreign Plantations, minutes, 10 January 1660/1. William Brayne, Commission, January 1656/7, ADD 71448, 71; Doyley, Journal, 30, 53, 104; Henry Stubbe, *Indian Nectar* (London, 1662), 32. For Fairfax's later career, see Firth, *Regimental History*, 725.
44. [Lynch], "Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica," 283v.
45. A regimental court at Liguanea dealt with the mutiny; Doyley, Journal, 99v. For Raymond's first name, see S. A. G. Taylor, introduction to "Edward D'Oyley's Journal, Part 2," *JHR* 11 (1978): 64. For his wife, see Council of State, order, 11 May 1660; Cundall, *Governors*, 5. Accounts are in Carla Gardina Pestana, "The Mutinies of Anglo-Jamaica," in *Rebellion, Repression, Reinvention: Mutiny in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Jane Hathaway (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 73–76; Beeston, Journal, 273. For continued fears of mutiny, see Thomas Wilkes to the Commissioners of the Navy, 26 March 1661, CO1/15:66. A Henry Tyson soon owned land in Port Royal, but his relationship (if any) to Edward is not known. See Port Royal Plat Book, 143. Morris had just bought the wine from Abraham Langford, but after the soldiers drank it up, he refused to pay for it, saying Langford had urged them on. See CO139/1:3 for the council meeting, 2 July 1661; and for the Morris case, 13 August 1661, 9v.
46. Anon., Consideration, [30 November] 1660. Charles II instructions to Doyley, which, along with his commission dated 8 February 1660[/1], is CO138/1:3–8. Doyley, Journal, 106v. For the members, listed from June 1661, see CO140/1:5 and ff.; names are printed in the appropriate volume of *CSPC* also. Previously business had been handled by a council of officers, whose work is documented in Doyley's Journal. Jamaica Council Minutes, 18 June 1661. Admiralty had always operated on the island, complying with instructions sent under previous governments; Doyley felt uncertain of his ability to exercise those powers once he knew of the Restoration. See his to [Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Navy], 22 January 1660[/1], HCA 1/9, pt. 1:2. His copy of John Man's vellum map of the island—known because he bequeathed it to his godson—has not survived. See Will of Edward Doyley of Saint Martin in the Field, Middlesex, 15 May 1675, PROB 11/347/538, TNA. A paper version Man apparently

made for Windsor does survive, in the British Library: ADD 16371.i. Clearly Man's map served as the basis of the map Hickeringill included in his book, *Jamaica Viewed*.

47. Webb, *Governors-General*, 216–17. The details of the financing involved in converting monies into goods have not survived, but may account for some of the funds Windsor appears to have kept. Assuming that the unsigned and undated document "The Invoice of goods sent by his Majestie Amounting to in Money the sum of [£1,1596, 16 s.]," BL319, Blathwayt Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California, lists amounts in money and slaves to pay men for a specific number of days but carries no indication that it is related to the donative. It may indicate that the 300 slaves Windsor contracted to have delivered would be used to cover part of the donative. For an effort to be included in the distribution, see Jamaica Council Minutes, 19 November 1662, 20v, 30v. Also see Jamaica, "The Distribution," CO139/1:18, 12 September 1662; Morice, "Further Additional." For the regiments initially organized, see "An Accompt of y^e Officers y^e Militia of Jamaica," 2 September 1662, ADD 11410, 8. CO139/1:27v–28, February 1662[/ 3].
48. Windsor to Joseph Williamson, 17 January 1663/4, CO1/18:15. Williamson retrieved "The Old Commission of Lord Windsor," [January 1663/4?], CO1/18:16v–17. Entry for 13 February 1662/3, *The Diary of Samuel Pepys*, rev. ed., ed. Robert Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970–83), 4:41. Lyttelton, Account of the State of Jamaica, [October? 1664], CO1/18:264-v, which varies in minor respects from "A Briefe Account of the State of Jamaica." On the Assembly, see *Journals of the Assembly*, 1:1.
49. Thomas Modyford, "Considerations touching Jamayca," [21 July 1664], CO1/18:207; also see [Richard Povey to Sir Charles Lyttelton], 10 December 1664, MS Clarendon 76:253–58. Modyford's initial dealing with the Assembly was tense, with Samuel Long accused of treason, a crisis he would weather. See Sir Thomas Whetstone, Articles of High Treasonable Crimes, [November? 1664], CO1/18:295. *Journals of the Assembly*, 1:2–3. Agnes M. Whitsun reviews the creation and early activities of the Assembly; *The Constitutional Development of Jamaica, 1660–1729* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1929), 12–35.
50. Windsor, Commission to William Mitchel, 23 October 1662, MSS/82/105, NMM. Mitchel most likely received his training in the civil law somewhere in Europe—Paris was a common location. Mitchel died within the year. See Beeston, *Journal*, 275, 280; CO139/1:18.
51. Lynch asserted that New Englanders decided not to come after local leader Sedgwick died, "Considerations about the peopling and settling of Jamaica," 283, 286v. See CO139/1:18, 12 September 1662; 20, 28 October 1662; Doyley, *Journal*, 105v. Charles II, Warrant to Sir Hineage Finch, [April 1663], CO1/17:58. In September 1662, Lyttelton and Povey were col-

- lecting information about everyone who owned land on Point Cagway; see Jamaica Council Meeting Minutes, 5 September 1662, CO139/1:17v.
52. Charles II commission to Sir Thomas Modyford, 15 February 1663/4, CO1/18:35–40; and see Anon., “It is humbly conseaved that it will be for his Ma^{ties} service that Coll Thomas Modiford may have power for y^e following perticulars,” n.d., CO1/18:4. Williamson to Windsor, [1664?], for Marlborough considered; and for another noble, see Joseph Williamson to Sir Richard Fanshaw, 14 May 1663, *The Manuscripts of J. M. Heathcote, Esq.* (Norwich, UK, 1889), 88–89. Martin Noell and associates earlier attempted to get Captain Watts appointed, but to no avail; see Martin Noell et al., “Petition,” 24 April 1660, Egerton 2395, 171.
 53. Modyford to Sir Henry Bennet, 10 May 1664, CO1/18:135–38. Morgan’s own requests were more practical—a minister, a linguist. See Edward Morgan, Memorial to Bennet, [1663?], CO1/17:248. Visiting: March 1663/4, CO139/1:23v.
 54. Jamaica Council Minutes, 18 June 1661, CO140/1:1–5. Hope, who came out with the invasion force as part of Heane’s regiment, by this time owned land on the fertile Liguanea Plain, which he would develop into a substantial plantation; his wife joined him in 1656, indicating an early commitment to Jamaica. See *Hope Transformed: A Historical Sketch of the Hope Landscape, St Andrew, Jamaica (1660–1960)* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2012), 10, 68. Also see Captain Glapthorne, July 1656, SPDC, 10:29. Jamaica Council Minutes, 3 July 1661, CO139/1:3, 6–7.
 55. Jamaica Council Minutes, 6 November 1663, CO139/1:23; Lyttelton, Account of the State of Jamaica, [October? 1664], 265. For Modyford’s legal training, see his ODNB entry; for reform, see Jamaica Council Minutes, “Orders and Rules directing the Method of Proceedings,” 20 October 1664, ADD 11410, 21v–29. *Journals of the Assembly*, 16 March 1664/5, 1:3.
 56. Bridge et al., “Report”; Povey et al., “Concerning the State of Jamaica,” 17 October 1658; Morgan, Memorial to Bennet, 1663. Bibles sent to Jamaica, SPDC, 9:14, 44, 412. Jamaica Council Minutes, 8 October 1661, CO140/1:33–34. Charles II, Instructions to Doyley, February? 1661; Warrant, [23 February 1662/3], CO1/16:276–77.
 57. Jamaica Council Minutes, 8 October 1661, 15 November 1661, CO140/1:33–34, 34–35; *Journals of the Assembly*, 1:1, 3. For earlier efforts, Order to the Committee of America, 29 September 1657, SPDC, 11:113. For an effort to arrange a teacher paid out of his All Souls’ College fellowship, 19 April 1662, see SPD, 2:342.
 58. “A View of the Condition of Jamaica,” 1 October 1664, CO1/18:260, sent in by Modyford. For the birthday, see Doyley, Journal, 106. The exception was Clarendon, named for Edward Hyde. Others were likewise named for individuals but with the added designation “Saint,” as in St. Catherine, honoring the new queen.

59. Carla Gardina Pestana, *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 118. A month after numerous Quakers were settled in September 1662, the proclamation appeared; whether to issue it was discussed; see Jamaica Council Minutes, 20 September, 10 October 1662, CO139/1:19v, 24. Jews petitioned the king for permission to worship; see Jacob Jeosua Bueno Enriques to Charles II, 1661?, CO1/15:141. Also see Beeston, Journal, 279–80; Benjamin Bueno de Mesquita petition to Charles II, [23 June] 1664, CO1/18:172; *SPD*, 3:623.
60. Carla Gardina Pestana, “The Conventionality of the Notorious John Perrot,” in *Early Quakers and Their Theological Thought, 1647–1723*, ed. Stephen W. Angell and Pink Dandelion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 183–85. Sir Charles Lyttelton, Proclamation, 1 February 1662/3, CO140/1:77–79.
61. See *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, 15 May 1661, 308; Beeston, Journal, 275. Wilkes in his letter of 26 March 1661 described the island as healthy, prosperous, and attracting settlers. Beeston states 200 from the Windward Islands, an obvious error; Journal, 275. John Browne (in his letter, dated 12 April 1662) reported that the *Diamond* brought passengers from Barbados in February 1661/2, although not as many as hoped, SP 29:57. Whiting, the *Diamond*’s captain, complained of obstruction; see his to Commissioners of the Navy, 20 November 1661. For the *Diamond*’s eventual departure, see Doyley, Journal, 11 April 1662, 111. On Barbados, see Humphrey Walrond to Sir Edward Nicholas, 21 August 1662, CO1/16:219, and enclosed documents. Reference to “receiving and settling the people called Quakers” implied free migrants, not transported servants. See Order to Richard Povey, 30 September 1662, *CSPC*, 5:109.
62. For customs and imposts, see Anon., “It is desired”; 18 February 1664, *SPD*, 4:397. For earlier freedom from customs and excise, see William Brayne to Thomas Povey, Martin Noell, and William Watts, Jamaica, 8 July 1657, Egerton 2395, 129–30. To get the benefit of the royal proclamations, families were to register; see Jamaica Council Minutes, 11 December 1662, CO139/1:20v.
63. Deputy Governor Morgan counted 1,000; see his to Sir Henry Bennet, dated 28 June 1664, CO1/18:176. Joseph Martyn states that 400 arrived, 300 en route; see his to Bennet, 26 June 1664, CO1/18:173. Beeston enumerated 600; see Journal, 282. For the eighty, see Modyford to Bennet (Lord Arlington), 20 March 1663/4 and 30 June 1664, CO1/18:78, 178. On Modyford’s recruitment efforts, see his Declaration, 2 March 1663/4, CO1/18:80. For terms, see Modyford’s Instructions to Samuel Berwicke et al., 10 May 1664, CO1/18:146. Modyford seems to have transported some in a ship fitted out for the slave trade; see [Thomas Kendall], “I make it my humble request,” [1664?], CO1/18:307. Cromwell, in his proclamation seeking settlers for the island, limited its benefits to those “professing the Protestant religion”; *Writings and Speeches*, 3:853.

64. See suggestion of his representative Kendall, "It is humbly Offered," n.d. [November 1664?], CO1 / 18:304. For instance, the physician Henry Stubbe lived in Jamaica in the early 1660s: dedication to Lyttelton, in *Arts of Grandeur and Submission* (1665), and Mordechai Feingold, "Stubbe, Henry (1632–1676)," *ODNB*. Sir John Modyford seems to have visited; J. K. Laughton and Nuala Zahedieh, "Modyford, Sir James, Baronet (1618–1673)," *ODNB*. Incidental mentions of individuals and small groups in Hickingingill to Thoresby, 31 May 1703, 13–14; Captain John Gregory, Petition to Charles II, March? 1663 / 4, SP29 / 95:145; Richard Miller, Petition to Sir Wm. Wyld, [August? 1663], SP29 / 78:69; Thomas Nicols to Charles II, 2 February 1663 [/ 4], CO1 / 18:33; Jean Belliard to Sir [Sam.] Moreland, 28 January 1664 / 5, *SPD*, 4:182; [Col. Walter Slingsby] to Williamson, 26 June 1665, *SPD*, 4:446 (fifteen couples). The assertion made in the nineteenth century that two regicides went to Jamaica cannot be corroborated; see Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British West Indies*, 2 vols. (London, 1793), 1:213–14n; and Cundall, *Governors*, 6, 7. Beeston's Journal carefully noted any sizable numbers; see 275, 282.
65. Dalyson to Blackborne, 31 January 1659 / 60, CO1 / 33:162. Lord Willoughby to Secretary Lord Arlington, 27 June 1664, CO1 / 18:174. Charles earlier commanded Willoughby to recruit settlers, see Charles II to Willoughby, January 1663 / 4, CO1 / 18:9. Alfred D. Chandler, "The Expansion of Barbados," *Journal of the Barbados Museum and Historical Society* 13 (1946): 125–36. Modyford's involvement in Carolinas: see Thomas Modyford and Peter Coleton, Proposals of several Gentlemen of Barbados, 12 August 1663, in *The Colonial Records of North Carolina* (1886), 1:39–42. Brayne to Cromwell, 18 April 1657.
66. Thomas Andrews to Heneage, earl of Winchelsea, 8 April 1664, in *Report on the Mss of Allan George Finch* 1 (1913): 306, prefers Surinam. William Brayne made this point early; his to John Thurloe, 10 January 1656 / 7, *SPT*, 5:778–79. *Bristol and America*, 90–92. See Charles II circular letter, 29 November 1664, *CSPC*, 5:257. James Modyford's "Description of Jamaica," [1663], *CSPC*, 5:177, indicates that he had been in Jamaica prior to his known arrival in 1664.
67. Also apparently London merchant Philip Lecock, who needed a new plantation manager after his died; see Jamaica Council Minutes, 2 June 1663, CO139 / 1:136; and Jeremiah Bonnell and associates, who complained of Richard Povey's bad management; see petition to Charles II, n.d. [February 1661 /], CO1 / 33:212. Carlisle's recorded grants all date from his term as governor in the late 1670s; see St. Catherine Plat Book, 5:99, 100. Refusal to carry: *SPD*, 4:164; William Smith et al., Certificate, 7 January 1664, SP29 / 110:61; S[mith], *A Second Relation from Hertford*, 17–18; and H. P. to John Knowles, 19 November 1664, SP29 / 105:31.
68. "Long Report," 133. For Africans, see Committee of the Council of Foreign Plantations, minutes, 10 January 1660 / 1. Anon., "An Accompt of the

- Inhabitants on the Island of Jamaica,” 28 October 1662, ADD 11410, 8v. “A Briefe Accompt of the Severall Inhabitants in the Island of Jamaica . . .,” 1661, CO1 / 15:193, gives 3,360, divided into 2,458 men, 454 women, 448 children, as well as 514 Africans (with no reference to those in the Pelinco). Lyttelton, “A Briefe Account of the State of Jamaica,” 17. Lynch to Bennet, 25 May 1664, CO1 / 18:154. Cundall, *Governors*, 26; the 1670 Survey was produced during his term.
69. Cundall, *Governors*, 26 George W. Roberts, *The Population of Jamaica* (Cambridge: The Conservation Foundation of the University Press, 1957), following Edward Long, gives higher figures: 1658, 4,500 whites; 1664, 6,000; 1670, 8,000 (36, 53). The 1670 survey was the source for the 8,000 in Long, enumerating 7,920 (excluding the maritime population of 2,500). See 1670 Survey, 130.
70. Charles II to Sir Charles Lyttelton, 28 April 1663, CO1 / 17:56. Market days, by August 1661, CO139 / 1:10v; February 1662 / 3, 21. For an explanation, “other commodities being more staple and profitable very few busy themselves with it” (or with cotton); see 1670 Survey, 132. Sarah Barber asserts that the English government suppressed the indigo trade after 1680; see *The Disputatious Caribbean: The West Indies in the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 53.
71. H[ickeringill], *Jamaica Viewed*, 10. “Long Report,” 127, 130; 1670 Survey, 131–32. For salt making and its challenges, see Brayne to Oliver Cromwell, 12 March 1656 / 7 and 18 April 1657; 1670 Survey, 131–32. For tobacco sent early (and custom-free), see SPDC, 11:113, 142, 208, 355. Burroughs to [Blackborne], 10 June 1659.
72. Burroughs to [Secretary], 28 November 1658. Mary Fortescue, petition to Charles II, August? 1661, CO1 / 15:161-v.
73. Committee to Lord Protector, n.d., Egerton 2395, 161. The process of developing a plantation in J. Harry Bennett, “William Whaley, Planter of Seventeenth Century Jamaica,” *Agricultural History* 40:2 (1966): 113–23. The apparently early Restoration “A Briefe Accompt of the Island Jamaica” says eighteen (5); the 1670 Survey, fifty-seven (131). Dalyson to Blackborne, 22 February 1659 / 60; also 31 January 1659 / 60. Hughes, *American Physitian*, 28. If 1670 Survey is to be believed, fifty-seven were in operation a decade later, producing “1710 thousand weigh sugar,” 131. Justin Roberts, “Surrendering Surinam: The Barbadian Diaspora and the Expansion of the English Sugar Frontier, 1650–75,” *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 73 (2016): 225–56.
74. Hughes, *American Physitian*, 74, 112. Hickeringill states that “the Plantane-Walks are usually made choice of, for such Nurseries”; *Jamaica Viewed*, 20. Jamaica Council Minutes, 18 June 1661, 28 April 1663. Same as CO139 / 1:2v, 21v. The record does not specify who currently held the walk; if it was Fairfax, his impending departure might explain the transfer.
75. Charles II, Instruction to Windsor, 21 March 1661 / 2. Lyttelton, “A Briefe Account of the State of Jamaica,” 18; also see his “Reasons proposed,”

- [rec'd 3 October 1664]. Dalyson to Robert Blackborne, 16 July 1658, CO1/33:113; 23 January 1659[/60], CO1/33:156; 31 January 1659/60, 22 February 1659/60. Stubbe, *Indian Nectar*, xi. His praise for cocoa helps to date "Mr Worsley's Discourse of the Privateers of Jamaica," as he remains optimistic about the crop; see ADD 11410, 660–65. As late as 1676, John Speed, *An Epitome of Mr. John Speed's Theatre of the Empire of Great Britain* (London, 1676), 235, listed it as Jamaica's principal crop. By that time on Jamaica and neighboring islands it had been decimated by blight. See Beeston, *Journal*, 284; also see [unknown] Nevil to the Earl of Carlisle, "The Present State of Jamaica," [1677], in *Interesting Tracts relating to the Island of Jamaica* (St. Jago de la Vega, 1800), 105–17, for lore surrounding it.
76. On the pepper, see Thomas Povey to Richard Povey, 29 October 1659, ADD 11411, 51. Robert Boyle and another doctor tasted a pepper brought back to England by an unnamed "late commander," no doubt Doyley; see *Some Considerations touching the Usefulness of Experimental Naturall Philosophy* (London, 1663), 12. In a list of undated Acts, under the Deputy Governorship of Lyttelton, CO139/1:46v.
77. A. P. Thornton, "The English at Campeachy, 1670–82," *JHR* 2:1 (December 1935): 27–38. Mahogany would become a desired consumer good in colonial North America in the eighteenth century; see Jennifer L. Anderson, *Mahogany: The Cost of Luxury in Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).
78. Martin Noell and Thomas Povey, "Overtures touching a Councell to bee erected for Foreign Plantations," (draft), n.d., Egerton 2395, 270–71, undated (but post-Restoration). For Brayne's doubts about the captain, see his to Povey, Noell, and Watts, Jamaica, 8 July 1657, 129–30. For the loss, see Thomas Povey to Richard Povey, 20 July 1658, ADD 11410, 156. The Povey letters contain many references to the scheme; see 62, 141, 143. For success over time, see Nuala Zahedieh, *The Capital and the Colonies: London and the Atlantic Economy, 1660–1700* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 260; and "The Merchants of Port Royal, Jamaica, and the Spanish Contraband Trade, 1655–1692," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., 43 (1986): 570–93.
79. Lyttelton, "A Briefe Account of the State of Jamaica," 17v. Reference to forced trade can be found in Windsor's Additional Instructions, dated 8 April 1662, in CO138/1:19; and Council Meeting Minutes, 11 December 1662, CO139/1:20-v. And see Jamaica Vice Admiralty Court, "Sentence . . . condemning a prize," 30 January 1662/3, in *Documents relating to Law and Custom of the Sea*, ed. R. G. Marsden, vol. 2, AD 1649–1767 ([London], 1915–16), 45–46.
80. John Haynes, Deposition, 25 January 1663/4, CO1/18:22–23, mentions contraband trade, but whether in slaves is unclear; he also reveals the dangers of pursuing it at a time of high tension. Anon., "An Extract out of a L^{re} from Jamaica," noted that the trade was unlikely except possibly in slaves. The Dutch closely watched English efforts; see Matthias Beck to

- Petrus Stuyvesant, 16 April 1665, in *Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade*, comp. Elizabeth Donnan, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution, 1930–35), 1:167. Linda A. Newsom and Susie Menchin, *From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 308–9. K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London: Longmans, 1957), 326–27, labels the contract “absurd.” Charles II, Warrant for safe conduct, 1663?, CO1 / 17:255, to a Spanish ship to come to the colony for slaves.
81. Beeston, Journal, 285, dated the trade from February 1665, but the TSTD shows the RAC bringing Africans from 1663. The eleven RAC voyages brought 2,664 slaves to Jamaica between 1663 and 1666; transshipment records are incomplete for this early period, but at least 802 went on to Spanish America in 1665–66. My thanks to Greg O’Malley for sharing the latter set of statistics. Modyford immediately sent negotiators to discuss trade prospects with the governor of Hispaniola; see his to the governor, 30 April 1664, and his Instructions to Theodore Cary and John Perrot, 2 May 1664, CO1 / 18:139-v, 141–42. Also see Lynch to Bennet, 25 May 1664.
82. Information for this discussion from “A View of the Condition of Jamaica,” 1 October 1664, and “Jamaica survey’d by Sir Tho Modyford, 1663,” based on Sir James Modyford’s “Description of Jamaica, 1663.” The parishes listed in “A View” aligned with those in the 1660 “A Brief Survey of Jamaica,” which explicitly links them to regiments. The “Jamaica survey’d” of 1663 listed various population centers indicating the continued use of Spanish names (or English renditions of them). Quote on 151.
83. “Jamaica Survey’d,” 154.
84. Jamaica, Council Orders, 19 November 1662, CO140 / 1:65–66.

Conclusion

1. This observation animated Stephen Saunders Webb’s treatment of early English Jamaica in *The Governors-General: The English Army and the Definition of the Empire, 1569–1681* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1979). Leslie Theibert concurs about the dating of this shift, in her 2013 dissertation, “Making an English Caribbean, 1650–1688” (Yale University).
2. For a detailed proposal for what would be required, see Martin Noell and Thomas Povey, “Overtures touching a Councill to bee erected for Foreign Plantations,” draft, n.d., Egerton 2395, 270–71.
3. To Edward Doyley, n.d., ADD 11411, 42–43.
4. S[amuel] S[tarling], *An Answer to the Seditious and Scandalous Pamphlet entitled The Tryal of W. Penn and W. Mead* (London, [1670]), 6. The younger Penn responded in *Truth Rescued from Imposture* ([London], 1670), 25–26. Edward Billing, *A Faithful Testimony for God & my Country* (London, 1664), 9.

5. Vincent Brown, *The Reaper's Garden: Death and Power in the World of Atlantic Slavery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
6. *A narrative of affairs lately received from His Majesties island of Jamaica* (London, 1683), 6.
7. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *The History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–1660*, vol. 2, *1649–1660* (London: Longmans, Green, 1897), 478.
8. Lyttelton, Order, dated 19 November 1662, CO1 / 140:62; also see corresponding Council Minute, “Act for Incouragem^t of Planting,” 19 November 1662, 25v; and “Act encouraging Planters and prohibition on public levies of men & arms on foreign designs,” [1663?], CO139:25v, 39. A serviceable narrative of the campaign can be found in Dudley Pope, *Harry Morgan's Way: The Biography of Sir Henry Morgan, 1635–1684* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1997), chaps. 21–22.

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I dedicate this book to my cherished friend Drew Cayton, whose unexpected death in 2015 left so many of us bereft. To him, and to my ever-supportive and loving family, my gratitude.

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