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ARMOUR

Patron: Major General Dave Chalmers, AO CSC
President: Rob Shoebridge . Editor George Baczocha

Donbas: the Future of Armoured Warfare

Russian military operations in Ukraine illustrate how quickly warfare has changed. Main battle tanks and heavy armour at the start of the war were considered too expensive and easily destroyed with light anti-tank weapons or drones. Quoting a British military historian's observation in 1960, Mihm wrote: "Time after time during the past 40 years defense authorities have

War in Donbass, disabled, damaged and destroyed Ukrainian government T-64 tanks.
enrique262.tumblr.com



announced that the tank is dead or dying. Each time it has risen from the grave to which they had consigned it — and they have been caught napping." As recently as 2020 the US Marine Corps' decided to get rid of its tanks, making clear that the force would leave that capability to the Army.

"What can move at 60kph and fire a 120mm round at a target 1km away while shrugging off machine gun and autocannon fire". At a recent armour tactics course at Fort Benning, Georgia, Lt. Col. John Dolan quoted; "A tank is one of the most lethal things you can put on the battlefield "It's got a ton of armour, it is fast, it can see everything ...it has proven essential on today's battlefield.

However sending tanks on their own is suicide. It needs a combination of both infantry and armour to be efficient, this is the combined arms aspect of military strategy — using an infantry force alongside a military's tanks.

During its annual May 9 Victory Day Parade commemorating the end of World War II, the Russian military demonstrated the most striking examples of their ground force vehicles. They unveiled what is possibly the most ambitious ground vehicle program since the end of the Cold War. The Armata Universal Combat Platform is Russia's attempt to make an interconnected family of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, and other vehicles. The centerpiece is the T-14 Armata main battle tank, a radical design that highlights a troubling lack of fighting vehicle development in the West.

The T-14's biggest departure from traditional tank design isn't quite evident from photos. The turret is completely unmanned; instead, the three crew members operate the tank in a compartment at the front of the hull. This provides several advantages. There is more room in the turret for armament; currently, the T-14 is equipped with the latest upgrade of Russia's standard 125mm tank gun, the 2A82A; in addition to the wide variety of Russian armor-piercing and high-explosive shells available, the gun is also capable of firing anti-tank guided missiles. According to the technical periodical, Jane's Defense Weekly, additional armament could be provided in the form of a co-axial 30mm autocannon and PKT machine gun, giving the T-14 the ability to engage a wide variety of targets.

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
President's Message

With the rapid approach of ANZAC Day 2023 I hope that many of you are able to join RAACA NSW in the Sydney March and then at the reunion drinks. Details are in this issue. RAACA NSW will be joined by the 1/15 RNSWL contingent and their Band. So, at last the parade organisers have seen the logic of having the Black Hats march en masse!

The first quarter of 2023 has been quiet for the Association, with the notable exception of the very considered and measured progress of the Colonel John Haynes Trust. I am indebted to Keith Schollum's leadership as Trust Chairman and Rob Lording's work as Trust Secretary. The Trust is working closely with the RAACA NSW ExCo and they are putting together a sound investment strategy for the funds that John left to the Trust. From the time that the Trust was a thought bubble with some ExCo members, John was kept abreast of planning and development and was extremely generous in his bequest to the Trust. We should be in a position to consider applications early in 2024. I hope that you have all enjoyed a happy Easter and look forward to catching up on ANZAC Day.

Yours,
Rob

Your invitation to march with the Royal Australian Armoured Corps Association NSW in Sydney on Anzac Day



IF YOU'RE SERVING NOW OR HAVE EVER SERVED IN ARMOUR

THE MARCH DETAILS

FUP: All Post WW2 Armour units (including 1/15 Royal NSW Lancers' Assoc) to assemble at the northern end of **Chifley Square (near Bent Street)**.
March-off commences from 0900hrs

THE POST-MARCH DETAILS

All Armour (current and ex-serving) are also invited to the RAAC Assoc (NSW) post march function at **The Civic Hotel, Cnr Goulburn & Pitt Streets** on the Lower Ground Floor. Drinks & food available at pub prices. Partners, family and friends are welcome.

For more information contact Mike Butler (0401 966 989) or Bob Ferrari (0418 412 469)

www.raacansw.org.au

The remote turret could also theoretically allow a single crew member to maneuver and fire the T-14's weapons, albeit much less effectively.

The turret is notably taller than previous Russian designs and contemporary Western tanks; its tall profile makes "hull down" position difficult to achieve. But the larger turret could possibly accommodate a larger 152mm main gun, increasing the T-14's firepower even more. Another possible tradeoff involves the crew compartment; while the front armour of most tanks is often the toughest, the T-14 crew will certainly be the first to know if any rounds do get through. Some designs, like the Israeli Merkava, have moved the engine to the front in order to provide more protection for the crew for exactly this reason.

The T-14 crew may not have to worry, however. In an unprecedented shift to prioritize protection over mobility, which shaped the design of many Soviet tanks, the T-14 will incorporate several active protection systems designed to kill incoming missiles before they even strike the tank. The tank also features explosive reactive armor as an inherent part of the design, providing an increased defense against projectiles. Completing the defense are slat armor panels at the rear, which provide some protection against shoulder-launched anti-tank weapons. The overall armor composition is new, but its makeup is unknown. It is likely similar to the "Chobham" and "Dorchester" composite armor developed by the British Ministry of Defense, putting it on par with tanks used by NATO nations.



T14 Tanks being tested in Syria

The T-14 features a new target and sensor package, including an active electronically scanned array radar suite derived from a fighter jet, enabling the T-14 to track multiple targets simultaneously and provide automatic ballistic solutions to the gunner. The commander has day, night, and thermal optics in a remote systems that also features a machine gun similar to the American Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station.

The T-14's massive improvements may be surprising, but the truth is the Russians have pioneered new tank designs for decades. Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, a armour expert

who has studied tanks since the early 1960s, explains in his book "Tanks: 100 Years Of Evolution" that the Russians always considered tanks an important part of ground warfare, whereas the West questioned the future of the tank several times during the Cold War. This was notably seen in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Israeli tanks counter-attacking against Egypt and Syria took heavy losses from AT-3 "Sagger" anti-tank guided missiles. Ogorkiewicz elaborates: On the Sinai front, the successful assault crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian forces was followed immediately by counter-attacks by the Israeli 252nd Division, which ran into Egyptian infantry equipped with an exceptionally large number of Soviet-made Sagger anti-tank guided missiles and failed, losing 165 of its 268 tanks. This immediately led to worldwide rumours that tanks were no longer effective and it took some time for this to be disproved.



Western tank development has ebbed and flowed, whereas Russian armored vehicle research remained almost a constant. As Ogorkiewicz explains:... the size of the Western European tank fleet was reduced to a fraction of what it had been. Thus, major Western European armies, were left with no more than about 200 tanks each... But elsewhere tanks have continued to be viewed as a major element of military strength.

In particular, the army of the Russian Federation has maintained a fleet of 2,000 to 3,000 modern tanks backed by a reserve of several thousand older vehicles.

That trend seems to have continued. The current American main battle tank, the M1A2 Abrams, is an improved version of a design from 1979. The Abrams is good tank, and the performance of its predecessor, the M1A1, in the Persian Gulf War is often cited as proving its superiority over Russian tanks like the T-72. In the decisive engagement at the Battle of 73 Easting during the Gulf War, one particular troop of 12 M1s destroyed 28 tanks, 16 armored personnel carriers, and 30 trucks in less than half an hour. But as Victor Suvorov, a member of Soviet military intelligence who defected to the West, explains, the Gulf War performance is misleading because the Soviets provided greatly simplified version of equipment for export to foreign nations, called "monkey models."

Therefore, the overmatch the Abrams enjoyed may fast be disappearing. Plans to upgrade the tank to “M1A3” status are slow and the modest changes of upgraded electronics and a lighter 120mm main gun won’t put it on par with the T-14. Tanks from the South Korea and China have leap-frogged the Abrams in terms of fire-control capability.

Upgrading the Abrams presents problems. The M1A3 upgrades assume the 120mm cannon and associated ammo will be sufficient to engage modern tanks like the T-14. 120mm guns are about the heaviest tank caliber able to accommodate a human loader. While the United States has experimented with a 140mm gun, it has never put an autoloading tank into full production. “Upgunning” the Abrams would require a redesign to fit an autoloading system. Then there’s the armour. While it was very effective in 1991, the Abrams’ composite armor has proved vulnerable to IEDs and tandem-shaped charge warheads. There’s also two of the more glaring flaws of the Abrams. Its heavy at over 60 tons, making it difficult to airlift. And it has a gas turbine engine, that while powerful and relatively quiet compared to the diesel option, guzzles gas and limits the tank’s range.

According to reports, the Russian military intends to purchase 2,300 T-14s over the next five years. Even a downgraded T-14 could stack up well against Western tanks, like the Abrams, Leopard 2, and Challenger 2. If the United States and its allies continue to assume their tanks are adequate for future confrontations, they may find out what the Iraqi experience was like at 73 Easting.

Western nations have begun pledging a variety of Western armored vehicles to Ukraine including infantry fighting vehicles and even main battle tanks. Until now, the majority of armored vehicles sent to Ukraine had been Soviet-era weapons Ukrainian forces were familiar with both in terms of operating and repairing them. However, following Ukraine’s Kherson and Kharkov offensives, much of this equipment has been destroyed, leaving the West little choice but to begin sending Western systems or leave Ukrainian forces in the field with only small arms.

While Western leaders and the media claim that Western armored vehicles represent a significant increase in Ukrainian capabilities, the reality is quite the opposite. Far from giving Ukraine an advantage on the battlefield, Ukrainian forces will struggle merely to get the vehicles on the battlefield and keep them there. Additionally, recent conflicts elsewhere in the world have proven Western armored vehicles including main battle tanks are neither “invincible,” nor “game-changing.” Thus, if Ukraine’s hundreds of Soviet-era tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers failed to achieve favorable outcomes for Kiev, it is unlikely replacing these systems with Western hardware will make any difference.

What will happen when Ukrainian tank crews given abbreviated training attempt to employ Western main battle tanks on the battlefield, only without the proper logistical or combined arms support? And what will happen when these Ukrainian tank crews go up against Russian-made anti-tank weapons proven over the years to be highly effective against the very best Western main battle tanks now that these anti-tank weapons are in the hands of Russian troops themselves?

It was Russian forces destroying hundreds upon hundreds of Ukrainian armored vehicles over the course of the special military operation, exhausting both Ukraine’s initial inventories and then NATO’s inventories of Soviet-era equipment that has

prompted the West to consider sending their own armor in the first place.



Effective Russian-made anti-tank weapons like the guided AT-7 Metis and AT-5 Konkurs but also the newer 9M133 Kornet missile along with RPG-29 and now RPG-30 rocket propelled grenades will surely produce the same destructive results experienced by Turkish, US, British, Saudi, and Israeli tank crews. But Ukrainian forces will also face hundreds of Russia’s own main battle tanks including modernized T-72 and T-80 tanks, as well as the newer T-90 Proryv. Russian military aviation also has a variety of

weapons capable of precision strikes on armored vehicles and Russian artillery is more than capable of destroying main battle tanks even on the move using laser-guided Krasnopol artillery rounds.

In other words, Ukrainian tank crews will be less prepared and fighting under less-than-ideal conditions than their Western counterparts and fighting against a much larger arsenal of anti-tank weapons both in terms of quantity and quality.

Just as other Western “wonder weapons” had supposedly “turned the tide” including the M777 155mm howitzer and the HIMARS GPS-guided multiple launch rocket system, Ukraine finds itself in need of yet another “wonder weapon” to induce yet another badly needed “turning of the tide.” Western main battle tanks will help Ukraine prolong the conflict, but ultimately Kiev will find themselves right back to where they started.

The Ukrainian war is not like anything the US has encountered since WW2, all the military doctrine so far has been developed fighting weaker and in many cases poorly lead and equipped enemy. The Russian army today is well equipped and trained. Most of the Russian “arm chair generals” have long been replaced with battlefield commanders of proven capability.

The Ukrainians have had their training mainly centred on small unit tactics and they are very efficient at this level. This has all come from fighting guerrilla warfare. No one expected that this would develop into a conventional war. Small unit tactics stop working once most of their experienced officers and NCO’s are either killed or captured. There is a decided lack of understanding in the use and maneuver of large forces.

Up to the Kharkov and Kherson offensives the Russians adhered to the concept of a Battalion Tactical group as the best structure to provide mobility and fire power and it work well up to a point, however due to the small number of attached infantry it only had to lose a small number of soldiers to become ineffective. This was proved during the Russian advance in 2014, 2015 where Ukrainian forces easily overcame the BTGs approach. This proved even more ineffective in urban areas.

The Russians learnt their lesson and have now adopted a structure more centred at division level with increased infantry support. They avoid advancing deeply into enemy lines without adequate backup and support, making sure that the rear is first mopped up using special forces. In addition the artillery has now been moved to brigade level to ensure better communication and control. Ironically the conflict is shaping up as Barbarossa Version 2 and with similar results.

Source Material has been taken from the following authors web pages

Douglas Abbott Macgregor is a retired U.S. Army colonel and government official, and an author, consultant, and television commentator. He played a significant role on the battlefield in the Gulf War. (Douglas Macgregor Straight Calls - youtube.)

William Scott Ritter Jr. is an American author, former United States Marine Corps intelligence officer, former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) weapons inspector.

Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Editors note: You quite often hear the term the fog of war: well it certainly fits when trying to unravel the actual situation in Ukraine. I spent considerable time in eastern Europe during and after the disintegration of the USSR so have first hand knowledge of the culture and the ambitions of the Central and Eastern European nations involved in the present conflict and have come to distrust official statements that are appearing in the media. For those seeking the truth, go to the people on the ground both Russian, Polish and Ukrainian. This is a conflict best stayed well away from.

For those interested in information the Russian Battalion Tactical group structure there is an excellent description the US Army “Armour” Spring 2017 journal.



Technical Notes & News

Redback turret to be manufactured in Australia (NOVEMBER 17, 2022)

Hanwha Defence Australia (HDA) and Elbit Systems of Israel have agreed to support the Redback turret, built in Australia, for the global market.




Based on the proven and tested MT30 turret, the Redback turret was developed and modernised as part of HDA's offering as part of Australia's Land 400 Phase 3 project for up to 450 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs).

The evolved variant of the turret will be built in Australia and integrated with the Redback vehicle at HDA's Hanwha Armoured vehicle Centre of Excellence (H-ACE). Construction of the H-ACE is underway at the Avalon Airport precinct in Geelong.

The Redback turret underwent a significant test and evaluation process as part of the Australian Commonwealth's Risk Mitigation Activity, was successfully trialed by the Republic of Korea Army earlier this year and is currently being trialed by the Polish Defence force.

"This agreement will see the Redback turret assembled and integrated at the H-ACE for the Australian Land 400 Phase 3 project, if we are successful, and then for export for global Redback customers," Richard Cho, Managing Director of HDA explained. "We will be working with a range of Australian suppliers to bring this important capability to market."



“Elbit is fully committed to establishing sovereign engineering, production and support capabilities of its proven and tested MT30 turret in the Redback configuration,” Yehuda (Udi) Vered, CEO of Elbit Systems Land said. “The MT30 Redback turret is the latest generation in our family of manned and unmanned turrets leveraging the high performance, advanced, lethality, protection and situational awareness capabilities tested and fielded worldwide.”

According to HDA, the Redback turret was designed from the very outset to integrate advanced technologies such as Iron Fist Active Protection Systems, Iron Vision Head Mounted Display Situational Awareness System and the Spike LR2 Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. The turret is designed to easily integrate these advanced systems to achieve optimum performance for the vehicle rather than bolt on aftermarket solutions.

The turret forms the basis of the lethality solution for the Redback IFV, integrating a range of systems under armour with an under-armour reloading capability while providing more space inside the vehicle with its low profile non-hull penetrating design.

HDA’s Redback IFV is one of two tenders currently under consideration as part of the Australian Department of Defence’s Land 400 Phase 3 project.

Courtesy: Australian Defence Magazine



Polish soldiers take delivery of the first batch of the Korean K2 Black Panther Tanks (Photo courtesy of 20th Mechanised Brigade).

Poland is procuring 1,000 K2s, the first 180 of which are scheduled to be delivered in 2022–25, followed in 2026 by the launch of production in Poland and the delivery of the first of 820 K2PL tanks.

The K2PL will be up-armoured and fitted with a 360° observation system, with the possibility of using programmable ammunition from different suppliers and the Polish WKM 12.7 mm machine gun. The first 180 K2s will be upgraded to the K2PL standard.

Australian Exit from Vietnam

Max Blenkin APRIL 15 2020, Australian Associated Press



Fifty years ago, the Gorton government began the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam.

It was a process as opaque as that which took Australia into the war in the first place.

The first withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam was announced on April 22, 1970 when Prime Minister John Gorton announced that one infantry battalion, 8RAR, which was due to return home in November, would not be replaced. That was the beginning of the end of Australia's engagement in a conflict which claimed 500 Australian lives and which, though initially popular, was increasingly

opposed by the community.

About a fortnight after Gorton's announcement, 120,000 people took part in the nation's first Vietnam moratorium march to protest against the war and conscription. The second, in September 1970, and the third, in June 1971, had fewer protesters but more violence and arrests. However, government plans were driven less by growing protests than by the US, which was embarking on its own drawdown, without consulting its allies including Australia.

Increasingly disillusioned with a conflict which was costing ever more lives without apparent progress, Nixon was looking to hand the war over to South Vietnamese forces in a face-saving process termed Vietnamisation, then get out. Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger cynically and secretly sought to achieve a "decent interval" before the seemingly inevitable victory of the communist North.

Australian soldiers had first gone to Vietnam in 1962, with 30 specialist military advisers despatched at the request of the US to assist South Vietnamese forces counter the growing communist insurgency. The big decision came in April 1965, with the deployment of an Army combat battalion, 1RAR, which arrived in May and June. More followed in 1966, creating a task force which in May 1969 peaked at more than 5000. This was a big commitment for Australia, but was utterly dwarfed by the US whose troop numbers peaked at 543,000 at the same time.

Ashley Ekins, former Australian War Memorial principal historian and author of the final volumes of the official history of Australia's war in Vietnam "Fighting to the Finish", said Washington's withdrawal announcements threw the Australian government into disarray. "We were a very minor player, although this was a major commitment to us. It became a heavy burden and cost," Ekins said. "The government kept trying to claim our withdrawal intentions were linked to those of the US as part of a larger plan."

When the Australian Defence Department began planning for a withdrawal, Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Tom Daly and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General John Wilton, concluded it should be "one out all out". They argued that piecemeal withdrawal would make the task force, based at Nui Dat and responsible for security of the sprawling Phuoc Tuy province, less effective and more vulnerable to enemy action.

Senior foreign affairs officials took the view that a phased withdrawal would better keep faith with the Americans. That view, backed by new Defence Minister Malcolm Fraser, prevailed and on April 22,

1970 Gorton, who initially favoured the "one out all out" approach, stood up in parliament. He announced that 8RAR plus some support personnel would return at the end of their tour in November and not be replaced. Further withdrawals would be considered as Vietnamisation proceeded. Shortly after 8RAR returned home, New Zealand also withdrew a rifle company, further reducing the task force capability.


In four years, Australian and New Zealand troops had achieved considerable success in Phuoc Tuy. At its peak, the task forces comprised three infantry battalions plus supporting units including tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and engineers. That enabled one battalion to be constantly rotated through field operations, maintaining pressure on insurgent forces while the other two conducted local operations and guarded the base.

One less battalion meant the troops had to work harder for less effect. Ekins said Gorton's decision was made against the advice of commanders and soldiers on the ground. "Duty bound as they were constitutionally, the service chiefs had to abide," he said. "The Army could make those required adjustments but they knew it would be at a cost."

The protracted withdrawal took two years. Only in March 1972 did the final task force soldiers come home. "In that time another 100 had died and more than 1000 had been wounded," Ekins said.

The last of the Centurion tanks departed Vietnam in September 1971 - also against the commanders' advice that they should stay until the end to provide the infantry with the mobile firepower they needed against enemy bunkers. Just how the risk had increased was demonstrated in the last major Australian action of the conflict, Operation Ivanhoe in September 1971. Soldiers of 3RAR and 4RAR/NZ attacked enemy positions without armour support, resulting in five killed and 30 wounded.

On August 18, 1971 - the fifth anniversary of the Battle of Long Tan - Prime Minister Billy McMahon, who succeeded Gorton in March 1971, announced the two remaining battalions would be home by Christmas. Australian combat operations effectively ended with their withdrawal, although the war would continue for another four years until the crushing victory by North Vietnamese forces in April 1975.





Beersheba Cambrai Dinner 2022
Left to right: Graham Munsell, John Keys, David Ritchie, Nobby Clark, Dave Ferguson and Bob Ferrari OAM

(All in photo were together in SVN in 1969 as members of B Sqn 1 AR.)

2/14th QMI Shoalwater Bay



Vale

Colonel AW Bewley passed away on 12th April 2021 at nearly 96 years of age; in his own bed surrounded by family.

Though he retired aged 50 & started a thriving wholesale nursery business, his heart & soul remained military in all aspects of his life.

A wonderful community leader & a loving patriarch, he is very much missed by all. The family property, where we all grew up, has recently been sold so I am finalising all remaining mail out magazines.

Very best wishes
Andrée Rose (nee Bewley)



Australian Government



Department of Defence

STATEMENT OF SERVICE

Full name: Alexander William BEWLEY

Service number: N346321, NX165694, NP27066, 2905

Category of service:
Citizen Military Forces (Full Time Duty) 26 February 1942 to 07 January 1943
Australian Imperial Force 08 January 1943 to 30 June 1947
Interim Army 01 July 1947 to 08 December 1947
Australian Regular Army 09 December 1947 to 08 June 1975

Employment: Royal Australian Corps of Transport Officer

Rank on discharge: Lieutenant Colonel

Postings:
Newcastle Covering Force Supply Column 26 February 1942
22 Australian Field Ambulance 16 March 1942
3 Independent Section Motor Ambulance Convoy 12 December 1943
66 Ambulance Platoon Motor Ambulance Convoy 10 January 1944
253 Supply Depot Platoon 19 October 1945
Headquarters 41 Australian Advance Supply Depot 17 December 1948
Headquarters Advanced Supply Depot 24 February 1949
British Commonwealth Occupation Force Field Bakery Platoon 25 January 1951
101 Supply Depot Platoon 11 June 1952
Headquarters Tasmania Command Troops 11 April 1953
Royal Australian Army Service Corps School 30 July 1957
Miscellaneous Detachments Australian Army Force, Far East Land Forces 02 October 1959
Royal Australian Army Service Corps Centre 02 December 1961
Air Movements Training Flight - 38 Transport Squadron RAAF 10 May 1962
Air Movements Training Flight - 86 Transport Wing RAAF 12 October 1962
Air Movements Training Flight (Army Component) 01 May 1963
Army Air Supply Organisation 18 October 1965
Officer Training Unit 09 January 1967
1 Ground Liaison Group 17 January 1969
Headquarters 9 Supply and Transport Column 02 February 1972
2 Transport Battalion 01 June 1973
1 Ground Liaison Group 11 December 1973

Attachments:
6 Company, Royal Army Service Corps 02 October 1959 to 02 December 1961
Australian Army Staff (Washington) – Training 18 June 1962 to 12 October 1962

Operational Service/Deployment:

New Guinea 17 October 1943 to 05 April 1944
New Guinea 07 July 1944 to 16 September 1944
Bougainville 17 September 1944 to 09 November 1945
Morotai 10 November 1945 to 15 February 1946
Japan 16 February 1946 to 03 December 1946
Japan 11 March 1947 to 14 March 1951
Japan 15 June 1951 to 10 February 1952
Singapore 02 October 1959 to 02 December 1961
United States of America 18 June 1962 to 25 September 1962
Vietnam 18 June 1969 to 25 June 1969
Vietnam 01 August 1970 to 13 August 1970

Honours and Awards:

1939-45 Star
Pacific Star
War Medal 1939-45
Australia Service Medal 1939-45
Australian Active Service Medal 1945-75 with Clasps Malaya and Vietnam
United Nations Service Medal (Korea)
Vietnam Logistic and Support Medal
Australian Service Medal 1945-75 with Clasps PNG, SW Pacific, Japan and SE Asia
Defence Force Service Medal with First, Second and Third Clasps
National Medal with First Clasp
Australian Defence Medal
Pingat Jasa Malaysia
Returned from Active Service Badge

Lieutenant Colonel Bewley was appointed Colonel Commandant of the Royal Australian Corps of Transport, 2 Military District, from 21 May 1979 until 01 July 1983.

Released on behalf of
S. L. Harnett
Director - Defence Archives and Service Centres
Service Delivery Division
Estate and Infrastructure Group
Department of Defence

19 February 2021

Objective ID: BS19307893



Lest we Forget
We regret to advise the passing of the following members

Mr.	Denis	D	Comber	1/15 RNSWL
Mr.		L	Birdsall	1/15 RNSWL
Sir	William	W	Durrant	12th/16th Hunter River Lancers.
Mr.	Peter	P	Knowland	1/15 RNSWL
Mr.	Ken	K	High	2/6 AR
COL	Allan	A	Bewley	66 MAC 3 Armd Div
Mr	Alan	A	Buckingham	1AR, 2/3 Cav, 12/16, 2/14

Vale

Sir William Alexander Estridge Durrant, 8th Baronet

Sir William Alexander Estridge Durrant, 8th Bt. was born on 26 November 1929. He was the son of Sir William Henry Estridge Durrant, 7th Bt. and Georgina Beryl Gwendoline Purse. He married Dorothy Croker, daughter of Ronal Croker, on 7 February 1953. He died on 26 August 2018 at age 88 at Gold Coast, Queensland, Australia.

He held the office of Justice of the Peace (J.P.) [New South Wales] in 1957. He gained the rank of Captain in 1958 in the 12th/16th Hunter River Lancers. He succeeded as the 8th Baronet Durrant, of Scottow, co. Norfolk [G.B., 1784] on 13 July 1994.

Vale

Paul Hanna

Please note that our colleague Paul Hanna passed away on 25 March 2023.

Paul served in the 1970s/80s, rising to the rank of sergeant. Wayne Clark recalls he was troop sergeant of Transport Troop, HQ Sqn in 1984. A highly competent soldier and very good company.

His funeral was held on 30th March.

Sincerely,
John Howells
Secretary

Vale

John Braddon Arnott

18 June 1928 to 15 December 2022

Further to my note of 15 December 2022; thanks to Colonel John's stepson Matthew Tumminello I can advise the funeral was held on Friday 23 December 2022 at the Magnolia Chapel Macquarie Park Crematorium.

Sincerely,
John Howells
Secretary
Royal New South Wales Lancers Association

