

There is ample authority in the Uniform Trust Code for the appointment of a special fiduciary, an appointment which can avoid the need for a resigning or removed trustee to exercise residual powers until a successor can take office. *See* Sections 704(e) (court may appoint additional trustee or special fiduciary whenever court considers appointment necessary for administration of trust), 705(b) (in approving resignation, court may impose conditions necessary for protection of trust property), 706(c) (pending decision on petition for removal, court may order appropriate relief), and 1001(b)(5) (to remedy breach of trust, court may appoint special fiduciary as necessary to protect trust property or interests of beneficiary).

If the former trustee has died, the Uniform Trust Code does not require that the trustee's personal representative windup the deceased trustee's administration. Nor is a trustee's conservator or guardian required to complete the former trustee's administration if the trustee's authority terminated due to an adjudication of incapacity. However, to limit the former trustee's liability, the personal representative, conservator or guardian may submit a trustee's report on the former trustee's behalf as authorized by Section 813(c). Otherwise, the former trustee remains liable for actions taken during the trustee's term of office until liability is otherwise barred.

SECTION 708. COMPENSATION OF TRUSTEE.

(a) If the terms of a trust do not specify the trustee's compensation, a trustee is entitled to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.

(b) If the terms of a trust specify the trustee's compensation, the trustee is entitled to be compensated as specified, but the court may allow more or less compensation if:

(1) the duties of the trustee are substantially different from those contemplated when the trust was created; or

(2) the compensation specified by the terms of the trust would be unreasonably low or high.

Comment

Subsection (a) establishes a standard of reasonable compensation. Relevant factors in determining this compensation, as specified in the Restatement, include the custom of the community; the trustee's skill, experience, and facilities; the time devoted to trust duties; the amount and character of the trust property; the degree of difficulty, responsibility and risk assumed in administering the trust, including in making discretionary distributions; the nature and costs of services rendered by others; and the quality of the trustee's performance. *See* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 242 cmt. b (1959).

In setting compensation, the services actually performed and responsibilities assumed by the trustee should be closely examined. A downward adjustment of fees may be appropriate if a trustee has delegated significant duties to agents, such as the delegation of investment authority to outside managers. *See* Section 807 (delegation by trustee). On the other hand, a trustee with special skills, such as those of a real estate agent, may be entitled to extra compensation for performing services that would ordinarily be delegated. *See* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 242 cmt. d (1959).

Because “trustee” as defined in Section 103(20) includes not only an individual trustee but also cotrustees, each trustee, including a cotrustee, is entitled to reasonable compensation under the circumstances. The fact that a trust has more than one trustee does not mean that the trustees together are entitled to more compensation than had either acted alone. Nor does the appointment of more than one trustee mean that the trustees are eligible to receive the compensation in equal shares. The total amount of the compensation to be paid and how it will be divided depend on the totality of the circumstances. Factors to be considered include the settlor’s reasons for naming more than one trustee and the level of responsibility assumed and exact services performed by each trustee. Often the fees of cotrustees will be in the aggregate higher than the fees for a single trustee because of the duty of each trustee to participate in administration and not delegate to a cotrustee duties the settlor expected the trustees to perform jointly. *See* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999). The trust may benefit in such cases from the enhanced quality of decision-making resulting from the collective deliberations of the trustees.

Financial institution trustees normally base their fees on published fee schedules. Published fee schedules are subject to the same standard of reasonableness under the Uniform Trust Code as are other methods for computing fees. The courts have generally upheld published fee schedules but this is not automatic. Among the more litigated topics is the issue of termination fees. Termination fees are charged upon termination of the trust and sometimes upon transfer of the trust to a successor trustee. Factors relevant to whether the fee is appropriate include the actual work performed; whether a termination fee was authorized in the terms of the trust; whether the fee schedule specified the circumstances in which a termination fee would be charged; whether the trustee’s overall fees for administering the trust from the date of the trust’s creation, including the termination fee, were reasonable; and the general practice in the community regarding termination fees. Because significantly less work is normally involved, termination fees are less appropriate upon transfer to a successor trustee than upon termination of the trust. For representative cases, see *Cleveland Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co.*, 258 A.2d 58 (Del. 1969); *In re Trusts Under Will of Dwan*, 371 N.W. 2d 641 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); *Mercer v. Merchants National Bank*, 298 A.2d 736 (N.H. 1972); *In re Estate of Payson*, 562 N.Y.S. 2d 329 (Surr. Ct. 1990); *In re Indenture Agreement of Lawson*, 607 A. 2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); *In re Estate of Ischy*, 415 A.2d 37 (Pa. 1980); *Memphis Memorial Park v. Planters National Bank*, 1986 Tenn. App. LEXIS 2978 (May 7, 1986); *In re Trust of Sensenbrenner*, 252 N.W. 2d 47 (Wis. 1977).

This Code does not take a specific position on whether dual fees may be charged when a trustee hires its own law firm to represent the trust. The trend is to authorize dual compensation

as long as the overall fees are reasonable. For a discussion, see Ronald C. Link, *Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Lawyer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct*, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 1, 22-38 (1991).

Subsection (b) permits the terms of the trust to override the reasonable compensation standard, subject to the court's inherent equity power to make adjustments downward or upward in appropriate circumstances. Compensation provisions should be drafted with care. Common questions include whether a provision in the terms of the trust setting the amount of the trustee's compensation is binding on a successor trustee, whether a dispositive provision for the trustee in the terms of the trust is in addition to or in lieu of the trustee's regular compensation, and whether a dispositive provision for the trustee is conditional on the person performing services as trustee. *See* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No.2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 242 cmt. f (1959).

Compensation may be set by agreement. A trustee may enter into an agreement with the beneficiaries for lesser or increased compensation, although an agreement increasing compensation is not binding on a nonconsenting beneficiary. *See* Section 111(d) (matters that may be resolved by nonjudicial settlement). *See also* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 242 cmt. i (1959). A trustee may also agree to waive compensation and should do so prior to rendering significant services if concerned about possible gift and income taxation of the compensation accrued prior to the waiver. *See* Rev. Rul. 66-167, 1966-1 C.B. 20. *See also* Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 38 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 242 cmt. j (1959).

Section 816(15) grants the trustee authority to fix and pay its compensation without the necessity of prior court review, subject to the right of a beneficiary to object to the compensation in a later judicial proceeding. Allowing the trustee to pay its compensation without prior court approval promotes efficient trust administration but does place a significant burden on a beneficiary who believes the compensation is unreasonable. To provide a beneficiary with time to take action, and because of the importance of trustee's fees to the beneficiaries' interests, Section 813(b)(4) requires a trustee to provide the qualified beneficiaries with advance notice of any change in the method or rate of the trustee's compensation. Failure to provide such advance notice constitutes a breach of trust, which, if sufficiently serious, would justify the trustee's removal under Section 706.

Under Sections 501-502 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act (1997), one-half of a trustee's regular compensation is charged to income and the other half to principal. Chargeable to principal are fees for acceptance, distribution, or termination of the trust, and fees charged on disbursements made to prepare property for sale.

SECTION 709. REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES.

(a) A trustee is entitled to be reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as appropriate, for:

(1) expenses that were properly incurred in the administration of the trust; and
(2) to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust, expenses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the trust.

(b) An advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust gives rise to a lien against trust property to secure reimbursement with reasonable interest.

Comment

A trustee has the authority to expend trust funds as necessary in the administration of the trust, including expenses incurred in the hiring of agents. *See* Sections 807 (delegation by trustee) and 816(15) (trustee to pay expenses of administration from trust).

Subsection (a)(1) clarifies that a trustee is entitled to reimbursement from the trust for incurring expenses within the trustee's authority. The trustee may also withhold appropriate reimbursement for expenses before making distributions to the beneficiaries. *See* Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 38 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 244 cmt. b (1959). A trustee is ordinarily not entitled to reimbursement for incurring unauthorized expenses. Such expenses are normally the personal responsibility of the trustee.

As provided in subsection (a)(2), a trustee is entitled to reimbursement for unauthorized expenses only if the unauthorized expenditures benefitted the trust. The purpose of this provision, which is derived from Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 245 (1959), is not to ratify the unauthorized conduct of the trustee, but to prevent unjust enrichment of the trust. Given this purpose, a court, on appropriate grounds, may delay or even deny reimbursement for expenses which benefitted the trust. Appropriate grounds include: (1) whether the trustee acted in bad faith in incurring the expense; (2) whether the trustee knew that the expense was inappropriate; (3) whether the trustee reasonably believed the expense was necessary for the preservation of the trust estate; (4) whether the expense has resulted in a benefit; and (5) whether indemnity can be allowed without defeating or impairing the purposes of the trust. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 245 cmt. g (1959).

Subsection (b) implements Section 802(h)(5), which creates an exception to the duty of loyalty for advances by the trustee for the protection of the trust if the transaction is fair to the beneficiaries.

Reimbursement under this section may include attorney's fees and expenses incurred by the trustee in defending an action. However, a trustee is not ordinarily entitled to attorney's fees and expenses if it is determined that the trustee breached the trust. *See* 3A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, *The Law of Trusts* § 245 (4th ed. 1988).

ARTICLE 8

DUTIES AND POWERS OF TRUSTEE

General Comment

This article states the fundamental duties of a trustee and lists the trustee's powers. The duties listed are not new, but how the particular duties are formulated and applied has changed over the years. This article was drafted where possible to conform with the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor Act, which has been enacted in approximately two thirds of the States. The Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee's responsibilities with respect to the management and investment of trust property. The Uniform Trust Code also addresses a trustee's duties with respect to distribution to beneficiaries.

Because of the widespread adoption of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, it was decided not to disassemble and fully integrate the Prudent Investor Act into the Uniform Trust Code. Instead, States enacting the Uniform Trust Code are encouraged to recodify their version of the Prudent Investor Act by reenacting it as Article 9 of this Code rather than leaving it elsewhere in their statutes. Where the Uniform Trust Code and Uniform Prudent Investor Act overlap, States should enact the provisions of this article and not enact the duplicative provisions of the Prudent Investor Act. Sections of this article which overlap with the Prudent Investor Act are Sections 802 (duty of loyalty), 803 (impartiality), 805 (costs of administration), 806 (trustee's skills), and 807 (delegation). For more complete instructions on how to enact the Uniform Prudent Investor Act as part of this Code, see the General Comment to Article 9.

All of the provisions of this article may be overridden in the terms of the trust except for certain aspects of the trustee's duty to keep the beneficiaries informed of administration (*see* Section 105(b)(8)-(9)), and the trustee's fundamental obligation to act in good faith, in accordance with the purposes of the trust, and for the benefit of the beneficiaries (*see* Section 105(b)(2)-(3)).

SECTION 801. DUTY TO ADMINISTER TRUST. Upon acceptance of a trusteeship, the trustee shall administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this [Code].

Comment

This section confirms that a primary duty of a trustee is to follow the terms and purposes of the trust and to do so in good faith. Only if the terms of a trust are silent or for some reason invalid on a particular issue does this Code govern the trustee's duties. This section also confirms that a trustee does not have a duty to act until the trustee has accepted the trusteeship. For the procedure for accepting a trusteeship, see Section 701.

In administering the trust, the trustee must not only comply with this section but also with the other duties specified in this article, particularly the obligation not to place the interests of others above those of the beneficiaries (Section 802), the duty to act with prudence (Section

by which that compensation was determined.

(g) In voting shares of stock or in exercising powers of control over similar interests in other forms of enterprise, the trustee shall act in the best interests of the beneficiaries. If the trust is the sole owner of a corporation or other form of enterprise, the trustee shall elect or appoint directors or other managers who will manage the corporation or enterprise in the best interests of the beneficiaries.

(h) This section does not preclude the following transactions, if fair to the beneficiaries:

- (1) an agreement between a trustee and a beneficiary relating to the appointment or compensation of the trustee;
- (2) payment of reasonable compensation to the trustee;
- (3) a transaction between a trust and another trust, decedent's estate, or [conservatorship] of which the trustee is a fiduciary or in which a beneficiary has an interest;
- (4) a deposit of trust money in a regulated financial-service institution operated by the trustee; or
- (5) an advance by the trustee of money for the protection of the trust.

(i) The court may appoint a special fiduciary to make a decision with respect to any proposed transaction that might violate this section if entered into by the trustee.

Comment

This section addresses the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most fundamental duty of the trustee. Subsection (a) states the general principle, which is copied from Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 170(1) (1959). A trustee owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries, a principle which is sometimes expressed as the obligation of the trustee not to place the trustee's own interests over those of the beneficiaries. Most but not all violations of the duty of loyalty concern transactions involving the trust property, but breaches of the duty can take other forms. For a discussion of the different types of violations, see George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, *The Law of Trusts and Trustees* Section 543 (Rev. 2d ed. 1993); and 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, *The Law of Trusts* Sections 170-170.24 (4th ed. 1987). The "interests of the beneficiaries" to which the trustee must be loyal are the beneficial interests as provided in the

was authorized by the terms of the trust or approved by the court, or if the beneficiary failed to commence a judicial proceeding within the time allowed or chose to ratify the transaction, either prior to or subsequent to its occurrence. In determining whether a beneficiary has consented to a transaction, the principles of representation from Article 3 may be applied.

Subsection (b)(5), which is derived from Section 3-713(1) of the Uniform Probate Code, allows a trustee to implement a contract or pursue a claim that the trustee entered into or acquired before the person became or contemplated becoming trustee. While this subsection allows the transaction to proceed without automatically being voidable by a beneficiary, the transaction is not necessarily free from scrutiny. In implementing the contract or pursuing the claim, the trustee must still complete the transaction in a way that avoids a conflict between the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests. Because avoiding such a conflict will frequently be difficult, the trustee should consider petitioning the court to appoint a special fiduciary, as authorized by subsection (i), to work out the details and complete the transaction.

Subsection (d) creates a presumption that a transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary not involving trust property is an abuse by the trustee of a confidential relationship with the beneficiary. This subsection has limited scope. If the trust has terminated, there must be proof that the trustee's influence with the beneficiary remained. Furthermore, whether or not the trust has terminated, there must be proof that the trustee obtained an advantage from the relationship. The fact the trustee profited is insufficient to show an abuse if a third party would have similarly profited in an arm's length transaction. Subsection (d) is based on Cal. Prob. Code Section 16004(c). *See also* 2A Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher Section 170.25 (4th ed. 1987), which states the same principle in a slightly different form: "Where he deals directly with the beneficiaries, the transaction may stand, but only if the trustee makes full disclosure and takes no advantage of his position and the transaction is in all respects fair and reasonable."

Subsection (e), which allows a beneficiary to void a transaction entered into by the trustee that involved an opportunity belonging to the trust, is based on Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 170 cmt. k (1959). While normally associated with corporations and with their directors and officers, what is usually referred to as the corporate opportunity doctrine also applies to other types of fiduciary. The doctrine prohibits the trustee's pursuit of certain business activities, such as entering into a business in direct competition with a business owned by the trust, or the purchasing of an investment that the facts suggest the trustee was expected to purchase for the trust. For discussion of the corporate opportunity doctrine, see Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., *Corporate Opportunity and Comparative Advantage*, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 211 (1999); and Richard A. Epstein, *Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Opportunity*, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 5 (1996). *See also* Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations Section 5.05 (American Law Inst. 1994).

Subsection (f) creates an exception to the no further inquiry rule for trustee investment in mutual funds. This exception applies even though the mutual fund company pays the financial-service institution trustee a fee for providing investment advice and other services, such as custody, transfer agent, and distribution, that would otherwise be provided by agents of the fund. Mutual funds offer several advantages for fiduciary investing. By comparison with common trust funds, mutual fund shares may be distributed in-kind when trust interests terminate, avoiding

liquidation and the associated recognition of gain for tax purposes. Mutual funds commonly offer daily pricing, which gives trustees and beneficiaries better information about performance. Because mutual funds can combine fiduciary and nonfiduciary accounts, they can achieve larger size, which can enhance diversification and produce economies of scale that can lower investment costs.

Mutual fund investment also has a number of potential disadvantages. It adds another layer of expense to the trust, and it causes the trustee to lose control over the nature and timing of transactions in the fund. Trustee investment in mutual funds sponsored by the trustee, its affiliate, or from which the trustee receives extra fees has given rise to litigation implicating the trustee's duty of loyalty, the duty to invest with prudence, and the right to receive only reasonable compensation. Because financial institution trustees ordinarily provide advisory services to and receive compensation from the very funds in which they invest trust assets, the contention is made that investing the assets of individual trusts in these funds is imprudent and motivated by the effort to generate additional fee income. Because the financial institution trustee often will also charge its regular fee for administering the trust, the contention is made that the financial institution trustee's total compensation, both direct and indirect, is excessive.

Subsection (f) attempts to retain the advantages of mutual funds while at the same time making clear that such investments are subject to traditional fiduciary responsibilities. Nearly all of the States have enacted statutes authorizing trustees to invest in funds from which the trustee might derive additional compensation. Portions of subsection (f) are based on these statutes. Subsection (f) makes clear that such dual investment-fee arrangements are not automatically presumed to involve a conflict between the trustee's personal and fiduciary interests, but subsection (f) does not otherwise waive or lessen a trustee's fiduciary obligations. The trustee, in deciding whether to invest in a mutual fund, must not place its own interests ahead of those of the beneficiaries. The investment decision must also comply with the enacting jurisdiction's prudent investor rule. To obtain the protection afforded by subsection (f), the trustee must disclose at least annually to the beneficiaries entitled to receive a copy of the trustee's annual report the rate and method by which the additional compensation was determined. Furthermore, the selection of a mutual fund, and the resulting delegation of certain of the trustee's functions, may be taken into account under Section 708 in setting the trustee's regular compensation. *See also* Uniform Prudent Investor Act Sections 7 and 9 and Comments; Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule Section 227 cmt. m (1992).

Subsection (f) applies whether the services to the fund are provided directly by the trustee or by an affiliate. While the term "affiliate" is not used in subsection (c), the individuals and entities listed there are examples of affiliates. The term is also used in the regulations under ERISA. An "affiliate" of a fiduciary includes (1) any person who directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the fiduciary; (2) any officer, director, partner, employee, or relative of the fiduciary, and any corporation or partnership of which the fiduciary is an officer, director or partner. *See* 29 C.F.R. Section 2510.3-21(e).

Subsection (g) addresses an overlap between trust and corporate law. It is based on Restatement of Trusts (Second) Section 193 cmt. a (1959), which provides that "[i]t is the duty

of the trustee in voting shares of stock to use proper care to promote the interest of the beneficiary,” and that the fiduciary responsibility of a trustee in voting a control block “is heavier than where he holds only a small fraction of the shares.” Similarly, the Department of Labor construes ERISA’s duty of loyalty to make share voting a fiduciary function. *See* 29 C.F.R. Section 2509.94-2. When the trust owns the entirety of the shares of a corporation, the corporate assets are in effect trust assets that the trustee determines to hold in corporate form. The trustee may not use the corporate form to escape the fiduciary duties of trust law. Thus, for example, a trustee whose duty of impartiality would require the trustee to make current distributions for the support of current beneficiaries may not evade that duty by holding assets in corporate form and pleading the discretion of corporate directors to determine dividend policy. Rather, the trustee must vote for corporate directors who will follow a dividend policy consistent with the trustee’s trust-law duty of impartiality.

Subsection (h) contains several exceptions to the general duty of loyalty, which apply if the transaction was fair to the beneficiaries. Subsection (h)(1)-(2) clarify that a trustee is free to contract about the terms of appointment and rate of compensation. Consistent with Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 170 cmt. r (1959), subsection (h)(3) authorizes a trustee to engage in a transaction involving another trust of which the trustee is also trustee, a transaction with a decedent’s estate or a conservatorship estate of which the trustee is personal representative or conservator, or a transaction with another trust or other fiduciary relationship in which a beneficiary of the trust has an interest. The authority of a trustee to deposit funds in a financial institution operated by the trustee, as provided in subsection (h)(4), is recognized as an exception to the duty of loyalty in a number of state statutes although deemed to be a breach of trust in Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 170 cmt. m (1959). The power to deposit funds in its own institution does not negate the trustee’s responsibility to invest prudently, including the obligation to earn a reasonable rate of interest on deposits. Subsection (h)(5) authorizes a trustee to advance money for the protection of the trust. Such advances usually are of small amounts and are made in emergencies or as a matter of convenience. Pursuant to Section 709(b), the trustee has a lien against the trust property for any advances made.

2003 Amendment. The amendment revises subsection (f) to clarify that compensation received from a mutual fund for providing services to the fund is in addition to the trustee’s regular compensation. It also clarifies that the trustee obligation to notify certain of the beneficiaries of compensation received from the fund applies only to compensation received for providing investment management or advisory services. The amendment conforms subsection (f) to the drafters’ original intent.

Subsection (f) formerly provided:

(f) An investment by a trustee in securities of an investment company or investment trust to which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than as trustee is not presumed to be affected by a conflict between personal and fiduciary interests if the investment complies with the prudent investor rule of [Article] 9. The trustee may be compensated by the investment company or investment trust for providing those services out of fees charged to the trust if the trustee at least annually notifies the persons entitled under Section

813 to receive a copy of the trustee's annual report of the rate and method by which the compensation was determined.

2004 Amendment. Section 802(f) creates an exception to the prohibition on self-dealing for certain investments in mutual funds in which the trustee, or its affiliate, provides services in a capacity other than that as trustee. As originally drafted, Section 802(f) provided that the exception applied only if the investment complied with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the trustee notified the qualified beneficiaries of the additional compensation received for providing the services. However, the Uniform Prudent Investor Act itself contains its own duty of loyalty provision (Section 5), thereby arguably limiting or undoing this exception to the UTC's loyalty provision. The amendment, by providing that the investment does not violate the duty of loyalty under the UTC if it "otherwise" complies with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, is intended to negate the implication that the investment must also comply with the Uniform Prudent Investor Act's own duty of loyalty provision.

SECTION 803. IMPARTIALITY. If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing, managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries' respective interests.

Comment

The duty of impartiality is an important aspect of the duty of loyalty. This section is identical to Section 6 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, except that this section also applies to all aspects of trust administration and to decisions by a trustee with respect to distributions. The Prudent Investor Act is limited to duties with respect to the investment and management of trust property. The differing beneficial interests for which the trustee must act impartially include those of the current beneficiaries versus those of beneficiaries holding interests in the remainder; and among those currently eligible to receive distributions. In fulfilling the duty to act impartially, the trustee should be particularly sensitive to allocation of receipts and disbursements between income and principal and should consider, in an appropriate case, a reallocation of income to the principal account and vice versa, if allowable under local law. For an example of such authority, see Uniform Principal and Income Act § 104 (1997).

The duty to act impartially does not mean that the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equally. Rather, the trustee must treat the beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes and terms of the trust. A settlor who prefers that the trustee, when making decisions, generally favor the interests of one beneficiary over those of others should provide appropriate guidance in the terms of the trust. *See* Restatement (Second) of § 183 cmt. a (1959).

SECTION 804. PRUDENT ADMINISTRATION. A trustee shall administer the trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable

care, skill, and caution.

Comment

The duty to administer a trust with prudence is a fundamental duty of the trustee. This duty does not depend on whether the trustee receives compensation. The duty may be altered by the terms of the trust. *See* Section 105. This section is similar to Section 2(a) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227 (1992).

The language of this section diverges from the language of the previous Restatement. The prior Restatement can be read as applying the same standard – “man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property” – regardless of the type or purposes of the trust. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 cmt. a (1959). This section appropriately bases the standard on the purposes and other circumstances of the particular trust.

A settlor who wishes to modify the standard of care specified in this section is free to do so, but there is a limit. Section 1008 prohibits a settlor from exculpating a trustee from liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the trust or to the interests of the beneficiaries.

SECTION 805. COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION. In administering a trust, the trustee may incur only costs that are reasonable in relation to the trust property, the purposes of the trust, and the skills of the trustee.

Comment

This section is similar to Section 7 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act and is consistent with the rules concerning costs in Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule § 227(c)(3) (1992). For related rules concerning compensation and reimbursement of trustees, see Sections 708 and 709. The duty not to incur unreasonable costs applies when a trustee decides whether and how to delegate to agents, as well as to other aspects of trust administration. In deciding whether and how to delegate, the trustee must be alert to balancing projected benefits against the likely costs. To protect the beneficiary against excessive costs, the trustee should also be alert to adjusting compensation for functions which the trustee has delegated to others. The obligation to incur only necessary or appropriate costs of administration has long been part of the law of trusts. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 188 (1959).

SECTION 806. TRUSTEE’S SKILLS. A trustee who has special skills or expertise, or is named trustee in reliance upon the trustee’s representation that the trustee has special skills or expertise, shall use those special skills or expertise.

Comment

This section is similar to Section 7-302 of the Uniform Probate Code, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 (1959), and Section 2(f) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.

SECTION 807. DELEGATION BY TRUSTEE.

(a) A trustee may delegate duties and powers that a prudent trustee of comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances. The trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in:

(1) selecting an agent;

(2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the trust; and

(3) periodically reviewing the agent's actions in order to monitor the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation.

(b) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the trust to exercise reasonable care to comply with the terms of the delegation.

(c) A trustee who complies with subsection (a) is not liable to the beneficiaries or to the trust for an action of the agent to whom the function was delegated.

(d) By accepting a delegation of powers or duties from the trustee of a trust that is subject to the law of this State, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State.

Comment

This section permits trustees to delegate various aspects of trust administration to agents, subject to the standards of the section. The language is derived from Section 9 of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. *See also* John H. Langbein, *Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment Law*, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 105 (1994) (discussing prior law).

This section encourages and protects the trustee in making delegations appropriate to the facts and circumstances of the particular trust. Whether a particular function is delegable is based on whether it is a function that a prudent trustee might delegate under similar circumstances. For example, delegating some administrative and reporting duties might be prudent for a family trustee but unnecessary for a corporate trustee.

This section applies only to delegation to agents, not to delegation to a cotrustee. For the provision regulating delegation to a cotrustee, see Section 703(e).

SECTION 808. [RESERVED]

Legislative Note: A state that has enacted the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA) should repeal Section 808 and revise certain other provisions of the UTC as indicated in the legislative notes to the UDTA.

2018 Amendment. Former UTC Section 808 was largely superseded by the Uniform Directed Trust Act (UDTA) in 2017. The UDTA addresses the subject of trust directors and directed trustees more comprehensively. Former subsection (a), addressing directions from the settlor of a revocable trust to the trustee, was revised for clarity and relocated to UTC Section 603 with other rules governing revocable trusts. Former subsections (b)-(d) were deleted.

Former UTC Section 808 provided as follows:

- (a) While a trust is revocable, the trustee may follow a direction of the settlor that is contrary to the terms of the trust.
- (b) If the terms of a trust confer upon a person other than the settlor of a revocable trust power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in accordance with an exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes to the beneficiaries of the trust.
- (c) The terms of a trust may confer upon a trustee or other person a power to direct the modification or termination of the trust.
- (d) A person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to direct is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The holder of a power to direct is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty.

SECTION 809. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF TRUST PROPERTY. A

trustee shall take reasonable steps to take control of and protect the trust property.

Comment

This section codifies the substance of Sections 175 and 176 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). The duty to take control of and safeguard trust property is an aspect of the trustee's duty of prudent administration as provided in Section 804. *See also* Sections 816(1) (power to collect trust property), 816(11) (power to insure trust property), and 816(12) (power to abandon trust property). The duty to take control normally means that the trustee must take

physical possession of tangible personal property and securities belonging to the trust, and must secure payment of any choses in action. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 175 cmt. a, c and d (1959). This section, like the other sections in this article, is subject to alteration by the terms of the trust. *See* Section 105. For example, the settlor may provide that the spouse may occupy the settlor's former residence rent free, in which event the spouse's occupancy would prevent the trustee from taking possession.

SECTION 810. RECORDKEEPING AND IDENTIFICATION OF TRUST

PROPERTY.

(a) A trustee shall keep adequate records of the administration of the trust.

(b) A trustee shall keep trust property separate from the trustee's own property.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a trustee shall cause the trust property to be designated so that the interest of the trust, to the extent feasible, appears in records maintained by a party other than a trustee or beneficiary.

(d) If the trustee maintains records clearly indicating the respective interests, a trustee may invest as a whole the property of two or more separate trusts.

Comment

The duty to keep adequate records stated in subsection (a) is implicit in the duty to act with prudence (Section 804) and the duty to report to beneficiaries (Section 813). For an application, see *Green v. Lombard*, 343 A. 2d 905, 911 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). *See also* Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 172, 174 (1959).

The duty to earmark trust assets and the duty of a trustee not to mingle the assets of the trust with the trustee's own are closely related. Subsection (b), which addresses the duty not to mingle, is derived from Section 179 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). Subsection (c) makes the requirement that assets be earmarked more precise than that articulated in Restatement (Second) § 179 by requiring that the interest of the trust must appear in the records of a third party, such as a bank, brokerage firm, or transfer agent. Because of the serious risk of mistake or misappropriation even if disclosure is made to the beneficiaries, showing the interest of the trust solely in the trustee's own internal records is insufficient. Section 816(7)(B), which allows a trustee to hold securities in nominee form, is not inconsistent with this requirement. While securities held in nominee form are not specifically registered in the name of the trustee, they are properly earmarked because the trustee's holdings are indicated in the records maintained by an independent party, such as in an account at a brokerage firm.

Earmarking is not practical for all types of assets. With respect to assets not subject to

registration, such as tangible personal property and bearer bonds, arranging for the trust's ownership interest to be reflected on the records of a third-party custodian would not be feasible. For this reason, subsection (c) waives separate recordkeeping for these types of assets. Under subsection (b), however, the duty of the trustee not to mingle these or any other trust assets with the trustee's own remains absolute.

Subsection (d), following the lead of a number of state statutes, allows a trustee to use the property of two or more trusts to make joint investments, even though under traditional principles a joint investment would violate the duty to earmark. A joint investment frequently is more economical than attempting to invest the funds of each trust separately. Also, the risk of misappropriation or mistake is less when the trust property is invested jointly with the property of another trust than when pooled with the property of the trustee or other person.

SECTION 811. ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OF CLAIMS. A trustee shall take reasonable steps to enforce claims of the trust and to defend claims against the trust.

Comment

This section codifies the substance of Sections 177 and 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959). It may not be reasonable to enforce a claim depending upon the likelihood of recovery and the cost of suit and enforcement. It might also be reasonable to settle an action or suffer a default rather than to defend an action. *See also* Section 816(14) (power to pay, contest, settle, or release claims).

SECTION 812. COLLECTING TRUST PROPERTY. A trustee shall take reasonable steps to compel a former trustee or other person to deliver trust property to the trustee, and to redress a breach of trust known to the trustee to have been committed by a former trustee.

Comment

This section is a specific application of Section 811 on the duty to enforce claims, which includes a claim for trust property held by a former trustee or others, and a claim against a predecessor trustee for breach of trust. The duty imposed by this section is not absolute. Pursuit of a claim is not required if the amount of the claim, costs of suit and enforcement, and likelihood of recovery, make such action uneconomic. Unlike Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 223 (1959), this section only requires a successor trustee to redress breaches of trust "known" to have been committed by the predecessor. For the definition of "know," see Section 104. Limiting the successor's obligation to known breaches is a common feature of state trust statutes. *See, e.g.,* Mo. Rev. Stat. § 456.187.2.

As authorized by Section 1009, the beneficiaries may relieve the trustee from potential

liability for failing to pursue a claim against a predecessor trustee or other person holding trust property. The obligation to pursue a predecessor trustee can also be addressed in the terms of the trust. *See* Section 105.

SECTION 813. DUTY TO INFORM AND REPORT.

(a) A trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect their interests. Unless unreasonable under the circumstances, a trustee shall promptly respond to a beneficiary's request for information related to the administration of the trust.

(b) A trustee:

(1) upon request of a beneficiary, shall promptly furnish to the beneficiary a copy of the trust instrument;

(2) within 60 days after accepting a trusteeship, shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of the acceptance and of the trustee's name, address, and telephone number;

(3) within 60 days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of the creation of an irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowledge that a formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable, whether by the death of the settlor or otherwise, shall notify the qualified beneficiaries of the trust's existence, of the identity of the settlor or settlors, of the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to a trustee's report as provided in subsection (c); and

(4) shall notify the qualified beneficiaries in advance of any change in the method or rate of the trustee's compensation.

(c) A trustee shall send to the distributees or permissible distributees of trust income or principal, and to other qualified or nonqualified beneficiaries who request it, at least annually and at the termination of the trust, a report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and

disbursements, including the source and amount of the trustee's compensation, a listing of the trust assets and, if feasible, their respective market values. Upon a vacancy in a trusteeship, unless a cotrustee remains in office, a report must be sent to the qualified beneficiaries by the former trustee. A personal representative, [conservator], or [guardian] may send the qualified beneficiaries a report on behalf of a deceased or incapacitated trustee.

(d) A beneficiary may waive the right to a trustee's report or other information otherwise required to be furnished under this section. A beneficiary, with respect to future reports and other information, may withdraw a waiver previously given.

(e) Subsections (b)(2) and (3) do not apply to a trustee who accepts a trusteeship before [the effective date of this [Code]], to an irrevocable trust created before [the effective date of this [Code]], or to a revocable trust that becomes irrevocable before [the effective date of this [Code]].

Comment

The duty to keep the beneficiaries reasonably informed of the administration of the trust is a fundamental duty of a trustee. This duty, which is stated in subsection (a), is derived from Section 7-303(a) of the Uniform Probate Code, which was approved in 1969 and which has been enacted in about a third of the states. This provision of the UPC has also been enacted in states that have not otherwise enacted the Uniform Probate Code. *See, e.g.,* Cal. Prob. Code. Sections 16060-16061. Unlike the cited provision of the UPC, subsection (a) of this section limits the duty to keep the beneficiaries informed to the qualified beneficiaries. For the definition of qualified beneficiary, see Section 103(13). The result of this limitation is that the information need not be furnished to beneficiaries with remote remainder interests unless they have made a request to the trustee.

For the extent to which a settlor may waive the requirements of this section in the terms of the trust, see Section 105(b)(8)-(9).

Subsection (a) requires that the trustee keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect their interests. This may include a duty to communicate to a qualified beneficiary information about the administration of the trust that is reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary's rights and to prevent or redress a breach of trust. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 173 cmt. c (1959). With respect to the

permissible distributees, the duty articulated in subsection (a) would ordinarily be satisfied by providing the beneficiary with a copy of the annual report mandated by subsection (c). Otherwise, the trustee is not ordinarily under a duty to furnish information to a beneficiary in the absence of a specific request for the information. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 173 cmt. d (1959). However, special circumstances may require that the trustee take affirmative steps to provide additional information. For example, if the trustee is dealing with the beneficiary on the trustee's own account, the trustee must communicate material facts relating to the transaction that the trustee knows or should know. *See* Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 173 cmt. d (1959). Furthermore, to enable the beneficiaries to take action to protect their interests, the trustee may be required to provide advance notice of transactions involving real estate, closely-held business interests, and other assets that are difficult to value or to replace. *See In re Green Charitable Trust*, 431 N.W. 2d 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); *Allard v. Pacific National Bank*, 663 P.2d 104 (Wash. 1983). The trustee is justified in not providing such advance disclosure if disclosure is forbidden by other law, as under federal securities laws, or if disclosure would be seriously detrimental to the interests of the beneficiaries, for example, when disclosure would cause the loss of the only serious buyer.

Subsection (a) also requires that the trustee promptly respond to the request of any beneficiary, whether qualified or not, for information related to the administration of the trust. Performance is excused only if compliance is unreasonable under the circumstances. Within the bounds of the reasonableness limit, this provision allows the beneficiary to determine what information is relevant to protect the beneficiary's interest. Should a beneficiary so request, subsection (b)(1) also requires the trustee to furnish the beneficiary with a complete copy of the trust instrument and not merely with those portions the trustee deems relevant to the beneficiary's interest. For a case reaching the same result, *see Fletcher v. Fletcher*, 480 S.E. 2d 488 (Va. Ct. App. 1997). Subsection (b)(1) is more expansive Section 7-303(b) of the Uniform Probate Code, which provides that "[u]pon reasonable request, the trustee shall provide the beneficiary with a copy of the terms of the trust which describe or affect his interest. . . ."

The drafters of this Code decided to leave open for further consideration by the courts the extent to which a trustee may claim attorney-client privilege against a beneficiary seeking discovery of attorney-client communications between the trustee and the trustee's attorney. The courts are split because of the important values that are in tension on this question. "The [attorney-client] privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client." *Upjohn Co. v. United States*, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). On the other hand, subsection (a) of this section requires that a trustee keep the qualified beneficiaries reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to protect their interests, which could include facts that the trustee has revealed only to the trustee's attorney. There is authority for the view that the trustee is estopped from pleading attorney-client privilege in such circumstances. In the leading case, *Riggs National Bank v. Zimmer*, 355 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. Ch. 1976), the court reasoned that the beneficiary, not the trustee, is the attorney's client: "As a representative for the beneficiaries of the trust which he is administering, the trustee is not the real client . . ." This beneficiary-as-client theory has been criticized on the ground that it conflicts with the trustee's fiduciary duty to implement the intentions of the settlor, which are sometimes in tension with the wishes of one or more beneficiaries. *See* Louis H. Hamel, Jr.,

Trustee's Privileged Counsel: A Rebuttal, 21 ACTEC Notes 156 (1995); Charles F. Gibbs & Cindy D. Hanson, *The Fiduciary Exception to a Trustee's Attorney/Client Privilege*, 21 ACTEC Notes 236 (1995). Prominent decisions in California and Texas have refused to follow Delaware in recognizing an exception for the beneficiary against the trustee's attorney-client privilege. *Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (Boltwood)*, 990 P.2d 591 (Cal. 2000); *Huie v. De Shazo*, 922 S.W. 2d 920 (Tex. 1996). The beneficiary-as-client theory continues to be applied to ERISA trusts. See, e.g., *United States v. Mett*, 178 F.3d 1058, 1062-64 (9th Cir. 1999). However, in a pension trust the beneficiaries are the settlors of their own trust because the trust is funded with their own earnings. Accordingly, in ERISA attorney-client cases "[t]here are no competing interests such as other stockholders or the intentions of the Settlor." Gibbs & Hanson, 21 ACTEC Notes at 238. For further discussion of the attorney-client privilege and whether there is a duty to disclose to the beneficiaries, see ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Commentary on MRPC 1.2 (3d ed. 1999); Rust E. Reid et al., *Privilege and Confidentiality Issues When a Lawyer Represents a Fiduciary*, 30 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 541 (1996).

To enable beneficiaries to protect their interests effectively, it is essential that they know the identity of the trustee. Subsection (b)(2) requires that a trustee inform the qualified beneficiaries within 60 days of the trustee's acceptance of office and of the trustee's name, address and telephone number. Similar to the obligation imposed on a personal representative following admission of the will to probate, subsection (b)(3) requires the trustee of a revocable trust to inform the qualified beneficiaries of the trust's existence within 60 days after the settlor's death. These two duties can overlap. If the death of the settlor happens also to be the occasion for the appointment of a successor trustee, the new trustee of the formerly revocable trust would need to inform the qualified beneficiaries both of the trustee's acceptance and of the trust's existence.

Subsection (b)(4) deals with the sensitive issue of changes, usually increases, in trustee compensation. Changes can include changes in a periodic base fee, rate of percentage compensation, hourly rate, termination fee, or transaction charge. Regarding the standard for setting trustee compensation, see Section 708 and Comment.

Subsection (c) requires the trustee to furnish the current beneficiaries and other beneficiaries who request it with a copy of a trustee's report at least annually and upon termination of the trust. Unless a cotrustee remains in office, the former trustee also must provide a report to all of the qualified beneficiaries upon the trustee's resignation or removal. If the vacancy occurred because of the former trustee's death or adjudication of incapacity, a report may, but need not be provided by the former trustee's personal representative, conservator, or guardian.

The Uniform Trust Code employs the term "report" instead of "accounting" in order to negate any inference that the report must be prepared in any particular format or with a high degree of formality. The reporting requirement might even be satisfied by providing the beneficiaries with copies of the trust's income tax returns and monthly brokerage account statements if the information on those returns and statements is complete and sufficiently clear. The key factor is not the format chosen but whether the report provides the beneficiaries with the

information necessary to protect their interests. For model account forms, together with practical advice on how to prepare reports, see Robert Whitman, *Fiduciary Accounting Guide* (2d ed. 1998).

Subsection (d) allows trustee reports and other required information to be waived by a beneficiary. A beneficiary may also withdraw a consent. However, a waiver of a trustee's report or other information does not relieve the trustee from accountability and potential liability for matters that the report or other information would have disclosed.

Subsection (e), which was added to the Code in 2004, is discussed in 2004 Amendment below.

2004 Amendment. Subsection (b)(2) and (b)(3) require that certain notices be sent by the trustee to the qualified beneficiaries within 60 days of the trustee's acceptance of office, or within 60 days after the creation of an irrevocable trust or the date a revocable trust becomes irrevocable. Subsection (e) is added to make clear the drafting committee's intent that these requirements are not to be retroactively applied to trustee acceptances of office occurring prior to the effective date of the Code and to trusts which have become irrevocable prior to the effective date.

SECTION 814. DISCRETIONARY POWERS; TAX SAVINGS.

(a) Notwithstanding the breadth of discretion granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as "absolute", "sole", or "uncontrolled", the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.

(b) Subject to subsection (d), and unless the terms of the trust expressly indicate that a rule in this subsection does not apply:

(1) a person other than a settlor who is a beneficiary and trustee of a trust that confers on the trustee a power to make discretionary distributions to or for the trustee's personal benefit may exercise the power only in accordance with an ascertainable standard; and

(2) a trustee may not exercise a power to make discretionary distributions to satisfy a legal obligation of support that the trustee personally owes another person.

(c) A power whose exercise is limited or prohibited by subsection (b) may be exercised

by a majority of the remaining trustees whose exercise of the power is not so limited or prohibited. If the power of all trustees is so limited or prohibited, the court may appoint a special fiduciary with authority to exercise the power.

(d) Subsection (b) does not apply to:

(1) a power held by the settlor's spouse who is the trustee of a trust for which a marital deduction, as defined in Section 2056(b)(5) or 2523(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code]] [, or as later amended], was previously allowed;

(2) any trust during any period that the trust may be revoked or amended by its settlor; or

(3) a trust if contributions to the trust qualify for the annual exclusion under Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on [the effective date of this [Code]] [, or as later amended].

Comment

Despite the breadth of discretion purportedly granted by the wording of a trust, no grant of discretion to a trustee, whether with respect to management or distribution, is ever absolute. A grant of discretion establishes a range within which the trustee may act. The greater the grant of discretion, the broader the range. Pursuant to subsection (a), a trustee's exercise of discretion must be in good faith. Consistent with the trustee's duty to administer the trust (*see* Section 801), the trustee's exercise must also be in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. "Interests of the beneficiaries" means the beneficial interests provided in the terms of the trust. *See* Section 103(8). Subsection (a) does not otherwise address the obligations of a trustee to make distributions, leaving that issue to the caselaw. Regarding the standards for exercising discretion and construing particular language of discretion, with numerous case citations, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 50 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959). *See also* Edward C. Halbach, Jr., *Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts*, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1425 (1961). Under these standards, whether the trustee has a duty in a given situation to make a distribution depends on the exact language used, whether the standard grants discretion and its breadth, whether this discretion is coupled with a standard, whether the beneficiary has other available resources, and, more broadly, the overriding purposes of the trust. For example, distilling the

results of scores of cases, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts concludes that there is a presumption that the “trustee’s discretion should be exercised in a manner that will avoid either disqualifying the beneficiary for other benefits or expending trust funds for purposes for which public funds would otherwise be available.” Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 50 cmt. e & Reporter’s Notes (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1999).

Subsection (a) requires a trustee exercise a discretionary power in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. Similar to Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 (1959), subsection (a) does not impose an obligation that a trustee’s decision be within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, although such an interpretive standard may be imposed by the courts if the document adds a standard whereby the reasonableness of the trustee’s judgment can be tested. Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 187 cmt. f (1959).

The obligation of a trustee to act in good faith is a fundamental concept of fiduciary law although there are different ways that it can be expressed. Sometimes different formulations appear in the same source. Scott, in his treatise on trusts, states that the court *will not* interfere with the trustee’s exercise of discretion if the trustee “acts in good faith and does not act capriciously,” but Scott then states that the trustee *will* interfere if the trustee “acts dishonestly or in bad faith, or where he acts from an improper motive.” 3 Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, *The Law of Trusts* Section 187.2 (4th ed. 1988).

Sometimes different formulations are used in the same case:

[If] the “sole discretion” vested in and exercised by the trustees in this case . . . were exercised fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of discretion, it is subject to . . . review. Whether good faith has been exercised, or whether fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion has been committed is always subject to consideration by the court upon appropriate allegations and proof.

In re Ferrall’s Estate, 258 P.2d 1009 (Cal. 1953).

An abuse by the trustee of the discretion granted in the terms of the trust is a breach of trust that can result in surcharge. *See* Section 1001(b) (remedies for breach of trust). The standard stated in subsection (a) applies only to powers which are to be exercised in a fiduciary as opposed to a nonfiduciary capacity.

Subsections (b) through (d) rewrite the terms of a trust that might otherwise result in adverse estate and gift tax consequences to a beneficiary-trustee. This Code does not generally address the subject of tax curative provisions. These are provisions that automatically rewrite the terms of trusts that might otherwise fail to qualify for probable intended tax benefits. Such provisions, because they apply to all trusts using or failing to use specified language, are often overbroad, applying not only to trusts intended to qualify for tax benefits but also to smaller trust situations where taxes are not a concern. Enacting tax-curative provisions also requires special diligence by state legislatures to make certain that these provisions are periodically amended to account for the frequent changes in federal tax law. Furthermore, many failures to draft with

