No. 19-4036

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

W. CLARK APOSHIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM BARR, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of Utah, No. 2:19-cv-00037-JNP
Honorable Jill N. Parrish

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE DUE PROCESS INSTITUTE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT AND URGING REVERSAL

John D. Cline
LAW OFFICE OF JOHN D. CLINE
One Embarcadero Center, Suite 500
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 662-2260

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
DUE PROCESS INSTITUTE

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Amicus curiae Due Process Institute submits the following corporate disclosure statement, as required by Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 29(c): Due Process Institute is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia. It has no parent corporation, and no publicly held corporation owns ten percent or more of its stock.

DATED: June 19, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John D. Cline
John D. Cline

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Due Process Institute

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, AND RULES

OTHER AUTHORITIES

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Due Process Institute is a nonprofit, bipartisan, public interest organization that works to honor, preserve, and restore procedural fairness in the criminal justice system. We believe that the rule of lenity--"the most venerable and venerated of interpretive principles," *Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.*, 736 F.3d 722, 731 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring)--should take precedence over conflicting canons of construction for statutes with criminal application, given the risk to life and liberty.[1]

All parties have consented to the filing of this amicus brief.

ARGUMENT

Lurking just below the surface of this case is an important and unresolved question: when *Chevron* deference and the rule of lenity conflict in the interpretation of an ambiguous statute with both criminal and civil applications, which should prevail?[2] For the reasons that follow, amicus contends that in all such instances, the

---

[1] Counsel for amicus state that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party's counsel contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and no person other than amicus, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.

[2] The question lurks below the surface because the government has taken an equivocal position on the application of *Chevron* deference, *compare* Appellant's Appendix at A92 (government argues that BATFE interpretation is "reasonable") *with id*. at A103 (government notes that agencies are not "ordinarily entitled to deference" in interpreting criminal statutes), and the district court disclaimed reliance on *Chevron*, *id*. at A133 n.8. Under somewhat similar circumstances

statute should be construed in accordance with the rule of lenity. That is the only approach that preserves the separation of powers and ensures fair warning to criminal defendants.

I. THE RULE OF LENITY AND *CHEVRON* DEFERENCE.

As Chief Justice Marshall observed, the rule of lenity "is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment." *United States v. Wiltberger*, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). Under the rule of lenity, "when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, [the Court is] to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language." *McNally v. United States*, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987); *see, e.g., Yates v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion); *Skilling v. United States*, 561 U.S. 358, 410-11 (2010); *Scheidler v. NOW*, 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003). Although it may not be constitutionally mandated, the rule of lenity is "rooted in a

---

involving the same statute at issue here, a D.C. Circuit panel majority embraced *Chevron* deference and rejected the rule of lenity, over a vigorous dissent. *See Guedes v. BATFE*, 920 F.3d 1, 17-28 (D.C. Cir. 2019); *id*. at 35-42 (Henderson, J., dissenting in part).

constitutional principle." Cass R. Sunstein, *Nondelegation Canons*, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 332 (2000).

Chevron deference has a far shorter pedigree. In *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Supreme Court declared that

> the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.

Id. at 140. *Skidmore*, in other words, instructed courts to *consider* agency "interpretations" and to give them such weight as their persuasiveness suggested. But *Skidmore* did not require courts to *adopt* those interpretations; courts remained free to construe statutes as they thought best.

Forty years later, the Supreme Court made deference to agency interpretations of statutes mandatory under some circumstances. In *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC*, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Court held that where Congress has empowered an agency to interpret a statute, courts must defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. *See id*. at 844-45. Although *Chevron* deference has always been controversial,[3] it remains the law.

[3] *See, e.g.,* Paul J. Larkin, Jr., *Chevron and Federal Criminal Law*, 32 J.L. & Politics 211, 218-19 & n.33 (2017) (citing articles critical of *Chevron*); *Gutierrez-*

What happens when the rule of lenity and *Chevron* deference conflict? In other words, when an ambiguous statute has criminal application and an agency has formally adopted a broad (and reasonable) interpretation, must a court defer to that interpretation, or must it instead construe the statute strictly, as the rule of lenity requires?

The law is settled that a court must apply the rule of lenity, rather than *Chevron* deference, when interpreting a purely criminal statute. As the Supreme Court declared, "criminal laws are for courts, not for the Government, to construe." *Abramski v. United States*, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014); *see, e.g., United States v. Apel*, 571 U.S. 359, 369 (2014) ("[W]e have never held that the Government's reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.").

But the Court's decisions are less clear when a statute has both civil and criminal applications.[4] In *United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.*, 504 U.S. 505 (1992), a civil tax case, the Court interpreted the phrase "making" a "firearm" in the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5821. Because the statute had both civil and criminal applications, the plurality invoked the rule of lenity, construed the statute narrowly, and found that the defendant had not "made" a firearm and therefore was

---

Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-58 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (criticizing *Chevron* primarily on separation of powers grounds).

[4] Courts agree that a particular statutory term must be given the same meaning in both civil and criminal contexts. *See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez*, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005); *Leocal v. Ashcroft*, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).

not subject to tax. *See id*. at 517-18. The plurality gave no deference to the BATF's conclusion that the defendant's conduct--packaging an unregulated pistol with a kit allowing its conversion into a regulated "firearm"--amounted to "making" a "firearm." The plurality rejected Justice Stevens' contention in dissent that the rule of lenity should not apply in a civil setting and that "the Court should approach this case like any other civil case testing the Government's interpretation of an important regulatory statute." *Id*. at 526 (Stevens, J., dissenting); *see id*. at 518 n.10 (plurality responds to Justice Stevens' dissent).

Thompson/Center stands for the proposition that the rule of lenity prevails over an agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute with both civil and criminal applications. In *Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter*, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), however, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Stevens) clouded the picture. *Babbitt* involved interpretation of the terms "take" and "harm" in the Endangered Species Act. The Department of Interior adopted a broad interpretation of those terms, which a group of small landowners and logging companies challenged. The challengers invoked the rule of lenity, because the Endangered Species Act has both civil and criminal applications. The Court rejected this argument in a footnote. It declared:

> We have applied the rule of lenity in a case raising a narrow question concerning the application of a statute that contains criminal sanctions to a specific factual dispute--whether pistols with short barrels and attachable shoulder stocks are short-barreled rifles--where no regulation was present. See [*Thompson/Center Arms Co.*]. We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for

> reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement. Even if there exist regulations whose interpretations of statutory criminal penalties provide such inadequate notice of potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity, the "harm" regulation, which has existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its consequences, cannot be one of them.

Id. at 704 n.18. Instead of the rule of lenity, the Court applied *Chevron* deference and upheld the regulation interpreting the statute. *See id*. at 708.[5]

Nine years later, in an immigration case, the Court found the rule of lenity applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 16 (defining "crime of violence"), because the statute has criminal as well as civil applications. *See Leocal v. Ashcroft*, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (citing *Thompson/Center Arms*). The Court gave no deference to the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals, and it did not cite *Babbitt*.

In the wake of *Thompson/Center Arms*, *Babbitt*, and *Leocal*, judges and law professors have differed over the proper interpretive approach to an ambiguous statute with both criminal and civil applications. Some urge *Chevron* deference.[6]

---

[5] For critiques of *Babbitt*'s "drive-by" footnote 18, *Whitman v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 354 (2014) (statement of Scalia & Thomas, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari), see, e.g., *id*. at 352-54; *Guedes v. BATFE*, 920 F.3d 1, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Henderson, J., dissenting in part); *Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch*, 810 F.3d 1019, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), *rev'd*, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017); *Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.*, 736 F.3d 722, 734-36 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring).

[6] *See, e.g., Guedes v. BATFE,* 920 F.3d 1, 17-28 (D.C. Cir. 2019); *United States v. Royer*, 549 F.3d 886, 899 (2d Cir. 2008); Sanford N. Greenberg, *Who Says It's a Crime? Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability*, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1 (1996).

Others invoke the rule of lenity.[7] This Court's decisions do not clearly resolve the question. *See, e.g., United States v. White*, 782 F.3d 1118, 1135 n.18 (10th Cir. 2015) (court finds that it "need not address the thorny issue of whether it is appropriate to defer to a prosecuting agency's interpretation of a criminal statute"; citing cases reaching conflicting results); *United States v. Atandi*, 376 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2004) (court does not decide whether to give *Chevron* deference; it gives "some deference" to agency interpretation, which it finds "both reasonable and consistent with our interpretive norms for criminal statutes"); *NLRB v. Oklahoma Fixture Co.*, 332 F.3d 1284, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (same).

As we discuss in the next part, considerations of fair warning and separation of powers require use of the rule of lenity in construing ambiguous statutes with both criminal and civil applications.

[7] *See, e.g., Whitman v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014) (statement of Scalia & Thomas, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari); *Guedes v. BATFE*, 920 F.3d 1, 35-42 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (Henderson, J., dissenting in part); *Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch*, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); *Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch*, 810 F.3d 1019, 1027-32 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), *rev'd*, 137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017); *Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.*, 736 F.3d 722, 729-35 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring); Larkin, *supra* note 3, 32 J.L. & Politics at 232-38.

II. WHEN BOTH THE RULE OF LENITY AND *CHEVRON* DEFERENCE CAN APPLY, A COURT SHOULD APPLY THE RULE OF LENITY.

The statute at issue here--26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)--has both criminal and civil applications. This Court should not give *Chevron* deference to the BATFE interpretation of the statutory term "machinegun." It should instead interpret the statute narrowly, in accordance with the rule of lenity.[8]

The rule of lenity should control for several reasons. To begin, applying *Chevron*, rather than lenity, undermines the principle that "'fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.'" *United States v. Aguilar*, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (quoting *McBoyle v. United States*, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)); *see, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey*, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."). As Judge Sutton has observed, "[I]f agencies are free to ignore the rule of lenity, the state could make an act a crime in a remote statement issued by an administrative agency. The agency's pronouncement need not even come in a notice-and-comment rule. All

[8] We assume for the purposes of this argument that § 5845(b) is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger both *Chevron* deference and the rule of lenity. We recognize that appellant contends otherwise, Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 30-37, and we take no position on that question.

kinds of administrative documents, ranging from manuals to opinion letters, sometimes receive *Chevron* deference." *Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.*, 736 F.3d 722, 731-32 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing *Barnhart v. Walton*, 535 U.S. 212, 221-22 (2002)). The presumption that citizens know the law is already strained in a world chock-full of crimes; it will lose all contact with reality if extended to the emanations of federal agencies.

But the right to fair warning is not the only reason to apply the rule of lenity rather than *Chevron* deference to statutes with criminal application. "[E]qually important, [the rule of lenity] vindicates the principle that only the *legislature* may define crimes and fix punishments. Congress cannot, through ambiguity, effectively leave that function to the courts--much less to the administrative bureaucracy." *Whitman v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (statement of Scalia & Thomas, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari) (emphasis in original).

These separation of powers concerns have powerful implications for individual liberty. Choosing *Chevron* deference over the rule of lenity concentrates the power to prosecute and punish in a single branch of government, contrary to the constitutional design of dispersed powers. "With deference to agency interpretations of statutory provisions to which criminal prohibitions are attached, federal administrators can in effect create (and uncreate) new crimes at will, so long as they

do not roam beyond ambiguities that the laws contain." *Id*. at 354.[9] In the words of then-Judge Gorsuch,

> *Chevron* invests the power to decide the meaning of the law, and to do so with legislative policy goals in mind, in the very entity charged with enforcing the law. Under its terms, an administrative agency may set and revise policy (legislative), override adverse judicial determinations (judicial), and exercise enforcement discretion (executive). Add to this the fact that today many administrative agencies wield vast power and are overseen by political appointees (but often receive little effective oversight from the chief executive to whom they nominally report), and you have a pretty potent mix.

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quotation and brackets omitted). By maintaining the allocation of responsibility among the three branches, the rule of lenity protects criminal defendants against the concentration of executive power that *Chevron* encourages.

In addition to concentrating legislative and judicial power in the executive branch--and thus risking prosecutorial overreach--*Chevron* deference in the criminal context shifts responsibility for pronouncing moral judgments from the people's representatives to unelected bureaucrats:

> Making something a crime is serious business. It visits the moral condemnation of the community upon the citizen who engages in the forbidden conduct, and it allows the government to take away his liberty and property. The rule of lenity carries into effect the principle

[9] The BATFE has done here exactly what Justices Scalia and Thomas warned against: after taking the position for years that possession of a bump stock was legal, it then changed course and decided that (as of March 26, 2019) possession of a (lawfully acquired) bump stock is illegal. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 19-21 (describing changing BATFE positions).

> that only the legislature, the most democratic and accountable branch of government, should decide what conduct triggers these consequences. By giving unelected commissioners and directors and administrators carte blanche to decide when an ambiguous statute justifies sending people to prison, [*Chevron* deference] diminishes this ideal.

Carter, 736 F.3d at 731 (Sutton, J., concurring); *see, e.g.,* Larkin, *supra* note 3, 32 J.L. & Politics at 235 ("The criminal law reflects underlying moral judgments that it is the responsibility of the people to make in a democracy. Agencies lack expertise in making these moral judgments; their skills lie elsewhere.").

To ensure fair warning and preserve the separation of powers--which, in turn, protects individual liberty against government overreach--the Court should (if it finds § 5845(b) ambiguous) apply the rule of lenity, "the most venerable and venerated of interpretive principles." *Carter*, 736 F.3d at 731 (Sutton, J., concurring).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should give no deference to the BATFE interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) and should construe the statute strictly, in accordance with the rule of lenity.

DATED: June 19, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John D. Cline
John D. Cline

Attorney for Amicus Curiae
DUE PROCESS INSTITUTE

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)(C)

Case No. 19-4036

I certify that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(5) and 32(a), the foregoing brief is proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points, and contains 2855 words.

/s/ John D. Cline
John D. Cline

ECF CERTIFICATE

U.S. Court of Appeals Docket Number: 19-4036

I hereby certify (1) that all privacy redactions have been made in the foregoing; (2) that the hard copy or copies of the foregoing that will be submitted to the Court is/are identical to the electronically filed version; and (3) that the foregoing has been scanned using the latest version of Sophos Antivirus for Mac Home Edition and no viruses or other threats were found.

/s/ John D. Cline
John D. Cline

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
When All Case Participants Are Registered For
The Appellate CM/ECF System

U.S. Court of Appeals Docket Number: 19-4036

I hereby certify that on the 19th day of June 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ John D. Cline
John D. Cline