Reimagining the '72 Summit Series in the Canadian Cultural Memory

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edited by: Taylor McKee

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preface

The Haunted Summit: The Summit Series at 50 By: Taylor McKee and Brittany Reid

o you remember where you were during the '72 Summit Series? Perhaps you were working at the time, and you recall sporting conspiracies blossoming in the dark corners of break rooms. You learned fantastical theories about bionic Russians and hoped "our boys" would triumph over Communism, once and for all. Maybe, like many Canadian children, you remember filing into the gym and the sacred television cart being rolled in to greet you. You sat shoulder-to-shoulder with your young classmates, learning new vocabulary words like "Kharlamov," "Yakushev," and "Tretiak," as nationalism and sporting pride became curriculum. No doubt that you can still hear the dulcet tones of Foster Hewitt's goal call as you put yourself to sleep: "Henderson has scored for Canada!" It is also possible that you were among the lucky ones who attended a game yourself. You heard the cheers and jeers firsthand or, if you were really lucky, you were so close to the fray that you could smell the metallic odour of fresh blood or sweat on sweaters. Were you part of the crowd that Phil Esposito chided? (be honest, someone had to be). Were you one of the chosen few that witnessed Henderson's goal in person? Did you pretend that you were there, until you lied so long that you believed it yourself? But what if the Summit Series took place before you were born? What if you are from a place that had no stake in this international hockey conflict? Or what if you are from the former Soviet Union; was your sorrow proportionate to our exaltation? What if you don't remember? What if you don't care?

For all of us described above, what do we now make of this cultural inheritance? The year 2022 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the 1972 Summit Series. This hockey series, played between Canada and the former Soviet Union, has become the subject of Canadian cultural mythmaking since Paul Henderson's winning goal for Canada during game eight. In *Home Game: Hockey and Life in Canada* (1989), Ken Dryden and Roy MacGregor identified the Summit Series as a uniquely "Canadian memory" and marked 1972 as a "coming of age" for Canada as a nation (195). Now, over thirty years since Dryden and MacGregor observed its significance, the Summit Series has continued to pervade broader sporting and cultural discourse in Canada. Although younger generations today experience the Series as a received cultural inheritance, efforts to memorialize it continue to appear in many forms. For example, filmic treatments, such as

Summit on Ice (1996) or Cold War on Ice: Summit Series '72 (2012), attempted to visually recreate the series' material realities. Within the world of hockey, events such as the 2012 Canada-Russia Challenge, which was intended to mark the series' fortieth anniversary, have been hosted. Finally, the 1972 Canadian Men's Hockey Team was honoured with a star on Canada's Walk of Fame in 2012 and an official Canada Post stamp in 2017, two tributes intended to reaffirm their staying power as national icons. As Dryden and MacGregor asserted in 1989, when it comes to the Summit Series, "the specifics of memory do not deliver the resonance of the feeling that lingers" (194). However, the Summit Series continues to occupy a seemingly heightened role in the Canadian cultural consciousness, despite its relative temporal distance now fifty years later.

For many, the Summit Series has entered the realm of national mythology, causing its key moments and figures to become larger than life, while other details and hard truths are lost to time. The story of the Summit Series in Canada today is now a story of collective sporting nostalgia. As cultural critic Chuck Klosterman deftly describes, nostalgia emerges from a split temporality that affects the way we perceive ourselves: "People enjoy remembering things, and particularly things that happened within their own lifetime. Remembering creates meaning. There are really only two stages in any existence — what we're doing now, and what we were doing then" (2011). Klosterman here captures how nostalgia represents a sense of deep longing for our past, a persisting desire to pull our cherished memories forward and preserve them in our eternal present. Like Janus, the Roman God of time who possessed two faces, nostalgia is a condition typified by simultaneously looking to the past and the future, while being irreconcilably pulled in both directions. Nostalgia is often experienced as a nagging sense of heartsickness, as it forces us to live in a split state that stymies progress and keeps us locked within our ceaseless desire for return. In a sense, nostalgia can feel like an antidote for missing the past, when it can in fact poison the possibility of an enlightened future. Since Klosterman posits that nostalgia is most acutely felt by those who experienced an event "within their own lifetime," is it possible to feel nostalgia for someone or something that you never experienced yourself?

Whether consciously or not, nostalgia allows our present selves to merge with our past experiences. Through the trick of memory, an event that was important to us, such as the Summit Series for many Canadian hockey fans, functionally becomes us. Nostalgia blurs the lines that distinguish the self from the other, the memory from the reality, and the collective versus the individual. Further contributing to the condition's oftentimes damaging outcomes, nostalgia masquerades as a shared experience, when it is, necessarily, isolating. Klosterman's description foregrounds the inherently subjective, egocentric dimension of nostalgia: my recalled past is worth saving because it belongs to me. In this way, nostalgia allows us to regard ourselves as beings both in and out of time, imbuing objects, events, and even people we encounter with greater significance through our vivifying recollections. Put another way, through remembering, we come to re-member and resuscitate either who or what is lost for our own benefit. Nostalgia thus has the potential to resurrect what is past, giving it a renewed half-life in our present. Through nostalgia, we choose to be haunted.

The recurrence of the Summit Series, and its associated figures, throughout Canadian sport history is a form of collective cultural haunting. Concerted efforts to reanimate the Series and its cast of characters for future generations, including the present collection, create an uncanny afterlife for the event. The Summit Series is of course not unique in this way; memorializing the past and commemorating key historical events is the underlying project of all public history. But while it might feel stereotypical to suggest that a hockey tournament is essential to Canada's self-conception, there can be little argument that the Summit Series is a watershed moment in Canadian cultural history and its resonance can still be felt today. What distinguishes the Summit Series are several salient attributes: the tournament's oversized cultural influence based on other examples of Canadian hockey excellence, the reliance on firstperson experience to elevate its collective import, the evocation of the Series' context to extend its historical significance, the explicit adoption of the Series as Canadian folklore, its influence on internal and external conceptions of Canadian identity, and conscious efforts to proliferate the tournament's legacy for future generations. Taken together, it is apparent that Canada is still haunted by the Summit Series, always contending with the complexities of its legacy.

In Canada, the Summit Series has been remembered, and misremembered so many times over that the lived realities of the tournament have been augmented and altered through memory. When recalling the Series today, the "real" versions of Bobby Clarke, Harry Sinden, Vsevolod Bobrov, Josef Kompalla, or any other figure are quickly subsumed by their ghostly doubles. In Cities of the *Dead*, Joseph Roach employs the term "surrogation" to describe this impulse to fill holes left in the cultural memory with our individual and collective recollections. Surrogation, suggests Roach, occurs when "survivors attempt to fit satisfactory alternates" into "the cavities created by loss through death or other forms of departure" (1996, 2). Unfortunately though, the fit can never be exact, since "the intended substitute either cannot fulfill expectations, creating a deficit, or actually exceeds them, creating a surplus" (2). Such is the case with the Summit Series, where the documentary record has been supplemented by hearsay, memory, and perceived legitimacy through autobiographical authenticity. The result is a literal shadow roster of key plays that recur and repeat across time: the Summit Series and its ghostly double.

Ghosts, in many ways, are the ultimate culmination of collective nostalgia and the result of our shared efforts to recall and resuscitate our pasts. While ghosts are often associated with horror or terror, they also represent nostalgic wish fulfillment: the return of the past to the present. Literary critics and cultural theorists often employ the ghost as a metaphor for our shared "compulsion to repeat" (Garber, 2010 19) and our desire to "seeing what we saw before" through literal "recognition," "reknowing" and "unforgetting" (Rayner, 2006, xviii). The ghost thus captures the *zeitgeist*, the literal "spirit of time" in German, and is defined by both its timeliness and timelessness. Mark Fisher, who helped re-popularize and extend Jacques Derrida's concept of "Hauntology" into the twenty-first century, explains that "Haunting can be seen as intrinsically resistant to the contraction and homogenization of time and space" (Fisher, 2012, 20). In this same vein, Avery Gordon conceives of the ghost as "a living force" and elaborates that "the need of the dead to be remembered and accommodated...is inseparable from the needs of the living. In other words, the ghost is nothing without you. In this sense, the ghost figures what systematically continues to work

on the here and now" (1997, 179). Gordon's argument presents the relationship between the haunt and the haunted as mutually beneficial and sustaining: ghosts need us to carry into the present, but we need them too.

The image of the ghost thus offers both a framework for reading the Summit Series in Canada and a methodological approach for our continuing engagement with the subject. Buoyed by nostalgia, the tournament seems to offer an escape from present ills and a balm for future anxieties. The certainty of the past, and the alleged moral clarity of the Series' central conflict, provides a refuge in time and place. But the metaphor of the ghost imbues the Summit Series with a greater sense of immediacy and prevents us from taking comfort in it as pure nostalgia.

Ghosts are not random occurrences; they are instead consciously formed and fed over time, and they mirror those they haunt. Leo Braudy further develops this characterization of ghosts, explaining that they perform an important function by marking a misunderstood history: "they represent an admonition, a warning that proper ritual has not been fulfilled... In this way the ghost serves as a defender of religious orthodoxy, seeking revenge on the living because the proper forms have been ignored" (2016, 39). Braudy here shows that ghosts function as a call to action and a sign that something from the past has been forgotten or misremembered. As "denizens of a particular place," they exist to remind us of unacknowledged or overlooked pasts, not to provide shelter from the present (40).

Like a ghost, the Summit Series continues to haunt Canada in 2022. It haunts our actions and behaviours, including our international reputation, how hockey is played and who gets to participate, our perceived hockey supremacy, our conceptions and performance of masculinity, and what it means to "be" Canadian. Since 1972, these notions have been codified through nostalgic returns to the Summit Series, not as it was but, more importantly, how each of *us* remember it. This has resulted in a proliferation of many distinct Summit Series, each unique to the individual who has cultivated it over time through repeated recollections. But the presence of a ghost indicates a mistake that has been allowed to fester: a history that is misunderstood or, even intentionally, misremembered. In the case of Canada and the '72 Summit Series, it is up to each of us to determine if we will work to exorcize these ghosts or give up and live with them.

Collection Structure

As this introduction has outlined, we were interested in learning more about what it means to live and long in the wake of the Summit Series. Based on this received cultural legacy, *Reaching the Summit* explores the role of the 1972 Summit Series in persisting conceptions of Canadian self-identification. We thus attempt to critically contribute to the existing body of scholarship regarding the summit series, including the collection *Coming Down the Mountain: Rethinking the 1972 Summit Series* (2014) and many other prominent works that have been written over the last half-century. This project seeks to create a new approach to this seminal event in Canadian sport history by assembling a concert of voices through diverse forms of criticism or storytelling modes.

To accomplish this, this collection's conception and curation were guided the principles of Bricolage, which is defined by Claude Lévi-Strauss as "the processes by which... societies construct language and myth" (1966). Elaborating on this approach, Jacques Derrida explained that bricolage therefore constitutes "the activity of borrowing from one's own textual heritage whatever is needed to produce new and different texts, with an emphasis on intertextual borrowing for the purpose of textual construction" (1997, 15).

In twenty-first-century scholarship, bricolage has evolved into an important methodology that has the potential to recover lost narratives, better facilitate interdisciplinary or multimodal research, and produce fundamentally innovative research that is open to a greater plurality of viewpoints. According to Kathleen S. Berry (2006), "At a time when the discourses of emancipation, inclusiveness, social justice, plurality, multiplicity, diversity, complexity, and chaos are entering academic circles and mainstream communication media, a way of incorporating these discourses and their complimentary practices requires new research questions, tools, processes, and ways of reporting. Bricolage offers the potential to do so" (88).

The use of bricolage as the guiding principle behind this collection is reflected in the initial call for submissions and ultimately realized through the broad range of contributions assembled here.

We invited proposals for critical and/or creative works, developed in response to the 1972 Summit Series. Proposed submissions could take the form of traditional critical chapters that interrogated the received cultural memory of the tournament. The studies submitted have reimagined the Summit Series by applying critical lenses, including identity, gender, memory, politics, analytics or nationhood. Furthermore, our goal to create an interdisciplinary collection was further realized through the inclusion of submissions from across sport studies, including politics, history, sociology, and statistics.

Furthermore, in keeping with the guiding principles of bricolage, we sought to follow the "trail of memory" left behind from the Summit Series and recapture a multiplicity of new, or long-overlooked, perspectives (Dryden and MacGregor, 1989, 193). To that end, in addition to critical article submissions, we also welcomed non-traditional engagement with the collection's theme. The submissions featured here cover a broad array of forms, such as original artwork, poetry, prose, biography, interviews, or other forms of remembrance. Moreover, in reviewing the final collection now, the line between "critical" and "creative" works is blurred, with numerous intersections of memory and formal inquiry. Consequently, this mixed method has allowed the collection's architects and contributors to draw together a collage of critical-creative viewpoints on the evolving legacy of the "series of the century."

Although we do not presume that this collection is the last chapter in the Summit Series' storied legacy, perhaps it brings us closer to resolving the event as a bit of "unfinished business" in Canadian sporting history.

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chapter one

Canadian Enforcers: Canadian Masculine Nationalism and the 1972 Summit Series By: Kaitlyn N. Carter

n a fall afternoon in September 1972, two nations held their breath while their collective attention turned to an ice rink in Russia. Across Canada, schools had been released or called to assembly and many businesses closed early to allow people time to make it to their televisions for an international broadcast from Moscow. At 1:00 pm EST, the puck dropped for the final hockey game of an eight-game series played between the Soviet Union and Canada. It was a hard-fought tournament, showcasing the exceptional talent of both nations, who were eager to cement their place in hockey history as the best national team. By the final minute of play the game was tied 5-5. Fans and players alike were becoming increasingly violent, desperate for any form of victory. With only 34 seconds left in the game, Paul Henderson, a native of Kincardine, Ontario, and a man who was literally born on the ice of Lake Huron,¹ fulfilled the greatest Canadian narrative: he scored the game winning goal, and a nation rejoiced.

Despite the desire to highlight the favourable aspects of international competition, the Summit Series took on characteristics akin to political and military engagement. This ideological association was not lost on the spectators of the games, nor on the players of the series. In a 2016 retrospective on the Summit Series, Team Canada co-captain Phil Esposito commented that:

You got to understand something. This became political and it became political very quickly. Not only the Russians, the Canadian government, too. It became society against society. Not that [the players] wanted it, not that we realized it was going to be that way. But it did. So for me, anyway, *it was almost like war*. [emphasis my own].²

Here Esposito recognized the essential element of competition on an international stage: that sports always have been, and always will be, political.

¹Paul Henderson with Roger Lajoie, *The Goal of My Life: A Memoir* (Plattsburgh, NY: Fenn/McClelland & Stewart, 2012), 1.

²Stu Cowan, "Summit Series Tour will be 'rock show' about seminal hockey event," *The Montreal Gazette*, 10 February 2016. https://montrealgazette.com/sports/hockey/ nhl/montreal-canadiens/stu-cowan-summit-series-tour-will-be-rock-show-about-seminal-hockey-event

It became very clear, amidst aggressive physical play and confrontational interviews from Canadians, that the Summit Series did not reflect a beneficial, diplomatic relationship between the two nations. Instead, it stressed the relationship that Canadians had to their bodies, nation, and innate competitive desire for physical supremacy. The Summit Series is a story that is greater than hockey. It is one of Canadian men and their persisting need to conspicuously display their masculinity on an international scale. It is the story of how Canada would like to be seen and how Canadians remember their history. It is, simply put, a story of Canada. And it is one that, much like our collective national identity, is aggressively masculine, mythologized, and idolized.

By engaging in competition with the Soviet Union, Canadians were not only attempting to determine which nation was better at hockey, but also which society had superior men. The Summit Series lent legitimacy to the victorious Canadian players' gender expression, extending the same validity to Canadian men who performed masculinity in a similar fashion. Therefore, the 1972 Summit Series provided an outlet for the expression of Canadian national identity during the Cold War, which stressed the victory of Team Canada over the Soviet Union as the dominant signifier of hockey excellence. Beyond that, the result also seemed to confirm the international superiority of white Canadian masculinity during the second-wave feminist and civil rights movements, cementing the relationship between Canadian men and hockey as a means of hegemonic gender performance.

Hockey provides a canvas onto which Canadians can project their nationalist feelings and insecurities, particularly as a young immigrant nation with a relatively brief, post-settler, collective history. As hockey has been embedded with the weight and depth of nationality, the pursuit of hockey greatness not only denotes sporting victory, but also victory in the performance of nationalism. Thus, typical traits associated with hockey not only have personal value, but national significance as well. These traits, so embraced in a sporting culture, exist to reaffirm the validity of their presence in a national consciousness, Therefore the nationalist, or distinctly 'hockey-like,' behaviour of Canadians outside the ice rink. Valuing the characteristics associated with hockey culture lends authority to those who similarly perform these behaviours or exhibit these identities: namely, tough, aggressive, white, masculine men. International competition in hockey allows for the adoration of these characteristics on a much larger scale.

The 1972 Summit Series thrust the relationship Canadians had with hockey into the international spotlight and, in doing so, highlighted the common characteristics of hockey players that have come to be positively and negatively associated with Canada. For this reason, the Summit Series is an ideal case study through which to examine how Canadians perceive hockey in our national identity, as well as how this perception impacts the way Canadians perform our nationalism and gender. Furthermore, the Summit Series reveals the extent to which hockey has been purposely constructed as part of a Canadian national identity that makes space for athletic white men as aspirational, national heroes.

In the context of Cold War international relations, these Canadian hockey heroes triumphed over communism as well as the Soviet hockey team, proving that Western capitalism was the preferable political system. At the very least, it affirmed that such a system produced better hockey players. In Canada, the Summit Series players assured the superiority of customary systems of power, ones that prioritized the interests of white traditional masculinity over the feminist and civil rights movements that were challenging Canadian societal hegemony in the mid-to-late twentieth century. The series reaffirmed that men who exhibited the traits associated with traditional Canadian manhood were still successful and, therefore, that both they and the Canadian society that developed them did not need to be reformed or challenged. As Phil Esposito commented at the conclusion of game four in Vancouver, "Every one of us guys, thirty-five guys, that came out and played for Team Canada, we did it because we love our country, and not for any other reason. No other reason. [...] We came because we love Canada."³ However, the Canada that Esposito loved was one that primarily

³Foster Hewitt and Brian Conacher, "Game Four," Canada-USSR 1972 Summit Series, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Toronto, 8 September 1972. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JRlt02mitNU

benefited and reflected him and players like him.⁴ In this way, the Summit Series reflects the love Canadians have for the sport of hockey and its players, but also for the system that advantages them.

Hockey Culture in Canada

Following ideas of traditional hockey culture, Canada's special relationship to hockey also endorses Canadian nationalism and superiority based in xenophobia, physical toughness, and staunch masculinity. Hockey endorses the idea that to be valid, hockey players must be bred, taught, and trained to behave as good, tough, *Canadian* boys.⁵ As hockey has become one of the primary expressions of Canadian culture and identity amidst the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the sport endorses the idea that to be Canadian, one must replicate the values espoused by hockey. These values have traditionally included race and gender expression, and these expressions work to ensure Canadian superiority on an international stage.

The need for boys to behave in a way that reflects 'Canada' creates the question of what it means to *be* Canadian. Canada is a nation that has struggled to create a solid answer to "the Canadian question." The establishment of Canadian nationalism met several major challenges immediately following Confederation in 1867. First, Canada is a vast land with a small population spread over a large geographical space. The distance between those in the Atlantic provinces and the far west coast in British Columbia can lead to a sense of detachment between these groups of people, who may find it more appropriate to lay claim to a regional or provincial identity over a national one. Second, Confederation left many Anglo-Canadians

⁴Though it is important to acknowledge that Italian-Canadians have not always enjoyed a place of privilege in Canadian society, this statement reflects that the Esposito brothers were still white, talented, and masculine hockey players. As such, their ethnicity could be overlooked by Anglo-Protestant Canadians in favour of their participation in and success as members of Team Canada. For a detailed perspective on the challenges faced by Italian-Canadian immigrants in the twentieth century see Franca Iacovetta, *Such Hardworking People: Italian Immigrants in Postwar Toronto* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992). ⁵Kaitlyn N. Carter, "This is Canada's Game: Hockey, Masculinity, and Canadian Identity" (Course paper, Western University, 2020), 11-12.

searching for an identity that was separate from British culture, but did not conflict with the hegemony imposed by British rule. Third, though Canada finds pride in its status as an immigrant nation, this implicit within this identity is a pervasive sense of Indigenous erasure. Furthermore, uniting populations with deep ties to their heritage, like French Canadians, has historically proven difficult, especially with increasingly popular Quebec separatist movements in the second half of the twentieth century. Fourth, Canada has had difficulty in creating a national identity that includes minorities or disadvantaged groups, such as women or racial minorities like Black and Indigenous Canadians. For the benefit of the nation's ruling classes, Canada required a national meaning that supported the superiority of Anglo, bourgeois, and white masculinity.

Canadian identity is frequently defined by what the nation is not, just as much as what it actually is. When Confederation took place, Canada had yet to develop a unified language, religion, ethnicity, or history. There was little on which to base a cohesive identity. Rather, Canadians would be united by a shared understanding of what they were not: for Canada, it was not British. The United States, born from a violent revolution, found a dramatic way to separate from its British origins, declaring itself independent in a statement written in blood. In contrast, Canada became a nation through a series of diplomatic meetings that declared they would have independent, yet commonwealth status in the British Empire. Therefore, the British heritage of Canada would not be climactically distanced from the current state of the country. Rather, Britishness would provide a foundation for the established expression of Canadian nationalism and behaviour. British culture denoted common social cues and class structure. It was British pastimes and literature that were still popular. To create an identity that was unique to Canada, Canadians would need to challenge their British cultural roots by transforming them into something that was better tailored to the nascent nation. In the decade immediately following Confederation, an answer for the question of a Canadian rallying point would be partially answered through the game of hockey.

As suggested by Eric Hobsbawm, the popularity of vernacular activities or folklore can inspire a collective identity and nationalism, since they provide the basis for invented traditions and create a sense of shared history and culture.⁶ The vernacular culture of sport, with its deep connection to military history, has been a tool for nation building throughout the British Empire. Sports promoted the characteristics of good soldiers: physically disciplined, fraternal, and aggressive in the face of competition. When Canada was constructing a colonial identity in urban centres, which frequently developed around a military garrison, the qualities of a good soldier became the qualities of a good man. Sports ascended in the public consciousness as a way of determining who possessed these characteristics, and they also provided an outlet to strengthen British cultural ties on Canadian soil. However, as Canada modernized and separated from the need to perform overt Britishness, its culture evolved to allow Canadians to imagine and feel connected to their own national identity.

One sport that would emerge as a particularly Canadian sport in the nineteenth century was lacrosse. Lacrosse originated from the Indigenous game of *baggataway*, a stick and ball game that has been played in Canada since at least the seventeenth century. Michael A. Robidoux argues that lacrosse was appropriated to create a national Canadian identity before the invention and proliferation of ice hockey. The nation-building potential of lacrosse was recognized through to its violent, yet skilled gameplay, which "appeared to best embody the harsh and gruelling existence of Canadian natives as well as the trials of early Canadian settlers in this new and untamed land."7 Canadian men admired the alternative masculinity of Indigenous men that was thought to be based in emotion, strength, and physicality, rather than the restricted and civil masculinity associated with Britain.8 In contrast to lacrosse, which was fast paced and violent, cricket "provided no sense of the danger or aggression that had come to be associated with the landscape of Canada, and by extension the character of its people."9

The landscape of Canada also provides a cornerstone for the construction of Canadian identity. Canadians have strong emotional

⁶Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" in *The Invention of Tradition*, eds. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 4.

⁷Michael A. Robidoux, "Imagining a Canadian Identity: A Historical Interpretation of Hockey and Lacrosse," *Journal of American Folklore* 115, no. 456 (2002): 212. ⁸ Ibid., 214.

⁹Carter, "This is Canada's Game," 9.

ties to their harsh and unforgiving climate, and Canadian winters have long been held as a major component of our collective national identity. The Canadian superiority associated with surviving harsh winters similarly extended to enjoyment of ice sports, as they reinforced the historical insistence that Canadians were deeply shaped by the land that surrounded and created them. In a nation where it snows six to seven months of the year in many areas, it can hardly be surprising that the pastime that would become nationally beloved, and the most heavily associated with Canadian culture, is one that takes place on ice.¹⁰

As perhaps stated most eloquently by Bruce Kidd and John Macfarlane: "Hockey is the Canadian metaphor, the rink a symbol of this country's vast stretches of water and wilderness, its extremes of climate, the player a symbol of our struggle to civilize such a land. Some call it our national religion... In a land so inescapably and inhospitably cold, hockey is the dance of life, an affirmation that despite the deathly chill of winter we are alive."¹¹ Kidd and MacFarlane follow this observation by adding that, "to speak of a national religion, of course, is to grope for a national identity."¹² Fundamentally, hockey is the ideal sport for a mythologized Canada, as it represented what they wanted their young nation to be: virile, tough, resistant, and passionate.¹³

Nonetheless, if Canada is to fully adopt hockey as a core component of our national identity, in both historical and modern contexts, then we must also accept the darker elements of the sport. More specifically, we must contend with its place in maintaining and promoting power structures that benefit only a small subgroup of Canadians. Patrick F. McDevitt notes, "Sport has been more than just a mirror to society; it has also been an active engine in the creation and preservation of power relationships."¹⁴ Organized and professional hockey is an inaccessible sport. It is expensive to participate, even

¹⁰Carter, "This is Canada's Game," 9.

¹¹Bruce Kidd and John MacFarlane, *The Death of Hockey* (Toronto: New Press, 1972), 4.

¹²Ibid., 4.

¹³Carter, "This is Canada's Game," 12.

¹⁴Patrick F. McDevitt, *May the Best Man Win: Sport, Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain and the Empire*, 3.

before the added cost of training sessions that are expected and necessary for children to have hopes of going professional. The cost of hockey alone effectively limits diversity within the sport, as only middle- to upper-class families can afford to register their children without financial assistance. This expense leads to an overwhelming inequality in the professional leagues, where the majority of players come from wealthy, and predominantly white, urban areas. Simply put, hockey's material realities restrict access to those in the wealthy, upper classes of society, while maintaining the façade of being a traditional, working-class sport.

One area where professional leagues differ little from 1972 to the 2020s is the racial makeup of teams and fans. Hockey has an intensely limited demographic: primarily white, heterosexual men. This whiteness permeates every aspect of the sport. Most prominently, the almost infamous levels of on-ice violence in hockey are almost certainly only permissible due to the predominantly white demographic of the sport. White male violence is historically perceived as acceptable to a white audience, while the aggression of racial minorities has been expected to follow rules established by both the white sporting class and white spectators. There has been little improvement on the place and status of racial minorities in hockey since the time of the Summit Series. In 1972, there were no active Black players in the NHL, and only one, Alton White, playing in the WHA for the Los Angeles Sharks.¹⁵ Team Canada's roster in 1972 would be composed entirely – all 35 men – of white players.

The popularity hockey has maintained among white fans, also extends to white women. Though hockey has long been bemoaned as "a man's game," it has never been a solely male sport. Women have played hockey in Canada since at least the 1890s, as the first reported instance of a women's organized game took place in Ottawa in 1891.¹⁶ However, as argued by Courtney Szto, women's participation in hockey culture, particularly their involvement in international competition both as players and spectators, is an exercise in

¹⁵Coincidentally, during the 1972-73 season, White became the first Black player to surpass 20 goals in a single season and the first Black player to score a hat trick, yet would not be invited to any international competitions for Canada. See: "Rink Rookie Makes Hockey History," *Ebony* 28, no. 4 (1973): 64-70.

¹⁶"Ladies Play Hockey," *The Ottawa Citizen*, 11 February 1891.

nationalistic masculinity, rather than a show of feminism.¹⁷ Since women's participation in international hockey is seen as good for the nation, it excuses their infringement on a traditionally male space. Therefore, women's participation in hockey, at any level, can still be seen as gender performance within the constraints of appropriate feminine and masculine relations.

In the 1970s, women's involvement in hockey was relegated to spectating or participation in amateur leagues. Women would not experience sanctioned international hockey competition with the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) until 1990, and would not be featured in the Olympic games until 1998. In contrast, men's hockey has been featured in the Olympics since 1920, and international competition, such as the Summit Series, is a natural component of men's involvement in the sport. At its core, thriving in hockey is akin to thriving within masculinity. Therefore, until the complicated relationship between hockey and masculinity is at least partially dismantled, women's place in hockey will continue to be held against unobtainable masculine standards, rather than acknowledged or appreciated on its on terms.

Hockey's ties to masculinity serve two important purposes. First, the masculinity represented by hockey is a distinctly workingclass one. As historian Richard Holt argues, middle- and lower-class expressions of masculinity are typically exposed in sport; middleclass manhood stresses ideas of sportsmanship and respect for authority, while working-class manhood appreciates the physicality and aggression of sport.¹⁸ Hockey appeals to both working- and middle-class men while maintaining its status as a vernacular culture that can be used to promote nation building. Through the prevalence of hockey as a Canadian, nationalist identity, the vernacular manhood of the sport, which was associated with both skill and violence, became a basis for national values.

Within the first twenty years of its inception, Robidoux notes, "hockey was internationally known as being first, Canadian, and

¹⁷Courtney Szto, "How Nationalism + Masculinity Affect Women's Hockey." *Hockey in Society.* 24 October 2019. https://hockeyinsociety.com/2019/10/24/ how-nationalism-masculinity-affect-womens-hockey/

¹⁸Richard Holt, *Sport and the British* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 171-173.

second, notoriously violent."19 Violence is associated with hockey to an extent that is uncommon in other popular team sports. Children are trained to body check and fight opposing players and, in doing so, are encouraged to develop their bodies into weapons. Refusal to participate in the violent culture of hockey denotes those who are too weak, and by extension, unable to succeed in performing masculinity. As noted by Richard Gruneau and David Whitson, willingness to fight in hockey is "simply a mark of character."20 Hockey provides an outlet for male aggression in a controlled setting where it is actively respected and encouraged. Fist fighting in hockey earns a player cheers, rather than an assault charge. The militaristic connections between violence and sport are particularly important in international competition. As Gordon W. Russell points out, "Outside of wartime, sports is perhaps the only setting in which acts of interpersonal aggression are not only tolerated but enthusiastically applauded by large segments in society."²¹ When the game is akin to a battle, violence is a natural progression of hockey's warlike associations.

So where does this leave the 1972 Summit Series? In "Nations and their Pasts," Anthony D. Smith stated that, "Nationalism very often involves the pursuit of 'symbolic' goals."²² In the case of Canada, these goals are both literal and metaphorical, as Canada's nationalism relies on world domination in hockey. If Team Canada performed well in the 1972 Summit Series, then the conditions that had facilitated the hypermasculine and violent environment of hockey would be proven successful for Canadian men's performance of masculinity and nation. Therefore, Team Canada's victory in game eight, on September 28, 1972, reaffirmed that the society Canada had constructed, partially around hockey as a collective identity, was one that did not need to be challenged or questioned. It had been proven superior through the efforts of men whom the nation itself had created and developed.

¹⁹ Robidoux, "Imagining a Canadian Identity," 220.

²⁰Ibid., 176.

²¹Gordon W. Russell, *The Social Psychology of Sport* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993), 181.

²²Smith, "Nations and their Pasts," 362.

The 1970s and Canadian Society

The socio-political climate of the 1970s in Canada fostered an environment where hockey, via the Summit Series, served as a demonstrable, symbolic measurement of white Canadian masculinity and its continuing dominance over perceived challenges to its established superiority in Canadian society. These challenges included the Cold War, the civil rights movement, French Separatism, and second-wave feminism. The cultural context of the early 1970s, as the setting for the Summit Series, paints an image of 1972 as a unique year that was created by socio-political circumstances. This allowed for the Summit Series to play out on a national stage embedded with the symbolic weight of the established hegemony of Canada and its validation in international politics.

From the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the political and cultural climate of the Western world was dominated by the conditions created during the Cold War (generally agreed to be 1947-1991). For over four decades, the conflict between the communist system of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the capitalist interests of Western Europe and North America loomed large over Canadians. As noted by Reginald Whitaker and Steve Hewitt, "In a way that succeeding generations will find difficult to comprehend, the Cold War was, for those who grew up and lived within it, an all encompassing experience, the very air that we breathed."23 As the Cold War invariably touched and shaped all events that took place during this period, international events in particular, such as cultural exchanges through media and competition in sport, took on important political and social significance. By the 1970s, there was a discernible hangover following the "[o]pen hostility and suspicion [that had] characterized superpower relations into the 1960s. In such an atmosphere, triumphs were measured through the symbolic."24 These symbolic triumphs most commonly connected to "Defeat in any head-to-head athletic competition, [...] [which] would be interpreted as demonstrating the shortcomings of either

²³Reginald Whitaker and Steve Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War* (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd., Publishers, 2003), 6.

²⁴Whitaker and Hewitt, *Canada and the Cold War*, 193.

the capitalist or Communist systems, a factor of which the players involved were well aware." $^{\!\!\!25}$

The Cold War was a competition of two opposing masculinities. North American men generally believed themselves to be more virile and dominant in comparison to Soviet masculinity; however, the Cold War also heightened male anxiety and insecurity. Alongside the need for reassurance of the Western, capitalist lifestyle, North American men needed reassurance of their own unique performance of masculinity.

After the Second World War, the domestic space in Canada experienced upheaval. World War II had thrown women into the workspace while men were fighting overseas, and the postwar era stressed a return to traditional women's roles within the nuclear family. The societal push for Canadian women to return to the home contrasted with the theoretical gender equality of women in Soviet workplaces.²⁶ When Canadian women began to question their assigned place in Canadian society, they also questioned the hegemony that had been established to create a sense of security during the Cold War. Second-wave feminism began in Canada in the 1960s as Canadian women began demanding equality in the workplace, protection from domestic abuse, and reproductive and sexual freedom. Second-wave feminism challenged the place of white Canadian men who were already facing a crisis of masculinity in the face of the Cold War, which only served to increase men's insecurity in their role within society and their gender expression.

In addition to second-wave feminism, the 1970s challenged established white male hegemony in North America during the civil rights movement. Though Canada had gained a reputation as a refuge

²⁵Whitaker and Hewitt, Canada and the Cold War, 193.

²⁶Though the Soviet Union promoted gender equality in the workspace under Communist theory, women were paid less than men and continued to carry the primary load of the domestic duties. North America equated Russian femininity with masculinity due to the role women fulfilled in the Soviet economy. Women participating in politics and the economy challenged the established North American hegemony, leading to negative comments about the place of Soviet women. These stereotypes are explored in Robert L. Griswold, "Russian Blonde in Space": Soviet Women in the American Imagination, 1950-1965," *Journal of Social History*, no. 4 (2012): 881-907.

for racial equality by the 1960s,²⁷ the civil rights movement, which demanded equal rights and opportunities for Black Americans, disturbed white Canadians who felt that the movement's potential to impact their northern politics was frightening.²⁸ The geographical and political closeness of the racial prejudices of the United States uncovered similar experiences of racism taking place in Canada. However, the majority of racial equality protests that took place in Canada still remained focused on the American fight for civil rights. The civil rights movement, paired with American involvement in Vietnam, also bred further resentment towards the United States among a Canadian population that already defined itself in its opposition towards Americanism. Canada's identity has long hinged on the idea of not being American and, in doing so, it has neglected issues of racism in Canada in favour of highlighting racial inequalities in the United States. This redirection did not preclude the recognition of major racial inequalities in Canada and, by the 1970s, white, Anglo Canadians would feel their stranglehold on power in Canada being challenged by minority groups, such as Black Canadians, Indigenous Peoples, the Métis, and the Quebecois (despite being of French heritage and predominately white), who were able draw direct comparisons to the civil rights movements in the United States to highlight their own discrimination in Canada. As Asa McKrecher notes, the use of the American civil rights movement to frame racial inequality in Canada was "a tacit admission that Canada was more similar to the United States than long-standing myths would suggest."29 McKrecher also suggests that the civil rights movement inspired tactics that would be used by Quebec nationalists, who saw

²⁷Canada's long history of violent racism is often overlooked in favour of the American fight for civil rights, yet Canada undoubtedly still practiced racial segregation as it limited access to education, entertainment, housing, and legal rights for Black Canadians. See Robyn Maynard, *Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2017) and Graham Reynolds and Wanda Robson, *Viola Desmond's Canada: A History of Blacks and Racial Segregation in the Promised Land* (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2016).

²⁸Asa McKercher, "Too Close for Comfort: Canada, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and the North American Colo(u)r Line," *Journal of American History* 106, no. 1 (2019): 74-75.

²⁹Ibid., 85.

their own struggle against Anglo-Canadians reflected in the fight for equal rights in the United States.³⁰

The emergence of the extremist group the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) in the early 1960s led to violent terrorist attacks between 1963 and 1970, culminating in the October Crisis and an increasingly deep divide between Anglo-Canadians and Quebec separatists. The FLQ, most frighteningly to the established dominant hegemony of Canada, embraced Marxist-Leninist ideas in order to challenge their place as "a colonial people" in Canada.³¹ Within a Cold War context, this made the FLQ and the Quebec nationalist movement even more strongly opposed to the values held by the ruling Anglo capitalist class.

While Quebec nationalism endorsed a message of both men and women fighting for Quebecois equality and the Quebec separatist movement did not emerge as a distinctly masculine event, it did present a form of masculinity that has historically appealed to young men: the opportunity to fight and sacrifice oneself for a political and national movement. The FLQ embraced both the languages of socialism and militarism to inspire participation in extremist acts by young Quebecois men. The crisis of masculinity that appeared during the Cold War could be answered through participation in a movement that validated masculine ideas of male involvement in a nation. Therefore, the FLQ created a type of masculinity that could compete with the Anglo answer to the masculinity crisis, leaving Canada with a deep divide between Franco- and Anglo-Canadians by 1972.

Indeed, Canada in the 1970s could be visualized as a competition between gender ideals (i.e., social movements whose participants demanded equal treatment to that of white men) that challenged the hegemony of the nation, which had been formally established with white, Anglo, hetero-masculine men as the ruling class. The early 1970s begged for an outlet for men to confront the crisis of masculinity that had been initiated by the challenges to Canadian society. This crisis would be partially addressed through sports.

³⁰"McKercher, Too Close for Comfort," 86-87.

³¹Louis Fournier, *F.L.Q.: The Anatomy of an Underground Movement*, trans. Edward Baxter (Toronto: NC Press Limited, 1984), 18.

In 1945, George Orwell wrote of sport that, "It is bound up with hatred, jealousy, boastfulness, disregard of all rules and sadistic pleasure in witnessing violence." In a statement that is easily applicable to both the Cold War and sporting competition in general, Orwell stated, "in other words it is war minus the shooting."³² As previously demonstrated, hockey has been used in Canada to establish a national and constructed identity. The Summit Series emerged as a unifying factor against the backdrop of a deeply divided nation. Not only did it provide an answer for the Cold War crisis of masculinity, where it would firmly establish Canadian men as the superior form of masculinity, as opposed to the Soviets, but it also created the opportunity for Franco- and Anglo-Canadians to play side-by-side. While Quebec nationalism was not subsided by the Summit Series, Franco involvement in Team Canada allowed for a temporary truce between Quebec and the rest of Canada for the purposes of a shared national pastime. The eventual victory of Team Canada in game eight of the Series would ultimately quell questions of white male superiority brought about by the civil rights movement and secondwave feminism. Therefore, the 1972 Summit Series provided a forum for Canadian men to conquer their crises of masculinity that had been created by the socio-political conditions of the 1970s.

The Games

In the 1972 Summit Series, Team Canada went into the tournament with the confidence of a nation behind them and the certainty that they would not be challenged by the Soviet players. Canadians collectively believed that nobody could unseat them as the best hockey nation and they clung to that belief throughout Canada's boycott of the IIHF from 1970 to 1976.³³ After all, it was evident to Canadians that the Soviet Team had been winning international competition only because Canada was not there to beat them. In a poll conducted by *The Hockey News*, not one expert predicted the Soviets

³²George Orwell, "The Sporting Spirit," *Tribune*, 14 December 1945.

³³Canada boycotted the World Championships and the Olympic Games in protest of the IIHF's refusal to allow them to roster professional players from the NHL. This would be resolved in 1977 when the IIHF eventually conceded to Canada's demands to play professional players.

would win any one of the eight games.³⁴ When the 1972 Summit Series was announced, Canadians knew that Canada would win with the unshakable confidence of a country who found their identity on the same ice as the game of hockey itself. The upset in game one altered the way Canadians viewed the Summit Series and created a temporary identity crisis within the nation, which lasted at least until Canada narrowly won the series in game eight in Moscow. This narrow victory would become the basis for Canadian nationalist expression after the events of the Summit Series were appropriated to suit the necessary national narrative.

The first game of the series, played in the Montreal Forum on 2 September 1972, was a major shock to Canadians. Despite Canada scoring only 30 seconds into the first period, the Soviet Union drastically outplayed the Canadians, outscoring them 7-3 and taking the win in one of the most shocking upsets in hockey history. Players and fans were stunned. The early goal for Team Canada seemed like a false promise. Tim Burke, a reporter for The Montreal Gazette, described the tone after the first goal: "The crowd was delirious, all their preconceptions of Canadian hockey supremacy fulfilled."35 However, this would not last as Russia tied the score by the end of the first period and surpassed Canada for the victory in the second. The temperature of the Forum reached a disappointed fever pitch of 115°F and the concessions ran out of cold beer.³⁶ Intrinsic symbols of Canada – hockey, ice, and beer – had been defeated on all levels. Ted Blackman, the sports editor for The Montreal Gazette, lamented after game one's loss that "When our national institution crumbles with one bolshevik bodycheck [sic], what then can preserve the adjacent out-buildings of our culture? Nothing. Our national inferiority complex, defended only by our hockey, may now become terminal neurosis."37 The Soviet news agency, Tass, similarly agreed that the USSR's victory destroyed Canada's "myth of invincibility."38

³⁴Brian Macfarlane, *Team Canada 1972: Where are they now?* (Etobicoke, ON: Winding Stair Press, 2001), 9.

³⁵Tim Burke, "The beat us almost everywhere – Sinden," *The Montreal Gazette*, 4 Sep. 72, 14.

³⁶Ibid., 14.

³⁷Ted Blackman, "A dark day: Sept. 2, 1972; when pride turned to trauma," *The Montreal Gazette*, 4 September 1972, 13.

³⁸Tass: Invincibility myth destroyed," *The Montreal Gazette*, 4 September 1972, 17.

The rest of the series would be a fight. Canada came back to win game two with a 4-1 victory in Toronto, comforting fans that perhaps the first game was indeed a fluke. But then the Soviets tied Canada in game three in Winnipeg and won game four in Vancouver. With more than their dignity on the line, Canada had to win on Russian soil and prove that the Canadian national identity was not based on a false premise. Game five, played in the Luzhniki Ice Palace in Moscow, appeared to be Canada's redemption, with the score reading 3-0 Canada at the end of the second period. In the third and final period of the game, the Soviets scored five goals, while Canada only collected one extra goal, giving the Soviets a decisive 5-4 win. With Canada trailing the Soviets 3-to-1 in series wins, game six was, in the words of hockey play-by-play announcer Foster Hewitt, "Do or die."³⁹

Game six ended in a 3-2 win for Canada, restoring the hope of both the team and the nation. Game seven would similarly end in a one goal victory, with the final score being 4-3 in Canada's favour. Going into the final game of the series, the Canadians and Soviets were tied with three wins each and one tied game. The final game would be the deciding factor. Hewitt observed in the first minute of the broadcast that whether Canada won or lost to the Soviets, that night they would be "making hockey history."⁴⁰

The Canadians played like their lives were on the line. They played faster and harder than they had the entire tournament as the game descended into chaos. Canadian player Jean-Paul Parise was thrown out of the game, players fought with the crowds, a chair and bench were thrown onto the ice in protest, and the screams of the crowds were deafening. During the broadcast, shortly before the puck dropped on the second period, a fan sign appeared with two words: "Mission possible."⁴¹ Paul Henderson, who had scored the game-winning goal in the previous game, proved this fan correct

³⁹Foster Hewitt and Brian Conacher, "Game Six," *Canada-USSR 1972 Summit Series*, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Toronto 24 September 1972. Available at https://youtu.be/1_TPt-uSG6A

⁴¹Foster Hewitt and Brian Conacher, "Game Eight," *Canada-USSR 1972 Summit Series*, Canadian Broadcasting Company, Toronto, 28 September 1972. Available at https://youtu.be/JNFfK7lnLbY

⁴¹Ibid.

when he broke the tied score with 34 seconds left on the clock to win Canada the series. Paul Henderson proved, with what he would later call 'the goal of his life,' that hockey belonged to the northern climate of Canada and to the people of the Canadian nation. In scoring that final game winning goal, Paul Henderson had won a war.

1972 was the midst of the Cold War and, as such, victory for Team Canada in the Summit Series was crucial; this was not only to prove that Canada was superior at hockey, but also that Canada's capitalist, democratic society was superior to the Soviet Union's communist government, especially while navigating the difficult, political arms race between the United States and Canada. Canada's long held alliance with the United States, and the shared national values relating to capitalism and a Western lifestyle, overlaid the series with a competition between ways of life, of which Canadians were certain they had the preferable version. This viewpoint is why the 7-3 loss to the Soviets in game one was particularly shocking. Communism should not have been able to produce a team that dominated one created by Canada's more desirable political system. Canadians had predicted that the individuality permitted by their democracy would allow Team Canada to surprise the Soviet players, who were forced to play as a cohesive unit. Ironically, this freedom of individuality and presumption of superiority is exactly what backfired against Team Canada leading to that first blowout loss. Following the first loss, the narrative surrounded shifted, for example: the strict training of the Russians became a positive attribute, instead of a hindrance to their performance. After game one, Claude Ruel, a scout for the Montreal Canadiens, stated that, "The difference between them and us... is that if they show up for practice late, they could go to jail. Our guys can do anything they want these days."42

In his 1972 summary of the Summit Series, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, Jack Ludwig argued that by game four, Canadian fans began to recognize that the individualistic style of play Canadians resorted to would not win the series, leading to them booing the players.⁴³ To cite Brian Kennedy, "The irony was, of course, that in jeering

⁴²Quoted in Burke, "They beat us almost everywhere – Sinden," 14.

⁴³Jack Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), 79.

the Canadian players for their use of this style, Canadian fans were inadvertently booing the players for acting as Canadians believed that Canadians should act."⁴⁴ The conclusion of the Canadian half of the series was considered a disgrace to the country and, as Ludwig argued, "many of us knew that even if Team Canada were to go into Moscow and win all four game there by scores of 10-0, what happened in Montreal and Vancouver would still stand, and constitute a 'national identity crisis."⁴⁵

However, once Team Canada, joined by 2,700 Canadian fans, reached Moscow for the final four games of the series, the Canadian way of life would be confirmed as superior in multiple ways. First, life in the Soviet Union was a shock to visiting Canadian fans. They had to endure the shortages of consumer goods and lineups to which Russians had become accustomed. Canadians were confused how a team that had fishnets behind their net could challenge "men of financial status and security."⁴⁶ Ludwig wrote that:

If Team Canada had felt pity for the USSR players before the series began in Montreal, how much greater their pity now that they saw the that went with worn-out skates, cheap sticks, and the rest of it: a country with cars that look like demolition derby chevvies going to their certain doom in the next crash! A country with raincoats that looked like chintzy drop-cloths painters use to cover North American floors! And narrow ties – or that mug-shot look of many Soviet citizens, tieless, with the teentsie collar buttoned at the neck! Team Canada, when not in their official blazers, were ashamed to strut around in four-hundred-buck handmade suits – almost.⁴⁷

Ludwig's description does not evoke pity for Russians, but rather a sense of dread in Canadian audiences regarding the threat of communism. Team Canada had to prove that this system, which

⁴⁴Brian Kennedy, "Confronting a Compelling Order: The Summit Series and the Nostalgic (Trans)Formation of Canadian Identity," In *Canada's Game: Hockey and Identity*, Andrew C. Holman, ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 53.

⁴⁵Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow*, 82.

⁴⁶Ibid., 97.

⁴⁷Ibid., 97.

created so much suffering in Canadians' view, was not able to beat their own.

Second, once in Moscow, Team Canada started to win by leaning further into the more hard-hitting, Canadian style of hockey that had come to be associated with the NHL. Game six was an incredibly violent game, as Brian Conacher, the colour commentator for the series, described in the broadcast for CBC, "Down on that ice, it's just pure war. These two teams are going at it... They're not sparing the body."⁴⁸ Foster Hewitt agreed, stating with a sense of pride that there was, "Plenty of hard hitting, most of it handed out by the Canadians."⁴⁹ Game seven and eight remained violent. Canadians took to pushing the Soviets around on the ice and physically challenging them in a different style of gameplay: one that reflected traditional ideas of Canadian masculinity. The Summit Series affirmed the superiority of the Canadian way of life in one very key and simple way: Canada won.

When the Summit Series descended into violent play in Moscow, the players were essentially legitimizing their place on the ice and re-establishing their masculinity after being effectively emasculated by their losses in the first half of the series. The necessity for victory negated the comfort and safety of the players. Team Canada coach Harry Sinden recounted in his journal of the Summit Series that before game eight, "I found three defensemen hurting... I expect all of them to play."⁵⁰ The players' injuries were overlooked in favor of having them on the ice. One of the most frightening instances came in game five of the series, when Paul Henderson slid head first into the boards and had to be helped off the ice.⁵¹ It is likely that Henderson was saved from a horrendous injury because he happened to be one of only two players on Team Canada to wear a helmet, in contrast to the imposed and communist uniformity of Soviet players who all wore helmets. In a complete disregard for his

⁴⁸Hewitt and Conacher, "Game Six."

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Harry Sinden, *Hockey Showdown: The Canada-Russia Hockey Series* (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1972), 108.

⁵¹Foster Hewitt and Brian Conacher, "Game Five," *Canada-USSR 1972 Summit Series*, CTV Television Network, Toronto, 22 September 1972. Available at https://youtu.be/xER2E0jMu6w

injury, Paul Henderson returned to the ice for the third period, where he scored the fourth and final goal of the game for Canada. This disregard for any potential or sustained injury is congruent with how men are expected to regard their physical well-being when victory is on the line. As noted by Varda Burstyn, "Though both war and many sports put men at risk of serious injury and death, they give men [...] a sense of security and belonging that seems, at least to many, ultimately more important than the physical risks they are asked to take." In the case of the 1972 Summit Series and war, the nation is also considered more important than the physical risks to players.

As Team Canada became more desperate for a victory, they also became more violent and aggressive. This culminated in game six, when Bobby Clarke slashed the ankle of Soviet captain, Valeri Kharlamov, cracking the bone and taking him out of game seven. Kharlamov did return for game eight and, like Henderson, played with an injury. Regarding similarities between the Soviet and Canadian teams, the prevalence of toxic masculinity is most prominent. Both teams' anger resorted to violence since, according to masculine codes, these are the only valid emotions for men to feel and express. Hockey indoctrinates boys into a culture of hyper masculinity. Players are taught young not to show pain so that by the time they might be playing professionally, they are aware that, in the world of hockey, the only appropriate emotion to show in excess is aggression, especially when one is losing. Since loss in sport calls into question men's dominance and physical ability, it essentially emasculates the losing team. This sense of inferiority forces the losing team to overperform their gender through violence and aggression to regain masculine dominance. Team Canada, having lost three important games, were emasculated by the Summit Series on home soil; therefore, the aggression shown by Team Canada was legitimized, both by the war-like environment promoted by the games and by the players' need to reaffirm their own masculinity.

Team Canada took on the hopes and wishes of the nation. The backs of their jerseys were even void of players' surnames, instead containing the word 'CANADA,' thus reducing these men to their nationality and ability to play for the country. For a national identity that stressed their players' individuality over the Soviets' homogeneity, the irony of branding their players with the country's name and nothing else seemed to be lost on them. The men, like soldiers, were diminished to their place serving the nation. However, like many soldiers, the players wore their jerseys with pride and nationalism was expected of them. As expressed by Phil Esposito, "It was heresy to say you didn't want to play for your country."⁵² Esposito perhaps gave one of the most impassioned speeches of the series at the conclusion of game four. Addressing Canadian fans who had been booing the players, he stated that:

Every one of us guys, thirty-five guys, that came out and played for Team Canada, we did it because we love our country, and not for any other reason. No other reason. They can throw the money for the pension fund out the window. They can throw anything they want out the window. We came because we love Canada. And even though we play in the United States, and we earn money in the United States, Canada is still our home. That's the only reason we come.⁵³

Phil Esposito, and by extension the rest of the Summit Series team, publicly loved a particular version of Canada. It was one that endorsed men that looked and behaved like them. True, the Summit Series momentarily united a divided country over the love of a sport that had been deeply tied to Canadian national identity, but hockey often fails to recognize the issues with Canada's constructed myths, particularly the one that surrounds a violent and masculine sport. The Summit Series, and its story of defied expectations through increasingly aggressive play, is both a product of the Canadian national myth of superiority and a perpetrator of its continuation in the realm of hockey. In summary, though Team Canada nearly lost the Summit Series, their eventual victory through identifiably-Canadian, masculine style of play meant that their now established victory over the "other" extended back towards those in Canada who criticized hockey, and by extension, Canadian culture. The Summit Series emphasized the values of a masculine Canada that would remain in place for the remainder of the twentieth century.

The Summit Series in Legacy and Popular Memory

 ⁵²Phil Esposito, *Hockey is My Life* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1972), 176.
 ⁵³Hewitt and Conacher, "Game Four."

Paul Henderson's game winning goal in the final minute of play in game eight of the Summit Series has arguably remained the most significant instance of Canadian nationalism expressed through a singular moment of sport. However, Paul Henderson's goal, dubbed the 'goal of the century,' has become a part of the greater Canadian mythology while also being almost separated entirely from the historical reality of the series and the game. The Canadian memory of the Summit Series has largely ignored the struggle for victory, in favour of recounting the unquestionable dominance of Canadian masculinity, in both hockey and international politics. Therefore, the legacy of the Summit Series accurately replicates the ways Canadians interact with their history as a comforting exercise that reaffirms the existing hegemony of white male Canadian society and confirms Canada's superiority in international politics.

Immediately following Team Canada's win, newspapers across the country jumped onto the story of Canada's valiant comeback to rightfully claim its title as the best hockey nation. Jack Dulmage of *The Windsor Star* called the victory in Moscow, "Canada's greatest hour a page from a fairy tale."⁵⁴ Canadians across the nation rejoiced with the news of Canada's 6-5 win over the Soviet Union. Parties took place in the streets, with a group of 35 Canadians showing up outside of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, chanting "Esposito for Prime Minister" and singing "O Canada."⁵⁵ From the eastern coast of the country to the far west, Canadians were overjoyed with Team Canada's performance in game eight. Kathy Hugessen, a 23-yearold student in Montreal, proclaimed through tears and laughter that, "I'm so happy we won. I'm so damn proud of being a Canadian today."⁵⁶

Government officials joined in the celebrations, recognizing the unique opportunity to espouse Canadian nationalism over the final game of hockey. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau wired a message to the victorious Team Canada immediately following their victory,

⁵⁴Jack Dulmage, "Canada's greatest hour a page from a fairy tale," *The Windsor Star*, 29 September 1972, 1.

 ⁵⁵ "They'll return as conquering heroes," *The Vancouver Sun*, 29 September 1972, 1.
 ⁵⁶ Quoted in "Canadians flip as Russians slip – WE'RE THE CHAMPS," *The Calgary Herald*, 29 September 1972, 1.

telling them that:

The election campaign and virtually every other activity in Canada came to a standstill this afternoon while Canadians watched game number eight in this great hockey series. The country is now in a state of enthusiastic revelry following your tremendous victory. From start to finish, these games have been exciting and filled with tension, but only one word describes today's result – Wow!⁵⁷

The Summit Series was a unifying moment for a nation that loved a sport they believed was born on their frigid land. As the indisputable evidence of Canada's national ownership of hockey, it was something that all Canadians could rally behind. By joining in the euphoria of Canada's victory, and participating in the celebrations, Canadians were participating in the construction of a major element of our national myth. As argued by Roy MacSkimming, "By sharing in the enactment of the myth, Canadians - temperamentally so fractious and resentful a people, then as now, on grounds of language or region or ethnicity - joined together in a rare moment of unity. By surrendering to a process larger than ourselves, we transcended the pettiness of our usual concerns."58 The Summit Series was an occasion of Canadian nationalism that would go on to be recognized as one of the most important moments in our collective national history. Team Canada coach Harry Sinden reflected on game eight of the Summit Series as a vindication of his belief in the nation. He stated, "I said it was going to be the greatest hockey game ever played. It was - if you're Canadian."⁵⁹ Beyond the greatest hockey game, the lastminute Henderson goal was the greatest moment in international sport - if vou're Canadian.

However, despite Henderson's Hall-of-Fame worthy play, the Summit Series was not a decisive victory. Team Canada barely scraped by with the series win and the Soviets actually outscored them in the series 32-to-31. The struggles of Team Canada to win, and the

 ⁵⁷"Jubilant welcome planned for players," *The Vancouver Sun*, 29 September 1972, 2.
 ⁵⁸Roy MacSkimming, *Cold War: The Amazing Canada-Soviet Hockey Series of* 1972 (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 1996), 3.
 ⁵⁰C. L. M. L. Classica, 100

⁵⁹Sinden, Hockey Showdown, 109.

negative press received by Team Canada after the early games, were forgotten in the face of Henderson's goal. Some credited the tight series win for the excitement of the game, like Jack Dulmage, who wrote in *The Windsor Star* that, "True, they didn't [win] by much, but the way they did it wrote one of the most thrilling chapters in the history of global competition."⁶⁰ In the five decades since 1972, the series has similarly been cut down to the moment of Canada's win. The Summit Series has entered Canadian myth as a reassurance of Canada's world dominance in hockey. All other elements of the series – the losses, the violent play, the deflated sense of nationalism and decline in hope during defeat – have all been forgotten in favour of a national narrative that confirms that great, white, Canadian men are unbeatable at hockey and unbeatable at being Canadian.

The violence of the Summit Series is perhaps the most revised element of the history. Bobby Clarke's slash on Valeri Kharlamov has gone from horrifying to heroic. Jean-Paul Parise's threat to an official is understandable, and not outlandish. Victory and memory have softened the sharp edges of the violent series. Given that nationalism, as argued by Eric Hobsbawm, is founded on a shared national mythology,⁶¹ the altered memory of the Summit Series as a heroic and definitive win for Team Canada (as opposed to its reality as an increasingly embarrassing sequence of losses), mythologizes its narrative for the purposes of confirming the national folklore. In the face of Cold War politics, this affirmation of Canada's national myth of hockey superiority was necessary to ensure that Canadian patriotism would prevail. Therefore, the true nature of the Summit Series had to be transformed in such a way that did not question Canada's claim to hockey greatness, even if that greatness had been achieved through violent and unsportsmanlike measures.

Even immediately following the win, reporters were excusing the actions of Team Canada in securing their place as champions. Jack Dulmage wrote of the violence in game eight that, "the furious venting of temperament served to steady the game down. It was an escape valve for tensions that had been building for two days. The climate enveloping this final game was like a powder keg in

⁶⁰Dulmage, "Canada's greatest hour a page from a fairy tale," 1.

⁶¹Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," 1-2.

the centre of Moscow. The pride of two nations was nakedly on the line."⁶² Dulmage added, "It was inevitable that open fighting would come sooner or later. The series meant so much to the players."⁶³ Harry Sinden, likewise excused the violent play, saying simply that, "Even though our feelings ran very high, the series proved valuable to all players and fans in North America. In the end it was a victory for *our style* and victory for *our team* [emphasis my own]."⁶⁴ In Sinden's mind, like many Canadians, the violent, aggressive play in game eight was Canadian men playing like Canadian men and, in doing so, fully rejecting the communist, Soviet style of masculinity. It was Canadians *being* Canadian that won the series.

This is the myth of Canada: that aggressively masculine traits will always, and should always, result in victory. Canada is founded upon the idea that men must behave as traditionally masculine for our nation to be successful. The Summit Series embraced and furthered this message by leaning into the violence of hockey, a sport that has been considered Canadian nearly as long as Canada has been an independent nation. The myth of Canada owning hockey is a myth of Canada owning the performance of masculinity for our national benefit. This myth creates a nation where the characteristics of hockey are the chosen and endorsed characteristics of the people themselves. A sport that preaches acceptance of only a severely limited demographic will extend to the behaviour of the nation, and thus contradict the idea of Canada as a multicultural and peaceful country. Canada has embraced the story of hockey as our central and unifying myth, but this myth fails to recognize the irony of hockey's exclusivity in a country that espouses diversity. The 1972 Summit Series prolonged the exclusive nature of hockey and implicitly argued that a diverse nation should embrace a sport that is actively hostile to their inclusion because it is how Canada wins. MacSkimming argues that, "The 1972 Canada-Soviet series swept us into a wider world, and in the end it changed us; we learned something vital about who we are, and where and what we've come from. It was an odyssey from

⁶²Jack Dulmage, "The big game that very nearly wasn't," *The Windsor Star*, 29 September 1972, 1.

⁶³Dulmage, "Canada's greatest hour a page from a fairy tale," 2.

⁶⁴Quoted in Dulmage, "The big game that very nearly wasn't."

innocence to experience."65

But what did Canada learn? Canada learned that hockey is best played when a nation has nothing to lose, but everything to win. Canada learned that hockey is meant to be violently masculine and that when hockey is meant to be an extension of our national identity, those things must accompany each other. The Summit Series was a lesson in what it meant to be Canadian, but whether that lesson was a positive one to learn has yet to be shown. We stand fifty years from the events of the 1972 Summit Series and still, all that lives on in most Canadians' recollections is a single, show-stopping goal. The goal of the century.

Conclusion

In his critically acclaimed 2017 novel, Beartown, Fredik Backman writes of hockey that, "This game demands one thing from you. Your all."66 In the 1972 Summit Series, Canada demanded the same thing from its players. Canada demanded that they sacrifice their bodies to secure Canada's place as the best nation in the world at hockey. In many ways, the Summit Series exaggerated the relationship between Canadians and hockey, assuming that to every Canadian, a victory in Moscow was the most important event of the year. Yet, also in many ways, the Summit Series is an accurate embodiment of what hockey means to our nation. Hockey is the story we tell our children when we are teaching them who to be. Hockey is a story of Canada, and of Canadians' innate desire to find meaning in our frozen, northern nation. It has become our collective prayer for a united Canada. As stated by Jonathan Toews and Sidney Crosby at the 2016 World Cup of Hockey, "Canada didn't invent hockey, hockey invented Canada."67

At the fiftieth anniversary of the 1972 Summit Series, we reflect

⁶⁵MacSkimming, Cold War, 3.

⁶⁶Fredrik Backman, Beartown, Neil Smith, trans. (Toronto: Simon & Schuster Canada, 2017), 7.

⁶⁷Quoted in Tyler Shipley, "Hockey Invented Canada: Questioning the Myth of Manufactured Nationalism," In *The Spaces and Places of Canadian Popular Culture*, Victoria Kannen and Neil Shyminsky, eds. (Toronto: Canadian Scholars, 2019), 342.

upon these games with the same sense of nostalgia and amnesia that we have throughout much of these five decades. Canada forgets the ugly parts of the series in favour of the beauty of a united nation. The Summit Series is not an honest story. It is a lie we have crafted to find comfort in the established hegemony of Canadian society. After all, if the society that created the 1972 Team Canada could beat the Russians, then how could that society be bad? Perhaps, the answer lies in our close ties to hockey.

Canada has not appropriately questioned our ties to hockey as an identity and what this means for the ways we conceptualize our country. We embrace the game winning goals and the united euphoria of a gold medal or a series title, but if we are to accept hockey as a foundation for what it means to be Canadian, then we have to face and accept that this includes the less savory aspects of the sport. If hockey is to be Canadian, then violent, masculine play is equally Canadian. The 1972 Summit Series was an outlet for the expression of Canadian national identity during the Cold War that stressed the superiority of Canadian life (and hockey) over that of the Soviet Union. The Summit Series did not create the association between Canada and hockey, but it did legitimize it as serious evidence of Canada's place in the world, and as a domestic means of hegemonic gender performance. Therefore, by winning the Summit Series, Team Canada strengthened the bonds between the nation and hockey and, by extension, hockey's established uniformity and order of superiority, in a period when Canadians had been questioning the makeup of Canada's social hierarchy. The Summit Series reaffirmed that the basis of Canadian society should be the type of men who play hockey.

As Team Canada Coach Harry Sinden noted, "hockey never leaves the blood of a Canadian."⁶⁸ In some ways, he is correct. Much of this country's heart beats for a sport that does not love most of us back. If we are to accept that hockey is inherently running in the bloodstreams of this nation, then we must also question if it is poisoning our national understanding of who we are, and what we must be. Hockey *is* Canadian, but maybe that is the problem. Our national identity is tied so closely to the sport, that to criticize

⁶⁸Sinden, Showdown, 38.

its violence and fraternal culture is to criticize these elements of Canadian society as well. This makes Canadians reluctant to face that there are systemic issues within the game that reflect how we relate to being Canadian. Much like with the Summit Series, Canadians would rather focus on victory, the glorious and easily performative elements of the sport, than acknowledge how we got there – through violence. In the words of Team Canada goalie, Ken Dryden, "This is hockey. Until somebody changes it."⁶⁹ And, likewise, I posit that this, through the medium of hockey, is how Canadians understand, relate to, and justify our history. At least, until somebody changes it.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Dr. Monda Halpern and Lindsay Annis of Western University, as well as Dr. Taylor McKee and Holly Morrison of Brock University for their contributions and assistance with this paper.

⁶⁹Ken Dryden, "Saving the Game," *The Globe and Mail*. 27 March 2004. http://www. theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/saving-the-game/article742669/?page=all



PERSONAL REFLECTION: KARIM KURJI

The Summit Series was held long before I was born. I don't feel strongly about the tournament, probably because it happened in an era that I only experienced through reading about it in school, and tournaments like the Summit Series haven't really occurred since.

To me, the Summit Series was another minor element of the Cold War and a way for Canada to prove they were the best hockey team in the world because they were not participating in IIHF events. With the absence of true best-on-best tournaments for many years now, it would be fun to have tournaments like the Summit Series happen again, without the Cold War influences hanging over the tournament, of course.

chapter two

[hendərsən] By: Nathan Dueck

[hɛndərsən]

n.

was never spoken in normal voice around town

interj.

instead it was shouted

A shout of congratulations, i didnt know why

encouragement,

was it a battle cry an ad slogan heckle

or celebration;

i shouldve known when my rural dad was about as old me

an utterance by one speaker or spoken in unison.

he perched beside his rural dad like some cotton clad gargoyle on the chesterfield to gawk at channel 6 over eight days in september

1972 F. HEWITT, Canadian Broadcasting Corp.

until they heard the call

"Henderson!"

i didnt know why it was shouted in the receiving line before the math provincial from the bench during intramural volleyball by major junior hockey players on the parade float after a baptismal service

and

the time that plumber fixed the pump for our well

trans. v.

Can. colloquial.

To celebrate the effective completion of a procedure.

i didnt know it was ever the name shouted by a playbyplay broadcaster aka the voice of hockey when a rural dad raised his arms and launched into arms raised like some polyester clad angel honestly though that call

shrill

nasal eerie

always scared me

witless

for a second

chapter three

Because "All We Are Is the Memory of Ourselves": The Summit Series Now, and Then By: Brian Kennedy

It's a strange thing: the memory of a scene from the distant past, haunted by people who have grown up or grown old or are no more, doing things that are no longer done in a world that no longer exists. And yet it all seems so vivid in our minds that we can still see the glint in their eyes or the twitch at the corner of their mouths. Sometimes we even say their names under our breath as if that could magically bring them back to us.

Dr. Neel Burton, psychiatrist, describing nostalgia

In a consumer-capitalist world, an excess of nostalgia exists partly because it has to—business needs products to sell, and capitalizing on memories is an easy mark. At the same time, a jaded academy scorns memory-keepers as sentimentalists.

David Berry, in *On Nostalgia*, explains that "[M]odern nostalgia... is often treated dismissively or with suspicion" (23). He later adds, "[C]alling something 'nostalgic' or accusing someone of indulging in nostalgia is used as a sort of general slur, an easy shorthand that suggests some level of moral failure or backward thinking" (34).

Berry does not rest there, however. He rescues the nostalgic from condemnation and creates value for nostalgia: "[I]f you surround yourself with it [a particular era in history], constantly relive it, well, aren't you going back, kind of? Nostalgia here is not just a mere feeling, haphazardly accessed, but a full-on way of being" (57). He clinches the point by saying that nostalgia is not something to apologize for once we recognize that "[u]ltimately, all we are is the memory of ourselves" (145).

Like many Canadians of a certain age, I frequently dwell on particular moments that happened in September 1972. That month played host to events comprising the 1972 Summit Series, eight hockey games between Team Canada and a team from the USSR that began with an assertion—we are better than the Russians—and ended with Paul Henderson tumbling into Yvan Cournoyer's arms 26 days later, the point seemingly proved. I am nostalgic for these events. But I don't presume that they exist in any reproducible, durable way. Rather, they live in the chaos of my memory. I don't apologize for the value that I ascribe to them, because I realize that reveling in them renders me active in meaningmaking, making me, and others who share similar memories, "knowable, sensible, [having] some kind of arc or meaning—even if it never extend[s] much beyond our own head" (Berry 147).

This essay is a mash-up of my memories of that Series and its resonances in the 50 years since. Aside from memory fragments, it is comprised of documentary evidence gathered from my library of books on the Series as well as other artifacts, "facts" about what happened in games, stories of my later encounters with players, and scholarly citations on nostalgia. Of necessity, this agglomeration serves as an illustration that the past exists only in fragmented, disordered, and inaccurate form, and yet it also points to the power of nostalgia, which, no matter that it cannot offer a master narrative, gives glimpses into both what happened and what remains of what happened.

Fifty years after the moment(s), nostalgia's constructive effects demand attention because "though we cannot return to whatever moment we're pining for, we can learn something about who and what we are simply by understanding what it is we want to return to. Nostalgia is one of our most potent methods of creating the self . . . (Berry 111).

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Afterwards

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Three large-format books were produced about the Summit Series in the era of the Series itself: *Face-off of the Century: The New Era*, *Twenty-seven Days in September*, and *Death of a Legend: Summer of* '72 Team Canada vs. USSR Nationals.

Sometime in or around 1972-73, I acquired copies of all three of these books in Montreal, Quebec, where I was being raised. Fifty years later, as I write about the Summit Series, I have acquired copies of all three again. The old ones are not lost. They are in my nightstand. I bought duplicates because I don't want to mar my originals by frequently opening them and closing them to do research for the various things I've published on the Series. Plus, as an English professor, I mark texts as I read. I would never mark my own Summit Series books. The ones bought from strangers on the internet don't carry the same attachment to me.

However, my books are not mint. Inside the front cover of my copy of *Face-off of the Century*, in the slightly exaggerated cursive of a ten-year-old, it says:

Brian Kennedy 470 Victor Hugo Brossard, Que, Canada 671-5117

All this time later, I would like to read this as not just me possessing the book, but me possessing the Summit Series. To again cite Berry: "Nostalgia is not just an intensely personal experience, it is almost an exclusively personal one... [because] even if we are inspired into nostalgia by the same object, even if we are yearning for the same event or the same person, our experience of it will be, if not substantially different, at least meaningful in different ways, both occurring from different perspectives and spiralling out to suck in different references" (75).

My family left our Montreal roots for Ontario in the mid-1970s, when a referendum on Quebec's separation from Canada loomed. I later evacuated myself to the US to go to graduate school. The books I owned about the Summit Series, and other memorabilia, survived these various moves.

My poster of Team Canada '72 is rolled up and stored in the front closet of my California home. An identical poster is on eBay right now for \$199 USD. That one is perfect. Mine is tattered at the corners from being moved from house to house when my family left Quebec and later made two more house removals in Ontario between 1974 and 1981. Each time, I pulled out the staples, rolled the poster, and reversed the process in my new room. Occasionally, I look at the faces on that poster and wonder who will be the last player on Team Canada '72 to die. The youngest who played at least one of the eight games in the Summit Series is Gilbert Perreault, so demographics favor him to survive the longest. He just turned 70.

It would be prosaic if Paul Henderson could outlast all the others, though he has had health struggles for the past number of years. But it's probably going to be like the Beatles: they'll die off in reverse order of talent. I love Ringo, but I'm sure he'll be the last of the Fab Four to go.

Anyway, in 1972, they all looked old to me, although the grandpa of the group, goaltender Eddie Johnston, was 36, twenty-plus years younger than I am now. Ken Dryden, until then my hero, was 25.

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Before September 2, 1972
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Face-off of the Century starts with an Introduction in which the author explains the mood of training camp for Team Canada. "Hockey has come early this season, and come with a bang," he says. He cites Peter Mahovlich, breathing hard from a couple of turns around the ice, who says, "Comradeship, that's what we have here; you will not find it anywhere else" (7).

That word, "Comradeship," would sound, to most Canadians at the time, much more Russian than Canadian.

The Summit Series was the second-most-important thing to happen to me up until September of 1972, when I was nine. The first was Ken Dryden and the Montreal Canadiens winning the Stanley Cup in 1971.

Together these events superseded the impact of my grandfather's death in 1967, when I was four. When that happened, I merely

adjusted the prayer I said before bed to omit "Grandy" when it came time to list the people I wanted God to bless.

Game 1

"Nostalgia appears to be a longing for a place but is actually a yearning for a different time—the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams. In a broader sense, nostalgia is a rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress. The nostalgic desires to obliterate history and turn it into private or collective mythology..." (Boym np).

Phil Esposito's first goal of the Series might have been his most memorable because it came suddenly, at the 30-second mark of period one in Montreal, confirming everything we thought about the superiority of Team Canada.

My father and I were watching the game from our living room in Brossard, on the South Shore twenty minutes from the Montreal Forum, where the game took place. I was thrilled. My dad was barely over his pique at seeing Pierre Elliott Trudeau drop the ceremonial first puck.

Nowadays, ceremonial puck drops are not contested. The puck is dropped, it lies on the ice, and the home captain normally flicks his or her stick at it and scoops it up with a hand to give to the honored guests who look on. I don't know if things were that way in the 1970s. Certainly Phil Esposito didn't think so. He actively tried to win the ceremonial faceoff before Game 1, and he succeeded. My father was not amused, but this had little to do with hockey.

What offended him was that Trudeau, in the middle of an election campaign, was using the Series as a political stage. Most of what he blustered out concerned Trudeau's choice of fashion. He wore an open shirt with a silk scarf and a rose in his lapel. ***

Face-off of the Century contains a picture of the ceremonial faceoff. It shows Trudeau with an arm down, having just tossed the puck between two players. On the right is Esposito, who has corralled the puck on his backhand. On the left is a player in Team USSR white, standing still, his stick where it must have been when he and Espo lined up. His number is not visible. He is identified in the caption as Vladimir Starshinov. Other sources indicate that his first name was Vyacheslav.

Starshinov had been playing elite Soviet hockey since 1957. He was part of the teams that won the World Championship from 1963-71. He scored almost a goal a game in the Soviet league and International play.

Stats indicate that Starshinov actually played in only one game of the Series, Game 2 in Toronto. There is nothing that explains why he was the one to take the ceremonial drop to start the Series.

In the bio offered of him in *Death of a Legend*, Starshinov gets yet another name, "Viacheslav Starshinov," and he is described as "retired, but recalled for Canadian tour" with the further comment, "[N]ever any doubt of his ability to play North American pro hockey; tough and great; his stick may have saved Russians' championship in 1967 when it injured Carl Brewer's eye" (29).

This description interests me for what the writer, Henk Hoppener, sees to be the key quality of professional hockey in the NHL: toughness. It is odd that he attributes Starshinov's stick with agency, but not atypical to hear a European player criticized for what is often called "Stickwork." This kind of dirty play would be a major issue as the Summit Series wore on.

I have a vinyl record produced in the aftermath of the Summit Series called *Canada Russia Hockey Series 1972*, which has a number of

color photo prints included with the record itself. In one, there's Trudeau again, this time standing between Jean Ratelle and an unidentified Russian player, who I think is Yakushev. Trudeau has the rose in the lapel, and it must be the same night, because he's got the same blue striped shirt and grey blazer on.

According to records, Ratelle did play in this game, one of six he contested in. In the photo, he is handing the Russian player a commemorative maple leaf banner.

In 1972, Canadians were suspicious of the Russians, thinking them to be the most foreign people we would ever see. Perhaps this was due to the angularity of their features, partly genetic, partly a reflection of their fitness and lack of body fat. Their haircuts, too, put us off with their severity. In truth, they all looked sort of the same to us, at least early in the Series, before we knew them as hockey players that could "almost" (read: quite capably) compete with us.

Turns out, our perceived lack of familiarity with them meant that we hadn't been paying attention. Fourteen players on Team Canada had either direct knowledge of Team USSR, having played them in prior tournaments, or clear indirect knowledge that should have told them the Russians were a dangerous and skilled hockey team. They, and the rest of us, chose to ignore those warnings.

Berry says, "We are naturally going to forget the humdrum . . . or the only somewhat exciting" (27). Canadians liked winning when it came to hockey, and the Russians had, after all, beaten us, and everyone else, for years at the World Championships. That's what the Series was going to avenge.

The Canadians lost Game 1, 7-3.

I still feel the disbelief I had that Saturday night when it was all over. It felt like a betrayal by Montreal's/Team Canada's goalie, Ken Dryden, of me. I could not see that the loss was partly the fault of his out-of-shape, exhausted team. *** 1971

I had become a worshipper of goaltender Ken Dryden in the spring of 1971, when he led the Montreal Canadiens to the Stanley Cup in a seven-game series against Tony Esposito and Chicago. It was the nature of the win—that Dryden was not even officially a "rookie" (he would win the Calder as rookie of the year in 1971-72) and that he had played only six games in the 1970-71 regular season—that made it surprising and shocking.

Chicago's Jim Pappin told me that he still dreamed about the chance he missed in the seventh game of the Chicago-Montreal series when Dryden somehow got a foot out and saved what would have been the tying goal. What he didn't realize was that he had to miss that shot, or better, Dryden had to stop it, or I wouldn't have fallen into my spell of hero worship of Dryden.

If that hadn't happened, I wouldn't have been so disappointed in Dryden's performance in the Summit Series, a feeling that exists, fifty years later, coterminous in my emotions with happiness over the Goal that won Game 8 for Team Canada.

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Game 2
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In my book *My Country Is Hockey*, I tell the story of Peter Mahovlich's goal in Game 2. It came off the most spectacular move I've ever seen, where he faked a slapshot, went wide right against Yevgeny Poladiev, got to the net, deked to his backhand-forehand-backhand, got Russian goalie Tretiak all sprawled out, and tucked the puck under him. I don't remember this goal, but I've seen it on DVD.

When I spoke with Pete in the LA Kings' press box some years ago, I led with that. He smiled, like he was happy for the memory,

but he also looked surprised that someone out on the West Coast remembers the Summit Series.

Canada won Game 2, 4-1. Tony Esposito was in net.

Tony Esposito was originally signed by the Montreal Canadiens, for whom he played 13 games in the 1968-69 season. He did not participate for the team in the playoffs that year, a season in which they won the Stanley Cup. Rogie Vachon and Gump Worsley shared playoff duties.

Esposito was claimed by Chicago in June of 1969 and played nearly 900 games for the Black Hawks (now Blackhawks). He would eventually become an American and play for the US in the 1981-82 Canada Cup tournament. In five games, he registered a 2-3 record.

Tony Esposito entered the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1988 and was named to the NHL's 100 Greatest Players list in 2017. I interviewed him that night after the ceremony in Los Angeles. I don't recall if I asked him about the Summit Series. I do remember telling him that my mom faked his autograph on the shaft of a hockey stick I used on my local rink. He laughed. At the end of the interview, he said, "Say hi to your mom for me."

Game 4

Tony's brother was Team Captain Phil Esposito, famous for a speech he gave after Game 4 in Vancouver, which Team Canada lost, 5-3, with Dryden in net. In it, he addressed the crowd in a passionate plea not to be so disappointed in the players on Team Canada. He said that the reason they were there was not for the pension money that was being raised but for the nation (which means, of course, that they were there precisely for the pension money, at least at first).

Esposito didn't say anything about his own production, which at this point in the Series totaled three goals and four assists. He was focused instead on asking fans to be more indulgent towards the Canadian players, at least until they got back from Moscow after the Series was over.

Esposito scored goals in games 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8. He tallied two assists in game 4. The only games in which he was shut out of the goals and assists were 5 and 6, the ones right after the speech.

As he pled for patience, he said that if he was wrong, he would personally apologize to every Canadian fan who was disappointed. I have no contemporary memory of this speech.

1970

"For almost anything to stick in our head, there has to be a reasonably strong emotional experience attached to it" (Berry 26).

Maybe at nine, Esposito-style Canadian nationalism hadn't crystallized for me because Quebec nationalism was preoccupying whatever headspace I had for such topics. Perhaps this was because as a resident of Brossard, Quebec, I had lived through the FLQ "October Crisis" in 1970. At the tail end of that series of events, Pierre Laporte was kidnapped and found dead in the trunk of a car. My mother told me that this happened quite close to our house. I had just turned eight.

A couple of years after the Summit Series, my parents moved our household to Peterborough, Ontario, mostly in response to the continuing fear of the language politics in Quebec. Up until then, everything I knew had reference to Montreal, most of it related to hockey.

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Game 3

A relatively unremarkable Game 3 was held in Winnipeg, which did not have an NHL team, but had a WHA franchise and served as Hockey Canada's home. The Canadians tied the Russians, or vice versa, 4-4, with Tony Esposito once again in the Team Canada net. I don't remember that. What I do remember, and YouTube footage confirms it, is that a giant portrait of the Queen hung at one end of the Winnipeg Arena.

In 2009, I wrote about this large painting in an essay called, "What Ever Happened to the Organ and the Portrait of the Queen?" I gave this paper at a conference. *The Globe and Mail* newspaper liked the title so much that they mentioned it in an article. In the piece, I did not talk about the Summit Series.

Game 4 and After

Dryden was back in for game 4, and he lost again, prompting boos, and Esposito's heart-to-heart talk. Team Canada thus left for Russia with Dryden sporting an 0-2-0 record and Esposito a 1-0-1 record. They alternated in Russia, with Esposito losing Game 5 and winning Game 7 and Dryden winning Games 6 and 8.

In 1973, Dryden tried to get ahead of the bad press he'd gotten for his play by giving his version of the Series in a book called *Face-off at the Summit*. Nobody ever mentions this book when talking about Dryden as a writer.

I wrote about Dryden's paperback in the volume I edited called *Coming Down the Mountain: Rethinking the 1972 Summit Series.* I offer a careful deconstruction of Dryden and others' use of the term "Professional" to talk about the Soviets in 1972. Though my book is academic in nature, I have to admit that I did not stay neutral in my approach, which was a product of the death of my hero worship of Dryden more than forty years prior.

My experience proves Svetlana Boym's claim: "In the emotional topography of memory, personal and historical events tend to be conflated" (*Future* 52).

By all statistical measures, Tony Esposito, was better than the goalie with whom he rotated. Each played four games. Dryden was 2-2, Esposito 2-1-1. Dryden allowed 19 goals for a 4.75 GAA, and Esposito allowed 13 for a 3.25.

But that wasn't the only goaltending story, or the most interesting one. On the other end of the ice, Vladislav Tretiak played all eight games for the Russians, allowing 31 goals (one less than the combined total of the Canadian netminders) for a 3.87 GAA. His style was a generation ahead of how the Canadian goalies played—precise, technical, measured. Everything he did had purpose.

Tretiak was taken by the Montreal Canadiens in round seven of the 1983 NHL entry draft, by which time he was 31. There was almost no hope the Soviets would allow him to leave to play in Canada. He retired from CSKA Moscow after the 1983-84 season.

Then things changed in the Soviet Union. Tretiak worked as a coach for Chicago for several years between 1994-95 and 2003-04. He went into the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1989. He turns seventy in 2022.

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2020
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The third goalie on Team Canada was Eddie Johnston of the Boston Bruins. He was 36 and thus "old" for the job, but his coach, before he had been fired by Boston, was Harry Sinden, in 1972 the coach of Team Canada. Sinden and Johnston had won the Stanley Cup together in 1970.

Johnston never got into a Summit Series game. He played in one exhibition contest against Sweden between the Canada and USSR

portions of the Series. He was the backup for six games of the big eight.

In 2020, I got a call from a writer for the *New York Times*. He started the conversation by saying, "I'm writing an obituary of someone who has not died and who is not sick. Newspapers do that." I told him I was familiar with the practice.

"What do you know about Eddie Johnston of the Boston Bruins?"

I couldn't think of anything about his NHL career, and the writer said he'd already covered details about his post-playing days as a coach and in other roles, primarily with Pittsburgh. But I volunteered the information that he had been the third goalie in 1972. This was something the writer had not thought of before I said it.

I wish Mr. Johnston all the best, but I am anxious to see whether my factoid made it into the final version of his death notice. It is, I would argue, more important than the fact that he finished his career in the 1977-78 season by playing four games for the Chicago Black Hawks, the team for which "Tony O" starred from 1969-84.

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September 9-21, 1972 (and After)
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My friend Ravi Ramashandran from Montreal reminded me a few years ago that during the Summit Series, we sent encouraging postcards to Team Canada during the lull between Game 4 (September 8th) and Game 5 (September 22nd). Our dads had gotten the cards for us. They were sponsored by Scotia Bank, according to the lettering on the cards themselves.

We sent them to Team Canada in Moscow using the pre-printed address on the back, which said simply: To [we were to fill in a name] Palace of Sports Moscow USSR We must have followed the instructions to use a ten-cent stamp as well.

Though Ravi assures me we shared this job of addressing at my kitchen table, I have no recollection of this event. I do, however, have one of those postcards, bought like many of my Summit Series souvenirs from eBay in the last dozen years or so.

The front of the card says "Go Canada" under an image of two players: a Team Canada member who looks much like Vic Hadfield and a Russian goalie who looks nothing like Tretiak.

Underneath "Go Canada" the card reads, "Canada-U.S.S.R. 1972." There is a Canadian flag off to the goalie's left and slightly behind.

The same image is used on most of the 2019 commemorative 100-ruble notes issued in Russia. I ordered a set of these from eBay in 2021. They came in a small binder with the hammer and sickle and maple leaf sharing the front cover. The inside front cover has a drawing of two players: one in a Team Canada sweater, the other in a CCCP sweater. The inside back cover has the same drawing, only now the sweaters are on the opposite players. Neither resembles anyone who played in the Series.

The first of the notes, as arranged in the book, features a line drawing of Valery Kharlamov and another man. The rest have photo-quality images of players. There are nine such bills altogether, one for each game of the Series plus the Kharlamov one.

When they showed up at my house, they were in an envelope with 69 10-p stamps neatly stuck on it. The stamps are hand-cancelled in blocks of four. I saved this packaging.

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Game 5
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Before each game, player introductions were made. Players skated forward and back from their bluelines to acknowledge when their name was called. When he heard his name called before Game 5, Phil Esposito did a tumble and ended up on his backside. He got up and performed an exaggerated bow. My dad and I laughed because we felt his embarrassment.

Before Game 6, Espo took his intro from the edge of the ice, holding onto the boards. I remember this, but, as I said, I don't remember his Game 4 speech, which was obviously a more important moment; I know about the speech only from more recent watching of the Series DVD set and from reading about it.

Paul Henderson was the hero in Game 8, but he might not have been. In game 5, he went hard into the boards behind the Russian net. Team Canada doctor Jim Murray declared him concussed and ruled him unfit to play. Henderson begged Coach Sinden to overrule the advice, and Sinden relented. Henderson finished the game, which Canada won, 5-4. He went on to score the winning goals in Games 6, 7, and 8.

Game 6

On January 14, 1948, Valery Kharlamov was born in Moscow, USSR. On August 13 of that same year, Bobby Clarke was born in Flin Flon, Manitoba. On September 24, 1972, Clarke broke Kharlamov's ankle with a slash intended to put him out of the Summit Series. The Russian missed Game 7, but he played in Game 8.

The Canadians won Games 6, 7, and 8.

In 2006, filmmaker Brett Kashmere produced the documentary short *Valery's Ankle*. It highlighted what Kashmere called a "glitch' in the production of Canadian nationalism, identity, and masculinity." He wanted to show how violence on the ice was being miscoded as the equivalent of masculinity in Canada, a place known for gentle behavior. And he wanted to know why violence had become an easy way to sell tickets to hockey games.

Much of Kashmere's compelling film has to do with hockey violence in the 1970s, which is perhaps why he starts with the slash in Game 6. His film re-creates that incident and also includes game footage of the actual moment. He then goes through a compendium of violent incidents in hockey. He frames this using the words of Bobbly Clarke in a speech made at an awards event in 1979. In that address, Clarke talks about playing the game "at our highest level at all times." Kashmere then cuts to video of the Flyers, Clarke's team, engaged in an all-out brawl on the ice.

In so doing, he seems to be listening to Boym's prescription: "Nostalgia can be a poetic creation, an individual mechanism of survival, a countercultural practice, a poison, and a cure. It is up to us to take responsibility of our nostalgia and not let others 'prefabricate' it for us" (Boym np).

It has been variously reported that Clarke once said, "If I couldn't deliver a two-handed chop, I would never have gotten out of Flin Flon," though this may be legend. It is also on record that Clarke was content to follow his father into the mining trade at home in Manitoba, and that hockey was something that he hadn't expected to work out as well as it did. I know this because he told me so when I interviewed him in around 2009. Mostly, my interview concerned what hockey was like for him as a kid.

Game 7

In Kharlamov's absence, the Russians scored three goals in Game 7, which they lost, 4-3. Two were by Alexander Yakushev. Yakushev would end as the top scorer on the Russian team, with 11 points (7-4-11). He poured it on late in the tournament, getting two goals in Game 8 also. Five of his seven goals, and one assist, came after the slash.

Their Game 8

When Kharlamov returned for Game 8, he managed only one assist, on the third of five goals the Soviets would score. Kharlamov ended the tournament tied for third in Team USSR scoring, with seven points (3-4-7). Clarke was third on Team Canada, with six points (2-4-6).

When I asked TV analyst (the late) Howie Meeker about these events in a phone interview several years ago, he said, "If Bobby Clarke hadn't broken [Kharlamov's] leg, I don't think the Canadians would have won. The major catastrophe that the Russians had was that they lost their best right-winger. He could fly, and he could beat most defensemen one-on-one for a chance on goal." This is not what most Canadians, me included, remember about Game 8.

1974

Hockey fans with memories of this era might remember something else about Kharlamov's encounters with Canadians: in the TV broadcast of the second Summit Series, the one played between WHA stars and the Russian team in 1974, color analyst Meeker called Kharlamov variously "Karmalov," then "Harmanov," and later "Harmalov."

Those of us who had watched the first series, and that was nearly everyone, knew what a fool Meeker was making of himself, because we knew what the name should sound like. We'd heard it over and over from the mouth of color analyst Brian Conacher and play-byplay man Foster Hewitt (who didn't always get it right) in 1972.

When I queried Meeker as to whether they'd been coached on how to pronounce player names during the '74 Series, he responded, "I think our people pronounced the words extremely well, our broadcasters. I never had a complaint after I got home. The CBC, who monitored the games, they never complained. Our broadcasters really worked at it, got it down, found out the proper Russian pronunciations, and I think we got it pretty good."

In Summit Series 1974, Valery Kharlamov was second on his team in scoring, with two goals and seven points. Bobby Hull led the tournament (7-2-9). Alexander Yakushev was second overall with eight points on five goals. Gordie Howe, who had been in the NHL since 1946-47, two years before Kharlamov was born, had three goals and four assists to be third in Team Canada scoring.

No nostalgia exists for this series, during which Canada could do no more than win one game and tie three. "[N]ostalgia is about the relationship between individual biography and the biography of groups or nations, between personal and collective memory" (Boym np). No such ties exist to 1974. The 1974 series is labeled "The Lost Series" on the front of its DVD box set. No video exists of Game 5.

Va-LER-ee KHAR-la-mov was killed in a car accident near Solnechnogorsk, Russia, in August 1981. At the time, Bobby Clarke was about to enter his 13th of 15 seasons playing for the Philadelphia Flyers. He had played 929 of his 1144 NHL games.

After retiring from playing hockey, Clarke went on to various management positions with the Flyers. He went into the Hockey Hall of Fame in 1987.

Kharlamov's posthumous induction came in 2005.

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Our Game 8

For Canada, Game 8 was the culmination of a series of violent episodes that had been building as the Series went on. Things looked

so grim that Team Canada threatened to boycott the game when it was learned that referees Josef Kompalla and Rudy Bata had been appointed to officiate it, because they were sure they would be disadvantaged with penalty calls. Canadian player JP Parise didn't take to Kompalla's presence kindly, especially after he was singled out for a minor penalty at about the four-minute mark. He skated towards the ref, his stick held high as if he were going to decapitate him. Kompalla shielded his head by crossing his hands in front of his body, then immediately took them down and slapped one onto each hip, the symbol for a misconduct penalty. Parise was thrown out of the game.

Game 8 was ugly. But most of us forget that. Berry claims, "[C] omplicating critiques . . . [of] nostalgic appeals typically take the form of granting the nostalgics that their perception about the past is right—it's hard to argue with a feeling, after all—but then suggesting that they are being too narrow-minded" (Berry 83). Most of us don't care. We're too focused on the Goal.

In any case, Parise, the shame of his violent and disrespectful actions forgotten, would eventually complete 890 NHL games, playing for Boston in the Original Six days, then Toronto, Minnesota, the Islanders, and the Cleveland Barons. He finished his NHL career back in Minnesota. He died at age 73 in 2015.

The final goal, which became the Goal, in the Series was scored by Paul Henderson, a fact as well known to Canadians as that the Battle of Vimy Ridge took place in 1917. But while Henderson tied for the tournament lead in goals scored, he did not lead Team Canada in scoring points. He had seven goals, as did Yakushev and Phil Esposito. Esposito had more assists than either of them. The numbers were Henderson 7-3-10; Yakushev 7-4-11; and Esposito 7-6-13.

Citing those facts using the dash-shorthand that is seen in hockey stats makes the Series feel more contemporary but simultaneously smaller than it has always seemed to me, because it renders it reducible to numbers, like any game might be. ***

At our school, Preville Elementary, there was no question we were going to watch the games that played on TV while we were supposed to be in class. Our teachers took us to the auditorium to see them on televisions mounted on rolling carts. I think the boys got to sit in the front rows, on the floor, because it was presumed that we cared more about hockey than the girls did.

The day of Game 8, they kept us watching as long as they could, but finally we had to get on the bus for home. Henderson had not yet scored his goal. He did that while we were cruising down Taschereau Boulevard, piloted by Jack, our everyday driver. He had a tiny radio mounted on the dash of the bus to his left. When we got on, he pointed it out to us so we would know we could follow the game.

Unlike most days, nobody said a word as we drove.

The Goal (and After)

When the Goal was scored, Jack threw his arms over his head, both hands off the wheel and a bus full of kids screaming their heads off. We thought the Series was over. I had no idea it would still be having real material consequences for me decades later. "The fantasies of the past determined by the needs of the present have a direct impact on the realities of the future . . . ," Boym presciently said (np).

In 2007, I published *Growing Up Hockey*. In it, I tell the story of where I was when the Goal was scored. I also say that my future brother-inlaw, growing up in Ontario, was not offered the chance to watch at school, so he asked to go to the bathroom and saw the Goal with the school janitor, who had a small TV in his closet.

In around 2010, I got an email from someone in Sofia, Bulgaria. She told me that she was a newspaper reporter, and that she had loved my book so much that she had translated a chapter into Russian and run

it in the newspaper. The edition sold out. So she translated another chapter, the Summit Series one.

When the official sensor saw it, he objected to the depiction I made of the janitor not working but taking time off to watch the hockey game.

That's how the Summit Series got me declared an "enemy of the people" in Bulgaria.

I have a puck signed in 2016 by both the players who lived the magic moment of the Goal, Henderson and Tretiak. The actual puck used to score the goal is probably the one that the late Pat Stapleton picked up at the end of Game 8. You can see him chase it out of the frame in the video footage of the game.

The most famous photograph of the Series, and perhaps one of the most famous by a Canadian, ever, is Frank Lennon's image of Henderson jumping into Yvan Cournoyer's arms after scoring the Goal. The family of Lennon, who died in 2006, allows use of this image, with permission, for no fee. They believe that the photo should be enjoyed by all Canadians, and others.

Since Then

In 2009, an essay I wrote about the Series as it constructed Canadian national identity appeared in a book. For years afterwards, I got a royalty check for reproduction of the piece. Thus, I must acknowledge that I have participated in the capitalist enterprise of profiting from the Summit Series. I don't apologize for my nostalgia anymore, but neither did I expect to make money from it.

But it's bigger than that. In many ways, I owe my career as a writer to the Summit Series, because of a set of tumble-on accidents that got me to where I am today. I wrote an article about Canadian masculine identity in the Summit Series for a conference on identity, in Amsterdam, in 2004. Someone at that conference heard it and invited me to give an altered version at another conference, in Regina. At that conference, I met someone who told me about a hockey scholars conference taking place in Boston, in 2005. I went to that conference and talked about the Series again. It was there that I met the man who acted as my agent in the publication of what turned out to be my first four books on hockey. This in turn gave me access to the NHL as a member of the press corps. And in the press box, I had access to former players, now working for NHL teams.

I have spoken with nine of the players who wore the Team Canada uniform in the 1972 Summit Series. There were 38 recruited in all, according to the new-ish official Team Canada '72 website. A total of 29 played at least one game, not including the exhibition games versus Sweden in the interim between the Canadian and Russian parts of the series and the game in Prague after the series concluded.

I have never spoken to any of the members of what was sometimes called the Russian Red Army team. I'm hoping someday to run into Tretiak, however.

I have no plans to make speaking with all of the players on Team Canada '72 a quest, though it is something I would typically do, because I am a list-maker. Proof? I have kept a careful record of every one of the 671 NHL games I have attended as either a fan or a credentialed media member.

In any event, completing such a bucket list will be harder by the year as these players age and die off. Right now, eight players and Assistant Coach John Ferguson have passed away. The players are Bill Goldsworthy, Pat Stapleton, Gary Bergman, Rick Martin (who did not play in the eight games, only in one exhibition), Stan Makita, Michel "Bunny" Larocque (the fourth goalie, mostly for training camp purposes), Jean-Paul Parise, and as of August 10, 2021 ("yesterday" when I wrote this), Tony Esposito. Make that nine plus Ferguson, since Rod Gilbert died August 21, 2021. It's too fresh to lump with the others, so I enumerate it separately here.

My nine are Bobby Clarke, Frank Mahovlich, Peter Mahovlich, Dennis Hull, Marcel Dionne, Ron Ellis, Tony Esposito, Mickey Redmond, and John Van Boxmeer (on the squad as a youngster not enrolled for the traveling team). Most of these conversations were about other matters related to their careers. Occasionally the Summit Series would come up.

I have also spoken with Bobby Hull. He was barred from playing in the Series because he was under contract to the Winnipeg Jets, a team in the WHA.

Aftermaths

Henk W. Hoppener wrote the only negative book about the Summit Series of which I am aware, *Death of a Legend*. This came out in 1972, though some sources date it 1974 and at least one has it as January 1, 1972. Obviously, that's wrong, since the Summit Series didn't happen until September.

Several things about this book are out-of-phase with other published materials. First, the name of the author must have struck hockey readers as "foreign" in that day. Second, Hoppener insists in the subtitle and in the text on talking about the "Summer of '72," which is not typically how we refer to September. Third, and most obvious, is the title—*Death of a Legend*. He would seem to be alone in that era in debunking the myth of the Series, especially right after the grand triumph.

But Hoppener is not some prophet crying in the wilderness. Much of the book is not his words, but quotes from newspapers and magazines from the era. Hoppener, in other words, has preserved the anti-nostalgic look at the Series that would otherwise be forgotten, and he did so while showing that Canadians themselves, or those who spoke for them in print, were doing anything but embracing the Series as nostalgia.

Hoppener does admit, despite having constructed the book out of the words of others, that it "represents one man's choice of words and pictures which best illustrate the things he would like to remember" (6).

Remembering the bad? Hoppener must have been a fun guy at a party. Still, his book puts the lie to many other texts, then and since, which might be described saying, "This is what is often terrifying about political applications of nostalgia: the erasure contained within them" (Berry 97).

Hoppener kind of diminishes his critique at the end of his book, the last section of which is called "Death of a Legend?" with a crucial question mark. He unpacks his inquiry starting with, "A legend is dead. Or is it?" He carries on to muse on legends and claim, "Legends do not die; they suffer interruptions or transitions, not a total, final demise" (100). Then he says, "So, Canada's hockey legend will find new life in other dimensions, in new directions, to give us new illusions" (100).

"This is the mechanism of nostalgia: a yearning that's impossible to deny and impossible to destroy" (Berry 110). Perhaps that's why Canada Cup '76 and other, later, international series existed.

Dave Bidini wrote a book, published in 2012, called *A Wild Stab For It: This is Game Eight from Russia.* It is a compendium of small facts and anecdotes about the Series.

Why is it that he chose those words, rather than the culmination of the play, "Henderson has scored for Canada" for his title? And didn't Foster Hewitt say, "This is Game 8, from *Moscow*?"

"The most common demonstration of our faulty recollections is flashbulb memories, the tendency people have to vividly remember major events while also somehow getting virtually all of the details wrong" (Berry 25).

It's less unclear why Kevin Sylvester called his book *Shadrin Has Scored for Russia: The Day Canadian Hockey Died.* This book is billed on the front cover to be a "Mockumentary." It recasts the Series with Russia as the winner.

Re-Creations

"[N]ostalgia—the way it makes us feel, the things it inspires us to do, its function in our personal sense of meaning and identity—is an almost perfect impulse for a consumerist ethic . . . utterly symbiotic with the drives and desires necessary for a consumptive society to function smoothly" (Berry 102).

In 1992, the first attempt at really capitalizing on commemoration of the Series happened in the form of a VHS release that had player interviews and the whole of Game 8. Next it was 1997, when the whole Series came out via a DVD box set. This product was what started me on the road to recapturing the Series as a building block of my cultural memories.

There were also card sets issued in both 1992 and 2010.

When I interviewed him on a day that I was doing research on the Summit Series using the Hockey Hall of Fame's archive, around 2013, Ron Ellis told me about the production and licensing of Summit Series souvenirs. He explained that the players had seen their images used for advertising purposes but had not been compensated, so he and some other players hired representatives who helped restore the name and likeness rights to the players themselves. Team Canada had previously owned these rights. "[T]here is almost certainly a direct link between our growing awareness of nostalgia as a phenomenon over the last century and its effectiveness as a marketing tactic in a world increasingly at the mercy of a system that demands unlimited consumption" (Berry 101).

According to the *Toronto Star*, "[T]he ['72 Summit Series] corporation has expanded into a multi-pronged enterprise with an educational component and marketing and merchandising arms. As part of their mission, they are targeting four demographic groups: those 50 and over (to refresh the memories); 35-50 (to confirm the legend); 20-35 (to tell the story), under-20 (to advocate team values)" (Rush np).

Ellis also told me that he had a special set of Summit Series cards, and a complete DVD set, but that he had never watched it to that point. He wanted to do that sometime when he could be off, alone, like in a cabin.

Sitting in his office, I felt like I had a more clear and complete memory of what happened in the eight games than someone who had played in all of them.

Or maybe I just know more facts about the Series than Ron Ellis does.

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At some point, overfamiliarity cuts the cord of authenticity. In terms of the Summit Series, was this at the moment when ten of the star players were rendered in the form of bobblehead dolls? If that's so, what does it mean that the Ken Dryden bobblehead is usually on eBay for around \$80 and the Frank Mahovlich goes for as little as \$30? Mahovlich played in six games and got two points. Dryden nearly cost his team the Series by allowing five goals in two periods to start Game 8. (By October, they were once again teammates on the Montreal Canadiens.)

As Berry says, "Our memory inherently creates a past where everything is deeply meaningful. \ldots [G]iven the choice between the

abject chaos of our present and a reasonably ideal past—presented to us as our actual past—nostalgic longing hardly needs the help" (28).

Dryden retired from the NHL in 1979 with six Stanley Cups, including four in a row. Mahovlich left the NHL in 1974 and played out his career, which ended in 1978, in the WHA. He also had six Cups. Four were with Toronto, the last two with Montreal.

Mahovlich served as a member of the Senate in Canada from 1998-2013. Dryden was a Member of Parliament from 2004-11. Each is in the Hockey Hall of Fame and was one of the 100 Best named in 2017.

"Our era is one that is littered with relics, one that preserves the past in any number of explicit and happenstance ways" (Berry 56). My memorabilia collection related to the Summit Series now stretches to perhaps 50 items. There are some things I would still like to find, but what I don't need is a collection of Summit Series 40th Anniversary wine, though at \$20, plus shipping, it's got a beautiful label.

If I could create a commemorative item not yet produced for the Series, it would be a pair of Vans sneakers in the pattern of the Team Canada sweaters. Somehow, maybe on the tongue, I'd have the image of Henderson and Cournoyer after the Goal. This is not an impossible ask. Vans has commemorated both Peanuts and Bruce Lee on recent special-edition shoes.

During the Covid lockdown, I decided to complete my set of Summit Series insert cards, given away in hockey card packs during the 1972-73 season. There are 28 of them altogether, and though I have cards from that year in my collection of childhood leftovers, I didn't have any of this special series, nor do I remember these cards from that year, though I have vivid memories of others from the era, including the Ken Dryden card (now called the "Ken Dryden Rookie") from 1971-72. In 2020, the Summit Series inserts were surprisingly easy to find, which might be a sign of diminishing interest in the Series, or it might be an indication that lockdowns produce spending on items other than hockey cards.

My best commemorative item is a wristwatch produced sometime in the early 1990s, before the Soviet Union collapsed. The brand is Molnija, and the face is emblazoned with graphics including the Russian and Canadian flags, the letters 5:6 to represent the score of Game 8 (though backwards to me), the numbers 59:26 to signal when the last goal of the Series was scored, the names Henderson and Esposito and also Kharlamov (why not either of the men who finished above him in scoring for the Soviet team?) and Tretiak, and a graphic of two players fighting for a puck. And just in case someone still doesn't get what the watch commemorates, at the bottom, the watch face says, "Sammit Series."

Still Game 8

Each Christmas when I'm home in Canada, my brother-in-law Phil Reimer and I watch Game 8 on DVD. One time when we were watching, Phil reacted to a play as it happened on screen as if it were happening in real time. Catching himself, he said, "Oh, for a minute there I was back in 1972."

"Restorative nostalgia... views the past with an eye toward recreating it—a desire to relive those special moments Reflective nostalgia, on the other hand, accepts the fact that the past is, in fact, past, and rather than trying to recreate a special past experience, savors the emotions evoked by its recollection" (McDonald np). Both claims would seem to be proved by our experience.

Phil and I make a big show of standing and humming along with the Soviet national anthem as the game begins. It reminds us of the foreignness of all things Soviet back in 1972. While we do this, we usually are wearing our white Team Canada replica sweaters, a present from my sister for Christmas one year.

"There is no way to separate who we are from what we are nostalgic about, much less how we are nostalgic" (Berry 76).

What Now?

"[N]ostalgia is ultimately a future-oriented emotional experience. Nostalgia involves reflecting on past experiences but it motivates affective states, behaviors, and goals that improve people's future lives" (FioRito and Routledge np).

That makes me feel like at the 100-year anniversary, when I'm well gone, people will still be talking, thinking, and writing about the Summit Series. Or Sammit Series.

"This feeling is about all the defence we can muster against the end, inadequate as it may be; the idea not just that we existed, but were knowable, sensible, had some kind of arc or meaning—even if it never extended much beyond our own head. It is not much, maybe, but it is the best we can do" (Berry 147).

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chapter four

Forfeit By: Brittany Reid

Forfeit

Just for old time's sake,

I will let you keep your Summit Series.

No, I mean it. Take it.

Honestly, it suits you better anyway.

You can have the sepia-toned memories all to yourself,

since my presence always registered to you as counterfeit.

Be honest, isn't it exhausting to quiz me when I bring it up?

To feel smug at my obvious wanting and lack?

To relish in my inherent inequity, that I had the gall to be born too late?

And to toy with me, the silly fool I know I am,

as I sheepishly listen, adorned in my counterfeit garb as "sport fan"? as "professor"?

Seriously, it's all yours.

Truly, I don't even want it.

I'm done with your Espositos, your Hendersons, your Parises, your Kharlamovs.*

(*always checking the spelling to be sure).

The Summit Series is a language I learned in adulthood, and I will never speak it fluently.

I'm tired of hearing you laugh at my accent behind my back.

I will admire it from afar as a symbol, a metaphor, a metonymy.

It works for me as literary device, but I didn't fight for it, and it will never love me back.

So, I can't rightfully share in the spoils or criticize the conquering heroes.

But I can still stare longingly from a distance, watching and waiting in its wake

always trying, but always failing,

to imagine what it's like to feel so much when you watch back the footage.

It was not my war, and these will not be my enemies.

But, just between us, *It wasn't really about hockey, was it?*

You know what, I'm starting to think that I only wanted it so you couldn't have it anymore.

So you couldn't use it against me.

you couldn't lord it over me every time we spoke...

In any case, you can have your Summit Series.

Just know that when I now scream, open-throated at the ref,

calling for blood and justice in a voice that is so unlike my own,

that I might be taking up your mantle,

the reluctant inheritor of your unintended inheritance,

but I will soon drown you out, with my new convictions and my rage-tightened fists.

and the day will come when I won't even think of you or your Summit Series anymore.

Personal Reflection: Brett Pardy



The 1972 Summit Series DVD and a Pale Shadow of Cultural Memory

When I was 13, and first getting seriously into hockey, I purchased the complete 72 Summit Series on DVD during a trip to A&B Sound. It had been released the year prior for the 30th anniversary, and I was excited to watch this legendary hockey. I thought the great games would be like the great films and novels: enjoyable outside their historic anchors. I remember watching the first several games and being rather let down. If anything, the tactical Soviet style of hockey was more admirable than the slogging violence of Canada. I skipped ahead to Game 8.

This was a radicalizing formative experience for me in realizing that hockey lives in cultural imaginary and received wisdom of myth, rather than in some "pure" form. Watching the actual games years later damaged, rather than deepened, my appreciation for the event. What becomes of the 72 Summit Series as there are fewer people with living memory it? The imagined Cold War stakes no longer loom, and Canadian hockey is a continual series of triumphs against a small pool of competition, making the assigned importance harder to justify.

As someone who did not live through 72, watching the DVD could only serve as nostalgia for someone with original feelings, or perhaps the feelings a Canadian is "supposed" to feel. The joy of sport is in the ephemeral moment, which renders 72 a shadow of a real event that is impossible to witness again. The emotion can never be re-captured from an aesthetic object.

chapter five

From Zone Entries to Expected Goals: Using Modern Hockey Analytics to Describe the 1972 Summit Series By: Jean Lemoyne & Vladislav A. Bespomoshchnov

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Introduction: Foundations of a Perfect Rivalry

ost fields of human performance are driven by a worthy rivalry, where at least two competitors aim to challenge the L status quo. Ice hockey is no different. The games between the Canadian and Soviet Union hockey teams have been recognized as one of the most iconic rivalries in sport history. In fact, the Summit Series in '72 represents the first meeting between "best versus the best," Canadian professional superstars against the most talented players of Soviet hockey. In September 1972, two different schools of thought collided to showcase their mastery of skill and tactical repertoire. Furthermore, the 1972 Summit Series can be defined as a historical starting point for internationalization and commercialization of modern ice hockey (Kreiser, 1972; Kennedy, 2014). More specifically, for Canadian hockey, the Summit Series was a catalyst for the establishment of Canadian national identity, involving socio-political issues (Beauchamp, 2014). On the Soviet side, their ability to match the competition level of established NHL superstars served the Russian system as a lever for their development model in the following years (Jokispila, 2006). While there are no right or wrong answers for how to play ice hockey, the two distinct styles of play and hockey philosophies that emerged from the 1972 Summit Series were seen as mutually exclusive and diametrically opposed. Despite the differences at the time, one thing was common for both teams: the desire to beat their rival. In addition to the sport competition, it is necessary to acknowledge the political context that many media outlets at the time used to create an additional layer of competition beyond the ice rink. This further contributed to the conceptualisation of a major "international" hockey rivalry, not only between the players and coaches, but also fans and other stakeholders involved in the sport. Defining the series as a real "War on ice" (McSkimming, 2012) demonstrates how the series was perceived from a socio-political standpoint.

The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the ice hockey 'ecology' in both countries and shed light on the games of the '72 Summit Series through the lens of modern ice hockey analytics. This chapter is divided in two sections: the first part is a brief overview of Canadian and Soviet styles of hockey and examines the sociocultural constraints on the sport at the time. In the second part, we look at the series from a refreshing perspective, by using 'modern' hockey analytics to better understand the tactical tendencies of both teams and see how their styles of play differ. While there have been many accounts where authors aim to enrich our understanding through anecdotal accounts of the series, our pursuit attempts to contribute an alternative, numerical look at the series' games.

Roots of Elite Hockey in Canada and Soviet Union

Sports and pathways for athletic development are embedded in broader socio-cultural contexts (Rietveld & Kiverstein, 2014; Vaughan et al. 2019). For example, Uehara et al. (2018) provides insight on the development of football (soccer) in Brazil through a cultural lens and the vast impact of cultural and historic factors on the sports context. Specifically in ice hockey, Martel (2015) points out that the structure of competition is one of the key constraints that shapes coaching philosophy and athletes' performance preparation in a given social context. From this perspective, this first section explains how socio-cultural factors shaped the development of ice hockey as a sport in Canada and the Soviet Union, on micro- and macro-timescales, in the years preceding the 1972 Summit Series.

Ice hockey, as we now know it, has been played in Canada for over a century, whereas in Soviet Union, modern ice hockey was introduced roughly two decades later, in the early 1920s. In Canada, the professionalization of ice hockey began in the early 1900s, whereas the Soviet amateur league was only originated after World War II in 1946. In Canada, each professional team was responsible for attracting fans, leading to a greater emphasis on high-tempo skating, shooting, scoring, bodychecking and physicality (Dryden, 2019; Russell, 1979). Canadian ice hockey was so popular that many towns had an outdoor rink for people to come and watch their local heroes play the game (Marsh, 2015). In the years that followed, every decade had its generational players, and professional hockey in Canada was considered by many to be the "right way" to play hockey. Legendary NHL coaches, such as Joseph Hector 'Toe' Blake, Scotty Bowman, and many superstars like Maurice Richard, Gordie Howe, Jean Béliveau, Phil Esposito and Bobby Orr shaped the historic evolution of Canadian ice hockey. Each of the coaches and players reflected their own era, while also conveying an overriding passion for the sport. But Canadian hockey was not only recognized at the professional levels. The seminal work of Lloyd Percival's Hockey Handbook (1951) provides a great overview of how was developed Canada's national sport in regard to physical preparation and playing systems. As Franke (2018) suggests that at the dawn of Summit Series, Canadian hockey was a dominant, ice hockey country which was ready to be challenged.

At the other side of the ocean, the Russian "path to hockey excellence" was somewhat different. In comparison to the Canadian system, the Soviet Union's sport clubs were dependent on state funding. Ice hockey per se was the successor of 'bandy' or Russian hockey, where the sport was played on larger ice sheet and instead of the rubber puck, players used a wooden ball (Gorbunov, 2015). Despite an existing tradition for Soviet athletes, Anatoly Tarasov, who is commonly referred to as the 'father' of Russian ice hockey, as he was presented with ice a hockey rule book, was tasked with the development of the sport in the Soviet Union (Bespomoshchnov & Caron, 2017) as it was outlined in autobiography (Tarasov, 2015). While Coach Tarasov had the opportunity to visit Canada and observe how Canadian teams played the game, his mentor, Mikhail Tovarovsky, insisted that he should abandon this idea. Tovarovsky believed that Tarasov's visit to Canada would negatively influence his own thinking about the sport and its Soviet development. Thus, Tarasov was encouraged to build the system by borrowing principles from other competitive sports, such as football, basketball, and handball. This probably explains why some of Tarasov's methods were considered unorthodox by some of his colleagues. Nevertheless, his performance preparation approach became well-known worldwide as best practices of Soviet hockey (Bespomoshchnov & Caron, 2017). Similar to Canada, Soviets also had their hockey legends, who were recognized for their dominance at the international level. Players such as Yevgeni Babich, Anatoli Firsov, Valery Kharlamov, Vladislav Tretiak (and many others) were exposed to the unique coaching methods of Tarasov (Thompson, 2021; Tarasov, 1969).

Each of the players' playing style also reflected the key qualities of Soviet ice hockey at the time: technical skills, creativity, tactical skill, and robust conditioning.

The Sociocultural Aspects that Defined Canadian and Soviet Hockey

When coach Tarasov reflected on his trips to Canada (Tarasov, 2015), he highlighted the two key characteristics that have historically defined Canadian ice hockey are the game's physicality and level of competitiveness. According to his observations, starting from a young age, Canadian players are exposed to a hockey environment where physical contact is not only accepted, but also expected of them, which explains wider leg position when skating compared to Europeans. While it certainly has its downsides, such as resulting injuries (Dryden, 2019), it also prepares hockey players for the later risks associated with high-performance sport. Yet, certainly there are downsides such as resulting injuries (Dryden, 2019), which adds a shadow to the superb performance of Canadian hockey players in the physical game. In this regard, Coach Tarasov (2015) pointed out that this cultural convention might be one factor that explains why Canadian players have historically played differently than their European counterparts. Complementing this physical aspect, coaches with international experience point out that Canadian teams are more likely to exhibit a high intensity playing style, deploying pressure on the opponent and attacking the net with a storm of shots (Summanen et al., 2005; Tarasov, 1997). In line with the perceptions of international coaches, McFarlane⁷⁰ postulates that Canadian hockey was a mix of individual skills combined with the ability to make it work in a team oriented: "What impressed me though was the rallying ability of all the Team Canada guys. You could go down the list and every guy contributed all the skills he could muster and great spirit and attitude to develop a team concept. Even in the darkest days, after leaving Canada upset and frustrated, everyone played a part in staving off defeat." Such observations were specifically evident in the first game of the

⁷⁰https://www.brian-mcfarlane.com/post/comedy-grit-and-creative-hockey-style-of-team-canada-72

Summit Series (e.g., individual talent, high speed, massive shooting towards the net), as it did not take long for the Canadian team to take the lead. Interestingly, this also seemed to be a potential factor in the comeback win in game eight (e.g., overcoming frustration and displaying collective efforts to find ways to win).

In the Soviet Union, and to this day in Russia, despite ice hockey's entertainment component, there was a greater emphasis on the sports performance side of the game. Most efforts were dedicated to the development of the national team and junior programs (Dufraisse, 2020). As ice hockey was becoming more popular on the international stage, the Soviet government dedicated considerable efforts to developing the sport in the country, which resulted in two key objectives: the development of infrastructure to create an environment for the national team to excel at training and the identification of recruitment strategies (e.g., talent identification) for younger players (Gorbunov, 2015; Tarasov, 1997). While funding for junior and senior programs was dependent on the success and performance of the teams, the system was not dependent on the revenue generated from ticket sales or commercial partnerships (Dufraisse, 2020). Consequently, physical preparation and tactical development were valued for their benefit to international competitions. The emphasis on training, both on and off the ice, was guided by a competition structure in the Soviet Union (Franke, 2018; Tarasov, 1997). The ratio between the number of games and training sessions leaned heavily towards the latter, allowing coaches to dedicate significantly more time towards athlete development. Following the Summit Series, Soviet innovations in performance preparation, such as physical training, invaded the North American ice hockey culture and persist to the present (Franke, 2018). The second of wave of Russian integration into global hockey culture started in the 1990s, after the fall of Soviet Union, when many coaches and players explored international markets.

Culture Shock: The Contrasting Styles of Play at the Summit Series

A substantial amount of work, scholarly publications, and popular media have resulted from the '72 Summit Series. Considering our objective to offer an analytical look at the styles of play emphasized by the two rival teams, we will turn our attention

to the existing literature that has foregrounded the style of play. As mentioned earlier, both teams' playing styles resulted from their respective socio-cultural environments, which led to a unique technical skillset and tactical tendencies. As shown in Table 1, Team Canada was constructed from the professional hockey tradition, in which an "NHL all-stars" pickup team was built to play the series. They were older and had more experience in "playoffs-type" series. In this regard, coaches and decision makers assumed that these allstars would easily adapt to the Soviet style of hockey because they were simply the world's best players (Kreiser, 2012). On the Soviet side, the 1972' cohort was composed of solid international players with some young promising assets who would become dominant in the following decade. As reported by Hoppener (1972), most media and hockey analysts predicted a sweep or a "seven games to one" rout in favor of Team Canada. With established NHL veterans, Team Canada's squad was older, more experimented and expected to dominate opponents with their high levels of physicality and competitiveness (Franke, 2018). The members of Team Canada entered the Summit Series with many Stanley Cup trophies and individual awards to their credit, demonstrating their talent and ability to perform. At the other end of the spectrum, analyses although the Soviet Union teams had been dominant at the international level, winning three Olympic gold medals in the decade that preceded the 1972 Series, they were still emphasizing that they "came to learn" and were not inclined to predict the series' outcome (Beddoes, 1972). Yet, there were indications of their potential to compete with the NHL's best players, including their rigorous physical preparation and the high-quality team systems that defined Soviet-era hockey (Dyotte & Ruel, 1976). Other tactical aspects, such as creativity, puck possession, style of play, and shot quality were also reported among factors that defined the Soviet style of play (Boulonne et al., 1976). While it is not a secret that a possession style of play was also present in Canada in the '50s, when Toe Blake adopted that mentality with Les Canadiens de Montréal (Beliveau, 2005), the Soviet style of ice hockey further employed game and training concepts from other sports and even classical ballet from the Bolshoi theatre. The playing style at the Summit Series thus blurred the line between two distinct hockey philosophies.

	Team Canada	Soviet Union	
Mean Age*	28.3 years	24.9 years	
Morphology*	5'11" / 188.1 lbs	5'11" / 188.9 lbs	
Team's expectations	Show superiority and establish dominance	Came to "learn" and test them- selves against the best	
Development based on	Hockey talent Determination Physicality Competitiveness	Athletic (+ hockey) talent Fitness and conditioning Team tactics and system	
Team composition	NHL stars Stanley Cup winners Individual awards	International experience Olympic gold medals	
Style of play	Intensity in small areas, Skating, Physicality	Using space with puck control Passing, Team play	

Table 1. "Tale of the Tape 1972": Canadian and Russian hockey at the Summit Series

*Data extracted from eliteprospects.com

Towards a Modern View of the Summit Series

Since the 1972 Summit Series, ice hockey has significantly evolved in multiple ways. Subsequent analyses from these mythic confrontations led to a deeper understanding of Canada's national sport and influenced the way it was taught and approached over the last 50 years. In fact, every summary, analysis, and reflection related with the Summit Series resulted in a detailed overview of what happened at specific moments of the series. For example, the Game 1, 7-3 "rout" in favour of the Soviet team opened the door for many hypotheses regarding the strengths of Soviet hockey that allowed them to overcome the NHL players' lack of fitness, less structured team play, and dubious tactics (Morrison, 1989; McSkimming, 2012). Despite these early observations, Paul Henderson scored the famous game-8 winning goal, suggesting to many that "Canadian hockey" was characterized by a high level of competitiveness and resilience, which allowed them to overcome a Soviet team that lacked emotions in crucial situations. Although this type of description, regarding what typified Canadian and Soviet hockey during the Summit Series, has been previously stated, these games have not been much studied from the perspective of statistical analysis.

Despite all that has been said, the picture of the Summit Series is somewhat incomplete, and any discussion of what distinguished these two hockey philosophies requires a quantitative, more objective perspective. In previous accounts of the games, traditional statistics, such as points (e.g., goals and assists), number of shots, and save percentages are used to offer insight into the series' best players. The efforts of Bendell et al. (2013) are particularly relevant in this regard, especially because they provide additional statistical data, such as special units scoring and face-offs performance. They provide additional insight into how both teams played the Series and the kind of tactics displayed in 1972, by providing revised game summaries and box scores. However, these statistics might not be sufficient for evaluating the differences between Canadian and Soviet players. A good example came from Brimberg and Hurley (2012), who showed that chance was key a factor to consider when trying to explain Game 8's 3-5 deficit and Paul Henderson's goal in the last minute of the game. While Team Canada ultimately outperformed the Soviet team, the line between being "treated as heroes" and "viewed as choking or not being able to handle pressure" was quite thin. From this perspective of the Series, we argue that modern hockey analytics have the potential provide objective insight to shed light on the characteristics that define Canadian and Russian hockey 50 years ago. Moreover, we think that some key analytics might help to decipher which facets of the game determined the winner and the lessons learned from such high-caliber competition. Our goal in the remaining sections is to provide a quantitative layer of more "modern" data to objectively review and reflect on the ingame events from the '72 Summit Series. Such data will deepen our understanding of the differences and/or similarities in the approach of both competitors and how their path to excellence evolved in the following years.

Modern Hockey Analytics as a Tool of Observation

In the last ten years, the world of ice hockey has evolved in many ways. The internationalization of the sport, combined with emerging technologies that give access to the sport of ice hockey, led to new ways to observe the game. This highlights the importance of sports analytics, as a means of gaining a better understanding of the game. The origins of sports analytics as a popular practice begin in professional baseball, with the seminal works of Bill James (1983). In his bestselling book Moneyball (2004), which was inspired by James' techniques and Billy Beane's application of these practices with the 2002 Oakland Athletics, Michael Lewis showed how Oakland's success heralded a new way to analyze the sport, by using new performance indicators that allowed one to see the cause and not only the effect. This had a cascade effect on all major sports and, today, the term advanced hockey analytics is common in sport analysts' jargon. In ice hockey, the emergence of modern analytics took place during the last decade (Vollman, 2016). Since then, sport analytics experts have developed a vast repertoire of metrics that help explain both teams' and individuals' performances in specific situations. In the present study, we have conducted an analysis of the Summit Series by using some of the most common modern hockey analytics. We are specifically using three key metrics: 1) the Corsi statistic, 2) Expected goals and scored goals, 3) Shot and goal types, and 3) Zone entries.

The Corsi statistic was introduced by Jim Corsi, the retired Buffalo Sabres goaltender and current goaltending coach for the Columbus Blue Jackets. Expressed in percentage, Corsi reflects a team's shot attempts differential (McKenzie, 2015). This statistic is related to a team's performance, and many analysts suggest that relative Corsi (adjusted-Corsi) represents an evaluation of a team's puck possession (and approximation of time in the offensive zone), because it is calculated from the number of actions (shots) that are related with a situation in which a team has the puck, in 5-on-5 situations (or all situations, if we include special units). For example, a team with an adjusted Corsi that is superior to 50% would be rated as a good possession team because they had more shot attempts, which mean that they have the puck more often. However, taking shot attempts does not guarantee shot quality and chances to score on each of them. This introduces the next metric, which accounts for the quality of shooting, which is called *Expected* Goals.

Expected Goals (xG) represent the probability of scoring on each of a players' (or team) shot attempts. The calculation of expected goals is derived from an algorithm that considers many variables, such as shot provenance, goaltender efficiency and home advantage (Chatel, 2020). In the expected-goals jargon, each shot has a value between 0 and 1, representing the probability to score on each shot attempt. From there, it becomes possible to evaluate how many goals a team, and player, should score in a game. In addition, this metric provides a good estimation of the quality of scoring chance that result from a shot attempt. Inversely, it can also show how a goaltender might have "stolen" or "blown" a game, if the final score is below or over the opponents' xG. The expected goal statistic allows for the ranking of each player based on their cumulative xG, which can show how (or if) he was "dangerous" at different time of the series.

Types of shots. Types of shots are helpful to understand a team's shooting patterns, by informing how players tend to make shot attempts. In general, shot attempts come from four situations: 1) offensive zone play that result from passes and shots, 2) rebounds or shots taken close to the opponent's goal, 3) shots that are taken directly following a pass (e.g., one-timers, pass and shoot) and 4) rushes and/or breakaways, which are defined as transition plays.

Zone entries. Zone entries refer to the way a team, or a player, tend to enter the offensive zone. The more common types of zone entries are carry-ins and dump-ins. Carry-ins refer to entries that are performed when the player in possession of the puck is getting into the offensive zone. This kind of situation leads to higher puck possession numbers and is related to higher winning percentages and scoring opportunities (O'Connor, 2017). In other situations, players will sometimes dump-in, a situation in which the possession team will place the puck behind the opposite team's defence with the purpose of getting the puck back. This type of entry creates loose puck situations, which might result in lower possession numbers.

The advantage of using new or more modern metrics to look at the 1972 Summit Series is that it allows us to identify the key characteristics that define both rivals' respective styles of play. In other words, it allows to confirm how both rivals were different in their playing styles. In this regard, this study also uses some of the more common hockey analytics statistics to: 1) compare both teams' playing styles, in terms of puck possession, scoring chances, and zone entries, 2) see how modern analytics are aligned with the Summit Serie's conclusions (e.g., according to these statistics, who *should* have won the Series?), and 3) determine how selected metrics are precursors of what happened in the following matchups between Team Canada and the Soviet Union, and later Russia.

Looking at the Summit Series through Modern Hockey Analytics

Each of the Series' eight games were used in our project. The DVDs present the best possible video quality that is available. We utilized notational video analysis to quantitatively code and analyse data through manual data collection. Each of the recordings of the games was viewed and coded. All data was coded in an Excel file and calculation were performed from Magnus Corsi database algorithms⁷¹. As a result, descriptive statistics were used to shed light on our aforementioned research questions. Results are displayed below in descriptive tables and figures, accompanied with discussions on each selected hockey analytic. Our hypotheses were formulated based on the existing literature that extensively covered the 1972 Summit Series and new opportunities that modern hockey analytics offer. First, we believe that the Corsi statistic will tend to be "tightly" in favour of the Soviet team, as multiple voices across the globe have advocated for their possession-style of ice hockey. Our second hypothesis focuses on the shooing and net driving tendencies of Canadian players and suggests that Teams Canada's expected goals would be higher, due to the potentially overwhelming numerical advantage associated with a high number of shots and their "crash to the net" style of play. In terms of shot types, we expect to see more shots in rushes and rebounds for Canada, whereas the Soviets likely had a lot of shots from passes and efficient offensive zone play. In zone entries, we think that the Soviet team had a higher proportion of controlled zone entries because of their more methodical style of play. Inversely Team Canada should display more dump-ins to the offensive zone, trying to chase and recover the puck behind the Soviet Team's defensemen.

⁷¹https://www.passionhockey.com/2019/05/02/magnus-corsi-intro-bilan-de-loutil-de-pronostics-camambert/

What Does Corsi Say? It Was a Close Series

In six games (out of seven decisions), the winning team displayed higher 5-on-5 Corsi values, which emphasizes the importance of controlling puck possession in key matchups. This is interesting, since Canada outshot the Soviets by almost 40 shots (285 to 247 over the 8-game series). The only game in which Corsi was in favor of the losing team was Game 7 in Moscow, in which Team Canada played more than 14 minutes in penalty-killing situations. Games 1, 2 and 5 were the one in which higher Corsi differences were seen, and the games in which winners were the most dominant. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the Corsi statistics throughout the series. In summary, the Soviet Union had a higher Corsi ratio (53 % versus 47%), which shows that they were more inclined to value puck control. However, further observations regarding the Corsi statistic confirm that these numbers are inflated by a high number of powerplays in favour of the Soviet Union. Indeed, more penalties can certainly be associated with the fact that the Soviet players had higher puck possession, forcing Team Canada to use different tactics to slow Soviet players form progressing offensively. In fact, when we adjusted the Corsi statistic for 5-on-5 play only, the statistic shows that it was clearly a close series, with a 50-50 share in puck possession: two dynamic systems, defined by their equifinality. In Team Canada's corner, we could assume, based on this information, that winning the Series might be attributed to their excellent defensive play and successful penalty kill. At the other side, a more efficient powerplay might be one factor that could have helped the Soviets overcome the NHL superstars.

Expected Goals: Canada by Volume, Soviet Union by Quality

As mentioned earlier, the number of shot attempts (e.g., Corsi) might not be sufficient to explain how a team creates scoring chances and generates probabilities of scoring, as the expected goals statistics suggests. As shown in Figure 2, Team Canada displayed higher expected goals, which shows that the team was not only focused on shooting at the net, but also creating high-quality scoring opportunities. If the expected goals had translated into real goals, Canada would have won 5 games out of the 8-game matchup,




Figure 1. *The evolution of the Corsi statistic throughout the series.* (Games 1-4 were played in Canada; Games 5-8 were played in Moscow).

instead of 4. In summary, the expected goals statistic suggest that Canada should have outscored the Soviet Union by almost 5 goals (34.8 to 29.7), whereas the "real" final score was 32-31 in favour of the Soviets. In fact, Team Canada underachieved, in terms of their ability to get advantage from xG with a 0.89 "xG to goal" ratio. In comparison, Soviet Union was more efficient in this fact of the game, by scoring more goals than it was expected (1.07 "xG to goal" ratio).

If we consider the expected goals calculations, even Game 1, which was described as a "historical rout" in favor of the Soviet Union should have gone in favor of Team Canada (by a score of 5 to 4). This shows that Canadian hockey at the time was well designed to for high volume of shot attempts, with emphasis on scoring and offensive play. From another perspective, expected goals shows how the goaltending of young Vladislav Tretiak (20-year-old at the time) was a key highlight in the Series, especially in the first 4 games that were played in Canada, since he was able to minimize Canada's potential scoring impact.

Many other factors account for how the expected goals gave an advantage to Canada. Even if they were less efficient to transform xG to real goals, Team Canada had greater access around the net, and




Figure 2. *Expected goal (xGs) during the Summit Series. Each team's real* scored goals are at each line ends.

most of their shots were taken in high-danger areas. In fact, Team Canada net presence was remarkable, not only at the Summit but in the Canadian style of hockey. Conversely, the Soviet system, as explained by Boulonne (1976), was more systematically prepared to score "perfect" goals, which suggests that they produced more shots from the perimeter, and tend to design plays that bring the puck to the slot with passes and players movement in the offensive zone. Such hypotheses are supported by the "types of shot attempts" chart, as shown on Figure 3. When comparing shots that came from rebounds and rushes, differences are evident. Teams Canada's offense generated more rebounds by recovering pucks in the slot (16% versus 8%), which shows that intense play around the net was one of the key characteristics of Canadian hockey at the time The Soviet Union used more passes on the rush (40% versus 29%) against Team Canada's netminders, which shows how they prioritized moving the puck in offensive transitions. Despite such differences, the types of shots that resulted in goals were similar for both teams. It appears that shot creation was approached differently, but it translates to goals in similar patterns, which came mostly from: rebound-puck recoveries in the slot (29%), passes-shot from the slot (32%), and transition-rushes (34%).




Figure 3. Types of shot attempts by both teams. (Soviet Union (CCCP) scores on the right side of the rink; Team Canada scores on the left side).

Table 2 illustrates the fourteen best performing players, in terms of expected goals, scored goals, and shot percentages. Scored goals and shot percentages are extracted from revised data, available in Bendell et al. (2013) and serve to rank players according to their expected goals numbers. Not surprisingly, Phil Esposito was one of the dominant figures of the Series, displaying 7.4 expected goals (e.g., this means that he was expected to have scored 7 goals or more). Boris Mikhailov, of the Soviet team, was the player who generated the highest amount of scoring opportunities, with an xG of 5. However, Alexander Yakushev and Paul Henderson were certainly the Summit's two best forwards in terms of expected goals. In fact, they scored more goals than their xG value and displayed astonishing shooting percentages, which confirms that they had the best offensive contribution of their team. Some players, like young Bobby Clarke (xG = 1.76, 1.14 ratio, 13% shooting) and Valery Kharlamov (xG = 1.76, 1.14 ratio, 13% shooting)2.76, 1.08 ratio, 15% shooting), also had good numbers, but their most important contribution was providing scoring opportunities to their teammates, such as Clarke to Henderson and Kharlamov to Mikhailov and Petrov. We also observe that the players' goals per expected goals ratio look different, with Soviet forwards tending to show fewer discrepancies between xG and scored goals (e.g., the Soviets tend to display better "goals: expected goals" ratios and higher shooting percentages). In this line of analysis, Team Canada's

Players	Expected Goals	Scored goals*	G / xG	Shooting %*
P.Esposito	7.44	6	0.81	11.76
B.Mikhailov	5.02	3	0.60	9.40
A.Yakushev	3.83	7	1.83	28.00
P.Henderson	3.53	7	1.98	25.93
A.Maltsev	3.32	2	0.60	6.67
Y.Cournoyer	3.19	3	0.94	11.11
V.Kharlamov	2.76	3	1.08	15.00
J.Ratelle	2.72	1	0.37	11.11
R.Ellis	2.58	0	0.00	0.00
F Mahovlich	2.44	1	0.41	5.26
V.Petrov	2.23	3	1.35	13.64
R.Gilbert	2.12	1	0.47	9.09
V.Shadrin	2.06	3	1.14	30.00

Table 2. *Expected goals, shots and goals scored in the Summit Series: the most performing players (xG > 2.0).*

*Goal data extracted from revised box scores (Bendell, 2013).

xG stats are in line with our hypothesis, which suggests that the best scorers perform on shot volume. As explained by Boulonne (1976), the Russian hockey system put a lot of emphasis on collective team play. Table 2 confirms this observation by showing that the "goals per expected goals" ratio tended to be higher for Soviet players, which shows their ability to capitalize on their chances (e.g., as we mentioned earlier, they scored more goals than expected, with a 1.07 team ratio). The active defensemen, which is nowadays the norm in high-level hockey, was at its dawn with the emergence of young Bobby Orr. Interestingly, the Soviet practice of letting defensemen

get involved in the offense is supported by modern analytics, as the xG statistic among the top 10 defensemen was in favour of Soviet players (3.11 vs 2.49) despite Canada's Brad Park (xG = 1.01) being the leader among the Series' defensemen.

Zone Entries: Different Tactics, Similar Results

We observed each team's zone entries and evaluated whether they were maintained (or got possession) in the following sequences. Not surprisingly, figure 5 shows that the Soviet Union clearly outperformed Team Canada in controlled zone entries (rate of success in controlled entries: 74% vs 58%), which reflects a key aspect of the Soviet playing style: puck possession and the creativity needed to confuse defensemen. To do so, the Soviet team tend to use lots of criss-cross passes at their opponent's blue line and used their skills and speed to get in the offensive zone. The dump-in strategy was almost non-existent in the Soviet camp, with very few entries. In contrast, even if Team Canada aimed to get in the zone in control of puck possession, they adjusted their game by using dump-ins to put pressure on the opponent's defensemen. This was observed more specifically in game 2, but Team Canada played with physical intensity throughout the Series. The dump-in approach became a frequently used strategy in professional hockey by the end of the '80s and it still prevails, even if its rate of success for puck possession is




Figure 4. Rate of success in controlled zone entries.

still relatively mitigated. In the long term, the influence of Russian hockey regarding zone entry strategies may still take many decades to fully leave its imprint on modern hockey.

Final Thoughts: The 1972 Summit Series ' Heritage for Canadian and Russian Hockey

It has now been 50 years since the 1972 Summit Series. Yet, the eight games that were played by the best of the best from both countries, competing against one another for the first time, offer an enormous platform that is rich in knowledge. While the rivalry was largely shaped by media and anecdotal accounts of the key stakeholders, i.e., biographies/memoirs of coaches and players, we offer an alternative perspective using modern advanced statistical measures. Through this study, we have therefore aimed to reconstruct the events from the eight games of the series through the quantitative domain. While the overall victories across 8 games were in favour of Canadian team by 1 game (in a one-goal decision, with 30 seconds to play), we would like to consider how other parameters can explain what happened in the autumn of 1972. As we saw in the following decades, the short-term heritage of the 1972 Summit Series led to many confrontations in which hockey fans had the chance to appreciate the differences between the two philosophies of Canadian and Soviet hockey. In its long-term heritage, the Summit Series went on to earn a reputation that suffused ice hockey with the tournament's broader cultural impact.

Many factors help to explain the fundamental differences that we observed on the ice at the '72 Summit Series. The first part of our observations take account of shot attempts, by using both teams' Corsi numbers. At first sight, our observations support past literature that suggests the Soviet team was mainly built on puck-possession tactics. This is supported by many indicators, such as the amount of time in one-man advantage (powerplays) and controlled zone entries in which the Soviet players were highly effective. However, as it was earlier stated, Team Canada also generated shot attempts by displaying similar numbers in 5-on-5 play. In this regard, Team Canada won the Series with efficient penalty killing or, inversely, the Soviet lost the Summit Series with poor powerplay numbers, especially in the Moscow games. Further analyses, detailed with defensive indicators such as the number of blocked shots, entry denials and such actions would be needed to expand our understanding of factors pertaining to special teams and efficient defensive play in this series.

Thinking of the representation of competitiveness as a psychological quality, and how it could be represented within the quantitative domain, the Canadian team produced a higher number of rebounds by crowding the net-front area in the pursuit of secondary scoring chances resulting from shots (as shown on the shot maps, Figure 3). This resulted in a higher xG statistic, which predicted that the Canadian team should have outscored the Soviet team. In fact, the way that Canadian players got to the net, and the provenance of their shots, should have led to a greater advantage. Nevertheless, the superior performance of 20-year-old Vladislav Tretiak, especially in the first 4 games held in Canada, potentially accounts for the 'real' numbers that were in favour of Soviet team. As everybody knows, Tretiak's success would translate over the following decades as he became one of the greatest goaltenders of all-time. In addition, the xG for Soviet defencemen was higher than for their counterparts, which reflects the Soviet playing style or working as a unit and interchanging player roles in the offensive end. This coincided with the emergence of Bobby Orr, who did not play in this Series, but we can nevertheless conclude here that defensive contributions to offensive play was in its first stages at this time. As Orr was a precursor of puck moving defensemen in North American hockey, this pattern seemed to be under construction in Eastern Europe.

It is also evident that not all changes in the game are exactly innovative solutions. Just as the Soviet's style of puck position was not entirely new, since it was already played by the Montreal Canadiens in the 1950s, our analysis indicates that the mobilization of modern defence for offensive support is not completely novel. The systematic rotation of defence and forwards could have potentially derived from tactical principles from basketball and football (soccer), where the continuous exchange of positions creates space and gaps that the attacking team can exploit in order to create scoring chances. It can also be seen from the zone entries statistics that the Soviet team had a significantly higher number of successful controlled-zone entries and shots generated from straights attacks, as opposed to those produced from lateral and diagonal passing. Yet, when it comes to how those principles manifest themselves in the game, that requires deeper investigation. Motion capture and computer vision could potentially provide insights into common strategical patterns of play for each team. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Series, it was possible to see that aspects beyond tactical manoeuvres found a new home in hockey culture. Another element of knowledge was brought by the Summit Series: the importance of physical training. One of the highlights of the Series was the fitness level of Soviet Union players. Many authors evoked that in the seventies NHL players tend to came in pre-season camps in "out of shape" condition, and took early season to get their fitness back. As the fitness factor gave a probable advantage to the Soviet team in early series, this aspect raised some Canadian scholars' interests (Dyotte and Ruel, 1976). Since then, physical preparation was gradually becoming a 'new normal' in North America, as there was a progressing consensus among players and coaches that superior physical conditioning could become a key characteristic for ensuring performance readiness.

This chapter aimed to identify how modern statistical metrics can provide a new look on the events in the eight-game '72 Summit Series'. Our work identified that the xG statistic was in favour of a Canadian team, highlighting their competitiveness and aggressive style of play. Conversely, the xG of Soviet defencemen and higher rates of successful controlled-zone entries correlates with the unitlike, collective philosophy of the Soviet players. Taken together, the eight games comprise a rich landscape of tactical events that could be studied in further detail; the outcome of the Series was decided right before the end of the last game. This raises a question: was the outcome of the Summit Series decided by the quality of the individual games or was it due to mere chance? In any case, while our work contributes new insight into the events that occurred in 1972, there have been 50 years of exciting ice hockey that has been played against these international rivals on multiple levels, such as the world-juniors and world championships, different decades, and numerous contexts, including group stages, medal games and professional players matchups. We thus suggest that future analysis should study how the rivalry has evolved, and to what extent these distinguished game philosophies have been dampened or amplified as a result of ice hockey's internationalisation since this initial meeting in autumn 1972.

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Personal Reflection: Bill Tran

The Iginla to Crosby goal is forever for one of the greatest moments of all time for this generation of hockey fans. When hearing about the Summit Series today, you can appreciate that those who are fondly talking about it simply had the privilege of seeing two iconic Canadian hockey moments.

chapter six

Constructing the Official Other: Josef Kompalla and the 1972 Summit Series By: Cedric Bolz

"A penalty is a penalty, no matter what time of the game it occurs." Josef Kompalla (February 28th, 2020)

There were two international hockey games in 1972 whose respective historical legacies truly deserve the label 'epic.' The first is the primary focus of this project, as it culminated in 'the Henderson goal' on September 28th. This goal has been described by so many, including Brian Kennedy, Ken Dryden, Paul Henderson and even former Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, as a truly Canadian 'where were you moment.'⁷² However, viewed through a wider global and/or Cold War historical lens, the other titanic on-ice clash represented the most intense international hockey rivalry of 1972: Czechoslovakia versus the Soviet Union. On April 26, Jaroslav Holik scored his historic, game-winning goal against the Soviets in front of an ecstatic crowd in Prague. When posed with the question: "where were you when both games were decided?" former IIHF referee, Josef Kompalla, provides the same answer: "I was there, on the ice, officiating."⁷³

For an individual whom his contemporaries labelled as "the most unpopular unknown man in Canada," a "Canadian *Bête Noire*," or simply "universally reviled,"⁷⁴ Josef Kompalla has received limited scholarly attention. In the thought-provoking essay collection *Coming Down the Mountain: Rethinking the 1972 Summit Series*, refereeing controversies were touched upon by Brett Kashmere's discussion of the 'Kharlamov Slash' in game six, as well as Iri Cermak and Tim Elcombe's focus on the 'Parise incident' and Alan Eagleson's

⁷²Brian Kennedy, "Introduction: "Yeah, I've got that Too": What's Left (Over) from the Summit Series" in *Coming Down the Mountain – Rethinking the 1972 Summit Series* (Toronto, 2014), 10. Ken Dryden and Roy MacGregor, Home Game – Hockey and Life in Canada (Toronto, 1989), 193. Stephen Harper, "Foreword" in Paul Henderson with Jim Prime Henderson, *How Hockey Explains Canada* (Chicago, 2011), xi.

⁷³Interviews conducted with Josef Kompalla in person February 28th, 2020, by phone March 2020 to February 24th, 2022 and again in person May 16th to June 8th 2022.§

⁷⁴Milt Dunnell, "Nobody Knows Him Everybody Hates Him" in Toronto Star (20 Feb. 1974), Jim Coleman, "The Reformation of Josef Kompalla" in *Calgary Herald* (15 Feb. 1980) or Eric Duhatschek, "German Player's Father-in-Law left bad mark on '72 series" in *Calgary Herald* (9 Feb. 1998)

legendary on-ice antics, both in game eight.⁷⁵ Furthermore, Tobias Stark also examined the two lesser-known Stockholm games in relation to officiating controversies. However, Don Morrow was the only academic to mention any of the eight Summit Series referees by name: the two Americans, Frank Larsen and Steve Dowling, who only officiated a single game each. In sharp contrast, Josef Kompalla officiated all four games cited by the *Coming Down the Mountain* contributors, yet the West German official remained unnamed.

While a void thus exists in the scholarly assessment of Kompalla's Summit Series legacy, his primary, secondary and popular representations, beginning in 1972, have been extensive. A close examination of primary sources from 1972 to 2022 reveals the perplexing duality of Kompalla's historical impact. In the early 1970s, he was celebrated in Europe as a rising, West German officiating star, in 1992 a Federal Order of Merit Recipient, and, by 2003, as an IIHF Hall of Famer. Concurrently, he was depicted as an 'entirely incompetent official,' a 'Soviet Bloc sympathizer,' and, after 1991, simply an 'East German' in Canadian recollections of the series. It is this stunningly long durée, now nearing fifty years in North America, of depicting Kompalla as a near "James Bond Villain" that provided the central impetus for this study.⁷⁶

The initial link to this story emerged from a peculiar intersection of my personal and familial histories. In the early 1970s, my Canadian stepfather played Junior hockey for the Chilliwack Bruins and subsequently continued his career in Europe. In 1972, he was playing for Krefeld in Germany. He regularly sent newspaper clippings home to his parents in East Vancouver, documenting that the referee who officiated games six and eight in Moscow was the same one who called his Bundesliga games, Josef Kompalla. When he related this story to me, we both believed that it could form the basis for an untold chapter of the Summit Series.

⁷⁵See Iri Cermak, "Media Retrospectives on the Summit Series," 199. Tim Elcombe, "Reflections on Canadian Moral Nation-Making on the Occasion of the Summit Series' Seventy-Fifth Anniversary," 288. Brett Kashmere, "Lessons from *Valerie's Ankle*," 249. Tobias Stark, "From Sweden with Love," 170. Don Morrow, "*Da*, *Da*, Canada; *Nyet*, *Nyet* Soviet: From Hagiography to Reality in the Canada-Soviet '72 Hockey Series," 38. All in Brian Kennedy (ed.), *Coming Down the Mountain*.

⁷⁶A comment attributed to my colleague, Gail Edwards, as she assisted in collecting the primary sources in Canadian newspapers from 1972.

During a research trip to Germany in February 2020, I decided to contact Josef Kompalla, who was about to turn eighty-four, by phone and ask whether he would be interested in taking part in a Summit Series project. Over the next nearly two and a half years, during multiple calls and in-person interviews we tried to piece together the details of the events of 1972. Far from a hagiographic rehabilitation of Kompalla, the following pages will thoroughly depict how his complex historical legacy was constructed: from his participation in the Toronto Referee Training Camp in late August 1972, to his shockingly erroneous portrayal as an "East German" official in both the *Official 40*th *Anniversary History* and the current *The Canadian Encyclopedia* Summit Series entries.⁷⁷

Biography: From Katowice to Krefeld

Since so much biographical misinformation has been churned out by various writers between 1972 and 2022, it is imperative to outline the key aspects of Kompalla's life from the outset. Josef Kompalla's was born on March 13th in the 1936 Polish city of Katowice. Like many regions of Poland, Katowice has a complex past.⁷⁸ Kompalla and his family, for example, always considered themselves to be 'ethnically German' and, while speaking Polish in school, he continued to converse in German at home. After 1945, when Poland gradually fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, Kompalla was also taught Russian at school.⁷⁹ Significantly, due to the Cold War fate of Katowice, Kompalla was the only referee at the Summit series who spoke fluent Russian. In hindsight, and in relation to his later negative Canadian portrayals, Kompalla

⁷⁷See Andrew Podnieks, *Team Canada 1972: The Official 40th Anniversary Celebration of the Summit Series – As Told by the Players with Andrew Podnieks* (Toronto, 2012) where Kompalla is twice referred to as an "East German," 157 and 221. A peculiar error, especially considering that many '72 players took part in the project. Also see *Canadian Encyclopedia Project*. While far from academic, it is marketed as a source of valid information for grade-school students and funded by the Government of Canada. The "East German" Kompalla entry was still actively listed on June 30th, 2022.

 ⁷⁸For history of Katowice see Norm Davies, *God's Playground – History of Poland Volume II 1795 to the Present* (New York, 2005), 125 and 373.
 ⁷⁹Ibid. 436

remarked: "perhaps it would have been better to not have learned Russian; that way I could not have conversed on the ice with any Soviet players."⁸⁰

On July 8th, 1958, the entire Kompalla family: Josef, his wife, mother, father and two sisters, fled Poland to start a new life in Krefeld, West Germany. Prior to leaving Katowice, Kompalla's father had spent six years in a Polish jail spent six years in a Polish jail and was not released until the mid-1950s. Predictably, given the hardships his family experienced under communism, Kompalla still categorically opposes being labelled a 'Soviet sympathizer.'

Josef Kompalla began his hockey career playing for Gwardia and then Gornik Katowice. He also had brief stints with the Polish and West German National B-Teams. In both countries, he developed a reputation as a hard-nosed defenceman. In West Germany, he played for Preussen Krefeld from 1958 until his retirement at the age of thirty-three in 1969. He believes that his own playing experience was essential in helping him relate to players on the ice, stating: "I know what players may say in the heat of battle, I played: hockey is an emotional game."⁸¹ In the same year he retired from playing, he began taking his German refereeing levels.

In total, Kompalla officiated 2019 games, prior to his retirement in 1994. On September 22nd, 2002, nearly thirty years to the day after he refereed the infamous game six in Moscow, he was nominated for the IIHC Hockey Hall of Fame. Along with a lengthy, 2002 IIHF Hall of Fame induction interview, his career statistics include: "14 IIHF World Championships, two IIHF World U 20 Juniors, the 1976, 1980 and 1984 Olympics, the 1972 Summit Series, the 1974 Canada Soviet Series which featured the WHA players…"⁸² games in the German First and Second Divisions, as well as a tenure officiating in South Africa. Overall, Kompalla believes he has refereed in forty-five

⁸⁰Josef Kompalla interview June 14th, 2021.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Szymon Szemberg interview with Josef Kompalla, "IIHF Hall of famer 'Jupp' Kompalla: Games of '72 my best memories" online in *IIHF Hall of Famer Special* (Nov. 2002), 6-7. The Official induction year was 2003. Kompalla has IIHF certification on his wall to document he has refereed in fourteen, not as stated in the interview, twelve, world championships.

countries. Lastly, it should be mentioned that he was awarded the Federal Order of Merit for services rendered to the German state on April 13th, 1992.⁸³

Kompalla's Preparations for the Summit: "1972 was a very good year for me."

1972, Kompalla's "very good year," included much more than just refereeing games six (September 24th) and eight (September 28th) of the Summit Series, as well as both 'friendly' games held in Stockholm (September 16th and 17th). Although he was only three years into his career, Kompalla officiated at the 1972 IIHF World Championships (April 7-22nd) in Czechoslovakia. In Prague, he refereed both high-stakes games between the Czechs and Soviets. The USSR did not emerge victorious in either game, tying the first 3-3 and losing their crucial final clash with the Czechs 3-2.⁸⁴ In terms of building Kompalla's international reputation, the German newsmagazine *Der Spiegel* was first to praise him for his work at the World Championships. Under the headline "Germans Wanted," the article emphasised how West German referees were desired at the highest international level, even while their national hockey team was repeatedly being trounced.⁸⁵

With the eyes of the World Championship observers upon him in Prague, including those of Canadian series organizer Alan Eagleson and Soviet coach, Vsevolod Bobrov, Kompalla performed

⁸³Phone and photo session with Josef Kompalla on October 2nd, 2021, during which he made all 1958 emigration papers, past and current passports as well as his 1992 Federal Order of Merit available to me to dispel any notions of his supposed 'East German Citizenship.' Copies of all documents are confidentially held in my possession.

⁸⁴Email confirmation from IIHF Staff Statistician, Martin Merk, (6 June. 2020) – grainy footage of the game can be found online. Alexander Ragulin received a penalty with under three minutes to play virtually sealing the game for the Czechs. ⁸⁵Der Spiegel 17/1972, "Deutsche Erwünscht – Deutsche Schiedsrichter erreichten Weltniveau – vor allem in Sportarten in denen die deutschen Mannschaften zweitklassig sind." Article stating that the last four games for the German hockey team had been lost by a combined score of 6-37 goals and that at the 1972 Sapporo Olympics in February, both the Czechs and Russians had requested the West Germans, Franz Baader, Kompalla's Summit Series officiating partner, even though an East German counterpart had been available.

well enough to be selected for officiating the Summit Series. In late April, he received his invitation to attend the referee training camp in Canada and he instantly accepted, stating: "Canada was the hockey inspiration for me, and I had dreams of becoming an NHL official."⁸⁶

Kompalla's time in Canada began with a three-day referee clinic, held from August 24th to 26th, in Etobicoke near Toronto. Along with four Americans: Gordon Lee, Steve Dowling, Frank Larsen, and Len Gagnon, three additional Europeans: fellow West German, Franz Baader, the Czech, Rudolf Bata and the Swede, Ove Dahlberg, the eight Summit Series referees took part in theoretical and practical on-ice sessions headed by NHL Referee in Chief, Ian "Scotty" Morrison. When asked what the American and European amateurs were instructed to do by the NHL professionals, Kompalla remembered that the European officials were encouraged to "be involved in the game a bit less, not whistle as much" and to "be a bit less strict."⁸⁷

For reasons presumably linked to the smaller ice surface in North America, possible differences in IIHF and NHL rules, as well as different officiating styles, only the four American referees were chosen to officiate the games in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. Similarly, only the four European officials were allowed to referee in Moscow, as well as the additional three exhibition games: two in Stockholm and one in Prague.

As agreed upon by the organizers, every game would employ the IIHF two head-official system, instead of the NHL's one headofficial and two linesmen format. On this topic, Scotty Morrison had already expressed reservations prior to the referee camp, stating: "I'm not convinced the two-man system will work, because it's too much to expect two men to be able to call offsides and watch for penalties at the same time."⁸⁸ Kompalla fully agreed with Morrison and was puzzled by the decision to remain with a two-man system that, due to the speed and agility of the world's best players, resulted in what

⁸⁶Josef Kompalla Interview August 20th, 2021.

⁸⁷Josef Kompalla interview February 28th, 2020.

⁸⁸Dan Proudfoot, "NHL Referees to miss series, but clinic planned for amateurs," in *The Globe and Mail* (15. Aug. 1972)

the German referee described as: "the toughest games I have ever been assigned to. My head was spinning like a ball-bearing. There was action everywhere."⁸⁹

While still training in Canada, not everything was limited to observation and theory as the referees took turns practicing their craft. Baader and Kompalla took part in officiating the final Canadian Red vs White inter-squad test, a 6-2 White victory in Toronto on August 29th.⁹⁰ After the game, Dan Proudfoot of *The Globe and Mail* reported: "there were minor grievances with some calls" but Canadian head coach, Harry Sinden, concluded: "There are no discernable differences between the quality of the Europeans in comparison to North Americans."⁹¹ The entire contingent of European officials then travelled to: Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver, and observed all games in person, while only the Americans officiated. The next time the Europeans refereed a game involving the Canadians would be in Sweden.

Out of Sight: Kompalla's Debut in the two Stockholm 'Friendlies'

Officially billed as 'friendly exhibitions' to commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Swedish Ice Hockey Association, the two games in Stockholm (September 16th and 17th, 1972) were very physical affairs. Team Sweden veteran, Ulf Sterner, reflected in a recent interview: "we were no longer friendly as soon as we met Mr. Esposito and Mr. Cashman."⁹² In reference to the refereeing, the games represented the first time European, amateur officials were exposed to the NHL professionals, and vice versa. Although the games were not televised in Canada, the public was first introduced

⁸⁹"Josef Kompalla - IIHF Hall of Fame Interview" in *IIHF Hall of Famer Special* Vol 6 – No 5 (November 2002).

⁹⁰German press coverage of Kompalla being in Canada was, "Zuerst gewannen die Russen 7:3" (Week of Sept. 10th, 1972) – Roy Ovington (personal collection) press clipping, no newspaper title or date visible.

⁹¹Dan Proudfoot, "Team Canada Test – Henderson Ellis lead Whites over Reds" in *The Globe and Mail* (30 Aug. 1972).

⁹²Unfortunately, even with their best efforts and connections to Swedish television, the Sterners were not able to locate any film footage of game one. Ulf shown here wearing one of his old Team Sweden jerseys (Oct. 29, 2021). Photo courtesy of Pia Sterner.

to the officiating duo of Josef Kompalla and Franz Baader by the Canadian press.

By all accounts, the Canadian team arrived in Sweden in a foul mood and took on an 'us against the world attitude' after having been booed by home fans during the game-four loss in Vancouver. Although many players on the Swedish team were surprised at how intense the games were, Ulf Sterner took it all in stride; it was the same aggressive physicality that he had experienced when he became the first European to play in the NHL with the New York Rangers in 1965. He stated bluntly: "the Canadians came out and wanted to intimidate us." When asked whether he would have described this Canadian style as physical or dirty, Sterner answered: "it was both."⁹³

While the Canadians prevailed 4-1 on Saturday, the Swedes quickly adapted. Swedish coach, Karl Svensson, already stated after game one: "...if Canada wants to play according to Canadian rules, all right, we are prepared to do so."⁹⁴ As a result, both sides drastically upped their aggressive and physical play in game two the next day. Phil Esposito, for example, reflected on the escalating violence in the second game, which he said had originated from the Swedes repeatedly spearing the Canadians, and then bluntly stated: "...even though it was an exhibition game, boy, we went after them with both barrels. Beating them up was more important to us than winning."⁹⁵

Due to the excessive violence, and especially the two major injuries to Wayne Cashman and Lars-Erik Sjöberg, one Canadian reporter went as far as labelling game two the "Blackest Hour in Canadian hockey."⁹⁶ Another wrote that the two teams were involved

⁹³Ibid. Ulf Sterner was the first European player to play in the NHL where he played four games with the New York Rangers in 1965. In reference to immediately experiencing on-ice intimidation in the NHL, he said that during the pre-game skate of his very first game, noted Boston Bruins enforcer, Reggie Fleming, skated up to him and stated: 'tonight I am going to kill you.' Sterner still has the New York newspaper clipping with the headline 'Sterner survives Fleming.'

⁹⁴Jim Coleman, "Swedes Totally Unimpressed with Canadians" in *Calgary Herald* (18 Sept. 1972).

⁹⁵ Phil Esposito and Peter Golenbock, Thunder and Lightning: *A No B.S. Hockey Memoir* (Toronto, 2003), 130-131. Esposito then erroneously mentions 'winning the second game in Sweden' - it was a 4:4 tie.

⁹⁶Jim Coleman, "Blackest Hour in Canadian Hockey" in *The Ottawa Citizen* (18 Sept. 1972).

in "an ugly exhibition of stick-wielding that made the National Hockey League look tame in comparison."⁹⁷ Rather than gradual acclimating to NHL-style hockey in Sweden, Baader and Kompalla received a baptism by fire.

Significantly, the two Stockholm games also began a pattern of Canadian referee intimidation, both on and off the ice. The key incident in this regard occurred with seventeen seconds left to play in the first period, when Wayne Cashman and Ulf Sterner collided after the whistle near the Swedish blue line and the Canadian player presumably suffered a nasty tongue laceration; there was no penalty assessed. Contrary to popular depictions, which refer to Cashman's injury as 'one of the worst in the history of hockey' that supposedly required between 'eighteen to over fifty stitches,' there was initially no blood visible on the ice. Cashman himself noted in a 2012 interview:

"At the end of the period, of the second game, I was skating off the ice, and a guy came up behind me and speared me in the face. That's all I know, I did not go the hospital for a couple of days, but I finally had to go because it got so bad. It should have been stitched, but it never was."⁹⁸

After recently reviewing the game footage, Kompalla stated that he "did not see a penalty on the play as Sterner put up his stick in self-defence" and he now believes that "Cashman likely bit his own tongue."⁹⁹ For his part, Sterner said the Canadian forward "ignored the whistle and tried to kill me" and thus, his high stick to Cashman's face was an act of "protecting myself." Sterner added that he had: "learned how to defend himself playing pro in North America."¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷Ted Blackman, "Esposito's Goal Salvages 4:4 Tie" in *The Gazette* (18 Sept. 1972). ⁹⁸Podnieks, *40th Celebration*, 121. Then seemingly ignoring his own interview with Cashman, Podnieks claimed Cashman was cut for "eighteen stitches." Ibid. 109. For '50 stitches' see: Staff "Professional Hockey's Worst Injuries" *The Globe and Mail* (2 Feb. 2009), the 2012 documentary *Cold War on Ice: Summit Series '72* (44:18) or Alan Eagleson commentary in the movie Canada Russia '72 (DVD One 1:35:08) where he states Cashman received "forty-three stitches."

 ⁹⁹Josef Kompalla interview June 1st, 2022. Knowing the infamy of the Cashman-Sterner incident, Kompalla emphasized in English: "It was an accident."
 ¹⁰⁰Sterner interview August 3rd, 2021.

Whomever was to blame, the injury caused Cashman to miss the remainder of the games in Moscow; however, it should be noted that he was healthy enough to return to the line-up for the game in Prague on September 30th.¹⁰¹

The Cashman-Sterner clash then culminated in some remarkable off-ice exploits during the second intermission in the tunnel of the Stockholm arena. Harry Sinden provided the most detailed description of this incident in his 1972 diary *Hockey Showdown*, stating:

At the end of the second period, I waited on the runway for the referees. Both teams used the same runway, and in this case, that resulted in a bad scene. I jumped all over the Germans verbally, telling them how unfair they were...¹⁰²

Sinden continued: "Cashman dressed in street clothes, wanted to get back at someone."¹⁰³ Ultimately, this volatile situation needed to be diffused through Swedish police intervention, but not before the press had a field-day reporting the chaotic scenes.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹Dr. Andreas Nowak interview, May 23rd, 2022. Surgeon Nowak, who has worked hockey games in Germany, clarified explained: "Tongue lacerations are seldom stitched since they usually quickly heal by themselves. The laceration from a stick blow to the face often causes the recipient to bite down on their tongue. In severe cases, the injury may be stitched and require between two and five stitches. The highest number of stitches that can be physically placed in a tongue is about ten, this would be to repair a near complete detachment. If severely damaged, it also bleeds and forces the player to expel excess blood from the mouth repeatedly. Lastly, tongues are fast healing and recovery time from an injury is between two days to five days." Still, the latest 2022 official history of the Summit Series by Scott Morrison contends, Cashman "needed upwards of fifty stitches in and out of the mouth" Scott Morrison, *1972 The Series the Series that Changed Hockey Forever* (Toronto, 2022) p. 127. Freeze-frame images of the Cashman / Sterner collision (36:07-33) or (37:27-37:48) show no or very minimal damage to Cashman's mouth or face. See Disc Two in *'72 Complete* DVD set.

 ¹⁰²Harry Sinden, Hockey Showdown - The Canada-Russia Hockey Series: The Inside Story by Harry Sinden (Toronto, 1972), 68.
 ¹⁰³Ibid. 68

¹⁰⁴Ibid. 69 and in Associated Press, "Swedish Writers Hurl Harpoons – Criminal Assault" in *The Globe and Mail* (18 Sept. 1972) and Staff Stockholm, "Myth crushed – Swedish Papers Stress Hockey Violence" in *The Globe and Mail* (19 Sept. 1972).

After all this drama, both in and out of public view, Canadian goalie, Ken Dryden, noted in his diary:

"We played poorly and took a lot of stupid penalties. Naturally, we did a lot of crying about these penalties too. Actually, I think we deserved at least eighty percent of them; certainly, they would have been called by NHL referees."¹⁰⁵

Assistant coach, John Ferguson, took a similar line in relation to the West German officiating: "Ninety per cent of our penalties were so obvious that my five-year old could have called them."¹⁰⁶ Dryden reflected:

It's about time we stop bitching about European referees... We knew that European referees would be handling the games in Stockholm and Moscow, and we accepted that fact. Now we should accept the consequences and adjust accordingly.¹⁰⁷

The Canadian goalie then concluded: "... it would seem reasonable that we would begin to get the idea that European refereeing is not going to change to adjust to our style."¹⁰⁸ For reference, it is important to note that the penalty distribution Dryden and Ferguson were referring to in Stockholm was thirty-one minutes assessed to Canada and four to Sweden.

Instead of adapting to the European officiating style, Harry Sinden made a different adjustment after the second Stockholm game: he began to publicly lambaste the West German referees. After game two, he stated to the press: "The officiating was terrible out there tonight. And it will be worse in Moscow."¹⁰⁹ He then went one step further in setting up the final four games against the Soviets, prophesizing: "refereeing will be our biggest problem in Moscow."¹¹⁰ And lastly, on what the Germans had witnessed in Stockholm,

¹⁰⁷Dryden and Mulvoy, *Face-Off at the Summit*, 104.

¹⁰⁵Ken Dryden with Mark Mulvoy, *Face-Off at the Summit* (Toronto, 1973), 103.

¹⁰⁶Dan Proudfoot, "No Holiday in Stockholm -Tarnished Play Disturbs Team Canada Players" in *The Globe and Mail* 19 Sept. 1972).

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

¹⁰⁹Jim Coleman, "Team Canada Guilty of Stupid Sins." in *Edmonton Journal* (18 Sept. 1972).

¹¹⁰Sinden, *Hockey Showdown*, 71.

he stated: "...I'm not looking forward to seeing them again. I'm sure they have a chip on their shoulders after what happened."¹¹¹

The deliberate vilification and physical intimidation of the West German referees thus began in Sweden, well before game six in Moscow. It was here that the Canadian behaviour, especially that of its coach, Harry Sinden, began to trickle down and impact the way the players and press reacted to the German officials.¹¹² For example, Ted Blackman of *The Gazette* came up with the very catchy, yet derogatory, wordplay referring to [Franz] Baader's officiating during the game as moving from "Baader to worse." Phil Esposito also offered his views on the two amateur officials, telling Blackman: "You can't expect more from a guy who is a plumber for 11 months of the year and a referee for 10 games each winter." He then added: "As I told him on the ice, he had too much beer the night before."

As alluded to by Sinden, the tumultuous events in Sweden, both on and off the ice, certainly shaped how Baader and Kompalla approached their next assignment. Predictably, they wanted to maintain control of the upcoming Canadian-Soviet encounters, so that such chaotic scenes would not be repeated. The next time the two West Germans were officiating a Team Canada game was in Moscow.

Kompalla's Official Summit Debut: Game Six in Moscow

After Sweden, the tale of the series in Moscow is a familiar one: Canada had lost two, won one, and tied another game on home soil; every game in the Soviet Union was now of utmost significance. When game five was also won by the Soviets 5-4, games six, seven, and eight all became must-wins for Canada. In other words, from a Canadian standpoint, there was no longer any room for error;

¹¹¹ Ibid. 81.

¹¹²Here Sinden was clearly preparing the groundwork of grouping the West Germans in with the Soviet 'enemy other.' See Brian Kennedy, "Confronting a Compelling Other" in Andre C. Holman (ed.) *Canada's Game – Hockey and Identity* (Kingston, 2009) where the Soviets were transformed to the "compelling other" as the unfolding series proved they were athletically on par with the Canadians. Once victory was achieved, Kennedy explained, "the process of erasing the other began," 59. Rather than erasing the myth after the final Canadian victory, the legend of the 'Kompalla enemy other,' continued to build.

¹¹³Ted Blackman, "Swedes Wonder if NHL a Hoax" in *The Gazette* (18 Sept. 1972).

instead, all available forces needed to be mobilized to guarantee victory. It was amidst this win-at-all-costs scenario for Canada that Baader and Kompalla took the ice in game six.

Game six would be remembered for numerous defining moments: a remarkable, late, game-winning goal by Paul Henderson, officiating controversies, and the 'Kharlamov slash.'¹¹⁴ In reference to the latter incident, and claims of premeditation involving John Ferguson and Bobby Clarke, Kompalla responded tersely: "How am I to ascertain what transpires on the bench? I am there to call what I see on the ice."¹¹⁵ This resulted in the German referees assessing two minutes for the slash and a ten-minute misconduct for Clarke's behaviour after the whistle at 10:12 of the second period. For his part, in the most recent 2022 official history of the series by Scott Morrison, Clarke also blamed the refereeing for the slash on Kharlamov stating: "We were cranked up. I cracked that guy's ankle. We had just reached the end of it. The refereeing was one side of it. We had just had enough."¹¹⁶

The second period ended with another flurry of incidents eerily similar to the chaos in Sweden. Phil Esposito was assessed a fiveminute major for cutting Soviet defenceman Alexander Ragulin, while simultaneously, John Ferguson received a delayed bench minor for throwing a towel on the ice and verbally abusing the officials. Significantly, Sinden later explained: "Fergie and I knew what we were doing. There is only one way to stop a referee in a situation like that – embarrass him. Hold him out to ridicule before the crowd and the world..." and on receiving a bench-minor, he explained:

"We threw towels on the ice and kept raging at them. Finally, they gave Fergie a bench penalty and he wanted to clobber

¹¹⁴See the 2006 independent film on violence hockey *Valerie's Ankle* by Brett Kashmere. On the issue on Clarke's premeditation, see the John Ferguson's interview in the CBC's 1992 *Summit on Ice* where he recalled instructing Clarke to: "Bobby, try to tap that ankle of his and break it." (1:02:30). Similarly, this was restated by both Clarke and Ferguson, although this time Clarke explained that he received the directions to "break his ankle" from Ferguson in the pre-face-off break, prior to the slash. Ferguson indicated that he could give this type of assignment to 'a player like Clarke and not Rod Gilbert' see 1997 CTV documentary *September 1997*. Both TV documentaries were directed by Robert MacAskill.

¹¹⁵Kompalla Interview June 5th, 2021.

¹¹⁶Morrison, '72 The Series 190.

them. Fergie didn't not do anything that bad, he just called one of them kraut or something."¹¹⁷

Ferguson shed light on the subject of referee intimidation in his 1989 autobiography were he cited Scotty Bowman, Bob Pulford, and Harry Sinden as "masters in swinging refs in their favour" and then clarified:

"You've got to do it on the bench and, maybe, sacrifice a bench penalty to get the message across. That's part of being a good coach. You will verbally pummel the official but, by the end, he will be ruling in your favour."¹¹⁸

Beginning in Stockholm, and now escalating in game six, the Canadian coaches, especially Harry Sinden, encouraged and modelled behaviour that fostered unprecedented antipathy towards the German officials. Even later Sinden explained that in the closing moments of the second period, he had unleashed forces that he was now scarcely able to control, noting:

"From this point on, I became a little bit scared. The players – the ones on the ice and the ones in street clothes behind the bench – were so incensed I was afraid that if they ever got close to these officials, they'd kill them."¹¹⁹

The Canadian coach did not need to wait long for his fears to be realized, as the end of the period culminated in a second 'tunnel encounter' with the two Germans.

Similar to Wayne Cashman, who had changed into street clothes and pursued the officials in Sweden, a plain-clothed Bobby Orr led the pursuit of the officials during the second intermission in Moscow. Sinden's recollection is worth quoting at length:

We came out of the second period leading 3 to 2, and all of us raced after the officials [Baader and Kompalla] who were going to their dressing rooms. Bobby Orr and I got there first. We chased them up the runway screaming. We shouldn't have been behaving like this, but they didn't leave us any choice. If they were going to do a job on us, we were not going to let them off the hook. Just before they go to

¹¹⁷Sinden, *Hockey Showdown*, 96.

¹¹⁸John Ferguson, *Thunder and Lightning* (Scarborough, 1989) 325.

¹¹⁹Sinden, Hockey Showdown, 96.

the dressing room one of them stopped in his tracks to answer us. Orr was right on his heels, and when the referee – Baader – stopped, Bobby ran into him. Bobby gave him a shove, and faster than you could yell "cop," the Soviet police and officials were all around us.¹²⁰

After describing these remarkable tunnel scenes Sinden concluded: "We looked like clowns once again, but at this point we were beyond caring. We're not going to sit around and take the shaft anymore."¹²¹ It was notable, given the previous tunnel chaos, that Bobby Orr and Dale Tallon continued to target the Germans after the game. The Boston Bruins superstar reflected:

"I remember after the game, Dale Tallon (a Team Canada reserve) and I waited at the exit for the referees to come off the ice. We were both shaking we were so upset, and they were shaking too, but for different reasons. We yelled at those guys like a couple of fools, but that's how emotional it was."¹²²

When told about this post-game six behaviour of Orr and Tallon, Kompalla replied that he "did not pay attention to personal crowd abuse from the stands before or after games."¹²³

In the post-game press conference, Harry Sinden also intensified his attack: "Those were two of the worst officials I have ever seen handle a hockey game at any time in my career. We feel the refereeing was incompetent."¹²⁴ When reporter, Jim Taylor, asked if Sinden was concerned that a member of his team might slug a referee, he replied: "Yes, I am afraid it is going to be me."¹²⁵

¹²³Kompalla Interview June 6th, 2022.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹Ibid. 97.

¹²² Scott Morrison *The Days Canada Stood Still – Canada vs USSR 1972* (Toronto, 1989) 158. The latest official history of Team 72 is a frustrating read, due to the lack of proper citations and the considerable amount of overlap with the author's 1989 publication. See for example two chapters with the identical titles "To Hull with Russia" and numerous interview quotes that remained the same in both editions. Since no interviews were dated, in either edition, it is difficult to discern which player quotes originated in 1989 or in 2022.

¹²⁴Canadian Press, "Team Canada Furious at Referees" in *Calgary Herald* (25 Sept. 1972).

¹²⁵Jim Taylor, "Sport Editorial" in *The Vancouver Sun* (25 Sept. 1972).

In the end, Canada won game six 3-2, and the distribution of penalty minutes was indeed glaring: Kompalla and Baader gave out thirty-one total penalty minutes to the Canadian team, while only assessing four to the Soviets. When Kompalla was asked about this considerable imbalance he said, "a few misconducts can add up quickly" and he still believes all the calls were warranted.¹²⁶ In an odd, statistical coincidence, the thirty-one minutes to four ratio was identical to what Baader and Kompalla had assessed in game two in Stockholm. It was a disparity not lost on the Canadian press, resulting in headlines after game six grouping the West Germans as opponents alongside the Soviets.

While the clutch victory in game six was certainly the top story from a Canadian perspective, the injury to Kharlamov was the key take-away for the Soviets, with assistant coach Boris Kulagin stating to the press: "Canadian players have forgotten the game is played under international rules."¹²⁷ The Soviet government paper *Izvestia* proclaimed: "The Canadians openly hunted (star center Valerie) Kharlamov, seeking even in the first pretext to start a fight trying to strike with a skate or glove" and then concluded: "This type of playing is foreign to us."¹²⁸

After Canada also prevailed in game seven, Kompalla gave an interview to *The Globe and Mail* reporter, Dan Proudfoot. The referee was very frank in his assessment of the Canadian team, referring to Phil Esposito as "a hot shot who needed about ten to fifteen games more to be in top condition." He then added about the entire Canadian team: "I do think they could win if they were in top condition."¹²⁹ Kompalla also mentioned his amateur status and low wages in the German Bundesliga, compared to those of NHL officials. Still, he concluded that he felt up to the task and, although the Canadians were very verbose during their games, he did not worry about their criticisms, stating: "I let it go in one ear and out the other."¹³⁰

One Canadian criticism of note may have resonated with Kompalla, but he was not made aware of it at the time. It was levelled

¹²⁶Kompalla Interview June 5th, 2021.

¹²⁷Jack Ludwig, *Hockey Night in Moscow: Behind the Scenes in the USSR-Canada Series* (Toronto, 1972), 133.

¹²⁸UPI Moscow, "Rude' Canadians Criticized" in Vancouver Sun (25 Sept. 1972).

¹²⁹Dan Proudfoot, "Referee Clinic 'Waste of Time'" – Kompalla's performance disappoints Morrison' in *The Globe and Mail* (27 Sept. 1972) ¹³⁰Ibid.

at him specifically by NHL Referee in Chief, Scotty Morrison, who had organized the referee seminars in Toronto. Surprisingly, and similar to both Cashman in Stockholm and Orr in Moscow, Morrison also tried to gain access to the officials during the second intermission of game six. After the game, Morrison clarified his actions by stating: "I did not really have any right, because I am not here in an official capacity," and continued: "I have to admit, I reacted like a fan during that game and I just wanted to talk to them (Kompalla and Baader), but they would not let me in."¹³¹ Morrison then identified Kompalla as one of the referees who had caught his eye at the Etobicoke clinic, stating:

I was especially disappointed with Kompalla because he impressed me. I did not expect much from Baader, but I liked Kompalla. But it now looks like the entire clinic was a waste of time. The main thing I wanted to do in Toronto was standardize procedure – and the European officials agreed with me in Toronto. Then when I come here and they do everything different and when I ask about it, they say this is the way we do it in Europe.¹³²

For Morrison, the onus was squarely on the West Germans for changing their officiating styles to adjust to the Canadians, not the Canadian players adapting to IIHF refereeing.

Immediately after game six, Canadian forward Red Berenson, took a more philosophical view of what had transpired with Baader and Kompalla:

"We agitated them and we paid dearly for it. We've got to exercise more self-control in the face of adverse officiating. They're human too. You can't call a man names and expect him to give you a fair shake."¹³³

Red Fisher of *The Montreal Star* believed some offside calls were questionable in game six, but blamed "the [two man IIHF] system, not the men. But in the matter of calling penalties there was not

¹³¹Ibid. Here Morrison cited the Soviet precedent of protesting the American officials during game two in Toronto, which culminated in Steve Dowling and Frank Larsen not refereeing another game in the series.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Ted Blackman, "Soviets Agree to New Refs if Bergman Gagged" in *The Gazette* (27 Sept. 1972).

much to growl about. Not much at all."¹³⁴ The next time Kompalla officiated in the series was in the eventful game eight where the tumultuous opening five minutes were anything but a demonstration of Canadian self-control.

The Penultimate Game Eight: "I could have sent them all to the showers you know!"

Due to a protracted debate between the Canadian and Soviet representatives regarding who would referee the final game, Josef Kompalla did not officiate alongside his West German partner, Franz Baader, but instead with the Czech official, Rudolf Bata. Even though the controversies surrounding what unfolded in this legendary game clearly involved both referees, it was Kompalla who has garnered the most criticism. Foster Hewitt's pre-game preamble, "If you had written a script, it could not have produced a more dramatic and exciting final," proved to be prophetic. For many, Josef Kompalla was to emerge as the main villain in the drama.

The CBC play-by play commentator set the tone for the chaos that was to unfold by resolutely describing Kompalla's first penalty call on Bill White's at 2:25 of the opening period as "that was a dive." A second Canadian holding infraction followed only thirty-six seconds later at 3:01 against Peter Mahovlich. Contrary to numerous sources, it was not a call made by Kompalla, but by Rudolf Bata. With two Canadians in the penalty box, the Soviets opened the scoring on a goal by Yakushev at 3:34. Bata then assessed the next penalty to a Soviet, Vladimir Petrov, at 3:44, which resulted in both teams temporarily playing four-on-four. The fourth penalty of the game then came at 4:10 of the first period. It was an interference call made by Kompalla against Jean-Paul Parise who obstructed Alexander Maltsev, leaving his own zone. The firestorm that ensued would define the playing and officiating careers of both Parise and Kompalla.

Following the call, Parise became infuriated. Initially, he approached Kompalla about the infraction, entered the penalty box, and then vacated it. He then seemed to talk to the West German and slammed his stick on the ice in front of the official, for which

¹³⁴Red Fischer, "Game Six – Beating the System and Winning the Match" in Henk W. Hoppener Death of a Legend – Summer of '72 Team Canadavs. USSR Nationals. 70.

Kompalla added a ten-minute misconduct. The Canadian forward circled around center ice, approached the Canadian bench, and then, in a surreal moment, raised his stick in a motion to club Kompalla over the head. Thankfully, Parise stopped halfway through the swing. After recoiling in self-defence, Kompalla collected himself and gave the Canadian a game misconduct.¹³⁵

Following the game, Parise stressed that he did not dispute his actions, but was simply confused by the initial interference call by Kompalla, stating: "If he'd called anything else but interference, I'd accepted it and gone to the penalty box."¹³⁶ Unbelievable scenes then unfolded, including the Canadian coaches hurling a bench and chair on the ice, as well as numerous Canadian players heatedly arguing with the officials near the penalty box. When reviewing his, and John Ferguson's chair and bench-throwing antics in a 2002 interview, Harry Sinden stated: "We did get his [Kompalla's] attention. I mean, we should have been thrown out of the game for the way we behaved."¹³⁷ In hindsight, it seems truly remarkable that all this turmoil originated from Kompalla supposedly assigning the wrong *type* of penalty.

Kompalla, who still has a large, framed original of 'the Parise incident' photograph hanging by the entry to his apartment, has vivid memories of game eight. In reviewing the original calls on White, Mahovlich, and Parise, he believes the correct penalties were assessed. In a 2018 interview, Canadian forward Ron Ellis reflected:

I don't think in the NHL those first calls would have been made – even if they were technically penalties. The idea would have been, enough's enough here – there is a lot at stake. But that did not happen – I would

¹³⁵See Figure 6: described by Podnieks in 40th Celebration as "the second-most famous photograph from the Summit Series," 221. Remarkably, the ten-second (1:14:50 - 1:15:00) Kompalla verbal clarification on the Parise penalties in the 1992 CBC TV documentary *Summit on Ice*, represent the only time he gave a Canadian TV interview on the subject. I am thankful to Robert MacAskill, the co-producer, for confirming that the 1992 interview location was in front of the hockey arena in Prague. Phone conversation with Robert MacAskill and Ravi Baichwal, February 23rd, 2022.

¹³⁶Jim Taylor, "Column" in *The Vancouver Sun* (29 Sept. 1972) or Dan Proudfoot, "From Russia with Glory" in *The Globe and Mail* (29 Sept. 1972) where Parise believed it was a cross-check instead of interference.

¹³⁷Harry Sinden interview in '72 Complete DVD set Disc Six (41:55-42:00).

need to look at multiple slow motions to see if those first two calls were penalties – so the third one was just too much. 138

On the frequency of five penalties being assessed in the first five minutes of the deciding game, Kompalla, stated: "a penalty is a penalty no matter what time of the game it occurs" and then added "it takes courage for a referee to make these calls in big games to stay in control." ¹³⁹

Significantly, Harry Sinden's September 29th diary entry revealed that the Canadian chaos in game eight was orchestrated, claiming:

There was only one thing to do to make them stop – make them look bad, like we had in the previous games. This is why the chairs went and why I continued the argument as long as I could. I wanted these bastards to think that if they did make one more bad call, I would have one of my players go out and crease one of them with a stick. ¹⁴⁰

In the end, Sinden believed the outrageous Canadian behaviour achieved the desired result: the referees had been intimidated enough to call fewer penalties.

At the time, Sinden's view was not shared by the Canadian Moscow diplomat, Gary J. Smith, whose recent book *Ice War Diplomat* explained that this on-ice behaviour was potentially diplomatically damaging. By chance, Smith was sitting beside Bobby Orr during the Parise incident in game eight. Smith related that he and Orr differed on what they had just seen: "He [Orr] blamed the referees. He had been manifestly unhappy with the two Germans going back to the games in Sweden." Smith then continued that Canada had negotiated for the two officials for game eight and that the Canadians now needed to abide by the rules. Then specifically on the Parise incident: "The actions of Parise and Sinden, I said weren't helpful; they were disappointing and didn't reflect well on the Canadian team and on Canada." Ultimately, Smith continued, that he believed Orr came from the "Vince Lombardi school" in which

¹³⁸ Ron Ellis, interview in Greg Franke, *Epic Confrontation - Canada vs. Russia on Ice: The Greatest Sports Drama of All Time* (New York, 2018), 345.

¹³⁹Kompalla interview Feb. 28th, 2020

¹⁴⁰Sinden, *Hockey Showdown*, 113.

"winning isn't everything - it's the only thing." After mentioning to Orr that "how you win is also important" and "that our diplomatic objective was to build bridges and not blow them up." Orr countered: "You've been in Moscow too long." This led Smith to conclude: "We were obviously on completely different wavelengths."¹⁴¹

After the first period turmoil, the game would have even more drama to offer, and in nearly every defining moment, Josef Kompalla was at the center of the action. For example, more chaotic scenes occurred in the third period when Yvon Cournoyer scored the crucial 5-5 marker and the goal light apparently did not turn on. Even though the most important aspect of the play was that Kompalla had clearly signalled goal on the ice, Alan Eagleson still took it upon himself to vehemently protest the non-goal-light call at the time-keeper's bench. This culminated in yet another surreal moment in game eight involving Canadian players, coaches, a trainer, and Eagleson being escorted across the ice, causing a second major delay.

In a surprising revelation during one of our final interviews, Kompalla said that even fifty years later, he still had absolutely no idea what caused the Eagleson-led mayhem. When I told him that Eagleson was apparently upset over the goal light not turning on, Kompalla replied:

"This is the first time I have heard of the goal light not turning on and what does it matter? I am not concerned with what happens off the ice or with off-ice officials, I control the game on the ice and I clearly signalled goal."¹⁴²

He then continued to indicate that he was very puzzled by the Canadian behaviour that culminated in the entire coaching staff and some players 'rescuing' Eagleson from the time-keeper's box, then escorting him across the full length of the ice while he, and others, made rude gestures towards the crowd. Since this was the second Canadian-caused stoppage in game eight, Kompalla added sternly: "I could have sent them all to the showers, you know!"¹⁴³

¹⁴¹Gary J. Smith *Ice War Diplomat – Hockey Meets Cold War Politics at the 1972 Summit Series* (Medeira Park, 2022) 229-230.

¹⁴²Kompalla Interview June 1st 2022.

¹⁴³ Kompalla interview March 15th, 2022.

In the end, along with clearly signalling the Cournoyer goal, Kompalla also made the call on the Henderson goal. The 1973 publication *Twenty-Seven Days in September – The Official Hockey Canada History of the 1972 Canada / USSR Series* contains a freezeframe pictorial of the Henderson goal, and in no less than eighteen of twenty-five images, Kompalla is clearly visible.¹⁴⁴ On the late winner by Henderson, he remarked: "Of course, I signalled the final goal. We [along with Bata] then skated back to center ice and both knew the game had been decided."¹⁴⁵

Ending at the Beginning: Kompalla's 1972 Return to Prague

After the national euphoria unleashed by the Henderson goal in Canada, neither the press nor the public paid too much attention to what transpired prior to the team arriving back in Montreal. However, there was another game that, if added to the two Swedish contests, amounted to the eleventh hockey game for Team Canada. After defeating the Soviets in Moscow on September 28th, the team flew to Prague on September 29th to take on the reigning IIHF World Champions, Czechoslovakia, on September 30th. Significantly, Baader and Kompalla were scheduled to officiate this last game, but they resigned in protest. Depending on whose recollections are to be believed, the incidents that caused the Germans to formally quit the series occurred on an Aeroflot flight from Moscow to Prague and involved Canadian players abusing the two referees one final time.

The Globe and Mail, as well as The Times Columnist, picked up the Moscow to Prague flight story with the respective headlines: "Refs Resign After Fun Flight" and "Refs Go First Class with Soviet Coach." According to the press coverage, Canadian players, specifically Wayne Cashman and Jean-Paul Parise, bothered the two officials by shouting insults and hurling food left-overs at them. The Canadians were supposedly upset that Baader and Kompalla had been seated in the "First Class" section near the front of the plane and close to Soviet coach, Vselevod Bobrov. According to Joe Kryczka, President of the

 ¹⁴⁴John Macfarlane, Twenty -Seven Days in September - The Official Hockey Canada History of the 1972 Canada / USSR Series (Canada, 1973), 110-111.
 ¹⁴⁵Kompalla interview Feb. 28, 2020

Canadian Amateur Hockey Association: "They [Baader and Kompalla] were apparently unhappy because one of the players (Wayne Cashman) threw some food, small cucumbers, at them and a couple of them gave them a rough time." Kryczka then explained that the referees voiced their concerns and decision to withdraw to "the Czech Press and the Czech hockey people" and he surmised: "It's fine with us because we know they won't try to hose us like the Russians did."¹⁴⁶

Beyond the press coverage, there are no less than five different Canadian versions of what transpired on the plane to Prague by: Harry Sinden, Dennis Hull, Jean-Paul Parise, John Ferguson and, most recently, Phil Esposito. In his September 29th, 1972 diary entry, Sinden remarked:

Guess who was sitting up in first class, side by side, exchanging niceties? Coach Bobrov and Kompalla, the German referee. We thought it only fitting that we send some Canadian representatives to keep them company. Cashman and Peter Mahovlich volunteered and I understand the four lunched together. Someday I will have to get the complete details.¹⁴⁷

Of considerable importance, although the Canadian coach had previously criticized the Germans for their "incompetence" on the ice, here he specifically inferred Kompalla's complicity with the Soviet coach. According to Sinden's version, and in line with previous referee intimidation tactics, noted strong-men, Wayne Cashman and Peter Mahovlich, volunteered to 'lunch' with Kompalla and Bobrov.

While not mentioning Bobrov, Dennis Hull's version of the plane incident also depicted Kompalla's supposed subservience to the Russians as an accepted fact, by recalling: "Although we knew Kompalla had been told what to do by the Russians, J.P. still hated him." Hull then explained that Kompalla looked scared and nervous all flight, in anticipation of what Parise might do to him. Hull's retelling differs from the press coverage in terms of food:

"Just as they served dinner, J.P. approached him. I think Kompalla thought he was going to be beaten, J.P. just tipped the

¹⁴⁶Prague Staff, "Refs Resign after Fun Flight" in *The Globe and Mail* (30 Sept. 1972) and Special to *The Times*, "Refs Go First Class with Soviet Coach" in *Times Colonist* (30 Sept. 1972).

¹⁴⁷Sinden, *Hockey Showdown*, 120.

referee's dinner into his lap. Kompalla sat there and didn't move a muscle in protest."¹⁴⁸

According to Hull, Parise had thus exacted his revenge on a 'terrified' Josef Kompalla.

Jean-Paul Parise also recollected what transpired between him and Kompalla en route to Prague, although he did not mention Bobrov's presence. After first being startled that Kompalla was on the same plane, he then took the initiative. Parise explained:

He was sitting near the front of the plane, so I went behind him and grabbed his cheek and squeezed it. He turns white and I said, 'I just want you to know I'm here you stupid communist so-and-so.' We threw a couple of cucumber slices at him, too.¹⁴⁹

Although Parise expressed remorse in a 2012 *The Hockey News* interview, stating, "It's one of those things that you regret for the rest of your life," he still recounted the same story to Andrew Podnieks for *Team Canada 1972: The Official 40th Anniversary Celebration* – *As Told by the Players*, but without the referring to Kompalla as "stupid communist so and so." Instead, he clarified his motive: "I told him that I just wanted to let him know I was there."¹⁵⁰

Canadian assistant coach, John Ferguson, remarked that for him, the flight from Moscow to Prague was: "uneventful, unless you count some overtime partying, and that our least favourite referee Kompalla shared the plane with us." Then, seemingly with a clear view of the seated Josef Kompalla, Ferguson concluded: "One thing I noticed about the German was that he was eating peanuts and kept dropping them on his lap. The man could not do anything right!"¹⁵¹ Perhaps Ferguson may have witnessed Kompalla trying to remove Canadian food projectiles from his pants.

Josef Kompalla's version of what transpired differs considerably from what Sinden, Hull, Parise and Ferguson wrote. First and foremost,

¹⁴⁸Dennis Hull with Robert Thompson, *The Third Best Hull* (Toronto, 2013), 116.Hull then, erroneously, had Kompalla refereeing the last game in Prague, 117.

¹⁴⁹Adam Proteau, "The Summit Series at 40, Extended Version" citing Jean-Paul Parise's interview in *The Hockey News* (10 Sept. 2012).

¹⁵⁰Jean-Paul Parise, "#22 J-P (Jean-Paul) Parise – Passion and Rage" in Podnieks, *Official 40th Celebration*, 225.

¹⁵¹Ferguson, *Thunder and Lightning*, 198.

Kompalla did confirm that it was because of the rude Canadian behaviour on the plane that Baader and he complained to the press and Czech Hockey officials in Prague and both declined to referee the last game. He recollects that there was certainly the throwing of leftovers coming from behind where he was seated, but he refutes that he was scared and had a plate of food spilled into his lap by Parise, or that Cashman and Mahovlich 'lunched' with him. He became particularly upset about Parise's claims and underlined that no Canadian player approached, let alone touched, him. He added that had any physicality occurred, he would have either: "gotten into a fight or pressed police charges as soon as the plane landed in Prague."¹⁵² Lastly, he does not recall "ever having any problems eating peanuts on airplanes."¹⁵³

On sitting in "First Class" and "exchanging niceties" with Bobrov, he added: "We [Baader and Kompalla] just sat side by side closer to the cockpit and the Canadians all sat behind us. The plane was not partitioned, it was all one seating."¹⁵⁴ On a supposed verbal exchange with Bobrov: "I once spoke to [Bobrov's famous predecessor] Anatoly Tarasov about hockey on a flight, but I don't recall ever speaking to Bobrov. If he was there, sure, it is possible I could have talked to him." Kompalla was then very puzzled by how conversing with a coach on an airplane was proof of his 'communist complicity.'¹⁵⁵

In sum, although the Moscow-to-Prague flight encounter has numerous narrative incarnations, all versions exposed disturbing trends. The behaviour of some members of Team Canada on the plane represented the final act in a deliberate campaign of referee embarrassment, vilification, and intimidation that began in Stockholm. If the endgame was to break the officials' willingness

¹⁵²Kompalla interview June 14th, 2021

¹⁵³Kompalla interview May 30th, 2022.

¹⁵⁴Not clear whose recollections are most accurate here, but in the 1970s, the Soviet state-owned carrier seldom had First Class sections on domestic flights. First Class compartments did exist on longer international flights, but these were usually sectioned off (wall or curtain) from the non-First-Class section. Presumably, if there was a First Class section on the flight to Prague, thrown food projectiles may have needed to travel through a partition to hit Baader and Kompalla. For views of interiors in Soviet passenger liners see Eleonora Goldman "What was air travel like in the USSR (photos only)" in the state-backed publication *Russia Beyond* (30 Aug. 2019).

¹⁵⁵Kompalla interview August 16th, 2021.

to partake in the Summit Series, it had now succeeded: Baader and Kompalla refused to take the ice in Prague. Significantly, this chance encounter, which, according to Sinden's version, involved Kompalla speaking to Bobrov, gave the Canadian coach the 'proof' he needed to suggest that the West German was clearly in the communist camp.

The last and most recent version of the Moscow to Prague plane incident, stems from Phil Esposito. Cited here from the 2022 official Team 72 history of the Summit Series, Esposito provided the following explanation of his conduct:

When we flew to Prague, I remember the referee [Franz Baader] was on the plane sitting in first class. J.P. Parise and me – you know those meals they have on the airplane and there's those little cherry tomatoes, fuck, we were throwing them at him. When I think of it that's terrible. How bad were we? But we won. I don't think we could ever get away with it today."¹⁵⁶

Aftermath: From Canadian '*Bête Noire*' to the 'East German' Kompalla (1972 to 2002)

In early October 1972, Kompalla gave an interview to the German newspaper *General Anzeiger* in which he was still coming to grips with what he experienced a few weeks earlier. He referred to the Canadian conduct, on and off the ice, as "at times scandalous," singling out not just the players, but also coaches Sinden and Ferguson for their behaviour. He believed the referees had been justified in their penalty calls against the Canadians, adding: "One gets the impression that it would suit the Canadians best to play games without referees so that they could do all they like." Lastly, it was clear that more than rude behaviour and rule transgressions were on his mind when he told the German reporter: "I am very glad that I got back home uninjured."¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶Scott Morrison, 1972 *The Series that Changed Hockey Forever 249*. Odd usage of "[Baader]" by the author here, which denotes Morrison added the German's name and Esposito presumably just referred to "the referee" in the interview. Of note: Morrison then places Kompalla on the same flight, stating: "The other referee the Canadians despised was also on the flight…" 250. According to Kompalla, he sat beside Franz Baader the entire flight.

¹⁵⁷Canadian Press Bonn, "German Referee: We are Very Crude and Dangerous" cited in *The Ottawa Citizen* (5 Oct. 1972).

Two years later, Kompalla returned to Canada and refereed in the 1974 WHA – Soviet Series. He officiated, this time with a three person NHL-type system, the opening game in Quebec and another game eight in Moscow. These duties were followed by numerous IIHF World Championships, as well as Olympic game officiating. Almost every time the Canadian press covered a game with Kompalla after 1972, until his retirement in 1994, his Summit Series legacy was immediately revisited, and he was rarely depicted in a positive manner. Oddly, in 1978 he was first falsely portrayed as an "East German" in a Canadian Press article covering the Soviet-Canada IIHF game in Prague on May 9th, 1978, when Canadian goalie, Dan Bouchard, "drew a 10-minute misconduct for arguing with East German referee Josef Kompalla."¹⁵⁸

The next press reference to an "East German" Kompalla was made by David Shoalts of *The Globe and Mail* in his 1997 article: "Summit Series: 25 Years Later." He described the referee as: "the notorious Josef Kompalla, an East German."¹⁵⁹ One year later, reputable hockey reporter Eric Duhatschek also perpetuated the East German label. While interviewing Kompalla's former Canadian son-in-law, Benoit Doucet, who played in the 1998 Olympics in Nagano, Duhatscheck introduced Kompalla as "East German." Then, he wrote as a matter of fact that: "To millions of Canadians, Josef Kompalla was the East German referee, who was co-opted by the Soviet Union."¹⁶⁰

It is clear by the nationality errors made by Shoalts and Duhatscheck in their respective 1997 and 1998 articles that they had not kept up with current research. Just in time for the 25th anniversary of the Summit Series in 1997, Roy MacSkimming released the first comprehensive history of the series entitled *Cold War – The Amazing Canada-Soviet Hockey Series of 1972*. While historically frustrating, due to its omission of formal source citations, the book relied heavily on first-hand accounts, especially Harry Sinden's Hockey Showdown, Ken Dryden's *Face-Off at the Summit*, as well as Jack Ludwig's *Hockey Night in Moscow*, to reconstruct the past.

¹⁵⁸Canadian Press Prague, "Last-Minute Lapse Costs Canada" in *Alberni Valley Times* (9 May. 1978).

¹⁵⁹David Shoalts interviewing Bill White, "Summit Series: 25 Years Later" in *The Globe and Mail* (9 Sept. 1997).

¹⁶⁰Duhatschek, "German Player's Father-in-Law."

On Kompalla, MacSkimming still correctly identified him as a West German official. However, he also erroneously attributed a key oversight to Kompalla and Baader for the Kharlamov slash, which the author described as: "somehow missed by both the television cameras and the referees."¹⁶¹

While MacSkimming got Kompalla's nationality correct, it was Alan Eagleson who really accentuated the misleading portrayal of Kompalla as an 'Eastern Bloc sympathizer'. Published in 1991, the same year that the Soviet Union's final disintegration was unfolding, it was Eagleson who revisited the events of 1972 and depicted his own role therein as a Cold War vanquisher of communism. In the egregiously entitled: Power Play: The Memoir of Hockey Czar Alan Eagleson, he began to spin a bewildering tale of an 'Eastern bloc' refereeing conspiracy in Moscow. For example, with the exception of Ove Dahlberg, whom he correctly identified as "Swedish," Eagleson grouped the Czech Bata, along with Baader and Kompalla, and clarified "We called them Badder and Worser", into an all "Eastern bloc" officiating team.¹⁶² Essentially, he was claiming that after Dahlberg was not able to officiate game eight, the only choices left for the Canadians were all Eastern bloc referees. Ironically, in the same year Eagleson was making these false Eastern bloc accusations, Josef Kompalla was nominated for the German Order of Merit which he received on April 13th, 1992.

For better or for worse, Phil Esposito has always been known for speaking his mind.¹⁶³ When he released his 2003 book *Thunder and Lightning: A No-B.S. Hockey Memoir*, it was sure to contain a no-holds-barred approach to some of the key moments from the '72 series, including the officiating. In line with Eagleson's confusing

¹⁶¹Roy MacSkimming, *Cold War – The Amazing Canada Hockey Series of 1972* (Vancouver, 1996), 75. Referring to the Kharlamov Slash as a blown call by Baader and Kompalla was puzzling since MacSkimming's own statistical game sheet list Clarke's penalty at 10:12 of the second period; although, the accompanying 10-minute misconduct, all assessed by the German referees, was omitted by the author. See MacSkimming's statistical appendix, 259.

¹⁶²Alan Eagleson with Scott Young, *Power Play: The Memoirs of Hockey Czar Alan Eagleson* (Toronto, 1991), 118-119.

¹⁶³See for example Esposito's famous remark: "I would have killed them to win" in Dryden and MacGregor *Home Game*, 211.

Eastern bloc ramblings, Esposito also wrote: "The referees were from the Soviet bloc – except one who was from West Germany - and they were bad. They were cheating. Sure, they were. The referees were under the orders from Russian officials."¹⁶⁴ He then concluded on all the controversies in game eight involving Rudolf Bata and Josef Kompalla: "In that game we had two referees, this guy we liked and another guy, an asshole…"¹⁶⁵ Significantly, Esposito continues to be the most vocal '72 player when it comes to giving interviews. Take for example his appearance on the CBC's *The Hour with* George Stroumboulopoulos where he nearly referred to Kompalla as "the Russian referee," and then corrected his own first mistake by adding another: "Excuse me, it was the communist guy from East Germany."¹⁶⁶

A Missed Chance for Corrections: Kompalla's 2003 IIHF Hall of Fame Induction

In the propagation of historical inaccuracies, whether their origins can be explained through human error or, as in Alan Eagleson's case, deliberately constructed historical fallacies, the internet presents a fascinating information gateway. This is not the place to assess the numerous Summit Series tribute sites or internet boards that have dealt with the topic of Josef Kompalla and the 1972 Summit Series. However, in terms of historical accuracy and reputable reference sources, it is important to mention that a comprehensive English-language Josef Kompalla interview was conducted, as is the tradition, prior to his induction into the IIHF Hall of Fame in 2003 and this was accompanied by a detailed online biography. For all writers who rely somewhat, or even predominantly, on the internet for their research material, the IIHF Hall of Fame profile of Kompalla contained accurate and accessible information ranging from birthdate, place of birth, emigration to West Germany, and general career statistics. In other words, after 2003 at the very latest, all the inaccuracies of his citizenship,

¹⁶⁴Esposito and Golenbock, *Thunder and Lightning*, 138.

¹⁶⁵Ibid. 142.

¹⁶⁶See Phil Esposito interview on the CBCs *This Hour with John Stroumboulopoulos*, YouTube (10:34-10:40 minutes) aired Nov. 8th, 2008.

especially the 'East German' label, should have been rectified by a quick visit to the IIHF website.

Instead, as exemplified by the 2006 CBC movie *Canada Russia '72*, director T.W. Peacocke and producer Barrie Dunn, who explained they 'went to great lengths to recreate the key scenes of the Summit Series as authentically as possible,' actually took the vilification of Kompalla to new heights.¹⁶⁷ This is not an attempt to offer a film review of a marginal made-for-TV project, but what was included in the 'bonus material' in the three DVD set is of historical value. Here, Alan Eagleson and Harry Sinden are featured viewing the movie alongside Peacocke and Dunn. In other words, two of the most important eyewitnesses from 1972 were providing a running commentary on the artistic reconstruction of the events they experienced.

From the first scenes depicting Kompalla and Baader in Stockholm, it becomes apparent that neither photographs nor film footage were reviewed very thoroughly, since the referees were given the wrong numbers: Baader was 17 not 16, Kompalla 16 not 17. The lightning-rod Cashman-Sterner incident then erroneously shows the Swede being the aggressor and viciously sticking the Canadian in the mouth, while blood splatters the ice. Rather than correct any of the inaccuracies depicted, for example the original absence of blood on the ice and/or that Cashman initiated the contact well after the whistle had gone, Sinden observed: "this, this was one of the worst injuries he had ever seen."¹⁶⁸ To their credit, the filmmakers then portrayed the targeting of Baader and Kompalla in the Swedish player-tunnel, which had all previously occurred out of public view.

For Eagleson's movie commentary on Kompalla, reviewing the string of early penalties in game eight that culminated in the Parise incident, he simply added: "Kompalla, Kompalla it was all Kompalla." Sinden then chimed in: "yes, it was all the one guy." Eagleson continued: "Kompalla just looked like he had been paid off by the

¹⁶⁷*Canada Russia* '72 DVD One. Here the writers and director went to great lengths of creating a fictional cartoon showing Kompalla and Baader with donkey ears and tails, then labelling the image "Baader and Worst" (2:27:00). ¹⁶⁸Ibid. (1:34:40)

Russians to get seven or eight players of ours in the penalty box." Then, in attempting to justify his own bizarre actions of falling into the time-keeper's bench, Eagleson also blamed Kompalla, not just the goal judge for supposedly failing to turn on the light, thus inciting his rage, claiming: "I saw Bata pointing down into the net – which means goal. Kompalla, he is in another world, he is not going to do anything to help us."¹⁶⁹ To be clear, it was Josef Kompalla, not Rudolf Bata, who signalled that the puck had crossed the goal line. In fact, Kompalla called all of Canada's last three goals by Esposito, Cournoyer, and Henderson.¹⁷⁰

One last memorable scene re-enacts a post-game six press conference. However, here the writers diverted from what actually took place and chose to insert a direct quote from Sinden's 1972 memoir *Hockey Showdown*. Actor Booth Savage, as Sinden, is shown stating: "The only way to deal with incompetent referees is to embarrass them – hold them up to ridicule so the world can see how bad they really are."¹⁷¹ While this was indeed a line contained in his diary, Sinden did not make this statement to the press in Moscow. Still, director Peacocke then awkwardly congratulated Sinden on his strategy of deflection:

I thought this was quite masterful on your part, Harry. You talk about this in your book – how you deflected in the media and your defence of your strategy of attacking or being critical of the refs, was quite a brilliant stroke.¹⁷²

After the odd compliment, Sinden remained uncharacteristically silent.

40th Anniversary and Beyond: The Kompalla Legend Entrenched

In chronologically sifting through the flood of material that had been written on Kompalla since 1972, I was very hopeful that some of the inaccuracies about his historical legacy would finally

¹⁶⁹Alan Eagleson with Harry Sinden, "Special Guest Commentary" in *Canada Russia* '72 DVD One (2:48:54).

¹⁷⁰Kompalla Interview June 6th, 2022.

¹⁷¹Canada Russia '72 DVD One (2:23:05)

¹⁷²Ibid. (2:23:29-52)

be corrected in time for the 40th Anniversary in 2012. Two oral history projects, one by *The Hockey News* and the second by *The Globe and Mail*, enabled numerous key eyewitnesses to finally come forward. The latter *Globe* project in particular, entitled "The Story of the Summit Series, as it's never been told before," involved interviews with numerous players from both teams, coaches, fans, and significantly, even two referees: Steve Dowling and Rudolf Bata.

Predominantly referring to game eight, Dowling commented that the officials "looked uncomfortable" and "weren't prepared for the amount of activity and pressure."¹⁷³ For his part, Bata, while not mentioning his own penalty call on Peter Mahovlich that put Canada down two men and actually culminated in the first Soviet goal, then characterized Kompalla's penalty on Parise: "It was crazy" and "Parise skated at us [only Kompalla was targeted] with his stick up and, cried "I'll kill you." Then, on the chaos that ensued, Harry Sinden added: "The referees were susceptible to embarrassment. That's why after the Parise penalty I went crazy behind the bench. The players did too." After hurling a stool and throwing it in the referees' direction, he admitted: "To tell you the truth, I was acting. I knew exactly what I was doing."¹⁷⁴

Most notable in the oscillating 2012 interviews of Bata and Sinden was when the Czech referee, Bata, related on game eight: "I skate to the penalty box and tell the off-ice official, who was the second chief of Russian hockey, the game is over. We can play no more." To this quote, Sinden replied, seemingly startled: "I had not heard that for sure until now, that Bata was going to call the game. It could have been over. That's scary to look at that, it really is." Rudolf Bata therefore explained that he was the reason the game was allowed to continue, after a Soviet official had pleaded with him to carry on and then the Czech added: "Kompalla was out for the rest of the game. He did not blow his whistle at all after that."¹⁷⁵ If Kompalla had received a phone call to be part of this project in 2012, he would

¹⁷³Patrick White, "The Summit Series, as it's Never Been Told Before" in *The Globe and Mail* (15 Sept. 2012).

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

have elaborated on Dowling, Bata, and Sinden's version of events, by adding:

I was the reason the game continued by speaking to the Russian officials, Rudy's [Bata's] Russian was not as good as mine. I was also not at all embarrassed or intimidated by the Canadian antics after the Parise penalty and I continued to referee the game correctly to the end.¹⁷⁶

The book that served as a central impetus for this study, Andrew Podnieks' *Team Canada 1972 – The Official 40th Anniversary Celebration of the Summit Series: As Told by the Players*, was an oral history, similar in approach to The Globe and Mail project. However, as the title indicates, essentially all the surviving Team Canada players, along with Harry Sinden, Billy Harris and John Van Boxmeer, made themselves available for interviews. With so much promise, in terms of eye-witness participation in the 'official 40th celebration,' it came as quite a surprise that the errors surrounding Kompalla's nationality were not corrected, but instead perpetuated. For example, Podnieks commenting on game six, claimed:

... a new enemy emerged – the officials. A pair of West Germans had the whistle on this night, though soon after Canada would discover that one of them, Josef Kompalla, was East German (i.e., Communist and biased toward the Soviets by political necessity).¹⁷⁷

Whereas Kompalla was supposedly involved in a perplexing process of converting from a West German to an East German citizen, his changing of national identities had apparently been completed in time for the Parise incident in game eight. In Podnieks' words: "It was a marginal call, but worse it was assessed by Josef Kompalla, the East German referee who had made life difficult for Canada in game six."¹⁷⁸

An integral part of 'officially celebrating forty years of the Summit Series' was therefore to recast Kompalla as an 'East German,'

¹⁷⁶Kompalla phone interview August 16th, 2021.

¹⁷⁷Podnieks, Official 40th Celebration, 157.

¹⁷⁸Ibid. p. 221.

fly in the face of primary sources published in 1972, and ignore his official 2003 biographical entry on the IIHF Hall of Fame website. Disturbingly, even if formal research was eliminated from the process entirely, many of the participants who were part of the series in 1972 surely would have taken the time to proof-read the final copy prior to publication? If so, they should have caught the errors of Kompalla's nationality.

One player who was seemingly more content than diligent with his research was Paul Henderson himself. In his ambitious, 2011 book *How Hockey Explains Canada*, Alan Eagleson was given the opportunity to correct his 'Eastern bloc officiating' claims. Unfortunately, the Team Canada '72 outcast only muddied the waters further, stating: "There was Rudi Bata, the Czech, and there was Baader the East German and there was Kompalla, another East German. So we had Bata, Baader and Worser and the Worser was Kompalla."¹⁷⁹ For Eagleson, crafting his latest 'witty' take on the 'Baader and Worse' construct thus took precedent over finally correcting his historical errors. Although Henderson co-authored the book with notable sports author, Jim Prime, a lack of proofreading by both again allowed the false Kompalla legend to be perpetuated.

After the 40th Anniversary publication flood passed, and the historical inaccuracies persisted, two comprehensive books on the series claimed to correct past wrongs: Richard J. Bendell's 2013 statistical monolith *The 1972 Summit Series: Stats, Lies and Videotape and the predominantly primary source-driven 2018 Epic Confrontation – Canada vs. Russia on Ice: The Greatest Sports Drama of All Time, by Greg Franke.*

As they pertain to Kompalla, both books did not fall into the post-1991 trap of getting his citizenship wrong. However, the mostly objective Richard Bendell provided a characteristically patriotic interpretation of the Parise and Eagleson incidents in game eight, stating: "If Parise's threatening of Kompalla was an example of the little guy thumbing his nose at Communist authority then Eagleson

¹⁷⁹Alan Eagleson, "How Hockey Explains the Cold War" in *How Hockey Explains Canada*, 104.

was giving them the finger.^{"180} Surprisingly, Bendell also passes off Bata's inaccurate game eight characterization of Kompalla as fact, introducing the head referee for the game in Prague as: "Czech-native Rudy Bata, the same ref who took control and essentially officiated the last 56 minutes of Game 8 pretty much on his own…"¹⁸¹ For a researcher who prided himself on the minute dissection of nearly every frame of the game tapes, it was odd that Bendell simply did not apply the same diligence to Kompalla's officiating after the Parise incident. The 'solo refereeing for 56 minutes' theory is simply not accurate: Rudolf Bata did not referee the remainder of game eight on his own.

While not nearly as obsessive in terms of his use of statistics, Greg Franke similarly adopted a play-by-play, whistle-to-whistle approach in an attempt to "dispassionately" deconstruct the series. Most significantly, he provided in-depth coverage of the European refereeing, quoting *Montreal Star* reporter, John Robertson, and his predictions that the Canadians will "blow their cool" before they get out of Sweden and that officiating will give them trouble "simply because they are not used to European officials and they are not used to them."¹⁸² On Kompalla specifically, Franke observed that: "Many of the series' biggest misconceptions revolve around game six in which it's become an article of faith that the referees practically cheated for the Soviets."¹⁸³ The author then analyzed each call and concluded that "perhaps the one truly borderline Canadian penalty was called against Ron Ellis."¹⁸⁴

With two of the most detail-oriented books published in the last decade, many of the erroneous portrayals of the series seem to have been rectified or are now under more rigorous scrutiny. Unfortunately, that the process is far from completed in relation to Josef Kompalla is reflected in the latest entry of the *Canadian Encyclopedia*. Billed

¹⁸⁰Richard J. Bendell with Paul Patskou and Robert MacAskill, 1972 The Summit Series Canada vs. USSR – Stats Lies and Videotape: The UNTOLD Story of Hockey's Series of the Century (Bolton, 2013), 284.

¹⁸¹ Ibid. 352

¹⁸²Franke, Greg. *Epic Confrontation – Canada vs. Russia on Ice: The Greatest Sports Drama of All Time.* (New York, 2018), 311.

¹⁸³ Ibid. 334.

¹⁸⁴Ibid. 339.

as a government-funded project for 'educators and students,' the following entry was September 21st, 2022: "Russian insistence that Josef Kompalla of East Germany work the final game resulted in a number of questionable penalties..."¹⁸⁵

Conclusion: Kompalla's Historical Portrayals nearing the 50th Anniversary

According to Josef Kompalla, 1972 was a "very good year." At the World Championships in Prague, he officiated both high-profile games between the Czechs and Soviets. In late April, he received an invitation to referee the Summit Series. After attending a three-day referee camp in Etobicoke and officiating the final Canadian intersquad game in Toronto, he observed all four games of the series in Canada. His first full immersion refereeing the Canadian professionals in Stockholm proved to be a baptism by fire. During the second, very violent game in Sweden, Harry Sinden began orchestrating a campaign to intimidate and embarrass the West German referees, both on and off the ice, which did not end until the last game of the series. Although eventful and challenging, Kompalla believes he played a large part in maintaining control of not only game six, but especially the legendary eighth game in Moscow.¹⁸⁶ However, he cited the continued aggressive and undisciplined behaviour of Team Canada, especially during a chance encounter on a shared flight from Moscow to Prague, as the reason for ultimately resigning from the series. After the Canadian "September to Remember," he stated to the German press in early October that he was "glad to be home uninjured."

By examining the 1972 primary sources covering Josef Kompalla, from the IIHF World Championships in April to the last Summit Series exhibition game between Canada and Czechoslovakia on September 30th in Prague, contemporaries clearly identified him for who he was: a West German hockey official. Although there was an example of a journalist erroneously labelling Kompalla an "East

¹⁸⁵*The Canadian Encyclopedia* entry "1972 Canada-Soviet Hockey Series (Summit Series)" still active September 21st, 2022.

¹⁸⁶Kompalla interview June 6th, 2022. In his final interview, Kompalla stated that he believed seeing game eight through to the end, after the turmoil of the Parise and Eagleson stoppages, was his greatest contribution to the Summit Series.

German" in 1978, the bewildering rebranding of his nationality really took hold after 1991. In fact, Alan Eagleson, Phil Esposito, Paul Henderson, and even the *Official 40th Anniversary* project, simply depicted him as an East German official outright. After his 2003 induction into the IIHF Hall of Fame, these repeated biographical fallacies could have been easily rectified. Instead, fitting in with the near folkloric tale of Team Canada '72 playing a part in vanquishing the Soviets in the Cold War, the myth of portraying Kompalla as an Eastern bloc villain proved more expedient than correcting the historical record. Remarkably, it is a fabricated and misconstrued historical legacy that has been perpetuated for nearly fifty years.¹⁸⁷

Appendix: No One Cares about the Referees

After over two years of research, writing, and attempting to document Josef Kompalla's own words in time for the fiftieth anniversary, I thought I had achieved a breakthrough on March 17th, 2022. To provide fellow researchers full access to my findings, I shared my unpublished essay with the producers and research staff of the forthcoming four-part Summit Series CBC documentary. The documentary research team, including Robert MacAskill, Ravi Baichwal, Paul Patskou and Igor Kuperman, shared the following questions for me to pass on to Kompalla, which I posed to him by phone on March 15th and then relayed back to them on March 17th, 2022. Kompalla's answers appear below in bold type:

- Did Andrei Starovoitov [Head of Soviet Ice Hockey Federation] ever discuss officiating the series with him? Kompalla: "Never"
- 2. If so, what was the predominant nature of the discussion(s)? (See above)
- 3. Did Starovoitov try to influence how the game was called. Kompalla: **"Never"**

¹⁸⁷On March 2nd, 2022, I forwarded an advanced, read-only copy of this article to Robert MacAskill and Ravi Baichwal, two of the producers of the forthcoming four-part CBC documentary on the Summit Series. My main aim was to draw attention to my research finding and to emphasize that Josef Kompalla still wished his historical voice to be heard.

- 4. If so, did Josef make calls in favour of the Russian team? Kompalla: **"Never"**
- 5. How had did Josef learn that Uwe Dahlberg [Ove Dahlberg was a Swedish official who had refereed with Rudolf Bata in games five and seven] was not going to referee (as had been the selection)? Kompalla: "I received the phone call to referee mid-day on the day of game eight. What happens to other referees is not my concern. I get the call, I referee."
- 6. Was anything communicated to Josef before the start of Game 8. Kompalla: **"Nothing"**
- 7. In hindsight, does Josef still agree that the calls to Bill White and Pete Mahovlich were legitimate calls? Kompalla: "I believe they were both penalties. I called the first one and the second was called by my officiating partner, Rudolf Bata."
- How did the Parise incident influence how Josef and Rudolf Bata called the game afterwards? Kompalla: "Not at all, I refereed correctly to the end. Afterwards, the teams played hockey."
- 9. Does Josef know why goal judge Victor Dombrovski began signalling the Esposito where the goal light is clearly functioning] and Cournoyer goals differently than at any other time of the series? Kompalla: "No idea, this did not concern me. What does it matter what happens with off-ice officials? It is the referees on the ice who make the calls."
- Did Josef feel pressured to make certain calls out of concern it could influence certain IIHF assignments after the series? Kompalla: "Tell these guys to go and [expletive deleted] themselves."
- 11. Were implied or overt threats ever made to him? (Kompalla did not answer the last question)

Lastly, I asked for some expert feedback on the advanced-copy of my article from the four-person documentary research team. Ravi Baichwal commended my 'thorough research' and indicated that he 'had read every word.' Unfortunately, he came to the following conclusion: 'no one cares about the refs, they should remain invisible and referee intimidation is nothing new, it has always been, and continues to be, part of hockey.'

After listening to Mr. Baichwal's clarifications on the roles of referees, both past and present, it left me with little hope that my research findings would be utilized in the latest official Team 72-sanctioned CBC documentary of the Summit Series.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸This six-person Zoom meeting took place on March 17th, 2022 and included: Robert MacAskill, Ravi Baichwal, Paul Patskou, Igor Kuperman and Taylor Mckee. After attempts to contact members of Team 72 to see if they would be interested in including Josef Kompalla in any Fiftieth Anniversary projects, this Zoom call was also my last attempt to request a reply.

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Personal Reflection: Catherine Garrett



Being born in 1996, I did not watch the 1972 Summit Series.

I first became a hockey fan in grade 10, and it started with the Canucks losing miserably in the Stanley Cup Final.

But, the series was considered the pinnacle of Canadian hockey greatness to the adults in my life at the time, and talked about decades after it actually happened with the same reverence as the golden goal.

I figured, if I was going to be a hockey fan, I would have to do it properly and know my history.

At the age of 15 I was awkward, geeky, and tended to dive in headfirst to a subject when it peaked my interest.

Not much has changed if we are being honest, I just do it for work now instead of memorizing obscure stats and jersey numbers and reciting them to the annoyance of everyone within a 50 mile radius.

Enter several highschool research projects on the series, checking out half a dozen different Summit Series books, and watching every piece of popular media about it

It wasn't just the "defining sports moment" that attracted me - it was the first example I can remember (obviously there are more before this) of the way sports and politics and diplomacy overlap, and I found it fascinating.

It taught me that the thing I love because of the drama and theatrics can be used to contribute to a larger conversation -- the 1968 Black Power Salute at the Olympics, Colin Kaepernick kneeling for the national anthem, WNBA and the Black Lives Matter Movement, Costa Rica's Luciana Alvarado raising her fist during her floor routine in support of BLM – the list is endless.

In short, I think the Summit Series offered me a way in to a conversation that I'm not sure I would have found otherwise.

epilogue

What if? By: Mike Commito

What if the Soviets won?

While many in the hockey world, at least in Canada for that matter, thought it inconceivable that the Soviet Union would win the Summit Series – *Globe and Mail* columnist Dick Beddoes even went as far as saying that if the Russians won a single game, he would eat his newspaper column shredded in a bowl of borscht on the steps of the Russian embassy – what if the Soviets had captured the series?

Beyond the significant geopolitical implications, there is also the tangible impact the outcome would have had on the sport. In the first game of the series, in which the Soviets upended Canada's unquestioned belief in its hockey supremacy, it was clear that the creative east-west style of Russia's game, which focused on passing on cycling the puck around, was a mismatch for Canada's traditional north-south game.

Although Canada ended up winning the tournament in the final game in Russia, you must wonder if the Soviet innovations to the game, along with its emphasis on off-ice physical conditioning, would have been adopted sooner had the Canadians faltered.

While Russia's pioneering tactics slowly infiltrated the National Hockey League, you could make the argument that, had the Canadians lost, the sport might have been better off. The existential crisis that presumably would have followed in Canada might have led to some seismic shifts that would have ushered in these changes sooner.

The emphasis on skill and finesse, instead of the physicality that continued to define the game for much of the 1970s and beyond, could have changed the North American approach to the sport and forever changed hockey history.