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### Is America tough enough to handle today's threats?; FROM THE RIGHT

BYLINE: Rachel Marsden

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The Green Berets need to throw more tea parties, don't you think?

The federal government is requesting public-sector proposals from contractors to train U.S. **Special Forces** in ethnography and cultural work. That includes, according to the wording of the government tender, "the distinct cultural and societal differences and engagement considerations between U.S. Country Teams, Host Nation military forces, local leaders in rural villages, and political, economic, and social leaders on a national stage."

Great, let's burden our top warriors with more bureaucratic nonsense.

Maybe the next **Special Forces** training course can focus on animal husbandry or the nuances of needlepoint techniques.

This administration has lost all sense of how to utilize the formidable tools at its disposal. **Special Forces** need to learn where to put the bullets in the most effective way possible, not (as per the tender) how to "distinguish between societies of status (clan societies), societies of contract (rule of law societies), and the hybrids that form the core of the **human domain.**" What's next? Making them pass a pop quiz before they're allowed to (ire a bullet?

Another important aspect of warfare is psychological operations, or "psy-ops" - spreading strategic disinformation to undermine the enemy. One of the most effective tools used for psy-ops these days is the computer, if only because cyber is the new witchcraft. Look at all the cyber-wusses that it's creating. Hardly anyone understands what they're looking at when presented with "evidence" of a so-called information security breach. Most of what the public sees as "hacking" is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.

Recently, a group - ing itself the "Islamic State Hacking Division" posted what it claimed to be the addresses of 100 U.S. military members using, according to the group's website, "the huge amount of data we have from various different servers and databases."

The reason for posting the personal information and addresses? "So that our (Islamic State) brothers residing in America can deal with (the military members)."

Scary, right? It would be if the same information wasn't readily available via Google and the open-source research of personal information on social media that people willingly spew all over the Internet. This is personal data here, not nuclear secrets.

The Obama administration has failed to leverage this perceived scare to explain the objective and the nature of psychological operations, and educate the American public about the inherent risks of social media.

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A reaction of strength would have been a good laugh in mockery of the enemy's "skills," coupled with a heads-up to stay off social media in favor of private email or, you know, that ancient relic called the telephone.

But no. The Pentagon did acknowledge that the breach wasn't an actual act of hacking. But an anonymous military of(icial told the Christian Science Monitor, "We want to help people who want to be on social media to share information in a manner that's going to be a good experience for them, and to feel as safe as they can be."

And with that, an opportunity was missed to make America a harder target - safer and stronger at the level of the average citizen.

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### REP. JOE WILSON HOLDS A HEARING ON U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND BUDGET FOR F.Y. 2016

March 18, 2015 Wednesday

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COMMITTEE: HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

**EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES** 

SPEAKER: REP. JOE WILSON, CHAIRMAN

#### WITNESSES:

REP. JOE WILSON, R-S.C. CHAIRMAN

REP. JIM LANGEVIN, D-R.I. RANKING MEMBER

WITNESSES: MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW

INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL (USA), COMMANDER OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

REP. DOUG LAMBORN, R-CO.

REP. JIM COOPER, D-TN.

REP. RICH NUGENT, R-FLA.

REP. JOHN GARAMENDI, D-CALIF.

REP. MO BROOKS, R-AL.

#### TEXT:

**WILSON**: Ladies and gentlemen, I call this briefing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to order.

I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very important hearing on our Special Operations Forces in the United States Special Operations Command as we review the fiscal year 2016 budget request with the evolving and persistent threats being posted by state and non-state actors. Our Special Operations Forces have never been more central, strategic and sought after.

Illegal, asymmetric enemy combatants, not in uniform must be stopped overseas. From the unconventional hybrid threats of an aggressive Russia to the troubling, expensive, and clandestine networks

of Iran and, of course, an evolving Al-Qaida and their affiliates, now the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant, known in the region as Daesh, we do indeed face an uncertain threat environment.

Our Special Operations Forces have been engaged in heavy combat and direct action for nearly 14 continuous years. It is imperative that we properly resource, train, and equip to now deal equally as well with the hybrid and asymmetric threats of tomorrow, and do so with the looming shadow of defense sequestration. Simply put, our national defense and security of American families depends on this.

The House Armed Services Committee has consistently supported our Special Operations Forces, providing additional authorities when warranted, authorizing additional funds for unmet critical requirements, and most recently resourcing important family support and suicide prevention programs to ensure our servicemen and women, our warriors and their families are taken care of and know firsthand that humans are indeed more important than hardware.

Although our support has been consistent, it has also been accompanied by prudent oversight and robust dialogue to ensure that we do all things that are right for the overall defense of our great nation.

The commitment and sacrifice of our Special Operations Forces is evident to all of us. We examine this budget request to ensure that we, in Congress, are doing everything that we think is right and necessary for those units and their families. So we look forward to discussing today the priorities for the US Special Operations Command and our Special Operations Forces for Fiscal Year 2016, and perhaps more importantly discussing candidly the challenges that stand before us today.

We have before us a very distinguished panel of witnesses, the Honorable Michael Lumpkin, the assistant secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; and General Joseph Votel, the commanding general of the United States Special Operations Command.

I like now to turn to my long-term friend and ranking member, Mr. Jim Langevin from Rhode Island for any comments he'd like to make.

**LANGEVIN**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to discuss the Special Operations Command Fiscal Year 2016 budget request.

Although our conventional forces have seen increases in dwell time over the last few years as combat operations in the Middle East change in character, Special Operations Forces continue to experience a very high operational tempo.

The demand for SOF is high around the globe due to a variety of important missions, including counterterrorism. These operators and the conventional forces that enable them to place their -- that enable them to place their lives on the line each and every day far from home in order to keep us safe. And we should never lose sight of that sacrifice for which we are all very grateful.

This subcommittee is keenly aware of the threats that we face and the importance of SOF missions to national security, and we have acted commensurately, both in funding and unique authorities such as those provided under Section 1208.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about the importance of these and other unique authorities as well as about authorities that may need to be extended in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016. If there are any new authorities that may be required to combat ISIL or conduct operations in areas outside the Middle East like European Command, I hope that the witnesses will make that case this afternoon.

Congressional oversight of such authorities as well as SOCOM funding is obviously very important. Our SOF personnel operate in uncertain, varying and evolving environments that necessitate continuous assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness of authorities granted. Our subcommittee has worked in the past to increase oversight through improved reporting, and I want to express my appreciation for the transparency of SOCOM. But internal oversight of SOF operations and SOCOM is just -- is just as important.

Secretary Lumpkin, we recently had the opportunity to discuss the Oversight Council that you established. And I'd appreciate if you could provide the subcommittee with an understanding of the council, including members, meetings, and issues of focus.

General Votel, I certainly look forward to hearing from you as well on the Preservation of the Force and Family initiative among the -- the other things and your responsibility, and I appreciate the meeting that you and I had yesterday.

As I mentioned earlier, Special Operations Forces continue to face high operational tempo. The mental health of the operators and their families remains a priority both for you, I know, and for Secretary Lumpkin and for this Congress.

Last year, our subcommittee, in conjunction with the Personnel Subcommittee, increased funding for mental health programs for SOC due to increases in suicides. Additionally, I sponsored a provision in the FY '15 NDAA to assess the effectiveness of SOCOM's alternative approach to mental and behavioral health in lieu of existing service programs.

General, I look forward to working with you this year to continue to support our SOC members and their families. Our goal on this front -- taking care of our force and their families are one and the same.

In closing, I want to express again my gratitude to General Votel for your service to our nation and Secretary Lumpkin as well for you -- for all you do for our nation and the enduring commitment that you have to our men and women in uniform.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for convening this hearing today, and I look forward to discussion. Thank you.

WILSON: Mr. Langevin, thank you very much.

And we'll proceed with Secretary Lumpkin. We look forward to your opening statements and -- of each of you. And then following that, we'll have a five-minute question period for each member as we alternate. And we're very fortunate that Kevin Gates will be maintaining the time. He's above reproach. So we'll begin with the secretary.

Thank you.

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I'm glad to speak about the health and welfare of our nation's Special Operations community and our capability to meet our nation's most pressing national security concerns today and into the future.

Currently, our Special Operations Forces, also known as SOF, work within an environment where fiscal uncertainty challenge us to think creatively and bridge gaps between resources and US national security objectives, and where the changing nature of the threats we face today demands SOF's attention and engagement through agile authorities that enable us to remain ahead of our adversaries.

Addressing how SOF will effectively operate within this environment, I'd like to invite your attention to the following three topics.

Foremost, SOF is navigating a challenging fiscal environment through enhanced oversight. As the service-like secretary of US SOCOM, fixed income provide oversight and supervision of SOF resources, developed SOF policies for counterterrorism to counternarcotics, and preserve and protect our Special Operations Force. This role becomes ever more challenging in a constrained budgetary environment in which we must use limited resources efficiently and effectively so that SOF is globally postured to support the combatant commands.

With sequestration level cuts set for fiscal year 2016 and beyond, we continue to strengthen our budget management in order to maximize taxpayers return on investment in SOF. In addition, we look for innovative ways to use existing resources.

Moving to my second point, SOF is most effective to handle the changing nature of threats that we face when agile authorities are available. From ISIL to pro-Russian rebel forces in Ukraine, the United States and our international partners face a diverse set of unconventional threats worldwide centered within the physical terrain, the **human domain**, information environment, and financial cyberspace. Additionally, our response efforts often require security force assistance missions in non-permissive and politically sensitive areas where the host station demands discrete US footprint.

Due to its unique irregular and unconventional capabilities, SOF routinely becomes the force of choice. To this point, agile authorities maximize SOF capabilities helping support SOF operations.

Support for foreign partners is fundamental to operational success in overseas contingency operations. And US financial and logistics support is necessary to ensure their continued participation.

With the codification of Sections 2282, 1004 and 2022 in Title 10 of the US Code, the Global Security Contingency Fund and the new Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, we can assist our partners to address emerging threats and opportunities by building their security capacities before those threats exceed their ability to effectively respond. However, building partner capacity takes time. Our building partnership capacity authorities do not accommodate sustainment costs, so we work closely with the State Department to ensure partner nations eventually fund and sustain these programs on their own.

Agile unallocated funding enables implementers to rapidly respond to urgent needs of partner nations more expeditiously and for a greater length of time than as possible through traditional mechanisms.

And my final point, protection and preservation of SOF is of utmost importance. Our people are the foundation of Special Operations, and we strive to ensure our force and their families have a support system necessary to ensure their long-term prosperity and health.

Assessing our force structure, operational requirements and capabilities at various resourcing levels, we have reshaped SOF's operational units, elements and platforms that we can meet future operational requirements. In addition, we seek to ensure the physical and mental resilience of the individuals who make-up our force. Continual combat deployments combined with the demanding training regimen needed to keep the force sharp have caused stress on the force and with their families.

As ASD SO/LIC, I will continue to support enhanced resiliency training currently being conducted through US SOCOM service component programs.

In closing, throughout the entire department, we are committed to doing everything we can to ensure that our nation's SOF have the best training equipment and overall support that we can possibly provide. We will continue to work closely with Congress and senior policymakers across the government to ensure that we have the right policies and oversight in place so that SOF effectively operates within the current and future environments.

I thank Congress for its continuing support of our Special Operation initiatives, resourcing and personnel, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

**WILSON**: Secretary Lumpkin, thank you very much.

General Votel?

**VOTEL**: Good afternoon, Chairman Wilson and Ranking Member Langevin, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the current posture of the United States Special Operations Command, or SOCOM as we call it. I'm especially pleased to be here with my OSD teammate Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin.

SOCOM was created by the Congress to ensure that we always had ready and capable SOF forces to meet the nation's challenges. Our ability to address these challenges is due in large part to the strong support we get from the Congress from the House Armed Services Committee and especially from this distinguished subcommittee. Thank you very much.

I'd like to start out by commenting on the amazing actions made every day by our Special Operations men and women, operators, acquirers, logisticians, analysts, and many others, active and reserve, military and civilian, the total SOF force. Alongside our conventional force partners, the 69,000 quiet professionals of SOCOM are committed to values-based excellence and service to our nation. They relentlessly pursue mission success. And today, roughly 7,500 of them are deployed to over 90 countries worldwide supporting geographic combatant commander requirements and named operations.

We are a force that has been heavily deployed over the last 14 years and our military members, civilians and their families have paid a significant price physically and emotionally serving our country. We are very

appreciative of the support we have received from Congress to address the visible and invisible challenges, and we never forget that for SOCOM people are our most important resource.

Today, the United States is faced with many challenges. The spread of technology and the diffusion of power are not only being used by responsible leaders to better societies, but unfortunately, by wicked actors to orchestrate terror and violence regionally and globally. Non-state actors like Al-Qaida and ISIL and other violent extremist organizations, menacing state actors like North Korea and growingly course of actors like Russia are just a few examples of the entities affecting the strategic environment in which we operate.

We are equally affected by the growing use of cyber capabilities and social media, which make it easy for our adversaries to communicate, coordinate, execute, and inspire their actions.

The fiscal environment is of concern as well. While SOCOM has been well-supported in recent years, I remain profoundly concerned by the impact of another round of sequestration and how it not only impacts SOCOM, but more importantly, how it will affect the force services upon whom we are absolutely dependent for mission support.

To address the challenging security environment, SOF provides a portfolio of options to our national leaders and to the geographic combatant commanders through small footprint operations and by relying on a network of purposeful partnerships, SOF provides a comparative advantage through persistent engagement, partner enablement, network focus, and discrete rapid response to crisis situations.

While we support military operations across the spectrum, SOF capabilities are uniquely suited to operate and succeed in the gray zone between normal international competition and open conflict. And it is in this area where we see our very best opportunities to help shape the future environment.

To enable our efforts, I have established five priorities for the command. First, we must ensure SOF readiness by developing the right people, skills and capabilities to meet future -- current and future requirements.

To this end, we want to ensure the -- we wanted to ensure effectiveness now and into the future with the very best SOF operators and support personnel enabled by the best technology and capabilities we can field. Along the way, we want to make the very best use of the unique MFP-11 authorities that Congress has granted us.

Second, we must help our nation win by addressing today's security challenges. We strive to provide coherent and well- integrated SOF forces for the geographic combatant commanders focused on optimizing our SOF activities. Nearly everywhere, you will find SOF forces working alongside and often in support of their conventional force partners help and accomplish our security objectives.

Third, we must build purposeful relationships to improve global understanding and awareness to create options for our leaders. We don't own the network, but we are an important part of it. And working with our partners we will always produce the best options for our nation.

Fourth, we have to prepare for the future security environment to ensure that SOF is ready to win in an increasingly complex world. Ultimately, our goal is to match exquisite people with cutting-edge capability and the very best ideas to help our nation succeed against the looming challenges we will face in the future.

Finally, we must preserve our force and families to ensure their long-term well-being. It is this area we are especially focused where we are especially focused on a holistic approach to address the invisible challenges of stress and suicide that are affecting our service members, civilians, and their family members.

In closing, I remain honored and humbled by the opportunity to command the best Special Operations Forces in the world. I am incredibly proud of each and every one of our team members and their families. I look forward to your questions and our dialogue today.

**WILSON**: Thank you very much, General Votel, and thank both you for being here this afternoon. We are going to begin now the five- minute round of each member of the subcommittee. And each of us will be strictly held to five minutes, and Mr. Gates will maintain those -- the clock.

My first question for both of you is -- deals with the impacts of defense sequestration on national security in our military. I know this has impacted even Special Operations Forces. And for both of you, can you

provide specifics of how defense sequestration has impacted Special Operations Forces? Without a solution of defense sequestration, what damage will be done? And I'm particularly concerned about readiness.

And we'll begin with the secretary.

LUMPKIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.

The -- well, as General Votel mentioned in his opening statement, the reliance of support from the services is where we see the largest impact from where I sit as -- when we look at what the impacts of sequestration would have on USSOCOM. Potential of losing ISR support, impacts on modernization of our -- of our air fleet, and modernization across the board on those service supported surface common items would also slow our modernization across the board, and so I have real concerns about that.

We've had to base on where we were on -- in '14 as we ended up divesting ourselves from program growth and combat support and combat service support. And I fear that if sequestration were to take effect in '16, the services would divest of the support that we're now more reliant on them than we would have been before. So I see the impacts, while not direct, would be significant nonetheless.

**VOTEL**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we will see some immediate impacts. We'll be perhaps in some of our key investment areas. That would include the procurement and recapitalization of some of our air, ground, and maritime platforms. It could affect our enhancing of SOF-specific ISR capabilities that have been so effective for us fighting some of the enemies we deal with today.

It could also affect our communications infrastructure and equipment technology, upon which we depend to conduct global operations. And so that's the impacts, I think, on SOCOM.

Beyond that, as I mentioned, I am very concerned about the impact that it has on the services. The lack of availability of air, ground, especially maritime platforms will affect our readiness and our training exercises and -- that we count on to be ready to deal with situations that will affect our operational effectiveness when we are conducting operations.

We depend heavily on service-provided capabilities to support us. A good example, of course, is the Navy's helicopter capability that is provided in the past for us, which as it now goes away is a lost -- a service provider capability that we no longer are able to rely on.

Beyond that, we're impacted by SOF. We will be impacted by SOF- specific enhancements to service-managed programs as they draw down some of their areas there. That will -- that will impact us, Mr. Chairman.

**WILSON**: Well, I thank both of you. And indeed, I believe the members of our subcommittee ensure your concerns.

Secretary Lumpkin, I'm really grateful. I work with the Partners of the Americas program in Colombia, and we've had many exchange students, too. My sons went to high school in Cali, Colombia. And then I have a very significant Filipino-American population in the district that I represent. And in your written statement, you indicate about the strategic engagement in both Colombia and the Philippines. What -- what is the status and what is the future of what has been so successful in both countries?

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And you're absolutely correct. Both of those endeavors have been successful. They have been -- each has been long-term. We've been in Colombia since the -- in supporting the government there since the mid-1980's. We developed Plan Colombia. We have invested heavily through Plan Colombia itself. And as we are on the cusp of having a peace dividend, but as the peace accords between the FARC, and ELN, and the government of Colombia are being realized, we'll see some -- some reduction there of our support.

What I -- what does concern me is the ideas of a vacuum that may be created when these insurgent groups are no longer there, and it may open itself up to transnational organized crime. So I think we need to continue to engage decisively with the Colombians to make sure that we're providing them the support they need and those areas that have been controlled by these insurgent groups that criminal activities don't take over.

In the Philippines, again we've had a lengthy relationship with our Filipino partners as they work to remove the insurgents from the Southern part of the country. We have -- are transitioning that mission now as we built capacity there, but we have to remain engaged with them to make sure that we don't lose the gains that we've made.

**WILSON**: Well, thank you. In both countries, I really wish the American people knew of the success and that success cannot be achieved against narco terrorists and -- and the destabilization.

We now proceed to Mr. Langevin.

LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks to our witnesses.

Secretary Lumpkin, if I could start with you. Last year, you established the Special Operations Oversight Council and I referred to that in my opening statement to provide policy oversight and guidance to SOCOM.

The council was to coordinate Special Operations-related matters across the Office of the Secretary of Defense and service secretary staffs, and address key issues in the areas of Special Operations policies and operational priorities, budget execution, force employment, legislative changes, and -- and required capabilities. So what actions in the areas of policy and operational priorities, budget execution, force employment, proposed legislative changes and required capabilities as the council reviewed or taken to date, and what we're the results of the review of any related issues?

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you very much for the questions, Sir.

When I created the Special Operations Policy Oversight Council, it wasn't to supplant any of the responsibilities that I had as driven by statute as the assistant secretary. What I -- once I assumed office, what I quickly realized is that as USSOCOM has grown and become more complex in the nature of their operations and what they do, we were on a 20 percent manpower reduction within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

So the scope of the work was getting more complex, and my staff was shrinking, so I needed another tool to make sure that I -- I had in my tool bag in order to make sure I could cut across those issues within the department. So we created the council.

We've had numerous meetings set-up for leadership and working groups, which have proven to be profoundly successful. We've tackled three principal issues thus far. We tackled inter-theater airlifts to support Special Operations Forces within the different geographic combatant commands.

When USSOCOM took OPCON, Operational Control, of the theater Special Operations Command, when they started doing these -- the J Set training, there was issues of who was going to pay the bills.

We were able to work through that process to make sure it was cross-cutting within the department, and it was clear. Unfortunately, this is one of those where USSOCOM got the bill, but rightly so because a J set is 51 percent of the benefit needs to be for -- for the SOF personnel so that -- that made sense.

We're also working to establish -- the next topic that we took on was MILCON, and is when -- when should we -- and when should we not use MFP-11 funding for military construction.

And the final one is coming up with a real definition of what's SOF peculiar, so we know where the bills should go with -- with the services versus within USSOCOM. Those two we haven't finalized the results, yet we're still working. But it's proven to be very successful and -- and gives me the ability to -- the other -- it really gives me the ability to do is that I walk a line at times between providing oversight and advocacy for USSOCOM.

So what this does when I get a decision that's cross cutting and everybody is in agreement, and I can clearly shift in everybody's mind from being oversight to advocate to make sure that everything is done, and it makes it very easy for all to understand the building. So for me, that's the real benefit in addition to being able to navigate some of these sticky wickets.

**LANGEVIN**: Okay. Thank you. So you've alluded to this a little bit, but how do the roles and responsibilities of the council differ from the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, SOCOM or the military departments?

**LUMPKIN**: Again, it's a -- I look at it as a tool that informs me, that helps me make better decisions, and so I can take it to the undersecretary of Policy, the deputy secretary or the secretary to bring resolution to any conflict. So again, it's just a tool for me and it doesn't supplant any of my roles and responsibilities.

LANGEVIN: Okay. Thank you.

General Votel, as I noted in my opening statement, global demand for Special Operations Forces obviously continues to be high. What impact has the continuous high tempo had on force readiness, training, mental health and the like? And also what steps is the command taking to ensure the global demand for positioning of Special Operations Forces is met today and in the future?

**VOTEL**: Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.

So we have -- we've -- which continued to pay a lot of attention to our -- to our first tempo of our -- of our deployed members. And we, over the last couple of years have been with the support of Congress (inaudible) a good process in place where we can manage our first tempo much better now so we understand what the deployment tempo of our -- of our people are. And we've put in the policies and practices in place that allow us to actually control that and manage that, and understand what the impact is on the force, and so that has helped us managed the force better than perhaps we were doing that in the past.

What -- what that is really translated into is -- is -- is our -- our components, being able to organize their forces in a manner so they could have forces that were forward-deployed, deployed doing -- doing the work of the nation. They could have forces back in recovery. They could have forces recovery, so this kind of one-third, one-third, one-third approach is what we strive to do.

And while we're not complete there in all of our -- in all of our components, we are definitely moving in the right direction to -- to try to control that.

LANGEVIN: Thank you.

**WILSON**: Thank you very much. And, Mr. Langevin, we now proceed to Congressman Doug Lamborn of Colorado.

**LAMBORN**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing and thank you all for being here and for your service.

My first question has to do with legal authorities and rules of engagement. Given the sensitive nature of the missions that Special Operations Forces conduct and sometimes the fast-moving nature of those and lethal nature of those engagements, are you concerned that sometimes the need to lawyer-up (ph) is just so burdensome or that the rules of engagement are so restrictive that you find it difficult to carry-out the missions properly? And if so, can we help you in that regard?

**VOTEL**: Thank you, Congressman, for the question. I -- the answer from my perspective is I don't see that as a -- as an impediment to our operations right now. I think we have a very effectively integrated operational law into our activities and in -- as in my experience, we have had the rules of engagement where we have had the process in place that has allowed us to go back and ask for the rules of engagement that will require to -- to conduct the operations, which we have been asked to -- asked to undertake.

**LAMBORN**: Would you care to add anything to that?

**LUMPKIN**: No, I cared completely. I haven't seen an issue where we were up against the rules of engagement issue that we couldn't resolve in a tight -- very rapid and timely manner.

**LAMBORN**: And -- and to have controlling legal authority, is that a concern at any time?

**VOTEL**: It's -- it's not a concern for us right now. We have been well-served by the previous AUMF. And I'm hopeful that the future AUMF will -- I think it gives us what we need.

**LAMBORN**: Okay. And I'll just comment on that. I don't want to see restrictions on an -- any future AUMF that do tie the hands of our military too much, so I'd like to see that open-ended as -- as much as possible.

What is the status of -- and by the way, I do appreciate the 10 **special forces**, which is in my district at Fort Carson and Germany, a great group of people. I always enjoy visiting them, and I took -- enjoyed taking Chairman Thornberry out to see them last August so. What is this status of the Preservation of Force and Families Program these days?

**VOTEL**: Thanks. Let me -- let me talk about that. I think we are making significant progress in this area that the investments that we've made over the last several years with the support of Congress I think are making -- making a big difference. While I still think the force is stressed, I think it is -- it is lessened than we have seen in the past, so a holistic approach here that addresses the physical, spiritual, the emotional, the psychological aspect of this I think is -- is beginning to -- beginning to pay-off.

I think we've got a good strategy in place to address our most pressing problems, which I consider to be the invisible challenges of stress that is leading to suicide or suicide ideations. And I think we've got a good approach to this.

We're really focused on three big objectives. One is to empower our people by communicating to them the variety of resources that are available. Second is to enable them by providing as easy of access as we can to those resources so that they can take advantage of them. And then finally is to encourage them by emphasizing that it is absolutely normal to seek care for yourself and your family, and that we expect that and we encourage it. And there is no stigma associated with that. And I'm -- we are beginning to see indicators now that that message is sinking in and that understanding is -- is going down into the -- into the SOCOM force.

LAMBORN: Okay. Well, that's great to hear. I want to thank you for your service and for being here today.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

**WILSON**: Thank you, Congressman Lamborn. We now proceed to Congressman Jim Cooper of Tennessee.

COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WILSON: And Congressman Nugent all the way Florida.

**NUGENT**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank both of you for your service, and we're just upstreet from you, so we appreciate it.

General Votel, in the NDAA I'll be asking for report to explore the future of directed energy weapons within SOCOM, and I'm encouraged to see the SOCOM already is looking into directed energy solutions. And I would just like to emphasize to you that I am going to be very, very protective of keeping your flexible and relatively agile acquisition system uninhibited if I can.

And for the subcommittee today, would you just give us some broad strokes of what that report would look like? In other words, you know, what would SOCOM's future plans be as it relates to directed energy?

**VOTEL**: Congressman, I'll take -- first of all take -- I'll take the question for the record and will provide you a detailed response, and we'll look into the very specific capabilities.

I thank you for your continued support of our acquisition capability. You know, the advantage I think we have is that we can -- we can very closely link the requirements of the operators to our acquisition -- acquisition arm. And unlike the service chiefs that -- that you heard of yesterday, I do have a very close relationship with my acquisition authority. And because of the great authorities that Congress has provided us, we are able to respond quickly.

To -- broadly to your question on directed energy, we are always looking at the very best tools that we will require for the future. Certainly directed energy fits into a model that we have been perceiving against for sometime, which is precision and accuracy in -- in the employment of our weapons systems. And I think that directed energy offers us a great opportunity in terms of that. So I look forward to providing you a more detailed response on that for the record.

**NUGENT**: Well, General, I appreciate that.

Now, in the FY '15 NDAA directs a report on technology roadmap for underseas mobility. Of course, I'm very interested in the full details of that report later this year. I want to ask for maybe just a preview of just two parts of that dry combat submersible program. What requirement drives the development of a dry combat submersible one? And in an unclassified setting, what do you need the dry combat submersible to do if you could? And I understand this is...

VOTEL: Yeah.

**NUGENT**: ...on a classified setting so.

**VOTEL**: Yeah, thanks. And again I think this probably would be best discussed in a classified setting, Congressman.

But in general, what it allows us to do is it allows us to take the full opportunity of the maritime environment to pursue the full- range of missions that SOCOM does on behalf of the nation, and that includes the sensitive activities that we do out there. And this -- this really does provide us a very unique capability to emplace our operators or our folks at -- at the right place to pursue the missions that -- that we have. So we look forward to kind of laying that -- lay it out for you in a classified setting, but I do think it allows us to take the full opportunity of the maritime environment to accomplish the missions that were assigned.

**NUGENT**: I appreciate that. I appreciate both of your comments. So in regards to what sequestration may not directly affect you, but at the -- you know, the services that support you, it will affect and it's certainly will have an effect on you in regards to implementing your mission.

And I worry about the fact that we're going to be limited in regards to being able to project that force where we need it in a pinpoint accuracy if we continue with sequestration.

I know the chairman is in agreement with that. Sequestration is a cancer that is going to eat and destroy our national security and it's one that we're all very, very invested in trying to turn around. So I appreciate your service both of you. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

**WILSON**: Thank you, Congressman Nugent. We now proceed to Congressman John Garamendi of California.

**GARAMENDI**: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And for the two witnesses, my apologies for not being here. We seem to have three Armed Services Committee -- Subcommittees operating at the same moment including the Coast Guard Subcommittee.

So just a question. I'm going to follow-up. I think this is a question to Mr. Lumpkin. You were asked -- maybe Mr. Langevin asked this question.

In the operations of the Special Operations Forces, you do different things and -- for different parts of the security -- national security. Who winds up paying for the pieces of that where, let's say, it might be a naval operation or an Army or Marine operation? Who winds up paying for these -- these operations?

**LUMPKIN**: The -- I think we have two parts of the payment issue. One of them is in -- how we procure equipment and things of that nature. If it is a -- what we call a service common item then the service would pay that requisite bill, and then anything that was peculiar to the Special Operations community, we would use MFP-11, that's Major Force Program 11 funds to go ahead and pay that whether it's to modify it or adjust it to make it useful for us the way we need it -- what we needed to do.

Operations themselves -- I mean, for overseas contingency operations generally come out of the department's OCO funding. So we have -- we have -- there's funding -- and so what -- who's paying for the bill really kind of depends on the nature of the operation of whose OCO account it would come out of.

But I can give you a detailed breakdown of that if you would like. I'd be happy to take that for the record for you.

**GARAMENDI**: Yes, if you would. I think this -- I know that that Mr. Langevin was interested in that and as am I. But yes, if you could please do that.

LUMPKIN: I'll do that.

**GARAMENDI**: We know that in Iraq and Syria, it's anticipated that the Special Operations units will be used. Is that going to be -- how do -- how does get paid for? And what is the extent of that? We're going to have to deal with an AUMF here pretty quickly, at least we should. And the issue was not just the men and women that are going to be deployed, but then how much is it going to cost us to deploy them.

Mr. Lumpkin, and then, General, if you could delve into that.

**LUMPKIN**: And those operations in Iraq and Syria, those that are going on today in support of the Iraqi government and such are paid for through OCO. But -- but if you -- I mean, that will be part of the breakdown that I'd get you is -- is the actual dollar figures that are being used to date. We can do that.

**GARAMENDI**: It seems to me that one of the important things we ought to be considering as we deal with this AUMF is that it will be expensive or have some expense for the taxpayers of the United States. We need to know -- at least have some really good idea how much is going to cost us. And we also know that it is likely to be expensive for the men and women that are involved quite possibly with death and injury. So we need to know that also, so if that's something that's on my mind, I hope it's on the rest of my colleagues' minds also.

Finally, in the last few moments here, we spend a lot of time in other subcommittees dealing with communications. GPS is vulnerable. What steps are being taken by Special Operations that are extensively using that particular technology to deal with its interruption? Whichever one of you like to jump into that.

**VOTEL**: Thanks. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman. We -- we obviously -- as I mentioned in my opening statement, we -- we are very concerned about the cyber environment, and these are different ways that people can come after our use of technologies, our use of the Internet to support us. So in conjunction with direction we've gotten from the chairman and working along with Cyber Command, we are very much in the process of addressing our cyber protection capability, both reliant on resources that are made available to us from the Cyber Command and by elements that we will stand up within SOCOM to get after that particular problem.

So we are -- we are very alert to the -- to the threat that you just outlined right here. And certainly, GPS is something that's impacting, but certainly all of our communications and communications architecture is potentially a risk as well.

**GARAMENDI**: Much of the rest of the world is looking at what's known as an advanced or e-Lorraine (ph) systems. I'd like to have some comment from you on the record about what you may be using in that regard not just within the United States, but around the world where this is actually being deployed by some people that we're very interested in. Thank you.

**VOTEL**: Thank you, Mr. Congressman.

WILSON: Thank you, Congressman Garamendi. We now proceed to Congressman Mo Brooks of Alabama.

**BROOKS**: Thank you for your service.

Guys, you're aware Capitol Hill is engaged in a significant debate over the budgets. We've got the White House budget. We've got the House budget and presumably the Senate is also working on a budget.

The President's proposed budget for national defense is \$561 billion roughly for base defense and another \$51 billion roughly speaking for OCO for a total roughly of \$612 billion.

The House budget for national defense is \$523 billion for base, that being the amount set forth in the Budget Control Act and roughly \$90 billion for OCO.

To state a little bit differently, base defense budget president \$561 billion, which is \$38 billion more than permitted under the Budget Control Act, and the \$523 billion that the House budget, at least as of this moment represents. And on the OCO side, the president's budget proposes \$51 billion while the House is \$39 billion more, OCO.

So we have \$612 billion, \$613 billion from the two budgets being spent on national defense, but the key issue is, which is better for our national defense for the money to be in the base or the money to be in OCO?

Can you please share with me your insight on which you think is a better place to put the money and how that affects our security capabilities? And whoever wants to go first can go first.

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you, Sir. I appreciate the question very much.

The challenge we have with OCO is it's, you know, the money comes that year and you've got the year -- you don't have it in the outyears. It's not something I can sit here and plan on so it actually increases my -- my fiscal uncertainty because I'm going to buy a piece of equipment, for example, and I can't count. I'm going to have the sustainment cost in the outyears because I -- it's kind of like a -- if I had to give an example like buying a car and not know when you can pay the car insurance two years from now or put gas in it or do the maintenance.

And so while you end up with the same dollar figure when it's done for that particular year, and I just don't know what I've gotten in the future, so it's very difficult for me to plan. So I'm -- as I'm looking at programmatics from where I sit, I'm frequently figuring what's my exit strategy if I don't get the -- the funding in the future to fix it.

Each one will meet a very short-term need, but in the outyears it becomes problematic when we -- we have this reliance on OCO and don't move it over to your base budget.

**BROOKS**: So you've got the adverse effect on planning and what I'm minding for is the adverse effect on purchasing capital goods long-term.

LUMPKIN: Exactly, yes.

**BROOKS**: Okay. **LUMPKIN**: Yes, Sir.

BROOKS: Anything else? Any other adverse effect or -- General Votel?

**VOTEL**: I would just -- I would add, I agree with Secretary Lumpkin in his comments. This is better in the base. I think the big advantage is that the base funding provides us certainty in the time of uncertainty as we -- as we continue moving forward in this very complex environment. And so I think that helps us plan better, I think it helps us make better investments long-term and then, of course, it gives us the best ability to sustain those programs as we -- as we move forward.

So -- and like -- like the secretary has said, both of these will work in the short-term. The base, I think, helps us for the longer- term.

**BROOKS**: Let me focus on the OCO money again for just a moment.

If the House were to pass a budget that spent roughly \$90 billion on OCO and giving the planning and spending inhibitions that you've just or problems that you just described, is all that \$90 billion have to be spent by the Department of Defense or is some of it is not going to be used because you can't properly plan and use it. And I don't know the answer to these questions, that's why I'm asking them.

**LUMPKIN**: You know, I don't want to necessarily speculate on -- on -- but I would say that there's a possibility of that as that it may not all get used.

**BROOKS**: General Votel?

**VOTEL**: I would agree. I think the disadvantage of single-year money, which OCO generally is, does -- does create the risk that we -- we may not be able to employ large sums of it that way. As it is right now, we -- you know, our -- we do -- part of our budget we do ask for some OCO funding and so we are able to plan for some of that. But again I think I would be speculating a little bit here.

**BROOKS**: Well, we've got roughly 15, 20 seconds left. Anything else you all would like to add that would help me decide how to vote on this issue?

**LUMPKIN**: I'm just of the opinion if it's important enough to do and it's part of what you're -- what you should be doing every day it should be in your base budget.

**VOTEL**: I think our -- I think our people deserves certainty.

BROOKS: All right. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**WILSON**: Thank you, Congressman Brooks. And at this time, if there are any further questions, they can be submitted for the record.

And I'd like to thank again, Mr. Secretary General, for your being here today. I'm grateful to be serving with Congressman Langevin. And at this time, we are adjourned.

**END** 

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REP. MAC THORNBERRY HOLDS A HEARING ON U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR F.Y. 2015

March 13, 2014 Thursday

**EVENT DATE:** March 13, 2014

**TYPE: COMMITTEE HEARING** 

LOCATION: WASHINGTON, D.C.

COMMITTEE: HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.

**EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES** 

SPEAKER: REP. MAC THORNBERRY, CHAIRMAN

#### WITNESSES:

REP. MAC THORNBERRY, R-TEXAS CHAIRMAN

REP. JIM LANGEVIN, D-R.I. RANKING MEMBER

WITNESSES: MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL

OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ADMIRAL WILLIAM MCRAVEN (USN), COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

REP. CHRIS GIBSON, R-N.Y.

REP. SUSAN A. DAVIS, D-CALIF.

REP. VICKY HARTZLER, R-MO.

REP. HANK JOHNSON, D-GA.

REP. RICH NUGENT, R-FLA.

REP. ANDRE CARSON, D-IND.

REP. TRENT FRANKS, R-ARIZ.

REP. DUNCAN HUNTER, R-CALIF.

#### TEXT:

**THORNBERRY**: The subcommittee will come to order. Again, I appreciate everyone's flexibility with rooms and times and we're anxious to have this open hearing and then as members know we will continue in closed session downstairs just across the hall from the Intelligence Committee once the closed session has concluded.

I'll just say welcome to our witnesses, I believe this will be the first time that Assistant Secretary Lumpkin has testified in front of our subcommittee, we're glad to have you. Admiral McRaven has been testifying a lot

lately on both this side and the other side of the Capitol. We are always grateful for your openness and your willingness to engage with this committee on a whole range of issues and that includes being here today.

So with that I will yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island for any comments he'd like to make.

**LANGEVIN**: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, I want to thank you very much for being here today and we truly appreciate your service to the nation and we certainly hope that you will pass on gratitude to all the men and women who serve under each of you and your charge, we see the next and again thank you again for the work that you're doing.

The report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review is clear that our Special Operations Forces will remain an integral part of the way the United States addresses our global and national security interest today and in the future.

Even as we go draw down in Afghanistan the QDR calls for the growth in SOF and for them to remain decisively committed to our fight against Al Qaeda. It also highlights their role in dealing with other transnational threats, cannon spread or use of WMD and of course the critical part in helping to build the capacity of our partner the Security Forces as well.

Clearly, it's a busy future for SOF and even our error of reduced events resources that's why I'm pleased to see Secretary Lumpkin's renewed effort at strengthening SOLIC's oversight over SOCOM and ensuring that Admiral McRaven's forces are properly trained, manned and equipped.

I know that Admiral McRaven present in SOCOMs posture statement to the full Committee earlier this month but to see -- to here -- as he is here today together, it's not unlike the service posture hearings we have the full Committee with the service secretaries and the chiefs together.

Not to detract from the role the subcommittee plays but rather to emphasize the importance of SOCOM and the role of SOLIC, perhaps this is the way the full Committee should treat SOCOMs posture statement in the future.

So now as we proceed, I'll be interested to hear if your acquisitions authorities remain flexible enough to provide SOF what it needs without duplicating other service acquisitions efforts. Your research and development accounts funded so that you can continue set the pace to secure technology, does your set of existing authorities both statutory and command provide you the space to which to properly operate? And finally and most importantly, how your people and their family is faring and what can we do to help you to take care of them properly.

Thank you Mr. Chairman and I yield back.

**THORNBERRY**: Thank you gentleman. Without objection your full statements to be made and part of the record and if you'd like to summarize Secretary Lumpkin, again, thanks for being here, you may proceed.

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for your steadfast support to our Special Operators and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The authorities and appropriations the Congress has provided the Department of Defense have allowed us to prosecute the current fight and ensure we are prepared to confront emerging threats and to protect the homeland.

I am pleased to testify here today with Admiral Bill McRaven who has expertly led United States Special Operations Command over the past three years. The threat we face especially from Al Qaeda is continuing to change. Although the scale of the threat to the homeland has diminished, threats to our interest overseas are actually increasing.

With their leadership depleting, Al Qaeda still retains sanctuaries in the remote areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Terrorist organizations are also expanding in Syria, North Africa and Sahel. The threat continues to evolve, we must maintain pressure on terrorist organizations to protect the homeland.

We are in a time of transition, we face -- and yet undetermined to draw down in Afghanistan and new fiscal realities. It may become more difficult to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda in their traditional safe havens.

I closely monitor how the cost to the services impact the readiness if U.S. SOCOM. We are assessing the impact on critical enablers. For example, we are ensuring that the cuts to the ISR fleet will not erode our capabilities to find, fix and finished targets. As we transition in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other theaters, we need to ensure our operations and maintenance accounts are resourced to support operations

In accordance with the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, ASD/SOLIC and the undersecretary of Defense for acquisitions, technology and logistics are strengthening our roles in the oversight of U.S. SOCOM to maximize efficiencies and maintain oversight responsibilities over Major Force Program 11 funds.

These include routine interactions between my staff and U.S. SOCOM and frequent dialogue between me and Admiral McRaven. We owe the president the best strategic options to accomplish our national security objectives. These includes -- this is conducted in close coordination and honest discussion with the Congress as you exercise your oversight, authorization and appropriations responsibilities.

We are moving from a state of perpetual war to perpetual engagement; engaging with partners to build their capacity, engaging problems before they become too big to fix and engaging in direct and indirect action to disrupt and destroy our enemies.

As we move towards a globally network perpetual engagement, our efforts are grounded in experiences that demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and Philippines are case studies in how small investment of SOF resourced for an enduring timeframe can have positive results.

In the Philippines, the task force of about 500 special operators and supporting general purpose forces help degrade a serious trans- national terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah.

In Colombia, we provided counterinsurgency training and humanitarian assistance to prevent narcotics traffickers from developing sanctuaries. This effort in Colombia not only resulted in a far more secure and prosperous nation now, it has emerged as a great exporter of regional security.

We have the same opportunities in Africa and the Middle East. Our support to the French, in Sahel has been critical in stemming the tide of extremism in Mali. Modest support to AMISOM and the Horn of Africa has helped reverse the trajectory of al-Shabab. These discreet activities and operations constitute a global SOF network required for perpetual vigilance.

I am proud to represent the sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines and civilians of U.S. SOCOM, their sacrifice in this war are immense. Since October 2001, 385 special operators have been killed in action, another 2,160 have been wounded.

I am committed to do everything I possibly can to ensure these brave warriors have the best training, equipment and support we can provide. Working closely with Congress we will surely have the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively.

Thank you for your support and I look forward to your questions.

THORNBERRY: Thank you. Admiral?

**MCRAVEN**: Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to address you today. I'd also like to recognize my friend and colleague Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. Mike and I have a long history together and I greatly value ASD/SOLICs partnership and oversight of U.S. SOCOM.

Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased to say that since my last hearing SOCOM has made some great strides in dealing with current conflicts, preparing for the future conflicts and most importantly taking care of our people.

SOCOM continues to provide the finest warriors in the world to the fight in Afghanistan and as we approach the end of 2014, your Special Operations Forces will be ready to adjust to whatever decisions are made regarding our future employment in that country.

Globally, we are developing plans to better serve the geographic combatant commanders and the chiefs of mission who owing to the past 12 years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan have gone under resourced with SOF forces.

SOCOM is the Department of Defense's synchronizer for the war on terrorism, is also working hard to help better coordinate our activities locally, regionally and globally with both the GCCs and the U.S. Ambassadors.

I believe the future of U.S. Special Operations will be in helping to build partner capacity with those willing nations who share our interest. This will mean strengthening our existing allied relationships and building new ones. No nation alone can stem the rise of extremism, we need our friends and allies more now than ever before.

Our future as a Special Operations Forces also inextricably linked to the general purpose for some interagency. The past 12 years have shown us that a whole of government effort is required to be successful against extremism; and in SOF, we have always, always relied heavily on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines for support around the globe.

Finally, we have gone to great lengths to take care of our most precious resource: our people. The preservation of force and families initiative or the POTFF has already seen a marked improvement in the morale and wellbeing of those who serve in SOF. While we still suffer from the tragedy of high suicide rates, I believe we have laid the foundation for keeping our force and their family strong and resilient in the future.

Once again sir, thank you for your interest and unwavering support for the men and women in the Special Operations community and to members of the Committee, thank you. I look forward to your questions.

**THORNBERRY**: Thank you and I appreciate the testimony of you both. Admiral, I was struck when you testified in the full committee posture hearing and I believe you said, "Essentially the most important thing we can do to fight terrorism is working with others." And you just reiterated that the future of Special Operations is building partnership capacity.

I -- have I got that right as far as the most important thing we can do in your view to fight terrorism and then secondly, my perception is we are very good, best in the world at a variety of direct action and so forth, but we're still evolving our authorities, our organizations, our skills even on building partnership capacity, this thing that you say is the most important.

Do you agree with my perception of where we are?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, I do and to -- maybe not clarify my words but I just mentioned on this. I think the most important thing to kind of fight the extremist threats that's out there is keep the pressure on. I think the way we do that in the Special Operations community is by building partnership capacity so that the host nation where the extremist live, they can take care of their own security problems.

So I do think that is the best tool we have recognizing however that we always going to have be in a position to conduct direct action against those irreconcilables.

**THORNBERRY**: OK. Let me just ask one other question right quick. I had a member of Congress within the past few weeks come to me and say, "Look at how much money Special Operations is asking for in the president's budget. That's nearly as much money as the Marine Corps they're asking for and they have a lot fewer people."

What's your answer to the question of why Special Operations Command with fewer people requires the funding that it does require? I mean, it is one of the only really two areas in the budget where funding is going up, with Special Operations and Cyber. And -- but what's your answer to folks who say why is this so expensive?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes sir, the fact of the matter is it takes a lot to kind of grow a Special Operations operator. So when you look at the time from the time we bring them into SOF community and most of them historically the data will show that they spend about seven to eight years in the General Purpose Force.

So you see the General Purpose Force already picks up a certain amount of the financing of the base level training. So by time they hit E5 and some of them E6, that's when they come into Special Operations

community. Then to really make them world class, in whether that is language, cultural training, direct action training, reconnaissance, it just takes more to train an average SOF soldier than it does a basic infantryman in the Marine Corps or in the Army.

And obviously, as we look at the technology they were able to apply against a problem set that really isn't scalable to some degree across broad brigades or battalions; it is scalable if you want to provide everybody in your squad a radio, if you want to make sure that ISRs supporting a platoon or a ODA level operation.

We have the resources to do that because it requires special technology and specially trained people to do the missions that we're being asked to do.

THORNBERRY: Thank you. Mr. Langevin.

**LANGEVIN**: Thank you again gentlemen. So Admiral McRaven as you -- I'm sure you know that this committee has been very interested in support of the development and fielding of directed energy weapons to support military applications and we understand that SOCOMs supported by JIEDDO has been funding the development of a man-portable high energy laser system to address SOCOM particular needs.

Could you talk a little bit about the status of this development effort as well as what actions have been taken to test potential field such a weapon system?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes sir, as you pointed out, we have been working with the JIEDDO, they've provided us some funding to do some initial testing with the man-portable high energy weapons.

I do think that we have a future in looking at the high energy weapons. The problems we have right now of course is we are going through to make sure that we are in compliance with the law. The Laser Safety Law is something we have to make sure that whatever man portable device we have is compliant with that and then there are some health laws and others that we've got to take into consideration as we're doing the testing.

We have done some basic level testing in the country of the United States, the results of that I have not seen sir, so I'm happy to get back to you and take that one for the record.

**LANGEVIN**: OK, thank you Admiral. And right now what is the current status of SOCOMs undersea mobility program and what gaps do you foresee?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, we have two areas in our undersea mobility that we're looking at, we have a smaller version, a wet submersible, the SWCS we refer to and then we have our dry combat submersible.

So the dry combat submersible, we currently have a vessel that we are listing and we are doing some testing evaluation on that. And then we have two prototypes that are being built, one in the U.K. and one in Italy. The eventual program of record is looking at a total of three dry combat submersibles. This really puts us in a position to have our SEALs in this case with other operators in a dry environment as they transit from point A to point B.

The shallow water combat submersible, the SWCS is a new variation, new technology based on our old SEAL delivery vehicle. So a wet submersible a little bit more limited capability than the dry submersible but frankly, we need both. The wet submersible will be able to get into regions where the dry submersible will not. So you -- but you have to have both capabilities.

So we have -- but we're looking at a program of record of about 10 shallow water combats submersibles. The dry combat submersible sir, is on track and we're pleased with the direction we're heading. We've been working with the Navy on classifying this as you know classification, making sure that we are meeting industry standards for dry combat submersibles and the Navy again has been working with us in doing this.

This submersible, the dry combat submersible will not be attached to a larger submarine. So that actually allows me to buy down some of the risk as we're building the vessel itself.

The shallow water submersible, again, we're working with the Navy in developing that and while we have a little bit of slippage in the development because it is a new piece of equipment, I'm confident we'll be on track to produce the right number sir.

**LANGEVIN**: Yeah, I know how the submersible -- we had problems, technical problems, but those -- in the past those have substantially been overcome?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes sir, in fact sir, that's why we're actually going through an industry standard and looking at prototypes before we get into our final build. So by looking at how industry works their dry submersibles we think we're going to learn a lot in terms of kind of a systemic approach to building the dry submersible, that industry's very good at doing and then we'll take the lessons learned from there and incorporate them into our long term dry combat submersible.

**LANGEVIN**: Thank you. So the Secretary of Defense has recently commented that SOF will grow to 67 -- 69, 700 personnel from roughly 67,000 today and the FY '15 budget request includes this growth with declining budgets, how will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure you're not choosing quantity over quality. This is for both witnesses.

**LUMPKIN**: I think the key is when we look at the numbers of SOF we're not actually keeping of it from a programmatic view which is 72,000 going down to the 69,700, that's not actually a cut in the force, it's actually just stemming the growth of the force.

So because that it's been a metered and we'll thought a process on how we would grow the force, I think that we're definitely in a position and a trajectory to make sure that the force is robust.

What I'm concerned most about is the cuts and the services that provide the enablers for U.S. Special Operations Command, these are the things that are not organic to them, whether it's the ships that support them or as I mentioned in my open comments, the ISR that supports them. So that's what I'm diligently working on, focusing on because that's my greatest concern in making sure SOF maintains its capabilities.

The services have been absolutely great but there are competing requirements that they're having to resource so I'm working diligently with that to make sure that doesn't happen.

**LANGEVIN**: Admiral, do you care to comment?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes sir, the only thing I'll add is our basic qualification courses that we do, the basic field training or the **Special Force** Qualifications Course, we have had to ramp up over the years as the demand signal for SOF increase.

So now, we're fortunate to have the infrastructure in place to be able to meet the demand signal of the increasing force size. So, I'm not concerned at all sir but the quality of our force will diminish, I can tell you from my experience, the quality now is better than it has ever been and I'm pleased to say and that's across the board with our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, sir.

LANGEVIN: Thank you. Thank you Admiral and thank you Mr. Secretary. I yield back.

**THORNBERRY**: Thank you gentlemen. I'll just remind all members after this open session, we will head downstairs for a close session. Hopefully, all before four votes resume.

Gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson.

**GIBSON**: Well, thanks Mr. Chairman and I welcome the panelists as well and express my deep gratitude for your leadership and to your command for their achievements and their sacrifices and their families.

I'm going to ask a question on integration and cooperation recognizing that we're in an open session here, fully understanding that but also recognizing that the American people are looking for confidence in what we're doing. So, to the degree that you can bring it up to in the unclassified level your response helps me communicate so we can keep that confidence going.

In 2009, a radicalized youth gets on an aircraft and is en route to our country, lights himself on fire and it's not our system that saves us, it's really some brave soul on the aircraft puts him out and turns out that weeks prior this young man's father had called our country and expressing that he didn't recognize his son, that he was talking crazy talk, that he could attack our country.

And when I had a chance to come here in 2011, I chatted with Admiral Olson and I asked him, I said, "Did that call ever land on your desk?" and he said, "No."

And so, working with General Clapper, we worked an amendment in the intel authorization bill to try to take some of the effective action that I saw firsthand in Iraq in terms of flattening intelligence, linking it with operations and turn to elevate data to a national level asset and about 10 months or so later, he came back and said, "We're making progress on the cloud in terms of sharing information and also budgeting so that we can have better integration.

So I'm interested in hearing how we've been doing in the last year on integration within the whole of government, I appreciate your opening remarks on that score.

And then also cooperation I couldn't agree more, I associate myself with the remarks, talking of how important it is that we work with our friends and allies and I think that goes across the whole of government as well in terms of our diplomacy and how we work and interact with countries across the world and then of course as part of that is the deterrent and when deterrents fails and when we have irreconcilables is taking direct action there.

So I'm interested in that and certainly understanding that classification but to the extent that I could get response that helps me communicate to the public the confidence that I have with you.

**LUMPKIN**: The collaboration on the intelligence front particularly within the inter-agency is phenomenal. I mean, my relationship with the folks at NCTC, CIA, FBI, DHS, I mean, and it's not just my relationships, it's the department's and how we dialogue and we discuss.

So, we are firing on our eight cylinders, I mean, they work with -- the machine is working. So I feel very confident on the information intelligence sharing that is happening. The other piece is the information intelligence with our allies and our partners and that becomes -- because this is a truly global challenge that we're facing that the security of the United States is -- many of the threats of course come from outside the country and that's a work in progress.

I mean, as we build our relationships and we continue to build the partner capacity part of this is to make sure we can also have this information intelligence sharing across these national security spectrum.

**MCRAVEN**: And sir, I would echo the Secretary's comments. You know, I have a personal and professional relationship with Letitia Long at NGA, Mike Flynn at DIA, John Brennan at CIA, Jim Clapper at DNI, METLs and at NCTC; I mean, these are personal and professional friends and they do not hesitate to reach out to me personally if they think there is intelligence that's worth knowing.

But, in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, another bomber you were referring to, I'm not sure we will ever be good enough to see these individuals that are radicalized out in the middle of Yemen in his case, just because no matter how good our intelligence gets, it's very difficult sometimes to get that detail and that in-depth on a particular target.

So this is why I think again, we need to continue to build our relationships with other host nations so that they may see things that we don't see. And those relationships, sir, as you indicated, they need to be at the intelligence community level or the law enforcement, the mil-to-mil, the diplomatic levels and I am a very big believer in partnering.

And I think this is where the trip wires will be crossed and our ability to find threats that maybe our intelligence community wasn't looking for but the law enforcement community was. Or, just somebody comes in from the tribal region and says, "Hey, something doesn't seem right here."

So -- but again, I would echo the Secretary's sentiments that our relationship today is as good as I have ever seen it in my 37 years of doing it.

**GIBSON**: And -- well thanks gentlemen, my time has just about expired so I'd ask for the record if you have recommendations, as we move towards the mark where we could continue this trend, whether it be with regard to resources or approvals authorities, we'd welcome that and thank you gentlemen. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

THORNBERRY: Thank you. Ms. Davis?

**DAVIS**: Thank you Mr. Chairman and Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you for being here. It's good to see you both. I wanted to ask you -- for Secretary Lumpkin about the Combatting Terrorism and

Technical Support Office and you mentioned that in your statement and I certainly have been very supportive of the whole government approach.

Could you share with us -- I think -- why this investment is critical but I also at the same time know that we have a development and acquisition center that -- seems like there are several different entities and I suspect they interact but I'm a little concerned, is there a replication and -- or duplication really?

And what about the other services, is there some way as we talk about cost, is there some way that some of that effort maybe could be more helpful to the other services or vice versa? How much of this is going on that we could streamline a little bit more?

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you for the question. The Counter Terrorism Technical Support Office or CTTSO is truly a unique enterprise and the fact that it partners with not only the state department but each of these services, the combatting commands and our international allies in order to work research and development projects.

So we have U.S.- U.K. projects; we're working projects in support of the U.S. Army where we can actually give cost sharing and bring moneys together for a common goal. So it truly is a place where we do exactly what you're saying, is that we can support people's requirements and we can leverage it across the entire defense sector not only in the United States but also with our partners.

So we can take an idea whether it's a new type of ammunition that we need to look at and our support of special operations or even law enforcement and then we can work together and -- to do the development and then share the results and maybe even find a company or a technology that can provide something that we truly don't have today. So it is a...

**DAVIS**: Is that different from DARPA or does DARPA interphase with that?

**LUMPKIN**: I mean, there are discussions that go on. DARPA and CTTSO -- the CTTSO is largely focused on truly the combatting terrorism piece whereas DARPA has a much larger aperture that they're looking at.

So, the other piece of it is, the CTTSO gives us the ability to -- if there's a project that we want to put in the future and we see it coming, we can do the initial research and development in order to support our future projects. It's quite agile and it gives us the flexibility to do what we need.

**DAVIS**: Admiral McRaven, did you want to comment on that and can we -- maybe, could we say in some other areas if we put -- really the resources that you need this right and do you have those resources today? Do you think that you do?

**LUMPKIN**: I think the -- again, the beauty of CTTSO in itself is that it's not just DOD money. I mean, because we're taking money -- I mean, leveraging money from the interagency as well as the international community. So we have this pooling of resources for a common goal and I think that's the real beauty of it.

**DAVIS**: Is there also a way and we know from -- not only the San Diego community and others that there are many businesses that would like to be engaged in some way and sometimes what they share with us is it's very difficult for them to get the attention for something and I'm just wondering, how do you do that in terms of the business piece to that so that we can bring those things online, innovate quickly and get the job done?

**LUMPKIN**: Well, we have an open forum for business that we do once a year before -- and make sure they understand what was in the special requirements. In fact, I just did the opening comments forward here last month so I think it's generally the first week in February we do that. So we open it to business, we did it at the Reagan Center this year and we had a -- over 600 businesses in attendance who came to see what we were looking for in the future.

**DAVIS**: Admiral McRaven, we -- General Dunford was with us this morning talking about Afghanistan and where he gave the good stories and some of the concerns. What are your concerns when it comes to their special ops forces?

**MCRAVEN**: Ma'am, I'm very confident in their special ops forces. In fact, I just received a detailed brief today from our folks in Afghanistan, we're very pleased, very proud of the great work the Afghans have done and they're thanking my forces have done in training them. I think they have a very capable commando element, **special forces** element and we're pleased with the development of the Afghan local boys.

So, I think as long as we can continue to be in the position to shepherd this forces as they go forward in the future and it doesn't require a lot to do that but I do think we need to continue to be in position to train, advise and assist for a little bit longer in order to make sure that all the processes that General Dunford and General Allen before him and others before him have put in place and make sure those are functioning processes, pay maintenance, those sorts of thing; I think if we can get to that point then they will be successful in the future.

And so we certainly look forward to having the opportunity to continue to partner with our great Afghan special forces.

DAVIS: Thank you.

THORNBERRY: Ms. Hartzler.

**HARTZLER**: Thank you Mr. Chairman and thank you gentlemen for your service. In your testimony Secretary Lumpkin, you mentioned the advances that Colombia has achieved and I just had the opportunity to go with Chairman McKeon on a codel to Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Panama.

And I was so impressed with what the Colombian people and their military has done and how they have really taken it to the FARC (ph) and their -- pushed them down and now they're in negotiations on that operation but while we were there the general in charge was very adamant saying, "We are on the 10-yard line, we are so close but please don't leave us yet. The game is not over and if you leave, it would be a game changer for us. We need that."

So, considering of the instance there that you mentioned in your testimony, how much longer do you anticipate that we'd be engaged there with them and what level of involvement do you foresee us pursuing still with them?

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you for the question because it's interesting from my days, I mean, my first time in Colombia was in the last 80s when I was in uniform. At that time, to see where it's gone from that period to now is amazing and there -- the comment was actually correct on the 10-yard line and we need to make sure we sustain our presence and partnership with the Colombians in this effort.

I think the key is that we look at it from the outset, when the developments to plan Colombia came into place, was -- is that -- was it going to be an enduring commitment on our part and when we look at it from that way, we knew that we weren't looking nor playing a short game here. It was going to be the long game and we focused on that.

And I -- the enemy gets a vote as far as how long it's going to go. So I'm hesitant to say that it's going to be X number of years or months or what have you.

But I think that the fruits of our labor and our efforts and the resources is a tremendous return on investment long term and I think it serves as a model that we could use in other regions and other areas an countries that we're -- there are challenges because there's many countries that are challenging for us now that aren't near as bad as the situation that Colombia was in the late 80s.

**HARTZLER**: You did give me hope for other countries and do you see it possibly being used as a model for Mexico? I know that NorthCom has added a Special Operations Command-North, they established that. So what lessons do you think that we can translate from Colombia to say, Mexico?

**LUMPKIN**: I'm kind of hesitant to say which country it would go to. But I think the key is that we -- there has to be a comprehensive plan supported by the inter-agency that we make a commitment to and we know again it's a mindset of having the long game here and there's going to be this enduring commitment to see it true to the end.

And having very clear metrics that we had with the Colombians, and the Colombians clearly have skin in the game which was a key. And so it's about everybody's sitting around the table, understanding with tremendous support from the Congress and making sure that this was resourced and it wouldn't have happened if the Congress had not been decisively engaged at the beginning.

**HARTZLER**: If you were to list the five things and that's what I kept trying to narrow down while I was there, what were the keys to the success here that we could translate to other countries? And some of the answers

that I got was one, first of all, the people have to -- have to stand up, have to be fed up with it. The people of the country have to say enough is enough and be willing to get behind leadership.

And the second thing they said was to have strong leadership within their own government willing to take them on, who are not corrupt and that sort of thing but then having our engagement too.

Now those are three things -- so I'm just visiting with a few people but I'd like to hear your top five things, lessons from Colombia why has that worked or why is it working that we can translate to others?

**LUMPKIN**: If I could just, off the top of my head I think that the top five things would be, first of all as you mentioned the people has also a sense of nationalism. They saw themselves as a cohesive unit as a -- as a country and I think that's actually key that -- because it wasn't fragmented.

The other ones was our -- the inter-agency commitment in the support of the U.S. Congress on our part. And that we could enter something knowing that we were looking at a long term relationship so we weren't rushing against timelines but rather had key milestones, because it was milestone-based.

I think that the other pieces that which resourced the level that it need to be resourced, and I believe that we -- and my final one here is that because there was a commitment and then we have the relationship and the skin in the game of the Colombian people.

**HARTZLER**: Very good. **LUMPKIN**: Thank you.

**HARTZLER**: Thank you for all you do. **THORNBERRY**: Thank you. Mr. Johnson.

**JOHNSON**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral McRaven, you along with General Odierno and General Amos have embraced the concept of the **Human Domain** in a white paper entitled Strategic Land Owner with great vigor.

This concept is built upon the lessons of the decade of war from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with his staff and that noted -- and it noted that the failure to understand the apparitional environment was the primary reason for the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Do you agree with that assessment? And if so, why?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, we've had a great conversation between the Commandant, the Chief of Staff of the Army and myself about the **Human Domain**. My point has always been you have to take the population and the consideration I think regardless of what you're doing whether it is a major conflict or whether it is an insurgency.

As we look at the **Human Domain**, it's kind of the totality of the cultural, the ethnic, the social fabric that makes up the people that live on a particular area, you have to know that before you can make any decisions whether those are, you know, large maneuver decisions for the Army, expeditionary decisions for the Marine Corps or counter- insurgency decisions for SOF.

So the **Human Domain** to me really is a fundamental area for we in the Special Operations community have to focus our time and our attention. We have to understand everything about the culture before we, you know, go off and make decisions that are going to affect those people in a certain area.

**JOHNSON**: And, thank you. Does a program like the Human Terrain System support the **Human Domain** concept?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, I'm only vaguely familiar with the Human Terrain System. We have a number of programs out there that look at the human terrain. I'm not familiar with that exact system. Having said that, we have a number of systems layer our knowledge of the human terrain.

So if you look at a valley in Kunar Province for example, the systems we have out there can tell you the ethnicity. They can tell you the cultural ties. They can tell you the tribal relationships. They can begin to layer this information one on top of the other. That gives us a much better appreciation for the dynamics in a certain region in Kunar or in Latin America or in Africa or wherever.

So we use a number of systems to again layer that information so we have a better understanding of the problems that we're dealing with.

JOHNSON: Do you think that SOCOM would be a good fit for the Human Terrain System?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, if I can take that for the record and get back to you, again, I'm not personally familiar with that specific system but I will found out and get back to you, sir.

**JOHNSON**: All right. Thank you. What status of operations -- excuse me. What special operation forces core mission areas and activities remain of critical importance to United States National Security?

In other words, given fiscal constraints, what should remain off of the chopping block to ensure that we do not hollow out the forces?

**LUMPKIN**: All of the core missions that writ or codified in Title 10 remain valid and necessary. So I don't recommend shutting any mission sets from the U.S. Special Operations command inventory.

**JOHNSON**: OK. According to the May 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance on standards and procedures for the use of forcing counterterrorism operations outside the United States in areas of active hostility, lethal action may only be taken in the case that an assessment has been made that captures not feasible at the time of the operation.

Which individuals or which entity is responsible for making the original determination that capture of any given target is not feasible?

**LUMPKIN**: We have an inter-agency process that works and discusses that particular issue and makes recommendations.

JOHNSON: What would be the titles of those inter-agency personnel?

**LUMPKIN**: PPD-1 which is the Presidential Policy Directive number one outlines the process for decision making along this way. So normally it's a process of inter-agency meetings, deputy's meetings, principal's meetings, and for ultimate recommendations.

JOHNSON: So it's a collective decision?

**LUMPKIN**: It is a process that works through and we make sure everybody's concerns and equities are known that makes recommendations.

**JOHNSON**: How quickly can it be called to act quite rapidly when necessary? All right. Thank you.

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you.

THORNBERRY: Mr. Nugent.

**NUGENT**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the Secretary and Admiral McRaven again for you being here within the in the last, what, two weeks. And, Admiral, I really do appreciate your candor in regards to how you've discussed issues particularly as it relates core conventional forces.

I would say, you know, we're hearing about SOCOM but you can't have one without the other. And I think sometimes people get somewhat confused about that. And just from my good friend, Mr. Johnson, I mean if you're ever interested in finding out what the criteria is and how decisions are made, we do have that in classified setting that goes over those particular issues because I had the same concerns that you had, Mr. Johnson. So committee has done a good job on that.

But, Admiral, today was the first time I heard that we -- we're not going to use a dry combat submersible off of a submarine was -- did I hear that correctly?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, we have right now, our path is to take a look at what we have in terms of prototypes out there. So we are releasing one vessel, we have two prototypes for building. However, the intent right now is because we think our major platform, the SSGN, is scheduled for retirement in the mid-20s. We are preparing to be in a position, you know, not to build a submarine that is tied necessarily to the SSGN or to the follow on vessel.

Now having said that, we are absolutely looking at alternatives that would make to a U.S. submarine. Right now I have where these prototypes are designed to industry standards first and then we will learn from the industry standards to make a decision on what the final product will look like.

**NUGENT**: Obviously to do that I mean you do have to have some type of a dry facility and the sub -- on a deck of a sub.

MCRAVEN: No, sir, not necessarily.

**NUGENT**: OK.

**MCRAVEN**: So there, I mean there are alternatives out there that would imply that you do not necessarily have to have a hanger as we think of it in order to be able to launch a dry submersible.

So again while we're not heading down that path right now, we are looking at alternatives that would put us in a position if necessary to be able to have the dry combat submersible launch from a U.S. submarine.

**NUGENT**: Having the ability to do that launch from a submarine, does that increase your capabilities?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, it does. Clearly the clandestine nature of a large submarine puts us in a position to gain the element of surprise in certain areas.

However having said that, you know, we're not going into too much detail in the open session, we have good tactics and good procedures that can get us close enough. And as we build the technology we think we will be in a position with the dry combat submersible to meet most of our targets that we looked at.

**NUGENT**: Both of you said submersibles that you're talking about, the dry and the wet, replace -- what's the legacy model sitting out there?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, the legacy model not now on the wet -- on the wet side is the SEAL Delivery Vehicle or the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle, Mark 8, Mod. I'm not sure where we are now, Mod 3, Mod 4. I was raised on the Mark 8 SDV almost 30 years ago, that we've continued to upgrade.

However the technology in the Mark 8 today is reasonably good but frankly the new technology just coming online will make the next Shallow Water Combat Submersible really a generational leap beyond what the current capacity is.

We have no dry combat submersible in the inventory right now. Our advance SEAL Delivery System is no longer active so we are down to -- we have no capabilities in the dry side.

**NUGENT**: And then what obviously limits you in regards to distance that you can travel based upon the operator's ability to operate after being exposed to extremely cold water?

Is there anything else that is I guess -- is big navy on board with the opportunity to utilize a dry combat submersible housed somewhere on another submarine, what could be named?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes, sir. So we are partnering with the Navy in this process. One of the reasons we are going with the industry standard is because if you made a dry submersible now with the Navy vessel with the Navy submarine, then you have to comply with Navy standards.

And frankly the -- we think the industry standards are good enough for our operations right now. If we had to do it in compliance with the navy standards now, we think it would cost much more to meet those standards and may not -- may not give us a better capability.

So that's why we're exploring a number of different options to find out whether or not the industry standards will be good enough for our future dry combat submersible.

**NUGENT**: And I would think as we, you know, as we move along and the budget's hour tight, that is a good way to go looking at industry standards because every time we tried to invent a new mouse trap, I hate to say that one of my sons has one of those on his leg when he flys a Blackhawk, not too good.

So I appreciate it and, Admiral, we're certainly here to support you. Thank you. I yield back.

**THORNBERRY**: Thank you, gentleman. All sorts of implications for the larger acquisition reform effort and the exchange that you all just had, it seems to me. Mr. Carson.

**CARSON**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lumpkin, looking across the globe and considering the threat of trans-national terrorism, what are your largest concerns? What are we assuming? Where are we assuming risk in current strategies and are we postured to counter these threats?

**LUMPKIN**: Not only am I the Acting Assistant Secretary for Special Operations but I'm also performing the duties as the Undersecretary for Policy right now.

So I have an opportunity to take a -- I have a much broader view than I would normally have just looking at from the SOF perspective. The world is just a much smaller place now.

So when you ask as what are the threats, and I would say the threat is it's coming from everywhere. I mean in the sense that it's totally -- its base is fungible now. People can move from place to place and the world is just much smaller.

So there aren't -- well, there are lines for the threat comes more directly, it can come from anywhere. So for us it's about having that truly a global presence and having this network approach that U.S. SOCOM has built so well as to making sure that each of the Theater Special Operations commands in the SOF operators across and there's each -- geographic combat and commander has a key SOF and Theater Special Operations has got the abilities to talk to each other.

And each one of them now works and it's supporting the geographic combat and combat but for Admiral McRaven at U.S. SOCOM and he has the ability to synchronize their operations. And I think that's key to that allows me to sleep at night. So I'm not worrying about this and it keeps me up.

So I think we're postured for success. But the key is just making sure that that global SOF network remains resourced, active, and viable.

CARSON: Sir, would you like to add something?

**MCRAVEN**: Well I'm glad you're sleeping at night. But I would tell you that the Secretary nailed it. When we talk about kind of the evolution of U.S. Special Operations -- and I appreciate the opportunity that -- to roll this out.

You know, we have had a Special Operations enterprise for decades. We have -- we have been globally dispersed for the last 27 years, the U.S. SOCOM has been around. Now that global enterprise, because of our ability to bring them together with communications now we have taken those thousand desperate nodes and we've connected them through communications.

And starting last October, we established a very disciplined, what we call battle rhythm. So video teleconferences whereas the Secretary said I have four video teleconferences a week. My staff has them every day with the entire network now. And so we talk about the global SOF network, that's just the name.

The enterprise has been there forever. Communications has allowed us to connect those various nodes and now we can better meet the geographic combat and commander's requirements because we are much better synchronized. And so the Secretary exactly characterized it.

But the point I wanted to raise is for decades we have had thousands of people out in the battle field. Until recently we haven't been able to connect them globally through both communications and authorities, and now we have that ability.

**CARSON**: To that point, Admiral, I've been interested in some time in Servicemember Mental Health particularly providing mental health assessments throughout deployment. Can you give us some assessment of SOCOM's embedded behavioral health programs and the impact that they have had on resiliency for that matter in your units?

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, thank you for that question. We have our program called the Preservation of the Force and Families. And my predecessor (inaudible) goals and -- that they link the task force study before I took command. It's been about 10 months, we can talk to 7,000 soldiers, about 1,000 spouses, 440 different units, and that report landed on my desk when I took command.

And currently what the report showed was that the force was frayed (ph). And I can tell you in the last, you know, almost three years that I've been in command, the force has continued to fray. But I -- but I'm

confident now that as this body has provided us the resources necessary we are getting ahead of the problems so we are investing in the psychological performance.

We are investing in the physical performance capabilities and we are investing in family resiliency. We think the family resiliency piece is absolutely critical. And we do so with the support of the services, we leverage every service program out there but we greatly appreciate what the Congress has allowed us to do in terms of the Preservation of the Force and Families.

Thank you, sir.

CARSON: Chairman, I yield back.

THORNBERRY: Thank you. Franks (ph).

**FRANKS**: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for being here. If it's all right, Admiral Raven -- I mean McRaven, I'll start with you. And I'm always grateful, to men like you that give your life to cause a freedom. My five-year olds have a better chance to attain that and living that freedom. And I appreciate that along with all the folks there behind you that wear the uniform.

You know, I spent the conviction of many of us that the threat and the challenge in terms of our National Security should drive the budget rather than the reverse. And you know that as much as we tried to put that concept forward that it usually is a victim of sometimes mathematics.

But you've outlined some pretty significant challenges that you faced and you mentioned that the forces frayed. And I just noticed that the initiative fund that you submitted in the FY '15 budget the opportunity growth in security initiative included -- includes 14 -- I'm sorry, \$400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure.

And maybe give us just a quick idea what those requirements are and why were these not included in the FY '15 budget request?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes, sir. So the \$400 million is actually broken down into two parts, one of them 300-somewhat million is for readiness. So we're going to go back in where we had the takeouts in order to meet the budget numbers. We're in flying hours and steaming hours and training hours, so we'll be able to put I think 350 million or so back in through readiness to make sure that we're able to improve the readiness of our folks back in the continental United States.

It has never affected the readiness of our forces deploying forward. We always make sure that they are absolutely ready to go forward wherever that might be whether it's Afghanistan or anywhere else in the globe.

But in the past, we have -- we have taken some liberties with the readiness in the continental United States until they were ready to go forward.

Having said that, there were also three programs within that 400 million that are part of our Preservation of the Force and Families. There are Milcon projects that we are looking at and so we're -- we are grateful for this additional money coming in because we'll be able to solve some of our readiness problems and hopefully some of our Milcon projects with the Preservation of the Force and Families.

**FRANKS**: Well, thank you, sir. You know, as much as we try whether to duty or whatever it might be to try to ascertain what our challenges are, it seems that the serendipity always outpaces our predictive capability.

And so the only real answer is to have a comprehensive force that can meet whatever potential threat might come. And it seems to me that maybe one of the greatest things that we're overlooking here, we think that, you know, we're getting a leaner and meaner machine.

And I appreciate that, but we need to have the overall capacity ultimately to handle what comes that we can't predict. And so with that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, you've talked about a globally network perpetual engagement for our Special Operations troops and that's the same force that Admiral McRaven in my judgment wisely and rightly has indicated a strain (ph) from a demand placed on them.

And at the same time in asking for diplomatic community here you -- this administration has depended on our special operators sort of being the glue for our worldwide military operations during a time that we're withdrawing and really backing off of our obligations that your friends and allies alike across the globe.

And to top it all, the budget is being cut. And so there is a breaking point to all of this and I'm just wondering what your own assessment of that breaking point is?

**LUMPKIN**: Going back to the QDR, and the QDR is a strategy-driven document. It happens to be budget informed in order to recognize the realities of what we have as far as from a -- from a budget in what we have to operate with.

That said, the global engagement piece, I mean this is about fulfilling our obligations and our commitments to our allies and our friends, to help them build the partnership capacity to build the capacity to deal with these security challenges that become too big to fix, and to leverage their capabilities to do things on their own so we don't have to have this big military general purpose force to roll in and do that.

But this was -- when we bid QDR6 and QDR10, this was the reason we built the force and QDR6 was to grow the Special Operations force in order to focus and allow us to do this building partnership capacity mission.

As in the QDR10, it was focused on giving U.S. SOCOM deal with those organic enablers to do those missions whenever possible to reduce the reliance on the other services when feasible.

So that's as -- as we look at '14 and we took in mind as the end of combat operations interact and we're looking at a reduction, we don't know what the -- whether we're going to end up with a bilateral security agreement in Afghanistan at this juncture, but at some point our footprint will be reduced in Afghanistan in those forces, there's demand signal by the geographic combat and commanders, they want more SOF in their theater.

And with the post '14 Afghanistan, and as we draw down the forces, we'll give us the ability to meet those unmet demands within the GCC, so they can do that capacity-building with our partners and our allies.

FRANKS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentleman.

**THORNBERRY**: Thank you. Talk about Milcon, it reminds me that I believe we have an outstanding request for Special Operations, military construction that was requested to be submitted with the budget. I don't think we've quite gotten it yet.

So, Secretary Lumpkin, I might just put that on your radar screen, if you don't mind, when you go back to the building to check and see where that is.

You were talking earlier that in addition to being the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations low intensity conflict, you're the acting undersecretary for Policy, you're also in charge of the tax force looking for one of our folks who has been taking captive, correct?

LUMPKIN: I am the department lead for that endeavor, yes.

**THORNBERRY**: It seems to me like you got a full plate.

LUMPKIN: I keep busy, yes, sir.

THORNBERRY: Well, have they nominated somebody for Policy yet?

**LUMPKIN**: Yes, sir. I've been nominated at the hearing. We're waiting for the confirmation process to work its way through.

**THORNBERRY**: OK. When you testified in front of the Senate, I know you were asked about the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. And frankly I've gotten a little confused over the years what the administration policy is towards that. Sometimes we hear that it's don't mess with it, sometimes it's change it, can you help me understand the Administration's policy?

And from your experience, isn't it getting harder and harder to do the things that we ask our special operators to do around the world relying back on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that was passed in September 2001?

**LUMPKIN**: Thank you for the questions. I truly do appreciate it.

In May of last year, the President in May speech at National Defense University mentioned about revising and eventually repealing the AUMF as a goal. I truly believe that the AUMF has served us well, it continues to serve us well.

It gives us the ability to keep this nation safe and do the missions that we need to do. That said, my comment to the Senate was that we are at an inflection point where to point that it's always good to relook at authorities because they evolve. The threat evolves.

And so I would encourage a look at the AUMF, make sure it's doing everything we needed to do. And if it's not, if it needs to be taken in or expanded or whatever, it's a chance to do that if we're going to -- if we're going to take a look at it. And so that's what I support.

**THORNBERRY**: OK. Well, and I agree actually. And what I also agree with is that we should not ask our men and women to go and do something anywhere in the world that they are not fully backed up with law to do.

And I worry about the strain as we get further and further away from 9/11 and the -- exact wording of the AUMF makes it -- makes it harder and harder to draw those connections, so.

Speaking of authorities, Admiral, let me just touch back, we talked at the beginning about working with others. One of the things that is -- has been requested is an extension of the 1208 authority as well as increasing the dollar limit on that.

And in this forum, can you describe for us the role that 1208 plays, how important you think it is in the menu of options that special operators have to work with others, with 1206 and global security fund?

**MCRAVEN**: Yes, sir. And then -- and then I'd like to defer to Secretary Lumpkin because he has been very supportive of increasing the amount of money for our 1208.

Sir, I would tell you, 1208 is probably the single most important authority we have in our fight against terrorism. It allows us to build forces to train them, to equip them, and to do so, well I think the right amount of oversight.

And right now we are finding that this is a, you know, about building partner capacity. This is a growth industry. So whereas a couple of years ago, we had a certain level of authority and we found that our expenditure rates didn't really match the authority.

Now already, we are closing in on the \$50 million authority and I think the demand signal -- I know the demand signal out there is even larger than that.

So Secretary Lumpkin has put forth a proposal to increase the authority and I am in strong favor of that.

However, one of the problems we run into is as we look at how we build partner capacity, we do have to have a patchwork of various authorities so we do use 1206 on appropriate 1207 Global Security Contingency Fund, 1208, and we make it work but there is an awkwardness to it and sometimes limitations to it.

Some of the authorities allow us to work with the Minister of Defense but not the Minister of the Interior where in some cases their counterterrorism forces actually are in the MOI. Or some allows us to build minor military construction, you know, small shoot house or small barracks, others don't.

So what we try to do is find the right authority for the right situation. But that's not always -- not always easy. 1208 is the -- is the -- gives us the greatest latitude but it is strictly focused on counterterrorism, whereas 1206 and 1207 give us a little bit more latitude in other areas.

**LUMPKIN**: And if I may, I absolutely agree with the Admiral in the sense that 1208 is a tremendous tool for us. And we are rapidly approaching our maximum authorization of the 50 million and it's -- we're not even halfway through the year yet.

We're tightening up our obligation looking what we can find other mechanisms to fund so we don't find ourselves up against a wall. But the other concern I have is that in the event it's not renewed or we end up

with a CR where -- that doesn't allow me to continue operations, stopping that particular mission set is -- has significant impact operationally.

So I would encourage and support getting an extended authorization sooner rather than later.

**THORNBERRY**: Well, I am struck by the conversation you all having with Ms. Hartzler. This is an operational authority, not some of the other authorities and yet operationally it's still takes a while to help develop some of these capacities and so we don't want to be so excited about it.

Mr. Langevin, do you have other questions?

LANGEVIN: (OFF-MIKE)

THORNBERRY: OK. Does anybody else have open session questions? Yes. Mr. Hunter.

**HUNTER**: Really quick. JIEDDO. I just wonder what's your -- what do you see with the JIEDDO going forward? I mean that's a -- you know, what do you do with JIEDDO right now? And they've been supporting SOCOM for a long time. They're also supporting, you know, big army marines or everybody else too.

But from your side of things, what do you want to see happening with them going forward? What parts of them should be kept and what parts of JIEDDO or just bureaucratic and won't be needed anymore once we get out of Afghanistan?

**LUMPKIN**: From a larger policy perspective, JIEDDO as you're keenly aware has been crucial and instrumental and been tremendously supportive through our operations and initiatives forward. So for me from a policy perspective, would really like to ensure we codified it in the department long term, and it doesn't go by the wayside as we move past beyond our current operations.

**HUNTER**: After this, so when you codify, you want to make sure it's really, really good.

So you want to maybe cut out the parts that you don't think are being productive right now or not as productive or change those parts and keep the parts that are really good if you codify.

So what parts would those be? What parts would you keep, what parts would you change? Or you can get back to me if you don't have that on you right now?

LUMPKIN: I'll defer so that Admiral McRaven has -- that I can get background.

**MCRAVEN**: Sir, we have a JIEDDO rep as you know and almost every location where we have our SOF forces. And as the Secretary said, JIEDDO has been absolutely fabulous over the years.

For us, you know, what JIEDDO has learned to do is to understand networks. So as we look at the terrorist threat, frankly, where JIEDDO started out focusing on IEDs and of course understanding IEDs, you have to understand the IED network.

Now the folks at JIEDDO because they understand the foundation of network development, you can take that talent and that capability and overlay it on the threat networks elsewhere. So I'm a very big believer that what JIEDDO has learned, the IED fights in Iraq and Afghanistan is fungible as we move forward and have to fight networks globally.

So I wouldn't portend to tell you where you could cut them or not cut them. I can tell you that they have been a tremendous resource to SOCOM and we greatly appreciate what they have done and frankly how they have, to some degree to reshape themselves, and look at the broader network problem set.

**HUNTER**: All right. Thank you. That's all I got, Mr. Chairman.

**THORNBERRY**: All right. Thank you both. With that, the open portion of this hearing will be adjourned and will move swiftly down one floor and...

**END** 

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### 4 of 10 DOCUMENTS

#### **Army Times**

January 6, 2014 Monday

# The Army in 2014

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1The end of Afghanistan? One way or another, 2014 will bookend the post-2001 period of U.S. military warfare in the Middle East. The nation's longest war is slated to formally end next December when the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan expires. And while many Pentagon officials have long insisted that the U.S. military will maintain an enduring presence there, the rocky relationship between the U.S. and Afghan President Hamid Karzai is raising serious questions about whether the U.S. commander in chief might just tell all his troops to pack up and leave, just as they did from Iraq at the end of 2011.

"We continue to plan until such time we're told not to plan anymore," a senior Army planner, who spoke on background, told Army Times.

That question will linger for many months into the New Year. A betting sort probably would say the good money is on some number of U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan. But the numbers will be small, no more than 10,000. And the mission will be different: The 14-year operation known as Enduring Freedom will get a new name. And most people, in and outside the military, will stop calling it a war.

For the youngest troops who were in the first grade when a passenger jet struck the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, that will be an extraordinary change.

About 42,700 troops remain in Afghanistan; about 30,000 of them are soldiers, according to information provided by the Defense Department. That number is expected to drop to 34,000 by February.

Karzai so far has refused to sign an agreement outlining a 10-year extension for U.S. troops to stay in Afghanistan, even though a deal seemed to be finalized in November after the thorny issue of legal immunity for U.S. troops was resolved and a conference of Afghan tribal leaders approved the draft agreement.

Senior U.S. officials have said the agreement must be signed soon to allow for the U.S. and NATO to properly plan for the post-2014 force.

The Army continues to train and prepare soldiers for potential deployments amid the uncertainty. The Pentagon on Dec. 13 announced upcoming deployments for about 8,300 soldiers from four brigades and a division headquarters.

They will deploy this spring and summer.

2A shrinking force. There's no doubt that the U.S. military will get smaller in 2014. The question is by how much - and with how much pain. The Army and Marine Corps already have plans to reduce force levels and are likely to request permission from Congress to cut even more rapidly than initially planned.

The Air Force recently unveiled plans to cut the force to its lowest level ever. The Navy may follow suit if the budget outlook does not improve.

For individual troops, that will mean the growing fear of enlisted retention boards, in some cases even for E-9s. Involuntary separations will cause anxiety throughout the ranks.

Both officers and enlisted at the 15-year mark may have retirement options.

And for those who stay, promotion boards will be tougher than ever as part of the force reduction plans will inevitably involve "attrition" - i.e. not promoting people and letting them separate voluntarily or politely shown to the gate with an up-or-out cap.

And commanders likely will crack down on low-level misconduct, simply because they can. Those who are fortunate enough to make rank and stay in uniform probably will end up doing more with less.

Keep your ear to the ground in February when the Pentagon sends its annual budget request to Congress. That's when the real extent of the problem is likely to be revealed.

3BAH rollbacks? Personnel programs are in the cross-hairs as Pentagon leadership adjusts to the long-term reality of the budget cuts known as sequestration. And none is centered more than the Basic Allowance for Housing. The bean counters have their eyes on that \$20 billion annual budget that helps about 1 million troops pay their monthly rent. It's not part of "basic compensation," but for many troops, BAH helps pay a big portion of the monthly bills.

Troops could see a return to the 1990s rules, when BAH was intended to cover only about 80 percent of average rental housing costs, with troops expected to cough up the rest out of pocket. Or the entire system might be simplified, scaled back and given a new name. One reason it's a target is that the Defense Department may not need congressional approval to make such changes (unlike many other big-ticket personnel programs). Details likely will come in February when the Defense Department unveils its annual budget plans.

4In-state tuition. Lawmakers in the House and Senate worked on bills to push colleges and universities to automatically offer in-state tuition to all veterans, regardless of whether they are state residents, but they were unable to pass them into law in 2013. The effort will continue in 2014, and it could make a big difference in how much vets have to pay for school and where they can go.

The Post-9/11 GI Bill covers the full cost of in-state tuition at public schools. But any extra costs associated with out-of-state tuition are not covered, which sometimes forces vets to pay the difference themselves. And that's not a small amount: In the 2012-13 school year, in-state tuition averaged \$8,655 while out-of-state tuition averaged \$21,706, according to the College Board.

Bills in Congress aim to address the problem, which is common for service members often forced to relocate by Uncle Sam, by requiring public colleges and universities to either offer state residency waivers to veterans or lose all eligibility to accept the Post-9/11 GI Bill. This would likely mean that vets 100-percent eligible for the GI Bill could attend more schools with no out-of-pocket costs. Yet it would also likely shrink the number of schools at which vets can use their Post-9/11 benefit.

5New PT test in the works. The gender-neutral physical standards established for combat specialties will provide the backbone of a new PT test in the works.

Fitness officials at Fort Jackson, S.C., are developing a test comprised of three or four common tasks that will be used across the Army. Soldiers in combat specialties will have to do the MOS-specific tasks to certify them for inclusion in that field.

While a new test is not likely in 2014, soldiers can expect to see a lot of details as the test is developed. A version will be used at recruiting stations to let candidates know if they have what it takes to be in combat arms. Cognitive tests will eventually be added to pre-qualify recruits.

6Army drawdown. The Army will continue paring down the active-duty force in 2014 as it seeks to reach an end-strength of 490,000 in two years.

The drawdown of 80,000 soldiers was supposed to be spread across four years, through fiscal year 2017, but the cuts were accelerated to help the Army prepare for any additional manpower reductions generated by the ongoing budget crisis.

As of Nov. 30, the Army's end-strength was 528,000, down from a war-time high of about 570,000.

This means the Army has to reduce the active force by about 38,000 soldiers by Sept. 30, 2015, and these reductions will happen in tandem with one of the Army's largest force structure reorganizations since World War II.

At least 10 brigade combat teams will be inactivated over the next two years.

In addition, most of the remaining armored and infantry BCTs will each receive a third maneuver battalion and enhanced engineer and fires capabilities.

In 2014, the Army will use a number of involuntary separation tools, including Officer Separation Boards, Enhanced Selective Early Retirement Boards and the Qualitative Service Program for senior noncommissioned officers.

As early as this spring, about 19,000 captains and majors will face the OSB and E-SERB. Army officials said up to 2,000 officers will be selected for separation.

This is the first time since the 1970s that the Army will convene reduction-in-force boards for captains and majors in over-strength year groups. What has yet to be determined is what might happen once the Army reaches its goal of 490,000.

Further cuts of up to 70,000 more soldiers could take place between 2018 and 2023, although Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno has testified on Capitol Hill that the Army's active-duty end-strength should not drop below 420,000.

7Retirees back into Prime. As many as 171,000 retirees and their family members booted from Tricare Prime in October will be invited to rejoin the plan.

They were pushed out of Tricare Prime when the Defense Department decided to strictly enforce Prime Service Areas as within 40 miles of a current military medical facility or within 40 miles of a closed facility on a base that had shut down under base realignment and closure. Prime had a wide reach for much of the past decade defense officials believed it was more economical. The savings did not materialize and the Pentagon turned to this new plan, which has been in the works for several years.

Those retirees and families on Oct. 1 had to switch to Tricare Standard, which has higher out-of-pocket costs. That sparked outrage within the retiree community and its advocates in Washington. Lawmakers listened, and gave the group the the chance to opt back in under a provision of the recently passed 2014 National Defense Authorization Act.

When and how they will be able to do this, however, remains to be seen. Pentagon officials have said they must follow procedural rules and study the issue, publish federal notices and solicit comment from the public before it can act.

8Regional alignment. The Army will continue to align its forces with the geographic combatant commands around the world in 2014, a senior Army planner told Army Times.

"What we can expect in 2014 is continued success," said the planner, who spoke on background. "What we have now are bona fide data points that show us it is working."

The 1st Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team was the first Army brigade to be aligned, and the soldiers' work with U.S. Africa Command over the past year - including military-to-military engagements, multinational exercises and advise-and-assist missions - has had a "huge" impact, the senior planner said.

"About 3,500 men and women have had an impact in 50 different states, essentially," he said. The 2nd BCT will complete its regional alignment in the February and March timeframe, handing over the mission to the 1st Infantry Division's 4th BCT.

However, the staffs for both brigades are working together to ensure continuity, the senior planner said.

"If we're building partner capacity and relationships, we want to make sure we have continuity," he said. "The planners in the unit that will replace [2nd BCT] have been working with them since September."

The Army also is extending the 1st Armored Division's engagement in Jordan, the senior planner said. The division is regionally aligned with U.S. Central Command.

"It's working very well and the numbers aren't very large so we've decided to extend them there another year," he said.

Up to 200 soldiers from the division at Fort Bliss, Texas, began deploying to Jordan in April to assist efforts to contain violence along the Syrian border.

The soldiers, most of them planners and specialists in intelligence and logistics who rotate in and out throughout the year, were to partner with the Jordanian armed forces and the U.S. embassy to conduct humanitarian assistance, stability operations and training with their Jordanian partners.

"Today, the whole U.S. Army is aligned," the senior Army planner said. "Corps and divisions are aligned, and in some cases the multi-functional brigades that go with them."

As units come home from Afghanistan, they also will be aligned to a combatant command, he said.

Generally, units on the West Coast of the United States - including I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii and Alaska - are aligned with U.S. Pacific Command, he said.

Many units in the "central sector" of the country, including III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas, are aligned with CENTCOM, while 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division is aligned with U.S. European Command.

In addition, the 82nd Airborne Division, at Fort Bragg, N.C., serves as the global response force. The Fort Bragg-based XVIII Airborne Corps also has been designated as a global response force, but the corps headquarters is preparing to deploy to Afghanistan in 2014.

Other major units aligned are the 1st Infantry Division with AFRICOM and the Georgia National Guard's 48th BCT with U.S. Southern Command.

In the near term, regionally aligned brigades are expected to rotate annually, while corps and division headquarters will not, officials have said. One factor that could affect that is the demand in Afghanistan, which remains the Army's top priority, officials said.

In 2014, the Army will continue to look for more opportunities for regional alignment, the senior planner said.

9Electronic warfare. The Army is poised in 2014 to develop software that would help manage the jamming of enemy communications, remote-detonated IEDs and radar systems while protecting U.S. and allied signals.

A \$97.9 million contract for the software, an Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, has been the center of two protests. Army acquisitions officials expect to begin development in the spring, following a delay of six to nine months.

For Army electronic warfare officers and spectrum managers, the EWPMT will be like a field artilleryman's fire support command and control software. Support a brigade's intelligence, operations and signals, electronic warfare officers and spectrum managers would use the software to plan, manage and ensure unit electronic warfare activities do not conflict.

"We have to make sure we're not stepping on our blue force comms, especially as we introduce offensive alongside defensive jammers in the inventory," electronic warfare program manager Mike Ryan said.

Electronic Warfare Project Manager Col. Joe Dupont says if, for instance, a brigade wanted to jam an enemy's command and control signal, it would have to understand what other frequencies are being used, and how they might be effected. That's where EWPMT comes in to analyze enemy and friendly signals to present options to commanders.

The acquisition office plans to roll out three groups of capabilities over the next several years, after which the software will serve as a hub for several of the service's electronic warfare technologies, including its jamming and signal collection gear for vehicles, soldiers, forward operating bases - and eventually airborne systems.

The requirement for the software was approved last spring, and the acquisition office awarded a contract first to the mid-sized Sotera Solutions Inc. However, Raytheon protested the award and won the contract away on Dec. 2. Since then, Sotera has lodged its own protest, temporary halting work on the program.

"We will award to somebody this spring and we'll start," Ryan said.

10Subterranean training. Expect training for underground spaces such as tunnels, sewers, caves and subterranean bunkers and facilities as the world's population becomes increasingly urban, and combat ops become more complex and nonconventional.

The effort is led by the Asymmetric Warfare Group, out of Fort Meade, Md. AWG soldiers have put units through subterranean operations in the past year as the unit tries to build doctrine to push out to the force. Unlike jungle and urban operations, doctrine for subterranean operations does not yet exist.

"AWG has conducted a series of tactical level exercises to illuminate the operational challenges and capture best tactics, techniques and procedures," said Lt. Col. Michael Richardson, the Concepts and Integration Squadron Commander at AWG.

"We want to identify the challenges that our soldiers will face, so that they are prepared to fight in complex environments instead of having to adapt while under fire," said Capt. Justin Carlton, a troop commander at AWG.

Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, have been training in underground operations as AWG works on developing the TTPs and an Army Techniques Publication. Soon soldiers attending the Combat Training Centers could also be training in underground scenarios.

"Collaboration with the Combat Training Centers is underway to look at integrations of complex environments into future scenarios as the Army maintains its focus on strategic land power," said Command Sgt. Maj. Cory Ackley, the Concepts and Integration Squadron command sergeant major at AWG.

But soldiers don't need to travel to the CTCs to do the training. They can do it at their home stations, a concept the Army is focused on with the budget cuts and drawdown.

"The Army is reenergizing home station training and its capabilities as the foundation for readiness," Ackley said. He said existing infrastructure can be repurposed or adapted for subterranean training, saving the Army money.

"To train and prepare for subterranean operations, units need to train in dark confined spaces. This can be done by blacking out existing training facilities and employing obstacles to simulate underground facilities, "said Master Sgt. Bill Tomlin III, an operational adviser and troop sergeant major at AWG. "You can employ drainage ditches, connexes (shipping containers), or (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) sites to meet your training objective."

11GCV will likely be canceled. Though long-touted as a "must have" for the future Army, the Ground Combat Vehicle may be nearing the end of the road.

The Army, driven by the findings of its Unified Quest exercises, plans to shrink squads and brigades. Having smaller squads could be a kill shot for GCV. The Army has long argued for the vehicle because it can carry an entire squad. The Bradley carries seven soldiers. Nine soldiers comprise the current Army squad.

Squads aren't the only things being cut. Funding also is taking a big hit, and the Army will spend more than 80 percent of its combat vehicle modernization budget on GCV over the next five years. The program comes in at least \$29 billion without overruns, setbacks and other problems these programs tend to face. Some estimates place the cost as high as \$34 billion.

An April 17 Congressional Research Service report raised significant questions about the cost and need for the next-generation combat troop carrier. This comes on the heels of an April 2013 Congressional Budget Office analysis that recommended the Army replace the \$29 billion program with more Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles or foreign vehicles.

GCV's size is becoming a hot topic, as well. BAE Systems' GCV tips the scales at a whopping 70 tons, for example. This matches the enhanced M1A2 tank, making it the world's heaviest infantry fighting vehicle. Much of its weight comes from multiple armor packages that rest on a steel core hull to provide maximum protection. But Army leadership said in November it wants to use emerging (undeveloped) technologies to ensure the heaviest vehicles come in at 30 tons. That is the optimal size for sustainment and operations in the heavily urbanized environments that lay ahead, officials said.

12New warfighting function. The Army in 2014 will add a seventh warfighting function that focuses on the **human domain.** 

A warfighting function is a collection of tasks and systems with a common purpose. By establishing it as a warfighting function means the Army will take a tactical approach to the **human domain** - all matters pertaining to the socio-economic, partner-building, cognitive, and cultural aspects of operations. This will combine decades of lessons learned from the **special forces** and conventional warfighters' points of view.

The human and cyber domains of war will be merged. Expect doctrine to address such concepts as engagement and influence.

13Tuition Assistance. Soldiers of the active and reserve components will be limited to 16 semester hours of Army-funded college studies annually under several changes to the Tuition Assistance program that take effect Jan. 1.

Based on 2013 participation rates, the new rules will apply to nearly 160,000 officers and enlisted soldiers of the Regular Army, National Guard and Army Reserve who pursue college-level studies with TA support.

In another major change, soldiers will not be allowed to use TA until one year after they complete initial entry training, whether that is officer candidate school, an officer basic course or advanced individual training. Also, soldiers will not be allowed to use TA for post-bachelor's degrees until they have completed at least 10 years of service, unless they entered the Army with a bachelor's degree. Soldiers in the latter category will be allowed to begin graduate studies one year after completion of initial entry training.

Recommendations coming out of an extensive review of the TA program also have resulted in the stricter enforcement of a long-standing rule that requires soldier/students to be in compliance with physical fitness and weight control standards, and not be under a flag for adverse personnel action, to qualify for Armyfunded studies.

During 2013, soldiers completed 413,000 TA-funded courses at a cost of \$335 million. More than 8,500 soldiers were awarded degrees as a result of those studies.

The TA program will continue to be funded up to \$4,500 annually per soldier, with a payment cap of \$250 per semester hour. As under existing policy, TA can be used to pay for up to 130 semester hours of study toward a bachelor's degree, and 39 hours for a master's degree.

14New pistol. The new carbine may be shot down, but a new pistol is not.

Testing and evaluation of a variety of pistols should begin early in 2014 as the service looks to replace the M9. The goal is to replace all 239,000 M9s and the concealable M11s with a better pistol at a better price.

Expect a pistol that provides greater lethality and an increase in permanent wound channel, the ability to suppress, grip modularity, integrated rail and night-sight capabilities and a service life of at least 25,000 rounds. The M9 is only required to fire 5,000 rounds. Beretta data shows the average reliability of all M9s to be 17,500 rounds.

Army officials also have taken aim at the M9's slide-mounted safety and open-slide design, which allow contaminants and dirt into the system.

15Putting eyes on the enemy. Intelligence gear that operates at the "speed of change" will be the primary focus in 2014. Priorities include getting the network into standard units, more interoperable and user-friendly mission command, mobile and survivable command posts and hands-free heads-up displays.

Service leaders also are seeking a "leap-ahead investment" in cyber, energetics, laser weapons, RF weapons and power. These will better allow for the self-sufficiency needed to overcome the logistics burden and operate in swift fashion.

Investment is needed to retain advantage in computing, night vision and UAVs. Adversaries are already overtaking advantages in active protection, cannon and rocket artillery, chemical weapons, C3/deception, SRB missiles and shaped charges. Army leaders say soldiers will be in a fair fight by 2025 if these changes are not made.

16Regional career assignments. Top Army leaders are giving this serious consideration.

Intelligence leaders pressed Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno to let their soldiers stay in the region of their expertise, much like the **Special Forces**. Gen. Robert Cone, head of Training and Doctrine Command, has voiced strong support, as well.

Training in 2014 will be saturated with language, regional expertise and culture training. Soldiers also will spend a lot of time training allied armies to do things they are now unable to do. There will be a lot of joint and partner-building exercises to increase U.S. influence and enhance the nation's ability to gain access if required.

Therefore, expect a lot of talk and tests that looks at keeping regional expertise in the region. Since there already is a healthy dialogue between trainers and personnel officials, don't be surprised to see some trial runs that keep soldiers on post, or at least in the region, when it comes time for a career-enhancing assignment such as a tour at a major headquarters.

17First women entering combat MOSs. The first combat fields - combat engineers and artillery - will open to women in 2014.

The Army has determined gender-neutral physical standards for combat specialties and scientists are now validating that data.

Don't expect women to enter every company or brigade. Since the number of females desiring to join combat arms will be limited, officials will assemble them in yet-unidentified units.

Combat engineers will be the first to see women in the ranks. The field needs little integration as it has a large population of female officers and NCOs. All MOSs from 12C through 12W are open to women, and many have similar tasks and capabilities as combat engineers. Combat engineers already conduct integrated training with female engineers.

The Army will also tackle field artillery, which has women but fewer than among engineers. Field artillery has a cadre to help minimize the cultural impact when women become cannon crewmembers.

From there, the Army will set standards for armor and infantry, which should open by the end of 2015 or early 2016.

18New grooming standards. These have been in the works for well over a year, and there is a good chance a decision will come in 2014.

Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno said tattoos caused the pause. The original plan would not allow tattoos to extend below the wrist line and or be visible on the hands. Sleeve tattoos would be prohibited. Vulgarities were especially taboo. But Odierno said officials want to make sure the new policy meets professional expectations while taking social realities into account.

The potential changes are part of a comprehensive review of Army Regulation 670-1 led by Sergeant Major of the Army Raymond Chandler and his board of directors, which is composed of key command sergeants major. The proposals are sitting on the desk of Army Secretary John McHugh, where they have sat for a couple of months.

Other changes could address everything from civilian attire and hairdos to restrictions on cosmetics, visible body piercings and dental ornamentation, but tattoos restrictions have been the hot button. Chandler's plan was to forbid ink above the neck line when the physical fitness uniform is worn.

19New weapons and vehicles. Look for unmanned ground vehicle technology to roll into the ranks as the Army moves forward with its Route Clearance Interrogation System. This calls for a remote-controlled High Mobility Engineering Excavator to interrogate, classify and excavate buried explosives. The RG 31 would be under semi-autonomous control as it detects and neutralizes explosive hazards and trigger mechanisms.

Sixty-six Joint Light Tactical Vehicle prototypes produced by three companies will spend the entire year in rigorous testing and evaluations. An initial order for nearly 55,000 vehicles will go to the winner. Long-term plans include the first Army units receiving JLTVs by fiscal year 2018 and all 49,000 JLTVs delivered to the Army by sometime in the 2030 decade.

Special operators will be rolling in the new Ground Mobility Vehicle. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems in August won a \$562 million contract to build 1,297 Ground Mobility Vehicles. All will be delivered by 2020.

The XM25 Punisher is back on track. The Army in November spent \$255 million on new M2A1 Quick Change Barrel Kits. The Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar, whose funds were cut by half last year, is budgeted for \$83 million in the 2014 NDAA. That is a more than a 200-percent increase. And the M240L light medium-machine gun is moving ahead smartly.

The Bradley fighting vehicle will get \$158 million for modifications while the M88A2 improved recovery vehicle program will get \$186million, a 68 percent increase over the Army request. Modifications to Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles are funded at \$563 million.

20Officer evaluation report. The Army is preparing to launch an extensive training program that will prepare the officer corps for a new evaluation reporting system that goes live for the active and reserve components on April 1.

The new OER system had been planned to start Dec. 1, but has been delayed to accommodate changes to the rating form for colonels, and to introduce a new support form that will become mandatory for colonels and below next spring.

A major feature of the new system is separate reports, four in all, for company-grade commissioned and warrant officers, field-grade officers in the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel and chief warrant officer 3 through 5, and strategic leaders in the ranks of colonel and brigadier general.

The evaluation report for colonels will have four senior rater boxes, with two of those boxes being control boxes.

The top box (multi-star potential) will have a senior rater ceiling of 24 percent, and the second box (promote to brigadier general) a range of 25 percent to 49 percent. Senior raters must limit checks in the top two boxes to no more than 49 percent of the colonels they have rated, much like the inflation-dampening technique used on the current OER.

The senior rater portion of the colonel form is designed to identify the future general officers of the Army, according to George Piccirilli, chief of the evaluations, selections and promotions division of the Human Resources Command.

The new support form will be used for the mandatory counseling of colonels and below regarding performance objectives for the rating period.

The form (DA Form 67-10-1A) becomes mandatory April 1, but has been fielded online to familiarize the officer corps with the five-page document so it can be used for OER training that begins in January. To download the form, access https://

www.hrc.army.mil/site/assets/pdf/final draft support form

da\_form\_67-10\_1a.pdf.

21NCO evaluation report. The design of a new evaluation reporting system for noncommissioned officers remains a work in progress, but will likely include several innovations that are sharply different from the current rating system, according to Sergeant Major of the Army Raymond Chandler.

Personnel officials expect that design work on the system will continue in 2014, so that new NCOER forms can be launched in 2015, about one year later than the new officer system which launches in April.

Tentative design changes include three separate reports, based on rank and operating environment, according to Chandler.

Tactical: There will be one report for sergeants and staff sergeants that will be used to evaluate a soldier's ability to do his or her job and meet Army standards for performance.

Organizational: A second grade-plate under the new system will be used to evaluate sergeants first class and master sergeants, which are soldiers who typically serve as leaders at the organizational level.

Strategic: A third grade-plate that will be limited to sergeants major.

Similar to the enumeration features of the new officer evaluation system, the new NCOER may include changes that will limit the number of people who can be given top-box ratings by the senior raters at the strategic, and possibly the organizational, level.

22NCO promotion forecast. Promotion totals for sergeant through sergeant major are expected to remain relatively steady in 2014, despite a planned reduction that will see the Army's active-duty rolls reduced by at least 24,000 soldiers over the next 12 months.

Pentagon personnel officials expect there will be 44,258 promotions to sergeant, staff sergeant, sergeant first class, master sergeant and sergeant major in 2014, a reduction of 240 from the NCO promotion total for fiscal 2014.

The annual promotion forecast developed by the Office of the Army G-1 (Human Resources), calls for 655 advancements to sergeant major, an increase of 121 over last year; 2,291 to master sergeant, an increase of 96, and 6,320 to sergeant first class, an increase of 494.

Promotions to staff sergeant will total 11,480, a decrease of 707 from 2013, while advancements to sergeant will total 23,512, which is 244 fewer promotions than last year.

The forecast could be revised if retirement and separation projections change.

23Schools and promotions. A new NCO leader development strategy that tightens the linkage between promotions and military education will be implemented in phases, beginning in January.

The upcoming changes link, for promotion purposes, the completion of Structured Self-Development and professional military education courses.

Soldiers must complete an appropriate level of Structured Self-Development to be considered for promotion to sergeant, sergeant first class and master sergeant, under a directive issued by Army Secretary John McHugh.

The SSD program consists of three online courses of 80 hours each that serve as a bridge between the resident courses of the NCO Education System.

As an interim step toward the Jan. 1 changes, SSD-1, SSD-3 and SSD-4 became requirements for attendance at the Warrior Leader Course, Senior Leader Course and the Sergeants Major Course this past year.

Under the Jan. 1 changes:

Specialists and corporals of the Regular Army and Army Reserve must complete SSD-1 to be recommended for promotion to sergeant.

Specialists and corporals of the Army National Guard must complete SSD-1 to be eligible for promotion against a valid promotion vacancy.

Staff sergeants must complete SSD-3 to be eligible for promotion to sergeant first class.

Sergeants first class must complete SSD-4 to be eligible for promotion to master sergeant.

The common core phase of the Advanced Leaders Course continues to serve as a bridge between SSD-1 and SSD-3, but is not a promotion requirement.

Because the SSD courses are delivered online, the lack of funding for temporary duty assignments, such as school attendance, "should not prevent the new policies going forward on Jan. 1," said a Pentagon source.

Soldiers who could not attend a resident NCO Education Course because of the government shutdown in October, and who do not have the required NCO education credit to be considered for promotion, should request an exception to policy, according to personnel officials.

24NCO leader development. In addition to tightening the linkage between promotions and military education, Army leaders have approved changes to the NCO career map that feature new methods for selecting and preparing soldiers for promotion.

The new leader development strategy is scheduled to be fully implemented by September 2015.

The new strategy supports a 32-year career timeline that will see soldiers, on average, advance to sergeant at 4.6 years of service, staff sergeant at eight years, sergeant first class at 14 years, master sergeant at 20 years and sergeant major at 25 to 26 years.

The career template is designed so that soldiers who elect to voluntarily retire at 20 years of service will do so as sergeants first class. Soldiers who remain, and who are promoted to sergeant major, will have an opportunity to serve at least one tour as a battalion command sergeant major before retiring at 32 years of service.

During a full career, soldiers should expect to spend 12 to 18 months in the school house or attending specialty-specific training courses, about 16 years in home-station assignments, 10 years deployed and five years in joint or broadening assignments.

The career track stretches out the average times between promotions in the senior NCO ranks from 12.6 to 14 years for sergeant first class, 17.7 to 20 years for master sergeant and 22.6 to 25 to 26 years for sergeant major.

The increases are designed to provide additional time for the leader development activities needed to prepare soldiers for duty at the next higher grade, particularly in the senior NCO grades.

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#### **Army Times**

November 4, 2013 Monday

Training: 'Not to full capability'

SECTION: A; Pg. 15

LENGTH: 511 words

Units scheduled for deployment will see training that focuses heavily on the human nature of conflict and leader development. Significant investment in human sciences can also be expected, as sergeants today do what a **Special Forces** sergeant first class with 10 years of experience would have done a decade ago.

The goal is to go from Army of execution to an Army of preparation, said Gen. Robert Cone, commander of Army Training and Doctrine Command. This will center greatly on the physical and virtual training within the regional alignment model.

"The last place we want to meet and work these things out is the battlefield," he said.

That means a lot of language and culture training for troops, especially those preparing to deploy within the regional alignment model. Training in the human dimension will be a cornerstone of combat training centers, and will be prevalent in home station and institutional training. Troops can expect complex counterinsurgency training with some level of combined-arms maneuver and stability operations. There also will be an increase in over-the-shoulder interaction between soldiers and troops on the ground.

But that is dependent on the budget.

Lt. Gen. Perry Wiggins, commander of Army North (Fifth Army), said he is concerned the fiscal crunch could jeopardize the annual vibrant response exercises, which include his command, federal and local authorities.

"That trust is built on exercising and interaction," he said. "When you start reducing the budgets ... my big thing is the impact to those exercises, which enable me to work with my interagency partners."

"When we take as much money out of the budget as we've been doing, you know there's going to be impacts," said Lt. Gen. William Ingram, director of the Army National Guard. "It's hard to absorb. It takes longer to figure out what the impacts really are."

Gen. Daniel B. Allyn, commander of Army Forces Command, said he's concerned over readiness.

"The vision for regional alignment would have us train every unit to decisive action capability," he said. "That may not be possible in our current fiscal environment, so we'd train them to their assigned mission and not to full capability. We may have to take that approach with our regionally aligned forces in the near term."

Decisive action operations include offense, defense, mission command, sustainment and other core tasks, and these rotations prepare brigade combat teams for the full range of operations.

Soldiers from 2nd BCT, 1st Infantry Division, the first BCT to be regionally aligned, underwent a decisive action rotation before they were aligned with Africa Command, Allyn said. That training enabled the brigade to take on a contingency response force mission.

Boots on the ground also will be trained to understand culture and the value of local terrain.

Odierno said human factors are not well represented in current doctrine, and this effort should have started a couple of years ago.

"We went to war without understanding **human domain** or dimension," Odierno said. "I don't want to make that mistake again."

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# Political Transcript Wire

October 23, 2013 Wednesday

# ARMY FORCES COMMAND GEN. DANIEL ALLYN PARTICIPATES IN A DISCUSSION ON REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2013 ANNUAL MEETING AND EXPOSITION

LENGTH: 16416 words

ARMY FORCES COMMAND GEN. DANIEL ALLYN, PARTICIPATES IN A DISCUSSION ON REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2013 ANNUAL MEETING AND EXPOSITION

OCTOBER 22, 2013

SPEAKERS: ARMY FORCES COMMAND GEN. DANIEL ALLYN

LTG JAMES HUGGINS, JR., DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7, UNITED STATES ARMY

LTG JEFFREY TALLEY, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

MG PATRICK DONAHUE II, COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY AFRICA/SOUTHERN EUROPEAN TASK FORCE

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[\*] ALLYN: All right, before I turn it over to the moderator, I'll ask, if anybody is sitting in the back fighting for seat there's a lot of seats up here towards the front and I don't think there's a chaperon on the front row with an open (ph) plate so you're probably going to sit down in front. But we were kind of visually impaired up there. It sort of feels that we're about to go under an interrogation with those spotlights coming at us. So we may have difficulty seeing some of the folks in rears, so the far that you sit forward, the easier for us. Not that you should worry about us but we appreciate it. And Steve, to you.

SMITH: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning and welcome to today's Institute of Land Warfare panel discussion on Regionally Aligned Forces. My name is Colonel Steve Smith and I will serve as your moderator for this morning's event. Before introducing our panel, I'd like to provide some administrative remarks. First from our public affairs office and it's written in (inaudible) prints so please excuse me. Army Public Affairs, are seeking audience feedback on this panel/forum. If you received a feedback -- if you received a feedback form when you came in, or if there's one on your seat, please take a few minutes to complete it.

And formal provide valuable feedback, it will help the army gauge communication of key messages and will assist your army in planning future army panels and forums for a USA events. At the end of the panel, please return the form in either by placing it in the designated box near the exit of the room or hand it off to one of the Public Affairs representatives.

Army Public Affairs representatives, please identify yourself by raising your hands. There they are on the back of the room. Ladies and gentlemen, located at your seats is a short trifled on the army's Regionally

Aligned Forces concept. It is provided as a take away and one which off service a good primer for today's event.

To follow my introductions, General Allyn will present a short Regionally Aligned Forces overview to set the stage for follow on questions and answer. Immediately following his remarks we'll open the floor up to your questions. In the isles are four standing microphones. Once the floor is opened, I'd ask you to please move forward with your questions and we'll alternate between the microphones in order to get to all of you.

If you do have a question but unable to move to a microphone, please raise your hand and one of the General Allyn's crack team will move to your seat and/or pass the microphone to your seats so you can ask right from that location. We'll also be filling questions from a virtual audience facilitated by our public affairs officer.

Now, for introductions of our panel members (inaudible), please. Our panel members represent a significant breadth and depths of operational and institutional experience across both the United States Army and the French Army. At this time, it's my pleasure to introduce today's starting line up.

Leading this morning's panel, General Daniel, Commanding General of United States Army Forces Command. General Allyn's operational experience includes almost every major U.S. combat operation from Grenada through operations in Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom as well as experience during the U.S. humanitarian assistance and to that's after (ph) relief response to the earthquake in Haiti. And most recently as Commanding General of First Calvary division and CJTF 1 in regional command East Afghanistan.

Lieutenant General Huggins, the army deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, T357. Similarly, Lieutenant General Huggins has multiple combat towards at every level, most recently serving as the commanding general of the 82nd Airborne Division in CJTF82 in regional command South Afghanistan.

Providing insights from the perspective of the United States Army Reserve is Lieutenant General Jeff Talley, the chief of U.S Army Reserve and the commanding general U.S Army Reserve Command. Lieutenant General Talley's operational experience includes command of the 926th Engineer Brigade, Multinational Division Baghdad, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

We're also most fortunate today to have Major General Oliver Tramond, commander of the French Army's forces employment Doctrine Center, the equivalent to the U.S. Armies combined on center of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. An airborne marine (inaudible) Major General Promotable Tramond's operational experience includes service in the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and the Pacific.

Providing an army services component commanders perspective and region experience is Major General Pat Donahue, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Africa and the Southern European Task Force. Among other deployments, Major General Donohue previously served as a deputy commanding general third infantry division during the operation in Iraqi Freedoms transition to operation (inaudible). Major General Patrick Murphy, the Adjutant General of the New York National Guard to provide the Army National Guard perspective and bringing substantial personal joint and interagency experience. Most recently, Major General Murphy led the New York National Guard's response during the super storm Sandy relief efforts in October of last year.

Bringing the special operation forces perspective is the commanding General of the United States Army, **Special Forces** Command, Major general Chris Hoess (ph). Major General Hoess (ph) has extensive experience in both operations Iraqi freedom and Enduring Freedom, including command of the Combined Joint Special Operation Task Force Afghanistan and **special forces** group, and subsequently command of the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command Afghanistan.

Finally, making the trip down form Carlyle, Mr. Nathan Freier, a 20 year army veteran and associate professor of national security studies with the Strategic Studies Institute who has contributed to multiple strategic planning efforts including the 2005 National Defense Strategy and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

At this time, it is my pleasure to introduce today's panel lead, ladies and gentlemen, General Daniel.

ALLYN: OK. Good morning and it's great to have all of you here with us. And I'm sure that this is going to be a rich opportunity for us to have a dialogue about Regionally Aligned Forces and their impact on national security and our army's efforts to ensure that we worked this in concert with our unified action partners.

And we also thank our distinguished panel members for participating in today's panel, unconfident they are more than ready to answer the hard questions in particular. Each brings a unique perspective on Regionally Aligned Forces and I believe will help provide greater depth and context to our Regionally Aligned Force Employment and I'm sure we'll be able to address the majority of your questions on this topic.

Before we begin, let me take just a few minutes to lay the foundation for our dialogue with just a couple of slides. At your seat as was mentioned you do have a Regionally Aligned Force trifled and I'm not going to insult your intelligence, I know you know how to read but I also know the print on that is very small because I had to read it previously, so I'll try to hit some of the high points upfront. So let's get started.

We go to the next chart. To begin, let's first define what we mean by Regionally Aligned Forces. And quite simply, Regionally Aligned Forces is the army's vision to ensure we provide combatant commanders with tailored responsive and consistently available forces in support of their needs. Eventually aligning our forces to the combatant commanders creates clear advantages for the combatant commanders as well as for our soldiers and our units. Some of which are highlighted on the slide. Regionally Aligned Forces is not limited to the active component. It is a comprehensive approach that includes our active, our guard, and our army reserved or what we refer to as the army total force. It is also not limited to our brigade combat teams. So that tends to be a focus area as we discuss our approach in Regionally Aligned Forces.

It includes the full array of army capabilities and they are tailored to meet the specific requirements that the combatant commanders identified. And it isn't -- it's facilitated by our army service component commanders, and Pat Donahue will be able to talk to you in great detail about some of the fidelity and the agility of the efforts that we've demonstrated this past year with the 201 armor brigade combat team.

To this alignment, our army soldiers will be better prepared and postured to support combatant commander requirements whether they'd be peer security cooperation, emerging operational requirements or a set of mission across the full range in military operations. We can and will have forces prepared to meet whatever those requirements are.

## Next chart.

Now given our army's current operational (inaudible) particularly with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, we will not fully implement Regionally Aligned Forces in accordance with the (inaudible) vision until more forces become available.

Nonetheless, looking forward just as the end of operations in Iraq provided the opportunity to initiate our Regionally Aligned Force concept, the ongoing draw down of forces in Afghanistan and the ultimate transition of full security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces will increase the availability of army forces for the Regionally Aligned Force Employment.

Aligning our (inaudible) United States based formations with each of the nations six geographic combatant commands best enables us to respond to varying degrees of both formal need and emerging requirements as we go forward in this uncertain environment.

This in turn contributes to a predictable efficient way of preparing our forces, preparing our soldiers and preparing our units to meet the needs of combatant commanders. And as we tailor our army to meet new fiscal realities, we are mindful of the complex global threats that are out there and we will seize the opportunity to adjust our existing approaches both on how we prepare our forces and how those forces are employed in support the combatant commanders needs leveraging all of our capacity across the total army in all of our turning locations.

Regionally Aligned Force specific training will provide critical experience and expertise amongst our leaders and soldiers in our formation to complement the work of our regional experts from our special operations forces in our foreign area officer experts.

Next slide. Now, why is it important to the nation? I think for most of us is relatively intuitive, but let me just hit a couple of the eye points. Because our business, the army business occurs between and among people.

what has been referred to as the **human domain** and the words that define or prevent, shape, win strategy reflect deliberate actions, preventing and shaping conflict requires engagement. Routine, deliberate interaction between us, our allies, those on the fence, and yes even potential adversaries.

Leveraging our many partners and our assister services the interagency, the multinational community and the many non-governmental agencies operating everyday around the globe is a critical and integral component of our Regionally Aligned Force Approach.

Our regional alignment activities will compliment not compete nor supplant the unique capabilities that each of our partners brings to this effort and to stability in the regions. Doing so will optimize available resources and capacity enabling what we believe will be better outcomes for the nation. And if necessary regional familiarity among our soldiers and our units, better postures than to fight and win decisively wherever and whenever the nation may direct.

# Next chart.

So where we are? We're moving forward and have been globally and regionally aligning available army course, army divisions, selected brigade combat teams, and enable our capabilities from across each of our components and support of each of the geographic combatant commanders.

Our soldiers, our leaders and our formations are routinely participating in training and exercises and (inaudible) security cooperation activities around the globe. A couple of recent highlights in Pacific Command, first quarter (ph) recently completely participation this summer and (inaudible) to 2013, biennial training exercise focused on combined United States and Australian operations. This exercise resulted in first quarter (ph) certification as a combined force land component command to support US Pacific Commander which covers nearly half the globe and includes 36 nations.

In Africa is, you know, Pat Donahue will be prepared to talk about in some detail, second armor brigade combat team, the first infantry division recently completed participation and exercise shared to coordinate 2013, another biennial training exercise to strengthen relationship and cohesion between the United States and South African militaries.

This exercise also brought to bear the 82nd Airborne divisions, second brigade combat team, elements to the 10th **special forces** group, elements of the Washington DC and New York National Guard units, and soldiers from the third infantry division. A tremendous illustration of the army total force supporting the needs of our geographic combatant commanders.

And next slide. And I promise this is the last one unless we don't get the questions we need in which case I'm told that Steve Smith has 200 more data field slide ready for you. Regionally Aligned Force is our army's vision to enable the army total force to remain globally responsive and regionally engage.

I'll turn it over now to Colonel Steve Smith to facilitate what I'm sure will be a lively discussion and dialogue and as a special incentive again, Steve has 200 slides. You don't want to see ready in case your questions log. And just so you know we have the army (ph) desktops on the table for a reason. He's accustomed to answering the unanswerable hard questions. So, if you have a really hard questions Jim is ready for it. And with that, Steve to you.

SMITH: Thank you sir. Ladies and gentlemen at this time the floor is up for questions. I would ask you to move forward to the microphones and as you do I will call on each of you, so that the panel can answer the questions that you have. So, please come forward and ask away. So, is that (inaudible) pause for the first question? Everybody is afraid to ask. Sure, please.

(UNKNOWN): Gentlemen, good morning. My name is (inaudible) Hamilton. What do you see or maybe any in policy impediments to Regionally Aligned Forces concept? For example, the units that are deploying to Afghanistan right now train a lot non-standard equipment and get urgent material releases in order to conduct training that (inaudible) material leases don't apply to units that aren't going to Afghanistan, the Regionally Aligned Forces and Global Response Forces need the ability to train on a non-standard equipment that they're being equipped with (inaudible) to deploy to those areas. So there are other types of policy that you see need to be adjusted and adopted to fit the Regionally Aligned Forces concept to make work (ph) as you envision.

(UNKNOWN): Well, I know that General Donahue can probably give you some concrete examples. I will speak in general terms that army service component commands play a vital role in helping identify specific training and equipping needs for their region. And then we worked with the headquarters of department of the army to ensure that we can provide both the training and equipment that that force is going forward will need to operate effectively in the environment if they will go forward in. And that's far we have not identified a challenge in our agility or ability to enable a properly training equip force to meet the army service component commands need. Pat, anything you wanted to reinforce?

DONAHUE: Sir, yes. Interestingly enough allow the initial challenge that we have were not with the American weapons but foreign weapons. And so, I know that (inaudible) 21 ABCT with the 162nd brigade and direct assistance in 10th group, developed a university call, Dagger University insure that every soldier living in Fort Riley left with the proper skill sets that would enable them to provide the requested training and often that required them to have some knowledge on a formed (ph) weapon which is -- so it's not what you're talking about but something completely different.

And now, I think the challenge is the was one that we're still working through in some cases is always some new piece of gear that we haven't seen before that we have to get (inaudible) with and we're working through means to get that done, but it's not been an obstacle (inaudible).

(UNKNOWN): And one of the bright things (ph) we have at forces command is we're collocated with the United States Army Special Operation Command and with **Special Forces** Command (inaudible) command. And we've got a great supportive relationship there so that if we need an augmentation of our capacity to deliver foreign weapons training then (inaudible) in our special operators stand for and ready to fill that gap, and they've done a great job as you heard about the 10th **Special Forces** Group (inaudible).

(UNKNOWN): OK, so back here.

(UNKNOWN): Sir, I'm Major Matt Kelly (ph) (inaudible) with regard to Regionally Aligned Forces (inaudible) for that.

(UNKNOWN): That's a great question. And we've been fortunate this past year to leverage the capability with the 162nd brigade at Fort Polk Louisiana, where we have assigned within that unit (inaudible) experts from every region of the world who are able to assist in that effort of culturally preparing our units. And, we are in close dialogue right now with United States Army Special Operations Command and training in doctrine command to solidify the way forward to ensure that we can meet the -- both cultural preparation and the minimal language skills necessary for soldiers to be effective.

We are not going to turn them into special operators. We're not going to turn them into language -- linguist, but we do have linguist capability resident within our formations that we leverage to assist units before they employ. I know that you deal with dozens of languages on a daily basis over the past, so.

(UNKNOWN): Thank you sir. What we found out is that, you know, within -- a lot of people view Africa as a country, as a continent and each country has concluded (inaudible) 50, 70 languages within that country. So, it's almost (inaudible) that they try to develop, you know, Regionally Aligned Force to become a linguist so they were efficient, but what has been very effective is that this entire university in the programs of course come to set up, we are sending our soldiers there so they're culturally fluent. They know how to operate. They understand the dynamics within the culture, understand how to interact with the people they're training. And more importantly they're also taught how to use translators. And so, we've trained them on that.

And the language -- the two languages that we find most useful in Africa are English and French. So, normally speaking every -- you go to place like (inaudible) they speak 50 different languages, but the common language is French. And so, there is training we done within 201, so there is proficiency in French, basic proficiency when they show up.

So, I don't think making (inaudible) where we have a linguistic expertise in all of the language that we're dealing will (inaudible) et cetera, is a fruitful endeavor because I think we can get specter of what we want to achieve to become culturally fluent and to rely on these interpreters and learning a basic common language of French and English.

(UNKNOWN): Matt, that's a great question. Where the army reserve is helping to (inaudible) is 100 -- with exceptional one brigade all conventional civil affairs for the total army is in the army reserve aligned under one to start command located at Fort Bragg. These are (inaudible) who works for Dan Alynn (inaudible).

Those civil affairs folks often are trained in different languages and certainly in understanding cultures on how to use interpreters and we have a very close relationship as they're part of the Regionally Aligned Force to the army reserve plan that support General Odierno, but they're also aligned very close to the Charlie Cleveland and his folks at (inaudible).

And, what we're trying to do is leverage that a lot more because often those are the skills sets that they have from the civilian (ph) acquired skills and we work for the state department to be (inaudible) and they work for other agencies but they have those skills sets and we're leveraging those and we're seeing that that is a very efficient and inexpensive way for the army to access to those capabilities in a reserve command.

(UNKNOWN): OK. I've got a question here, sir, for General Tramond, reference regional alignment forces in a perspective from a regional operations in Mali. And the question is the reason French led operations in Mali were impressive. How did the French earn its version of regional alignment contribute to that victory, sir?

TRAMOND: Thank you. Let me begin with a personal experience about foreign language at a French point of view.

In '86, I was a known captain in the marines and I was in shock for an emergency mission. And my mission was to translate some explanation about the American (inaudible). So there were two American agents, retired, I don't know. They spoke English. I try to understand the technical applications, I translate that in French for some sergeant from the south that speaks French but before the guy have to translate that in Arabic sergeant and the first one have to translate that into (inaudible) to use that against (inaudible) strikes. So it's got a (inaudible).

So this is a difficult issue -- language issue is very important.

(UNKNOWN): Yes. TRAMOND: Yes. (UNKNOWN): OK.

TRAMOND: So the French have a good advantage in Western Africa because most of people speak French. It's not sufficient. First, we need a more foreign language. The French mission of the Regionally Aligned Forces is quite different from the American because we are small site army. And we have that kind of system before the professionalization, you know, the French army was mixed, there were constricts in professionals. And after the first gulf war, (inaudible) decided to process (inaudible) fully personal army, which was in '86 and we needed four years to transform the army.

So before, we have some kind of Regionally Aligned Forces, the early units was conquered, where facing the east, for the cold war and after and some fractional units. So, you know, the foreign region, the marines, and the (inaudible) **special forces** who are dedicated to special (inaudible) operations. So it was kind of Regionally Aligned Forces.

The price of the professionalism has been very heavy because we have been advised to divide the size of the army by (inaudible). So we only have combined arms we get today and we have much more before. So because of the scales of the size of the (inaudible) specializing units.

You know, the reason today, this is the coefficient, I formed them, an American study or report, I kind of read, the French military (inaudible) is a way of war once it gets more strategically although the French have a long run practice with operating with secure resources. So that is one explanation, we do what we can with what we have.

The second explanation is the historic background. You know, we have a big combine (ph) and one of the reason of the (inaudible) for me much of Africans speak French and a least of French. And this heritage has good consequences for our army. But first, we give (inaudible) the priority to (inaudible) our skills and we mentioned that. The understanding of all those traditional civilization.

We have also a high level of autonomous leadership. We call that mission from the French (inaudible) but that's because we are small units isolated and they must decide by themselves. We have the four good spirit of adaptation and flexibility. We are (inaudible) reminded since we are professional and because I'm the boss of the combined lamp (ph) center of the doctrine. We have a good doctrine.

(UNKNOWN): Yes.

TRAMOND: The doctrine is adopted for the country -- was (inaudible) the biggest that went to Somali (ph), two books, one brand new book about the war in the desert and one of those are historical book about all the tricks (ph), that drag the right from attacks in the desert, so understanding. Today, and we show some maps. We have a quick contingency deployment system for families of forces. So the figures you have here are the joint forces but the army who are 80 percent of this figures.

In yellow, you have the French territories that we call sovereignty forces. In France, any citizen who lives in the metropolitan France or obviously territories of (inaudible) for health, for security so similar resources. And it's very good because we are rotating units. I think that more than 20 percent of the sergeants in the areas are rotating but they're trained specifically (inaudible) that wasn't the best thing before so training (inaudible) skills are warranted.

The second summary, and it's very important for the operation, for the whole when there was a big crisis in (inaudible), the French contribution for the solution of (inaudible) Americans where the people from the western, (inaudible) units are like very fast.

The second family, the green one. So we have -- because of the (inaudible) basis in Africa so we can see the green in background, in (inaudible) so we have agreements and we have permanent forces that can train and become real.

In red, we have a subtype of forces deployed that is the, what we call operations. So there are (inaudible) permanent forces in Chad, in Ivory Coast, in Central Africa and in Mali since the beginning of this year.

And we have permanent reserve brigade among eight, one permanent for six months. We called it cheetah system, the rapid reaction brigade.

So to sum up, the French system is adopted for or modifies and it enable us to conserve the rather high level of ambition of a country and we can't treat the regional crisis with that.

So I think that's Mali is a next, right, is a good example. I would say that this operation that name is namely the (inaudible) the small white capsule, so it's good for the size of that operation. Only three or four thousand, or one brigade level. Very good example of contingency deployment. Why did we send such a quick and strong response at the very beginning of January (inaudible)? And why some journalist called rather unfriendly that unilateral operation.

So, we have at the beginning very clear quality call guidance. The first was to protect Bamako because where 6,000 nationals and the gypsies (ph) were a little versed to conserve Bamako. The second was to surprise the (inaudible) before they're eyeing the cities so the bush (ph) filled these creative shocks especially in the older African capitols. They were slow to mobilize their forces and they saw the French so they came. And it accelerates the deployment of those African forces. How we did that?

Through main elements -- first is to reduce the people just in forces that they described first of all, the mission forces. For BPR (ph) number one, for Burkina Faso and the first French (inaudible) in that auction was lessons of the helicopter pilots. It was just a and the helicopter arrived. And the -- in the (inaudible) we took some -- we gathered in this one called battle groups from Chad and from Ivory Coast. Both (inaudible) and they came by over and by range. And the civilization was the brigade that every brigade just shoot a brigade with three battle groups including one of the for indigent part of (inaudible) system. The first session mission was to stop the reverse and the second was to shield the (inaudible) and to destroy the enemy in mountains. So it was well-balanced. I want to give a focus of the role of Chad in that mission and we'll -- in just my neighbor. Participating of the Chinese was huge because they sent 2000 to 3000 soldiers. My road from (inaudible) and related to (inaudible) Somali, and they fought very tough fights with the French and they have very heavy loss. More than 50 soldiers killed in the operation.

Why did they take part of that complete -- so intensively? Because it's kind of bloated (ph) and some years ago, in Spain 2008, the president got a package by -- from Sudan. It was a big red from rebels. And the French then, and they did not forget so it gets -- so this is trying difference touch -- of links, (inaudible).

And the success of that mission in Mali, it's not a unilateral missions because each time we saw it and we see they are not victories, African veterans came and we could stop getting and has a good momentum of action. So that is another part. And to sum up, I can give you my -- the main lesson learned in that mission.

The key lessons, decision. We have that key political on states, we have a soft political loop the President decided and somewhere else or some small house regions. The risk was assumed at all level from the President to the (inaudible) leader (ph) -- everyone knew there were ventures. That's the risk for the question. The deployments was successful because we have free deployed sources just like I mentioned.

And it was successful also because we have (inaudible) forces, the (inaudible) we get so we simply. And we always have an original approach. We don't need to deal with the Mali questions -- we dealt with some way with the major one that challenge one then work on the -- its privileges. For the fight, we have the full implemented maneuver joints and combined arms into this -- the French chief of staffs General Hadmadu (ph) say the return of the maneuver has 10 years of SOD (ph) good momentum.

It's an alliance of high technology and very old style of war combat. An alliance of the city and strong leadership, and but not the least, would support, with the city, the U.S. support for strategical (inaudible) and intelligence among those (inaudible).

The international support also from you and UN. As you mentioned, the French-U.K. project was to build an (inaudible) force with UK and the French so we are preparing that and we are, I think in the future, we will be able to do the same (inaudible) and one of the support issue is the mobilization of the African, I mentioned that (inaudible) system prevention (inaudible).

So to sum up, crucial acculturation of forces for human cultural awareness to physical environment and updating and the well known doctrine and lesson learned feeding the (inaudible).

(UNKNOWN): Thanks for that. We appreciate that really thorough one down on what was a complex and very effective execution. And I know the support for that continues today so we appreciate all that you're doing. TRAMOND: And make me, I subject to ladies and gentlemen, we are in this French boost, some six captains and eight (inaudible) coming from Mali, from the foreign regions from the marines and from the black country. This all these done 24, 25 and you can speak to them because they are the true actors. I'm just (inaudible) of their resume.

(UNKNOWN): Great, thank you.

(UNKNOWN): Good morning General. Thanks for your time and there's a lot of knowledge up there and apparently according to General Allen, I know what you spoke and (inaudible) correct, sir.

On the fields (inaudible) and National Guard Bureau, my question's directed towards General Murphy. Sir can you talk about how regional armed forces affect the National Guard and specifically, the dual status commander?

MURPHY: OK so I'm not sure the -- I have to think about the connection of the dual status commander when we're talking about Regionally Aligned Forces. You may have given it more thought but really the state partnership program, is it -- is it supports the commander and that is really the intent as works more into over the 20-year history of the program.

It's -- it is a mature program and some of the country state relationships have changed over that time but we can focus on a couple different examples real quick and some of the most mature ones as the -- the break of the Soviet Union and the stage that were a result of that with the original states partnerships that were aligned.

And those are fairly mature. And those relationships still exist today. More recently, as the -- (inaudible) in the crowd here, more recently something like Mississippi being aligned with Uzbekistan in 2012. We continue to -- to develop new relationships but it really -- the state partnership program is really a Department Of Defense program just administered by the National Guard Bureau.

It is there to foster that cooperation between the state nation. And really the -- the thing that's the greatest benefit to these programs are the long lasting relationships. There's not a lot of rotation amongst the military forces that we deal with. In some of these countries as well as in the states, the same talent is able to be used for each one of these engagements. Excuse me.

In our case, we're realigned with African in New York's case with the South Africa. We are about -- we are ten years old in the program. It is originally taken on. They mill to mill relationship but it is led to -- into civilian relationships that foster that cooperation between the organizations regularly.

And so for (inaudible) in Africa which the eight state partnerships in Africa and the regionally aligned force that's put out there now, it is really a tool in the toolbox that the combating commander linked with, you know, either the army command or in our case, we're able to apply air assets as well since we have an international guard and an army national guard New York. We have a flexibility to work with more than just the army forces when we -- when we apply that.

So that's kind of a general review to your question. I think I'll stop there and maybe there'll be more specific questions about those relationships or what it adds to the commander's toolbox.

(UNKNOWN): If I may add to that, you know, one of my -- my talking points is that the raft is bigger than the 21ABCD. It definitely includes the SVP partners and the institutional army. And General Hamm and I are in Botswana really speaking clear that's -- we're at a event -- a dinner, a (inaudible) exercise in (inaudible) 12. And the one that, the tag from North Carolina showed up, he's a partner with Botswana. It's like a rock star entered the room. Everybody went to him and start talking and merely, General Hamm and I were ignored in the corner. And he turned to me, he goes, "I finally get it. It's about relationships. They have a personal relationship that the African generals have been over to Jack's house in North Carolina, you know, he's been to their house. It's like General Murphy was saying. It's a sustained and personal relationship. They really get some access and influence that is beyond what we can provide.

At the other way, we leverage the state partners and what we do is that if we had an exercise that's been in an area where the state has a partnership, we go to that state first to see if they want to provide the brigade headquarters that we need for tactical headquarters or whatever because they have the expertise and the knowledge of (inaudible) with the people in that particular country. And it just make a lot of sense that's proven to be very effective. We've done that several times already this year.

(UNKNOWN): OK, then back to you.

(UNKNOWN): Hi. My name is Nick Dowling (ph) with Ideas International. One of the criticisms that I've heard about the regional armed forces concept is it is hard enough to dig in to the culture of a country like Afghanistan or even down at the provincial level where it really becomes useful. How can you possibly, you know, expose, expect to give forces a useful focus on something as wide as a continent like Africa? And then the other criticism that I've heard is what are you going to do? Prepare a unit of, you know, know more about African and then they end up going to the Middle East to the Pacific and how is that useful.

The answer that I have given, as my own personal experience, is that the experience of delving into a culture, learning about the differences between how culture and leadership, tribal societies, non tribal societies, how those things work. That learning experience, that how to think is as important as the foundation you provide. But that's my answer. I'd like to hear what you guys think of that and also how does the Human Terrain Systems program play into Regionally Aligned Forces?

(OFF-MIKE)

(UKNOWN): I wanted you know I wasn't kidding.

(UKNOWN): First off, great question. And I would not argue with your kind of first blush response to that. But first and foremost, you know, what RAF is and what RAF is not is also important to keep in the context. And certainly, everybody understands what our four structures looks like today. And it potentially could look like here in the next two to four years.

But we're not going to be able to regionally focus integrate cultural expertise in every corner of the world. So, we don't' intend to. But, there is a general process to which we hope we can build some institutional

knowledge inside each of the organizations to do that thinking to be able to enter that **human domain** and being able to understand what is culturally significant where to go get the answers.

I'd like to elevate at one other piece and it ties back to the state partnership piece and everything, all of the tools that the combatant commanders and the services provide to play into this Regionally Aligned Force strategy or concept.

It has to be built at the COCOM so the needs have to be identified fairly early on. We would then turn in aligned forces to that. (Inaudible) forces command to their mission aligned with orders and with the National Guard in United States Army Reserved Headquarters to do so. Projecting that demand signal, which I believe the COCOMs, through the Army Service Component Commands are doing a better job like with (inaudible) is key. Because that allows us to prepare and I would argue that that is probably the key factor in trying to make a difference.

Each of the COCOMs is responsible for each of the areas to develop a country team analysis, to identify what their goals are so that the combatant commander can achieve his global employment of the force endstage, get endstage which then support the unified command plan which then allows us to figure out how we're going to portion (ph) in the force.

So, identifying those needs in that strategy is key. For instance, we are rolling in a State Partnership Program not to try and take credit for what's the great works there, but we're rolling that into RAF so that we can start to get that demand signal.

And as we project that in the future, we can do more than prepare, which is key in the at least in general orient of strategy in the prevent portion of this. It is significant when we have combatant commanders around the world today that say, "Hey, I have to keep my AOR at phase zero. I have to do data security cooperation. I have to build partnership capacity. Because I don't -- if I go to phase two or three, I have failed my mission."

And Regionally Aligned Forces at least one measure by which the army provides that tailorable, as General Allyn said, that tailorable scale of force that's forward in many cases. I mean, for them it's all about presence, it's about gaining access and then flexibility to respond, especially within the parameters with a new norm. And those continue to response forces. United States army has over 70 -- approximate with 70,000 soldiers who were deployed that day and are answering a lot of those cruel (ph) calls. Unfortunately, our narrative is not that good and we're not getting a credit for all of that work we're doing.

And that's what has to role into this Regionally Aligned Force concept. But, the **human domain** piece of it, we can probably talk for hours and I think there's a few other form that will talk at that. You know, we are in some significant discussions with the forces command, special operations command at USASAC and TRADOC in terms of how to develop this. And some large discussions about whether this becomes a (inaudible) in function. Thank you.

(UNKNOW): All right. I just want to add to that. I think there is, there is actually a danger right now and the current policy strategy-making environment that -- it looks like -- it can reflect the army is trying to cover down on the world, right?

And I think you raised a good point that you're not going to be able to actually -- you know, the force is going shrink. You're going to find that resources available over the next decade. And so there's going to have to be a prioritization that goes on, not only within the army but frankly at levels above the army as well as to where you want to engage and for what purposes.

And so I think, you know, getting back directly to your questions, two things I think that are really important about this initiative inside the army. Number one, ultimately, the operational I.Q. of the force is going to diminish as, you know, soldiers begin to separate, that were veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, et cetera. And eventually, we're going to return them back to a force that's sort of focused on contingency response abroad, somewhere.

And the regional alignment function actually gets to actually continuously allowing the force to exercise, to flex its muscles, to challenge itself in an environment that's not, you know, for their win (ph) or the back would just footloose. So I think that internally, that's really important. What's going to really be important externally for this program I think is actually identifying where it's important to engage because I would submit actually

that, number one, some of the places you want to go and engage and prevent things from happening, you will either, a, not be allowed to go into in any strength because you're not welcome, or, b, the things that would happen in that place are not preventable, right?

So, as a traditional soldier, I think I want to deter, you know, an adversary from crossing over foreign boarder and checking one of my allies. Well, that might not be the problem 10, 15 years from now. The problem might be just the sort of the dissolution of the ally itself, right? And no amount of engagement with that ally is going to prevent their political system from collapsing on top of itself.

And so, I think then, comes (inaudible) and lies (ph) the other benefit of regional alignment which is operating in this theatre so that when you do have to respond to something very non-standard that you have relationships, you are familiar with the infrastructure of that region, if you have operated under hastier expeditionary conditions with the partner or with, you know, with partners in that region to sort of respond to crisis.

So, I think there are a number of things that are going to be very important to this program going forward. I think the real challenge will be in the current decision making environment, how you actually allow it to rise to a level of importance that gets it supported above the army, right? Because this will be imminently important going forward. We will have to respond in critical regions. But the question is, will those regions be actually important to policy makers.

(UNKNOWN): And, sir, if I could jump in and address and potentially mitigate some of the criticism regarding this aspect, its culture of the lack of understanding, the culture. So, within Army Special Operations Committee, we spent a great deal of time training our operators in the required foreign language in the culture. And yet we haven't mastered that, particularly in a continent besides the Africa.

So, in order to mitigate this, what really is that (ph) the foundation of the RAF engagement and even special operations engagements with the partner nation's forces is a military culture. And the expertise, the professionalism that we begin -- we bring and of course that is inherent in that partner nation force. And so, since we're not engaging in cultural activities in 99 percent of these cases (inaudible) were not working out of embassies. I think this criticism is that the RAF will not understand the culture enough and to be detrimental to it is over-exaggerated.

ALLYN: I have to agree because -- really great (inaudible) we do this. It's not done in full partnership with the partner armies. And everything, it takes a long time -- you know, we're training the training (ph) battalions to go to Mali starting, probably, in early November. (Inaudible) on that. But, you know, I went out there and I met with the CHAD (ph) and the MAD (ph) -- went out to the site, (inaudible) guys are working for months to set this up.

So, we're doing this thing in full partnership with our partner nation. This is not something we're trying to impose on them. This is something we're doing with them. They're more -- they're capable. They're very well (inaudible) a U.N. standard. So, that's the type of expertise we bring.

And I think maybe context (ph) that the people are critical are a little bit different. We're not kind of going there and impose our will. We're going in there and working with partners to give them this extra capacity they need that they lack and they requested from us. (Inaudible).

SMITH: OK. Right upfront.

NIBLOCK: Thank you. General Allyn, thank you for your time. My name is Tom Niblock. I'm a Senior Foreign Service Officer. Spent about half my 30 years in and on African issues. I spoke four of the recent six in Afghanistan so I know something about that, and have some perspective on few of these things. And General Tramond, I was on the other end of that (inaudible) Operation in 1986. And congratulations, we won there. Very special. That history has been often (ph) told.

I currently, however, am serving as Foreign Policy Advisor to General Grass of the Guard Bureau. And with respect to General Grass, I'm not speaking on his behalf or the Guard Bureau, but as a Foreign Service officer. I've been profoundly influenced by my experiences with the State Partnership Program as have many of you. It really comes down to relationships, and general, as you've noted, you know, when you walk into the

room and you see the Hero's Welcome that the tag gets (ph), and I've done this in a number of countries over the past couple of years that I've been working in the Guard Bureau. It's really quite extraordinary.

My experience in the Foreign Service is somewhere between year two and year three of building a relationship, there is a material difference. We've been engaged around the world, and most of our foreign partners say, "It's Tuesday. It's another American." In many cases, they hardly remember our name or our face. At some point though, you know, they realize, "Hey, you're still here." And then you start talking about families and dogs, and pets, and hunting trips and whatnot. Just is the kind of relationship that the (inaudible) general had developed over 20 years starting in the (inaudible).

That's materially different than anything we do in our government, civilian or military elsewhere. And it happens only because the guard is structurally set up to allow that to happen. You know, I'm a civilian, I can't do that. I stay in the country three, four years, I'm gone. Wish I could go back. I've seen a lot of guard officers who have risen from, you know, Lieutenant Colonel to General Officer rank alongside their foreign partners, much in the same way that the French have done with their political alliances and partnerships in Africa.

So, you know, that model works. It's cross-effective and I think we all agree on that point. As I think about Regionally Aligned Forces, and I understand the perspective of the army and why this is important, the need for it, but it would seem to me that a large role for the guards simply makes sense in that context because you're developing state level, more intensive relationships, but you're also developing some regional perspective and regional expertise, most importantly of all, you're keeping a lot of the same people on task, three, five, seven, 10, 15 years of war. And as a civilian in the government, I can't do that. And frankly, most of the rest of us can't do that.

So, I would just sort of throw out those comments. And again, thank you for your time, I'm going to sit down.

ALLYN: You know what? I think you would find everyone on the stand on violent agreement with you. And that is why the State Partnership Program is a critical and integral component of the Regionally Aligned Force concept and it's one that we are trying to ensure is also fully aligned with the priorities of the geographic combatant commander through the army service component commanders or the Air Guards equivalent on the Air Force side. But you're absolutely right and we are leveraging those relationships on a recurring basis around the globe.

TALLEY: Can I add something for one second? From the Army Reserve perspective, you know, we provide that stability because where (ph) most of the comments of Foreign Service support for the total army and in many cases for the total force. So, when you think of all those neighbors out their, and so combatant commanders and ASCCs want to help prevent and shape so they never have to go to a win (ph). A lot of that capability, in fact, to be frank, most of that capability's actually in the Army Reserve.

And the Army Reserve has those long-term relationships just like the State Partnership Program in countries around the world, currently 130 countries, but we do it through training exercise. We used to do it extensively in terms of overseas deployments for training prior to the last 11 years of war. And so, as the Army Reserve supports general of the (inaudible) Regionally Aligned Forces, we're doing that through a concept called Army Reserve Engagement Cells that are embedded in every ASCC and Army Reserve Engagement Teams that are embedded in every COCOM. And they are linked to those theatre enablers that are the subject matter experts and pick your favorite enabler. And that provides long-term stability and relationship building around the world, ask those -- and to help define those requirements working as a supporting element to the ASCC and the COCOM.

So I just want to -- you know, we've been doing this for a long time in the Army Reserve. We got away with it -- way from it last three years because we were a little busy like everybody else supporting the war fight in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we're going back to that under the Army Reserve engagement cells and teams concept as part of the army RAF. And I think that that in conjunction with state partnerships provide the stability and relationship piece that COMPO 1 may not be able to provide at the same level for variety of reasons. Thank you.

(UNKNOWN): I think that that your question or your comment raise like a really important issue though that I think is still kind of in the balance with respect to Regionally Aligned Forces in the army. I do wholeheartedly with General Allyn and General Talley on this idea that -- I mean, the State Partnership Program is

foundational too, but the real question is, as the active force gets smaller, what is the point -- I mean, what is the point, what is the focus of regional alignment for the active forces, right?

There is a very, I think, somewhat nebulous idea we're going to engage to shape, you know, create conditions, et cetera, et cetera. That all makes perfect sense. But frankly, I think, what makes more sense is that when somebody says, "I need a force to do X, dot, dot, dot." That Army Regionally Aligned Forces should be the ones who are rack and stack to do that.

So, for example, there maybe -- one region may have more problems with humanitarian disaster or responsibility to protect problem, genocides, et cetera, et cetera. And so, when the president says, "I need a force to, dot, dot, stand between two warring factions and protect this population," it should be a Regionally Aligned Force that has been at some level has been focused on that challenge, OK, or to secure weapons of mass destruction, or to, you know, respond to -- whatever it is, respond to a hurricane or seize and secure critical infrastructure that has been damaged in the civil war. I mean, there's all kinds of potentialities.

And there's too many actually to aligned forces to and to mission (ph) them again. However, there are a finite number that probably should be prioritized and should be rack and stack. And then what you then have is you have regional alignment that's not only gets the force, the specific force culturally sensitive to the region they may be employed in rotating into that region commonly for engagement and they kind of really sort of do strategic reconnaissance and things like that as well. But also then the mission it tailor so that from actual spin up to certification, to readiness, they are the ones standing there when the president says, "I need a force to do, dot, dot, dot, dot."

(UNKNOWN): Excellent.

ALLYN: If I may build on that. I think the cost that we have for Regionally Aligned Forces does get (inaudible) at least for Africa. One of the misconceptions of the 2-1s (ph) is like an (inaudible) brigade far from that. That's just one of the missions it does. 2-1 (ph) is our force of choice for main operations in Africa. There's an operation that, you know, we've doing like security -- provides security in the -- in HOA or the East Africa Response Force, the force we go to is the RAF because it's a sustained mission, requires expertise on (inaudible). It also does (inaudible), you know, the training equipped (ph) mission devices. These missions we're doing in Afghanistan. It is the force we go to for exercises.

So, we're doing high-end exercises in Africa right now with our -- the forces we used that include the company level live fires and night airfield seizures and all sorts of high-end training events. So, we're getting great training out of it as well as have training with our partners.

And then there's the traditional TSC. So, you know, one of the -- (inaudible) a little bit is that we're looking at the Regionally Aligned Forces (inaudible) and SVET (ph) from based on experience in Afghanistan. It's not. It is a force that is able -- it is trained, it has a knowledge for those different missions of massive (inaudible) for instance. (Inaudible).

SMITH: OK. I've got question from online. This is from Mr. Ryan Jones regarding force reductions. The question is, how will the anticipated army force reductions impact the ability of the army to implement RAF?

ALLYN: All right. A simple answer is the math problem. There will be less forces available. All right. I mean, that's the short answer. But the longer answer is that we are going to have all forces that are not aligned to a specific mission in operation and during freedom to Korea or to other globally-assigned missions will be aligned to a combatant commander based on the needs of that geographic combatant commander as identified through the army service component commander. So, we will have units from all components and all functional capabilities that are prepared, trained, and ready to respond but we'll have less of...

(AUDIO GAP)

SMITH: Right here.

(UNKNOWN): Good morning. My name is (inaudible) from the Institute for Defense Analyses. And before I came to IDA, I was an Africa analyst. So this has been a great conversation to listen to. But as an Africa analyst, one of the problems that I feel that many organization faces how to incentivize that kind of expertise

and how granular you want that to be, and that's an issue we've already sort of touched on. So I won't (inaudible) on that.

But, my two-part question really is, is there a plan to incentivize this outside of the field program. And if so, if you're going to make that kind of investment in developing this expertise, will there be a similar investment in institutional knowledge? Because as we know, when you come into a COCOM, you bring your knowledge with you. But unfortunately, that knowledge goes right out the door with you when you leave. So, will there be an effort to maintain institutional knowledge not just explicit but tested as well.

ALLYN: Do you want a two-part answer or short answer?

(UNKNOWN): Yes.

ALLYN: Yes.

(UNKNOWN): Whichever you feel like giving.

ALLYN: The short answer is yes. The longer answer is it is a work in progress and you all know what's going on inside United States Army today. We are pretty busy but we're focused at the institutional level in how to codify the means and methods to get at what you talked about.

In the near term, that is not a critical focus in terms of the trained capacity that we provide to the geographic combatant commanders. In the longer term ensuring we tracked those with the expertise is something that we will bring to bear.

We do track for instance language skills. And when you look at 2-1 (ph) Armored Brigade Combat Team, the language capacity that they leverage in the early stages came straight out of Fort Riley, Kansas and all the great former African citizens that are now United States Army soldiers serving in the ranks who are able to come bring their expertise in there. But, I mean, as you clearly identified, we have some longer term issues to wrestle with and I know General Hoess (ph) and our **Special Forces** teammate have been working this for, you know, for decades. And we are heavily leveraging their experience and expertise. And one of the relationships that we're strengthening is between our conventional forces and special warfare center and some of the experts and expertise that they can provide to the leaders of our conventional force.

(UNKNOWN): (Inaudible) that -- I think the mere fact they're trying to work the alignment with BCTs is maybe -- is a building block, the base building block but we're also aligning division in corps. I think that will also help with the institutional portion of that.

You know, in my mind, the strategy is always as I said before linked back to the (inaudible) routine, is that has to be developed. But, at least from, you know, with capabilities, as we've worked with the state department, not to do the job but to help them with their job because there are used to be some concern about that too with RAF.

But, just the framework it force (inaudible) will establish will -- I think will help capture some of that. And people will come and go. We won't try and (inaudible) and say, "We're going to stabilize everybody in that BCT division corp." They're going to rotate. But I do believe institutions also have an ability to hold on to knowledge and that knowledge with repetition I think will only increase.

That said, I can't create the expectation also that those divisions in corps will always be aligned to the same combatant commander because demand is going to drive that. And since we do seem to be fixated on Africa a little bit, I would just, you know, add and because my old boss is there from company commander. So I had to be careful but, you know, numbers are going to be a problem in the future. It is just a fact of life. So, you know, we're going to go to priorities in terms of how we're going to address all the needs.

All right, this Regionally Aligned Force concept, you know, it is one of the chief new strategic priorities. It is a way to try and hit combat and commander's capability, army capability to execute their mission. But in some point in time in the near future, as we - some of us have to go through and work with the joint stuff in OSD on how we're going to do the allocation and how we're going to do the assignment, and then how we're going to do apportionment for, you know, contingency plans.

We're going to run into a numbers issue and so I will mention and I will tell you it will generally fallback to the force allocation decision makers in the fact. And that can tell you where Africa sits on the fact. So, it's going to be tough.

(UNKNOWN): So it's going to go link directly to our National Security Strategy and the Defense Strategy that supports that and that's how we're working it right now. That's how we prioritize.

(UNKNOWN): Sir, if I could add one thing to that comment. Commanders, I made a state from United States Army Africa.

One of the great things about the RAF is the individual training. That those soldiers from 3rd Brigade, 1st I.D. get when they go down to South Africa and participate and share their corps (ph), there's a lot of learning that our soldiers are getting down there on a comment that most people like General Donahue said early to think of two countries, Egypt and South Africa. And there's a lot of differences South Africa, BRC, he get up into Chad where we recently at.

So we can never forget about that importance, that when our soldiers leave from Q1 and they go on the 25th I.D., they also take the experience with them.

And maybe one day, God forbid it does happened, something happened on that comment. And now, that young private, that was very sure the corp is now a platoon sergeant. He had some experience and he can now share with his platoon to get them better prepared and that is some that is very critical that we forget at the tactical level that the RAF survives.

Sir, thank you.

(UNKNOWN): That's great point Sergeant Major. Thanks for bringing us back to the soldier where it all starts and ends.

(UNKNOWN): (Inaudible).

(UNKNOWN): Gentlemen, my name is Major Nick Mallin (ph). I'm a fellow with the chief strategic studies group. And my question is really tied into the previous comments that has to do with talent management in RAF.

As the battalion excelled in 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division down at Fort Bliss, my S4 (ph) was Nigerian, that's where he grew up. He spokes three languages. I asked two, which from Ghana. He spoke a number of languages as well.

And my chaplain was from Brazil and two are Portuguese speaker. It really struck me that we have a global army just even within our formation. I was just wondering what efforts might be a flip to sort of harness that capability that we already have.

And then perhaps from a futurist perspective, is there on any thought given to strategic recruiting to acquire key capability in our regionally-aligned areas, you know, having someone from a place to generally better than trying to train a person to know about a place.

(UNKNOWN): Well, I'll jump on it first. I go back to something my cousin lot taught me when I was a young captain as a former **Special Forces** the AT (ph) member. He said, "Your first job when you take charge your unit is know the capabilities of the people in it because you're going to find out, you've got just about every kind of capability you need resident within your formation."

So your point is extremely well taken and I know that that is what Jeff Rod (ph) later in two months (ph). The first thing he did was scan his formation to identify the resident expertise that he had that he can apply to problems that he's got. Now from a wider perspective, I think we have additional work to do institutionally to assist commanders. So they're not trying to solve that problem at a local level. We aren't be able to broaden that much like we do with language skill that we do clarify. And I think we certainly can do a better job at second point that you make about ensuring we scan for the talents within our formation before we start to train it from the grassroots level.

Any other point, sir?

(UNKNOWN): Sir, yes. So first of all, we want to recruit in the Special Operations Community half of that formation that you are proud to serve in, and then I would recommend you look at our matinee program and other activities that we've done in the Special Operations Community to reach the strategic capability that you were talking about to see that pros and cons that we've had to deal with over the last couple of years since we stood this (inaudible).

It is a great concept and it works in some cases but it is -- and then also, there are some significant challenges with it particularly in incentivizing those that you've identified as strategic in nature to help you with this engagement piece.

(UNKNOWN): (Off-mike).

(UKNOWN): Nothing.

(UKNOWN): There is work in that link. We leverage that for some very, very competitive skills that you're being high demand and that there are programs to manage the great skills that we require.

Can we expand it? But as Chris said, there is a pro in the content in that most. Just because you go to a specific region, you get a specific capability. You better do a 360.

(UNKNOWN): How long that length?

(UNKNOWN): But there aren't programs. We will certainly look at and turn that counsel lead to expand talent management aperture to see what else we can do to leverage it.

I think the more we get into RAF, I think the more good ideas will come just as you stated from those that are out there serving in those capabilities and they'll give us some good ideas here at the table turning work on.

(UNKNOWN): We're looking at that within the Army Reserve. What we're saying is, OK, folks that are out there that are in COMPO 1. Not just the army, marine corp, picture of favorite service, I hope its army by the way. And they have these cultural language experiences and that they want to go off and serve the nation other ways after leaving at the duty.

We're -- we looking that as I the mentioned I want Civil Affairs Program but the Army Reserve Language Program does specifically to see if I can as the CAR, if I can rebalance that and provide out of my own money some of them is to attract those folks, a lot of those folks leave COMPO 1 and go in -- and don't go into COMPO 2 or 3, but then they go work for the State Department or they go work a number of organizations that the same numbers in this audience represent.

You're perfect to be able to continue to serve your nation uniform as a member of the reserve component particularly in the Army Reserve Civil Affair of Linguist Community, we can provide some incentive there and we can also provide linkage with special private sector organizations. I'm looking at all that right now and I'm trying to grow that a little bit as I maybe down size some of the capabilities we have in combat support -- in combat service support.

# Thanks.

(UNKNOWN): I wanted to say one thing, I knew General Huggins have made a really good point that I just want to reinforce. So that is that the way that the current -- the way that policies headed right now unless it involves USPACOM or USSOCOM everything will need to squeeze out.

And so basically, innovation right now, any innovation that gets be protected to anticipate to have anticipatory capability that other regions of the world or regions of the world that are not necessarily considered top priorities strategically by the Department of Defense right now is going to -- I think it's going to be a giant hedge against what will be in an inevitable employment of forces precisely what we're not focus.

So, I think that anything that can be done at the service level frankly to protect some of these capabilities can be really important.

(UNKNOWN): Sir, back to you.

(UNKNOWN): Sir, good morning. My name is Lieutenant Kevin Poll (ph). Lieutenant, I'm an exchange officer in the Pentagon in the Department of the Army.

Poll (ph): Thank you sir. It's a privilege to be here.

I just like to ask what the army has already put in place and terms to put in place in the future to harness the historical ties and experience but some of your oldest allies and partners in specific regions and French (inaudible) and Central Africa, the British, and East and then Southern Africa for example, any of others in other continent.

What are you plans on that front to try and use your relationships with allies and partners to make more of this project?

(UNKNOWN): James, why don't you answer that question.

HUGGINS: I know. OK, I was going to (inaudible) earlier month. But it's one that the -- it's not enforced complaint obviously, but it's one the department has to continue to walk through and one that initially I would have thought would've been intuitively obviously. It's not. Because I think the conditions have caused us all the kind of withdraw a little bit and focus.

You know, there's an assumption out there in today's environment that as we draw down, we're just going depend more up on our allies. And they'll step up. The policy with that is just most of our allies were doing the same thing we're doing.

So we have an impact and we create a gap. I think this is the way it had and, you know, as evidence by last years' step talks that we held and the accord we signed together. Those are the things that we're going to continue to do that the chief, I just made a terrific out to the pacific and try to leverage those.

We have got to do more of that in the future because we got to bring everybody's capabilities to table because unfortunately, there were some as I said before that are just thinking we can all just go back focus on our lanes and depend on partner capacity.

I don't think that's been brought together and so the numbers were at General Odierno has asked us to do some more detail look in terms of literally every partner, potential partner that's out there in terms of what their armies and what their militaries are doing.

And I just said, I don't make, you know, a lot of days or comment that says most everyone is doing the same thing except for maybe some near peer competitors.

(UNKNOWN): You know, let me just give you one example where there is already underway, you know, forces command provides to the joint stuff, the global response force, which is the foundation of which is an Airborne Brigade Combat Team from 82nd Airborne Division but which includes units from all across the con of United States that bring capabilities for any potential contingency that maybe out there.

What we have done is invited our allies that have similar contingency response units in their formation, as you country is one of them and they have participated with us in recent joint operational access exercises that we've done as we train up our global response force.

And it was pretty exciting this past fall, we have nearly a dozen nations, only two or three of which participated as -- participating units but others had senior leaders present because they knew that they needed to -- we needed to learn together about what capabilities we can each bring at there in case that response is somewhere in their neighborhood and they might be able to contribute.

So I think that's an example of the great teamwork that's going on with our allies and partners and that we know is going to get stronger as we go forward.

(UNKNOWN): I give the example. You know, it's always, you know, it's difficult in the Pentagon is all are teacher in the field and in the field in my cases, it's been very pleasant working with French, English, Britain, and Dutch for instance. We use (inaudible) to communicate and pass intelligence to the French in Bamako and Jeddah to our native system. Who ever thought that this system we would use but it's available, it's proven, and we were using it.

We have routine, intelligence updates where we have the J2 (ph) and serve all online with the analyst and 66th M.I. in Germany with my analyst sharing intelligence assessment to what's going to happen. British are on there too as a matter of fact.

So we have -- I have 10 French officers assisting 2-1 (ph) anything with the admission that they're going to train to -- we have end of this month until November training a battalions in Guinea getting ready to go to Mali.

So I think the cooperation just happened in the field because their interests are so obvious out there. And so, I think we're probably better off than you may think.

(UNKNOWN): For me, special operations respect the challenges we rely on the Theater Special Operations Commander to do much that synchronization with our allies and partner nations.

And clearly, the funding available that we have to support, combine operations with multinational soft partners in one country is diminishing and becoming less and less. And so, I think we have to relook and how do we resource more opportunities particularly from a special operations perspective to ensure they were benefiting from this expertise that exist within our British friends and other allied soft nations. And right now, we just don't have an answer in it. It's going to get top performances in the future.

I think we ...

(UNKNOWN): OK, thanks. We really need to -- I need to work with my team and figure out how to bring this to more formally into the CPVs (ph), more formally into, I mean there's a lot going on and that's what we both said but it is a matter of capturing the way ahead with how to get every asset we can put into that leaders do the cooperation framework. So, we'll take that on.

Thank you very much.

(UNKNOWN): Thank you.

(UNKNOWN): That's Colonel (inaudible) joins staff J-5 and this is indeed General Huggins and General Talley. There's the old saying that ounce of prevention is worth the pound of cure.

And as we joined to a smaller army, it's going to be more important to utilize, yes, because we have more effectively and a lot of Phase Zero kinds of things and we talked already if you have to go into the shape and win piece of it. To some extent you fail.

But as we go through the fourth calculation, calculus and we're going to the QDR process and things right now. We don't look at Phase Zero typically to generate that demand signal. So, Serval from a G- 3/5/7 standpoint and from a USARC standpoint where a lot of those skills that we use in the Phase Zero piece are. Are we looking at modifying that process or taking to account things we could do in Phase Zero to help create a demand signal? Are we working with the COCOMs to do that?

Thank you very much.

ALLYN: And before I -- as I give Jim a chance to think about that, while I can hear his wheels turning.

HUGGINS: Clunking.

ALLYN: Let me just capture that it's really the Army Service Component commanders that are capturing that demand signal for us and that demand signal is on the rise. All we have to look at is the mission alignment order for 14 and 15 as an upward curve.

So that demand signal for the capabilities that are excellent within our reserve component and the active component is on the rise and we are capturing that through our Army Service Component commanders because frankly, we're doing a lot out there that as you capture, it's not necessarily being codified and we're codifying that through our Army Service Component commanders (inaudible).

(UNKNOWN): Thank you, sir. He's not a plant, so -- but I would give (inaudible) some credit for probably knowing a little more than this question indicated about what's going on. And it is in essence a very, very difficult question. This last year in the Global Force Management Process, PACOM actually did a very, very good job in capturing the demand required to do their Phase Zero operations. It really helped the army.

While it is not forced -- not a foresight in construct, I mean, it helped make the argument to capacity matters and sometimes capacity matters. But I will tell you that in an effort, I'm very pleased to see that we're developing right now, working with the joint staff, is we're talking about a concept that really goes through, you know, what would be the steady state requirement.

And, you know, if there was a crisis and you had to go fight a major war but what is the steady state requirement either before that and then post that. You know, our general math that we use in the army is about for and I'll just go to BCGs (ph) and to seizure (ph) analogy.

Twelve BCGs (ph) is just about a steady state requirement for us and I won't go through the whole list but that's a few in Afghanistan, that's one and Kuwait with James Terry (ph) and one in peninsula in Korea and whatever the numbers 12. That's steady state day to day.

If there was some sort of an outbreak and we had to respond to a major (inaudible), so now what would the steady state be? And what we're trying to do is get that captured in the demand signal as we look at structure bills and foresight and constructs in the future. I mean, we've gone through some scenarios that we would say, "Hey, well, it depends on how bad we have to, you know, the situations that we have to respond to. But one that we think because informed by the new normal, we believe we probably should still keep even if there is a contingency that breaks up, arises, we should keep eight in steady state and that would be things like well, we'd probably commit the GRF first but we'd have to reconstitute the GRF. It's an army thing, so we can do that.

And then the next one would be, you know, and we probably don't want to take, especially if maybe the prices in them -- in the Pacific. We don't want -- we're all going to take the brigade that's sitting with James Terry (ph) and move it. So, I probably need to keep that in a steady state.

I don't think Pat Donahue here would be happy if I came down and took to one idea because they haven't got a lot of allocated forces and certainly have no assigned forces and he's getting a lot of bang for the buck so I got to leave that there.

I would tell you that we have to make some hard choices for PACOM and some hard choice for SOUTHCOM in the future because, you know, we're just now moving out with our National Guard partners in terms of trying to work to 48 Brigade on Georgia, working regional law enforces for SOUTHCOM.

So that tailored deterrence force which would be sort of a floor, we have to add that into whatever we need in terms of the other crisis and a large percentage of that floor are the forces that Jeff Talley has and I won't go there in that regard because those are the enablers that we committed to build along with the six brigades for contingency force that we're trying to build in 14th to hedge a little more strategic risk for the chief and the nation.

But I'm hoping in the construct without a demand signal that we get some help with this steady state, tailored deterrence force that has to assist regardless of whichever way we shift. I mean, this idea of a swing force, I'm not so sure that's going to work.

TALLEY: Well, thanks for the question. I've -- unfortunately that General Allyn and General Huggins have pretty much answered it.

But, you know, I'll say a couple simplistic or simple things. First off is as I go around at (inaudible) and talk to combatant commanders and their DCOs (ph) and their teams. First thing I do is reinforce that the Army Senior (ph) Service Command is the one-stop shop to the army, Active Guard Reserve. And that a lot of folks forget a really fundamental concept.

General Allyn provides -- he's the force provider for all conventional forces in the army, Active Guard Reserve. That's -- those two simple things I just said, it's shocking to me how many people don't know that even within the army.

So, we would go back to that concept of those Army Reserve Engagement Cells embedded into the ASCCs and my AREFs that are already embedded but we're trying to reorganize them at COCOMs. The reason they are there is to help the COCOMs send us help -- Help them send an educated signal on what enablers they need for Phase Zero. And to make sure all of that requests gets down eventually to the right channels, you know, through FORSCOM, through USARC.

The second point that I would make is those cells or teams that are full on active duty with a one star on active duty in charge of them to include our ARACs and then our AREF. Their link, as I mentioned, all (inaudible) enabling commands that represent that could vote into the army.

We're going to have a mirror image of all those ARACs and AREFs that are not on active duty, that are KPU soldiers and I have a benefit of being a commander and a component later. The Army Reserve is the only component that's also a single command.

So what does that mean to you? That means I don't need to go to the Pentagon to direct order people in active duty with no notice if they're aligned to say U.S. Army Pacific. For example, and I already have about 5,000 troops in U.S. Army Pacific, full-time. But let's say, I've got that ARAC cell there and if something comes up where we need to search the Phase Zero planning capability that gets to those enablers in the army. I -- it just takes one quick decision by me -- of course I would talk to my boss, General Allyn, and boom, you just got 50 more Joes that are there the next day to help you with that critical planning.

By the way, we did this all prior to OIF 1. We used to have these little more ad hoc relationship but I'll be a little (inaudible), let's talk about the great engineer regiment we have in army. The ENCOMs which are both in the Army Reserve now called Theater Engineer Command, they had positioned for in third army a big planning cell. I was part of that planning cell.

Then, I was a professor at Notre Dame. I got a call on Tuesday night, it was -- I was doing final exams, "Hey, you got to leave Thursday to get on plane with your A bag and B bag and you're going to Kuwait to do immediately emergency planning for early entry into theater from an engineering perspective, APA/DPA (ph) and you're part of the Deployable Command Post Theater Engineer Command

There's no (inaudible), there is no thing. Get on the plane and go. Luckily, I gave the final exam, graded the papers when I go over to Kuwait and executed the mission that I was assigned, ended up staying there for a while as you might guess because OIF -- OEF, then it was called OEF, kicked off but that's what we did then and it worked great. And now, we're just trying to formalize that through all of our ASCCs and COCOMs.

But I want people, I want to keep beating the message, the Army Reserve exists just for one reason, to serve Compo 1 and to make sure through General Allyn that we're linked in understanding and helping define that signal, demand signal, from the CGs, the FDCs and direct support of this total force (inaudible) through COCOMs. That was a great question.

(UNKNOWN): Thank you, (inaudible).

HIMEL: Hi. Sam Himel (ph), Institute for Defense Analyses. This is another question that sort of comes off of with the (inaudible) concept that you've been talking earlier. You mentioned how important it will be in a lot of the (inaudible) to keep things up Phase Zero.

So, is there a sort of regionally aligned force construct that you've been talking about this morning? To what extent does it merit or require a second look at how irregular warfare capability took up residence in the General Purpose Forces and not just for self supporting of anything but for missions they conducted themselves.

ALLYN: Well, I'll start it and I'm sure that several team mates will pile on here but I think upfront, we talked about the ability to provide the full range of military operations capability from within our organic formations to do Regionally Aligned Forces capabilities. And -- I mean, that includes the ability to do, advise and assist, that ability to assist the unit if they're dealing with an insurgency.

Clearly, we have a lot of expertise, within our army but I think as we currently look at it, we don't assess that we need to expand the (inaudible) capability that we have because we have such broad expertise across the conventional force and I'll open it up to other panel members who want to pile on.

Yes, you know, I have to catch Chris (ph).

(UNKNOWN): Yes, sir. I believe you know -- our special warfare center school will maintain the lead on a regular warfare for the army in the future. But certainly, the RAF concept and the increasing frequency of RAF elements deployment into the theaters to provide us a great opportunity for improved (inaudible) and

conventional force interdependence now only back at home station (inaudible) but more importantly, forward in theaters for the combat commander.

And so I think we'll -- we will be able to work a lot of these regular warfare issues, not only in the school house, but then forward in specific countries.

(UNKNOWN): I think, you know what, the army is -- is going to have a challenge here and essentially, I have to return to kind of the horse have been flogging the whole time here but I mean look, DoD's essentially retraditionalized defense strategy, right? They basically said, "Look, we're going to manage the terrorist problem remotely and with **Special Forces** and the rest of your problem essentially going to be the rising recalcitrant Iran or China, right?

And so, it doesn't essentially fall into those two bends. It's going to be low on the packing order. And all the great efforts on the part of the army and the marine corps and I think SOF actually will continue to be able to sort of, you know, benefit from DIW challenge more so I think than the conventional forces because frankly, in the efforts to sort of constrain the investment of resources, DIW challenge at its worse is the manpower-intensive challenge that essentially DoD is trying to divest from in the mainstream, right?

I mean if they have to actually do it, they say, "We're going to do it with luck where this luck, we have in reserve component," et cetera.

So, I just think actually this is going to be a challenge. Actually what I think would be the most dominant problem for DoD for the next 20 years will also be bureaucratically, what it sees was least important.

(UNKNOWN): (Inaudible).

WILCOX: Greg Wilcox from SRI International.

It occurs to me that one of the problems that we have currently, we're going to have with RAF and that means have with our allies or some ISR capabilities that gain the information and the troops on the ground, we need it immediately, which could be treated as current information.

Is there any effort or attempt to look at this Formation of RAF as an opportunity to not challenge but reconcile Title 10 and Title 50 law?

(UNKNOWN): Title 10, that's 3-5-7.

HUGGINS: I'm looking for the two for the title 50 and I can't find her, so.

Sir, great question. I would say that -- first off, I'm not 100 percent with you that I think we've made some tremendous increases in terms of our capability to share information. Tremendous, both Chris (ph) and I and Joe Allen (ph) was on one flank (ph) and he was all -- Chris (ph) was all over this in the last year. And, you know, we're in there with a pretty strong coalition in terms of trying to work that.

Do we need to get better fully acknowledged? Yes, there's always this disclosure piece we've got to watch.

Acces to realtime intel, yes, you can, we always want to get better but we got to tell you I don't know how much better we could get. There's always a timely issue but, you know, it takes time to even process orders, not just intelligence.

So, I'm not as down on it -- on that but is RAF an opportunity to help that, absolutely, it is. I can't tell you the number of discussions I've been in and had with the (inaudible) of the world and General (inaudible). It is generally that guys like us in previous lives who just say, "I want, I want it now," and just do it. And then it doesn't happen for us instantaneously because we didn't ask in a timely manner and we -- but we come out and we, you know, criticize the system.

I think it's gotten much more response though we can always strive to get better.

Obviously, it's intuitive that you say with RAF, the more exposure we have with our partners, the more opportunity we have to build relationships to work to those challenges that could exist rather than building a coalition together at the last minute.

So I got to admit that that works but I also would not stand up on a bandwagon and say that we're absolutely broke. I mean, you know, the things we put together, not just Afghanistan but with some of the crisis response elements that we had to do in the recent past, I think we've leveraged other countries' capabilities.

Could we do better? Yes.

Have there been some oversights? Possibly yes also. But we're pulling an awful lot of information and you can argue intelligence in that through data systems. They have to go through commanders and then have to get processed in the decisions. I'm just not 100 percent there that we're 100 percent broke. I do -- I will admit we got to get better. But I don't if Chris (ph) has got any better examples with the other panel members.

But I firmly believe that RAF can help us, but if commanders ask for the form (ph) disclosure approval the day before we cross COD (ph), we might have a problem. And then just let the commander mitigate that risk, which I know with John Allen (ph), I would do, but it would...

(UNKNOWN): Yes. And I would tell you, just for everybody in the audience, we all work with allies and partners in the current site and we have never prevented relevant intelligence from being provided to our partners to ensure they could protect their force and accomplish their missions. So though (ph) anybody who walk away from here thinking that that would ever happen, it will never happen.

(UNKNOWN): Right. So we have a question online and then I'll go to you, sir. Are there online question that has to do with Defense Support to Civil Authorities. And specifically, the question is what about Regional Alignment of Forces and how is it applied to this commissions?

(UNKNOWN): Let me try a little bit. Let me see if -- see where this goes. The -- we want to think we do have quite a bit of expertise in the National Guard (inaudible) the Defense Support to Civil Authorities. Now, depending on which side of defense you're talking about and you're going to call it the National Guard Support to Civil Authorities, you're going to call it defense support and so forth, you have to get pass that argument to begin with.

But the opportunity to work with partner nations on that -- those types of issues that bring a systematic approach to dealing with an emergency, a crisis in some way, we have a great deal of experience with that. And so, as it escalates within a country or the opportunity to apply more resources to that, we can lend that and have lent that to a number of nations.

Israel is probably one of the best examples of a civilian force that incorporates a part-time military with a full-time military and escalates fairly quickly, and the response and the integration and that kind of thing. In working with our partner with New York and South Africa, we have gone in and tried to use those parts and pieces that have occurred through us at the state level and those that have managed those to lend expertise in that area.

The World Cup, for example, a number of years ago, we worked with South Africa in bringing some of the law enforcement that we have relationships with to the table and communicated how we do things in New York, for example, through NYPD up to the state, and then where we would need to go with our Defense Coordinating Officer into a Title 10 capability and that whole range.

And so, again, I think as Kim Donald (ph) looked that his country is in Africa, for example, since he is sitting at the table, he has all of those experiences laid out regardless of the component, and we can bring that in a -- to look to our partners in this case.

(UNKNOWN): If I think I understand the question right, I guess the way I would answer it is this -- it looks to me that this is the responsibility guiding General Jacoby, the commander in NORTHCOM, because that's how I interpret the question. And so, who with his one stop shop for anything Army, Active Guard or Reserve, it's called Army North, and the C.G. of Army North.

And so, the Army Reserve Engagement so (ph), there's also one imbedded in Army North, but we also have a DCG, a Deputy Commanding General, for Reserve Affairs embedded right in there. And then I have an Army Reserve Engagement Team at NORTHCOM and those are aligned with special units and capabilities across the United States to provide Army North and General Jacoby with Title 10 immediate response forces that would be dealt with, say, for our complex catastrophe in the event that they would require that.

ARMY FORCES COMMAND GEN. DANIEL ALLYN PARTICIPATES IN A DISCUSSION ON REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2013 ANNUAL MEETING AND EXPOSITION Political Transcript Wire October 23, 2013 Wednesday

This also can -- we've taken advantage of, under the recent National Defense Act, particularly, 2012, particularly, 12304 Alpha. In fact, the Army Reserve executed this, where we had pump (ph) units respond in less than 24 hours notice over to New York and New Jersey to do the watering (ph) operations at the request of the combatant commander.

All of the emergency prepared liaison officers for the entire Department of Defense are actually provided by the -- to the BOD (ph) by the Army Reserve. We were aligned under one of our commands called the 76 for Cooperation Radius (ph) Command, commanded by Dan York (ph).

And so, we see NORTHCOM and our support in NORTHCOM no different than any combatant command. We provide that direct linkage through the A-Reps (ph) and the A-reps back down to our formations. By the way, those team report back to AUSA, which reports this to General Allyn, that way we don't have a separate stone (ph) pipe of activity, and what we find is it's worked very well. We also have this commission for (inaudible) or certain responsibilities to NORTHCOM.

And so, right now, we look at strengthening that relationship and of course we do this in support of the ASCC and the COCOM in partnership with our National Guard brothers and sisters who have looked (ph) to, you know, the heavy lifting within the states.

So that's how I would answer the question. And hopefully that gets to the -- sort of the answer you're looking for. Thanks.

(UNKNOWN): All right, so we have time for one more question, sir, to you.

(UNKNOWN): Colonel Jeff Hartman (ph). I'm at the Chief Strategic Studies Group. Good morning gentleman. I have two related questions. The first is for General Tramond. General Tramond, can you discuss France's multilateral and bilateral efforts and where you think the French Armed Forces receive the most benefit whether in Africa or elsewhere? And for the American panelist, are there any specific plans or efforts right now to build partnership capacity on the conventional side in any specific partners as part of RAF? Thank you.

TRAMOND: So, sir, a very interesting question because we have a big involvement in reaching lots of organizations. We have been involved in Afghanistan so we are focusing in the general public in Naval (ph) Force. This is one of my missions for doctrines (ph) for the very good (ph) and (inaudible) public.

We had also big (inaudible) issues with all allies. I mentioned the (inaudible) so many force (inaudible) with the Brits. We have also some migratory (ph) projects for the -- with Italians called the Brigade Mountains (ph). With the German; we have the German-French Brigade. So, this is (inaudible) effort with all allies.

And with the African countries, we have a known tradition of military corporations. I mentioned the agreements we have. So the agreements are not only for an emergency response. If there is a main (ph) crisis, it's also for prevention. And we have evidence officers and troops that prepare the African units.

I didn't mention the projects we have with our American counterparts. We have a yearly training induction (ph) conference with the tradeoff, the next is in November. And we will exchange about all we can share with American or African experience of training or some issues like that. So, I think it's open.

(UNKNOWN): Thanks, Oliver. And if I heard your question right about do we have specific plans within regional law enforces to develop partner capacity in any part of the globe. We as an army do not. We -- regional law enforces are specifically in response to the needs identified and the requirements identified by the geographic combatant commanders through our Army Service Component Commanders. So, as they identify the needs, we will prepare and tailor the force to meet that mission. And we are not generating missions from the army's standpoint.

(UNKNOWN): (inaudible) for any closing remarks.

(UNKNOWN): Hey, listen. I appreciate the dialogue and as I assured (ph) to see the threat of anymore PowerPoint slides, we are sure to ensure that we had the right mix of questions. But, in all seriousness, we appreciate the questions that you've raised.

ARMY FORCES COMMAND GEN. DANIEL ALLYN PARTICIPATES IN A DISCUSSION ON REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AT THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 2013 ANNUAL MEETING AND EXPOSITION Political Transcript Wire October 23, 2013 Wednesday

If you have additional questions, James Huggins is going to be standing by to answer them -- just kidding. It's been a great dialogue and I appreciate the participation from all of the expertise that we have here, its representatives. And if you would please join me in a round of applause for the work of (inaudible)

And I'd like to, before I close this out, also give a shout out to the Association of the United States Army for pulling this panel together and for supporting us in this critical dialogue as part of the Institute for Land Warfare. And we all wish you the best as you continue on here in AUSA.

God bless you and your efforts and your support to our mission and to our soldiers. And particularly, for those soldiers deployed overseas and their families back home, God bless you. Thanks.

**END** 

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Federal News Service

October 22, 2013 Tuesday

Contemporary Military Forum at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) Conference Subject: "Regionally Aligned Forces and Global Engagement" Lead Speaker: General Daniel B. Allyn, **Commanding General, United States Army Forces Command Panelists:** Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7; Lieutenant General Jeffrey W. Talley, Chief, Army Reserve; Commanding General, United States Army Reserve Command; Major General Christopher K. Haas, Commanding General, United States Special Forces Command (Airborne); Major General Patrick J. Donahue II, Commanding General, United States Army Africa/Southern European Task Force; Major General Patrick A. Murphy, The Adjutant General --NY; Major General Olivier Tramond, Director of the French Army Doctrine Center; Nathan Freier, GS Title 10 Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Location: Walter E. Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C. Time: 10:05 a.m. EDT Date: Tuesday, October 22, 2013

**SECTION: DEPARTMENT DEFENSE BRIEFING** 

LENGTH: 14883 words

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GENERAL DANIEL ALLYN: Hey, good morning. And it's great to have all of you here with us. And I'm sure that this is going to be a rich opportunity for us to have a dialogue about regionally aligned forces and their impact on national security and our Army's efforts to ensure that we work this in concert with our unified action partners.

And we also thank our distinguished panel members for participating in today's panel. I'm confident they are more than ready to answer the hard questions in particular. Each brings a unique perspective on regionally aligned forces and I believe will help provide greater depth and context to our regionally aligned force employment and I'm sure will be able to address the majority of your questions on this topic.

Before we begin, let me take just a few minutes to lay the foundation for our dialogue with just a couple of slides. At your seats, as was mentioned, you do have a regionally aligned force trifold. And I'm not going to insult your intelligence, I know you know how to read, but I also know the print on that is very small because I had to read it previously. So I'll try to hit some of the high points upfront.

So let's get started. If we go to the next chart.

To begin, let's first define what we mean by regionally aligned forces. And quite simply, regionally aligned forces is the Army's vision to ensure we provide combatant commanders with tailored, responsive and consistently available forces in support of their needs. Habitually, aligning our force to the combatant commanders creates clear advantages for the combatant commanders as well as for our soldiers and our units, some of which are highlighted on the slide.

Regionally aligned force is not limited to the active component. It is a comprehensive approach that includes our active, our Guard and our Army Reserve -- what we refer to as the Army total force. It is also not limited to our brigade combat teams, though that tends to be a focus area as we discuss our approach to regionally aligned forces. It includes the full array of Army capabilities, and they are tailored to meet the specific requirements that the combatant commanders identify. And it is facilitated by our Army service component commanders. And Pat Donahue will be able to talk to you in great detail about some of the fidelity and the agility of the efforts that we've demonstrated this past year with the 2-1 armored brigade combat team.

Through this alignment, our Army soldiers will be better prepared and postured to support combatant commander requirements, whether they be theater security cooperation, (emerging?) operational requirements or a set of missions across the full range of military operations. We can and will have forces prepared to meet whatever those requirements are.

#### Next chart.

Now, given our Army's current operational tempo, particularly with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, we will not fully implement regionally aligned forces in accordance with the chief's vision until more forces become available. Nonetheless, looking forward, just as the end of operations in Iraq provided the opportunity to initiate our regionally aligned force concept, the ongoing drawdown of forces in Afghanistan and the ultimate transition of full security to the Afghan government and Afghan security forces will increase the availability of Army forces for the regionally aligned force employment.

Aligning our continental United States base formations with each of the nation's six geographic combatant commands best enables us to respond to varying degrees of both formal need and emerging requirements as we go forward in this uncertain environment. This, in turn, contributes to a predictable, efficient way of preparing our forces, preparing our soldiers and preparing our units to meet the needs of combatant commanders.

And as we tailor our Army to meet new fiscal realities, we are mindful of the complex global threats that are out there, and we will seize the opportunity to adjust our existing approaches both in how we prepare our forces and how those forces are employed in support of the combatant commanders' needs, leveraging all of our capacity across the total Army and all of our training locations.

Regionally aligned force specific training will provide critical experience and expertise amongst our leaders and soldiers and our formations to complement the work of our regional experts from our special operations forces and our foreign area officer experts.

#### Next slide.

Now, why is it important to the nation? I think for most of us, it's relatively intuitive, but let me just hit a couple of the high points because our business, the Army business, occurs between and among people, what has been referred to as the **human domain**. And the words that define our prevent, shape, win strategy reflect deliberate actions. Preventing and shaping conflict requires engagement -- routine, deliberate interaction between us, our allies, those on the fence, and yes, even potential adversaries.

Leveraging our many partners in our sister services, the interagency, the multinational community and the many nongovernmental agencies operating every day around the globe is a critical and integral component of our regionally aligned force approach. Our regional alignment activities will complement, not compete nor supplant the unique capabilities that each of our partners brings to this effort and to stability in the regions. Doing so will optimize available resources and capacity, enabling what we believe will be better outcomes for the nation. And if necessary, regional familiarity among our soldiers and our units better postures them to fight and win decisively wherever and whenever the nation may direct.

#### Next chart.

So where we are. We're moving forward and have been globally and regionally aligning available Army corps, Army divisions, selected brigade combat teams and enabler capabilities from across each of our components in support of each of the geographic combatant commanders. Our soldiers, our leaders and our formations are routinely participating in training and exercises and theater security cooperation activities around the globe.

A couple of recent highlights: In Pacific Command, I Corps recently completed participating this summer in Talisman Saber 2013, a biennial training exercise focused on combined United States and Australian operations. This exercise resulted in I Corps' certification as a combined force land component command to support U.S. Pacific Commander, which covers nearly half the globe and includes 36 nations.

In AFRICOM, as General Pat Donahue will be prepared to talk about in some detail, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team of 1st Infantry Division recently completed participation in exercise Shared Accord 2013, another biennial training exercise to strengthen relationships and cohesion between the United States and South African militaries. This exercise also brought to bear the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team, elements of the 10th **Special Forces** Group, elements of the Washington, D.C., and New York National Guard units, and soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division, a tremendous illustration of the Army Total Force supporting the needs of our geographic combatant commanders.

And next slide. And I promise this is the last one unless we don't get the questions we need, in which case I'm told that Steve Smith has 200 more data-filled slides ready for you. (Laughter.)

Regionally aligned force is our Army's vision to enable the Army Total Force to remain globally responsive and regionally engaged.

I'll turn it over now to Colonel Steve Smith to facilitate what I'm sure will be a lively discussion and dialogue. And as a special incentive, again, Steve has 200 slides you don't want to see ready in case your questions lag.

And just so you know, we have the Army DesOps (sp) on the table for a reason: He's accustomed to answering the unanswerable hard questions. (Laughter.) So if you have a really hard question, Jim is ready for it

And with that, Steve, to you.

COLONEL STEVE SMITH (sp): Thank you, sir.

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time the floor is open for your questions. I would ask you to move forward to the microphones and as you do, we'll call on each of you, so that the panel can answer the questions that you have. So please come forward and ask away.

There's always that pregnant pause for the first question. Everybody's afraid to ask it. Sir, please.

Q: Gentlemen, good morning. My name is Mike -- (inaudible). I'm a contractor with Booz Allen Hamilton. What do you see are the -- may be any policy impediments to the regionally aligned forces concept? For example, the units that are deploying to Afghanistan right now train on a lot of nonstandard equipment and get urgent materiel releases in order to able to conduct that training. But those urgent materiel releases don't apply to units that aren't going to Afghanistan, and the regionally aligned forces and global response forces need the ability to train on the nonstandard equipment that they're being equipped with to better deploy to those areas. So are there other types of policies that you see need to be adjusted and adapted to fit the regionally aligned forces concept and make it work as you envisioned?

GEN. : While I know that General Donahue can probably give you some concrete examples, I will speak in general terms that Army Service Component Commands play a vital role in helping identify specific training and equipping needs for their regions, and then we work with the headquarters of the Department of the Army to ensure that we can provide both the training and equipment that that forces going forward will need to operate effectively in the environments that they will go forward in.

And thus far we have not identified a challenge in our agility or ability to enable a properly trained and equipped force to meet the Army Service component Commands' needs.

Pat, anything you wanted to reinforce?

MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK J. DONAHUE II: Well, sir, yes. Interestingly enough, a lot of the initial challenges that we had were not with American weapons but with foreign weapons. And so I know the 1 ID and 21 ABCT with the 162nd Brigade and direct assistance and 10th Group develop a university they call the Dagger University to assure that every soldier leaving Fort Riley left with the proper skill sets that would enable them to provide the requested training. And often that required them to have some knowledge on a foreign weapon, which was -- so it's not what you're talking about but something completely different. And that was -- it's a good challenge. It's -- it was one that we're still working through, in some cases. There's always some new piece of gear that we hadn't seen before that we have to get spun up with. And we're working through various means to get that done, but it's not -- has not been an obstacle heretofore.

GEN. : And one of the blessings we have at Forces Command is, we're co-located with the United States Army Special Operations Command and with **Special Forces** Command that Chris Haas commands, and we've got a great supportive relationship there, so that if we need augmentation of our capacity to deliver foreign weapons training, then USASOC and our special operators stand forward and ready to fill that gap. And they've done a great job, as you heard about the 10th **Special Forces** Group, in support of Fort Riley.

COL. SMITH: OK, sir, back here.

Q: Sir, I'm Major Matt Kelly (sp) from -- (audio break).

GEN. : (Audio break) -- deal with dozens of languages on a daily basis, Pat, so (you may speak ?) --

GEN. DONAHUE: Thank you, sir.

What we found out is that, you know, any -- within -- a lot of people view Africa as a country, as a continent, and each country is completely diverse, maybe 50, 70 languages within that particular country. So it's almost fruitless to try to develop, you know, a regionally aligned force and become a linguist (so they're?) proficient.

But what has been very effective is that this Dagger University and the programs that FORSCOM has set up. We are sending our soldiers there so that they're culturally fluent, they know how to operate, they understand the dynamics within the culture and understand how to interact with the people they're training.

And more importantly, they're also taught how to use translators. And so we've trained them on that. And the language -- the two languages that we find most useful in Africa are English and French. So normally speaking, every -- you go to a place like Chad, they'll speak 50 different languages, but the common language is French, and so there is training being done within (two one ?), so there is proficiency in French, basic proficiency when they show up. So I don't think good -- making us FEOs (ph) where we have linguistic expertise in all the languages we'll be dealing with -- you know, Bantu, Swahili, et cetera -- is a real fruitful endeavor because I think we can get -- the effect we want to achieve (through ?) becoming culturally fluent and through learning how to use interpreters and learning a basic common language like French and English.

GEN./MR.: Matt, that's a great question. Where the Army Reserve is helping in this area is 100 -- with the exception of one brigade, all conventional civil affairs for the total army is in the Army Reserve aligned under one two-star command located at Fort Bragg, USAKPAC (ph), which reports to USARC, who works for Dan Allyn in FORSCOM. Those civil affairs folks often are trained in different languages and certainly in understanding cultures and how to use interpreters. And we have a very close relationship as they're part of the regional line force through the Army Reserve plan that support General Odierno, but they're also aligned very closely with Charlie Cleveland and his folks at USASOC. And what we're trying to do is leverage that a lot more because often those are the skill sets that they have from their -- (inaudible) -- acquired skills. They may work for the State Department. To be frank, some cases they may work for other agencies, but they have those skill sets. And we're leveraging those, and we're seeing that that is a very efficient and inexpensive way for the Army to access some of those capabilities in the Reserve Command.

GEN. ALLYN: OK. I've got a question here, sir, for General Tramond, a reference to regional alignment of forces perspective from recent operations in Mali. And the question is, the recent French-led operations in Mali were impressive. How did the French Army's own version of regional alignment contribute to that victory?

Sir.

GEN. TRAMOND: Thank you. Let me begin with a personal experience about foreign language from the French point of view. In '86 I was a young captain in the Marines, and I was in Chad for an emergency mission, and my mission was to translate some explanation about the American missile Redeye, anti-aircraft Redeye.

So there were two American agents -- (inaudible) -- I don't know. (Laughter.) They spoke English. I tried to understand the technical (explication?). I translated that in French for some Chadian from the south that speak French. This other guy had to translate that in Arabic Chadian, and the first one had to translate that

into Tulu (ph) dialect because the Tulu (ph) were to use that against (Calaphist fights?) -- (inaudible). So this is a difficult issue. Language issue is very important, yes. So the French have a good (advantage?) in Western Africa because most of people speak French. It's not sufficient. Perhaps we need more foreign language.

The French vision of the regionally aligned forces is quite different from the American because we are small-size Army. And we have that kind of system before the professionalization. You know, the French Army was mixed. There were conscripts and professionals, and after the first Gulf War, President Chirac to professionalize -- fully professional Army. It was in '86, and we needed four years to transform the Army.

So before we had some kind of regionally aligned forces, the -- (inaudible) -- nits with conscripts were facing the east. It was the Cold War (and after ?). And some professional units -- so, you know, the Foreign Legion, the Marines and the -- (inaudible) -- troopers, **special forces**, were dedicated to special theater operations.

So it was kind of -- (audio break) -- aligned forces.

The price of the -- (inaudible) -- has been very heavy because we have been obliged to divide the size of the Army by two. So we only have eight combined arms brigade today. And we are much more -- (audio break) -- before. So because of the scale and the size of that army, we cannot specialize the units.

In -- (inaudible) -- today, this is a quotation I found in American study report, I can read: The French military culture of a way of war well-suited for scarcity. Further, the French have a long- range practice with operating with few resources. That is one explanation. We do what we can with what we have. (Audio break.)

In yellow, you have the French territories that we call sovereignty forces. In France, any citizens who lives in the French -- (inaudible) -- or obviously its territories has the same rights for health, for security. So -- (inaudible) -- forces. And it's very good because we have rotating units. I think that more than 20 percent of the soldiers in the areas are rotating -- that they train to specific areas. I was in the Pacific before, so we train Nordic skills or mountain.

The second family -- and it's very important for the operation. For example, when there was a big crisis in Haiti the French contribution for the solution of that with the Americans were the people from the West Indies -- from -- (inaudible). The units arrived very fast. The second family is the green one. So we have, because of the history, permanent bases in Africa. So you can see the green in Dhaka (sp) in -- (inaudible) -- Djibouti and the Emirates. So we have agreements and we have permanent forces that can train and that can react.

In red we have a third type of forces deployed. That is the -- what we call operations. So there are -- (inaudible) -- things. We have permanent forces in Chad, in Ivory Coast, in Central Africa and in Mali since the beginning of this year. And we have permanent reserve brigade -- among eight, one permanent -- for six months. We call it the Cheetah system, the rapid reaction brigade.

So to sum up, the French system is adapted for our modest size. And it's enabled us to answer the rather high level of ambition of our country. And we can treat the regional crisis with that. So I think that Mali is -- next slide -- is a good example. I would say that this operation that's name is -- name is -- serval. Serval -- is a small white cat, so it's good for the size of that operation, only 3(,000), 4,000 -- one brigade level.

Very good example of contingency deployments. Why did we send such a quick and strong response at the very beginning of January against the jihadist threat? And why some journalists called rather unfriendly -- (audio break) -- that unilateral operation?

So we had, at the beginning, very clear political guidance. The first was to protect Bamako, because we have 6,000 nationals, and the jihadists were on the verge to control Bamako. The second was to surprise the enemy before they are in the cities, so in the bush. Third is to create a shock, especially in the other African capitals. They were slow to mobilize their forces, and they saw the French, so they came, and it accelerated the deployment of those African forces.

How we did that -- two main elements. First echelon, we used the pre-positioned forces that I describe, first of all the **special forces** from Burkina, number one -- from Burkina Faso. And the first French killed in action in that operation was a (left-handed?) helicopter pilot who was killed during a helicopter raid. And in that echelon, we took some -- we gathered an encore (ph) battle group from Chad and from Ivory Coast, both light infantry and armament. And they came by road and by plane.

And the second echelon was the brigade, the heavy brigade, the "cheetah" brigade, with three battle groups, including one of Foreign Legion paratroopers. They jump. And then the first echelon mission was to stop the rebels, and the second was to seize the Niger bend and to destroy the enemy in the mountains. So it was well-balanced.

I want to give a focus about the role of Chad in that mission, and it will interest my neighbor. (Laughter.) Chad -- the participation of the Chadese (ph) was huge because they send 2(,000) to 3,000 soldiers by road from Chad and (readied?) to the north of Mali, and they fought very tough fights with the French, and they have very heavy lost, more than 50 soldiers killed in the operation.

And why did they -- did they take part of that conflict so intensively? Because it's kind of blood debt. In some years ago, in spring 2008, the president was attacked by -- from Sudan. There was a big raid from rebels, and the French helped them, and they didn't forget, so (it gave ?). So this is kind of France touch. We have links, historical links.

And the success of that mission in Mali -- it's not a unilateral mission because each time we set an objective, African battalions came, and we come -- we could start again and have the good momentum of action. So that is another point.

And to sum up, I can give you my -- the main lesson of that mission, the key lessons -- decision. We had the clear political instinct. We have a short political loop. The president decided, and some hours -- some small hours, we jumped. The risk was assumed at all level, from the president to the platoon leader. Everyone knew it was dangerous, but the risk was assumed.

The deployment was successful because we have pre-deployed forces, just like I mentioned. And it was successful also because we have high-readiness forces, the "cheetah" brigade, so we send it. And we always have original approach. We don't need -- deal with the Mali question, but we dealt the same way with the Niger one, the Chadese (ph) one, the Mauritanian. It's a global approach.

For the fight, we had the fully integrated maneuver, joint and combined arms. In the (depths?), the French chief of staff, General Ract-Madoux, (said?) the return of the maneuver after 10 years of FOB in Afghanistan, so good momentum. It's an alliance of high technology and very old-style war, combat, both, an alliance of audacity and strong leadership.

And last but not the least, the support was decisive, the U.S. support for strategic lift, because we have -- we have gaps, and intelligence, (among others ?) -- (inaudible) -- the international support also from EU and the U.N. I should mention the French-U.K. project we have to build an expeditionary force with the U.K. and the French.

So we are preparing that, and we are -- I think in the future we will be able to do the same thing bilateral. And one of the support key issue is the mobilization of the African, I mentioned that, thanks to our system of prevention we have in Africa.

So to sum up, cultural acculturation of forces to human cultural awareness to physical environment and -- (inaudible) -- and well-known doctrine and lesson learned feeding the (notion ?).

GEN. ALLYN: Thanks for that. We appreciate that really thorough rundown on what was a complex, very effective execution. And I know the support for that continues today. So we appreciate all that you're doing.

GEN. TRAMOND: And may I suggest to ladies and gentlemen, we have in the French booth some six captains and NCOs coming from Mali, from the Foreign Legion, from the Marines and from the light infantry, booths -- (inaudible) -- 24, 25. And you can speak with them because they are the true actors. I'm just responsible of the -- (inaudible).

GEN. ALLYN: Great. Thank you.

MR. : Sir, right here.

Q: Good morning, General. Thanks for your time. And there is a lot of knowledge up there, and apparently, according to General Allyn, knowledge is spelled -- (inaudible). Is that correct, sir? I'm the senior -- (inaudible) -- National Guard Bureau. My question is directed towards General Murphy. Sir, can you talk about how regionally aligned forces affects the National Guard and specifically the dual-status commander?

MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK MURPHY: OK, so I'm not sure the -- I'll have to think about the connection of the dual-status commander while we're talking about regionally aligned forces. You may have given it more thought.

But really, the State Partnership Program is it -- is it supports the combatant commander, and that is really the intent, is where it's morphed into over the 20-year history of the program. It's -- it is -- it is a mature program, and some of the country state relationships have changed over that time. But we can focus on a couple different examples real quick.

And some of the most mature ones, as the breakup of the Soviet Union and the states that were a result of that were the original states partnerships that were aligned. And those were fairly mature. And those relationships still exist today. More recently -- I see Major General Collins (sp) in the -- in the crowd here -- more recently something like Mississippi being aligned with Uzbekistan in 2012. We continue to develop new relationships.

But it really -- the State Partnership Program is really a Department of Defense program, just administered by the National Guard Bureau. It is there to foster that cooperation between a state and nation. And really, the thing that's the greatest benefit to these programs are the long-lasting relationships. There is not a lot of rotation amongst the military forces that we deal with in some of these countries as well as in the statess; the same talent is able to be used for each one of these engagement. (Clears throat.) Excuse me.

In our case, where we're aligned with AFRICOM, in New York's case, with South Africa, we are about -- we are 10 years old in the program. It has originally taken on a mil-to-mil relationship, but it has led to -- into civilian relationships that have fostered that cooperation between the organizations regularly. And so for General -- (inaudible) -- in the -- in AFRICOM with eight state partnerships in Africa and the regionally aligned forces that's put out there now, it is really a tool in the toolbox for the combatant commander linked with either the Army command or, in our case, we're able to apply air assets as well; since with have an air National Guard and an Army National Guard in New York, we have the flexibility to work with more than just the Army forces when we -- when we apply that.

So that's kind of a general overview to your question. I think I'll stop there. And maybe there'll be more specific questions about those relationships or what it adds to a combatant commander's toolbox.

MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK DONAHUE: If I may add to that, you know, one of my talking points is that the raft is bigger than the 2-1 -- (inaudible) -- definitely includes the SBP partners and the institutional army.

And General Ham and I were in Botswana when it really became clear to us. We were at a(n) event, a dinner during an exercise, Southern Accord 12. And then when the TAG from North Carolina showed up -- he's the partner with Botswana -- it was like a rock star entered a room. Everybody went to him, started talking, and literally, General Ham and I were ignored in a corner. And he turned to me and goes, I finally get it. This is about relationships. They have a personal relationship. The African generals have been over to the TAG's house, North Carolina, you know, he's been to their house -- it's like General Murphy was saying. It's a sustained and personal relationship that really gives them access and influence that is beyond what we can provide.

The other way we leverage the state partners in what we do is if we have an exercise that's in an area where the state has a partnership, we go to that state first to see if they want to provide the brigade headquarters that we need for a tactical headquarters or whatever, because they have the expertise and the knowledge and familiarity with the people in that particular country, and it just makes a lot of sense and it's proven to be very effective. We've done that several times already this year.

COL. SMITH: In the back here.

Q: Hi, my name is Nick Dowling (sp) with IDS International. One of the criticisms that I've heard about the regionally aligned forces concept is it is hard enough to dig into the culture of a country like Afghanistan or even down at the provincial level where it really becomes useful. How can you possibly, you know, expose, expect to give forces a useful focus on something as wide as a continent like Africa? And then the other criticism that I've heard is, what are you going to do, prepare a unit to, you know, be -- know more about Africa, and then they end up going to the Middle East or the Pacific and how is that useful?

The answer that I have given out of my own personal experience is that the experience of delving into a culture, learning about the differences between how culture and leadership, tribal societies, nontribal societies, how those things work -- that learning experience, that how to think, is as important as the foundation you provide.

But that's my answer. I'd like to hear what you guys think of that, and also, how does the human terrain system program play into regionally aligned forces?

GEN. HUGGINS: OK. (Laughter.) Hey, I wanted you to know I wasn't kidding.

First off, Nick (sp), great question. And I would not argue with your kind of first blush response to that. First and foremost, you know, what RAF is and what RAF is not is also important to keep into context. And certainly everybody understands what our force structure looks like today and what it potentially could look like here in the next two to four years. We're not going to be able to regionally focus and create cultural expertise in every corner of the world, so we don't intend to. But there is a general process to which we hope we can build some institutional knowledge inside each of the organizations to do that thinking, to be able to enter that <a href="https://www.numan.com/hu

I'd like to elevate one other piece, and it ties back to the state partnership piece and everything -- all the tools that the combatant commanders and the services provide to play into this regionally aligned force strategy or concept. It has to be built at the COCOM. So the needs have to be identified fairly early on. We would then

turn and align forces to that, working with forces command through their mission alignment orders and with the National Guard and the United States Army Reserve headquarters to do so. Projecting that demand signal, which I believe the COCOMs, through the Army service commands, are doing a better job, like with Pat Donahue, is key because that allows us to prepare. And I would argue that that is probably the key factor in trying to make a difference. Each of the COCOMs is responsible for each of the areas to develop a country team analysis to identify what their goals are so that the combatant commander can achieve his global employment of the force end states, his GEF end states, which then support the unified command plan, which then allows us to figure out how we're going to apportion the force.

So identifying those needs and that strategy is key. For instance, we are rolling in the state partnership program, not to try and take credit for what -- the great works there, but we're rolling that in to RAF so that we can start to get that demand signal. And as we project that in the future, we can do more of the prepare, which is key in -- at least in General Odierno's strategy in the prevent portion of this.

It is significant when we have combatant commanders around the world today that say hey, I have to keep my AOR at Phase Zero. I have to do theater security cooperation. I have to build partnership capacity because I don't -- if I go to Phase 2 or 3, I have failed my mission. And regionally aligned force is at least one measure by which the Army provides that tailorable -- as General Allyn said, that tailorable, scalable force that's forward in many cases.

I mean, for them, it's all about presence, it's about gaining access and then flexibility to respond, especially within the parameters of the new normal and those continue to respond forces.

The United States Army has over -- approximately 70,000 soldiers forward-deployed today, and they're answering a lot of those calls. Unfortunately, our narrative is not that good and we're not getting the credit for all that work we're doing. And that's what has to roll into this regionally aligned force concept, but the **human domain** piece of it, we probably talked for hours and I think there's a few other forums that'll talk to that.

You know, we are in some significant discussions with both Forces Command, Special Operations Command, U.S. SOC, and TRADOC in terms of how to develop this, and some large discussions about whether this becomes a seventh warfighting function. Thank you.

NATHAN FREIER: I just want to add to that. I think there is actually a danger right now in the current policy and strategy making environment that -- it looks like -- it can look like the Army is trying to cover down on the world, right? And I think you raised a good point that you're not going to be able to actually -- you know, the force is going to shrink, you're going to have finite resources available over the next decade, and so there's going to have to be a prioritization that goes on not only within the Army but, frankly, at the levels above the Army as well as to where you want to engage and for what purposes.

And so I think, you know, that getting back directly to your question, there's two things I think that are really important about this initiative inside the Army. Number one, ultimately, the operational IQ of the force is going to diminish as, you know, soldiers begin to separate that were veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, et cetera, and eventually, we're going to return back to a force that's sort of focused on contingency response abroad somewhere.

And the regional alignment function actually gets to actually continuously allowing the force to exercise, to flex its muscles, to challenge itself in an environment that's not, you know, Fort Erwin or the backwoods of Fort Lewis. So I think that internally that's really important.

What's going to really be important externally for this program, I think, is actually identifying where it's important to engage because I would submit actually that, number one, some of the places you want to go

and engage and prevent things from happening you will either A, not be allowed to go into in any strength because you're not welcome, or B, the things that would happen in that place are not preventable, right?

So as a traditional soldier, I think I want to deter, you know, an adversary from crossing over a foreign border and threatening one of my allies. Well, that might not be the problem 10, 15 years from now, the problem might be just the sort of the disillusion of the ally itself, right, and no amount of engagement with that ally is going to prevent their political system from collapsing on top of itself.

And so I think then comes -- therein lies the other benefit of regional alignment, which is operating in these theaters so that when you do have to respond to something very non-standard that you have relationships you are familiar with the infrastructure of that region, you have operated under austere expeditionary conditions with a partner or with -- you know, with partners in that region to sort of respond to crisis.

So I mean, I think there are a number of things that are going to be very important for this program going forward. I think the real challenge will be in the current decisionmaking environment, how do you actually allow it to rise to a level of importance that gets its supported above the Army, right, because this will be imminently important going forward. We will have to respond in critical regions, but the question is will those regions be actually important to policymakers.

GEN DONAHUE: Sir if I could jump in and address and potentially mitigate some of the criticism regarding this aspect of culture or the lack of understanding the culture.

So within the Army's special operations community, we spend a great deal of time training our operators in the required foreign language and the culture. And yet we haven't mastered that particularly in a continent the size of Africa.

So in order to mitigate this, what really is at the foundation of the RAF engagement and even special operations engagements with partner nations' forces is a military culture and the expertise, the professionalism that we bring and, of course, that is inherent in that partner nation force. And so since we're not engaging in cultural activities in 99 percent of these cases -- (audio break).

Q: (In progress following audio break) -- you know, that model works, it's cost-effective, and I think we all agree on that point.

As I think about regionally aligned forces -- and I understand the perspective of the Army and why this is important and the need for it, but it would seem to me that a large role for the Guard simply makes sense in that context because you're developing state-level more intensive relationships but you're also developing some regional perspective and regional expertise.

Most importantly of all, you're keeping a lot of the same people on task, three, five, seven, 10, 15 years or more. And as a civilian in the government, I can't do that. And frankly, most of the rest of us can't do that.

So I would just sort of throw out those comments. And again, thank you for your time. I'm going to sit down and (listen to ?) responses.

GEN. ALLYN: (Chuckles.) No, I think you would find everyone on this panel in violent agreement with you, and that is why the State Partnership Program is a critical and integral component of the regionally aligned force concept. And it's one that we are trying to ensure is also fully aligned with the priorities of the geographic combatant commander, through the Army service component commanders, or the Air Guard's equivalent on the Air Force side.

But you're absolutely right. And we are leveraging those relationships on a recurring basis around the globe.

MR. : Can I add -- oh, I'm sorry, go ahead, sir.

GEN. TALLEY: From the Army Reserve perspective, you know, we provide that stability, because we're most of the combat support and service support for the total Army and in many cases, to the total force. So when you think of all those enablers out there those combatant commanders and ASCCs want to help prevent and shape, so they never have to go to (a win?), a lot of that capability -- in fact, to be frank, most of that capability is actually in the Army Reserve.

And the Army Reserve has those long-term relationships, just like the State Partnership Program, in countries around the world. Currently, we're in 30 countries, but we do it through training exercises. We used to do this extensively in terms of overseas deployments for training, prior to the last 11 years of war. And so as the Army Reserve supports General Odierno and the Regionally Aligned Forces, we're doing that through a concept called Army Reserve engagement cells that are embedded in every ASCC, and Army Reserve engagement teams that are embedded in every COCOM. And they are linked to those theater enablers that are the subject matter experts in pick your favorite enabler.

And that provides long-term stability and relationship-building around the world, as -- and to -- and to help define those requirements, working as a supporting element to the ASCC and the COCOM.

So I just want to -- you know, we've been doing this for a long time in the Army Reserve; we got away with it -- away from it in the last few years, because we were a little busy, like everybody else, supporting the warfight in Afghanistan and Iraq. But we're going back to that under the Army Reserve engagement cells and teams concept that's part of the Army RAF. And I think that, in conjunction with State Partnership, provides that stability and relationship piece that COMPO 1 may not be able to provide at the same level for a variety of reasons.

#### Thank you.

MR. FREIER: I think that your question or your comment raised like a really important issue, though, that I think is still kind of in the balance, with respect to Regionally Aligned Forces in the Army. And I do -- I do wholeheartedly agree with General Allyn and General Talley on this idea that -- I mean, the State Partnership Program is foundational to it, but the real question is, as the active force gets smaller, what is the point -- I mean, what is the point -- what is the focus of regional alignment for the active forces, right?

There is the very, I think, somewhat nebulous idea of we're going to engage to shape, to you know, create conditions, et cetera, et cetera. That all -- that all makes perfect sense, but frankly, I think what makes more sense is that when somebody says, I need a force to do X, dot dot dot, that Army Regionally Aligned Forces should be -- should be the ones who are racked and stacked to do that.

So for example, there may be -- one region may have more problems with humanitarian disaster or responsibility to protect problems, genocide, et cetera, et cetera. And so when the president says I need a force to dot dot dot, stand between two warring factions and protect this population, it should be a regionally aligned force that has been -- at some level, has been focused on that challenge, OK, or to secure weapons of mass destruction, or to, you know, respond to a -- whatever it is, respond to a hurricane, or seize and secure critical infrastructure that has been damaged in a civil war. I mean, there's all kinds of potentialities. And there's too many, actually to align forces to and to mission them against.

However, there are a finite number that probably should be prioritized and should be racked and stacked. And then what you then have is you have regional alignment that not only gets the force, the specific force, culturally sensitive to the region they may be employed in, rotating into that region commonly for engagement and to kind of really sort of do strategic reconnaissance and things like that, as well.

But also, then, the mission is tailored so that from actual spin-up to certification, to readiness, they are the ones standing there when the president says, I need the force to do dot, dot, dot. That's my view.

GEN. HAAS: If I may build on that -- I think the concept we have for a regionally aligned force does get at that, at least for Africa. One of the misconceptions is that 2-1 is like an SFAT brigade; far from that. That's just one of the missions it does. 2-1 is our force of choice for named operations in Africa. If there's an operation that, you know, we've been doing -- like security -- providing security in HOA or to East Africa Response Force -- the force we go to is the RAF (sp), because a sustained mission requires expertise on the continent. It also does the SFAT task -- you know, the train and equip missions, the advise and assist missions we're doing in Afghanistan.

It is the force we go to for exercises. So we're doing high-end exercises in Africa right now with the -- with our forces we use, that include company-level live fires and night air field seizures -- all sorts of high-end training events. So we're getting great training out of it as well as training with our partners.

And then there's the traditional TSC. So, you know, one of the -- what I'm hearing a little bit is that we're looking at the regionally aligned force as kind of like an SFAT from -- based on our experience in Afghanistan. It's not. It is the force that is able -- that is trained -- it has the knowledge for those particular missions, like mass atrocities, for instance. So if we they have to, they can be the force we turn to.

MR. : Right, yeah, I totally agree.

MODERATOR: OK, I've got a question from online; this is from a Mr. Ryan Jones. It's regarding force reductions. The question is, how will the anticipated Army force reductions impact the ability of the Army to implement RAF?

GEN. ALLYN: The simple answer is a math problem. There will be less forces available, all right? I mean, that's the short answer. But the longer answer is that we are going to have all forces that are not aligned to a specific mission, be it in Operation Enduring Freedom to Korea or to other globally-assigned missions will be aligned to a combatant commander based on the needs of that geographic combatant commander as identified through the Army service component commander.

So we will have units from all components and all functional capabilities that are prepared, trained and ready to respond, but we'll have less of them.

MODERATOR: Ma'am, right here.

Q: Good morning. My name is Meg Midjit (ph) from the Institute for Defense Analyses. And before I came to IDA, I was an Africa analyst, so this has been a great conversation to listen to. But as an Africa analyst, one of the problems that I feel that many organizations face is how to incentivize that kind of expertise, and how granular you want that to be. And that's an issue we've already sort of touched on, so I won't -- I won't harp on that.

But my two-part question really is, is there a -- is there a plan to incentivize this outside of the FAO program, and if so -- if you're going to make that kind of investment in developing this expertise, will there be a similar investment in institutional knowledge? Because, as we know, when you come into a COCOM, you bring your knowledge with you. But unfortunately, that knowledge goes right out the door with you when you leave. So will there be an effort to maintain institutional knowledge, not just explicit, but tacit as well?

GEN. ALLYN: Do you want a two-part answer or a short answer? Yes.

Q: Whichever you feel like giving. (Laughter.)

GEN. ALLYN: The short answer is yes. The longer answer is, it is a work in progress, and you all know what's going on inside the United States Army today. We are pretty busy, but we're focused, at the institutional level, in how to codify the means and methods to get at what you talked about.

In the near-term that, is not a critical focus in terms of the trained capacity that we provide to the geographic combatant commanders in the longer term, ensuring we track those with the expertise is something that we will bring to bear.

We do track, for instance, language skills. And when you look at 2-1 Armored Brigade Combat Team, the linguist capacity that they leveraged in the early stages came straight out of Fort Riley, Kansas, and all the great former African citizens that are now United States Army soldiers serving in the ranks who are able to come bring their expertise to bear.

But I mean, as you've clearly identified, we have some longer-term issues to wrestle with. And I know General Haas and the -- and our **special forces** teammates have been working this for -- you know, for decades. And we are heavily leveraging their experience and expertise. And one of the relationships that we're strengthening is between our conventional forces and the special warfare center and some of the experts and expertise that they can provide to the leaders of our conventional force.

GEN. HUGGINS: Yes, sir. I'd add that -- I think the mere fact of trying to work the alignment with BCTs as maybe -- as a building block, the base building block, but we're also aligning divisions and cores. I think that will also help with the institutional portion of that. You know, it -- in my mind, the strategy has always, as I said before, linked back to the country team, is that has to be developed.

But, at least from, you know, capabilities, is we work with the State Department, not to do their job but to help them with their job because there used to be some concern about that too with RAF. But the -- just the framework that FORSCOM will establish I think will help capture some of that.

I think people will come and go. We won't -- we won't try and fool you and say we're going to stabilize everybody in that BCT division corps. They're going to rotate. But I do believe institutions also have an ability to hold on to knowledge. And that knowledge, with repetition, I think will only increase.

With that said, I can't create the expectation also that those divisions and corps will always be aligned to the same combatant commander because demand is going to drive that. And since we do seem to be fixated on AFRICOM a little bit, I would just, you know, add -- and because my old boss is the AFRICOM commander so I have to be careful, but -- (laughter) -- but you know, numbers are going to be a problem in the future. It's just fact of life.

So you know, we're going to go to priorities in terms of how we're going to address all the needs. I mean, this Regionally Aligned Force concept, you know, it is -- it is one of the chief's new strategic priorities. It is a way to try and get combatant commanders capability -- Army capability to execute their mission.

But at some point in time in the near future, as we -- as some of us have to go through and work with Joint Staff and OSD on how we're going to do the allocation and how we're going to do the assignment and then how we're going to do the apportionment for, you know, contingency plans, we're going to run into a numbers issue, as General Allyn mentioned. And I will tell you, it will generally fall back to the force allocation decision matrix, the FADM. And Pat can tell you where AFRICOM sits on the FADM. So it's going to be tough.

GEN. ALLYN: So it's going to have a link directly to our national security strategy and the defense strategy that supports that. And that's how we're working it right now. That's how we're prioritizing.

Q: Sir, if I could add one thing to that comment? Command Sergeant Major Stitzel, United States Army, Africa. One of the great things about the RAF is the individual training that those soldiers from 2nd Brigade, first ID (sp) get when they go down to South Africa and participate in shared accord. There's a lot of learning that our soldiers are getting down there (unaccounted?) that most people, like General Donahue said earlier, they think of two countries: Egypt and South Africa.

And there's a lot of differences, South Africa, DRC, you get up into Chad, where we're regionally at. So we can never forget about that importance, that when our soldiers leave from 2-1 (sp) and they go to 25th ID, they also take that experience with them. And maybe one day, God forbid, it does happen, something happen on that continent, and now that young private that was there that shared accord is now a platoon sergeant. He has some experience that he can now share with his platoon to get them better prepared. And that is something that is very critical that we forget at the tactical level that the RAF provides. Sir, thank you.

GEN. ALLYN: That's a great point, Sergeant Major. Thanks for bringing us back to the soldier, where it -- where it all starts and ends.

COL. SMITH: OK, right up front.

Q: Gentlemen, my name's Major Nick Maline (sp). I'm a fellow with the Chief's Strategic Studies Group. And my question is really tied into the previous comments. It has to do with talent management and RAF. As a battalion XO in the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armor Division down at Fort Bliss, my S-4 was Nigerian, and that's where he grew up. He spoke three languages. My S-2 was from Ghana. He spoke a number of languages as well. And my chaplain was from Brazil and fluent Portuguese speaker.

It really struck me that we have a global Army, just even within our formation. I was just wondering what efforts might be afoot to sort of harness that capability that we already have. And then, perhaps from a futures perspective, has there been any thought given to strategic recruiting to acquire key capability in our regionally aligned areas?

You know, having someone from a place is generally better than trying to train a person to know about a place.

GEN. ALLYN: Well, I'll jump on it first and go back to something my father-in-law taught me when I was a young captain, as a former **Special Forces** A-Team member. He said, your first job when you take charge of your unit is know the capabilities of the people in it because you're going to find out you've got just about every kind of capability you need resident within your formation.

So your point is extremely well taken, and I know that that is what Jeff Broadwater did in 2-1. The first thing he did was scan his formation to identify the resident expertise that he had that he can apply to the problems that he's got.

From a wider perspective, I think we have additional work to do institutionally to assist commanders so they're not trying to solve that problem at the local level. We ought to be able to broaden that much like we do with language skill, that we do codify. And I think we certainly can do a better job at the second point that you make, about ensuring we scan for the talent within our formation before we start to train it from the grass-roots level.

Any other points?

GEN. HAAS: Yes. So first of all, we want to recruit into the special operations community half of that formation that you were proud to serve in. And then I would recommend you to look at our MAVNI program and other activities that we've done in the special operations community to reach the strategic capability that you were talking about, see the pros and cons that we've had to deal with over the last couple of years since we stood this program up.

It is a great concept and it works in some cases, but it is -- also there are some other significant challenges with it, particularly in incentivizing those that you've identified as strategic in nature to help you with this engagement piece.

GEN. HUGGINS: Have you heard of the Great Skills Program?

Q: I have not, sir.

GEN. HUGGINS: There is work in that lane. We leverage that for some very, very competitive skills that are in high demand. And there are programs to manage the great skills that we require. Can we expand it? Mmm. But as Chris said, there is a pro and a con to that also. Just because you go to a specific region to get a specific capability, you better do a 360 along that lane. But there are certain programs we will certainly look at, and TRADOC has the lead to expand the talent management aperture to see what else we can do to leverage it.

I think the more we get into RAF, I think the more good ideas will come, just as you stated, from those that are out there serving in those units, and they'll give us some good ideas here at the table to turn and work on

GEN. TALLEY: We're looking at that within the Army Reserve. What we're saying is, OK, folks that are out there that are in Compo 1 (sp), not just the Army -- Marine Corps, pick your favorite service; I hope it's Army, by the way -- and they have these cultural and language experiences and that they want to go off and serve the nation other ways after leaving active duty.

We're re-looking, as I mentioned, not only in our civil affairs program but the Army Reserve linguist program, specifically to see if I -- as the CAR, if I can rebalance that and provide out of my own money some incentives to attract those folks. A lot of those folks leave Compo 1 (sp) and go in -- and don't go into Compo 2 (s) or 3 (sp), but then they go work for the State Department or they go work in a number of organizations that the civilian members in this audience represent.

You're perfect to be able to continue to serve your nation in uniform as a member of the Reserve component, particularly in the Army Reserve civil affair linguist community. We can provide some incentive there, and we can also provide linkage with special private sector organizations. I'm looking at all that right now and I'm trying to grow that a little bit as I maybe downsize some of the other capabilities we have in combat support and combat service support. Thanks.

MR. FREIER: I wanted to just add one thing. I think General Huggins mad a really good point that I just want to reinforce, and that is that the way that the current -- the way the policy is headed right now, unless it involves U.S. PACOM or U.S. CENTCOM, everything else gets squeezed out. And so basically, innovation right now -- any innovation that can be protected to anticipate -- to have anticipatory capability in other regions of the world or regions of the world that are not necessarily considered top priorities strategically by the Department of Defense right now is going to -- I think is going to be a giant hedge against what will be an inevitable employment of forces precisely where we're not focused.

So I think that anything that can be done at the service level, frankly, to protect some of this capability is going to be really important.

COL. SMITH: Sir, back here.

Q: Sir, good morning. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Paul Tennant. I'm an exchange officer in the Pentagon in the Department of the Army.

GEN. : Well, God bless you.

Q: Thank you, sir. (Laughter.) It's a privilege to be here.

I'd just like to ask what the Army has already put in place and plans to put in place in the future to harness the historical ties and experience of some of your oldest allies and partners in specific regions, and the

French example in Central Africa, the British in Eastern and Southern Africa, for example, plenty of others in other continents. What are your plans on that front to try and use your relationships with allies and partners to make more of this project?

GEN. : James, why don't you answer that question?

GEN. : I -- (chuckles) -- I was going to ask Colonel Liermont (sp).

GEN. HUGGINS (?): But it's one that -- it's not in force -- (inaudible) -- obviously, but it's one the department has to continue to evolve to and one that initially I would have thought would have been intuitively obvious but it's not, because I think the conditions have caused us all to kind of withdraw a little bit and focus. You know, there's an assumption out there in today's environment that as we draw down, we're just going to depend more upon our allies, and they'll step up. The fallacy with that is, is most of our allies are doing the same thing we're doing. So we're at an impasse, and we'll create a gap.

I think this is a way ahead. And you know, as evidenced by last year's staff talks that we held and the accord we signed together, those are the things that we've got to continue to do. The chief -- I just made a terrific out -- terrific trip out to the Pacific and tried to leverage those. We have got to do more of that in the future, because we've got to bring everybody's capabilities to the table, because unfortunately there were some, as I said before, that are just thinking we can all just go back, focus on our lanes, and depend on partner capacity. I don't think that's been brought together in the total numbers we're at. General Odierno has asked us to do some more detailed look in terms of literally every partner -- potential partner that's out there in terms of what their armies and what their militaries are doing. And as I said, it -- I don't make it, you know, a lackadaisical comment that says most everyone is doing the same thing, except for maybe some near-peer competitors.

GEN. ALLYN: Yeah, let me just give you one example where this is already underway. You know, forces command provides to the Joint Staff the global response force, which is -- the foundation of which is an airborne brigade combat team from 82nd Airborne Division but which includes units from all across the continental United States that bring capabilities for any potential contingency that may be out there.

What we have done is invited our allies that have similar contingency response units in their formations. Your country is one of them. And they have participated with us in recent joint operational access exercises that we've done as we train up our global response force.

And it was pretty exciting this past fall. We had nearly a dozen nations, only two or three of which participated as participating units, but others had senior leaders present because they knew that they needed to -- we needed to learn together about what capabilities we can each bring to bear in case that response is somewhere in their neighborhood, and they might be able to contribute.

So I think that's an example of the great teamwork that's going on with our allies and partners and that we know is going to get stronger as we go forward.

GEN. DONAHUE: Can I give you an example? You know, it's always, you know, difficult in the Pentagon and it's always easier in the field, and in the field in my case it's been very pleasant working with French, English -- Brits and Dutch, for instance. We use BICES to communicate, to pass intelligence to the French in Bamako and Chad, a NATO system. Whoever thought that would be the system we would use? But it's available, proven and it's -- and we're using it.

PAGE 34 10/22/2002 .STX AUSA-PANEL-GEN-ALLYN We have routine intelligence updates where we have the J2 and (Serval?) online with the analysts in 66 MI in Germany with my analysts sharing intelligence assessments of what's going to happen. The Brits are on there too, as a matter of fact. So we have -- I have

10 French officers assisting 21 in a -- with a mission that they're going to train a -- we have at the end of this month, the beginning of November, training a battalion in Guinea, getting ready to go to Mali.

So I think that cooperation is happening in the field because our interests are so obvious out there. And so I think we're probably better off than you may think.

GEN. HAAS: From a special operations perspect (sic), the challenges -- we rely on the theater special operations command to do much of that synchronization with our allies in partner nations. And clearly the funding available that we have to support combined operations with multinational soft partners in a -- in one country is diminishing and becoming less and less. And so I think we're going to have to relook at how do we afford -- how do we resource more opportunities, particularly from a special operations perspective to ensure that we're benefiting from this expertise that exists within our British, French and other allied soft nations. And right now we just don't have an answer and it's going to get tougher for us in the future.

I think --

GEN HUGGINS: I'd say -- thanks.

We really need to -- I need to work with my team and figure out how to bring this more formally into the CPBs and more formally into -- I mean, there's a lot going on and that's what we've all said, but it is a matter of capturing the way ahead with how to get every asset we can put into that theater's security cooperation framework. So we'll take that on.

But thank you very much.

COL. SMITH: Yeah.

Right here.

Q: Colonel Rich Dots (sp), Joint Staff J5, and this is aimed at General Huggins and General Talley. There's the old saw that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. And as we go into a smaller Army, it's going to be more important to utilize the assets we have more effectively and a lot of phase zero kinds of things. And we talked already, if you have to go into the (shape ?) and win piece of it, to some extent, you've failed. But as we go through the force calculation calculus and we're going through the QDR process and things right now, we don't look at phase zero, typically, to generate that demand signal.

So, sir, from a G3/5/7 standpoint and from a USAR standpoint where a lot of those skills that we use in the phase zero piece are, are we looking at modifying that process or taking into account things we could do in phase zero to help create a demand signal or are we working with the COCOMs to do that?

Thank you very much.

GEN. ALLYN: Yeah, before I -- as I give Jim a chance to think about that one, I can hear his wheels turning.

GEN. HUGGINS: Clunking.

GEN. ALLYN: (Laughs.) Let me just capture the -- it's really the Army service component commanders that are capturing that demand signal for us. And that demand signal is on the rise. All we have to look at is the mission alignment order for 14 and 15 is an upward curve.

So that demand signal for the capabilities that are extant within our reserve component and the active component is on the rise. And we are capturing that through our Army service component commanders because, frankly, we're doing a lot out there that as you capture is not necessarily being codified and we're codifying that through our Army service component commanders.

To you, Jim.

GEN. HUGGINS: Thank you, sir. (Laughter.)

He's not a plant, so -- but I would give Colonel Dots (sp) some credit for probably knowing a little more than his question indicated about what's going on. And it is in essence a very, very difficult question.

This last year in the global force management process, PACOM actually did a very, very good job at capturing the demand required to do their phase zero operations. And it really helped the Army. While it is not a force sizing construct, I mean, it helped make the argument that capacity matters, and sometimes capacity matters.

But I will tell you that in an effort, I'm very pleased to see that we're developing right now, working with the Joint Staff, is we're talking about a concept that really goes through, you know, what would be the steady state requirement. Now, you know, if there was a crisis and you had to go fight a major war, but what is the steady state requirement either before that and then post that. You know, our general math that we use in the Army is about for -- and I'll just go to BCT since it's an easier analogy, 12 BCTs is about a steady state requirement for us.

And I won't through the whole list, but that's a few in Afghanistan, that's one in Kuwait with James Terry and one in the peninsula in Korea and whatever, the number's 12. And that's steady state, day-to-day.

If there was some sort of an outbreak and we had to respond to a major theater of war, so now what would the steady state be? And what we're trying to do is get that captured in the demand signal as we look at structure bills and enforce sizing constructs in the future. I mean, we've gone through some scenarios that we would say, hey, well, it depends on how bad we have to -- you know, the situations that we have to respond to.

But one that we think -- because informed by the new normal, we believe we probably should still keep -- even if there is a contingency that breaks up arises, we should keep eight in a steady state. And that would be things like, well, we'd probably commit the GRF first, but we'd have to reconstitute the GRF; it's an Army thing, so we kind of do that.

Then the next one would be -- you know, we probably don't want to take -- especially if maybe the crisis is in the -- in the Pacific, we don't want -- we don't -- we don't take the brigade that's sitting with James Terry and move it, so I probably need to keep that in a steady state.

I don't think Pat Donahue would be real happy if I came down and took 21ID (sp) out, because they haven't got a lot of allocated forces; they certainly have no assigned forces, and he's getting a lot of bang of the buck, so I got to leave that there. I will tell you that we have to make some hard choices for PACOM and some hard choices for SOUTHCOM in the future, because, you know, we're just now moving out with our National Guard partners, in terms of trying to work the 48th Brigade out of Georgia, working Regionally Aligned Forces for SOUTHCOM.

So that theater deterrence force, which would be sort of a floor, we'd have to add that into whatever we need in terms of the other crisis. And a large percentage of that floor are the forces that Jeff Talley has. And I won't -- I won't go there in that regard, because those are the enablers that we committed to build, along with six brigades, for a contingency force pool that we're trying to build in '14 to hedge a little more strategic risk for the chief and the nation.

But I'm hoping, in the construct, without a demand signal, that we get some help with this steady state theater deterrence force that has to exist, regardless of whichever way we shift. I mean, this idea of a swing force, I'm not -- I'm not so sure that it's going to work.

GEN. TALLEY: Well, thanks for the question.

I am fortunate that General Allyn and General Huggins have pretty much answered it. (Scattered laughter.) But you know, I'll say a couple of simplistic or simple things. First off is, as I go around as the CAR and talk to combatant commanders and their DCOs and their teams, first thing I do is reinforce that the Army Senior Service Command is the one-stop shop to the Army Active Guard Reserve, and that a lot of folks forget a really fundamental concept. General Allyn provides -- he's the force provider for all conventional forces in the Army Active Guard Reserve. That's -- those two simple things I just said, it's shocking to me how many people don't know that, even within the Army.

So when you go back to that concept, those Army Reserve engagement cells embedded into the ASCCs and my ARETS, that are already embedded, but we're trying to reorganize them, at the COCOMPs -- the reason they're there is to help the COCOMs send us -- help them send an educated signal on what enablers they need for Phase Zero and to make sure all of that request gets down eventually through the right channels, you know, through FORCECOM to USARC.

The second point that I would make is those cells or teams, which are all on active duty with a one star on active duty in charge of them, to include our ARECs and then our ARETs -- they're linked, as I mentioned, to all of the theater enabling commands that represent that capability for the Army. We're going to -- we're going to have a mirror image of all of those ARECs and ARETs that are not on active duty, that are TPU soldiers, and I -- and I have a benefit of being a commander and a component leader. The Army Reserve is the only component that's also a single command.

So what does that mean to you? That means I don't need to go through the Pentagon to direct order people on active duty with no notice if they're aligned to, say, U.S. Army Pacific. For example -- and I already have about 5,000 in U.S. Army Pacific full-time -- but let's say I've got that AREC cell there, and something comes up where we need to surge the Phase Zero planning capability that gets to those enablers in the Army. I -- it just takes one quick decision by me -- of course, I would talk to my boss, General Allyn -- and boom, you just got 50 more Joes that are there the next day to help you with that critical planning.

By the way, we did this all prior to OIF-1. We used to have -- it was a little more ad hoc relationship. But I'll be a little parochial; let's talk about the great engineer regiment we have in our Army. The ENCOMs, which are both in the Army Reserve, now called Theater Enabling Commands -- they had position forward in 3rd Army, a big planning cell. I was part of that planning cell.

Back then I was a professor at Notre Dame. I got a call on Tuesday night -- it was -- it was during final exams -- said, hey, you got to leave Thursday to get on a plane with your A bag and B bag, and you're going to Kuwait to do immediately emergency planning for early entry into the theater from an engineering perspective, APOD and EPODs (ph), and you're part of that deployable command post, Theater Engineer Command. There's no MOB site (ph). There's no nothing. Get on the plane and go. Luckily, I gave the final exam, graded the papers when I got over to Kuwait and executed the mission that I was assigned. Now, ended up staying there for a while, as you might guess, because OIF -- OEF and -- then it was called OEF -- kicked off. But that's what we did then, and it worked great. And now we're just trying to formalize that through all of our ASCCs and COCOMs.

But I want people -- I want to keep beating the message. The Army Reserve exists for one reason: to serve COMPO 1 and to make sure, through General Allyn, that we're linked and understanding and helping to find that signal, demand signal from those CGs (ph) and the SCCs (ph) in direct support of the total force as aligned through COCOMs. That was a great question.

COL. SMITH: Thank you, sirs.

Right back here, please.

Q: Hi, Sam Himmel (sp), Institute for Defense Analyses. This is another question that sort of comes up, the phase zero concept you've been describing. And earlier you mentioned how important it will be in a lot of the AORs to keep things at phase zero. So is the sort of regionally aligned force construct that you've been talking about this morning -- to what extent does it merit or require a second look at how irregular warfare capabilities are kept resident in the general- purpose forces and not just for SOF support interfacing but for missions they conducted themselves?

GEN. ALLYN: Well, I'll start it, and I'm sure that several teammates'll pile on here. But I think up front, we talked about the ability to provide the full range of military operations capability from within our organic formations to do regionally aligned force capabilities. And I mean, that includes the ability to do advise and assist, that ability to assist a unit if they're dealing with an insurgency. Clearly, we have a lot of expertise within our Army. But I think as we currently look at it, we don't assess that we need to expand the extant capability that we have because we have such broad expertise across the conventional force. And I'll open it up to other panel members that want to pile on.

Yeah, you know I'm looking at you, Chris.

GEN. HAAS: Yes, sir. (Laughter.) So I believe, you know, our Special Warfare Center and School will maintain the lead on irregular warfare for the Army in the future, but certainly the RAF (ph) concept and the increasing frequency of RAF (ph) elements deployment into the theaters provides us a great opportunity for improved SOF and conventional force interdependence, not only back at home station CONUS, but more importantly, forward in theater in support of the combatant commander. And so I think we'll -- we will be able to work a lot of these irregular warfare issues not only in the schoolhouse but then forward in specific countries.

MR. FREIER: I think -- you know, look, the Army's in a -- is going to have a challenge here. And essentially, I hate to return to kind of what's the horse I've been flogging the whole time here, but I mean, look, DOD's essentially retraditionalized defense strategy, right? They basically said, look, we're going to manage the terrorist problem remotely and with **special forces**, and the rest of your problem essentially is going to be either a rising recalcitrant Iran or China, right? And so if it doesn't essentially fall into those two bins, it's going to be low on the -- low in the pecking order.

And all the great efforts on the part of the Army, the Marine Corps -- and I think SOF actually will continue to be able to sort of, you know, benefit from the IW challenge, more so, I think, than the conventional forces will, because frankly, in the effort to sort of constrain the investment of resources, the IW challenge at its worst is a manpower-intensive challenge that, essentially, DOD's trying to divest from in the mainstream, right, and that if they have to actually do it, they say we're going to do with slack; we're -- the slack we have in the reserve component, et cetera.

So I just think, actually, this is going to be a challenge. Actually, what I think will be the most dominant problem for DOD for the next 20 years will also be its -- it -- bureaucratically what it sees as least important.

COL. SMITH: Sir, right here.

Q: Greg Wilcox from SRI International. It occurs to me that one of the problems that we have currently and we're going to have with RAF and that we've had with our allies for some -- (audio break).

GEN./MR. : (Audio break) -- (with the three five ?) --

GEN. ALLYN: Title X -- that's 357.

GEN./MR. : Hoo-ah. (Laughter.)

GEN. HUGGINS: I'm looking for the two for the Title 50 (set ?). I can't find her. So -- (audio break) -- great question. I would say that first off, I'm not a hundred percent with you that -- I think we've made some tremendous increases in terms of our capability to share information, tremendous. Both Chris and I -- General Allyn was on one flank -- he was all -- Chris was all over us in the last year. And you know, we're in there with a pretty strong coalition in terms of trying to work that.

Do we need to get better? Fully acknowledged. Yeah, there is always this disclosure piece we've got to watch.

Access to real-time intel, I -- you know, I -- again, we always want to get better, but I'm going to tell you, I don't -- I don't know how much better it could get. There's always a timely issue, but you know, it takes time to even process orders, not just intelligence. So I'm not as down on it -- on that, but is RAF an opportunity to help that? Absolutely it is.

I can't tell you the number of discussions I've been in and had with the twos of the world and General Agere (sp). It is -- it is generally the guys like us in previous lives who just say, I want it, I want it now, and just do it. And then it doesn't happen for us instantaneously because we didn't ask in a timely manner, and we -- but we come out and we, you know, criticize the system.

I think it's gotten much more responsive. Do -- we can always strive to get better.

I -- obviously it's intuitive that you say with RAF, the more exposure we have with our partners, you know, the more opportunity we have to build relationships to work through those challenges that could exist, rather than throwing a coalition together at the last minute.

So I got to admit that that works, but I also would not stand up on a bandwagon and say that we're absolutely broke. I mean, you know, the things we've put together -- not just Afghanistan but with some of the crisis response elements that we had to do in the recent past -- I think we've leveraged to other countries' capabilities.

Could we do better? Yes. Has there been some oversights? Possibly yes also.

But we're pulling an awful lot of information -- and, you can (argue ?), intelligence in that -- through data systems that have to go through commanders and then has to get processed into decisions.

I'm just not a hundred percent there that we're a hundred percent broke. I do -- I will admit we've got to get better, but -- I don't know if Chris has got any better examples, or the other panel members, but I'll -- I'm -- I firmly believe that RAF can help us. But if commanders ask for the -- for the foreign disclosure approval the day before you cross the (LD?), you might have a problem. And then it's left to the commander to mitigate that risk, which -- I know what General Allyn and I would do, but you know, it -- we're --

GEN. ALLYN: Yeah, and I would tell you, just for everybody in the audience, we all work with allies and partners in the current fight, and we have never prevented relevant intelligence from being provided to our partners to ensure they can protect their force and accomplish their mission.

So don't anybody walk away from here thinking that that would ever happen; it will never happen.

MR. : Right, sir. We have a question online, and then I'll go to you, sir.

The online question has to do with defense support to civilian authorities. And specifically, the question is, what about regional alignment of forces, and how does it apply to (discommissions?)?

GEN. MURPHY (?): Let me try a little bit; we'll see if -- see where this goes. The -- one of the things we do have quite a bit of expertise in in the National Guard is that defense support to civil authorities. Now, depending on what side of the fence you fall down, you're going to call it National Guard support to civil authorities; you're going to call it defense support to civil authorities -- you have to get past that argument to begin with, but the opportunity to work with partner nations on that -- those types of issues that bring a systematic approach to dealing with an emergency -- a crisis in some way, we have a great deal of experience with that.

And so, as it escalates within a country or the opportunity to apply more research to that, we can lend that and have lent that to a number of nations. Israel is probably one of the best examples of a civilian force that incorporates a part-time military with a full-time military. And it escalates fairly quickly in their response and the integration and that kind of thing.

In working with our partner with New York and South Africa, we have gone in and tried to use those parts and pieces that have occurred to us at the state level and those that have managed those to lend expertise in that area. The World Cup, for example -- a number of years ago, we worked with South Africa in bringing some of the law enforcement that we have relationships with to the table and communicated how we do things in New York, for example, through NYPD up through the state, and then where we would need to go with our defense coordinating officer into a Title 10 capability, and that whole range.

And so, again, I think as -- (inaudible) -- look at his countries in Africa, for example, since he's sitting at the table. He has all of those experiences laid out regardless of the component, and we can bring that in a -- to our partners, in this case.

GEN. TALLEY: If I think I understand the question right, I guess the way I would answer it is, this looks to me as -- this is the responsibility of a guy named General Jacoby, the combatant commander of NORTHCOM, because that's how I interpreted the question.

And so who is his one-stop shop for anything Army, active guard or Reserve? It's called Army North, and the CG of Army North. And so the Army Reserve engagement cell is -- there was also one embedded in Army North, where we also have a DCG -- a deputy commanding general for reserve affairs embedded right in there, and then I have an Army Reserve engagement team at NORTHCOM, and those are aligned with special units and capabilities across the United States to provide Army North and General Jacoby with Title 10, immediate response forces that would be dealt with, say, for a complex catastrophe in the event that they would require that.

This also can be taken advantage of under the recent National Defense Act of 2012, particularly 12304a. In fact, the Army Reserve executed this, where we had (pump?) units respond in less than 24 hours' notice over to New York and New Jersey to do dewatering operations at the request of the combatant commander. All of the emergency prepare liaison officers for the entire Department of Defense are actually provided by the -- to the DOD by the Army Reserve, and they're aligned under one of our commands called the 76th ORC, or Operational Readiness Command, commanded by Dan York.

And so we see NORTHCOM and our support to NORTHCOM no different than any combatant command. We provide that direct linkage through the (ARACS?) and the (ARETS?) back down to our formations. By the way, those teams report back to USARC, which reports to General Allen, that way we don't have a separate stovepipe of activity, and what we find is it's worked very well.

We also have the (discommission?) for (desurf?) for certain responsibilities to NORTHCOM. And so right now, we look at strengthening that relationship. And of course, we do this in support of the ASCC and the

COCOM in partnership with our National Guard brothers and sisters who do, you know, the heavy lifting within the states.

So that's how I would answer that question. Hopefully that gets to the sort of answer you're looking for. Thanks.

COL. SMITH: All right. So we have time for one more question -- (inaudible) -- to you.

Q: Colonel Jeff Hartman (sp). I at the chief's Strategic Studies Group. Good morning, gentlemen.

I have two -- I have two related questions. The first is for General Tramond. General Tramond, can you discuss France's multilateral and bilateral efforts and where you think the French armed forces receive the most benefit, whether in Africa or elsewhere?

And for the American panelists, are there any specific plans or efforts right now to build partnership capacity on the conventional side in any specific partners as part of raf (ph)? Thank you.

GEN. TRAMOND: So it's a very interesting question because we have a big involvement in multilateral organizations. We have been in Afghanistan. So we are focusing in interoperability in a NATO force. And this is one of my missions for doctrine, to have a very good interoperability.

We've also big bilateral issues with our allies. I've mentioned the expeditionary force we are preparing with the Brits. We have also some bilateral projects, for example, with the Italians for the brigade mountains. With the German, we have the German-French brigade. So this is bilateral efforts with our allies.

With the African countries, we have an old tradition of military cooperation. I mentioned the agreements we have. So the agreements are not only for an emergency response if there is a main crisis; it's also for prevention. And we have permanent officers and troops that prepare the African units.

I didn't mention the project we have with our American counterpart. We have a yearly training and doctrine conference with the TRADOC. And next is in November, and we will exchange about all we can share with the American our African experience, our training, our -- some issues like that. So I think it's open.

GEN. ALLYN: Thanks, Olivier.

And if I heard your question right about do we have specific plans within regionally aligned forces to develop partner capacity in any part of the globe, we as an army do not. We -- regionally aligned forces are specifically in response to the needs identified, in the requirements identified by the geographic combatant commanders through our Army service component commanders. So as they identify the needs, we will prepare and tailor the force to meet that mission. And we are not generating missions from the Army standpoint.

COL. SMITH: All right, sir, to you for any closing remarks.

GEN. ALLYN: Hey, listen, I appreciate the dialogue. And as I assured Steve (sp), the threat of any more PowerPoint slides was sure to ensure that we had the right mix of questions. But in all seriousness, we appreciate the questions that you've raised. If you have additional questions, Jim Huggins in going to be standing by to answer them. (Laughter.) Just kidding.

It's been great dialogue, and I appreciate the participation from all of the expertise that we have here that's represented in -- if you would please join me in a round of applause for the -- (applause) --

And I'd like to, before I close this out, also give a shout-out to the Association of the United States Army for pulling this panel together and for supporting us in this critical dialogue as part of the Institute for Land Warfare. And we all wish you the best as you continue on here. And AUSA, God bless you and your efforts

and your support to our mission and to our soldiers and particularly for those soldiers deployed overseas and their families back home. God bless you. Thanks. (Applause.)

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#### **Army Times**

May 27, 2013 Monday 1 Edition

### 'It's time to shift focus'

BYLINE: By, Kathleen Curthoys

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VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. - The military must shift its focus to the future and beyond the hard-won lessons of the past decade, the Army's training commander said at a joint conference May 15.

That future should put soldiers in a new Cyber Center of Excellence and a cyber career branch, place iPads in barracks for soldiers to train on, and turn a new focus on the human dimension of conflict, said Gen. Robert Cone, commander of Training and Doctrine Command. He spoke in a keynote address at the EAST: Joint Warfighting 2013 conference here.

"The Army has been comfortable in the last few years in taking lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq," he said. "It's time to shift our focus to the future."

He described a wide range of ideas for the way ahead to an audience of military and industry professionals.

A major new effort to preserve lessons and invest in the future, Cone said, is the initiative to set up the Office of Strategic Landpower, a joint organization being formed by three principal components of landpower.

He said the three components have signed off on the project: Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno, Marine Commandant Gen. James Amos and the chief of U.S. Special Operations Command, Adm. William McRaven. A related white paper is available, which Cone encouraged his audience to read.

The Strategic Landpower initiative is, in part, a response to discussions with Special Operations Forces counterparts and a concern that "we're really afraid what's going to happen when budgets get tight and you guys go back to your corner and we go back to our corner," primary lessons will be lost, Cone said.

The intent now is "to prepare the land force and develop the sort of subsystems that ensure we have a sophisticated understanding of the **human domain,**" Cone said. "The fear I have is unless we pick this up as a key lesson, and put in the energy necessary, we're going to come apart."

That understanding of the human dimension was largely missing in the last decade, Cone said. When the U.S. went to war in Iraq, its forces had an order of battle and a target, but "we really didn't have enough knowledge of the culture, the language, the networks, the tribes," and the Iraqi will in the face of the American forces' "capitulation" mission, Cone said.

In Iraq, " our **special forces** brethren ... really understood that and gained a much more comprehensive understanding of where we were headed," Cone said.

The relevance for war fighters in a future that may bring "loose" weapons of mass destruction, cyber threats and unknown enemies is that conflict will be "driven by the nature of human interaction," he said.

The future for soldiers

The Army needs a cyber career specialty, Cone said.

"The strength of the Army is in longstanding programs, where a young soldier goes into a specific occupational specialty and understands where he will go for the next 25 years," he said. "Right now in the cyber realm, I'm not sure we have that kind of career progression, and career path. We've got to establish that."

The Army also needs a Cyber Center of Excellence, Cone said, and the current proposal is to put it at Fort Gordon, Ga., because that post has the Signal Center of Excellence.

"We have got to shift resources in the U.S. Army ... to put more effort into cyber," Cone said.

One question for the post-Afghanistan future is how to keep "the most digitally enabled generation of youngsters we have ever had" involved and energized.

"The challenge we have is this is a generation of young war fighters who can solve real-world problems and they do not want to sit out ... at Fort Hood and Fort Bragg, etc., and solve pretend problems in a training environment," Cone said.

The Army must "leverage the power of the digital revolution to deliver low-overhead, easy-to-use training solutions," Cone said. "Why can't I have iPads for soldiers in the barracks and have squad leaders lead them?"

The big area of investment for the future is shifting "from the paradigm of big physical [training] structures to smaller handheld applications, where commanders can design their own training objectives and soldiers can execute wherever they are," Cone said.

One real-world mission for soldiers will arrive in the concept of regionally aligned forces.

"They get deployments downrange into these theaters where they've never been before," Cone said, citing the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, which is heading for dozens of missions in Africa.

These missions will put soldiers on the ground to get familiar with the kinds of networks involved, he said.

In a separate panel discussion, the head of the Army Combined Arms Center echoed the theme of preparing for the future, saying he was asked to peer 45 years into the future and predict what U.S. forces will encounter.

Lt. Gen. Dave Perkins said that to put that challenge in perspective, he looked 45 years into the past to come up with this hard-to-predict scenario: In five years, two big buildings would be built in Manhattan, and 20-something years after that two guys would destroy them and because of that, the U.S. would get involved in large armed conflicts around the world. What were the two guys armed with? Box cutters. What was the command and control? A guy in a cave in Afghanistan. What did we do about it? We invaded Irag.

"If I had laid that out 45 years ago that that was the future, I'm sure I would be accused of taking advantage of happy hour a little too early," Perkins said, who quoted Yogi Berra as saying "predictions are difficult, especially about the future."

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#### **Defense News**

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### **U.S. Army Peers Into Uncertain Future**

BYLINE: By, PAUL McLEARY

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Fort Lauderdale, Fla. - As it grapples with what its global mission will look like after more than a decade of combat, the U.S. Army is focusing on a major lesson learned during its most recent wars: the importance of understanding culture, language and relationships when fighting an asymmetric force or partnering with local forces.

One of the key officials working through these issues is Lt. Gen. Keith Walker, director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC).

Speaking Feb. 20 at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) conference here, Walker lamented that the recently completed Unified Quest war game demonstrated "the human is absent in our current doctrine, period. We don't talk about it." In fact, he said the word "human" doesn't even appear in Army doctrine.

That doesn't mean the Army has not adapted to fight insurgents who can blend back into the populations from which they arise. Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, head of the Army Special Operations Command, noted that to meet the battlefield challenges of Iraq and Afghanistan, "we created a whole slew of ad hoc activities like JIEDDO and Female Engagement Teams and Human Terrain Teams," while partnering closely with the State Department and other civilian agencies like Treasury.

"I think the battlefield is telling us something," he said. "In the SOF [Special Operations] field, the things that we did before in El Salvador and Colombia, even the things we did in Vietnam, now have increasing relevance in the fight today ... it's really just an extension of what we are built to do."

Cleveland, whose **Special Forces** soldiers have long paid more attention to culture and language than general purpose forces, concluded rather pragmatically, "I don't know that you can dominate the **human domain**, but I think we need to at least investigate how we become much better war fighters in that space."

To a greater degree than the larger October AUSA conference in Washington, the event here had the feel of a transformational moment, when the critical work of equipping a large force engaged in combat has shifted to a more intellectual exercise focused on preparing for an uncertain future.

In fact, the head of the service's Training and Doctrine Command, Gen. Robert Cone, told the convention during his opening remarks that "our focus must now become setting conditions for the future. The intellectual has got to get in front of the physical."

In a warning to the dwindling number of defense industry representatives who attended, Cone said, "if we look at a very uncertain and fiscally constrained future, we must first and foremost invest in the process." He added, "the reality of it is, with money being much harder to come by, we'll make fewer, but bigger decisions."

The convention took place at the Broward County Convention Center here for perhaps the last time, as the annual winter meeting prepares to move to Raleigh, N.C., next year. A total of 57 Army officers were cleared

to attend the event, down from about 200 in 2012, and those wearing Army green were more than matched in numbers by German, Canadian, French, Australian and British soldiers.

With all of the hazy talk about the "human dimension" of the future battlefield and warnings of disaster if sequestration and the continuing resolution aren't fixed by their March deadlines, the usual subject of recent AUSA conventions - the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan - seemed like distant memories.

One of the few speakers to even utter the names of those conflicts, and to acknowledge that 66,000 U.S. troops are still deployed in Afghanistan, was Army Materiel Command chief Gen. Dennis Via, the man responsible for shipping all of those troops and their gear back home by the end of 2014.

Via warned that if the sequestration cuts and the freeze of the continuing resolution occur, the Army won't be able to afford to fly out of Afghanistan all of the \$22 billion in equipment - out of a total of \$28 billion - as planned.

The expected \$5 billion to \$7 billion shortfall in overseas contingency operations funding, and the lack of airlift "increases our transportation costs as we begin to surge equipment coming out of theater as we did surging equipment to go in," Via said.

Some of the equipment can be trucked through Pakistan, and Via confirmed that "we are starting to move some equipment there, not to the levels that we need of course, and not to the previous levels we enjoyed" before the Pakistani government began curtailing American ground traffic to protest the mistaken bombing of a Pakistani Army outpost in 2011.

As for the ground commanders in Afghanistan, Via added, "they are still in a very, very tough fight as they transition the mission lead to the Afghan Army, so it's retrograding while in contact, and I don't think there can be any more complex mission than what we face there in theater today."

Once the equipment returns home, it will need to be reset and refitted for use. But under sequestration and the continuing resolution, the Army claims that it would have to shutter maintenance depot work in the thirrd and fourth quarters of fiscal 2013. Such a move would push reset work back, idling all the gear that the Army spent so much money bringing home.

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# SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON DELIVERS REMARKS AT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND GALA DINNER

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SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON DELIVERS REMARKS AT THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND GALA DINNER, TAMPA, FLORIDA, AS RELEASED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT

MAY 23, 2012

SPEAKERS: SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

ADMIRAL WILLIAM MCRAVEN (USN), COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

[\*] MCRAVEN: Thank you, Steve. Well, good evening, everyone, and welcome to tonight's gala dinner. Before I begin, please join me in a round of applause for the staff of the Tampa Convention Center and the action officers from USSOCOM who worked so very hard to make this event a great success. (Applause.)

To our international guests, our local, state, and national leaders, our guests from industry, and the National Defense Industrial Association, thank you for making this event a priority in your busy schedule, and for your continued support to Special Operations.

Now I have the great privilege of introducing our guest speaker, a woman who has spent virtually her entire life in the service of our country and in the service of the greater international community. She was the first lady of the state of Arkansas, the first lady of the United States, a U.S. senator from the great state of New York, and since 2009, she has held the position as the U.S. Secretary of State.

In a Time Magazine article last month, she was named one of the top 100 most influential people in the world. In that Time article, the former Secretary of Defense, Bob Gates, said of her, and I quote, "In a world that is ever more complex, turbulent, and dangerous, Secretary Clinton has made a singular contribution to strengthening this country's relationships with allies, partners, and friends, rallying other countries to join us in dealing with challenges to the global order from Libya to Iran to the South China Sea, and reaching out to the people in scores continue -- in scores of countries to demonstrate that America cares about them."

No Secretary in recent memory has had to deal with more international challenges than the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Arab Spring, to the always difficult and challenging North Korea and Iran. In spite of these challenges, she has made incredible strides in safeguarding democratic reforms in Burma, advancing women's rights around the globe, and reshaping the State Department to align the incredible power of our diplomats, the civilian power, with our already strong military power.

Secretary Clinton is beloved by the men and women in the U.S. military. She is our type of lady -- a woman of uncompromising integrity who won't back down from a good fight, particularly when it comes to matters of principle, a leader who is passionate about the welfare of the world's less privileged, the disenfranchised, and the downtrodden, and a Secretary who deeply cares for her people and who is an incredibly strong supporter of our men and women in uniform.

Over the last few years, I have had several opportunities to work with Secretary Clinton on some of the United States's most sensitive military missions. In each case, she listened intently to my advice. In each case, she was instrumental in the final decisions. And in each and every case, she never, ever wavered from

her commitment to the American people. She is, without a doubt, one of the finest public servants ever to serve this great nation.

Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming the United States Secretary of State, The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton. (Applause.)

CLINTON: Good evening. Good evening. It is a great honor for me to be here with you this evening. I want to thank Admiral McRaven for that introduction, but far more than that, for his remarkable service to our country, from leading an underwater demolition SEAL platoon to heading the Joint Special Operations Command. He's doing a terrific job as the ninth commander of the United States Special Operations Command. (Applause.) Many of you know, as Admiral McRaven knows, that it takes real guts to run a mission deep into hostile territory, full of potential dangers. And of course, I'm talking about the White House Correspondents' Dinner. (Laughter.)

I am pleased to be here with so many representatives to this conference from 90 countries around the world. Your participation is a testament to the important partnerships, and I am grateful that you are here. Because we face common challenges, we face common threats, and they cannot be contained by borders and boundaries.

You know that extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected. And today's threats have become so complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone.

From the first days of this Administration, we have worked to craft a new approach to our national security that reflects this changing landscape, starting with better integrating the three Ds of our foreign policy and national security: diplomacy, development, and defense. And we call it smart power.

And I have been privileged to work with two secretaries of Defense, Bob Gates and Leon Panetta, and two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen and Marty Dempsey, who understood and valued the role of diplomacy and development, who saw that we need to work to try to prevent conflict, help rebuild shattered societies, and lighten the load on our military.

For my part, first as a senator serving on the Armed Services Committee and now as Secretary of State, I have seen and admired the extraordinary service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. So we have made it a priority to have our soldiers, diplomats, and development experts work hand-in-hand across the globe. And we are getting better at coordinating budgets and bureaucracies in Washington as well.

To my mind, Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart power -- fast and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages and cultures, dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work together. And we believe that we should work together wherever we can, and go it alone when we must. This model is delivering results.

Admiral McRaven talks about two mutually reinforcing strategies for Special Operations: the direct and the indirect. Well, we all know about the direct approach. Just ask the al-Qaida leaders who have been removed from the battlefield.

But not enough attention is paid to the quiet, persistent work Special Operations Forces are doing every single day along with many of you to build our joint capacity. You are forging relationships in key communities, and not just with other militaries, but also with civil society. You are responding to natural disasters and alleviating humanitarian suffering.

Now, some might ask what does all this have to do with your core mission of war fighting? Well, we've learned -- and it's been a hard lesson in the last decade -- we've learned that to defeat a terror network, we need to attack its finances, recruitment, and safe havens. We also need to take on its ideology and diminish its appeal, particularly to young people. And we need effective international partners in both government and civil society who can extend this effort to all the places where terrorists hide and plot their attacks.

This is part of the smart power approach to our long fight against terrorism. And so we need Special Operations Forces who are as comfortable drinking tea with tribal leaders as raiding a terrorist compound.

We also need diplomats and development experts who understand modern warfare and are up to the job of being your partners.

One of our senior Foreign Service officers, Karen Williams, is serving here in Tampa on Admiral McRaven's staff. And under an agreement finalized this year, we are nearly doubling the number of military and Foreign Service officers who will be exchanged between the Departments of State and Defense. (Applause.) We know we need to better understand each other, and we know that through that better understanding there is even more we can do together.

When I served on the Senate Armed Services Committee, I was impressed by the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Reviews, called the QDR, which guided plans and priorities every four years. So when I became Secretary of State, I launched the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, and we call it the QDDR. Through it, we are overhauling the State Department and USAID to become more operational, more strategic in our use of resources and personnel, more expeditionary, and more focused on transnational threats.

Let me highlight a few examples. As part of the QDDR, we created a new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations that is working to put into practice lessons learned over the past decade and institutionalize a civilian surge capacity to deal with crises and hotspots.

Experts from this new bureau are working closely with Special Operations Forces around the world. I'll give you, though, just this one example from Central Africa, where we are working together to help our African partners pursue Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army. In fact, they were on the ground a few months before our troops arrived, building relationships in local communities. And because of their work, village chiefs and other leaders are actively encouraging defections from the Lord's Resistance Army. Just a few weeks ago, our civilians and troops together helped one community set up its own radio station that is now broadcasting "come home" messages to the fighters. Our diplomats also saw that the UN staff in the region could be useful partners. So they worked through our team in Washington and New York to obtain new authorities for the UN officials on the ground and then link them up directly with our Special Operations Forces to share expertise and improve coordination. Now, this mission isn't finished yet, but you can begin to see the potential when soldiers and diplomats live in the same camps and eat the same MREs. That is smart power in action.

Here's another example. We know we need to do a better job contesting the online space, media websites and forums where al-Qaida and its affiliates spread their propaganda and recruit followers. So at the State Department, we've launched a new interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. It's housed at the State Department, but it draws on experts from the intelligence community and the Defense Department, including Special Operations Forces.

The nerve center in Washington is linking up to military and civilian teams around the world and serving as a force multiplier for our embassies' communications efforts. Together, we are working to pre-empt, discredit, and outmaneuver extremist propagandists. A digital outreach team of tech savvy specialists -- fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Somali -- is already patrolling the web and using social media and other tools to expose the inherent contradictions in al-Qaida's propaganda and also bring to light the abuses committed by al-Qaida, particularly the continuing brutal attacks on Muslim civilians.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, al-Qaida's affiliate in Yemen began an advertising campaign on key tribal web sites bragging about killing Americans and trying to recruit new supporters. Within 48 hours, our team plastered the same sites with altered versions of the ads that showed the toll al-Qaida attacks have taken on the Yemeni people. And we can tell that our efforts are starting to have an impact, because we monitor the extremists venting their frustration and asking their supporters not to believe everything they read on the Internet. (Applause.)

Now, this kind of ideological battle is slow and incremental, but I think it's critical to our efforts, because what sustains al-Qaida and its terrorist affiliates is the steady flow of new recruits. They replace the terrorists you kill or capture so that they can plan new attacks. This is not about winning a popularity contest, but it is a simple fact that achieving our objectives is easier with more friends and fewer enemies. And I believe passionately that the truth is our friend. Exposing the lies and evil that rests at the heart of the terrorist narrative is absolutely to our advantage.

Now, we've also changed the way we do business on the civilian side to be better partners to you in the military. As part of our reorganization, we've created a full Counterterrorism Bureau at the State Department that is spearheading a diplomatic campaign around the world to increase local capacity of governments and to deny terrorists the space and financing they need to plan and carry out attacks.

This fits right in with the purpose of this conference: deepening international cooperation against terrorism and other shared challenges. As the threat from al-Qaida becomes more diffuse and distributed, shifting from the core to the affiliates, it is even more important to forge close ties with the governments and communities on the front lines and to help build up their counterterrorism capacity. After all, they often are better positioned than we are to provide services to their people, disrupt plots, and prosecute extremists, and they certainly often bear the brunt of terrorist attacks. So we need to build an international counterterrorism network that is as nimble and adaptive as our adversaries'. Admiral McRaven helped establish the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre, so I know he understands how important this is.

Each year, the State Department trains nearly 7,000 police, prosecutors, and counterterrorism officials from more than 60 countries, including front line states like Yemen and Pakistan. We're expanding our work with civil society organizations in specific terrorist hotspots -- particular villages, prisons, and schools -- to try to disrupt the process of radicalization by creating jobs, promoting religious tolerance, amplifying the voices of the victims of terrorism.

This whole effort goes hand-in-glove with the work of Special Operations Forces to train elite troops in places like the Philippines, Colombia, and Afghanistan under the Army **Special Forces** motto: By, with, and through. You're doing this in one form or another in more than 100 countries around the world. And this work gives you a chance to develop a deeper understanding of local culture and customs, to learn the **human domain** as well as the physical terrain.

I'm impressed by the work of your Cultural Support Teams, highly- trained female Special Operations Forces who engage with local populations in sensitive areas like Afghanistan. This is part of our National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security that was developed jointly by the Departments of State, Defense, and others to capitalize on the contributions women everywhere can make to resolving conflicts and improving security. Around the world today, women are refusing to sit on the sidelines while extremism undermines their communities, steals their sons, kills their husbands, and destroys family after family. (Applause.) They're joining police forces in Afghanistan. They're writing newspaper articles in Yemen. They're forming organizations such as Sisters Against Violent Extremism that has now spread to 17 countries. And we are committed to working with these women and doing everything we can to support their efforts as well.

We have to keep our international cooperation going and growing at every level. Next week I'll be heading to Europe, and I'll end up in Istanbul for the second meeting of the new Global Counterterrorism Forum, which we helped launch last year. Turkey and the United States serve as the founding co-chairs, and we've been joined by nearly 30 other nations. Together, we're working to identify threats and weaknesses like porous borders, unchecked propaganda, and then devise solutions and mobilize resources. For example, the UAE has agreed to host a new center to develop best practices for countering extremism and radicalization.

Now, some of you in this room have come great distances to be here because you understand that we need a global effort to defeat a global terrorist network. And I thank you for that recognition and for your commitment.

I want to say just a final word about American **Special Forces** and to thank the admiral and every member of the United States Special Operations Forces who are here today -- Army Rangers and **Special Forces** soldiers, Navy SEALs and Marine special operators, Air Force commandos, every one of you. So much of what you do, both the tremendous successes and the terrible sacrifices, will never be known by the citizens we serve. But I know what you do, and so do others who marvel and appreciate what it means for you to serve.

We've just passed the one-year anniversary of the raid that killed Osama bin Laden. (Applause.) And I well remember those many hours in the Situation Room, the small group that was part of the planning and decision-making process with Admiral McRaven sitting there at the table with us. And I certainly remember that day. We were following every twist and turn of that mission. It was a day of stress and emotion, concern and commitment. I couldn't help but think of all the people that I represented as a senator from New York

serving on 9/11 and how much they and all of us deserved justice for our friends and our loved ones. I was thinking about America and how important it was to protect our country from another attack. But mostly, I was thinking of the men in the helicopters, praying for their safety as they risked their lives on that moonless Pakistani night.

And one thing that I am always proud of and that I hope is conveyed to our visitors and partners around the world: When you meet our special operators or when you meet members of our military or our diplomats and development experts, you will see every shade of skin color, every texture of hair, every color of eye. And if you spend a little time talking and getting to know that man or woman, you will find different parentage, different ethnicity, different religions, because we are Americans. And as Americans, we have a special opportunity and obligation in this interdependent, interconnected world to stand up for the universal rights and dignity of every person; to protect every man, woman, and child from the kind of senseless violence that terrorism inflicts; and also, frankly, to model.

In many places where we go, I as a Secretary of State or our **special forces** as members of our military, we see ancient disputes between tribes, ethnicities, religions, sex of the same religion, men and women. Just about every possible category is used all too often to separate people instead of finding common ground. If we have learned nothing in the last decade, we should certainly have learned that the terrorists are equal opportunity killers. They want to inflict terror on everyone who does not see the world from their particular narrow, outdated, dead-end worldview.

When you are pursuing a mission in partnership or on behalf of your own country, let us remember that we are on the right side of history. We are on the side of right. Your service is making the world safer for people to be who they are, to live their lives in peace and harmony. That is going to be the challenge of the 21st century. Will we once and for all recognize our common humanity and stand together against the forces of darkness or not? I'm betting we will. And I think it's a pretty good bet, knowing that our Special Operations Forces and their partners are at the point of that spear.

Thank you for all that you do, not only to keep us safe and protect our ways of life but to demonstrate unequivocally that the world will not tolerate being undermined by those who refuse to recognize that we are truly one world of humanity that deserves the opportunity to pursue our rights and opportunities for a better life. I am very proud to be here to thank you. Thank you for keeping our nation safe and strong. Thank you for working to keep other nations safe and strong. Thank you for helping us build the world that our children deserve.

Thank you all very much. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, the commander will now present our guest of honor with a token of our appreciation.

MCRAVEN: Madam Secretary, a small token of our appreciation for joining us here tonight. This is, as you quickly noted, our version of Excalibur, the sword and the stone. And of course, as legend has it, only the wisest and the bravest can pull the sword from the stone. My guess is it will come out easily in your hand. So thank you very much, ma'am, for joining us here tonight. Thank you very much.

CLINTON: Thank you so much, Admiral. (Applause.)

**END** 

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