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12 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
13 COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES  
14

15 YOUNES YOUNES, on behalf of himself  
16 and all others similarly situated,

17 Plaintiff,

18 v.

19 ELVIRA TAYLOR and DOES 1 through 200,  
20 inclusive,

21 Defendants.

Case No. 24STCV12520

**MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND  
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS  
CERTIFICATION**

[Notice of Motion, Statement Regarding Class  
Notice, Proposed Notice of Pending Class Action,  
Declarations of Younes Younes, Adam Zarazinski,  
Shaun Martin, and Nicole G. Malick, and  
Proposed Order Filed Concurrently Herewith]

Assigned for All Purposes to Hon. Elihu Berle

Date: May 7, 2025  
Time: 11:00 A.M.  
Place: 312 N. Spring Street,  
Los Angeles, CA 90012  
Dept. 6

Action Filed: May 17, 2024  
Trial Date: None

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1 Plaintiff Younes Younes (“Plaintiff”) submits this memorandum of law in support of his  
2 motion under for an order: (1) certifying a class as defined below, (2) appointing him to be Class  
3 Representative, and (3) appointing Plaintiff’s counsel as Class Counsel.

4 **I. INTRODUCTION**

5 Plaintiff seeks certification of a class of at least 325 individuals who suffered losses in a  
6 cryptocurrency scam orchestrated by Defendants. Posing as recruiters, Defendants directed Plaintiff  
7 and other class members to a fake online job platform, claiming they could accumulate earnings by  
8 performing various tasks. After misleading Plaintiff into believing he had earned substantial amounts  
9 in the online platform, they demanded additional “recharge” payments from him, falsely asserting that  
10 these deposits were necessary to unlock the purported earnings. Plaintiff and other class members  
11 transferred substantial cryptocurrency holdings into wallets controlled by Defendants. For example,  
12 Plaintiff personally transferred over \$400,000 to Defendants pursuant to this scheme.

13 Defendants then stole all of these funds, which were then transferred by Defendants through a  
14 deliberate and complex series of transactions intended to conceal their origin. The cryptocurrency was  
15 routed through multiple addresses and cycled through layered transactions before ultimately being  
16 consolidated in identifiable cryptocurrency deposit wallets at Binance and OKX. Plaintiff filed suit,  
17 and this Court promptly entered a temporary restraining order, and subsequently a preliminary  
18 injunction, that froze those funds. Plaintiff now seeks an order certifying the class so that it may return  
19 to the hundreds of defrauded class members the over \$1 million in stolen funds.

20 A class action is the most efficient and equitable means of resolving these claims — ensuring  
21 recovery is achieved through collective action that aligns with the structure of Defendants’ coordinated  
22 deception. Plaintiff therefore moves this Court to certify the class.

23 This case readily satisfies the prerequisites for class certification. Each class member’s claim  
24 arises from the same calculated and coordinated scheme of deception regarding the legitimacy of the  
25 fake online platform and the need for additional payments. The stolen funds obtained from these  
26 victims were ultimately pooled in specific, identifiable cryptocurrency wallets that have since been  
27 frozen by this Court. Class certification will enable these frozen assets to be returned to their rightful  
28 owners: the 300+ members of the class victimized by the Defendants.

1 Plaintiff and proposed class counsel are well-prepared to lead this action, having already  
2 secured court orders freezing the cryptocurrency wallets to which Defendants transferred and retain  
3 the misappropriated funds. A class action is the most efficient and equitable means of resolving these  
4 claims and securing potential recovery for all individuals affected by Defendants’ scheme. Plaintiff  
5 therefore moves this Court to certify the class.

6 **II. THE PROPOSED CLASS**

7 Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Class:

8 All persons whose property was converted by Defendants using fake  
9 online platforms and then routed and deposited at the OKX and  
10 Binance deposit addresses set forth in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint  
in this action.

11 Excluded from the Class are Defendants, the officers, directors, and affiliates of Defendants at  
12 all relevant times, members of their immediate families, their legal representatives, heirs, successors  
13 or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest.

14 **III. BACKGROUND**

15 **A. Factual Background**

16 In January 2024, Plaintiff Younes Younes, a California resident, was contacted via WhatsApp  
17 by an individual identifying herself as “Elvira Taylor.” Declaration of Younes Younes dated April 5,  
18 2025 (“Younes Decl.”), ¶ 3. Taylor claimed to offer Plaintiff a part-time online job opportunity that  
19 promised substantial cryptocurrency earnings. *Id.* She directed Plaintiff to a fake online platform  
20 where he completed various tasks, believing that he was accumulating substantial earnings based on  
21 Taylor’s representations. Younes Decl., ¶ 4.

22 After Plaintiff purportedly earned funds through the platform, Defendants falsely claimed that  
23 Plaintiff had to make additional “recharge” payments to “validate” his account and maintain his  
24 “eligibility” to withdraw his accumulated earnings. *Id.* Relying on Defendants’ representations,  
25 Plaintiff ultimately transferred over \$400,000 in cryptocurrency into wallets controlled by Defendants.  
26 *Id.* Unbeknownst to Plaintiff at the time, this platform was part of a coordinated scheme to defraud  
27 victims through calculated deception and misrepresentation. No matter how much Plaintiff paid  
28 Defendants, and no matter how many times he attempted to withdraw his so-called “earnings,”

1 Plaintiff was never able to recover either the funds he had transferred or the promised returns. Younes  
2 Decl., ¶ 4.

3 When it became clear that his funds were inaccessible, Plaintiff and his counsel engaged Inca  
4 Digital (“Inca”), a blockchain tracing firm with extensive expertise in tracing stolen digital assets.  
5 Younes Decl., ¶ 5; Declaration of Adam Zarazinski dated April 4, 2025 (“Zarazinski Decl.”), ¶ 3.  
6 Inca’s forensic tracing investigation revealed that Defendants operated a structured laundering scheme  
7 designed to obscure the origin and movement of victim funds. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14.

8 Inca’s forensic tracing revealed a deliberate, coordinated movement of misappropriated assets.  
9 Plaintiff and other victims were instructed by Defendants to send their initial asset transfers to specific  
10 wallets that Defendants controlled. These wallets are referred to as “Pivot Wallets” because they  
11 operate as key control points where victim deposits are aggregated before being redirected through  
12 multiple onward transactions — effectively “pivoting” the flow of stolen funds to break clean  
13 transaction links and obscure their origin. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 5. This deliberate blending tactic ensured  
14 individual victim transactions became indistinguishable before being routed onward through services  
15 designed to further frustrate traceability. *Id.*

16 Following this aggregation and dispersal, Plaintiff’s funds, like those of other victims, were  
17 fragmented through conversion services and ultimately deposited in Defendant-controlled wallets at  
18 centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, Binance and OKX. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 6–7.

19 In this case, Defendants consistently relied on the following four Pivot Wallets to consolidate  
20 victim deposits:

21 0x49f8B7feEE8C0B85ff61F2d7c38Af809614515Df

22 0x64E5f1a2480a3967EDD30b0b400Daf18422cE552

23 0x26196D89281e89f910c187b992C47C90D8200283

24 0x803BD7f6346127E0098d8a6f4aA3996410097aC1

25 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 5.

26 After consolidating victim funds in Pivot Wallets, Defendants employed cryptocurrency  
27 conversion services — including SWFT.PRO and OKX DEX Aggregation — to convert stolen  
28 Ethereum (ETH) into USDT on the TRON blockchain. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 5–6. This conversion

1 process fragmented the transaction path, severing the original Ethereum trail that linked victim  
2 deposits to Defendants’ accounts. *Id.* By shifting funds to a separate blockchain network, this  
3 maneuver significantly complicated recovery efforts and masked the connection between victims’  
4 initial deposits and the endpoint destinations. *Id.*

5 After the conversion process, Defendants transferred the laundered funds through additional  
6 intermediary wallets before consolidating the stolen assets in known Deposit Wallets at Binance and  
7 OKX. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 6–7. These Deposit Wallets serve as the final known destinations for stolen  
8 assets and were identified through Inca’s comprehensive tracing analysis (herein, “Deposit Wallets”).  
9 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 7. The presence of misappropriated funds in these wallets provided objective  
10 evidence that Defendants employed a structured laundering pattern designed to conceal victim  
11 deposits. *Id.*

12 As part of its forensic tracing investigation, Inca performed reverse tracing from the identified  
13 Binance and OKX Deposit Wallets and Pivot Wallets. This analysis tracked fund flows backward to  
14 identify originating sources of deposits — revealing that these sources were centralized exchange  
15 wallets controlled by additional victims. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 8. Inca’s reverse tracing confirmed that  
16 these originating accounts (referred to as “Victim Wallets” herein) belonged to approximately 325  
17 class members whose assets were misappropriated through the same laundering scheme. *Id.*

18 In addition to moving victim funds through structured transactions, Defendants employed a  
19 calculated manipulation tactic designed to build victim trust and encourage additional deposits.  
20 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 9. Defendants consistently used two specific wallets (referred to as “Staged Return  
21 Wallets” herein) to send small payments back to Victim Wallets that had previously transferred funds  
22 to Pivot Wallets at Defendants’ direction. This tactic created the false impression that victims were  
23 earning legitimate returns — convincing them that the platform was reliable and encouraging larger  
24 deposits. *Id.*

25 The two wallets used to issue these staged returns were:

26 0xA86545f9DCDd98869536401A76759Fd1227aAf29

27 0xe0227298588541484E81c44f7C3D107e3C3aAEaf

28 *Id.*



1 By fostering the belief that their accounts were secure and actively generating income, this  
2 manipulation tactic encouraged victims to send increasingly larger deposits. *Id.* This tactic was  
3 employed repeatedly across numerous victim transactions, reinforcing the broader pattern of  
4 calculated deception observed in Inca’s forensic analysis. *Id.*

5 By tracing both the structured movement of victim deposits and the recurring pattern of staged  
6 return payments, Inca successfully identified 325 class members whose transactions reflected these  
7 same tracing markers. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 10. These consistent transactional markers provided Inca  
8 with a reliable, data-driven method of identifying class members. *Id.* By analyzing these recurring  
9 markers across hundreds of transactions, Inca concluded that Defendants’ coordinated tactics impacted  
10 Plaintiff and the proposed class in the same way. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14.

#### 11 **B. Procedural Background**

12 On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint (the “Complaint”) asserting claims for  
13 conversion and money had and received. Plaintiff thereafter promptly filed an *ex parte* application for  
14 a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to freeze the particularized cryptocurrency assets identified  
15 by Inca, and listed in paragraph 22 of the Complaint, currently held in OKX and Binance wallets, in  
16 which Defendants stored the misappropriated funds from Plaintiff and the class. On June 26, 2024, the  
17 Court issued a TRO that froze these particular cryptocurrency wallets, along with an Order to Show  
18 Cause (“OSC”) that directed Defendants to appear and contest the issuance of Preliminary Injunction.

19 Plaintiff provided Defendants notice through court-approved service methods, including  
20 delivery to their cryptocurrency wallets via special-purpose tokens with hyperlinks to a dedicated  
21 website containing the Complaint, summons, TRO, OSC, and supporting documents. No Defendant  
22 has appeared or contested this action.

23 On August 5, 2024, the Court held a hearing pursuant to its Order to Show Cause, which  
24 directed Defendants to appear and contest Plaintiff’s request for a Preliminary Injunction. No  
25 Defendant appeared at the hearing, and the Court granted the requested relief, issuing a Preliminary  
26 Injunction to freeze the specific cryptocurrency assets identified in paragraph 22 of the Complaint held  
27 by Defendants in wallets at OKX and Binance. This injunction remains in place to prevent the  
28 dissipation of misappropriated funds and to safeguard the assets stolen from Plaintiff and other victims.

1 Plaintiff, with the assistance of tracing experts, continued to analyze blockchain transactions to  
2 identify additional victims whose assets were similarly misappropriated, and has now identified at  
3 least 325 other particularized victims of Defendants’ scam whose converted assets are held in the  
4 specific cryptocurrency wallets identified in the Complaint and frozen by this Court.

5 **IV. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT CLASS CERTIFICATION**

6 **A. Legal Standard**

7 A class action may proceed “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of  
8 many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the  
9 court.” C.C.P. § 382. To satisfy this provision, a class action must meet three requirements: (1) an  
10 ascertainable and sufficiently numerous class; (2) a community of interest; and (3) substantial benefits  
11 to justify class action treatment over individual actions. *Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court* (2012)  
12 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1021. The “community of interest” requirement in turn embodies three factors: (1)  
13 predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) typicality of claims or defenses; and (3) adequate  
14 representation of the class. *Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.

15 While California courts frequently refer to federal precedent in the absence of state guidance,  
16 California has not adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and trial courts are encouraged to apply  
17 “pragmatism and flexibility” in managing class actions.<sup>1</sup> Trial courts, with their unique insight into  
18 the facts, are therefore “afforded great discretion” in deciding whether to grant or deny certification.  
19 *Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co.* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435. The California Supreme Court has particularly  
20 encouraged trial courts to be “procedurally innovative” in managing class actions involving complex  
21 or novel claims. *Duran v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 33.

22 **B. The Proposed Class Meets California’s Certification Requirements**

23 **1. The Class Is Ascertainable and Sufficiently Numerous**

24 The numerosity requirement “is indefinite and has been construed liberally,” with no minimum  
25 number required to proceed as a class action. *Hendershott v. Ready to Roll Transportation, Inc.* (2014)  
26 228 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1222. Courts have certified classes as small as ten when joinder of all members

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27  
28 <sup>1</sup> See *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 240 (disapproved on other grounds  
by *Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware, Inc.* (2018) 4 Cal.App.5th 260, 269–70).

1 is impracticable. *Bowles v. Superior Court* (1955) 4 Cal.2d 574, 587. The proposed class here includes  
2 approximately 325 victims of Defendants’ scam, each of whom has assets traceable to the specific  
3 Deposit Wallets identified in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 10. These 325 victims  
4 easily satisfy the numerosity requirement.

5 The members of the class are also ascertainable. “It is firmly established a plaintiff is not  
6 required at this stage of the proceedings to establish the identity of class members.” *Nicodemus v. St.*  
7 *Francis Hospital* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1217. A class is sufficiently ascertainable when it is  
8 defined by objective characteristics and transactional facts that enable practical identification of its  
9 members. *Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.* (2019) 7 Cal.5th 955, 980.

10 Inca’s forensic analysis began with Plaintiff’s verifiable transaction data. Forward tracing  
11 followed Plaintiff’s cryptocurrency transfers, starting with the specific wallet addresses Defendants  
12 first instructed him to use when depositing funds under the false belief he was funding a legitimate  
13 platform account. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. From the wallets where his funds were first directed,  
14 Plaintiff’s stolen assets were tracked through Defendants’ calculated laundering process—a structured  
15 network of transactions that ultimately reached specific, identified Deposit Wallets under Defendant’s  
16 control at Binance and OKX. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 6-7.

17 Reverse tracing then tracked inflows into those Deposit Wallets, confirming that additional  
18 funds followed the same structured movement pattern, ultimately leading back to originating Victim  
19 Wallets. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 8. These Victim Wallets—held on these two centralized exchanges—  
20 represent the accounts of identifiable class members whose cryptocurrency was misappropriated as  
21 part of the same scheme. *Id.* This structured movement pattern—repeatedly observed across hundreds  
22 of victim transactions—is an objective, data-driven indicator that each victim was defrauded through  
23 the same coordinated scheme. *Id.* This forensic evidence confirms that class membership can be  
24 reliably determined through immutable blockchain data, satisfying the ascertainability requirement.  
25 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 11.

26 Specifically, the tracing analysis confirmed that all victim funds were initially directed into  
27 one or more of four designated wallets — referred to as “Pivot Wallets” because they operated as key  
28 control points where victim deposits were deliberately aggregated before Defendants “pivoted” stolen

1 funds outward through multiple onward transactions. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 5. This calculated tactic—a  
2 deliberate laundering method —broke clean transaction links and attempted to obscure the original  
3 sources of the misappropriated funds. *Id.* Defendants specifically and consistently used four Pivot  
4 Wallets to receive victims’ funds:

5 0x49f8B7feEE8C0B85ff61F2d7c38Af809614515Df

6 0x64E5f1a2480a3967EDD30b0b400Daf18422cE552

7 0x26196D89281e89f910c187b992C47C90D8200283

8 0x803BD7f6346127E0098d8a6f4aA3996410097aC1

9 *Id.*

10 In addition to directing victim funds into Pivot Wallets and thereafter controlling the structured  
11 flow of victim funds—strategically redistributing those funds through additional transactions, and  
12 ultimately funneling the stolen assets into Deposit Wallets—Defendants also employed a calculated  
13 deception tactic designed to build victim confidence and encourage additional deposits. Zarazinski  
14 Decl., ¶ 9. Defendants used two specific wallet addresses to issue small, staged return payments—  
15 falsely presented as platform “earnings” that created the illusion of legitimate returns. *Id.* These two  
16 wallets, referred to herein as Staged Return Wallets, include:

17 0xA86545f9DCDd98869536401A76759Fd1227aAf29

18 0xe0227298588541484E81c44f7C3D107e3C3aAEaf

19 *Id.* By consistently relying on these two specific wallets to send “staged returns” to Victim Wallets,  
20 Defendants reinforced the illusion that victims were accumulating legitimate earnings, thereby  
21 encouraging larger deposits and deepening the victims’ financial losses. *Id.*

22 Moreover, the consistent use of these two wallets provided Inca with an additional objective  
23 data point for identifying class members. The recurring pattern of staged returns, combined with the  
24 structured flow of funds into Pivot Wallets and the convergence of stolen assets in Binance and OKX  
25 Deposit Wallets, allowed Inca analysts to reliably identify the 325 Victim Wallets that make up the  
26 proposed class. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 10. These two data points—Pivot Wallet inflows and Staged Return  
27 Wallet outflows—were both distinct and consistent across victim transactions, providing an objective  
28 basis for identifying class members. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 10.

1 Inca’s forensic tracing analysis confirmed that the 325 identified class members were reliably  
2 identified by observing these consistent transactional markers: (a) funds originating from Victim  
3 Wallets were deposited into one of four designated Pivot Wallets; and (b) those same Victim Wallets  
4 received staged return payments from at least one of the two identified Staged Return Wallets. *Id.* By  
5 reverse-tracing cryptocurrency inflows into identified Deposit Wallets and Pivot Wallets, and  
6 analyzing these two consistent data points in combination, Inca reliably identified 325 Victim Wallets  
7 as the originating points for misappropriated assets. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 10. These Victim Wallets, held  
8 on centralized exchanges, represent the identifiable class members whose assets were similarly  
9 misappropriated. *Id.*

10 Class membership is sufficiently ascertainable because it is based on public blockchain records  
11 documenting specific transactions into specifically identified Defendant-controlled Pivot Wallets and  
12 the Deposit Wallets at Binance and OKX. *Id.* In cryptocurrency cases, courts have routinely held that  
13 blockchain transaction records — due to their public and immutable nature — provide a sufficiently  
14 objective method to identify class members. See, e.g., *Balestra v. Cloud With Me, Ltd.* (W.D. Pa. July  
15 2, 2020), Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-00804, 2020 WL 4370392, \*5; *Audet v. Fraser* (D. Conn. 2019)  
16 332 F.R.D. 53, 72. The same is true here. Blockchain tracing confirms that victim transactions  
17 consistently followed the same structured movement pattern, providing an objective method for  
18 identifying class members based on transactional data. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 11. Class members are  
19 sufficiently ascertainable.

## 20 **2. The Class Shares a Community of Interest**

### 21 *(a) Common Questions Predominate*

22 Significant common questions of law and fact are central to this case. Defendants executed a  
23 structured scheme that directed victims to deposit cryptocurrency into wallets under their control.  
24 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 5. Inca’s forensic tracing analysis confirms that funds from class members,  
25 including Plaintiff Younes, followed a consistent movement pattern. Each victim’s funds were  
26 directed into one or more of four designated Pivot Wallets — addresses Defendants routinely used to  
27 consolidate victim deposits. *Id.* These four Pivot Wallets include:

1 0x49f8B7feEE8C0B85ff61F2d7c38Af809614515Df  
2 0x64E5f1a2480a3967EDD30b0b400Daf18422cE552  
3 0x26196D89281e89f910c187b992C47C90D8200283  
4 0x803BD7f6346127E0098d8a6f4aA3996410097aC1

5 *Id.*

6 From these Pivot Wallets, Defendants deliberately routed stolen assets through cryptocurrency  
7 conversion services such as SWFT.PRO and OKX DEX Aggregation, exchanging Ethereum (ETH)  
8 for USDT on the TRON blockchain to sever transaction links between Victim Wallets and their  
9 Deposit Wallets. This calculated maneuver shifted assets to a separate blockchain network, further  
10 attempting to obscure the true origin of misappropriated funds. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 6.

11 Following this conversion process, Defendants transferred the laundered funds through  
12 additional intermediary wallets before consolidating them in the known Deposit Wallets at Binance  
13 and OKX identified in Paragraph 22 of the Complaint. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 7. These Deposit Wallets  
14 represent the final known destinations of victims’ misappropriated assets. *Id.*

15 This structured movement pattern—consistently observed across hundreds of victim  
16 transactions—reflects Defendants’ deliberate use of layering tactics to conceal stolen funds.  
17 Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14. Each victim’s assets passed through the same sequence of controlled wallets,  
18 confirming a coordinated scheme that impacted all class members similarly. *Id.*

19 In addition to asset movement, Defendants reinforced their scheme by issuing staged return  
20 payments from two scam-controlled wallets—referred to as “Staged Return Wallets”—that were  
21 falsely presented as platform “earnings.” Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 9. This tactic encouraged additional  
22 victim deposits and was repeatedly observed across class member transactions, demonstrating that  
23 Defendants’ manipulation tactics were calculated, uniform, and consistently applied. *Id.*

24 The predominance inquiry asks whether “the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared  
25 with those requiring separate adjudication, are so numerous or substantial that the maintenance of a  
26 class action would be advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.” *Brinker Rest. Corp. v.*  
27 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1022. The fact that each class member may perhaps be  
28 required to establish eligibility and damages individually does not preclude a finding of predominance.

1 Rather, the court considers whether a class-wide proceeding would more efficiently resolve the core  
2 issues. *Brinker*, 53 Cal.4th at 1021-22; *Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors* (1987) 196  
3 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1278.

4 This case presents common factual and legal questions that arise from Defendants' scheme.  
5 Defendants instructed class members that transferring funds to them was necessary to "unlock" funds  
6 that they had earned. Core common questions include:

- 7 i.) Whether Defendants misrepresented the legitimacy of the online  
8 platform and the requirement of additional deposits to access  
9 earnings;
- 10 ii.) Whether Defendants engaged in a coordinated scheme to  
11 defraud class members of their assets;
- 12 iii.) Whether Defendants used specific pivot and endpoint wallets to  
13 route and conceal stolen funds;
- 14 iv.) Whether Defendants' actions caused economic harm to the class  
15 members; and
- 16 v.) The extent to which Plaintiff and class members are entitled to  
17 damages.

18 Courts have long recognized that where claims stem from a common course of conduct  
19 involving standardized misrepresentations, common issues predominate. *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v.*  
20 *Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 331; *Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1976) 18 Cal.3d  
21 355, 362. Here, Inca's forensic tracing analysis conclusively establishes that Defendants' scheme  
22 followed a coordinated pattern that impacted all 325 class members in the same way. Zarazinski Decl.,  
23 ¶ 14. Each victim's claims rest on the same fraudulent scheme.

24 While class members may have suffered different levels of financial loss, "[a]s a general rule  
25 if the defendant's liability can be determined by facts common to all members of the class, a class will  
26 be certified even if the members must individually prove their damages." *Brinker Rest. Corp. v.*  
27 *Superior Court* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1022; *Occidental*, 18 Cal.3d at 363-64. Here, publicly  
28 verifiable blockchain data provides an objective and reliable method for identifying class members  
and quantifying their losses. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 11.

Defendants' scheme followed a structured, uniform methodology that impacted all victims  
similarly. Each victim's funds followed the same movement pattern, each victim was subjected to the  
same staged return tactic, and Defendants funneled all victim deposits through the same network of  
controlled wallets. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14. Inca's forensic analysis conclusively traces this pattern with

1 precision. Each victim’s assets were tracked from originating Victim Wallets to Pivot Wallets, through  
2 intermediary addresses, and ultimately into Deposit Wallets at Binance and OKX. Zarazinski Decl.,  
3 ¶¶ 5–7. This repeatable transaction pattern confirms Defendants employed a coordinated scheme that  
4 moved stolen assets in a deliberate, traceable sequence. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14.

5 Every victim was affected by the same process. Each victim’s losses stemmed from  
6 Defendants’ calculated use of deception, asset layering, and deliberate obfuscation tactics. Zarazinski  
7 Decl., ¶ 14. Blockchain evidence conclusively links every class member’s stolen assets to the same  
8 defendant-controlled wallets, demonstrating that Defendants’ structured scheme uniformly impacted  
9 all victims. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 11.

10 (b) *The Class Representative’s Claims Are Typical*

11 Plaintiff Younes’ experience exemplifies the shared experience of the class. Zarazinski Decl.,  
12 ¶ 14. The typicality requirement ensures alignment between the class representative’s interests and  
13 those of the class. Typicality is met if “other members have the same or similar injury, the action is  
14 based on conduct that is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and other class members have been injured  
15 by the same course of conduct.” *Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings, LLC* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th  
16 362, 375. It is sufficient that the representative’s claims arise from the same legal theories and factual  
17 circumstances affecting the class as a whole. *Classen v. Weller* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 27, 46.

18 Inca’s forensic tracing analysis revealed a calculated laundering process that consistently  
19 funneled victim funds through designated Pivot Wallets before fragmenting the transaction path via  
20 conversion services and ultimately consolidating stolen assets in Defendants’ Deposit Wallets on  
21 exchanges. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 5–7. Plaintiff’s assets followed this same movement pattern,  
22 confirming that his losses stemmed from the same structured scheme that impacted the entire class.  
23 Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 4–6.

24 Like other victims, Plaintiff was misled by Defendants’ false promises, encouraged to continue  
25 depositing funds by staged returns, and ultimately suffered financial loss when his funds were stolen,  
26 converted, and deposited into controlled Deposit Wallets. *Id.* Defendants’ reliance on staged returns  
27 —small payments designed to mimic platform “earnings”—consistently reinforced the illusion of  
28 legitimate returns across victim accounts, including Plaintiff’s. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 9.



1 This deliberate combination of deception tactics and calculated fund movement confirms that  
2 Plaintiff's experience was not only typical of class members, but reflects a deliberate scheme that  
3 consistently targeted victims using identical methods. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 4–6.

4 Courts have consistently recognized that the typicality requirement is satisfied where the  
5 plaintiff's claims arise from the same course of conduct that gave rise to the claims of other class  
6 members and are based on the same legal theory. *Richmond v. Dart Indus., Inc.* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462,  
7 470. Here, the fake nature of the online platform, the structured movement pattern of the stolen assets,  
8 and the resulting financial harm align Plaintiff directly with the experiences of the proposed class.  
9 This uniform pattern confirms that Plaintiff's claims are not only typical but pivotal in establishing  
10 the shared experience that defines the class.

11 (c) *Plaintiff and His Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Class*

12 The adequacy requirement ensures that both the class representative and counsel can  
13 effectively and faithfully represent the class without conflicts of interest. *J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc. v.*  
14 *Superior Court* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 195, 212. Adequacy is established when the representative  
15 plaintiff is (1) represented by qualified counsel, and (2) has interests aligned with the class. *McGhee*  
16 *v. Bank of America* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450.

17 Here, Plaintiff Younes' interests are fully aligned with those of the Class. Both Plaintiff and  
18 the proposed class members share the common objective of establishing Defendants' liability and  
19 recovering their misappropriated assets. Because Plaintiff's claims arise from the same fraudulent  
20 conduct that harmed all class members, pursuing his own claims will necessarily advance the interests  
21 of the entire class. Each class member was harmed by the same pig butchering scheme, in which  
22 Defendants directed victims to deposit cryptocurrency into specific wallets they controlled before  
23 funneling and stealing those assets through a structured laundering process. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 14.

24 Plaintiff has actively participated in this litigation, including consulting with counsel,  
25 providing detailed evidence of his losses, and remaining engaged in court proceedings to advance the  
26 interests of the class. Younes Decl., ¶ 7. His dedication to pursuing collective recovery underscores  
27 his commitment to serving as a diligent and effective class representative. He stands ready to fulfill  
28 all representative responsibilities and to seek relief on behalf of the entire class. *Id.* ¶ 8. Plaintiff's

counsel brings extensive experience in class action litigation and cryptocurrency matters, with the resources and dedication to represent the class on a fully contingent basis. Declaration of Shaun P. Martin dated April 3, 2025, ¶¶ 2–4; Declaration of Nicole Malick dated April 3, 2025, ¶¶ 2–3. Given the alignment of the interests of Plaintiff and the class and the expertise of his counsel, Plaintiff and his counsel amply satisfy the adequacy requirement.

### 3. A Class Action Is Superior to Any Alternative

“This state has a public policy which encourages the use of the class action device.” *Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319. Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 382, a class action is the preferred method for adjudicating claims when it provides substantial benefits to the parties, the class, the public, and the court. *Reyes v. San Diego County Bd. of Supervisors* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1271. Courts consider factors such as individual control over litigation, the difficulties of managing a class action, and the risk of duplicative lawsuits. *Maarten v. Cohanzad* (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 596, 627-28.

Class certification is the only practical and effective means of resolving the current claims and returning the stolen funds to the many defrauded victims of Defendants’ scam. Cryptocurrency laundering schemes are specifically designed to obscure individual victim losses, and without forensic tracing resources, victims face insurmountable obstacles in identifying, tracing, and recovering their stolen assets. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 12. The victims of Defendants’ scheme are geographically dispersed and lack the technical expertise to conduct independent tracing or asset recovery. *Id.* Identifying and tracing Defendants’ cryptocurrency transactions requires specialized forensic analysis, and class members generally do not have the expertise or access to broader tracing data necessary to link their losses to the larger scheme, much less the funds necessary to engage in this process. *Id.*

Without certification, class members face overwhelming obstacles in recovering their funds. Individual efforts would be impractical, inefficient, and unlikely to succeed given the complexity of Defendants’ laundering tactics. Further, the frozen cryptocurrency assets at OKX and Binance are only protected under existing court orders—if these assets are released, Defendants will likely dissipate them beyond recovery. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 12. The best chance of restitution is through collective action.

Moreover, individual lawsuits would be impractical and inefficient, creating a multiplicity of duplicative actions. *Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713 (recognizing the need to avoid “a multiplicity of legal actions dealing with identical basic issues” and that class actions prevent “unjust advantage to the wrongdoer”). This is precisely the type of inefficiency that class actions properly aim to prevent. *Vasquez v. Superior Court* (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 810 (noting that class actions effectively prevent wrongdoers from benefiting at victims’ expense). Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 8. Class treatment is therefore not only superior but necessary to ensure fair and efficient redress for all victims.

The class is manageable because its membership can be identified based on objective blockchain records. Zarazinski Decl., ¶¶ 10-11. Publicly available blockchain data, analyzed by Plaintiff’s experts through reverse-tracing, identified originating wallets and transaction hashes associated with misappropriated funds that were ultimately routed into specific Deposit Wallets at OKX and Binance, which pinpoints class members who were victimized by Defendants’ scheme. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 8. Given the complexity of Defendants’ calculated laundering tactics and the frozen assets held at Binance and OKX, class certification offers the only realistic path to recovery for hundreds of victims who would otherwise face insurmountable challenges in tracing their stolen funds.

#### **V. CLASS NOTIFICATION PROCESS**

Plaintiff’s notification plan combines forensic tracing analysis with targeted outreach to ensure that affected individuals are identified with precision. Plaintiff, with support from Inca Digital, will collaborate with cryptocurrency exchanges that maintain Know-Your-Customer (KYC) data for account holders linked to the identified Victim Wallets. Zarazinski Decl., ¶ 13. These exchanges will receive precise transaction data, including originating Victim Wallet addresses and associated transaction hashes, to identify affected account holders efficiently. *Id.*

Where exchange-facilitated notice is not feasible, Plaintiff’s counsel and Inca will employ alternative outreach strategies, including targeted on-chain notifications such as token dropping. *Id.* This method ensures direct notice to affected Victim Wallets. This approach—informed by forensic tracing data, KYC records, and direct outreach strategies—offers a practical, reliable, and effective method for ensuring class members are properly notified.

1 **VI. CONCLUSION**

2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion for  
3 class certification and issue an order (1) certifying the proposed class as defined in this motion; (2)  
4 appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative; and (3) appointing Plaintiff's counsel as Class Counsel.

5 Class certification is necessary to facilitate recovery for the identified victims whose assets  
6 were traced to Deposit Wallets at Binance and OKX — the final known consolidation points for victim  
7 funds, and in which the assets remain frozen pursuant to this Court's Preliminary Injunction  
8 Order. Certification will ensure those assets are returned through an organized and effective process,  
9 and is the only practical and reliable path to securing restitution for the 325 victims of Defendants'  
10 scam.

11  
12 Dated: April 7, 2025



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