

Tacitly Loaded Concepts
(Multiverse Prior to Cognition)

Ulrich de Balbian

PREFACE

Human beings employ concepts not merely to re-constitute their worlds, realities, including their selves, minds, consciousness, lives and loves but to fabricate and constitute these things. As well as their perceptions, thinking, feelings, emotions and reactions to, interpretations of, developing, maintaining and transforming these things.

In this way ideas and concepts enable the creation of realities, inner and external worlds and lives.

But this constitution is not absolutely unlimited or free, but restricted, determined, following norms, rules, -isms, patterns, customs, traditions, social, cultural, historical, intersubjective and many other rules, limits, aims, objectives, purposes, goals, etc.

Concepts, conceptual practices, usage and meanings are loaded and associated with pre-determined -isms, pre-suppositions, assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, restrictions, perspectives, frames of reference, and other phenomena that will determine how they are used, their effects, results, consequences, etc.

Employing the universe as frame of reference is my real objective and the exploration of what philosophy might mean in that universal context.

CONTENTS

1 Concepts	4
2 Acquisition	26
3 Ideas to make existence	32
4 Specialized intersubjectivities & worlds	37
5 Naked Universe prior to Cognition	46
6 Planet Earth-centered	61
7 Meanings of Philosophy	73

Concepts

1

Concepts are created, developed, maintained and operate by means of and in terms of these or other factors -

Institutionalized,

social,

cultural,

societies,

communities,

historical time or period,

civilization,

religion,

world-views

coloured by attitudes, biases, fallacies,

such as gender, age, IQ, education, genotype, phenotype, personality-type, profession, socio-economic class, interests, orientations, life-styles, etc.

2

I am especially interested in philosophically related colouring of concepts, conceptual use, usage and practices.

2.1

This philosophically-related colouring or being loaded philosophically include the following :

metaphysical,

ontological,

epistemological,

methodological,

political,

ethical,

aesthetical, etc

2.2

What are the reasons for,
the causes of
and the origins of the colouring?

They were indicated above

2.3

What are the reasons for, the functions, purposes,
consequences, effects, aims, objectives, results of
such colouring?

2.31

Do they change over time, vary from culture to
culture, from one society to another, for different
historical periods, socio-economic groups, commu-
nities, genders, age groups, generations, profes-
sions, ethnic groups, disciplines, professions, etc?

Take for example notions such as
reality,
world view,
God,
love,

consciousness,
sex,
marriage, etc.

2.4

When we employ concepts for perception, to think and understand, for cognition etc we commit ourselves to all sorts of things, positions, frames of reference, approaches, perspectives and -isms.

2.41

These things are implicitly associated with those concepts, their origins, evolution, history and nature and users are unaware of them.

2.42

They are associated with concepts and operate in many ways for example as pre-suppositions, assumptions, -isms, approaches, predetermined ideas and (opposing) pairs of ideas (that serve as poles of continuums -for example body and mind, free will and determinism, empiricism and idealism, rationalism, monism, duality and non-duality, etc,

2.5

From my last book - <https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B086PRKKL5>

Philosophy as Theorizing

In my last book *Philosophy Questioned* I mostly dealt with criticism and negative aspects of the traditional (especially metaphysics, ontology and epistemology) dealings of philosophy. And, that what philosophy should not do or attempt to do. The last chapter ended on a more positive note. It mentioned philosophizing as reflection. Reflection on anything and everything. I reprint that last chapter here as I wish to continue with that theme. Namely, what the nature, the aims, objectives and purposes of that reflection are. I deal with conceptual analysis as the start of theorizing. Then I show how employing concepts commits one to many things, suppositions, -isms... It is followed by 'hypothesizing' or conclusions about assumed sets, models or a system of ideas. That is if one follows through the urge for metaphysical speculation as in traditional Western philosophy.

- **Paperback:** 97 pages
- **Publisher:** Independently published (5 April 2020)
- **Language:** English
- **ISBN-13:** 979-8634262581
- **ASIN:** B086PRKKL5
-
- PP 19-21

4

It is one thing to have concepts, to imagine or think that they 'are', exist, function or operate - as if they are phenomena like everything or anything else in the universe. Things that one might sense, be aware of, perceive, can articulate, write or express in writing for example as signs, words, sounds, colours, tastes, feelings, emotions, data, etc. Or as tools or the means to articulate, convey,

express, communicate or represent something.

But, one must be aware of the fact that when doing this one already projects, assumes or ascribes states to them. This can influence how one perceives, interprets, deals with or employ them - for example as if they exist or have existence. That could lead one to becoming involved in the making of metaphysical and ontological statements or assumptions.

Perceiving, using or viewing concepts, analysed or not, analysing them or seeing the results of their analysis or analysing them might not be as objective or metaphysical and ontological neutral and uncomittal as one might imagine.

Employing concepts inevitably subscribes and commits one to metaphysical and ontological positions and -isms. If one is aware of it and if one wishes it, one has no choice in the matter as they are not metaphysical an ontological objective and/or neutral but loaded an they come,function and exist with metaphysical and ontological baggage, assumptions and pre-suppositions.

It therefore is easy to fall in the trap of following through with this accompanying metaphysical pre-suppositions, assumptions, baggage and associated or accompanying -isms.

5

Conclusions, pronouncements, statements, ideas that are made with concepts, sets of concepts, propositions, sentences, etc or about such things commit oneself to those metaphysical positions and their associated -isms. A number of factors, such as one's biases, attitudes, values, etc, determine the -isms and positions that one will subscribe to and support - and defend. Defend of course by means of reasoning, argumentations and other tools.

- pp
-

- 5

CASES

1

To illustrate that what I referred to in the last chapter it is necessary to present real examples of what occurs.

Such illustrations can be pasting examples from the work of philosophers (texts from books, journals, video, etc), descriptions of them from online sites and encyclopaedias, the creation of scenarios, imaginary situations thought experiments, etc or of discussions between philosophers, the investiga-

tion and criticism of the work of one philosopher by another, etc.

If I were to employ the above I might, again, be informed by the publisher, 'people do not wish to read work and ideas that are freely available for example on research sites, internet, Wikipedia, in journals, etc.

For this reason I will attempt to give a general description, the creation of possible scenarios or situations.

2 When the person perceives and begin to employ concepts, for example those he analysed and clarified he does this in the frame of reference that have underlying pre-suppositions, assumptions, biases, -isms, attitudes, preferences, his own personality type, genotype, phenotype, background, education, culture, etc.

2.1

He might be aware of these things, or at least some of them. In this case he might treat them as explicit factors that could colour his perception, thinking, cognition, judgement, etc.

2.12

There will however always remain implicit, tacit,

hidden factors and influences that are shared by and not identified by himself and even those reading and criticizing his work. They might include factors concerning the contemporary culture, society and historical period.

2.2

When the individual perceives and employs concepts he does this with particular intentions, aims, objectives and concerns in mind.

I do not imply or refer to the technical term intentionality as employed in phenomenology but only use this notion in a general sense.

2,21

Let me attempt to illustrate what I mean. I notice that I am short of milk, sugar or bread. I get myself ready and walk to a nearby shop or store. I might or might not have had an explicit intention in mind to go and do shopping, but that is what I eventually did or that what I could be described as that.

When certain individuals in specific contexts look at, think with and about concepts, for example the concepts he just analyzed, he might or might not do this, at that stage, with the explicit intention of some kind of philosophically-related objective, aim, purpose or intention - or as yet.

The individual himself might or might not, as yet, perceive, identify, intend to do some philosophical-related action with the concepts or about them. But he might already perceive and deal with them in such a manner. And, by dealing with them in that manner implies the functioning of philosophically-related notions, ideas, -isms, assumptions, pre-suppositions, positions, etc.

These could be endless for example the existence or not of certain phenomena, reality, some kinds of beliefs concerning them, for example ontological, metaphysical and epistemological ones.

These projections, positions, associations, interpretations, etc will determine that what the individual can, cannot, may and may not, will and will not do or be able to do, or imagine that he could, may, must and must not do. In other words a host of philosophical limits, possibilities, restrictions, determined employments, etc already exist. Because they are introduced when any individual employs concepts. And, specific variations on them are involved and introduced by each individual.

2.3

The next step in the doing of philosophizing with concepts are therefore never unlimited, not without any restrictions, it does not occur in a philosophical, metaphysical, social, cultural, metaphysical,

ontological, epistemological, etc vacuum or a kind of absolute objectivity. It is determined and predetermined in many ways and by many factors. Some of them the individual, reviewers and critics may be able to identify, but many we will not be able to identify, and at least some of them no one in the present age, historical period, society and culture will be able to identify - because they all share, take for granted, assume and employ those same biases, assumptions, pre-suppositions, attitudes, beliefs, etc.

2.31

The latter is the negative aspect of shared intersubjectivity. The positive aspects of it enable the creation, constitution, maintenance, development and transformation of shared ideas, life-worlds, personal and social 'realities; communication, disciplines and existence in general and in particular domains or areas. But at the same time they contribute, imply, impose and determine endless restrictions, pre-suppositions, assumptions, limits, biases, -isms and philosophical positions.

3

The use of all and any concepts and propositions

with them commit users to all sorts of positions, ideas, beliefs and -isms.

Certain concepts are associated with a continuum or a range of positions with polar extremes with set positions that limit and restrict the positions and ideas that one is inevitably restricted to accept, support, subscribe to, believe in, employ, think in terms of and exist by.

Here are some of those notions that set in motion the believe in and commitment to set positions or beliefs and ideas -

mind, mind and body, consciousness,
 love, life, death, determinism and free will,
 political ideologies, capitalism, socialism,
 god, religious beliefs,
 art, visual art, non-figurative and abstract art.
 evolution.

4

Senses

I am not concerned with the details of the senses, the familiar or unfamiliar ones, but the fact that consciousness is intertwined with them.

To be able to be consciousness or so that consciousness could be ascribed to someone at least

one of the senses must be involved, function or operate.

Without the presence and/or functioning or operation there will be no consciousness.

But can some phenomena that could be referred to as consciousness not be found in features of the brain or nervous system, without the presence and/or operation of a sense?

The answer is “no”. To be conscious or so as to be able to apply the word conscious, being conscious or consciousness to someone, his presence or actions, emotions, feelings, qualia, etc needs the presence, operation or activity of a sense. So, is it the case that consciousness or to be conscious is in fact the acknowledgement of the presence or the activity of a sense or senses?

Is there anything more than that to being conscious?

The answer is “no”.

The appearance is given that there is more to being conscious or consciousness than these biochemical, biological, neurological, physiological, etc - that evolved during the evolution of the species - because of the combination of many senses that operates together.

See for multimodal perception <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sense#Philosophy>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multisensory_integration

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness>

NOW read the following on consciousness to what I wrote above - the reduction or interpretation of consciousness to the integrated or multimodal workings of the senses.

If philosophers, especially epistemologists or those who became involved in epistemological questions read the above they would not have asked the questions they asked and arrived at the answers they did arrive at and/or they would have asked their questions in other ways.

Their unimodal ways of viewing human senses, perception and cognition led them to the views of Locke, Descartes, Berkley, Hume, Kant et al.

Their ways of asking questions about how do we know, what do we know and what ‘truths’, insights and knowledge we obtain, and what of our insights and knowledge are acceptable, reliable, meaningful, truthful and justifiable beliefs would have been very different from what Kant

et al suggested and proposed, pre-supposed and assumed if they read the above.

The following are some of the major issues dealt with in this domain of philosophy

1 What is knowledge, does it differ from belief and if it does how does it differ?

Knowledge is of what? A phenomenon, issue, problem, question...

In other words reality, an aspect of reality, ideas about them, notions about those ideas etc.

This takes us to the domain of metaphysics.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Ontology_\(Being\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics#Ontology_(Being))

Some issues that major philosophers in the Western tradition dealt with, namely

institutionalized issues, problems, questions, ideas and notions in

epistemology - for example the a priori and a posteriori ,

the analytic-synthetic etc.

metaphysics -

- metaphysics and ontology became institutionalized as a domain of its own, with its own notions, ideas, problems, questions, issues, aims and objectives.

Note issues, notions and problems dealt with by Kant. Also note peripheral issues that are even now dealt with and baffle institutionalized and academic philosophy -

- Peripheral questions
- 3.1Cosmology and cosmogony
- 3.2Mind and matter
- 3.3Determinism and free will
- 3.4Natural and social kinds
- 3.5Number

Essential ontological dichotomies include:

- universals and particulars
- substance and accident
- abstract and concrete objects
- essence and existence
- determinism and indeterminism
- monism and dualism
idealism and materialism

Philosophers and their assumptions

1

The Kantian model or theory of connecting the individual human being through his body, senses,

physiology, biology, brain and their cognitive operations to 'reality.

A few details of his system I considered dealing with -and the schematism in his system.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schema_\(Kant\)#Role_in_Kant's_architectonic_system](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schema_(Kant)#Role_in_Kant's_architectonic_system)

Instead of the above approach I decided to identify of few of Kant's many assumptions.

Assumptions concerning what?

Concerning the following phenomena, things, ideas and notions - reality, human cognition (that is perception, thinking, understanding, dealing with perceptions and thoughts, etc), the relationship of thinking, thoughts, perceptions, etc with that what is perceived (the phenomena) . In Kant's case of isolated individuals and not intersubjective collectivities, communities, groups, societies or cultures.

Instead of the following notions socialization, language, its usages and functions (for example in enabling meaningful perception, making sense of what is perceived, etc) and how it structures how reality is perceived or constituted and that it could be perceived and dealt with in different ways Kant creates and employs other notions to identify and describe a priori cognitive human 'mental' items

to do this work as could be seen in the posts concerning Kant's ideas that I have pasted.

By means of his own vocabulary he (like other philosophers) express their constitutions of reality for human beings and the ways in which they relate to their realities. Kant for example describes and explains the ways in which perceptions are connected

to that what is perceived, the nature of thoughts about such things, the possibility of thinking them or thinking about them.

Other philosophers employ their own notions to explore their constitutions of reality, the ways in which humans can relate to and make sense of realities for them. Wittgenstein for example employs language, its functions and usages, to execute this mapping of the constitutions of realities for human beings.

3

I am not concerned with the details of the systems of Kant, Wittgenstein, et al, their distinctive constitutions of realities for human beings and the socio-cultural practices and tools or institutionalized norms, mechanisms, linguistic, physiological, neurological, etc phenomena they say are being employed to create, maintain, explore, investigate and describe those realities.

4

I am more concerned with the underlying philosophical, metaphysical, epistemological, ontological pre-suppositions, assumptions and biases of these thinkers.

For example that there is a perceivable reality, that there is a reality, that we can and do perceive it and can and investigate, know, think, think and think about it.

pp22 -32 Philosophy as Theorizing Ulrich de Balbian

6

Drawing conclusions

1

We commenced with the analysis and clarification of concepts or conceptual analysis, or the definition of terms.

This is almost the philosophical version of the obtaining of relevant research data.

2

We looked at how this is or could be done in many different areas of knowledge or socio-cultural

practices such as the sciences, humanities and arts.

3

We warned about the fact that concepts are loaded with assumptions, pre-suppositions and -isms.

4

This could and most likely would lead to the development of -isms and metaphysical and ontological positions and commitments.

5

Now we arrived at the last stage of theorizing. This is when insights are identified and patterns in them revealed. This occurs by means of the identification, revealing of general patterns of notions and ideas by means of which they can be articulated, expressed, conveyed and communicated.

6.

These patterns of explanatory ideas or generalizations contribute to the formation of an model. This or theory represent the final result or summary of the philosophical system. It makes explicit the previously, tacit, guiding ideas of the system..

They reveal those interrelated sets or schemata of

generalizations or ideas as the conclusions that are drawn about the topic, issues, questions or problems that formed the subject-matter of theorizing or the object of philosophizing.

7

[Ontology part 5 Discourses, their realities and life-worlds](https://www.academia.edu/29618021/Ontology_part_5_Discourses_their_realities_and_life-worlds)

Ontology part 5 Discourses, their realities and life-worlds

https://www.academia.edu/29618021/Ontology_part_5_Discourses_their_realities_and_life-worlds

8

[Intersubjectivity](#)

8 Are the human and other species then intersubjective beings when it comes to awareness, consciousness, so-called ‘perception’, behaviour and existence? Are limits and conditions to these socio-cultural practices socio-cultural or intersubjective limits and conditions? Can the individual never escape this transcendental principle and the limits it lays down or the conditions it provides? Is it possible to identify actual (ly existing) conscious

phenomena (that a subject ‘have or is’ and the objects or contents of this consciousness) that do not employ intersubjective means and/or that are not intersubjective but ‘individual’?

Extensions and developments (of new elements) of existing or available discourses and discourses still to be developed are obviously included in the possible range of discourses.

9 So where or how are the subjects, objects and connecting intermediary means (of awareness, consciousness, perception, etc) of empiricists, rationalists, idealists, phenomenologists, pragmatists, critical theorists, etc etc when we employ this model of intersubjectivity?

https://www.academia.edu/29186105/Ontology_101_part_2_Intersubjectivity

Acquisition

1

Mentioning the ways, places and groups where and how concepts are obtained will read like part of a sociology, social psychology and psychology 101, A- and O-level syllabuses.

2

These will include the following

groups and situations individuals participate in from birth onwards,

aspects of phenotypes,

formal, specialized and informal education,

hobbies, leisure, cultural and sport groups,

religious (associated) groups,

communities, cultures and subcultures.

3

The ways of acquisition will include social and cultural processes, structures and tools (for exam-

ple socialization, internalization) and psychological processes (as well as their associated biological, bio-chemical, neurological, cognitive and other counterparts).

3.1

The above includes the how, the where, the what, et of the acquisition of concepts, conceptual uses, usages, practices, social, cultural, sub-cultural, community, personal, interpersonal, general and specialized customs and traditions.

This includes the social, interpersonal, cultural, the community, sub-community, intrapersonal, general and specialized, psychological, cognitive, etc aims, objectives, purposes, functions, etc of conceptual acquisition, practices, uses and usages.

3.2

My real interest in the above is the possibility that with the above acquisition philosophically relevant and related assumptions, suppositions, biases, pre-suppositions, commitments, attitudes, values, beliefs, norms, ideas and practices, preferences, leanings towards, associations, exclusions and inclusions, (in other words and more specifically metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, methodological, ethical, aesthetical, etc) might be acquired, tacitly believed in, accepted, subscribed and being

committed to, at the cost of the exclusion of other, possibly more meaningful, relevant, appropriate, functional and useful positions, perspectives, frames of reference, approaches, and -isms.

3.3

Let us make a list of all the countries, areas, societies and communities -

where different forms of

Judaism,

Islam,

Buddhism,

Hinduism,

Christianity

and other beliefs or approaches to phenomena and the universe (for example sciences, humanities and the arts)

are present.

Now let us identify their ideas about

the universe, its nature, origins, structure, aims,

objectives, aims, etc

the earth,

god and supernatural beings,

the human species, its origins, nature, etc

truth,

knowledge,

the self, the person, men, women,

love, families, parents, children,

interpersonal relationships,

societies, culture, education,

technology,.

Are there similarities?

Differences?

What are the metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, ethical, aesthetical and other philosophical features associated with them?

their world views,

constitutions and interpretations of reality, self, consciousness, the body, mind, cognition, free will and determinism and other philosophical problems and questions?

How are these beliefs, attitudes and ideas associated with and assumed, pre-supposed and related to their ideas, -isms and belief systems?

How are they reflected by, function and operate in their frames of reference, concepts, conceptual systems, usages and practices?

Are these things explicit(ly stated), assumed, tacit?

3.31

The depictions of, the ideas about, the interpretations of and the projections on things such as the world, god, life, death, sin, after life, the creation, nature and origin of the world, people or the human species, the self, soul, consciousness, mind and body, etc of these groups will vary, be specialized and specific, but underlying all of them will operate and lie all sorts of common assumptions,

pre-suppositions, beliefs, attitudes, fallacies, -isms
and biases that determine and colour them.

3

Ideas to Make Existence

1

The inkling I have is the suggestion that human cognition, perception, thinking and all features of consciousness are and/or employ socio-culturally constituted and originated conceptual tools.

These tools are developed, maintained, changed, transformed and obtained in communities or sub-communities that form part of larger communities and societies and that have socio-cultural histories.

For example the community and associated intersubjectivity of biology, chemistry, physics, visual art, philosophy, those of everyday existence, sociology, psychology, etc.

Concepts to maintain, develop, transform, perceive and constitute their realities employ socio-cultural or sociological structures and mechanisms. These communities in turn form part of larger societies, communities, cultures and their cognitive histories,

Individuals undergo specialized socialization in these communities by means of which they obtain the necessary concepts and other tools that enabled

them to perceive, think, think about, perceive, deal with and constitute aspects of the communities specialized worlds and realities.

These things are determined by the different current intersubjectivities of the community.

What is the nature and aspects of such intersubjectivities in general and those of specific communities and specialized domains or areas of communities? For example concerning the aims, objectives, purposes, acceptable ontologies, epistemologies, methodologies, methods, techniques, approaches, pre-suppositions, assumptions, biases, etc.

2

Please read carefully what I write and concentrate, focus and reflect on that what I intent and express.

I am very precise in my expression of ideas and thoughts and very specific in my thinking and that what I intend to say.

Here is an example to illustrate this.

[Do we have to do away with all illusions in order to see the truth?](#)

I am not sure what you mean by the truth’.

So I will talk about ‘truth’ that is contextually related and specific cases.

For example to ‘know’ and understand that and why

$1+1=2$ you will have

to be informed about and understand a few things about the symbols being employed.

For example 1 , 2, + and =

their meaning and functions in this context.

Things seemingly very simple and basic and taken for granted, like most concepts, ideas and many other things in our consciousness, perception, thinking, understanding,

cognition, expressions, communication, interaction and social lives, cultures, sub-cultures and existence.

Given this pre-supposition I wish to suggest that what might assist in

getting a clearer and more meaningful idea of truth and meaning in any

context are -

relevant information

insight and understanding

look out for reasoning and argumentation, sound and correct and without

fallacies, Or straight and crooked thinking. **[Straight and Crooked Thinking - Wikipedia](#)**

[en.wikipedia.org > wiki > Straight and Crooked Thin...](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straight_and_Crooked_Thin...)

Straight and Crooked Thinking, first published in 1930 and revised in 1953, is a book by Robert H. Thouless which describes, assesses and critically analyses ...

Author: [Robert H. Thouless](#)

[Fallacy - Wikipedia](#)

cognitive biases

A **cognitive bias** is a systematic error in thinking that affects the decisions and judgments that people make. ...

The way you remember an event may be **biased** for a number of reasons and that in turn can lead to **biased** thinking and decision-making. Other **cognitive biases** might be related to problems with attention.

Nov 1, 2019

[How Cognitive Biases Influence How You Think and Act](#)

[List of cognitive biases - Wikipedia](#)

[en.wikipedia.org > wiki > List of cognitive biases](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases)

Cognitive biases are systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment, and are often studied in psychology and behavioral economics.

And other things that might effect perception and cognition.

3

A human infant who does not grow up in human company and socio-cultural conditions will have

some form of reality, consciousness, perception and cognition of it and its constituents and the phenomena populating it.

But, it will be a less differentiated mental reality than those of standard human beings. Factors that play a role in this differentiation include genotype, phenotype, personality-type, formal and informal education, upbringing, socio-economic class, age, gender, social and cultural environment, historical period, biological, physiological, bio-chemical constitution, interests, profession, work experience, social relations, friends, etc.

Specialized intersubjectivities and worlds

1

Although many academics and scholars are involved with the exploration of very specific problems, the famous names of contemporary philosophy continue with some form of traditional, speculative 'philosophy'.

It might appear as if what they do is very different from what Kant and Hegel attempted, but their aims and objectives are not that different.

They aim to produce very general, all-inclusive, explanatory systems. I think for example of names such as Habermas, Derrida, Foucault, Brandom, Rorty, et al.

The ways in which they do it might mislead one into thinking that what they do are not resembling what Kant, etc did, but it is merely a variation on the same theme of speculative statements that are meant to be all-explanatory.

It might seem as if they do not attempt to produce

similar explanatory systems of truth, knowledge, mind, human realities, how they are constituted, perceived, thought, etc, but they merely concentrate on other ideas in this process, on other features and aspects of human cognition and existence.

The same pre-suppositions, intentions, methods, objectives are employed by contemporary thinkers and motivate them. It appears as if contemporary thinkers are not involved in metaphysical speculation because their issues and problems employ different ideas and notions, but what they do are no different from the traditional speculations to create all-explanatory systems of certain issues and ideas by means of unfounded, sweeping generalizations.

Habermas, Derrida, Rorty, Foucault and Brandom might talk about discourses and not mental process or perception, they might not use the individual or subject as point of reference but society, culture, intersubjectivity, social, cultural and political phenomena, but their aims, techniques, intentions and pre-suppositions of what philosophy can do, may do and how to do it are similar.

2

I can do nothing more than think or attempt to think philosophically. I cannot devise systems or produce ontological or epistemological explana-

tions, theories and systems.

All I am able to do is to notice certain things that are worthy of questioning. Asking questions about them that are philosophically relevant and related.

It is both the manner of asking these questions or how things are questions, as well as that what is questioned that are philosophically relevant.

The consequences of asking these questions might lead to philosophical insights, clarifications and the increased understanding of certain philosophical ideas, problems, issues, etc.

The above sums up that what I am obliged to do, that what I feel compelled to do and that what I am motivated to do - as these things give meaning to my life and purpose to my existence.

In this sense it is something very personal, even biographical, but in so far as I attempt to employ tools, techniques, methods, aims, objectives, norms, values, attitudes and pre-suppositions from the intersubjective discourse of the Western tradition of philosophy, they are philosophically related and perhaps relevant.

This approach might resemble features from the work of a number of philosophers, for example of those that are ascribed to the figure or name of the

individual referred to as Socrates.

3

The multiverse or universe, prior to anthropocentric conceptualization or pre-anthropocentric and -concepts 'is' or 'is not' the case. It merely 'is' and/or 'is not' the case.

3.1

It is merely with anthropocentric conceptualization that being, existence, to be and/or not to be and as a result other differentiations appear. Outside this anthropocentric conceptualization, in locations where it does not, yet, occur, their neither exist 'is' or 'not is', being and existence or not existence and being.

3.2

Cognitive differentiation, reflection, making mental or cerebral distinctions by means of concepts, the need for it, the aims of it and the differentiations, categorization and other consequences, effects and functions of it exist only because of and for human cognition. Where human beings do not exist the multiverse 'is' and/or 'is not' or carry on without the need for such things. Where anthropocentric, conceptualized cognition, consciousness, perception, etc is not present, there do not exist 'is'

and/or 'is not'. All just 'is' and/or 'is not'.

3.3

In other words, what is the multiverse like there where there are no human beings, no anthropocentered conceptualization, identifications, naming, classifications, judgements, differentiations, no projections concerning being, existence, time, space or anything cognitive?

What is the multiverse like when and where it is not reduced to human reality? When and where it is not, yet, reduced to, transformed into, restricted to anthropocentric attitudes, biases, assumptions, pre-suppositions, preconceptions, conceptions, evaluation, judgements, comparisons, conceptualizations and the consequences of such restrictive and restricting human cognition, perception, sciences, theories, models, culture, disciplines, social and cultural practices, norms, rules and human intersubjective agreements, aims, purposes, objectives? A multiverse that has not yet been transformed into, restricted to, reduced to, limited by anthropocentered needs, attitudes, objectives, biases, plans,

3.4

With the absence of human beings we have a completely, totally and absolutely pre-determined and determined multiverse, or if you prefer universe. A determined and pre-determined multi-dimensional, many-levelled universe of 'natural' 'forces', phenomena, processes, entities, systems (or whatever ways one wishes to name or label it, refer to it or identify it as) beyond the notions of human space or time.

3.5

What can be shown, said, experienced, perceived, done with or to, interacted with, etc the universe or multiverse prior to it being conscious of by living organisms? That includes organisms of any species, kind or type, be they fauna, flora or any phenomena.

3.6

Prior to the universe being conscious by any living organism nothing can be said about it. Except perhaps that it might be or might not be the case, that it is or might be and/or that it is not or might not be.

3.7

Only when the universe is being treated as an ob-

ject by some form of living organism and becomes or is being made the object of that organisms 'consciousness', reality, life-world, needs, experiences, actions, interactions, etc does it serve a purpose, has it a purpose, aim and objective.

3.71

Different living organisms participate in, share, live in and deal with different and very specific parts, aspects, features, levels and dimensions of the universe.

3.72

Compare the realities, worlds, experiences, life worlds and world constitutions of -

different sharks,
viruses,
flowers,
trees,
bees,
mice,
octopuses,
mammals,
reptiles,
the human species at different stages of its evolution,
different civilizations, cultures, societies, communities, genders, age groups, IQ groups, classes or

socio-economic groups, educational levels, genders, professions, etc from the human species of different historical periods and times.

3.73

And, subsequently the different dimensions, parts, levels, features, etc of the universe being interacted with, experienced, perceived, dealt with, being aware and conscious of by the above, and other, living organisms.

3.74

Prior to the being made conscious of and interacted with and by living organisms the universe has no aim, purpose or objective.

3.75

It does not even exist or is, and/or neither is it not or does it not exist - in terms of these anthropocentered, objectifying or object-making terms, ideas and notions.

‘It is’ nothing, it is no thing, neither is it not - ‘it is’ merely ‘the case’, a case of neither being, or nor, non-being, nor no thing, nor nothingness.

3.76

To be able to conceive of that nude, prior to be

conscious of, prior to being visualized, cognized state of the universe non-conceptual, non cognition or no-cognition, bare or pure awareness or 'consciousness' is required.

The kind of consciousness of the advanced spiritual contemplative or mystic, gods and legendary figures such as Buddha, Jesus, figures and Vedantic, non-dual states of minds, etc. The type of consciousness that allow the multiverse and enable the universe to be a 'subject' and not being perceived as, treated as, reduced to, limited and restricted by some form of consciousness to an object, a thing, a phenomenon.

5

The Naked Universe

(prior to being conceived, perceived, made an object of consciousness, an object of sciences, arts, religions, humanities, music, literature, films, IT, living organisms, different forms of consciousness, conceptualization, cognition, investigation, etc)

1

The nature or non-nature of the naked universe -
 that ‘just is’ and/or ‘not is’, as the case may be -
 as all ‘that is’ just ‘the case’; no more and no less.

1.1

The naked, bare universe , that is as a subject -
 (prior to being conceived, perceived, made an object of consciousness, an object of sciences, arts, religions, humanities, music, literature, films, IT, living organisms, different forms of consciousness, conceptualization, cognition, investigation, etc).

1.2

‘What’ ‘is’ and ‘how’ ‘is’ the naked pre- and not-yet conceptualized universe?

1.3

‘What’ and ‘how’ ‘is’ the ” ‘nature’ and/or ‘non-nature’ ” of this bare, naked, prior to being conceptualized, made an object, perceived, experiences, studied, investigated, theorized about, reduced to formulas, laws, propositions, ideas, concepts, equations, numbers, sounds, notations, etc?

1.4

What, if anything can be ‘said’, alleged, proposed, conjectures, proposed, ascribed, poetically and aesthetically suggested about it, philosophically said, asked, questioned, about it?

1.5

What will be a meaningful and relevant ‘language’ or system of signs, colours, forms, sounds, movements, etc that could be employed? Those of classical music, tantric sounds and movements, Tibetan chants, sciences, mathematics, metaphysical, ontological, epistemological, ethical and moral (lols!!) speculations, statements, hypotheses, etc?

1.6

To state that the universe is hostile is mistaken, because it is to project the ability to have and the nature of human attitudes or feelings on the universe. It could perhaps be described as mostly uninhabitable by human beings.

In the latter case we again use human beings as the norm or standard to measure, ascribe something to and make a projection on the universe. But, at least we do not project the nature of human beings on it.

1.7

Object-oriented Ontology as approach might provide us a few starting points to describe and explore the universe while refraining from treating it in an anthropocentric manner or reducing it to something merely anthropocentric. As if it is a mere extension of human beings and existing solely or mainly for the satisfaction of this species,

1.8

To bracket the problem of thinking or thinking for and about a not-yet-conceptualized, unconceptualized, prior to conceptualized universe, one can attempt to change or escape the problem in different ways, for example -

Socratic questioning about everything and anything,

Platonic reflections on many areas of human existence,

Aristotle's doing science before the development of science disciplines and their intersubjectivities, explore metaphysical and ontological questions, OR, the major escape - epistemology:

investigate how human 'consciousness', 'minds', cognition works or features, aspects, levels and dimensions of the physical, biological, bio-chemical, neuroscientific, social, genetic, psychological, personality-types, phenotype and other phenomena and factors that are involved -

for example Kant, empiricists, idealists, materialists, physicalists, panpsychism, Marxists, German Critical Thinkers, pragmatists, utilitarians, etc.

2

What can meaningfully, validly and legitimately be said about the universe?

A vast entity or phenomenon,

that contains everything,

everything that exists,
that were,

that will be,

everything that 'is the case'.

It has or is a past, a present and a future.

It contains, consists of or is many phenomena,

processes, levels, dimensions,

for example galaxies, black holes, solar systems,
stars, planets, etc.

It contains living beings,

on planet earth

and perhaps in other places.

Whatever we can perceive, conceive, experience
of, think and say about it will be from planet earth
as point of reference,

perspective,

and our restricted frame of reference

and anthropocentrism,

coloured by social, cultural and historical limits,
attitudes, biases, fallacies, objectives, intentions,
aims and purposes.

2.1

It contains living phenomena,
in certain places or areas.

Living beings developed in the universe.

The universe enabled the creation of living beings.

How did this come about or commence?

What are the factors that are involved and enabled
this creation of living beings?

How did, supposedly 'dead', physical, physicalist,
material, chemical, and other phenomena and pro-
cesses enable the creation and development in cer-
tain places, areas and contexts of the universe of
living beings?

2.2

This, life and living beings, might appear as some-
thing major to earth restricted human beings, but
in the context of the universe it is irrelevant, just a
minor, irrelevant, passing event occurring in one,
far off spot on one, tiny planet in the universe. And
a little planet that will eventually be destroyed by
one or other event. Be it the dying out of its sun or

other processes

2.3

All these considerations show the irrelevance of much valued human attitudes, values, objects, money, culture, art, sciences, religions, feelings, relationships, sport, etc.

2.4

When seeing the names of theories, models, ideas and speculations about ‘consciousness’, its nature, origins, relationship to the physical, material, body etc, I am struck by the fact that -

they are all mere speculation,

anthropocentric and anthropomorphic,

philosophical thinking, reasoning and argumentation are assumed to be the -

point of reference,

the aim, purpose, reason for -

consciousness, ‘reality’, the universe,

We are shown, by arguments and reasoning, why one approach, only, is meaningful, acceptable, true

and correct.

Endless splitting of concepts and ideas to devise new terms, words, notions, concepts, etc that are meant to do THE trick for the real, absolute and final explanation of ‘consciousness = matter = the physical, etc’

and as almost one and the same thing. Start with the one and eventually you will arrive at the other, naturally and automatically.

For example panpsychism’s sentience in or of ‘material, physical’ units lead to consciousness explained,

or start with ‘mental’ phenomena and you arrive at conscious, embodied physicalism, embodied consciousness etc.

2.5

From one of these notions about consciousness and its anthropocentrically conceived, proposed, invented and developed point of reference we then have a philosophical system and/or theory to view the universe. As if the universe was created and exist for the purpose of the human species or more specifically its philosophical ideas and practices, the contents of its metaphysical speculations, ethical pretences, faked moralities, epistemological at-

tempts, ontological wranglings, political manoeuvres, financial and economical exploitations, personal obsessions, needs and greed, crime, the ideas constituting its ontologies, the objective and reason for its epistemologies and let us not forget human notions of morality and ethical ideas, etc.

2.6

The universe is unaware of that what concern, that what occupy, that what please and satisfy, that what trouble human beings.

How human beings deal with these things, how they suffer because of these things, how they try to sublimate their desires and needs for these things.

How human beings perceive, think, think about thinking, their investigations of these things, their alternative theories about these things.

The universe 'is', 'was' and 'shall be', or 'is not', 'was not' and 'shall not be', or whatever the case may be, or not.

'It', has no needs, feelings, emotions, objectives, aims, purposes, plans, intentions - it just happens 'to be', or not, whatever is the case, whatever is the most appropriate 'state of being, non-being or non-non-being' on 'it'.

2.7

The concerns, sciences, needs, laws, cultures, wars, politics, monetary obsessions, politics, games, etc of earth-restricted and -originated, activities, plans, behaviour, etc are nothing more than that of a minute, irrelevant, unknown, undiscovered, primitive, prehistoric, incestuous, inbred, self-obsessed, shipwrecked tribe on an isolated island.

2.8

Although consciousness of individuals are involved and explored, it is not seen in isolation from the social, cultural, community, group and intersubjective aspects of it.

Individuals share not only their bodily constitution with each, for example genetically and through evolution, but also ideas, concepts, phenotypes and personality-types.

When using individuals as point of reference one already assumes and employs intersubjective, interpersonal, social, cultural, evolution and other shared structures, metaphysics, ontologies, epistemologies, disciplines, socio-cultural practices, values, attitudes, instincts, needs, world views, constitutions of reality, etc

3

It can, could, may and might be said that there 'is' reality, a reality or realities - for whatever such statements are worth or mean or whatever their value, if any, might be.

3.1

View the following statement -

a human being , human beings perceive, see, hear, feel, taste, etc 'something',

what does the person feel when undergoing this sensation or complex of sensations by means of multiple senses working simultaneously?

what do different people feel or undergo when in that context?

One reality? One phenomenon? Many, different, the identical, same reality, phenomena?

I doubt it.

3.2

What does a person, different people do, feel, undergo ? The same, identical things with different

bodies, genotypes, personality types and phenotypes?

3.3

What does on person feel, think about and do with the different feelings, sensations, etc? The identical, same thing? Many things?

3.4

Does it really only matter what someone does with, think and feel about their sensations and perceptions and not the perceptions themselves?

Biologists, physiologists, bio-chemists, physicists, sociologists, psychologists, different people, cultures, educational levels etc will look and experience and do different things with identical? sensations and perceptions.

What does a person, different people do with feelings, thoughts and reflections on feelings?

Why do they experience perceptions and sensations different with their different bodies, genotypes, phenotypes, personality types and other factors that are involved?

Why do they react and respond differently? Why do they do different things in seemingly similar si-

tuations?

Some people respond with compassion, others by hate, others by attacking or killing someone. What are the factors that are involved and that cause this?

What are the factors that are involved in presenting, enabling and allowing the different paths of action?

But, does the above anthropocentric concerns matter to the nature, the operation, the development and existence of the universe? Do they effect it?

No, not at all. They are mere earth-restricted, human concerns.

5

To talk about the beginning of the universe is a misnomer. What is intended is : the beginning or origin of the present structure of the present universe or the the universe we are aware of or that what we understand by the universe. That what big banged into the universe existed and did not come from nothing. The universe did not expand into no-thing or nothing, that what it expands into is the universe or part of the universe.

These ideas are not meant to be profound theories

in physics, but merely a few words about the more correct, meaningful or appropriate use of words.

6

It must be remembered that all our theories, speculations, stories and narratives are earth-centered or from the point of reference of this planet.

7

Here we have a few, general ideas about the setting or physical context of our planet. Its setting or place in 'the universe'. The past, present and possible future universe.

The latter, a universe consisting, it is suggested by some speculative ideas, that we will have its constitutive galaxies that are ever-increasing in size or space.

The 'reason' or 'explanation' for this being because its constitutive stars will drift further and further apart until there will be 'galaxies' that could no longer be recognized as such.

8

This is the planetary context or setting of philosophy and other socio-cultural practices, disciplines, religions, cultures, civilizations, countries, socie-

ties, communities, religions, histories, different species, including our own, genders, 'races', ethnic groups, socio- economic classes, individuals and their genotypes, phenotypes and personality types, the haves and have-nots of money, good and bad health, good and less good looks, attitudes, information, knowledge, wisdom, natural forces, earthquakes, disasters, the nature and changes of planet earth, both macroscopically and microscopically, etc, etc.

Planet Earth-centered

1

The origin, nature, changing atmospheric conditions, natural laws and forces, physical and natural history of the planet will not be explored, described or summarized as it is readily available in many encyclopedias, etc on internet.

2

The same goes for other aspects, features and phenomena in many dimensions and on many levels of that what constitute this planet, for example the different living entities, fauna, flora and species.

3

Whatever occurs with or to this planet and its constituents will have little effect on or consequences for the rest of the galaxy and the universe. It will be little more than a storm in an irrelevant tea cup.

4

For certain disciplines, for example sciences, arts, humanities and religions specific features, aspects,

events, etc of planet earth will form part of their specialized explorations. Phenomena that may or may not be the most important constituents of this planet, or to the existence and lives of contemporary human beings or members of other species

5

A list of phenomena that might have serious implications for and a massive effect on different species for example humans can be drawn up, for example -

universal and national economies,

weather and atmospheric conditions,

unexpected pandemics,

international and national wars and upheavals,

certain new technologies, developments and discoveries, (for example internet, computers, cell phones, medication, natural resources, food production of the lack of it, etc), mass beliefs and ideologies, etc.

5

One such ideology, idea, sets or system of ideas are those of Hegel-Marx.

Those ideas might concern certain aspects of human existence, interaction, societies, values, attitudes, economics, labour, history, beliefs, etc.

Regardless if they were correct or mere speculation, they had an immense social, cultural, psychological and personal effect and consequences for many countries, societies, communities and individuals.

6

The immensity, the scale and the effects of those ideas are equalled by certain religious and technological ones.

These include engines and machines, IT, internet, social media, certain components of computers, cell phones and their applications and 'religious' or religion-associated ideas for example those of the different varieties of Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam.

But, outside the realm of influence of planet earth none of these inventions or ideas have any effect. We can modify, transform, develop and destroy aspects or all of this planet and it will have little or no major effect on the rest of the galaxy or consequences for the universe.

It will signify as little or less than the death or shooting of a minute, irrelevant star.

7

And the meaning, the function, the purpose, the effect and relevance of the Western tradition of philosophy and philosophizing in all this universe of human irrelevance? A universe where the ideas, the values, attitudes, aspirations, speculations, inventions, hopes, fears, loves and behaviour of human beings signify nothing, less than nothing?

8

What appears like a philosophical problem, issue or question will vary from individual to individual. The reason for this is that a number of factors are involved -

these include, among others,

contexts - for example:

everyday situations,

specialized contexts for example in visual art, a particular science, religion (discussion, texts such as Divine Offices, religious texts, theologies, interpretations and pronouncements, etc), news in papers or on television, social media, films, critiques

and criticism, writing a book, article, for a journal, writing about those things,

age, gender, educational background, historical period, personality-type, present philosophical position, attitudes, interests, pre-suppositions, biases, etc, etc, etc

9

A few ideas about my own present philosophical concerns.

Anything, anywhere at any time can stimulate to think in philosophical relevant ways. Statements, words in books or spoken, appearance, behaviour, attitudes, expressions by individuals, words and ideas that are employed in ambiguous, misleading and incorrect ways.

What happens?

My attention is caught and I analyse that what I notice by asking certain types of questions about it.

I am not interested in developing a system of ideas, I am not interested in asking or answering metaphysical questions (whatever that might be). I merely dissect certain aspects of that what catches my attention.

I do this automatically in a logical, step by step manner. I continue the process until the issue has been clarified to my satisfying.

The result is not a theory or a metaphysical system. At most it is a suggestion, a hypothesis. Not mere guesswork or an opinion, but a statement that I have argued for in a simple, concise, precise manner, often by means of the exploration, analysis and clarification of concepts, conceptual connections, implications and their consequences.

Perhaps new information is produced, perhaps new knowledge is created? New or clarified insights are presented, insights that will produce new understanding - and of and when employed appropriately might assist in the realization of new features of wisdom.

What are the philosophical methods, techniques and tools being employed?

[PHILOSOPHY – Aims, Methods,](#) [Rationale](#)

In this meta-philosophical study I commence with an investigation of Wisdom. I then continue with an exploration of the institutionalization of the subject and the professionalization of those involved in it. This I contrast with original and creative philoso-

phizing. In then sows that philosophizing resembles and attempts to do theorizing. The 9 questions, etc of the Socratic Method and details of the Philosophical Toolkit occur throughout different stages of theorizing as one level and one dimension of it. Linked books are FREE for download.

1 Seeking, development and realization of wisdom	4
2 Institutionalization, Professionalization of 'philosophy'	5
3 Original and Creative Thinking Philosophizing	37
4 Philosophizing resembles Theorizing	38
(i) Socratic Method	41
(ii) Philosophical Toolkit	145

<https://legacy.carlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm#methodology>

- Are there methods peculiar to philosophy?
- Do we need a method to discover, examine, or justify a method? Do we need a certified method to certify a method? If so, how do we escape this apparent dilemma of circularity and infinite regress?
- How does philosophy justify its methods?
- Do (should) we acquire a method before claiming knowledge, or after? Is knowledge certified by the method that discovered or established it, or is method certified by the knowledge it discovers or establishes?
- What is the relationship between method and result in philosophy?

<https://legacy.carlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm#assertion>

- Do all philosophies "take positions" or "make assertions"? If not, what have some philosophies done in place of these?
- Why couldn't Plato (or Nietzsche...) just state his assertions and argue them? If we translated Plato (or Nietzsche...) into a "handbook" of their assertions and arguments, what would be lost except for "rhetorical color"?
- What of philosophical significance have philosophies done in addition to taking positions or making assertions?
- What are we missing if we read works of philosophy only for their assertions?
-
- What modes of assertion have philosophers used?

What are the aims, purposes and objectives?

<https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm#cognitivity>

- Does philosophy lead to knowledge (is it cognitive)? Can it be true or false?
- To be cognitive in this sense is to bear any truth-value, including falsehood, as opposed to bearing none at all. Don't confuse cognitivity with truth.
-
- To bear a truth-value is not necessarily to be knowable with certainty, or by any method. Don't confuse cognitivity with knowability.
- The question is not whether anything is knowledge or cognitive e.g. science; but whether *philosophy* is (ever) knowledge.
-
- Does philosophy merely criticize or examine knowledge, without itself being (or becoming) knowledge? If so, then why should we trust it? What warrants it? Can it be objective or corrigible? How should we evaluate it?
- Can philosophy be cognitive "in some sense" and non-cognitive "in another sense"? If so, try to articulate those senses. Can we say that the "highest" or "most important" philosophy is cognitive or non-cognitive?
- If philosophy is non-cognitive, would it follow that we should read it non-immanently? (See section below on [immanent and non-immanent readings of philosophy](#).)
- If philosophy is cognitive, does the apparently permanent character of disagreement in philosophy become a sign of failure? (See the section below on [disagreement and diversity](#).)
- In natural science even "negative results" are valuable. (A negative result is the failure to confirm an hypothesis.) Is there anything comparable in philosophy? What value might "mistaken" philosophies have?

What are the functions? The rationale?

<https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm#self-ref>

Self-Reference and Self-Application

- Are a given philosopher's criteria of truth (knowledge, meaning) true (knowable, meaningful) by their own terms? Must they be?
- Is self-referential inconsistency as objectionable as other kinds of inconsistency?
- Many philosophies have implications for the nature or use of argument, proof, language, method, and philosophy itself. Must philosophies always comply with their own strictures on these subjects, or can they work at a 'different level' and exempt themselves?
- Are there interesting or significant philosophical positions that cannot be expounded except with some self-referential problem or paradox? Can you think of examples?
- Compare the metaphilosophies of a few philosophers on their self-referential consistency.

- Many philosophers use reason to limit or subvert reason (see e.g. Sextus Empiricus, Hume, and Kant). If this is paradoxical at first sight, what does it show in the last analysis about the nature of reason, philosophy, and method?
- How should we judge philosophies which (as most do) instruct us how to judge?
- If we cannot 'get outside' philosophy to judge philosophies, should we regret or rejoice? What does it show about the cognitivity of philosophy?
-
- Why does a given philosopher practice philosophy and write books? Is her book consistent with this vision of the nature and function of philosophy?
- Can the doctrinal aspect of a philosophy be consistent with all its other aspects? What is the price of trying? of failing?
- See: Steven J. Bartlett and Peter Suber, *Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987 (contains a large bibliography).

What is my personality-type, interests, genotypes, phenotypes, etc that cause me to be interested in doing the above?

<https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/topics.htm#ers>

- What is gained and what is lost by studying philosophical texts apart from the biographies of their authors? To what extent, and for what purposes, should we bring in biography?
- Compare the autobiographies of a few philosophers on their relation to their philosophies. (Try Croce, Mill, Collingwood, Jung, Quine, Rescher.)
- Why have so few philosophers written autobiographies, compared, say, to novelists or diplomats?
- To what extent is philosophy autobiographical?
- See Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §6: "...every great philosophy so far

has been...the personal confession of its author and a kind of unconscious memoir".

- See Ernest Campbell Mossner, "Philosophy and Biography," in his *Hume*, Doubleday, 1966.
- See de Beauvoir's many-volume autobiography where, if anywhere, she expounds her philosophical position.
-
- The psychological motives, economic interests, and personal animosities of a philosopher may all be sources of his/her work. How relevant are they to our evaluation of that work?
- Does the recognition of causes for belief undermine the recognition of reasons for belief?
- When we say that the life-and-times of a philosopher "illuminate" her work, or that her life situation "influenced" her work, can we make sense of these claims without reducing philosophy a complex effect of blind causation? Is there a slippery slope from influence to reduction? If not, what is the "snag" that keeps reasons from sliding to causes?
- Do non-immanent reductions of philosophy necessarily entail relativism and determinism? Must they be self-referentially inconsistent?
- What parts of a philosophy can biography most illuminate? Its truth-value? the proper interpretation of its texts? the philosopher's choice of topics, scope of coverage, emphasis? expository style and structure? idea of the audience, hence, degree of rigour, use of technical language, political appeals?
- Steven Bartlett has written that philosophers as a group are typically individualistic and even narcissistic, more concerned to develop their own thought than to share or understand the thought of others. How true is this?
- Does philosophy appeal only to certain personality types? If so, what non-immanent perspectives on philosophy does this suggest? Could philosophy be a neurosis?
 - Which came first, psychological tendencies or philosophical positions?
 - Might the latter have their own autonomy and simply attract (rather than being explained by) the former?
 - Should we always explain the latter through the former instead of sometimes the former through the latter?
-
- May we legitimately call someone a philosopher who denied that she was a philosopher? (See case of Simone de Beauvoir; cf. Dostoevsky, Camus, Buber.) May we deny the name of philosopher to one who called himself a philosopher? (Analytic philosophers often deny that their non-analytic colleagues are philosophers.)
- How would we, and how should we, interpret the works of a philosopher with known moral failings? For example: Nietzsche was a vicious misogynist, Charles Peirce beat his wife, Heidegger was a Nazi. See the case of Paul de Man, an influential deconstructionist lately revealed to have been an early Nazi propagandist.
 - Do these failings contaminate all the writings by that philosopher, perhaps on a theory that a philosophical position comes from the whole person?
 - Can we compartmentalize, and hold a philosopher benighted on questions of gender or politics, but profound on epistemology, metaphysics, or perhaps even other topics within ethics?
 - Do we deliberately ignore such failings on the ground that to let them di-

- minish our assessment of the writings would commit the genetic fallacy?
- In answering this question, how do we factor in our belief that everyone has moral failings, including we ourselves?
-
- How would we, and how should we, change our evaluation of a philosopher's work if we learned that he killed someone in cold blood?
- See case of Louis Althusser, who murdered his wife at the height of his respect and influence as a Marx scholar.
-
- If a philosophy cannot 'be lived', what legitimately follows about its worth as a philosophy?
- See e.g. Hume.
-
- See: William Earle, "Philosophy as Autobiography," in his *Public Sorrows and Private Pleasures*, Indiana University Press, 1976, pp. 161-75; C.E.M. Joad, "Thought and Temperament," pp. 218-52 of his *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin, 2d ed. 1933; Jean-Jacques Lecercle, *Philosophy Through the Looking Glass*, Open Court, 1985; Albert W. Levi, "The Mental Crisis of John Stuart Mill," *Psychoanalytic Review*, V, xxxii (1945) 86-101; Fay Horton Sawyer, "Philosophy as Autobiography: John Stuart Mill's Case," *Philosophy Research Archives*, 11 (1985) 169-79; Ben-Ami Scharfstein, *The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought*, Basil Blackwell, 1980.

<https://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/meta/autobio.htm>

Philosophy as Autobiography

Psychologist, Reductive, & Non-Immanent Readings of Philosophy

[Peter Suber](#), [Philosophy Department](#), [Earlham College](#)

- [Quotations](#)
- [Bibliography](#)
-

Quotations

In chronological order

9

The above resembles and highlights a number of features of the dimensions, levels, contexts, aims, functions, objectives and reasons of and for the processes of theorizing.

[Philosophizing is part of the Pro-](#)

Process/es of Theorizing

Philosophizing is part of the Process/es of Theorizing

An illustration (by means of a number of articles, books, opinions, statements, hypotheses, theories, arguments, reasoning and comments) of doing philosophy or philosophizing and its methods, as aspects of the contexts, stages, steps and features of the process/es of theorizing.

A number of implicit assumptions and tacit pre-suppositions of this socio-cultural practice and discourse, for example as they resemble that of everyday and religious perception (MNC,) are identified and revealed.

philosophizing, no do theorizing

Much extended to included details of courses, subject-matter, methods taught in Analytic Philosophy, theorizing and Continental philosophy, for example vast appendix on 'the movement of non-philosophy' work. Much extended by details of undergraduate courses in philosophy (epistemology, arguments, metaphysics, and other aspects of 'Analytic' Philosophy, or as taught in the UK and US), as well as aspects theory-construction (the 3 approaches in the sciences) Meta-philosophical study of philosophy as it resembles the processes of theorizing. Surveying Analytical and Continental Philosophy as described by different authors to identify their subject-matter (that could be included and excluded in this discipline or shared with other disciplines as in cognitive sciences and X-Phi) and methods. AP concentrates on certain stages of theorizing (conceptual analysis, exploration and speculation about them), CP concentrates on 'the human condition', social, political and cultural fields, but lacks the clarity, meticulous details and systematic work of AP. These are some of the implicit assumptions (ideologies) underlying and determining contemporary philosophical practice and institutions.

7

Meanings of Philosophy

1

Human beings employ concepts not merely to re-constitute their worlds, realities, including their selves, minds, consciousness, lives and loves but to fabricate and constitute these things. As well as their perceptions, thinking, feelings, emotions and reactions to, interpretations of, developing, maintaining and transforming these things.

In this way ideas and concepts enable the creation of realities, inner and external worlds and lives.

But this constitution is not absolutely unlimited or free, but restricted, determined, following norms,

rules, -isms, patterns, customs, traditions, social, cultural, historical, intersubjective and many other rules, limits, aims, objectives, purposes, goals, etc.

Concepts, conceptual practices, usage and meanings are loaded and associated with pre-determined -isms, pre-suppositions, assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, restrictions, perspectives, frames of reference, and other phenomena that will determine how they are used, their effects, results, consequences, etc.

The above is earth- and anthropo-centered and restricted. The origins, nature, past, present and future is explored. This is suggested as point of reference and not the minute and irrelevant planet earth. Changes, modifications even the destruction of this planet will have little effect on and consequences for our galaxy and the universe.

Against or in this universal context the nature, the functions, aims, objectives, methods, techniques, relevance, meaning and possibility of philosophy and philosophizing is explored.

Reductionistic humans are obsessed with and drawn to minimalist and generalized patterns or sets and systems of ideas as explanations and underlying foundations of complex realities and phenomena.

But the notion of philosophy like those of consciousness and mind can have have different and therefore misleading meanings. They are like umbrella-words that can have many meanings, all of them rather vague, although those who employ them mistakenly assume they know precisely what is meant when they use these notions in a certain context and way.

2

One reason why the words philosophy and to do philosophy or philosophizing are misleading is because they can and do form part of most contexts, areas and dimensions of human existence, perception, thinking and thinking about thinking and these things.

2.1

When I sense or perceive anything it feels as if an aspect of what I do, undergo or am is doing philosophy. The short of critical aspect, the aware aspect of what I do, the conscious and self-conscious aspect of being critical, employing, undergoing or being biased, having, employing, applying and expressing attitudes, opinions and value.

We are usually unaware that we do, undergo, am or employ these things in every context and situation. But, they form part of what we might mean

by the notion of having, expressing, applying and employing philosophy or my personal philosophy.

2.2

These inklings of critical and reflective awareness, thinking and thinking about what we do and are all refers to some of the meanings of philosophy, having a philosophy, being philosophical and the doing of philosophy - and that in every situation, context and moment of our existence.

These are not merely examples of the everyday, man or woman on street notions of philosophy, but they form part of and express aspects and meanings of the more technical, specialized meanings of the notions philosophy and philosophizing. And, in this way and because of this the meanings of these notions become nebulous, confusing and misleading.

3

Imagine there is a process of perception, becoming aware of something through the senses, emotions, feelings, memory, etc. On aspect or feature of these things appear to be philosophical or related to what we might conceive of or understand by and as philosophical. For example the operation or presence of biases, fallacies, pre-suppositions and

the making of assumptions, world views, the presence of intentions and intentionality, etc.

4

We are already doing ‘active’ things at that stage or those stages and not merely passively undergoing perception, cognition, emotions, feelings, memories, etc. This active dimension of perceiving etc involves philosophically related and relevant aspects. Because of the misleading, vague, nebulous and umbrella-implications and applications of the words philosophy and doing philosophy.

5

Now what happens or can happen next with, to or by means of the contents of that what is involved in this ‘initial’ stage? For example we describe, we recount, we talk or think about them, explore them for example by asking questions about them or certain aspects of them.

When doing these things certain aspects of that what we do, that what we attempt to do, that what our aims, objectives and reasons are for doing it might appear philosophically, psychologically, sociologically (bio-chemically, neurologically, etc) related, relevant and meaningful.

Just think of the many explorations, descriptions, explanations, analyses, speculations about features of this stage by Locke, Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, Derrida, Habermas, contemporary Anglo-Saxons, in Buddhism, Hinduism and other ‘metaphysical’ systems and ideas.

6

I am not concerned with the details of the processes of perception, cognition, consciousness etc or to identify them, their nature, aims, objectives and purposes.

I wish to point out that there are many different contexts and situations that contain features or elements that are or might appear to be philosophical, philosophical relevant and philosophically related - correctly or not.

My reason for mentioning this is that this is one of the ways and reasons for the creation of some of the misleading meanings, uses, aims, functions and purposes of philosophy and philosophizing.

7

We can continue to those stages where the above are scientifically explored, findings classified, models and theories about them created, papers, dissertations and papers created and shared, etc.

These activities in turn will tacitly or explicitly employ and involve things such as questions, questioning, reasoning, argumentation, etc. Things that are or could be philosophically relevant and related.

With the possibility that here, again, we might find other features or aspects of what might be referred to as philosophy, philosophical, the doing of philosophy and other uses of the notion of philosophy.

8

In short, almost any human beings action or mere presence, how it is perceived or whatever is done with or to or by means of it could be said to be philosophical, contain, exhibit or imply something philosophical or philosophically relevant or related.

9

The problem with defining what philosophy and the doing of philosophy is, is that there exist no limits to these socio-cultural practices and that there is no way to describe, define, identify and draw these limits, that there can never be and that there will never be.

Everything and anything can be considered and dealt with philosophically, anything that is alive or dead, that exists or that do not exist.

Anything in or not in the universe, anything that ever was, that is and that will be or that never was and never will be can be dealt with, lead to, cause or create philosophizing.

And, that could be done from many perspectives, for many reasons, aims and purposes and by means of many different tools, employing many different pre-suppositions.

10

Then that what is transformed into philosophy or philosophically related phenomena in turn can lead to further philosophical subject-matter. As well as, of course meta-philosophically, dealing with the ways they were dealt with and the reasons why.

Any and all features of individual organisms, groups of them, their communal existence, social, political, economical, ethical and other dimensions, verbal and other forms of interaction, their limitations, personal, social and cultural first and third person perceptions, the communication tools and media being employed, technologies, the nature of these things in a particular historical period or time and its changes over time, etc - Habermas,

Foucault, Derrida and other Europeans explored some of these things - as if they are 'philosophy'.

And, they did this from their own restricted perspectives, frames of reference, biases, pre-suppositions, etc. Endless other frames of reference and perspectives are of course possible. Those are alternatives that can yield even more additions to the pot pourri or melting pot of possible philosophical questions, problems, ideas, models, theories, systems, speculations, etc.

All of them restricted by and relative to factors such as the time, social, historical, cultural, society, personal, personality-type, interests, phenotypes and other factors.

11

Perhaps the question what philosophy is, what it may be and can be could be answered by stating that:

any existing or still to be created concept or being used, with all the assumptions, pre-suppositions involved as well as all possible features of those employing them, their species, biological, bio-chemical, social, cultural, psychological, etc make-up, historical, planetary context and factors could be the subject-matter of philosophy. As well as all the tools, perspectives, frames of reference, assump-

tions, pre-suppositions that could be used (as seen from a meta-philosophical level) - are possible objects of philosophy?

12

So what does philosophy and the doing of philosophy consist of in its most general manner?

What will be and must be present in the doing of philosophy?

To feel the need to ask questions about something, some phenomena,

to explore the phenomenon because you have questions about it,

to ask these questions in a systematic manner,

to identify and explore many explicit and implicit features of the phenomenon, you consider to be relevant,

to develop insights about it, related to your questions,

to classify, generalize and develop your insights

usually in some form of hypotheses, models and even a theory.

13

But, everyone has and ask questions all the time about many things, so what are philosophically relevant questions?

What is their nature or what make them philosophically relevant?

Perhaps the attitude and intentions of the person asking the question? The way in which a question is used? It might not be something inherent to the individual who create the question but the intention with which or the reason why a question is asked?

I could for example read, ask and employ questions that were framed by others such as Socrates or Kant. Perhaps a certain understanding is required so as to employ a question for philosophical reasons, aims or purposes?

14

Do philosophical questions and/or their accompanying intentions contain, reveal, exhibit or have certain characteristics, traits, phenomena?

Are they of a certain types, category or class?

What, if anything makes them philosophically relevant, meaningful, useful, functional and appropriate?

15

I would suggest 'no' they do not form a certain class or category of questions. They probably fit in at one or other stage and contexts of the processes of theorizing. That type of theorizing that are relevant to philosophizing and the philosophical discourse.

16

It might assist us to identify philosophically relevant issues, problems, entities and questions about them is we involve the major domains of traditional Western philosophy?

These are of course metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, methodology, philosophical logic and other techniques and tools.

The list of such domains and their sub-domains will go on and on and on, for example philosophy of science, of particular sciences, questions concerning detailed aspects of those scientific disciplines, the different arts such as music, visual art, performance arts, films, sport, religion, politics, etc.

With this seemingly endless list of philosophy of.....some or other discipline, domain or subject and their sub-domains, we end up where we started from, namely endless possible subjects and features of philosophically relevant topics, problems, issues and questions about them.

17

In other words to try and identify every possible phenomenon that might be philosophically relevant in every philosophical domain, sub-domain or anything about which a philosophically relevant question might be asked, is impossible. Not only is the list too long and endless, but we do not know beforehand what would be included in such a list. So having an exhaustive list of universally applicable philosophical issues about which questions can be asked is obviously not how the minds of philosophers operate.

18

Perhaps it is a question of intuition? That philosophers have a sense of what is or might be philosophically relevant in any context they encounter?

But, will those things that are noticed by or stimulates the need for exploration by a Marxist, some variation of a Critical Theorist of the first or the 5

the generation, a Hegelian, or Young Leftist or Rightist Hegelian, a Kantian, Sophist, Platonist, etc be the same?

I doubt it as that what is noticed by, perceived by, critically perceived by, objected to, etc by one of the above -isms most likely will be ignored by some or many followers of the other -isms.

19

The above were mostly about questions that identify a philosophically relevant issue or problem, but there are many other types of questions for example those that concern comparisons and evaluations.

What will be the questions and tools that are employed to execute comparisons of detailed issues in specific contexts?

And what will be the standards that are employed to make evaluations in contexts concerning detailed issues for example in visual art, in one painting or installation, or between different paintings? Or to assess situations concerning ethics or an ethical issue in a particular situation? Or to assist the making of a decision between say a panpsychist or physicalist preference in a particular context and concerning a specific issue?

20

Most likely the first thing philosophy, or the philosopher, will notice will be the appropriate way something is expressed.

In the case of concepts and words, if they are used in appropriate and meaningful ways to express that what is being attempted to express in clear, logical and direct ways.

20.1

Attempts will be made to realize this by modifying the concepts being used and how they are employed, if possible. Or, to replace the usage so as to express the meanings and statements more clearly.

20.2

That what is being expressed is not merely scrutinized for linguistic correctness, but philosophical appropriateness and meaningfulness.

The latter could relate to any philosophical domain or sub-domain or philosophically statements and notions about almost anything.

By the modification of 13.1 many issues will be solved or disappear.

Issues, problems and questions about the philosophical contents are more subtle and complex. They will only be solved or dissolved by means of more complex and often very lengthy explorations or analysis.

21

The latter is what I explored as philosophizing or the doing of philosophy and that I suggested it consists of certain features, aspects and contexts of the processes of theorizing.

22

Traditional philosophical systems such as those of Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Habermas, Derrida, et al can be employed as data so as to explore and apply my idea that the doing of philosophy resembles and employs those features of the processes of theorizing.

22.1

In doing this or for the purpose of doing this hypotheses about these data can be formulated, explored and investigated.

This in turn can lead to the refinement of my idea as a model and a theory about:

the doing of philosophy or philosophizing resembles many aspects, features and contexts, dimensions and levels of the processes of theorizing.
