



MOVING TOWARDS RISK ANALYSIS FOR LH2 TRANSFER OPERATIONS: A CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT FOR LH₂ TRANSFER OPERATIONS

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
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


Quantitative risk assessment steps



Case studies

- Case study 1: Transfer of LH2 from a **trailer** to a **stationary tank**
- Case study 2: Transfer of LH2 from stationary **tank** to an LH2 heavy duty **truck**
- Case study 3: Transfer of LH2 from a **trailer** to an LH2 **vessel** (ship)





Case study 1-scenarios to be presented



AREA B	Pressure	Hose area	Wind speed	Geometry
	10 bar	100%	0 m/s	no obstacles
	5 bar	5%	5 m/s stab. D	
	2 bar	1%	3 m/s stab. F	

Phenomena examined

- Unignited dispersion (in order to assess the flammability limits)**
- Jet fire (ignited jet in order to assess the radiation effects)**
- Deflagration (delayed ignition in order to assess the overpressure)**

AREA C **Unignited dispersion (in order to assess the flammability limits)**




Case study 1 – release conditions


- Release conditions calculated with DISCHA tool

Area B


Stagnation conditions			Nozzle exit conditions								Fictitious nozzle conditions (Ma = 1, Total enthalpy = ct)						
P0 (bar)	T0 (K)	Vapor quality X0	Mass flux (kg/m2/s) G1	P1 (bar)	T1 (K)	X1	RHO1 (kg/m3)	Vel (m/s)	Diam (mm)	mfr (kg/s)	P2 (bar)	T2 (K)	X2	VOID2	RHO2	Vel (m/s)	Diam (mm)
10	31.39	0.00	3973.33	6.33	28.57	1.625E-01	28.511	139.360	50.0	7.802	1.013	20.369	3.57E-01	9.67E-01	3.61	179.31	123.91
									11.2	0.390							27.71
									5.0	0.078							12.39
5	27.24	0.00	2805.26	3.39	25.27	6.467E-02	33.028	84.935	50.0	5.508	1.013	20.369	1.79E-01	9.21E-01	6.85	120.94	92.02
									11.2	0.275							20.58
									5.0	0.055							9.20
2	22.91	0.00	1618.68	1.46	21.68	2.894E-02	33.825	47.855	50.0	3.178	1.013	20.369	5.73E-02	7.64E-01	17.75	62.20	60.55
									11.2	0.159							13.54
									5.0	0.032							6.05




Tank



Area C



Nozzle






AREA B – ADREA-HF setup

- Base case (10 bar, 50 mm hose rupture, 0 m/s wind)
 - 50% relative humidity
 - Horizontal release from $z=1$ m
 - Steady state RANS run
 - Symmetry
 - ~300 000 cells of half domain
 - Initial k $0.01 \text{ m}^2/\text{s}^2$
 - Heat transfer within ground (concrete, $z_0=0.001$ m)
 - 4 cells discretization of source
 - Source details from DISCHA
 - Fictitious nozzle model: Total enthalpy constant and Mach=1 (two phase conditions)
 - Fictitious nozzle area $\sim 0.0121 \text{ m}^2$
 - Exit velocity $\sim 179 \text{ m/s}$
 - Void fraction ~ 0.965





Dispersion – base case (10 bar, 50 mm) ELVHYS

Flammable isosurface
123 kg, 17000 m³









Base case results (10 bar, 50 mm)



Horizontal hazardous distances (m)	ADREA	ADREA-dry	AL	HyRAM
<u>Bird's eye view to 4% v/v H2</u>	<u>80</u>	<u>101</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>128</u>
Bird's eye view to 10%	64	82	52	66
Ground distance to 4%	48	62		80




No humidity







No-wind results – examples



With wind results – examples







5 m/s wind - stability D

3 m/s wind - stability F






Results for all winds (area B)





ADREA-HF vs. ALDEA (dispersion)



ALDEA is a simple model (non-CFD), used from AL



Jet fires setup – Radiation

- A total of 15 scenarios simulated (area B)
- CFD parameters remain identical with dispersion cases
- Non-premixed combustion: Eddy dissipation model
- Radiation: P1 model
- Absorption coefficient: Planck-mean approximation (i.e. no spectral dependence)
- Coupled thermal boundary condition on the ground






Jet fires – base case (10 bar, 50 mm)

Flammability
(dispersion simulation)

Visible flame







Radiative heat flux



Indirect effects: 1.6kW/m²
 Irreversible effects: 3.0kW/m²
 First lethal effects: 5.0kW/m²
 Significant lethal effects: 8.0kW/m²



Jet fires – examples



Preliminary results



Deflagration simulations setup



- The area B (hose) **10 bar** case was investigated
- 3 source diameters were simulated: **5, 11.2, 50** mm
- Main CFD parameters remain identical with dispersion cases
 - Premixed combustion model: Turbulent burning velocity model incorporating flame instabilities¹
- Grid:
 - 1.8 million for 5, 11.2 mm cases
 - 4.7 million for 50 mm case
- Ignition at the centre line
 - The effect of ignition distance from the source is also studied

¹Tolias I.C., Venetsanos A.G. 2018, An improved CFD model for vented deflagration simulations - Analysis of a medium-scale hydrogen experiment, IJHE, 43, 23568-84



Deflagration simulations – examples

■ 5 mm case: Ignition point at x=3.2 m










Cases	Hazardous distances (from ignition point)			
	20 mbar	50 mbar	140 mbar	200 mbar
Ignition at 3.2 m	3.6 m	0.8 m	-	-



Deflagration simulations – examples








11.2 mm case: Ignition point at $x=7.4$ and 5.4 m





Deflagration simulations – examples

11.2 mm case: Ignition point at x=7.4 and 5.4 m




Cases	Hazardous distances (from ignition point)			
	20 mbar	50 mbar	140 mbar	200 mbar
Ignition at 7.4 m	23 m	8.6 m	2.1 m	-
Ignition at 5.4 m	27 m	14 m	4.4 m	2.5 m




ADREA-HF vs. ALDEA

Jet fires (radiation) Deflagration (ignition)



AREA C – Dispersion results

- Vertical tank of 56 m³ – Bottom rupture of d = 20 cm
- Cylindrical symmetry – p = 1.5 bar





“Take-home” conclusions


- Reduced models are good, given their simplicity
 - Need to know their limitations
- Hose ruptures (area B): Release diameter very critical
 - Pressure not that critical
- Windy cases completely different
 - Distances up to 6 times higher
- Distances resulting from jet fires or deflagration are generally smaller than those of dispersion/flammability limit
- Big tank rupture (area C) very interesting



Future work within WP5 of ELVHYS

- Case study 1: Area A (BLEVE)
- Case study 1: Area C (large release from tank: wind, ignition)
- **Case studies 2 and 3: Areas B and C**

- Case study 1: Transfer of LH2 from a **trailer** to a **stationary tank**
- Case study 2: Transfer of LH2 from stationary **tank** to an LH2 heavy duty **truck**
- Case study 3: Transfer of LH2 from a **trailer** to an LH2 **vessel** (ship)






Thank you for your attention

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HPC ARIS

Computing time granted at the Greek HPC system “ARIS” under the project “LH2SAFE” is gratefully acknowledged



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