



CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS BY CFD MODEL FOR LH₂ BUNKERING OF A HYDROGEN POWERED SHIP

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
ELVHYS project No. 101101381 is supported by the Clean Hydrogen Partnership and its members. UK participants in Horizon Europe Project ELVHYS are supported by UKRI grant numbers 10063519 (University of Ulster) and 10070592 (Health and Safety Executive)

Introduction

- Studies roughly based on bunkering of “MF Hydra”, which is the only operational LH₂ ship



80 vehicles



Width
17m

Length
82.4m

300
passengers



Bunkering
tower



LH₂ arrangement

80 m³
hydrogen
tank

2 x 200 kW
fuel cells

Introduction


- Consequence analysis: What will happen IF something goes wrong and it results in hydrogen release
 - Not all hazardous scenarios examined with CFD
 - Few scenarios will be presented
- Liquid hydrogen release may result in:
 - Dispersion (flammable cloud – flash fire)
 - Vapour Cloud Explosion (delayed ignition/ high overpressures)
 - Jet fire (immediate ignition resulting in high radiation)
- Abrupt tank rupture may result in:
 - BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion)

Introduction







Indicative results/ BLEVE (trailer tank)




57 m³ tank/ 10 bar
Filling degree 90%
Double symmetry
No obstacles



	Overpressure (1 kPa = 10 barg)
Significant lethal effects (5%)	20 kPa
First lethal effects (1%)	14 kPa
Irreversible effects	5 kPa
Indirect effects	2 kPa

Approximate hazardous zone at 1m above pier






Indicative results/ hose rupture


Dispersion

Jet fire






Explosion




Maximum overpressure



5 m/s wind




- 50 mm rupture (full bore)
- 10 bar
- No obstacles
- Horizontal release (Z=1m from ground)






Hose rupture at top of bunkering tower

- 50 mm hose rupture, 10 bar, 50% R.H.
- Downwards release
- Source details using the DISCA tool
 - Fictitious nozzle
 - Total enthalpy=ct. Mach=1 (two phase conditions)
 - Fictitious nozzle area $\sim 0.0121 \text{ m}^2$
 - Exit velocity $\sim 179 \text{ m/s}$
- ADREA-HF RANS CFD code used
 - Non-premixed combustion: Eddy dissipation
 - Radiation: P1 model
 - Premixed combustion : Turbulent burning velocity incorporating flame instabilities



Top of tower hose rupture - geometry



- Simplified geometry of “Hydra” vessel
 - 82.4 x 17 x 16.1 m (X, Y, Z)
 - Axis origin at ship centre (sea level)
 - Tank deck at 9.5 m from sea
 - Tank external L=10 m, D=3.5 m
 - Tank centre at (X, Y) = (-4, -2.25)
 - Dispenser tower of 3 3.5x3.5m decks
 - Pier height 1.9 m – distance from ship 0.6 m
 - Release at Z=13.5 m between pier and ship



Top of tower hose rupture - results

Dispersion, no wind

Time evolution of $H_2 (v/v) = 0.3$ isosurface





Top of tower hose rupture - results

Dispersion, no wind

'steady-state' results

Flammable isosurface ($H_{2(v/v)} = 0.04$)

Concentration contours at X=0 plane




Top of tower hose rupture - results


Dispersion

5 m/s wind


Flammable
isosurface



Approximate
hazardous zone







Concentration
contours
at X=0 plane





Top of tower hose rupture - results

Jet fire, no wind

Time evolution:
temperature
contours and
 H_2 concentration
isolines




TA



Level H2 (v/v)

5	0.8
4	0.6
3	0.4
2	0.2
1	0.04




Top of tower hose rupture - results

Jet fire, no wind


'steady state' results

QR=3000 W/m² isosurface

Radiative heat flux (QR) contours




	QR
Significant lethal effects (5%)	8 kW·m ⁻²
First lethal effects (1%)	5 kW·m ⁻²
Irreversible effects	3 kW·m ⁻²
Indirect effects	1.6 kW·m ⁻²



Top of tower hose rupture - results

Explosion, no wind

Time evolution: overpressure contours




0.06 s

0.1 s

0.12 s

Maximum overpressure



Indicative results/ big ship tank release



- A hypothetical scenario of a very large 20cm hole below the tank is considered
- Transient release (with DISCHA)



Tank


Highly improbable scenario

Fictitious nozzle




Indicative results/ big ship tank release

Dispersion no wind




0.4 s



Z = 335 m




H₂ volume concentration contours




No flammable
at pier level

Indicative results/ big ship tank release

Dispersion, 5 m/s wind



No flammable at pier level





Maximum distance of flammable at big height > 264 m

Indicative results/ big ship tank release



Explosion, no wind

Ignition time:
80 s after release

Ignition position (m):
x= -7.7 y= -2.3 z= 13.8









Hazardous
distance
at pier level:
123 m



Indicative results/ big ship tank release

Explosion, 5 m/s wind

time = 0.14 s



Conclusions

- CFD suitable for detailed consequence assessment
 - All physics simulated, including combustion, radiation, BLEVE
- Approximate maximum hazardous distances at $z=1$ m:
 - **100 m** for BLEVE of 57 m^3 tank
 - **100 m** for 50 mm/ 10 bar hose rupture
- Downwards release from top of tower: complex physics
 - If channeled between pier and ship: >70 m hazardous distance
- Fast release of whole ship tank containment: worst case
 - May result in hazardous distances of about 200 m

Thank you for your attention

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UK Research
and Innovation

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