

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Building the Way Forward: Empowering Eastern Partnership with a Special Focus on Ukraine and Georgia

Letter from the Secretary-General

On behalf of my beloved Secretariat, as the Secretary General, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the first annual session of MUNSA'20.

At MUNSA, we strongly believe in the core value of bringing out the best in our MUN delegates. In other words, every step that we are taking is taken for you. We want every single delegate to have the opportunity to speak, participate and learn in a rigorous and supportive environment so we have chosen experts who work with us to provide topics on the dynamic global challenges and changes addressed in our committees. And I personally promise you to provide an environment for each of my delegates to do such things.

The Academic Team that we have made from scratch is organized by your needs. We are aware of what you want to see in an academically advanced conference. And we made sure that in an incredible 4 days what we are going to make you spend you will find what you're looking for. Every member of my team is focused on you and your needs. We want to learn from you, but also we want to teach you and make sure you experience things that you never have before.

Therefore, our academic team is combined with experienced people who are eager to teach you. It's my promise to you that you came before us in MUNSA.

I can ensure you with the amount of work and studying that we are doing these 4 days is going to be remarkable for you. Our staff in the organization team are skilled committee facilitators, experienced conference organizers, and most importantly, resourceful mentors with a strong passion for giving you the best mun experience.

Therefore, they will be there for you whenever you need. We work with unique people who are dedicated to you and only you. And when this team contains people I trust and love, you can take me saying it's going to be incredible as my word and promise to all of you.

-Ayberk Görmüş

Introduction

Launched in 2009 as a joint policy initiative, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) aims to deepen and strengthen relations between the European Union (EU), its Member States and its six Eastern neighbours: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Within this framework, all partners have committed to demonstrate and deliver tangible benefits to the daily lives of citizens across the region.



Finance

Financial assistance is an important component of the EU's role as global actor, and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) is the main source of funding to accompany the implementation of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. In 2014, the EU committed 730 million EUR for new programmes in the Eastern Partnership. This meant, for example, that we could mobilise major budgetary support to help stabilise Ukraine's economy in the immediate aftermath of the May democratic elections and the signature of the Association Agreement with the EU. We could also plan new investments in Georgia and Moldova to help small businesses grow and prepare for the market opportunities of the deep and comprehensive free trade areas with the EU. We worked with European banks and local financial institutions to make loan financing more accessible for private investors, including small businesses and families. Many of the new programmes have already begun; others will kick-start in the course of 2015 with concrete activities on the ground. In parallel, the EU continued the implementation of programmes launched in previous years that are bringing about concrete results. In 2014, the EU spent almost EUR 550 million to that end to the benefit of Eastern Partnership countries. Technical experts and advisers Hereinafter referred to as Moldova. worked with their peers in the partner countries to design new policy frameworks, prepare new legislation and introduce new practices. Civil society organisations accessed grants for monitoring national reforms and working with vulnerable groups. The private sector accessed business incubators and new lending opportunities; small farmers created new business-oriented associations; and young students accessed new skills to be better prepared for the modern labour market.

Relationships With Russia

Although Russia is not an addressee of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), neither the Russian government nor the political class expect to see any direct benefits flow from this policy framework of the European Union. At the very least, the eventual (and rather indirect) benefits therefrom are predicted to be outweighed by the expected negative consequences of a predominantly geopolitical nature.

The following new promises of the EaP are discerned as particularly problematic from the Russian Perspective:

The upgraded ambition of the EaP to offer eastern neighbours an association with the European Union, instead of an enhanced partnership and cooperation framework (albeit defined in rather vague terms), is seen as aiming at and eventually leading towards a progressive disassociation of those countries from the Russian Federation;

The objective of developing free trade between the EaP countries and the European Union is seen as capable of entering, at some point in time, into conflict with the objective of the Russian policy of establishing free trade or, even further, reaching economic community with the countries of the region. This in particular is seen as incompatible with the provisions and the objectives of the agreements establishing a Union State of Belarus and the Russian Federation, and the provisions of the trilateral agreement between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Federation aimed at establishing a customs union to be followed by deeper integration. In more general terms, developing free trade between the European Union and its eastern neighbours is seen as leading towards establishing new obstacles for commerce between the Russian Federation and those countries.

The proposition to include regulation of energy cooperation into the association agreements with the eastern partners, and particularly the prospect of a fast conclusion of negotiations about the membership of Ukraine and Moldova in the Energy Community, and the desire by the European Union to promote the full integration of the energy market of Ukraine into the EU energy market, are seen as potentially not only altering, but fundamentally undermining the existing political and legal frameworks of Russo-Ukrainian and, to a lesser extent, Russo-Moldovan cooperation in the energy sector.

The specific objective of the modernization of Ukraine's natural gas and oil transportation network with the assistance of the European Union has become a point of particular controversy in the Russian Federation after the endorsement of a European Commission-Ukrainian memorandum of understanding to that effect earlier in 2009. The objective to conclude a common declaration of the European Commission and Belarus about energy as the basis for further development of cooperation in the energy sector, pending greater details about its particular aims and provisions, bears the potential of becoming a no less controversial issue between the EU and Russia, in that it runs contrary to the objectives of Gazprom on the Belarusian energy market.

Although the Eastern Partnership's promise of greater mobility remains ambiguous, the prospective liberalization of the visa policy, and the freer movement of people between the European Union and its

eastern neighbours is seen as bearing a danger, in a longer run, that could complicate the free movement of people between the Russian Federation and the EU's partner states, with an effect similar to the one which occurred after the gradual introduction of the visa requirement by the Central European countries ahead of their accession to the European Union

EU- Ukraine bilateral Relations

Ukraine is a priority partner for the European Union. The EU supports Ukraine in ensuring a stable, prosperous and democratic future for its citizens and is unwavering in its support for Ukraine's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Association Agreement (AA), including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), is the main tool for bringing Ukraine and the EU closer together, promoting deeper political ties, stronger economic links and respect for common values. Since spring 2014, Ukraine has embarked on an ambitious reform programme, aiming to stabilise its economy and improve the livelihoods of its citizens. Priority reforms include the fight against corruption, reform of the judiciary, constitutional and electoral reforms, improvement of the business climate and energy efficiency, as well as reform of public administration, including decentralisation. The EU has pledged a package of €12.8 billion for the next few years to support the reform process, with strong conditionality on continued progress.

-5,200 Ukrainian students and education staff benefitting from the Erasmus+ exchange programme in the period up to summer 2018.

In 2017, exports from Ukraine to the EU increased by 27% and Ukrainian imports from the EU by about 22%, while overall trade increased by 24%

500,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) supported directly with EU funding and over 1500 IDP entrepreneurs supported with grants to establish new businesses

FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS



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STRONGER GOVERNANCE

- ✓ A nationwide decentralisation programme (€90 million) providing advice and support to improve the transparency and accountability of local and regional authorities and enhancing local administrative centres. 27 administrative centres have opened in all Ukrainian oblasts.
- ✓ A public administration programme (€104 million) aims to embed a new generation of civil servants, reorganising government structures to mirror EU standards and developing best practice in policy making and advancing key sector reforms.
- ✓ An anti-corruption programme (€15 million) is supporting the newly established anti-corruption institutions, strengthening parliamentary oversight and capacities of civil society and independent media to contribute to the fight against corruption.
- ✓ A programme developing the private sector (€110 million) and fostering Ukraine's economic recovery through technical assistance to improve the legislative framework for SMEs and supporting the set-up of business advice centres in the regions that facilitate access to finance.

STRONGER CONNECTIVITY

- ✓ The EU has provided support for the government of Ukraine in establishing an independent energy regulatory authority and new gas and electricity laws to improve efficiency in the energy sector.
- ✓ In close cooperation with partners and financial institutions such as BB, EBRD and the World Bank, the EU continues to support the modernisation of Ukraine's gas transport system, reconstructing parts of the east-west transit pipelines.
- ✓ The European Union is the largest donor to the new Safe Confinement above the destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, which was erected in November 2016.
- ✓ The EU has provided support for an ambitious transport agenda, contributing significantly to the AA and the DCFTA. Transport is the backbone of increased movement of people and goods between Ukraine and the EU and will foster trade and economic growth.

STRONGER ECONOMY

- ✓ The Association Agreement including its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), entered into force on 1 September 2017, although parts of the agreement have been provisionally applied since 1 November 2014 and the DCFTA since 1 January 2016. The DCFTA is a major milestone in bilateral trade relations offering new economic opportunities to both sides.
- ✓ The agreement triggers reform of Ukraine's legal framework, aiming to align it with that of the EU. Ukrainian businesses receive stable and predictable preferential access to the largest single market in the world, with over 500 million consumers. And EU businesses are able to benefit from easier access to the Ukrainian market, building new relationships with suppliers and partners.
- ✓ In 2017, exports from Ukraine to the EU increased by 27% and Ukrainian imports from the EU by about 22%, while overall trade increased by 24%.
- ✓ The reforms that are anchored in the AA/DCFTA will improve the overall business climate in Ukraine, including curbing corruption and eliminating protectionist measures, which will in turn increase investor confidence.
- ✓ Temporary 'Autonomous Trade Measures' for Ukraine were introduced in October 2017, topping up the quantities of agricultural products Ukraine can export to the EU without paying customs duties and accelerating the elimination of customs tariffs for several industrial products.
- ✓ The EU has supported Ukrainian authorities in establishing an independent regulatory authority for electronic communications, as well as in improving Ukraine's cyber resilience.

STRONGER SOCIETY

- ✓ Visa-free travel for Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports entered into force on 11 June 2017. In one year, over half a million Ukrainians travelled to the EU without needing a visa.
- ✓ Ukraine is one of the largest beneficiaries in the Eastern Partnership region of the Erasmus+ programme, with more than 5,200 Ukrainian students and education staff benefiting from the Erasmus exchange programme in the period up to summer 2018.
- ✓ The EU supports a €10 million civil society programme that aims to reinforce its capacity to support and monitor the reform programme that is underway.

The repercussions of the global economic crisis had just started to emerge when the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was established in 2009, and the top five global companies did not include any of the Silicon Valley firms that dominate the market and our lives today.

There have also been quite a few sudden shifts and developments in the EU's eastern community over the past ten years. In 2009, the EU proposed an 'integration-lite' sort of arrangement to the member states in the eastern neighborhood; through which peace, development and security would be enhanced within the eastern 'ring of friends.'

Now, ten years after the EaP was launched, it seems fair to say that the neighbourhood has not experienced a steady increase in prosperity, democracy and stability. Economic growth has been uneven and its proceeds to be distributed unequally. Corruption is evident but often not punished. Oligarchic regimes and

structures have demonstrated a high degree of resilience. Societies have mobilised and pushed for change, but elites have often been unable to deliver reform.

Russia has used military force and coercion to assert its supremacy over the region. Moscow's pugnacious foreign policy posture has, in turn, exacerbated the turbulence and uncertainty. Despite the EU's efforts to break the cycle of instability, geopolitical tensions persist and corruption and clientelism are still widespread.

However, the picture is not as bleak as it might appear at first sight. To begin with, in real life, reform processes are rarely a story of linear spectacular successes. Ups and downs are fundamental components to political and economic transformation. In fact, institutional frameworks such as the EaP prove their real worth exactly when reforms stall and political elites engage in democratic backsliding.

In this sense, the EaP has helped to stimulate pro-reform constituencies and rein in the repressive practices and predatory tactics of ruling elites – at least to some degree. The EaP has empowered citizens to demand more from their leaders – as has been demonstrated by the number of EU flags flying aloft in protests and demonstrations over the years.

Ten years ago, the EU sought to revamp its policy in the eastern neighbourhood. This endeavour became the Eastern Partnership initiative which offered Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine a much closer institutional, economic and political relationship with the EU.

The starting point for this analysis is a recognition that the eastern neighbourhood is not some retrograde post-Soviet backyard but that its states and societies are changing and moving on. Six interlinked megatrends, which manifest with different degrees of intensity throughout the region, shape the present and future trajectories of the countries of the eastern neighbourhood.

Since the fall of the USSR, power has been deviating away from Moscow towards the capitals located at the borders of the former Soviet space. This rise of polycentrism gathered pace during the last decade as eastern neighbours diversified their foreign policy options by engaging with other regional powers. Russia first tried to impede this trend and later to reverse it. Its increasingly assertive policy *vis-à-vis* former satellites have fuelled the security deficit in the region. This negative trend, in turn, has led to a bigger demand for the EU and the gradual transformation of the EU into one of the region's security managers. Against this background of the rise of polycentrism and a growing security deficit, the region is becoming progressively more heterogeneous, to the extent that the designation 'post-Soviet' is becoming obsolete. This neighbourhood has metamorphosed and is gradually turning into a 'post-post-Soviet' space as the states make their own political and economic choices and as the shared history that once united them is being interpreted and re-interpreted from different national perspectives. Although reforms and democracy have not progressed in a linear fashion in the region, in some EaP states a fragile pluralism and a

kind of rudimentary social contract are emerging as people turn from passive subjects into active citizens. This trend is likely to intensify in the next decade. One of the most persistent trends since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, has been a demographic decline powered by high levels of migration, which runs increasingly towards other parts of the world than to Russia. One of the key reasons for emigration is weak economic development in the region. Among the relatively new trends is the growing role of cyber in both the economy and politics in the eastern neighbourhood, which opens opportunities but also brings challenges. The future will be shaped by these major regional and internal shifts; policymakers need to factor them in when thinking about how to upgrade and improve the EaP for the next decade. In parallel with these regional megatrends, each EaP state has its own dynamics too. The six country case studies in this paper demonstrate the complexities of democratisation and reform as well as the fact that the developmental paths of these six states are increasingly varied. Thus, differentiation in the EaP region is already a reality. In the associate partner states, the degree of integration with the EU has deepened significantly, whereas in the non-associate states the EU plays an important but a more limited role.

Ukraine: The case of **Ukraine** is emblematic in some respects: significant progress in reform has been made in this country despite extremely challenging conditions, including an ongoing war in the east of the country. Paradoxically, Russia's aggression has improved rather than hindered Ukraine's performance in implementing reforms. The changes are however still reversible and achievements fragile. The creation of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) proved to be not only one of the key drivers of reforms but also an important tool to offset the effects of Russia's multiple trade embargoes. As a result, the EU has become by far Ukraine's key trade partner. Visa liberalisation is having an equally positive impact on the transportation sector and people-to-people contacts. Much still needs to be done, in particular in the domain of fighting corruption and improving the business climate. Ukrainian citizens support Europeanisation and expect more effective reform implementation from the government. The best EU strategy in the case of Ukraine is a bottom-up approach with strict conditionality and a renewed package of concrete benefits to provide sustained stimuli.

Moldova: **Moldova** has zigzagged with reforms and in its relationship with the EU. While economically Moldova is much closer to the EU than was the case a decade ago (almost 70% of exports are destined for the European market), politically it has experienced significant democratic backsliding. The simplistic labels of 'pro-Russian' and 'pro-European' have proven unhelpful in a country where oligarchic structures are particularly strong, and where the majority of citizens are primarily concerned about widespread corruption and poverty. Lately, the EU has strengthened conditionality and begun to shift financial assistance away from the government towards other stakeholders of reform. This has helped to restore the EU's reputation and support for European integration among citizens is on an ascending trajectory again. The constitutional crisis in June 2019 brought a new government to power

and offered a chance for a 'reset' in EU-Moldova relations. The value-based part of the *acquis* – in particular regarding the judiciary and fundamental rights – needs to be a priority in future EU engagement in Moldova.

Georgia: Interestingly, the Georgian case highlights the importance of the EU's role as a standard-setter after the years of Singapore-style minimum regulation. The biggest challenge for **Georgia** continues to be its economic model: the country has experienced some growth but little economic diversification and development. Despite the Association Agreement (AA) and DCFTA, trade with the EU is not growing as rapidly as was expected and unemployment remains very high. More positive effects of the EaP have been seen in the tourism industry as mobility has increased and Georgia has become more connected to Europe and the world. In the future, the EU needs to consider ways in which it can best support the increase in the competitiveness of Georgian business and its capacity to reach European markets.


Armenia: Among the non-associated partner states, **Armenia** stands out positively at least for now. The Armenia–EU relationship seems to have found a new equilibrium after several years of soul searching. Armenia pulled out of the AA/DCFTA negotiations at the last minute and joined instead the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015. Despite This, Armenia still sees the EU as a major partner in pursuing reforms and wants to utilise the existing potential of cooperation with the EU – as codified in the new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) – to the full extent. The EU is the biggest donor in Armenia and its efforts have not gone unnoticed: the majority of Armenian citizens and policymakers alike regard the EU as a trustworthy organisation and view the EaP with optimism. In the coming decade, the EU can make a difference in Armenia by supporting democratic reforms and economic development.

Belarus: **Belarus** has institutionally the weakest relationship with the EU; it does not even have a framework agreement with the EU although Europe is Belarus's second-biggest trading partner. The multilateral track of the EaP served as a valuable channel of communication with the EU when bilateral contacts were downgraded. The Ukrainian war changed calculations on both sides. After Belarus released some political prisoners and conducted parliamentary elections, the EU abolished most of the sanctions it had put in place before and formulated a new policy of 'critical engagement': *rapprochement without sacrificing values*. The Ukrainian crisis pushed Minsk to strengthen the European 'vector' in its foreign policy and to seek the normalisation of EU-Belarus relations. Despite some progress in bilateral relations, Belarus Yearns for faster normalisation and deeper cooperation, including within the EaP framework.

Azerbaijan: In **Azerbaijan**, the elite’s perception of the EU has evolved from a mildly positive one to disappointment. Baku tried to capitalise on its role as an energy supplier to Europe to put the relationship on a more pragmatic footing and garner the EU’s support for its stance on Nagorno-Karabakh. But this strategy did not work as planned: the EU has not given up on the normative dimension in its approach towards Azerbaijan and has avoided taking sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Recently Baku seems to have switched gears; it has agreed on partnership priorities and pushed for a new framework agreement with the EU. It also has shown interest in EU assistance that can help to diversify its resource-based economy. In the coming decade, the EU needs to engage more closely with local civil society in order to develop tailor-made programmes for Azerbaijan and to monitor the implementation of the partnership priorities.

Eastern Partnership Index – approximation

Approximation captures the extent to which EaP countries have implemented key EU norms and international standards. 1 = best performance.



By EDJN Created with LocalFocus

Source: [Eastern Partnership Index](#)

APPROXIMATION

Approximation captures the extent to which EaP countries have implemented key EU norms and international standards.

This dimension is divided into three sections:

- **Deep and Sustainable Democracy** measures the adoption and implementation of human rights and democratic principles defined by the European Convention on Human Rights, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), including the preceding Helsinki process.
- **EU Integration and Convergence** measures whether the EaP countries have converged with EU norms on trade, security, migration, energy, environment and transport infrastructures.
- **Sustainable Development** measures the sustainable development policies of the EaP countries and the extent to which they have achieved the sustainable development goals defined by the United Nations.

Responsible bodies:

The Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) handles all aspects of EU relations and cooperation with countries in:

- Eastern Europe: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine
- Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
- Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST)

The Trade Policy Committee also advises and assists the Commission in negotiating and concluding trade agreements with the EaP partner countries.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF IMPORTANT EVENTS:

1988-94: Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulting in de facto independence of Republic of Artsakh, which remains internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan;

- **1991: Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine;**
- **1992: Transnistrian war between Moldovan army and Transnistrian separatists backed by Russia, resulting in Transnistria's de facto independence, not recognised by the international community;**
- **2003: Georgian 'Rose Revolution': widespread protests after disputed parliamentary elections culminating in the ousting of President Eduard Shevardnadze and the election of Mikhail Saakashvili;**
- **2004: Ukrainian 'Orange Revolution': protests after presidential election demanding a pro-European change brought Viktor Yushchenko to power as president and Iulia Tymoshenko as prime minister;**
- **2008: Russo-Georgian war between Georgia, Russia and Russian-backed separatists from South Ossetia and Abkhazia resulting in Georgian loss of control over these territories;**

2009: The Eastern Partnership was launched at the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit in May 2009 with the ambitious aim of initiating political association and economic integration between the EU and its Eastern Partners. This would imply new Association Agreements (AAs) including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and gradual integration in the EU economy. It would also allow for easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration.

- **2009: Moldovan 'Twitter Revolution': protest after disputed parliamentary elections drove the Moldovan communist party from power and replaced it with a pro-European coalition;**
- **2009: Eastern Partnership (EaP) launched during the Prague Summit in May 2009, based on a Polish-Swedish proposal aimed at enhancing cooperation between the EU and its Eastern Partners;**
- **2011: Euronest Parliamentary Assembly launched at its first meeting in May 2011 in Brussels;**
- **2011: Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw in September; • 2013: Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November;**
- **2014: Ukrainian 'Revolution of Dignity' also known as 'Euromaidan': series of protests overthrew pro-Russian President Yanukovich who refused to sign the EU Association Agreement and brought pro-European prime minister Arseni Yatsenyuk and President Poroshenko to power;**

- **2014: Annexation of Crimea by Russia and start of Donbas war between Ukrainian army and Russian backed separatists; establishment of Donetsk and Luhansk republics, not internationally recognised;**
- **2014: EU-Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signed; Ukraine signed the part on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) later, because of objections by Russia;**
- **2015: Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga in May;**
- **2015: Belarus: Alexander Lukashenko secured his fifth term with 84 % of the vote in flawed presidential elections, showing that the country still had a long way to go towards full democracy;**
- **2017: Eastern Partnership Summit in Brussels in November;**
- **2018: Armenian 'Velvet Revolution': protests led to resignation of prime minister Serzh Sargsyan, succeeded by Nikol Pashinyan, who won the following snap parliamentary election with 70 % of the vote;**
- **2018: Georgia: Salome Zourabichvili won presidential election with 59 % of the vote;**
- **2018: Azerbaijan: Ilham Aliyev secured a fourth term with 86 % of the vote in flawed elections;**
- **2019: Ukraine: newcomer Volodymyr Zelensky won presidential election with 73 % of the vote; his party 'Servant of the people' won an absolute majority in the subsequent parliamentary election;**
- **2019: Moldova: opposition leader Maia Sandu formed coalition government with pro-Russian Socialist Party after parliamentary election, leading former government to step down**

The special case of Ukraine: If there is one country in the Eastern Partnership where questions of language and identity have been in the focus of political attention recently, then it is Ukraine, in particular since the 2014 Maidan revolution and the ensuing annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. From a historical point of view, identity has been much longer on the agenda, due to the constant movement of borders and foreign occupations over the centuries. Even during the past century, some cities saw their names changed four times: the current Lviv was named Lemberg during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Lwów under the Polish rule of the interbellum and Lvov in the Soviet Union. From a geopolitical point of view, the historic and linguistic diversity of Ukraine led to speculations about the viability of a unitary Ukrainian state. Here the narrative of the Russkiy Mir comes in and President Putin openly suggested that many people living in Ukraine were in fact Russians and should have the choice to be incorporated into Russia. Ideas for the federalisation of

Ukraine were floated as well and language became a divisive element between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers. From there it was a small step to use the narrative to justify the annexation of Crimea or support separatists in the East. The issuance of Russian passports to people living in Donbas is just the next step in a price.

2015: Communication on the ENP Review, November 2015

2016: The EU Global Strategy “Shared Vision, Common Action: Stronger Europe” launched in June 2016 outlined the EU’s key interests and principles guiding the EU’s external action. According to the Strategy, EU’s Foreign and Security Policy will pursue five priorities, three of which are directly pertinent to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region.

2017: During the 2017 Brussels Summit the participants recommitted themselves to strengthening democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as principles and norms of international law, which are at the heart of the Eastern Partnership. They confirm the importance of vibrant civil society and gender equality to release the full economic and social potential of their societies, improving economic development and strengthening social cohesion.

2020: Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020 Focusing on key priorities and tangible results

KEY TERMS:

Covenant of Mayors: The European Union (EU) is leading the global fight against climate change, and has made it a top priority. Its ambitious targets are spelt out in the EU Climate Action and Renewable Energy Package , which commits Member States to curb their CO2 emissions by at least 20% by 2020. Signatories of the Covenant of Mayors contribute to these policy objectives through a formal commitment to go beyond this target through the implementation of their Sustainable Energy Action Plan.

Multilateral cooperation: Partner countries share many common challenges. Addressing them jointly promotes cooperation and the exchange of best practice.

Association agreements (AA)

The EU has put forward concrete ideas for each eastern partner country through a new generation of association agreements. These replace the partnership and cooperation agreements concluded with partner countries in the late 1990s.

Free trade agreements (DCFTA): As part of the association agreements the EU has concluded negotiations on deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

Visa dialogue: Visa facilitation and readmission agreements promote the mobility of the citizens of the eastern partners' countries through visa facilitation, and provides rules for managing the return of irregular migrants through readmission agreements.

Trans-European Transport Network: The Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) policy addresses the implementation and development of a Europe-wide network of railway lines, roads, inland waterways, maritime shipping routes, ports, airports and railroad terminals. The ultimate objective is to close gaps, remove bottlenecks and technical barriers, as well as to strengthen social, economic and territorial cohesion in the EU. The current TEN-T policy is based on Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013.

Besides the construction of new physical infrastructure, the TEN-T policy supports the application of innovation, new technologies and digital solutions to all modes of transport. The objective is improved use of infrastructure, reduced environmental impact of transport, enhanced energy efficiency and increased safety.

TEN-T comprises two network 'layers':

- The Core Network includes the most important connections, linking the most important nodes, and is to be completed by 2030.
- The Comprehensive Network covers all European regions and is to be completed by 2050.

The backbone of the Core Network is represented by nine Core Network Corridors, which were identified to streamline and facilitate the coordinated development of the Core Network. Two horizontal priorities, the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) and Motorways of the Sea complement these. Oversight of the Corridors and of the two Horizontal Priorities lies with European Coordinators, nominated by the European Commission.

Past Treaties and solution attempts:

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine managed to fulfil the criteria set out by the EU and were able to sign Association Agreements in 2014. This has set their relationship with the EU on a completely different track. In their case, the last decade can be split into 'life before' and 'life after' the Association Agreements; in the past few years, they have achieved substantial approximation with EU regulations and standards. Still, the approximation to the EU *acquis* has not been an automatic process but rather a dynamic partnership between the state authorities, civil society actors and the EU. Last, but not least, few in the EaP states believed that visa-free travel to the EU was a feasible goal. Today citizens of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine who travel to the EU in increasing numbers take it for granted.

Although the ambitious goals of 2009 have not been achieved, the EaP is now more needed than ever. It has built economic linkages and laid down the foundations for deeper socio-economic transformations across the region in the future. Simultaneously, as the EU presence in the region has expanded, citizens' expectations in EaP states have increased. They look to the EU to set governance standards and pressure their governments to live up to their promises. It should be noted that the demand for a greater and more active role for the EU is not confined to associated EaP members only. Belarus and Armenia, both members of Russian-led regional military and economic organisations, increasingly turn to the EU to reduce their overreliance on Russia and/or get support for domestic reforms. Failure to heed and to act on these expectations would undercut the EU's transformative power – which may not be linear but which is nevertheless real – in the eastern neighbourhood. Ten years is a long enough time to assess which elements of the original partnership offer have worked and which have not worked – and, even more importantly, why. This *Chaillot Paper* sheds light on the dynamic evolution of the EaP, unveils shifting attitudes towards the EaP programme and provides analyses of both the successes and failures in the six partner states. The purpose of this reflection is twofold. First, the publication presents a *post-factum* account of what has been achieved and what remains to be done under the programme. Second, the paper builds on the insights into failures and successes in the respective countries, identifies the lessons that should be learned and outlines new approaches for the EaP for the coming decade. These new approaches do not derive only from the careful study of past policies and events but also from the anticipation of the future. The eastern neighbourhood is not a static world of its own, but a region in flux: these states and societies are moving with the times and are influenced by powerful regional and global megatrends that bring with them not only risks but also opportunities.

20 Deliverables

Following the endorsement by the Eastern Partnership Brussels Summit of the "20 Deliverables for 2020" and its new institutional setup, engagement is now focusing on implementation of this ambitious work plan and strategic communication about its tangible results for citizens. In order to support Member States and Partner Countries in guiding the implementation process, EEAS and Commission services monitor the implementation of the Deliverables, highlighting both achievements as well as areas where additional effort may be needed. The document attached provides an updated overview of the implementation of the "20 Deliverables for 2020" as well as of concrete results achieved by March 2019. It does not contain new commitments. Its findings are based on an internal monitoring process that involved EEAS and Commission services and take into consideration results from meetings of the new institutional setup (including platforms and panels). This document selectively highlights most representative findings from the in-depth internal monitoring. The previous report covered results achieved until September 2018.

- **Stronger Economy (economic development and market opportunities);**

Improving the Investment and business environment and unlock Small and Medium-sized Enterprises' (SMEs) growth potential

Since 2016, over 9500 SMEs (70% in DCFTA countries) have benefited from EU financial assistance. More than 30.000 jobs have been created or sustained, and over 218 business support organisations were assisted through the EU4Business initiative.

Addressing gaps in access to finance

Out of EUR 200 million in new access to finance programmes committed since the end of 2016, around 50% (EUR 100 million) will mobilise local currency lending. Policy work is ongoing to increase SMEs access to finance through non banking financial alternatives

Creating new job opportunities at the local and regional level

Since 2016, over 250 Local Authorities have committed to submit a plan for Local Economic Development (and 120 have already prepared it), while 16 urban demonstration projects have been kick-started.

- **Stronger Governance (strengthening institutions and good governance);**

Strengthening the rule of law and anti-corruption mechanisms

Legal frameworks on confiscation are in place in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine with different confiscation regimes, including criminal confiscation, civil forfeiture and/or administrative forfeiture. E-asset declaration systems have been set up in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan has expressed its interest in such systems.

Supporting the implementation of key judicial reforms

Initial steps towards establishing track records of judges' and prosecutors' performance have been taken, such as the online appraisal system for prosecutors in Georgia and planned work or initiatives in Armenia and Ukraine. Ukraine is establishing a High-Anti-Corruption Court and selected its judges in cooperation with international experts.

Building stronger security cooperation

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have adopted strategies and action plans on cybercrime. Although not yet fully aligned with the Budapest Convention, all six Eastern Partnership countries have set up specialised cybercrime units within the law enforcement. Increased cooperation with EU Agencies has led to the arrest of members of organised crime groups from Eastern Partnership countries active in the EU. Implementation of the Administrative Arrangement on stronger cooperation in civil protection and disaster management signed with Georgia in July 2018 is ongoing.

- **Stronger Connectivity (connectivity, energy efficiency, environment and climate change);**

Extending the **Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T)** core networks and transportation

High-level Understandings on defining the indicative extended core TEN-T network were signed and the related European Commission Delegated Act entered into force in January 2019. The Indicative TEN-T Investment Action Plan has been published and investment priority projects are being planned. All countries have endorsed a Declaration on Road Safety. Road Safety Investment Programmes have been approved in Armenia and Ukraine.

Increasing energy supply security

Progress on the **Southern Gas Corridor** is on track. First commercial deliveries from Azerbaijan to Turkey started in 2018. A roadmap for the identification of energy interconnectivity projects of interest to the Eastern Partnership was adopted.

Improving energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy, Reducing Greenhouse Gas emissions

Within the framework of **Covenant of Mayors**, 187 Local Authorities have committed to cut CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020 and 210 Local Authorities by 30% by 2030.

In 2018, the Ukrainian window of the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment Partnership (**E5P**) had the best results since establishment. E5P has leveraged a total investment of EUR 770 million in five Partner Countries. The high level EU-IFIs energy efficiency initiative has increased political ownership in Georgia and Ukraine, e.g. in Ukraine an Energy Efficiency Fund for residential buildings was established. The high-level EU-IFIs energy efficiency initiative was extended to Armenia in March 2019. Ukraine adopted a Low Emission Development Strategy until 2050.

- **Stronger Society (mobility and people-to-people contacts)**

Progress on Visa Liberalisation Dialogues and Mobility Partnerships

Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine continue to overall fulfil the Visa Liberalisation Action Plans benchmarks. Modernisation of Border Crossing Points' network is on track – e.g. jointly operated border crossing points between Poland and Ukraine and between Moldova and Ukraine. Integrated border management strategy has been introduced to all Eastern Partners and structured cooperation is now in place. The Mobility Partnership implementation with Belarus was launched.

Strengthening investment in young people's skills, entrepreneurship and employability

EU4Youth programme operational, encompassing 84 capacity building projects in the areas of civil society and entrepreneurship addressing challenges for youth entrepreneurship and disadvantaged youth, already to the benefit of over 6.000 young people. EU4Youth second phase adopted in December 2018, including newly launched call for proposal on social entrepreneurship. Erasmus+ provides strong support to mobility and quality of formal and nonformal education, 25.000 students and staff members participating in academic exchanges, 37.000 young people involved in youth exchanges, mobility and volunteering, and 1.700 schools participating in eTwinning Plus. Eastern Partnership countries participation in Creative Europe programme has increased; cultural organisations are involved in nearly 30 projects.

Establishing an Eastern Partnership European school

Eastern Partnership European School in Tbilisi has been operational since September 2018, with 30 diploma students from all Partner Countries. Scholarship scheme covering tuition and boarding costs in place for 30-35 new students per year.

Statistics for the Eastern Partnership (STEP):

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

The project aims to improve and harmonise the production of statistical data in the Eastern Partner countries by aligning them with European standards, thereby enhancing the political decision-making based on the statistical instrument.

OBJECTIVES

The project's specific objectives are:

- To empower users including policy-makers, civil society and social partners in using statistical information in an educated and informed way;
- To improve the availability of good quality statistics for all groups of users;
- To strengthen the professional independence and institutional capacity of the National Statistical Institutes.

Top 10 Achievements Listed By European Union

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eastern_partnerships_top_10_achievements.pdf

Eastern Partnership also supports delivery on key global policy goals set by the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on climate change

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS



Possible Solutions:

The case studies and the regional megatrends point towards the adaptation of the EaP in such a manner that it can effectively address both en- during and new challenges and capitalise on opportunities. Firstly, the EaP needs to embrace smart' differentiation without compromising the multilateral framework which remains an important source of reference and inspiration in particular for the three non-associated partners. Secondly, in addition to civil society actors, the EU needs to reach out to the constituencies likely to support European integration such as business communities, young people and the diasporas as well as to those groups that may be more reticent, such as national minorities and the church. Thirdly, the agenda for the EaP for the next decade should factor in not only Russia's role but also the growing influence of other regional powers in the neighbourhood. The EaP needs to acknowledge more fully the growing security interdependencies between the eastern neighbours and the EU. Finally, yet importantly, the communication strategy requires further improvement, in particular the part which deals with the

European audience. A message that needs to be communicated clearly is that, although it is not a problem-free, the EaP benefits both the eastern neighbourhood and the EU.

Support to the organisation of the Eastern Partnership summits. The EaP establishes stronger channels of communication through the organisation of summits at the level of heads of state or government. The summits are organised every two years and they provide political guidance for further development of the Eastern Partnership. The President of the European Council represents the EU externally at these summits, usually alongside the President of the European Commission. The EaP also holds annual meetings of ministers of foreign affairs from the EU and from the Eastern partners. These meetings are attached to a General Affairs or a Foreign Affairs Council.

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