



Committee: Special Politics and Decolonization

Agenda Item: Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

Letter From Secretary-General;

Dear Distinguished Future Participants of Sakıp Sabacı Anatolian High School Model United Nations Conference 2020,

On behalf of my beloved Secretariat, as the Secretary-General, it is my pleasure to welcome you all to the first annual session of Munsa'20.

At MUNSA, we strongly believe in the core value of bringing out the best in our MUN delegates. In other words, every step that we are taking is taken for you. We want every single delegate to have the opportunity to speak, participate and learn in a rigorous and supportive environment so we have chosen experts who work with us to provide topics on the dynamic global challenges and changes addressed in our committees. And I personally promise you to provide an environment for each of my delegates to do such things.

The Academic team that we have made from scratch is organized by your needs. We are aware of what you want to see in the academically advanced conference. And we made sure that in incredible 4 days what we are going to make you spend you will find what you're looking for. Every member of my team is focused on you and your needs. We want to learn from you, but also we want to teach you and make sure you experience things that you never have before.

Therefore, our academic team is combined with experienced people who are eager to teach you. It's my promise to you that you came before us in MUNSA.

I can ensure you with the amount of work and studying that we are doing these 4 days is going to be remarkable for you. Our staff in the organization team are skilled committee facilitators, experienced conference organizers, and most importantly, resourceful mentors with a strong passion for giving you the best mun experience.

Therefore, they will be there for you whenever you need. We work with unique people who are dedicated to you and only you. And when this team contains people I trust and love, you can take me saying it's going to be incredible as my word and promise to all of you.

-Ayberk Görmüş

Introduction:

Since the end of the 1960s and the 1970s, the Indian Ocean and its bordering states have been of growing significance in world geopolitics and global geostrategy. It is a region of great diversity and contrasts in terms of politics, population, economy and environment, as well as being a complex geopolitical framework where foreign powers and local states' interests deeply intermingle. Since the end of the Cold War, the region has been in a period of great instability and regional rearrangement that is still ongoing today. Taking into account the significance of its strategic energy resources, the importance of its strategic shipping lanes, the 'rise of India' as a dominant regional player, the turbulences of the Islamic world, the deep and broad involvement of the United States (and its allies) in the region, as well as China's recent entry on the regional chessboard, there is no doubt that the Indian Ocean will remain on the forefront of world geopolitics in the coming decades and most probably for the entire twenty-first century. The implementation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is an old issue which is coming from 1971. The main purpose of having that idea is ensuring permanent peace in the Indian Ocean. To clarify, banning all sort of nuclear weapons and tests in the area is the main and most focused purpose. The reason why armament became a race in the last 20-30 years, states needed to take action and be sure about the security of their countries. Every state considered its priority and made decisions. There are two sides with the most simple situation: Countries which support prohibiting nuclear weapons, tests and productions; and countries which support arming and nuclear actions especially in the Indian Ocean. To generalise, the countries that have got the power to be armed and protect their country by themselves, support nuclear armament in the Indian Ocean; the countries that cannot take action about that issue and ensure security in their country do not want that and support peace. For sure there are

some exceptions. Some countries support peace even if they have that power to strengthen themselves in nuclear weapons sector just because their policies are peaceful and humanitarian. However, these exceptions which are substantially beneficial for the World peace are too slight. Thus, countries take action about every possible way about security and militarism. The implementation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is one of the biggest peace steps that have been taken through the history. The thing that should be done is finding the common ground and act according to the peaceful policies of the United Nations.

Key Terminology:

Nuclear-Weapon: Nuclear-weapon is the weapon that is obtained by using nuclear reaction and nuclear fission together or more powerful fusion which is strongly devastating. It is usually used by the purpose of damaging more than standard explosives.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ): It is the zone which is completely purified from nuclear-weapons. It is also called the “peace zone”. This zones are provided by international treaties.

IAEA: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The IAEA was established as an autonomous organisation on 29 July 1957. Though established independently of the United Nations through its own international treaty, the IAEA Statute, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The IAEA has two "Regional Safeguards Offices" which are located in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA also has two liaison offices which are located in New York City, United States, and in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, the IAEA has laboratories and research centres located in Seibersdorf, Austria, in Monaco and in Trieste, Italy.

Indian Ocean: The Indian Ocean is the third-largest of the world's oceanic divisions, covering 70,560,000 km² (27,240,000 sq mi) or 19.8% of the water on the Earth's surface. It is bounded by Asia to the north, Africa to the west, and Australia to the east. To the south it is bounded by the Southern Ocean or Antarctica, depending on the definition in use.

History:

At the initiative of Sri Lanka, later joined by Tanzania, the United Nations General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth regular session in 1971, declared the

Indian Ocean "within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto... for all time... a zone of peace" (A/RES/2832 (XXVI)). While preserving free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels, whether military or not, for all nations in accordance with international law, the Declaration called on the "great powers" to halt "further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean", and to eliminate from the Indian Ocean "all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence... conceived in the context of great power rivalry". (Operative paragraph 2). Peace Zone Declaration, with its roots in the ferment of the sixties that inspired these resolutions, was an initiative of a different order. While directed at ultimately achieving formal international agreement on the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (paragraph 3(c)), the Declaration was, at least in the medium term, of an essentially political character: it was designed to compel political focus on a region with shared apprehensions regarding its traditional interest to the great powers, and a sense of vulnerability in the context of the latter's global schemes for maintaining a balance of military capability. It would serve as a rallying point, as a regular call to action in the years ahead, as the states of the region grappled with the issues involved in translating the peace zone concept into regulatory norms and rules capable of being administered at the national and international level. Adopted by the General Assembly by 61 votes in favour with none against, but with some 55 abstentions (including all of the permanent members of the Security Council with the exception of China), the Declaration addresses itself to three categories of states: the "great powers", a term that must surely subsume the "permanent members of the Security Council", which are, nevertheless, mentioned separately; the "major maritime users of the Indian Ocean", or those states whose ships or goods frequently traverse the area; and the "littoral" (perhaps more generally referred to as "coastal") states and the "hinterland" states of the Indian Ocean. The fact that there is a substantial overlap in categories - for example, France, in the category of "great power", also claims through its Indian Ocean territories, to be considered a "littoral State", and some littoral states may well be categorized as "major maritime users" - appears to be of little significance. The categories essentially counterpoised to one another are the "great powers", on the one hand, and the "littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean", on the other. The Declaration makes its fundamental appeal for action to the "great powers" which are required to halt the

expansion of their "military presence" in the Indian Ocean, and to remove from the area all manifestations of their military rivalry. Such manifestations include fixed elements such as military bases, installations and logistical supply facilities, as well as mobile elements, such as ships and aircraft, to the extent that they maintain a "military presence" and are not merely engaged in transit on their lawful occasions. It is important to note that the Declaration speaks of "military presence", which implies a situation subsisting in time of peace. The Declaration's primary aim is the elimination of any warlike presence in time of peace; the elimination of a menace to the security of a region at peace - the menace of a response to perceived threats from outside the region and unrelated to its communities; a menace that places innocent bystanders at risk and, to that extent, lacks justification on moral or legal grounds; a menace that could contribute to destabilizing or aggravating existing situations in the area, with attendant economic consequences. The Declaration makes its second, more generalized, appeal at the same time to the "great powers", to the "littoral and hinterland states" and to the "major maritime users"; it calls on all of them to enter into consultations with a view to implementing the Declaration. Implementation of the Declaration is contemplated through the elaboration of an international agreement, which must bring into balance two elements: the prohibition, addressed principally to the great powers, of the use of ships and aircraft against the littoral and hinterland states in contravention of the UN Charter, and the right of ships and aircraft, whether military or other, of all nations, to "free and unimpeded use" of the Indian Ocean and its air space, in accordance with international law. The Declaration finds a legal basis in the right of the states of the region to take such measures of self-defence as are appropriate in an era when the speed of ships, aircraft and weapons delivery systems make obsolete the rigid adherence to any principle that such measures may only be legitimized in the face of armed attack. It is not open to the usual criticism of such a thesis since establishment of the peace zone does not itself imply the use of force but, on the contrary, the recognition of an agreed status and procedures negotiated in advance and operated in a spirit of openness and cooperation, with due regard to the legitimate rights of all states in the use of seas beyond national jurisdiction, and the air space above them. The proposal was the result of an early concentration by the non-aligned movement on the military perils of "great power rivalry"; another proposal by Iran and Pakistan claimed that the West and South Asian regions should be nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the countries of ASEAN in 1971 called for recognition of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality,

free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers. However, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, more specific in its thrust than any similar initiative, called for a firm response from countries with global strategic concerns; and that response was far from encouraging.

An official Indian press release declared in 2002, "Mahan, the renowned naval strategist and scholar, had said over a century ago, "Whosoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided upon its waters. Quibbles over history aside, India clearly sees certain diplomatic, economic and military interests at stake in Indian Ocean waters. In particular, shipments of Middle East oil, natural gas, and raw materials are crucial to India's effort to build up economic strength commensurate with the needs and geopolitical aspirations of the Indian people. 90% of world trade, measured by bulk, travels by sea. A buildup of Indian maritime power represents the only prudent response to strategic conditions that are at once promising and worrisome in economic terms. Maritime threats fall into two broad categories, in the Indians' reckoning. First, judging from official pronouncements such as the maritime doctrine and the newly published Maritime Military Strategy, New Delhi is severely conscious that such nontraditional threats as seagoing terrorism, weapons proliferation, or piracy could disrupt vital sea-lanes. Cleansing Asian waters of these universal scourges has become a matter of real and growing concern. Curiously, given the importance they attach to the burgeoning US-Indian relationship and their concerted efforts to forge a seagoing partnership, American policymakers and maritime strategists have paid scant attention to the evolution of Indian sea power or the motives and aspirations prompting New Delhi's seaward turn. One small example: the Pentagon publishes no Indian counterpart to its annual report *The Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, despite the growth of Indian power and ambition. To the contrary: American diplomats speak in glowing terms of a "natural strategic partnership" between "the world's biggest" and "the world's oldest" democracies, while the US military has reached out to the Indian military on the tactical and operational levels—through, for instance, the sixteen-year-old Malabar series of combined maritime exercises. Few in Washington have devoted much energy to what lies between high diplomacy and hands-on military-to-military cooperation, to analysing the maritime component of Indian grand strategy. True, the recently published US Maritime Strategy, *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, proclaims that "Credible

combat power will be continuously postured in the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean.” however, its rationale for doing so is purely functional in nature: guarding American interests, assuring allies, deterring competitors, and so forth. The multinational context for this pronouncement, how Washington ought to manage relations with regional maritime powers, such as India, on which the success of a cooperative maritime strategy ineluctably depends, is left unexplained. Why New Delhi has rebuffed such apparently uncontroversial US-led ventures as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a primarily maritime effort to combat the traffic in material related to weapons of mass destruction, and Task Force 150, the multinational naval squadron monitoring for terrorists fleeing Afghanistan, will remain a mystery to American officials absent this larger context. A question arises: Why the apparent complacency toward India on the part of U.S. officials?

Several possible explanations come to mind. For one thing, the United States does not see India as a threat. The Clinton and Bush administrations have enlisted New Delhi in a “Concert of Democracies,” and, as mentioned before, they view India as a natural strategic partner or an ally. For another, other matters have dominated the bilateral relationship in recent years. The Bush administration lifted the sanctions imposed after the 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and negotiated an agreement providing for transfers of American nuclear technology to the Indian commercial nuclear sector in exchange for partial international supervision of Indian nuclear facilities. Legislative approval of this “123” agreement remains uncertain, in large part because of questions as to whether new Indian nuclear tests would terminate the accord. Maritime cooperation has been subsumed in other issues. Also, and more to the point, India has been slow to publish a maritime strategy that American analysts can study. Its Maritime Doctrine appeared in 2004, but a full-fledged maritime military strategy appeared only in 2007, meaning that India watchers in the United States have had little time to parse its meaning and its implications for U.S.-Indian collaboration at sea, let alone to publish and debate their findings. If American analysts seem blasé about the intentions and capabilities of their prospective strategic partner, many Chinese analysts depict the basic motives behind India’s maritime ambitions in starkly geopolitical terms. Indeed, their assumptions and arguments are unmistakably Mahanian. Zhang Ming of *Modern Ships* asserts, “The Indian subcontinent is akin to a massive triangle reaching into the heart of the Indian Ocean, benefiting any from there who seeks to control the Indian Ocean.”³⁰ In an article casting

suspicion on Indian naval intentions, the author states, “Geostrategically speaking, the Indian Ocean is a link of communication and oil transportation between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans and India is just like a giant and never-sinking aircraft carrier and the most important strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean.”³¹ The reference to an unsinkable aircraft carrier was clearly meant to trigger an emotional reaction, given that for many Chinese the phrase is most closely associated with Taiwan. Intriguingly, some have invoked Mahanian language, wrongly attributed to Mahan himself, to describe the value of the Indian Ocean to New Delhi. One Chinese commentator quotes (without citation) Mahan as asserting, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean will dominate India and the coastal states of the Indian Ocean as well as control the massive area between the Mediterranean and the Pacific Ocean.” In a more expansive reformulation, two articles cite Mahan as declaring, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean controls Asia. The Indian Ocean is the gateway to the world’s seven seas. The destiny of the world in the 21st century will be determined by the Indian Ocean.” (As noted before, a very similar, and likewise apocryphal, Mahan quotation has made the rounds in India, even finding its way into the official Maritime Military Strategy.) Faulty attribution notwithstanding, the Chinese are clearly drawn to Mahanian notions of sea power when forecasting how India will approach its maritime environs. To Chinese observers, these broader geopolitical forces seem to conform to the more outward-looking Indian maritime strategy on exhibit in recent years, and they tend to confirm Chinese suspicions of an expansive and ambitious pattern to India’s naval outlook. This initial inquiry into the maritime geometry of the Indian Ocean region suggests that conditions are auspicious for shaping a mutually beneficial maritime relationship among India, China, and the United States. For now, New Delhi seems at once sanguine about its maritime surroundings and conscious that it lacks the wherewithal to make good on a muscular Monroe Doctrine. While in principle India asserts regional primacy, much as James Monroe’s America did, it remains content to work with the predominant naval power, the United States, in the cause of maritime security in South Asia. If nothing else, this is a matter of expediency.

Important Events:

Some countries have been trying to set the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; however, some countries do not want it. That’s why some small conflicts and actions occur. Some satellites, which belong to the United States, displayed some unusual things in the south part of the Indian

Ocean. It was the light that could come into existence with nuclear tests. That happened on 22 September 1979. It is an allegation that the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) prepared a report which confirms that the light was a consequence of nuclear tests and the US kept it secret for some reason. However, it is not a valid proof about nuclear tests or production of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean since this is just a claim and no verification came from an authorised body.

Past Treaties and Solution Attempts:

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (PTBT)

This treaty is one of the first steps that have been taken about the prohibition of nuclear tests. It opened for signature on 5 August 1963 and entered into force on 10 October 1963. It was an unlimited treaty. In 1954, India made the first proposal calling for an agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests. In 1958, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom began a Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests in Geneva, aimed at reaching agreement on an effectively controlled test ban. The Conference did not come to fruition because the sides could not reach an agreement on the issue of verification procedures. On 5 August 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), was signed in Moscow by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The Treaty requires Parties to prohibit, prevent, and abstain from carrying out nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater, or in any other environment if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State that conducts an explosion; to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the above-described environments. It was the perfect treaty for the issue in theory; however, despite the theory and practice are same in theory, they are not same in practice. This treaty was not enough because France and the People's Republic of China were against this treaty. With the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, the PTBT became redundant. However, should a PTBT party withdraw from the CTBT, or not sign the CTBT, it would still be bound by the provisions of the PTBT. The thing is, PTBT did not prohibit the movements underground and let states to carry on their works and researches only in the underground.

https://media.nti.org/documents/ptbt_partial_test_ban_treaty.pdf

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

This treaty is more powerful and effective than PTBT. It was opened signature on 24 September 1996. Its last update was on 19 November 2019. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) itself includes a Protocol in three parts: Part I detailing the International Monitoring System (IMS); Part II on On-Site Inspections (OSI); and Part III on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs). There are also two Annexes to the Protocol: Annex 1 detailing the location of various Treaty monitoring assets associated with the IMS; and Annex 2 detailing the parameters for screening events. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion (i.e., true zero yield).

The CTBT is frequently associated with another key element in the process of nuclear disarmament: a ban on the production of fissile material for anything other than verified peaceful use. Such a ban would impose a quantitative limit on the amount of nuclear material available for weapons use. That objective is the basis for an initiative at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate a treaty banning further production of fissile material for weapons purposes — the draft Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Taken together, the CTBT and the FMCT are integral components of the nuclear control regime and provide the foundation for eventual nuclear disarmament. The Treaty establishes a CTBT Organization (CTBTO), located in Vienna, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those provisions for international verification measures. The Treaty will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty, but no earlier than two years after its opening for signature. Annex 2 lists the following 44 States, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Vietnam. The aforementioned States are members of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with nuclear power and/or research reactors. If the Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of its opening for signature, a conference of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification may convene annually to consider and decide by consensus what measures, consistent with international law, might be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. Of the 44 States included in Annex 2

required for entry into force of the CTBT, all have signed with the exceptions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), India, and Pakistan. Five of the 44 Annex 2 States have signed but not ratified the CTBT; they are China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States. The United States and China are the only remaining NPT Nuclear Weapon States that have not ratified the CTBT.

(https://media.nti.org/pdfs/ctbto_2.pdf)

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the

Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty)

This treaty was opened for signature on 11 February 1971. It was entered into force on 18 May 1972. In the 1960s, there were concerns that due to recent advances in oceanographic technologies, nations might use the seabed as a new environment for nuclear-related military installations. The Soviet Union and the United States submitted two separate drafts that differed on what was to be prohibited and verification measures. On 7 October 1969, the two States submitted a joint draft to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). During the deliberations in the CCD, coastal States raised concerns about the protection of their rights and smaller States had doubts whether they could check on violations. The final draft was approved by the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution 2660 (XXV) on 7 December 1970 by a vote of 104 to 2 (El Salvador, Peru), with two abstentions (Ecuador, France). The Seabed Treaty was opened for signature on 11 February 1971 and entered into force on 18 May 1972, when the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, as well as more than 22 nations, had deposited instruments of ratification. The Treaty forbids States Parties from implanting or placing on the seabed or ocean floor or in the subsoil thereof, beyond a 12-mile territorial zone, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction or structures, launching installations, or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing, or using such weapons. The Treaty allows for verification through observation by the States Parties of the activities of other States Parties, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain, further procedures for verification may be agreed upon, including inspections. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures. Its last update was on 26 October 2011.

(https://media.nti.org/documents/seabed_treaty.pdf)

Possible Solutions:

There are some solutions: Governments should act according to their policies. If they do not and complicate things, then everything will be harder to solve. Past treaties and solutions could be reconsidered. The reason why France and China did not accept PTBT and then accepted CTBT should be got back in question. Public awareness could be raised by the states in order to save the future. _

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