

AI-MSET FOR SCADA OPERATIONS

Catch the intrusion that looks like normal operations

Behavior-based anomaly detection for electric utilities, water systems, and railroad operations

Zero-day


no signature needed

Ultra-low

false and missed alarms

Passive

no scanning of live OT



THE PROBLEM


Control systems built for isolation are now connected

Rail and utility control systems were designed decades ago, when separation from outside networks was assumed. That assumption no longer holds.

THEN



NOW



Attackers blend in

The most dangerous intrusions change behavior slowly and stay inside normal-looking ranges.

IT tools do not fit

OT cannot tolerate frequent scanning, intrusive agents, or a steady stream of nuisance alarms.

Speed decides outcomes

How fast abnormal behavior is noticed determines whether a problem stays manageable or becomes a safety event.

Signatures catch known attacks. Behavior catches the rest.

Intrusion detection falls into three families. Each has a blind spot; together they give defense in depth.



Dictionary-based

Signature matching

Compares traffic and logs against a library of known attack signatures.

Strength Few false alarms, simple to run

Gap Blind to zero-day attacks; library needs constant updates



Specification-based

Expert-written rules

Security staff define allowed behavior and policies in advance.

Strength Low false alarms, no profiling stage

Gap Only as good as the rules; gaps and errors are manual



Behavior-based

AI-MSET + SPRT

Learns how the system behaves when healthy, then flags statistically significant departures.


Strength Detects zero-day, malicious intrusion activity from outside, and insider (disgruntled employee, etc) activity; no signature updates

Gap Needs good training data and disciplined tuning, which AI-MSET provides

Complement, not replace. AI-MSET adds a layer alongside signature IDS, segmentation, access control, and incident response.

HOW IT WORKS

From raw telemetry to an alert operators can trust




CONVENTIONAL LOGIC ASKS

Has any single value crossed its limit?

AI-MSET ASKS

Are the dynamic correlation relationships among signals departing from normal, even while every value is still within limits?

Quiet attacks slip under a fixed limit. SPRT still sees them.



Illustrative residual patterned on the University of Tennessee Nuclear Analysis Linux Cluster testbed attack sequence (shaded windows).

Attacks detected in this sequence

4 / 6

fixed threshold

6 / 6

AI-MSET + SPRT

Magnitudes differ by orders

In the testbed, the largest residuals were far bigger than the fuzzer and brute-force signatures. A limit set for one misses the other.


Error rates are set, not guessed

SPRT fixes ultra-low false- and missed-alarm probabilities up front and gives the (mathematically provable) earliest-warning malicious-activity alerts for anomalous patterns (even those “below the noise floor” that are impossible to detect with threshold rules).

EVIDENCE

Tested against real attack tools on a simulated SCADA network

University of Tennessee Nuclear Engineering with Oracle (Jeffries, Hines, Gross). Isolated servers in UT's HPC Nuclear Analysis Linux Cluster emulate the SCADA roles.



ATTACK SEQUENCE



Reconnaissance

SPARTA network and host discovery (Nmap, Nikto, others)



Denial of service

SSH, SMB2, and NTP protocol fuzzers from Metasploit



Brute-force login

SSH password attack until a shell is obtained



Privilege escalation

Meterpreter upgrade to root on a new port



Exfiltration

Files of 100 KB to 50 MB copied off the target

RESULTS

Every intrusion that disturbed the SCADA telemetry patterns was detected

Share of signals in each model group that flagged all six intrusions



Memory / CPU only: just 2 signals caught all six. These metrics still sharpen predictions for the rest of the model.

6 / 6

intrusion types detected by both
AAKR and AAMSET model families

4.5–5.1%

average per-signal prediction
uncertainty across monitored
telemetry

11 of 20

exploits changed telemetry. The other
9 left no trace and belong to signature
IDS

Source: Jeffries, Hines, Gross, NPIC&HMIT 2017; UT conference draft. Models were built with UT's PEM toolbox, a non-proprietary MSET-class method. SPRT $\alpha = \beta = 1\%$.

Early warning across generation, transmission, and grid control

Small deviations in these systems can escalate quickly. The goal is to see them while there is still time to isolate and respond.



WHAT AI-MSET CORRELATES

- Control commands against the physical response they should produce
- Relay and breaker states against measured currents and voltages
- Polling timing and traffic between master and RTUs
- Host and network metrics on the servers running SCADA itself

WHY IT MATTERS

Abnormal control actions, unexpected responses, and emerging instability show up as broken relationships before a protection trip or an operator notices.

Supports proactive monitoring expectations under NERC CIP without altering required controls.

Protect treatment chemistry and pumping without adding staff

Many water systems run lean. Behavior-based monitoring gives them continuous watch without a signature team to maintain it.



WHAT AI-MSET CORRELATES

- Chemical dosing rate against flow and measured residuals
- Pump commands against flow, pressure, and motor power
- Tank levels against pump and valve states
- RTU and PLC communication timing across remote sites


WHY IT MATTERS

A setpoint change can stay inside every individual limit and still break the physics between dosing, flow, and water quality. That broken relationship is what AI-MSET detects.

Complements AWIA risk and resilience planning and existing utility controls.

Guard the timing and logic that keep train movements safe

Switching, signaling, interlocking, and grade-crossing systems depend on deterministic timing. AI-MSET learns their normal interplay.



Unauthorized control actions

Switch or signal commands that do not match the traffic plan or occupancy state.

Timing anomalies

Crossing warnings, interlocking responses, or comms latency drifting from learned norms.

One engine, two jobs

The same AI-MSET engine also supports rail asset prognostics: locomotive DPUs, Railroad Positive Train Control (PTC) infrastructure, wayside detectors (HBD and Acoustics), bridge structural integrity assurance.

Built for the constraints of operational technology



Passive

Reads telemetry the system already produces. No scanning or agents on controllers.



No signature treadmill

Complements conventional “dictionary based” security. Proactively detects departures from normal telemetry dynamics, so zero-day attacks do not need a prior entry.



Error rates you choose

SPRT runs with ultra-low preset false- and missed-alarm probabilities, so alerts stay credible.



Light compute

Runs at the edge with far lower overhead than neural-network anomaly detectors.



Deterministic and explainable

Per-signal residuals show which relationships broke, and repeat runs give the same answer. Deterministic traceback root cause analysis (RCA) speeds NTSB and FRA post-event analyses, and Lloyds-of-London (and other) fault attribution.




Forensic replay

Software Black Box Recorder with TNP’s proprietary “Zeno’s Circular File” statistical-compression structure keeps a lifetime of telemetry history in a compact storage footprint for fast, accurate, and auditable root cause analyses.


A rigorous path from raw data to a validated model

Detection performance is specified before deployment and measured on held-out data, not assumed.



DEPLOYMENT

Runs beside existing controls, not in place of them



DESIGN PRINCIPLES

- ✓ **No write path to control**
AI-MSET observes; it never issues commands.
- ✓ **Data stays on site**
Models run at the edge under customer control.
- ✓ **Fits existing workflows**
Alerts flow to the tools operators and the SOC already use.
- ✓ **Supports compliance**
Adds evidence for NERC CIP, AWIA, and rail security programs without changing required controls.

NEXT STEP

Prove value in weeks from data you already keep

The fastest proof uses existing data-historian archives. A live pilot is needed only where no telemetry has been saved.

IF: ARCHIVE INCLUDES PAST FAILURES



Paper POC

Weeks no site access needed

YOU SEND

Data from assets that never had problems, plus one or more assets that suffered any undetected event [e.g. malicious intrusion of SCADA systems & networks]

WE SHOW

False-alarm rate measured on the healthy fleet, and how many weeks or months before the event AI-MSET would have flagged the small precursor faults

IF: ARCHIVE, BUT NO FAILURES



Fault-injection POC

Weeks no site access needed

WE DO

Train on archived data, then analytically insert many types of subtle anomalies at controlled sizes

WE SHOW

False-alarm rate on clean data, plus missed-alarm rate and time-to-detect for each anomaly type and size

IF: NO HISTORIAN ARCHIVE



Live pilot

90+ days read-only, on site

WE DO

Collect telemetry read-only, learn normal operation, then challenge with red-team injections in a replica

WE SHOW

Time-to-detect and false- and missed-alarm rates against the tools the operator runs today



Why the archives usually exist. Insurers of high-liability rail and utility assets often require operators to keep historian telemetry, so a major loss can be attributed: e.g. act of nature, maintenance lapse, manufacturing defects, software update errors, human error, or malicious activity. That same record lets AI-MSET prove itself retrospectively.

THE TAKEAWAY

AI-MSET SCADA Prognostic Cyber Security: Detect abnormal behavior early. Act deliberately, not reactively.

AI-MSET turns cybersecurity for electric, water, and rail SCADA control systems into an operational resilience capability, aligned with the safety and reliability goals operators already have.



Electric



Water



Rail