

*This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far, nor with so ill effects, as amongst men of letters.*

*The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes, which have so laid waste the intellectual world, is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words.*

*For, though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with, yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do, in their arguings one with another, is, that they speak different languages.*

*For I am apt to imagine that when any of them, quitting terms, think upon things, and know what they think, they think all the same.*

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 3, 10, 22.

*It is true indeed that [political institutions] and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. ...*

*We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply what has not.*

Aristotle, *Politics*, 1329b35.

*As soon as we are shown something old in the new,  
we are calmed.*

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 551.

# THE UNCHRISTIAN PARTY MANIFESTO

in 154 ejaculations.

Eleventh Edition

There is a book of his [Heraclitus] extant, which is about nature generally, and it is divided into three discourses; one on the Universe; one on Politics; and one on Theology. And he deposited this book in the temple of Artemis, as some authors report, having written it intentionally in an obscure style, in order that only those who were able men might comprehend it, and that it might not be exposed to ridicule at the hands of the common people.

Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 9, 6.

Pitt refused to suppress [William Godwin's *Political Justice*] on the ground that a three-guinea book could do no harm.

R. N. Carew Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, p. 141.

The Irish responded with sarcasm and invective, but they never banned [James Joyce's] book. Perhaps no outraged citizen felt qualified to file the necessary critique with the censorship board, which was set up only some years after publication. By then the panel may have judged it beyond the intellectual scope of corruptible readers.

Declan Kiberd, Introduction, *Ulysses*, Bodley Head edition.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> And see Plato, *Phaedrus*, 271; Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 24, 8-10; and Plato, *Republic*, 377e-378a.

This manifesto is based on, excerpted from, versified from  
our *e80 25vs5e e8nn*,  
eds. A. R. Byrne, D. W. Griffiths, and L. King.

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## Introduction.

### 2. Why Un-Christian Party? (1)

#### 2.1.1:

First, we considered the title: *The Humane Socialist Party*.

This is an accurate description of our position; but we felt it would probably lead to misunderstandings.

Socialism need not mean mob rule.

*Our* socialism does not mean mob rule.

Everything affects everything else.<sup>2</sup>

There *is* such a thing as society; and some people are a *burden* on it.

#### 2.1.2:

Everything affects everything else.

A butterfly fluttering its wings in Dominica could cause a hurricane in Dorset.

One thing leads to another.

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<sup>2</sup> The reader might recognise a possible inconsistency or contradiction here. If we specify *everything*, how can there be an *else*? How can there be something *outside*, apart from, everything? And isn't, in our system, a *thing* something other than a *person*? Have we not conveniently but unacceptably ignored the perennial problems regarding the nature of cause, causality, causation? And how could we know *everything* or even every-*one*? How could we know or be aware of *every* effect?

These are valid questions.

The best we can do here is (i) complement the reader on having the suitable philosophical outlook or quality or frame of mind, (ii) direct him or her to ejaculations 1.1 – 1.2.2, and (iii) say '*You know what we're getting at.*'

A clod of soil falling into the sea near Vladivostok can have a detrimental effect on someone standing on a mountain in Switzerland.

Someone falling from a mountain in Switzerland could matter as little as a clod of soil falling into the sea near Vladivostok.

If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the whole face of the earth would have been changed.

To the question/assertion/challenge – ‘What’s it got to do with you.’

The answer is – EVERYTHING.

### 2.1.3:

Our socialism is *humane* because we recognise that:

Persons, *as* Persons, cannot be, *by definition*, victims of circumstance.

Persons, *as* Persons, cannot, *by definition*, be bound by destiny.

They cannot be subject to God’s Grace.

They need not – *having eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil* – submit to Fate.

Inanimate objects, mere things, blocks, clods of soil cannot be held responsible.

Objects, *as* Objects, can, by definition be dismantled, binned, vandalised, but not punished.

Persons, *as* Persons, can be praised or blamed.

They can be rewarded or punished.

They can be deserving or undeserving.<sup>3</sup>

Whoever – *whatever* – cannot be held responsible, *is not a human being*.<sup>4</sup>

### 2.1.4:

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<sup>3</sup> *Odyssey*, 4, 325-327.

<sup>4</sup> And see Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*, 65.



‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars.’

As Persons:

The sun, the moon, and the stars cannot be guilty of our disasters.

We cannot be villains by necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance.

We cannot be drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence;

Nor all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on:

Not because our fathers compounded with our mothers under the Dragon’s tail, and our nativities were under Ursa Major.

We should have been as we are had the maidenliest star in the firmament twinkled on our bastardising.

Hence, ours is *humane* socialism.

#### 2.2.1:

We next considered the title: *The Right-Wing Anarchist Party*.

This gives a better, more accurate understanding; it *felt* good but is, technically, an inaccurate description.

From the Greek *an-arkhos*: anarchy does not mean ‘without law’ but ‘without ruler’.

#### 2.2.2:

Some people, *many* people, *need* to be ruled; for their own and everyone else’s good.

Some, too few, need little or no government.

Many, too many, *need* law. They are better off as *slaves*. And they *want* to be slaves.

They are born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward.

The freedom that many claim to want is no more than freedom from *responsibility*: freedom from *retribution*.<sup>5</sup>

2.2.3:

People are, clearly, *naturally un-equal*.

People are clearly unequal in reason;  
Unequal in faculties;  
Unequal in form and moving;  
Unequal in action;  
Unequal in apprehension.<sup>6</sup>

As Blake had it – One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.

Laws designed to benefit oxen should not concern the lion.

Aristotle, *Politics*, 1254a12-1255a35:

*He who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by nature a slave; and he may be said to be another's man who, being a human being, is also a possession. And a possession may be defined as an instrument of action, separable from the possessor.*

*But is there anyone thus intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a violation of nature?*

*There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both of reason and of fact. For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient.*

*From the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection...*

*It must be admitted that some are slaves everywhere, others nowhere.*

And Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface:

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<sup>5</sup> Isaiah Berlin's *Two Concepts of Liberty* unintentionally – *presumably* unintentionally – makes the same point.

<sup>6</sup> And see Plato, *Republic*, 580d-583a.

*In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society – the real foundation, on which the legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life.*

*It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.*

And Marx again: *The German Ideology*, 1, B, *Conclusions from the Materialist Conception of History*:

*History ... shows that circumstances make men.*

*ibid*, “Feuerbach”, 1:

*The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology, and their corresponding forms of consciousness no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter along with this their real existence, their thinking, and the products of their thinking.*

*Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life.*

They – the “slaves by nature” – *enthusiastically seek out* the exoneration by fate, the amnesty and forgiveness by circumstance.

For “Slave” substitute “*people whose forms of consciousness no longer retain the semblance of independence; [whose] relations are indispensable and independent of their will.*”

They stumble into the river, and they are swept along by the current.

They *eagerly seek out* the security of slavery.<sup>7</sup>

So, we dropped the “Anarchism”.

#### 2.3.1:

Next, we suggested *The Progressive Conservative Party* as a title.

Again, this is an accurate description; but gives the impression of being a deliberate rhetorical contradiction. Or maybe a piece of Orwellian Doublethink!

#### 2.3.2:

For us, *progress* means *conserving* the *principles* and *methods* that lead to a *meritocracy*. These principles and methods lead to progress.

Under an UnChristian administration, rigorous discrimination will operate in all areas of society.

The motto will be:

***To each according to his ability.***

We will discriminate against the bad;  
And discriminate in favour of the good.

We will discriminate in favour of the fair;  
And discriminate against the foul.

We will discriminate in favour of the virtuous.  
We will discriminate against the depraved and degenerate.

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<sup>7</sup> And see note 143.

We will discriminate in favour of the deserving;  
And against the undeserving.

For Rousseau, Bentham, Marx, Rawls *et al.*, “Progress” is equated with *egalitarianism* – a levelling *down*, a *dragging* down to the level of the lowest. It is degeneration: *re*-gression rather than *pro*-gression.

### 2.3.3:

The original motto was Mill’s:<sup>8</sup>

*The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection ... The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others ...*

*In the part that merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.*

That is: ‘You can do what you want, *as long as it doesn’t harm anyone else.*’

*But this is no longer the motto.*

Now the motto is changed to:

‘The *decadent* and the *dissolute* (as depicted in Hogarth’s paintings and prints), the *depraved* and the *degenerate* (as described in the works of Dickens), the burdens on society warned against by the original Fabians *have the right to do whatever the hell they want* –

‘They have the right to inflict themselves on everyone else, and *everyone else is obliged, has a duty to tolerate them, to put up with them, to indulge them.*’

As John Rawls puts it in his *A Theory of Justice*, 1, 1:

*Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot*

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<sup>8</sup> *On Liberty*, 1.

*override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.*

Education (*sic*) policy, the judicial system, foreign policy, the alms trade, and the rest is this maxim in action.

This isn't the programme for a new, sunnier age of mutual aid and mutual respect – “Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” (Mao Tsetung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, 8) –

It is a plan of attack for *one* group against *another*:

It is a plan of attack for the *decadent* and the *dissolute*, the *depraved* and the *degenerate*:

The sewer filth of the earth.

A stratagem for the Government *of* scum, *by* scum, *for* scum.

It has nothing to do with “Unity”.

There's no ‘pulling together’.

The burden-*ed* are being *pulled down* by the burden-*some*.<sup>9</sup>

#### 2.3.4:

Hence, we see the appearance of the sacrosanct adjectives and the inviolable verbs and their concomitants.<sup>10</sup>

*The Untouchables*, as we call them, have a privileged position under the Law.

There is discrimination *in favour* of the bad,

*In favour* of the degenerate,

*In favour* of the foul;

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<sup>9</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253a1-6.

<sup>10</sup> See Equality Act 2010, and section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

There is discrimination *against* the fair.  
And *against* the good.

There is the Government of *filth*, by *filth*, for *filth*.

#### 2.3.5:

Therefore, solely to avoid misunderstandings, we rejected the name: *Progressive Conservative Party*.

Socialism need not mean mob rule.<sup>11</sup>

*Our* socialism *does not* mean mob rule. It's simply a recognition that everything affects everything else.

It's simply a recognition that there *is* such a thing as society; and that some people are a *burden* on it.

*Their* socialism  $\equiv \mathbf{A}$  can do whatever the hell  $\mathbf{A}$  wants, and  $\mathbf{B}$  has a duty, a moral obligation, to sort out the damage and clear up the mess.

*Our* socialism  $\equiv \mathbf{B}$  can stop  $\mathbf{A}$  making a mess and causing damage.

If a James O'Brien or a Shelagh Fogarty's parents hadn't been at it in their stinking pits (a revolting thought), the consequences of their indulgence wouldn't be the curse that is a James O'Brien and a Shelagh Fogarty.

#### 2.4.1:

The *response* to CoViD-19 was Christianity in action.

The self-abasement and self-flagellation provoked by George Floyd was Christianity in action.<sup>12</sup>

It used to be said – when the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were pointing their I.C.B.M.s at each other – that it's *man's* (and we

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<sup>11</sup> And see Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'Prologue', 3.

<sup>12</sup> *And* the Subprime Loan debacle.

use the term advisedly) *man's* aggressive, violent, murderous nature that will be the ruin of us.

Now, this clearly is not true.

It's *Christian charity* that'll be our ruin.

The affected sanctimonious donning of sham/fraudulent *noblesse oblige*, the *de haut en bas* affectations, the axiomatic self-abasement and self-flagellation – The Bleeding-Heart “liberalism”, the “P.C.”, the “Woke”:

These are just Christianity and suicidal Christian charity by another name.

The effete, lifeless Christianity of the self-mutilating, effete, reedy-voiced, quivering-lipped, hair-shirt-wearing Anglican Bishop is the *real* Christianity.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Resisting not evil.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Turning the other cheek.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Loving one's enemies.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Blessing them that curse us.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Doing good to them that hate us and use us.

Therefore, we realised, and had to accept, that *The Un-Christian Party* could be the only option.

#### 2.4.2.1:

Whoever – someone with a misapplied, ill-placed brand loyalty – thinks Christianity is an essential part of the culture and traditions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland might be comforted or consoled by an examination of Tacitus's observations in relation to the religious feeling – or lack of it – amongst the northern tribes...

Or after an assessment of the Pelagius/Augustine controversy (c. 416 – 431 S.I.I.N.R.I. (for the sake of brevity, and to avoid confusion, we incorporate, employ, the old chronology in this manifesto)):

N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 357:

*If Christianity had accepted Pelagius' account of human nature as its presupposition, it would have ceased to be a "religion" in any intelligible sense of the term.*



One hundred and fifty-eight words are enough.

2.4.2.2:

What the hell did King Richard I's massacre at Ayyadieh have to do with Christianity!?

What did the massacre after the siege of Jerusalem – estimates range from 3,000 to 70,000 dead – have to do with Christianity?

What did the sack of Constantinople have to do with Christianity?

And the decrees of the Synod of Oxford?

What did the transatlantic slave economy have to do with Christianity?

What did the Empire have to do with *Luke*, 18, 22-23 or with *Matthew*, 19, 21-22 or with *Mark*, 10, 21-22: 'Go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor'?

What did the Industrial Revolution or the science of Isaac Newton or of Michael Faraday or of Charles Darwin or the economics of Adam Smith have to do with *Matthew*, 6, 19-34? Or with *Genesis*, 2, 16-17 or 3, 1-5 and 22-23?

St Paul's Cathedral, or Westminster Abbey, or Liverpool's Metropolitan Cathedral of Christ the King, or the spire of Salisbury Cathedral – What do they have to do with *Matthew*, 6, 1-7 and 19-29?

What did the views of the *Reverend* Malthus have to do with Christianity?

What did Henry VIII's beheading of Anne Boleyn and Catherine Howard have to do with any desperate day and night meditation on *Romans*, 1, 17?

And where the hell is it written that gentle Jesus meek and mild told us to burn heretics!!!?

B. R. Rees, *Pelagius: A Reluctant Heretic*, pp. ix-x:

*Christians in the West seem to have been particularly susceptible to attacks of [Pelagianism]: in fourteenth-century England Archbishop Bradwardine detected a Pelagian hiding beneath every academic gown, just as Reinhold Niebuhr in twentieth-century America saw Pelagians in every pew: Pelagianism has often been described as 'the English disease', and we are told that by the early years of the [20<sup>th</sup>] century the United States had 'gradually made its way, from being the most Calvinist, to being the most Pelagian of the Christian nations'.*

*Pelagianism is indeed an ever-recurring temptation and has survived all the onslaughts of its adversaries to challenge Arianism [see ejaculation 3.4.1] for the dubious honour of having been the most persistent of Christian heresies.*

F. C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 258:

*The traditional theological teaching was that divine grace was required for man to perform acts which were meritorious in God's eyes and to achieve salvation ... [William of Ockham] was convinced that no human act can be meritorious unless it is a free act, preceding from the human will as its cause ... The result of this insistence on human freedom, coupled with Ockham's admission of the theoretical possibility of man's performing meritorious acts and achieving salvation without the intervention of grace as a secondary cause, was the impression in certain quarters that a new form of Pelagianism had arisen, concerned with emphasising human freedom and self-sufficiency at the expense of the universal divine causality and the divine omniscience. Hence the sharp attack made by Bradwardine in his *De causa Dei contra Pelagium*.*

*Genesis*, 22, 17.

*Daniel*, 2, 46-49; 3, 26-30.

*Real* Christianity was given the Keys to the Gates only in  
1948!

## Part I.

### 3. Why Un-Christian Party? (2)

3.1:

Sophocles, *Antigone*, 620-623:

*Evil appears as good in the minds of those whom  
god leads to destruction.*

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – or, to be more accurate, *England* – is *now, clearly*, the most Christian country on Earth.

Surprised?  
Puzzled?  
Astounded?

So consider this – *Matthew*, 5, 39-44 – the essence of Christianity:

*But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but  
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him  
the other also.*

*And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take  
away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also.*

*And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go  
with him twain.*

*Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that  
would borrow of thee turn not thou away.*

*Ye have heard that it hath been said; thou shalt love  
thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy.*

*But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them  
that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray  
for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.*

And consider *Isaiah*, 2, 11-12:

*The lofty looks of man shall be humbled, and the  
haughtiness of men shall be bowed down, and the Lord  
alone shall be exalted in that day.*

*For the day of the Lord of hosts shall be upon every  
one that is proud and lofty, and upon every one that is  
lifted up; and he shall be brought low.*

*Everyone that is proud and lofty ... everyone that is lifted up ... he  
shall be brought low* – This, clearly, is the essence of government  
policy (*Sub Imperio Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum*).

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Resisting not evil.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Turning the other cheek.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Loving one's enemies.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Blessing them that curse us.

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Doing good to them that hate us and use us.

*Matthew*, 23, 11-12:

*But he that is greatest among you shall be your  
servant.*

*And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased,  
and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.*

It's the climate of opinion.

Christ is the curator of culture.

*Matthew*, 5, 17:

*Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the  
prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.*

Vicisti, Galilaeae.

*Isaiah*, 61, 1-2:

*The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me; because  
the Lord hath anointed me to preach good tidings unto  
the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the brokenhearted,  
to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the  
prison to them that are bound;*

*To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God; to comfort all that mourn.*

It's the spirit of the times.  
*Vicisti, Galilae.*  
Christianity *is* the dominant ideology.  
It's the intellectual fashion.  
The zeitgeist *is* Christianity.

'Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath; We have drunken of things Lethean...'

The *response* to CoViD-19 was Christianity in action.

The self-abasement and self-flagellation provoked by George Floyd was Christianity in action.

1 John, 2, 3-6:

*And hereby we do know that we know him, if we keep his commandments.*

*He that saith, I know him, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him.*

*But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected: hereby know we that we are in him.*

*He that saith he abideth in him ought himself also so to walk, even as he walked.*

It really isn't hyperbole.  
It's not going over the top.

It really isn't going too far to say that if we were encountering *Matthew*, 5, 39-44 for the first time, we could be forgiven for thinking we were reading a passage from the Marquis de Sade, *The 120 Days of Sodom*, XII:

*Having then adopted the most comfortable position, he glued his mouth to the object of his worship, and in less time than it takes to tell, I delivered a gobbet of shit the size of a pigeon's egg. He sucked it, turned it a thousand times about in his mouth, chewed it, savoured it, at the end of three or four minutes I distinctly saw him swallow it; I push again, the same ceremony is*

*repeated, and as I had a prodigious charge to be rid of, ten times over he filled his mouth and emptied it, and even after all was done he seemed famished still.*

The insane suicidal masochism:

The Crucifixion: The *reverence* of Christ on the Cross:  
The whole thing set up as an *aspiration*, an *object of desire*!

Insane suicidal masochism.

It's pure Marquis de Sade!

The *response* to CoViD-19:

The self-abasement, the self-flagellation provoked by  
George Floyd:

Pure Marquis de Sade:

Insane suicidal masochism *is* the climate of opinion, the spirit of the times, the dominant ideology, the intellectual fashion.

This, clearly, is the essence of government policy *Sub Imperio Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum* 2022:

Christianity.

### 3.2:

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 244:

*It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties ...*

*It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account.*

And in his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 415:

*Reason is the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.*

But there are the Christian passions and the *Un*-Christian passions [ejaculation 1.2.2 hammers the point home].

Attempting to justify one against the other is like giving a fish a bicycle.

The limits of their desires are the limits of their world.

The “Bleeding-Heart liberalism”, the sanctimonious donning of sham/fraudulent *noblesse oblige*, the *de haut en bas* affectations, the axiomatic self-abasement – the “P.C.”, the “Woke” – These are just Christianity and suicidal Christian charity by another name.

The effete, lifeless Christianity of the self-mutilating, effete, reedy-voiced, hair-shirt-wearing Anglican Bishop is the *real* Christianity.

### 3.3:

Education (*sic*) policy, economic policy, foreign policy: the Dominant Ideology: The *zeitgeist*, the *volksgeist*:

*Luke*, 14, 11:

*For whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.*

*Isaiah*, 26, 4-6:

*Trust ye in the Lord for ever: for in the Lord Jehovah is everlasting strength:*

*For he bringeth down them that dwell on high; the lofty city, he layeth it low; he layeth it low, even to the ground; he bringeth it even to the dust.*

*The foot shall tread it down, even the feet of the poor, and the steps of the needy.*



Luke, 13, 29-30:

*And they shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God.*

*And, behold, here are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last.*

*Egalitarianism:*

Cutting down.  
Dumbing down.  
Levelling down.  
Dragging down.

Fair is foul and foul is fair.  
Evil is presented – and is *accepted* – as good.<sup>13</sup>

Resisting not evil.  
Turning the other cheek.  
Loving one's enemies.  
Blessing them that curse us.  
Doing good to them that hate us and use us and persecute us.  
Suicidal self-mutilation and self-abasement.

#### 3.4.1:

The *political* Christ: The subversive Jesus: The seditious Jesus: Jesus the corruptor was pushed into the background by *the few Bishops* attending the Councils of Nicea or Chalcedon.

The supernatural, God-like, *hard-to-take-seriously, impossible-to-go-along-with* attributes of Jesus were *stipulated*, were *asserted*, were *imposed* as *necessary* attributes some four hundred years *after* Jesus was supposed to have lived.

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<sup>13</sup> We may ponder the dissonance in the fact that the 44,000,000-plus killed by Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot in the cause of egalitarianism is/are rarely, if ever, mentioned; but the other killing – of the 6,000,000 – is used as an irrefutable and unquestionable argument *in favour* of that egalitarianism.

During the patristic period, *c.* 100 S.I.I.N.R.I. to the Council of Chalcedon in 451 S.I.I.N.R.I., there was, in fact, no settled view regarding the nature of Jesus.

The Alexandrian School argued for his divinity.

However, the Antiochene School placed greater emphasis on his humanity, and the fact that he provided a moral *example*.

Arius (*c.* 250 – *c.* 336 S.I.I.N.R.I.) argued against any supernatural or God-like Jesus. For Arius, Jesus was certainly a pre-eminent human being, but any claim that he had an equal status with God was, at best, metaphorical.

Athanasius, to the contrary, held that any Christ must be divine in order to be able to properly fulfil the soteriological function and enterprise.

The problem is indicated in *Mark*, 6, 1-5:

*And he went out from thence, and came into his own country; and his disciples follow him.*

*And when the sabbath day was come, he began to teach in the synagogue: and many hearing him were astonished, saying, From whence hath this man these things? And what wisdom is this which is given unto him, that even such mighty works are wrought by his hands?*

*Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Judah, and Simon? And are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him.*

*But Jesus said unto them. A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country, and among his own kin, and in his own house.*

*And he could there do no mighty work, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them.*

In other words: How the hell could some bloke from down the street – a jumped-up two-bit carpenter – annul the transgressions of Adam!?

Thomas Campbell, *The Pleasures of Hope*, 1, 7:

*'Tis distance lends enchantment to the view,  
And robes the mountain in its azure hue.*

So, the provenance of some supernatural authority was made necessary.

In 325 S.I.I.N.R.I., Constantine convened the Council of Nicea with a view to resolving these Christological disagreements.

The Arian controversy, as it came to be known, was settled in the affirmation that Jesus was *homoousios*, “of one substance”, with God; and the Council of Chalcedon confirmed the decision.

*The point is* – The supernatural, God-like, *hard-to-believe* attributes of Jesus were *stipulated* – asserted or laid down – by some *Bishops* – by a collection of *mere people* – *some four hundred years after* Jesus was supposed to have lived.

The *political* Christ: The subversive Jesus: The seditious Jesus: Jesus the corruptor: the Jesus, maybe, of the Antiochene School was pushed into the background by *the few busybodies* attending the Councils of Nicea or Chalcedon.

And the practice continued.

#### 3.4.2:

To paraphrase Pascal:

The God of the scholars and philosophers moved further and further away from the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

The *real* Christianity has, during 2,000 years, been obscured by the verbal, literary, linguistic gymnastics of the *theologians*: The architects, the builders of the Cathedrals of the Mind.

#### 3.4.3.1:

But why do we not treat *The Bible* as we would any other ancient text – The *Zend Avesta*, the *Dharmaśāstras*, the Laws of Hammurabi, the *Atrahasis*, the Ugaritic texts, the Egyptian myths, the *Iliad*, or whatever?

We need not be followers of Durkheim or of Robertson Smith or of Radcliffe-Brown or of Malinowski; or of Spencer or Swanson, but if we read *The Bible* as though we were on an archaeological dig (and we would certainly need to be more

delicate than an Edward Robinson or a Charles Warren or a Heinrich Schliemann; or than a George Adam Smith or a Charles Clermont-Ganneau) – examining the practices and then deducing their function as an archaeologist might deduce the function of a pot from a few fragments – much good would be done.

Tertullian (c. 155 – 220 S.I.I.N.R.I.) had it right at the outset:

*Prescription against Heretics*, Ch.7:

*What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?  
What accord is there between the Academy and the  
Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our  
Instruction comes from “the porch of Solomon”, who had  
himself taught that “the Lord should be sought in  
simplicity of heart”.*

*Away with attempts to produce a mottled  
Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!  
We want no curious disputation after possessing Jesus  
Christ, no inquisition after enjoying the Gospel! With  
our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our  
palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to  
believe besides.*

Tertullian recognised in the Gospels the day-to-day, the face-to-face, the mundane. The New *and* the Old Testament is a political tract. How the hell it ever caught on outside its immediate, relevant, appropriate sphere is one of the great mysteries!

Note Xenophanes, reported in Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis*, V, 109, 3; and VII, 22, 1:

*But if cattle or horses or lions had hands, or were  
able to draw with their hands and do the works that  
men do, horses would draw the forms of gods like horses,  
and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies  
such as they each had themselves ...*

*The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed  
and black, the Thracians that theirs have light blue eyes  
and red hair.*

How the hell even just the mythology of Christianity ever caught on outside its immediate, relevant, appropriate sphere is one of the great mysteries.<sup>14</sup>

It's as if some strange Israeli sect, inspired by some destructive god, accepted *Mein Kampf* as a New Testament of a new religion, included the *Edda* as its Old Testament, and set the whole thing to music with selections from Wagner – All in the veneration of Wotan-Hitler:

Evil appearing as good:  
Insane suicidal masochism.

They may as well just lie down on the floor and say 'Please shit in my mouth.'

Surprised?  
Puzzled?  
Astounded?

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 24:

*Christianity can be understood only by referring to  
the soil out of which it grew.*

So consider this:

*Deuteronomy*, 20, 10-11:

*When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against  
it, then proclaim peace unto it.*

*And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace,  
and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people  
that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and  
they shall serve thee.*

*Isaiah*, 49, 23:

*And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their  
queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee*

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<sup>14</sup> And see *Havamal*, 43.

*with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me.*

*Deuteronomy, 7, 22-25:*

*And the Lord thy God will put out those nations before thee by little and little: thou mayest not consume them at once, lest the beasts of the field increase upon thee.*

*But the Lord thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed.*

*And he shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven: there shall no man be able to stand before thee, until thou have destroyed them.*

*The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire.*

*Genesis, 24, 60:*

*And they blessed Rebecca, and said unto her, Thou art our sister, be thou the mother of thousands of millions, and let thy seed possess the gate of those which hate them.<sup>15</sup>*

*Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity:*

*By the God you know the human, and conversely, by the human, you know the God.*

3.4.3.2:

The assumption – the assertion, the axiom – that religion has nothing to do with the mundane day-to-day practicalities of life as lived springs from the Catholic-Protestant conflicts of the Reformation.

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<sup>15</sup> Consider Emma Lazarus, *The New Colossus*.

John Locke was a pivotal author on these matters. He tied himself in knots arguing for the position and, in doing so, violated his own essential and crucially important principles (see ejaculation 6.3.1). He wanted to find a way to avoid any more burnings at the stake. An understandable motivation, but in the attempt, he was forced to *provide a definition* of religion that went against what was evident *in the Bible*; he forces or imposes a *stipulative* definition of true religion.

He employs an apodeicticism in that any conclusion must *necessarily* be true purely, and solely, *from the definitions* of the terms used in any argument:<sup>16</sup>

*A Letter Concerning Toleration:*

*Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of Body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.*

*It is the duty of the civil magistrate ... to secure unto all the people in general and to every one of his subjects in particular the just possession of these things belonging to this life ...*

*Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concerns, and that all civil power, right and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls ...*

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<sup>16</sup> Richard Dawkins uses the same method in his *The God Delusion*, p.52. He says, 'I shall define the God Hypothesis more defensibly: *there exists a superhuman, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us.*' If by 'supernatural' he means above or outside nature or the whole universe, i.e. outside *everything*, it would, of course, be impossible – *logically* impossible – for such a being to exist. Dawkins *defines* his God out of existence. It's clear that, like John Locke, Dawkins' real objection to *certain aspects* of contemporary religion is not, primarily, that it's un-scientific, but that it doesn't fit with his politics. See ejaculations 15.1.3; and 3.4.1 and 3.4.2. And see Cath Martin, "Richard Dawkins: First he was a 'cultural Anglican', now he's a 'secular Christian'", *Christian Today*, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2014; and "Richard Dawkins admits he is a 'cultural Anglican'", *Anglican Communion News Service*, 12<sup>th</sup> September 2013; and Stoyan Zaimov, "Richard Dawkins: I Guess I'm a Cultural Christian", *The Christian Post*, 5<sup>th</sup> March 2013.

However, Locke's toleration stopped short of the Roman Catholicism as he saw it due to its intrusion into the civil arena; the ground which Locke was determined to defend.

For Locke, Roman Catholicism had nothing to do with religion, or should not be tolerated, or should reject its allegiance to the Pope; in which case it would stop being Roman Catholicism.

So even John Locke was driven to put his own principles to one side and employ 'Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language ... and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning ...'.

It is clear that his stipulative definition of Christianity and of religion in general is unsupportable by any description that might be gleaned from the *texts*.

Christianity, and religion in general, is not, and has never been, just a private thing.

What is *Deuteronomy*, 7, 1-6 but a concern with 'civil interests ... life, liberty, health, and indolency of Body'?:

*Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.*

*For they will turn away thy son from following me that they may serve other gods: so will the anger of the Lord be kindled against you, and destroy thee suddenly.*

*But thus shall ye deal with them; ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire.*

*For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chose thee to be a special people unto himself, and above all people that are upon the face of the earth.*

And *Deuteronomy*, 6, 10-11:

*And it shall be, when the Lord thy God shall have brought thee into the land which he sware unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give thee great and goodly cities, which thou buildest not,*



*And houses full of all good things, which thou filledst not, and wells digged, which thou diggedst not, vineyards and olive trees, which thou plantedst not; when thou shalt have eaten to the full.*

What is this but a concern with ‘civil interests ... and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like’?

The writings of a Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Leonardo Boff, a José Miguéz Bonino, a Juan Luis Segundo or a James H. Cone would be closer to the mood and tone of the Gospels than is the *Letter Concerning Toleration*.<sup>17</sup>

3.4.4:

Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*:

*From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!*

Marx was not the first to come up with this prescription:

*Mark*, 10, 21-22:

*Then Jesus beholding him loved him, and said unto him, One thing thou lackest: go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, take up the cross, and follow me.*

*And he was sad at that saying, and went away grieved: for he had great possessions.*

*Matthew*, 19, 21-22:

*Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.*

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<sup>17</sup> And see *Isaiah*, 19, 2-3; and *Luke*, 11, 17; *Luke*, 1, 68-74; *Luke*, 1, 53-55; *Genesis*, 41, 15-16 and 37-43; *Daniel*, 2, 45-49; *Daniel*, 3, 26-30; *Genesis*, 45, 4-8; *Daniel*, 6, 24-28; *Genesis*, 24, 60.

*But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.*

*Luke, 18, 22-23:*

*Now when Jesus heard these things, he said unto him, Yet lackest thou one thing: sell all that thou hast, and distribute unto the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow me.*

*And when he heard this, he was very sorrowful: for he was very rich.*

*Acts, 4, 34-35:*

*Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold,*

*And laid them down at the apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man according as he had need.*

*Acts, 2, 44-45:*

*And all that believed were together, and had all things in common;*

*And sold their possessions and goods, and parted them to all men, as every man had need.*

If this isn't a concern with civil interests – a vindication and a justification, or an *excuse* and permission for the teachings of a Gustavo Gutiérrez, a Leonardo Boff, a José Miguél Bonino, a Juan Luis Segundo or a James H. Cone – what is!?<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> There's no needle in the haystack. We need not rely on, for example, the Rev. Percy Dearmer, Vicar of St. Mary-the-Virgin, Primrose Hill as our authority: 'It is extraordinary how little many Christian people realize the meaning of their own religion, so that they are actually shocked very often at socialism; and yet all the while socialism is doing just the very work that they have been commanded by their Master to do. The fact is so obvious that no representative and responsible Christian body can be found to deny it.' (*Socialism and Christianity*, 1907). He's there if you want him, but he's not

The injustice of it!

The absolute society-corrupting, civilisation-corrupting insanity of it!

3.4.5:

‘He shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven?’

‘The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire?’

‘Ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire?’

The parallels are clear.

‘The Lord thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed.’

Wouldn’t this be a contravention of Article II of United Nations General Assembly resolution 260 A (III)? *Including* part (a): the injunction against killing? What possible arguments could be put forward that it is *not* such a contravention?

*Matthew*, 5, 17:

*Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.*

*Romans*, 1, 14:

*I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the barbarians; both to the wise, and to the unwise.*

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indispensable. The same goes for the then Archbishop of Canterbury, and author of *Christianity and Social Order*, William Temple’s opinion that the Beveridge Report was “the first time anyone had set out to embody the whole spirit of the Christian ethic in an Act of Parliament”.

*So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are at Rome also.*

*For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.*

3.5:

The elevation, the exalting of the feeble – including the fashionable, chic, “normalisation” of mental illness;<sup>19</sup>

*Job, 7, 4-11:*

*When I lie down, I say, When shall I arise, and the night be gone? and I am full of tossings to and fro unto the dawning of the day.*

*My flesh is clothed with worms and clods of dust; my skin is broken, and become loathsome.*

*My days are swifter than a weaver's shuttle, and are spent without hope.*

*O remember that my life is wind: mine eye shall no more see good.*

*The eye of him that hath seen me shall see me no more: thine eyes are upon me, and I am not.*

*As the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away: so he that goeth down to the grave shall come up no more.*

*He shall return no more to his house, neither shall his place know him any more.*

*Therefore I will not refrain my mouth; I will speak in the anguish of my spirit; I will complain in the bitterness of my soul.*

And *θυμός*<sup>20</sup> is criminalized, exhibited, paraded in chains as some toxic and shameful thing!<sup>21</sup>

*Matthew, 18, 2-3:*

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<sup>19</sup> And see *Mahāsaccaka Sutta*.

<sup>20</sup> See *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 11, 234-235.

<sup>21</sup> This is not just from the mouth of Christ; see *Saccavibbanga Sutta*, 21; and *Dhammapada*, 271-272.

*And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him  
in the midst of them,*

*And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be  
converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter  
the kingdom of heaven.*

*Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this  
little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven.*

*Matthew, 5, 3-5:*

*Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the  
kingdom of heaven.*

*Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be  
comforted.*

*Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.*

The poor in spirit? They that mourn? The meek? The poor  
in *θυμός*.

The infantilising of adults:

The reducing of 30-year-olds, 40-year-olds, or 50-year-olds  
to the level of 3 or 4 or 5-year-olds:

The parallels are clear.

For the Greeks, *θυμός* was soul, life; will, desire; appetite;  
resolution; thought; mind, heart, sense; courage, spirit, passion,  
anger, wrath. For Plato, it's what the *φύλαξ*, *φύλακες* have, and  
the others don't.<sup>22</sup>

The parallels are clear.

3.6:

And at the root of it all:

*Matthew, 7, 1-2:*

*Judge not, that ye be not judged.*

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<sup>22</sup> And see *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, 1, 2, 6.

Genesis, 2, 16-17; 3, 1-5, 22-23:

*And the LORD God commanded the man saying,  
Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat:*

*But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil,  
thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest  
thereof thou shalt surely die.*

...

*Now the serpent was more subtle than any beast of  
the field which the LORD God had made. And he said  
unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat  
of every tree of the garden?*

*And the woman said unto the serpent. We may eat  
of the fruit of the trees of the garden:*

*But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of  
the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither  
shall ye touch it, lest ye die,*

*And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not  
surely die:*

*For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof,  
then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods,  
knowing good and evil.*

...

*And the LORD God said, Behold the man is  
become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now,  
lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of  
life, and eat, and live for ever:*

*Therefore the LORD God sent him forth from the  
garden of Eden.*

“Oh we mustn’t judge,” they say now. But Persons, *as* Persons, cannot, *by definition*, be bound by destiny, be subject to God’s Grace, be victims of circumstance.

The dawn of Free Will – the ability and the capacity to judge, to distinguish between good and bad, good and evil – and the exercising of it was and, to some – to far too many – still is the primal transgression and the greatest and vilest sin:<sup>23</sup>

Man’s first disobedience: ‘*The Fruit of That Forbidden Tree, whose mortal taste brought Death into the World, and all our woe.*’

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<sup>23</sup> And see *Al-Baqarah*, 32-37.

Romans, 5, 12-19:

*Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world,  
and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for  
that all have sinned ...*

*Therefore as by the offence of one, judgement came  
upon all men to condemnation ...*

*For as by one man's disobedience many were made  
sinners ...*

There's nothing new under the sun.

They may call themselves 'Humanists' or atheists or secularists.

They like to think of themselves as "Progressive";

Nevertheless, in reality, they are just as *religious* as were their Bronze Age ancestors.<sup>24</sup>

This is why we say the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland – or, to be more accurate, *England* – is, *clearly*, the most Christian country on Earth.

Christianity *is* the dominant ideology.

The zeitgeist *is* Christianity.

We have been delivered unto them.<sup>25</sup> The kings have been delivered into their hand, to destroy their name from under heaven:

The graven images of the gods have they burned with fire.

3.7:

Anthony Burgess, *A Clockwork Orange*, 2, 7:

*'He will be your true Christian,' Dr Brodsky was  
creeching out, 'ready to turn the other cheek, ready to be  
crucified rather than crucify, sick to the very heart at the  
thought even of killing a fly.'*

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<sup>24</sup> And see Plato, *Republic*, 432d-e.

<sup>25</sup> And consider Ignaz Maybaum's *The faith of God After Auschwitz*, pp. 81-4, in conjunction with *Numbers*, 14, 26-37; *Numbers*, 11, 1-3; *Deuteronomy*, 4, 25-31; *Ezekiel*, 38, 14-23; *Ezekiel*, 39, 1-10.

*And that was right, brothers, because when he said that I thought of killing a fly and felt just that tiny bit sick, but I pushed the sickness and pain back by thinking of the fly being fed with bits of sugar and being looked after like a bleeding pet and all that cal.*

*'Reclamation,' he creeched. 'Joy before the Angels of God.'*

*'The point is,' this Minister of the Inferior was saying real gromky, 'that it works.'*

*'Oh,' the prison charley said, like sighing, 'it works all right, God help the lot of us.'*

So, what is to be done?

#### **4. Material Base and Ideological Superstructure.**

- **In an UnChristian World; The best men will have sexual intercourse with the best women as often as possible, and the inferior men will have sexual intercourse with the inferior women as seldom as possible.**
- **The best women will never have sexual intercourse with the worst men.**
- ***And* the best men will never have sexual intercourse with bad women.**

4.1:

What a man and his wife get up to in the bedroom is *everyone's* business.

What you do with your "Own Body" affects others.

What Marija Princip did with her "Own Body" affected, and is affecting, billions of people.

What went on in Mr and Mrs Princip's bedroom in Obljaj in October 1893 S.I.I.N.R.I was and is everyone's business.



Laws can be abrogated. Economic policies can be reversed.  
But you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.  
If the base is unsound, the superstructure falls.  
Every UnChristian policy is subsidiary to this.

From the fairest we should desire increase.  
They are cruellest who lead their graces to the grave,  
And leave no copy  
Just folly, age, and cold decay.

A butterfly fluttering its wings in the jungles of Borneo  
could cause a hurricane in Dominica. One thing leads to  
another.

What a man and his wife get up to in the bedroom is  
*everyone's* business.

Contrary to Article 12 of the United Nations *Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights* (General Assembly resolution 217  
A);

The bedroom must be the most *public* of realms.

Nothing “funny” here. We’ve given just another example  
of a dynamical process, which can appear to be random and  
unpredictable due to the dependence of the process on its  
starting values and the wide range of different behaviours  
available to the process. Another example, if you need one, is  
that produced by iterations of the function:

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{2}(x - 1/x).$$

In other words:

From Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, 8, 29:

*If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the whole  
face of the earth would have been changed.*

4.2:

Aristotle, *Politics*, 1334b29:

*Now as it is a lawgiver's duty to start from the very beginning in looking for ways to secure the best possible young who are reared, we must first consider the union of their parents.*

Laws can be repealed. Economic policies can be abandoned. But you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

Plato, *Republic*, 459d:

*We must, if we are to be consistent, and if we're to have a really good quality people, mate the best of our men with the best of our women as often as possible, and the inferior men with the inferior women as seldom as possible.*

*Mānavadharmaśāstra* [Laws of Manu], 10, 69-71:

*As good seed, springing up in good soil, turns out perfectly well, even so the son of a Noble by a Noble woman is worthy of all the sacraments.*

*Some sages declare the seed to be more important, and others the field; again others (assert that) the seed and the field (are equally important); but the legal decision on this point is as follows:*

*Seed, sown on barren ground, perishes in it; a (fertile) field also, in which no (good) seed (is sown), will remain barren.*

#### 4.3.1:

What a man and his wife get up to in the bedroom is *everyone's* business.

You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

Everything affects everything else.

A clod of soil falling into the sea near Vladivostok can have a detrimental effect for someone standing on a mountain in Switzerland.

What went on in Mr and Mrs Princip's bedroom in Obljaj in October 1893 S.I.I.N.R.I. was *and is* everyone's business.

There *is* such a thing as society; and some people are a burden on it.

Surprised?  
Puzzled?  
Astounded?

But this was recognised long ago: *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 10, 59-61:

*A base-born man either resembles in character his father, or his mother, or both; he can never conceal his real nature.*

*Even if a man, born in a great family, sprang from criminal intercourse, he will certainly possess the faults of his father, be they small or great.*

*But that kingdom in which such bastards, sullyng the purity of varṇa, are born, perishes quickly together with its inhabitants.*<sup>26</sup>

There's nothing wrong in *argumentum ad hominem*.

A specific material base gives rise to a corresponding ideological superstructure.

Any ideological superstructure may be predictable from the material base.

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{2}(x - 1/x).$$

If Mr and Mrs Princip hadn't been at it in that bedroom in Obljaj in October 1893 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Gavrillo, wouldn't have been around to assassinate the Austrian Emperor's nephew 21 years later.

If Mr and Mrs Einstein hadn't been at it in that bedroom in June 1878 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Albert, wouldn't have been around to shift the paradigms of physics 27 years later.

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<sup>26</sup> And see note 87.

If Mr and Mrs Darwin hadn't been at it in that bedroom in May 1808 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Charles, wouldn't have been around to out-Copernicus Copernicus – *twice!* 51 *and* 63 years later.

If Ian Brady's parents hadn't been at it in that bedroom in Glasgow in April 1937 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son wouldn't have been around to commit his outrages 26 years later.

If Alistair Campbell's parents hadn't been at it in August 1956 S.I.I.N.R.I., we wouldn't have been burdened with Alistair Campbell.

If James O'Brien's parents hadn't been at it in their stinking pit in April 1971 S.I.I.N.R.I., we wouldn't have been burdened with James O'Brien.

*As good seed, springing up in good soil, turns out perfectly well, even so the son of a Noble by a Noble woman is worthy of all the sacraments.*

*A base-born man either resembles in character his father, or his mother, or both; he can never conceal his real nature.*

You can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

One may purchase Jackson Pollock's *Number 17A* for \$200,000,000.

One may spend sleepless nights fretting over the cost of a new car or kitchen improvement –

But when it comes to the quality of *human beings*, the same person might display, at best, an indifference that can only be described as criminal negligence, or, at worst, a suicidal/genocidal championing of the foul over the fair.<sup>27</sup>

#### 4.3.2:

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<sup>27</sup> And see Aristotle, *Politics*, 1269b29-37; Tacitus, *Germania*, 8; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 2, 6.

*Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 10, 59-61: This is why we insert Marxist jargon into this manifesto:

Karl Marx, *Capital*, Afterword to the Second German Edition:

*My dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian, but its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the Idea." With me, on the contrary, the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.*

Apples fell down rather than up the day before one of them fell on Isaac Newton's head just as they did one day after.

And the material world – as we take it, the physical, biological substance; the life process of the human brain – gave birth to ideas and then to the phenomenal world 100 years before Marx gave an imperfect or incomplete account of it just as it did 100 years after.

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 4:

*A civilization that can succumb to its vanquished enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it.*<sup>28</sup>

What you do with your "Own Body" affects others.

What Marija Princip did with her "Own Body" affected, and is affecting, billions of people.

The principle forces its way up everywhere.

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<sup>28</sup> And see *Odyssey*, 4, 220-226; and Tacitus, *Germania*, 23.

Just two or three generations ago it would have been unthinkable that people like James O'Brien or Shelagh Fogarty or Darren Adam could be in any position of influence.

Whoever believes that our position on this subject, our stance against criminal intercourse, is at best overstated or overemphasized, or at worst ludicrous or just wrong, should consider James O'Brien or Shelagh Fogarty or Darren Adam.

They use the most primitive of weapons –  
They employ the weapons of the bacteria and of the viruses:

They reproduce.

They breed.

Distinct material conditions produce associated ideologies.

Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface:

[The condition of] *material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life.*

*It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.*

And again Marx: *The German Ideology*, 1, B, *Conclusions from the Materialist Conception of History*:

*History ... shows that circumstances make men.*

Distinct material conditions produce associated ideologies.

This is, essentially, the message presupposed or whispered through the *Dharmaśāstras*, and through Plato, Aristotle and Pascal.

4.4:

According to Article II of United Nations General Assembly resolution 260 A (III), *genocide* means; the term specifies – with reference to any national, ethnic, racial or religious group – and apart from the obvious (as in Section (a)):

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

‘He shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven?’

‘The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire?’

‘Ye shall destroy their altars, and break down their images, and cut down their groves, and burn their graven images with fire?’

‘The Lord thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed?’

The UnChristian recognises that this contradicts Article 12 of the United Nations *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*.

If the base is unsound, the superstructure falls.

Deliberately inflicting conditions on the fairest which are calculated to bring about their destruction; and imposing measures intended to lead their graces to the grave and to leave no copy but folly, age, and cold decay – This clearly fulfils the conditions stipulated in Article II, resolution 260 A (III).

There *is* such a thing as society.

Some people are a burden on it.

And from some we should desire increase.

*As fast as thou shalt wane, so fast thou grow'st  
In one of thine, from that which thou departest;*

*And that fresh blood which youngly thou bestow'st,  
Thou mayst call thine when thou from youth  
convertest.*

*Herein lives wisdom, beauty, and increase;  
Without this folly, age, and cold decay:  
If all were minded so, the times should cease  
And threescore year would make the world away.  
Let those whom nature hath not made for store,  
Harsh, featureless, and rude, barrenly perish:  
Look whom she best endowed, she gave the more;  
Which bounteous gift thou shouldst in bounty  
cherish:*

*She carved thee for her seal, and meant thereby,  
Thou shouldst print more, not let that copy die.*

#### 4.5:

John Stuart Mill is often regarded as the Isaac Newton or the Charles Darwin or the Albert Einstein of liberal political philosophy: *'The fons et origo'*. The following – from *On Liberty*, 1 – is taken as the guiding principle:

*In the part that merely concerns himself, his  
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his  
own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.*

However, the contiguous passages are conveniently overlooked:

*The sole end for which mankind are warranted,  
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty  
of action of any of their number, is self-protection ... The  
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised  
over any member of a civilized community, against his  
will, is to prevent harm to others ...*

*Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in  
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their  
improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting  
that end.*

*Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any  
state of things anterior to the time when mankind have  
become capable of being improved by free and equal*



*discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.*

And we now know that harm – very great harm – can spring from the bedroom.

Permission, if permission were needed, is provided by Mill. So, what is to be done?

4.6:

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted.  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

4.7:

Every UnChristian policy is subsidiary to this.  
It supersedes, countermands, and overrides everything else.

## 5. Constitutional Reform.

- **For the UnChristian, One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.**<sup>29</sup>
- **Great men will have their proper business, and little men *their* proper business.**
- **We would decriminalize *θυμός*.**
- **The motto is: *To each according to his ability.***

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<sup>29</sup> And see Plato, *Protagoras*, 319b-d.

5.1:

G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Introduction:

*The deeds of great men, who are the Individuals of the World's History, thus appear not only justified in view of that intrinsic result ... but also from the point of view of the secular moralist.*

*But looked at from this point, moral claims that are irrelevant must not be brought into collision with world-historical deeds and their accomplishment.*

*The Litany of private virtues – modesty, humility, philanthropy and forbearance – must not be raised against them.*

The poor in spirit shall be abased.

They that mourn shall be abased.

The meek shall be abased.

The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted.

Their altars shall be glorious.

Their images shall be exalted.

The images of their Gods shall be exalted.

The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

5.2:

There's no getting away from it; Matters relating to political theory and philosophy, and to constitutional issues were explained and sorted out well enough by Callicles in his concise appraisal and dismissal of Socrates – described by Plato in the *Gorgias*, 483:

*The experience of suffering wrong does not happen to anyone who calls himself a man; it happens to a slave who had better die than live, seeing that when he is wronged and insulted he cannot defend himself or anyone else for whom he cares. Our laws ... are made, in my opinion, for the weaklings ... They are established ... in*

*an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand. They say that ambition is base and wrong, and that wrong-doing consists in trying to gain an advantage over others.*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

Vulgar?

Uncouth?

Crude?

Distressing to those of refined sensibilities?

Nevertheless, Callicles was right.<sup>30</sup>

### 5.3:

Christianity and its newer forms: Rousseau, Bentham, Marx, Rawls, and the diktats of the *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* – these are not *refutations* of Callicles’s position but confirmations of the *truth* of it.<sup>31</sup>

The so-called “Golden Rule” – ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.’

Treat others in the way you’d like them to treat you:

*Shu?*

Don’t treat others in a way you wouldn’t want to be treated:

‘Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ...’ and ‘Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.’ (Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Passage from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysic of Morals*);

‘A man ... should be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against

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<sup>30</sup> And see Plato, *Republic*, 434c.

<sup>31</sup> The sentiments behind the Equality Act 2010, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 are not new.

himself.' (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1, 14, "The second Law of Nature");

'Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.' (Rawls, *A theory of Justice*, 5, 46):

All, clearly, unjust; as the principle presupposes, requires, demands that: 'No one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune ... it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own case [or] particular inclinations and aspirations, and [a] persons' conceptions of their good' (Rawls, *op. cit.*, 1, 4).

The systems of Kant, Marx, Rawls are clearly '*made ... for the weaklings ... They are established ... in an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand. They say that ambition is base and wrong, and that wrong-doing consists in trying to gain an advantage over others.*'

The systems of Kant, Marx, Rawls (and Jesus) *are* those laws pointed out by Callicles.

Uncouth, vulgar, and true.

*Isaiah*, 65, 25:

*The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, and the lion shall eat straw like the bullock: and dust shall be the serpent's meat.*

We can't help feeling the wolf, the lion, and the serpent come off worst from this deal!

All, *clearly*, *un-just*.

5.4:

One law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.

The Wildebeest in constant fear and under constant threat of having his throat ripped out by the lion would, if he could,

be a fanatical follower of Jesus Christ or of Immanuel Kant or of John Rawls.

Distressing to those of refined sensibilities...  
And true.

5.5.1.1:

Aristotle gives us permission to relax, put our feet up, and accept the obvious: *Politics*, 1326b11-25:

*In order to give decisions on matters of justice, and for the purpose of distributing offices on merit, it is necessary that the citizens should know each other and know what kind of people they are. Where this condition does not exist, both decisions and appointments to office are bound to suffer, because it is unjust in either of these matters to proceed haphazardly, which is clearly what does happen where the population is excessive. ...*

[The state must not be] *so large that it cannot be easily surveyed.*<sup>32</sup>

From our day-to-day, face-to-face, routine, mundane encounters in the workplace, on the train, at school, in the supermarket, or anywhere else, we *know*, it is *obvious* that, contrary to the abstracted, fictional fantasy worlds of the egalitarian, liberal political theorists or commentators:

People are *naturally* unequal in *ability*.  
People are *naturally* unequal in *potential*.  
People are *naturally* unequal in *value*.

5.5.1.2:

The UnChristian Party takes these truths as evident: That men were not created equal and have not been endowed with a right to life, liberty, happiness, or anything else.

*Meng Tzu*, 3, a, 4:

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<sup>32</sup> And see Hayek, F. A., "The New Confusion about "Planning"", in *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and History of Ideas*, p. 237.

*Great men have their proper business, and little men  
have their proper business.*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

*If in employing the principles of understanding we do not merely apply  
our reason to objects of experience, but venture to extend these principles  
beyond the limits of experience, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines...*

From our day-to-day, face-to-face, routine, mundane encounters in the workplace, on the train, at school, in the supermarket, or anywhere else, we know, it is obvious that, contrary to the abstracted, fictional fantasy worlds of the egalitarian, liberal political theorists or commentators:

People are naturally unequal in ability.  
People are naturally unequal in potential.  
People are naturally unequal in value.

The *Rig Veda*, 10, 90, 11-12 – about 3,000 years ago – just about had it right:

*When they divided Purusha [The Man], how  
many portions did they make?*

*What do they call his mouth, his arms? What do  
they call his thighs and feet?*

*The Brahmanian [lover of wisdom] was his  
mouth, of both his arms was the Kshatriya [warrior]  
made.*

*His thighs became the Vaiśya [peasant], from his  
feet the Śūdra [servant] was produced.*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

Aristotle, *Politics*, 1328b24-1329b35:

*Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan,  
councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several  
occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons?  
Or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to  
individuals and others common to all? ...*

*In the state which is best governed and possesses men who are just absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of the constitution, the citizens must not lead the life akin to the slave's, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. And leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties...*

*Husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of any kind are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. And these are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others not.*

*It is not a new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen... It is true indeed that these and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds... We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply what has not.*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

And the *Avesta*, *Farvardin Yasht*, 24, 87-88:

*We worship the Fravashi of Gaya Maretan, who first listened into the thought and teaching of Ahura Mazda; of whom Ahura formed the people of the honourable nations, the seed of the honourable nations.*

*We worship the piety and the Fravashi of the holy Zarathustra;*

*Who first thought what is good, who first did what is good; who was the first Āthravan [lover of wisdom], the first Warrior, the first Plougher of the ground...*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

And the *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 10, 1-3:

*Let the three twice-born varṇa, discharging their duties, study the Veda; but among them the Brahmanīa alone shall teach it, not the other two; that is an established rule.*

*The Brahmanīa must know the means of subsistence prescribed by law for all, instruct the others, and himself live according to the law.*

*On account of his pre-eminence, on account of the superiority of his origin, on account of his observance of restrictive rules, and on account of his particular sanctification the Brahmanīa is the lord of all varṇa.*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

And the *Avesta*, *Āfrin Paighambar Zartūst*, 5:

*May ten sons be born of you! In three of them mayest thou be an Āthravan! In three of them mayest thou be a warrior! In three of them mayest thou be a tiller of the ground! And may one be like yourself, O Vīstāspa!*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

And Plato, *Republic*, 434a-c:

*'Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?'*

*'Not much.'*

*'But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the*



*implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.'*

*'Most true.'*

*'Seeing, then,' I said, 'that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?'*

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

And William Blake, *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*, 24, 11:

*One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.*

#### 5.5.2:

Under an UnChristian administration, rigorous discrimination will operate in all areas of society.

We will discriminate against the bad;  
And discriminate in favour of the good.

We will discriminate in favour of the fair;  
And discriminate against the foul.

We will discriminate in favour of the virtuous.  
We will discriminate against the depraved and degenerate.

We will discriminate in favour of the deserving;  
And against the undeserving.

There will be a bias in favour of the good.  
There will be a bias against the bad.

There will be a bias in favour of the fair.  
There will be a bias against the foul.

There will be a bias in favour of the virtuous.  
There will be a bias against the depraved and degenerate.

There'll be bias in favour of the deserving, and against the undeserving.

In Law, precedents are important.

So, forcing ourselves to see the glass as half full, precedents have been set by the imposition of those “Protected Characteristics” and their concomitants.

We are *already* unequal under the Law.

5.6:

All Law can be, and will be, distilled into six words:

**TO EACH ACCORDING TO HIS ABILITY.**

5.7:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

## **6. The “M” Word. The Unacknowledged Legislators.**

- In the UnChristian Nation, the Fraud Act 2006 S.I.I.N.R.I. (Updated: 16<sup>th</sup> July 2020 S.I.I.N.R.I.) will be clarified;
- We will clarify the Criminal Damage Act 1971 S.I.I.N.R.I.;
- We will clarify the Criminal Law Act 1967 S.I.I.N.R.I.;
- We will clarify the common law relating to the defence of the person.

6.1.1:

Plato, *Gorgias*, 456:

*It is the orators who dictate policy and get their proposals adopted ...*

*[The seemingly supernatural power of rhetoric] embraces and controls almost all other spheres of human activity.*

Hesiod, *Theogony*, 78-94:

*Whomever of heaven-nourished princes the daughters  
of great Zeus honour  
And behold at his birth,  
They pour sweet dew upon his tongue, ...  
And when he passes through a gathering, they greet  
him as a god with gentle reverence,  
And he is conspicuous amongst the assembled:  
Such is the holy gift of the Muses to men.*

Words might be used not only to convey facts, to transfer information, to impart knowledge, to frame and present theories, or to name objects;

Words can be used as offensive weapons: to stir an emotion, to provoke a reaction, and to cause damage.

Thersites was eloquent – because he *needed* to be.

Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 16b33:

*Every sentence is significant ..., but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false ... consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or poetry.*

The Enlightenment project was intended as an *antidote* to the woeful abuse of words, not as a facilitator for it.

The words of Judge Learned Hand, “Proceedings in Memory of Justice Brandeis”, from 1942 S.I.I.N.R.I. still hold true:

*The hand that rules the press, the radio, the screen  
and the far spread magazine, rules the country.*

And the words of Stanley Baldwin still hold true:

*The ["Media" – a misnomer, but, for brevity,  
we use it here] is an engine of propaganda for the ...  
desires, personal vices, personal likes and dislikes of [its  
controllers] ... Their methods are direct falsehoods,  
misrepresentation, half-truths ... [they have] power  
without responsibility.*

Gil Scott-Heron was *half* right:

*Their* revolution and the televising of it are not separated  
things – one observing the other.

The televising is *part of* the revolution.

To translate the opening lines of John Stuart Mill's *On  
Liberty*, Chapter 2:

The time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence  
could be attempted, or would be possible, of the 'Right' of  
those propagandists to do whatever they want and get away  
with it.

They have as little right to persuade, say, a three-year-old  
girl to drink bleach, as they have to assault her with an axe.

Saying something is doing something.

Sticks and stones can break bones; and words can incite  
riots, cause bankruptcies, cause economic collapses, bring  
about wars. Words have caused enormous damage.

They can't have it both ways –

Either the pen is mightier than the sword or it isn't.

The engines of propaganda:

Exalting the poor in spirit.

Exalting they that mourn.

Exalting the meek.

Humbling the Kings and destroying their names.

Destroying their altars.

Breaking down their images;

And burning the images of their Gods with fire.

Exalting the infantile ignorance of good and evil.  
Exalting the last.  
Declaring war on the first; to cut them down.

Declaring war on the lofty – the *proud* and lofty.  
Declaring war on the greatest.  
Binding up the brokenhearted.  
Proclaiming liberty to the captives.  
Opening up the prison to them that are bound.  
Heralding the day of vengeance to comfort all that mourn.  
Bringing down them that dwell on high; in the lofty city;  
Laying it low; even to the ground;  
Bringing it even to the dust;  
Treading it down, with the steps of vermin, and the feet of  
scum.

*Therefore they will not refrain their mouths; they will speak in the  
anguish of their spirit; they will complain in the bitterness of their souls.*

*Deuteronomy, 7, 22-25:*

*And the Lord thy God will put out those nations  
before thee by little and little: thou mayest not consume  
them at once, lest the beasts of the field increase upon  
thee.*

*But the Lord thy God shall deliver them unto thee,  
and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until  
they be destroyed.*

*And he shall deliver their kings into thine hand,  
and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven:  
there shall no man be able to stand before thee, until  
thou have destroyed them.*

*The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with  
fire.*

Little by little.  
Coming nigh unto the city, and declaring peace;  
But intending war on the exalted.

Little by little.  
By the abuse of words.

Fair is foul and foul is fair.

Declaring war on the fair;  
And exhaling the foul.

6.1.2:

The first lines of Aristotle's *On Sophistical Refutations* (165b1) explain well enough the character and quality and function of the Sophist:

*That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham ... Now for some people it is better and more worthwhile to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without reality, and the sophist is one who [benefits] from an apparent but unreal wisdom).*

The reader will see where we're going:

The columnists and commentators, the journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts: The Rhapsodes, the *Sophists*, the artists, the advertising industry: the "Media" –

*They are more influential than is any school or library.*

One moronic, cretinous journalist or columnist or commentator can cause more damage in one morning, than could every inmate of Wormwood Scrubs, Belmarsh, and Broadmoor in ten lifetimes.

A teacher of the top rank – an *old fashioned* teacher – can be toiling away in his classroom for thirty or forty years, but some moronic journalist can tear down his work with one cretinous comment.

These impudent little pipsqueaks can destroy someone in a morning.

Nonentities who were not good enough to lick the dog shit off his shoes pulled down Tim Hunt – Nobel Prize winner in Physiology – in a morning.

These impudent impertinent pipsqueaks brought down James Watson.

James Watson! – Who led the Human Genome Project, and who, with Francis Crick, discovered the structure of DNA.

An academic of the very first rank – an *old fashioned* thinker – can be toiling away in his study for thirty or forty years, but some cretinous journalist can destroy him, his reputation, his work, his life with one moronic comment.

How would Darwin fare today? If he were presenting his theory as new, and told some pea-brained Piers Morgan that human beings were related to monkeys, and that men and worms have a common ancestor?

Even the most stentorian Prometheus would eventually be drowned out (shouted down) by the deafening cacophony of chirping chirruping clattering Grasshoppers.

The project or the ambition of the Enlightenment was to defend science against The Church:

To protect any future Galileo from another pipsqueak Niccolò Lorini;

Or to protect a Copernicus from the Inquisition.

The Enlightenment Project was not anticipated as a catalyst for any moronic radio talk-show host, or soapbox ranter or ranting journalist to whip up a lynch mob against a Malthus, or a Darwin, or a Nietzsche.

The New Rhapsodes, the New Sophists: the “Media” –

*They are more influential than is any school or library.*

#### 6.2.1:

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1:

*Protection ... against the tyranny of the magistrate  
is not enough; there needs protection also against the  
tyranny of prevailing opinion and feeling.*

But what is this ‘prevailing opinion and feeling’ – this  
‘moral coercion’ or *de facto mob pressure*?

The *zeitgeist*?

Or *volksgeist*?

Or *weltgeist*?

How does it arise and become entrenched?

There’s nothing mysterious or inaccessible about the  
*zeitgeist*.

The columnists and commentators, the journalists and  
moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime  
television magazine program hosts *are* the *zeitgeist*.

The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising  
industry: the “Media” *is* the *zeitgeist*.

There’s nothing mystical or impenetrable about Hegel’s  
*volksgeist*, or the *weltgeist*.

The columnists and commentators, the journalists and  
moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime  
television magazine program hosts *are* the *volksgeist*.

The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising  
industry: the “Media” *is* the *volksgeist*.

They are the flag-wavers, the cheerleaders, the  
propagandists for the dregs of society.

They’re a noisy neighbour’s broken record hammering and  
hammering and hammering through the wall.

They are the drummers at the head of the horde of  
Hogarthian grotesques swarming through the streets and  
singing *We Shall Overcome*.

The ‘Something in the Air’ is the noise from the mouths of  
the columnists and commentators, the journalists and moronic  
radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television  
magazine program hosts;

The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising  
industry: the “Media”.



Perhaps this is what truth there is in Shelley's claim, in *A Defence of Poetry*, that:

*Poets ... are not only the authors of language and of music, of the dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting; they are the institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion. Hence all original religions are allegorical, or susceptible of allegory, and, like Janus, have a double face of false and true. Poets, according to the circumstances of the age and nation in which they appeared, were called, in the earlier epochs of the world, legislators, or prophets: a poet essentially comprises and unites both these characters ...*

*Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.*

For "poet" substitute "rhetorician"; substitute "propagandist".

*ibid.*

*The production and assurance of pleasure in this highest sense is true utility. Those who produce and preserve this pleasure are poets or poetical philosophers.*

*The exertions of Locke, Hume, Gibbon, Voltaire, Rousseau, and their disciples, in favor of oppressed and deluded humanity, are entitled to the gratitude of mankind. Yet it is easy to calculate the degree of moral and intellectual improvement which the world would have exhibited, had they never lived. A little more nonsense would have been talked for a century or two; and perhaps a few more men, women, and children burnt as heretics. We might not at this moment have been congratulating each other on the abolition of the Inquisition in Spain. But it exceeds all imagination to conceive what would have been the moral condition of the world if neither Dante, Petrarch, Boccaccio, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Calderon, Lord Bacon, nor Milton, had ever existed; if Raphael and Michael Angelo had never*

*been born; if the Hebrew poetry had never been translated; if a revival of the study of Greek literature had never taken place; if no monuments of ancient sculpture had been handed down to us; and if the poetry of the religion of the ancient world had been extinguished together with its belief.*

In other words: Emotion is more effective than reason when it comes to persuading or driving people to do anything.<sup>33</sup>

Rhetoric – sophistry and illusion as Hume had it – is more persuasive than science; and Plato’s *Gorgias*, 456, acknowledges.<sup>34</sup>

*It is the orators who dictate policy and get their proposals adopted ...*

*[The seemingly supernatural power of rhetoric] embraces and controls almost all other spheres of human activity ...*

*I tell you that, if in any city that you like to name, an orator and a doctor had to compete before the Assembly, or any other body for the appointment of medical officer, the man who could speak would be appointed by an overwhelming vote if he wanted the post, and the doctor would be nowhere. Similarly if he had to compete with any other professional man, the orator could get himself appointed against any opposition; there is no subject on which he could not speak before a popular audience more persuasively than any professional of whatever kind.*<sup>35</sup>

Perhaps this is what truth there is in C. P. Snow’s “Two Cultures”?<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 458-d makes the same point. David Attenborough’s output resembles more a painting by Constable or a poem by Wordsworth than any academic paper in the *Zoological Journal of the Linnean Society* or *Nature* or *The Journal of Experimental Biology*.

<sup>34</sup> And see Hesiod, *Theogony*, 32-35, 92-104; and Plato, *Ion*, 536a-b.

<sup>35</sup> And see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1403-b; *Saddharmapundarikasūtra*, 2; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *On the Wise Adaptation of the Human Being’s Cognitive Faculties to his Practical Vocation*; and Matthew, 13, 10-13.

<sup>36</sup> Rede Lecture, 1959.

*I believe the intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups: ... At one pole we have the literary intellectuals, who incidentally while no one was looking took to referring to themselves as 'intellectuals' as though there were no others. I remember G.H. Hardy once remarking to me in mild puzzlement, some time in the 1930s: 'Have you noticed how the word 'intellectual' is used nowadays? There seems to be a new definition which certainly doesn't include Rutherford or Eddington or Dirac or Adrian or me.' ...*

*I felt I was moving among two groups ... who had almost ceased to communicate at all, who in intellectual, moral and psychological climate had so little in common that instead of going from Burlington House or South Kensington to Chelsea, one might have crossed an ocean.*

*In fact, one had travelled much further than across an ocean – because after a few thousand Atlantic miles, one found Greenwich Village talking precisely the same language as Chelsea, and both having about as much communication with M.I.T as though the scientists spoke nothing but Tibetan.*

For “literary intellectual” substitute “rhetorician”;

Substitute “Rhapsode”;

Substitute “propagandist”;

Substitute “Sophist”;

Substitute – after Aristotle – people for whom it is *better and more worthwhile to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be*; who exhibit a *semblance of wisdom without reality*, and who *benefit from an apparent but unreal wisdom*.<sup>37</sup>

Substitute “Commentator”;

Substitute “Columnist”;

Substitute “Journalist”.

Snow delivered this lecture before the columnists and the commentators and the journalists and the advertising industry and the moronic radio talk-show hosts and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts became omnipresent and omnipotent:

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<sup>37</sup> And see Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1404b; and Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Joyful Science*, 173.

Before the walnut-brained rulers of the radio and screen – the “Media” – had fully inflicted their self-flagellating, lifeless and suicidal Christian morality and psychology on everyone else;

One wonders what he’d say if he were delivering his lecture today!

“Two Cultures” is too mild a description. Two *Species* is more accurate: A virus and the host.<sup>38</sup>

If CoViD-19 was a peashooter, even the most run-of-the-mill, ten-a-penny rhetorician is a 15 Megaton Hydrogen bomb.

#### 6.2.2:

We’d say that *Triumph des Willens* was propaganda.

Some would say that the painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel was/is propaganda on behalf of the Catholic Church.

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<sup>38</sup> An example of this is A. N. Wilson.

He’s a columnist.

He’s a weedy, weasely-faced, reedy-fluty-voiced, snotty little nonentity.

He taught medieval literature for a bit, and for some reason he got the idea into his head that he was qualified to write a critical biography of Charles Darwin: *Charles Darwin: Victorian Mythmaker*.

Geneticist and Emeritus Professor at University College London, Steven Jones FRS, remarked (*The Sunday Times*, 10<sup>th</sup> Sept’ 2017), ‘This book is the founding volume of the Fake News School of Science Writing.’ Fellow geneticist and editor of *Nature*, Adam Rutherford, said (*Evening Standard*, 11<sup>th</sup> Sept’ 2017), ‘Based on this book, he [Wilson] would fail GCSE biology catastrophically.’

In his book, *Hitler: A Short Biography*, pp. 26-28, Wilson pompously claims that Hitler, with his ‘gift of the gab’, belonged ‘to the vanishing world of the text; Hitler belonged to the oral future, the future which contained Walt Disney, television and cinema.’ Wilson presents this piece of journalistic rhetoric as if it’s some earth-shatteringly new observation, when it is, in fact nothing more than a comment on the importance of emotion and oratory as recognised by Plato, Aristotle, Shelly. Wilson’s own work is an example of the deceptive gift of the gab, in printed form, which he pretends to denounce. He’s an example – almost a caricature – of the fraudulent literary type described by Snow, or of the illusionist (Sophist) denounced by Aristotle and Hume.

Richard J. Evans – FRSL FRHistS FBA FLSW, Regus Professor of History at the University of Cambridge – demolished *Hitler: A Short Biography* as being factually inaccurate, lacking in original research and analysis, and blatantly infected with personal biases. He said ‘It’s hard to think why a publishing house that once had a respected history list agreed to produce this travesty of a biography.’ (*New Statesman*, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2012).

Some say that Shakespeare's *Richard III* is propaganda.

Many would have no trouble claiming that the works of Rudyard Kipling were propaganda.

Mao's posters of beaming peasants walking arm-in-arm with gleaming workers were propaganda.

The Great Pyramid was propaganda on behalf of the pharaoh Khufu (or *someone*).

Many would have no trouble claiming that *It's a Wonderful Life* (and most of James Stewart's output) was propaganda.

Most would say that the whole of John Wayne's output was propaganda.

We're under the influence of different propagandists, using newer technology, to perform updated tricks – That's all.

No discussion.

No debate.

No "conversation".

Just propaganda – This time on behalf of the degenerate sewer filth of the earth.

#### 6.3.1:

The project of The Enlightenment was to refine language, to delimit valid expression; not to corrupt it or pollute it.

The overpowering influence of the moronic, cretinous "broadcasters" in the era of the omnipotent and omnipresent radio and screen would have been unthinkable in the age of Newton, Hobbes or Locke.

John Locke in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, "Epistle to the Reader" describes the situation that he's steeling himself to fight against:

*Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.*

He published that passage in 1689 S.I.I.N.R.I.. Nothing has changed.

Thomas Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, 1, 4, “Of Speech”, also describes the abuse of language as he witnessed it:

*To [the legitimate] uses, there are also four correspondent abuses.*

*First, when men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves.*

*Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others.*

*Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will that is not.*

*Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.*

Hobbes published this passage in 1651 S.I.I.N.R.I.. Nothing has changed.

Thersites was eloquent – because he *needed* to be.

And Locke again, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 10:

*Woeful abuse of words: Besides the imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity and confusion that is so hard to be avoided in the use of words, there are several wilful faults and neglects which men are guilty of in this way of communication, whereby they render these signs less clear and distinct in their signification than naturally they need to be ...*

*In this kind, the first and most palpable abuse is, the using of words without clear and distinct ideas; or, which is worse, signs without anything signified.*

These founders of the Enlightenment are describing our columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts. The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising industry: the “Media”.

They are describing the puppet masters and rhetoricians of the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine – the Rulers of the World.

They are describing the methods of propaganda of the engines of propaganda: the rulers of the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine: The columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts. The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising industry: the “Media”:

*The unacknowledged legislators of the world.*

#### 6.3.2:

And Alexander Pope in his *An Essay on Criticism*, 2:

*For as in bodies, thus in souls we find  
What wants in blood and spirits, swell'd with wind:  
Pride, where wit fails, steps in to our defence,  
And fills up the mighty void of sense.*

*A little learning is a dangerous thing;  
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:  
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,  
And drinking largely sobers us again.*

This was published in 1711 S.I.I.N.R.I. Those with ‘little learning’ and ‘swell’d with wind’: Pope is describing our toxic engines of propaganda: the rulers of the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine: The columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts. The Rhapsodes, the Sophists, the artists, the advertising industry: our “Media”.

6.4.1.1:

But the problem was recognised long before Hobbes, Locke, Pope, and the other Enlightenment figures.

And the central importance of speech was recognised long before Wittgenstein.

*Chândogya Upanishad*, 7, 2, 1-2:

*‘Speech is better than a name. Speech makes us understand the Rig-veda, Yagur-veda, Sâma-veda, and as the fourth the Âtharvana, as the fifth the Itihâsa-purâna, the Veda of the Vedas, the Pîtrya, the Râsi, the Daiva, the Nidhi, the Vâkovâkyâ, the Ekâyana, the Deva-vidyâ, the Brahma-vidyâ, the Kshatra-vidyâ, the Nakshatra-vidyâ, the Sarpa and Devagana-vidyâ; heaven, earth, air, ether, water, fire, gods, men, cattle, birds, herbs, trees, all beasts down to worms, midges, and ants; what is right and what is wrong; what is true and what is false; what is good and what is bad; what is pleasing and what is not pleasing. For if there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither the true nor the false, neither the good nor the bad, neither the pleasant nor the unpleasant. Speech makes us understand all this. Meditate on speech.*

*‘He who meditates on speech as Brahman, is, as it were, lord and master as far as speech reaches he who meditates on speech as Brahman.’*

Plato and Aristotle – the two initiators of first, the Greek “Big Bang”, then of the “Western” outlook, then of the modern world – saw their task as being to counteract the toxic influence of the Sophists and the Rhapsodes.

It’s often claimed that the Greek contribution was the ‘demythologising’ of the world – the removal of the Gods, and the emphasizing of human reason. This may have been true of the “Pre-Socratics”, but the enterprise of Plato and Aristotle was the clarification of reason, or of reasoning, itself.

This took the form of a rejoinder to their Sophists and Rhapsodes and rhetoricians: Their counterpart of our columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio



talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts. The advertising industry: the “Media” – Their propagandists: Their poets and artists:

Plato, *Republic*, 600e-601b:

*We may assume, then, that all the poets from Homer downwards, have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat, including human excellence.*

*For example, as we said just now, the painter paints what looks like a shoemaker, though neither he nor his public know about shoemaking, but judge merely by colour and form ...*

*In the same way the poet can use words and phrases as a medium to paint a picture of any craftsman, though he knows nothing except how to represent him, and the meter and rhythm and music will persuade people who are as ignorant as he is, and who judge merely from his words, that he really has something to say about shoemaking or generalship or whatever it may be.*

*So great is the natural magic of poetry.*

*Strip it of its poetic colouring, reduce it to plain prose, and I think you know how little it amounts to.*

Nothing has changed.

Strip our toxic engines of propaganda – the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine – of their poetic colouring, and we see how little they amount to.

Strip the columnists of the poetic colouring and we see how little they amount to. They have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their meter and rhythm and music will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge, *merely from their words*, that they really have something to say.

Strip the commentators of the poetic colouring and we see how little they amount to. They have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they

are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.

Strip the journalists of the poetic colouring and we see how little they amount to. They have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.

Strip the moronic radio talk-show hosts of the poetic colouring and we see how little they amount to. They have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.

Strip the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts of the poetic colouring and we see how little they amount to. They have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.

Strip the advertising industry of the poetic colouring and we see how little it amounts to.

The Sophists and the Rhapsodes have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.

Strip the “Media” of the poetic colouring and we see how little it amounts to.

The Sophists and the Rhapsodes have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat. Their rhetoric will persuade people who are as ignorant as they are, and who judge merely from their words, that they really have something to say.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> And see Plato, *Republic*, 598b-c.

The style's the thing; the style has primacy.  
The poetic colouring;  
The music – the *muse*-ic;  
The rhetoric's the thing.

Any substance can be obscured or completely submerged:

Hesiod, *Theogony*, 78-94:

*Cleio and Euterpe,  
Thaleia, Melpomene and Terpsichore,  
And Erato and Polyhymnia and Urania.  
And Calliope, who is the chiefest of them all,  
For she attends on worshipful princes:  
Whomever of heaven-nourished princes the daughters  
of great Zeus honour  
And behold at his birth,  
They pour sweet dew upon his tongue,  
And from his lips flow gracious words.  
All the people look towards him while he settles  
causes with true judgements:  
And he, speaking surely, would soon make wise end  
even of a great quarrel;  
For therefore are there princes wise in heart,  
Because when the people are being misguided in their  
assembly,  
They set right the matter again with ease,  
persuading them with gentle words.  
And when he passes through a gathering, they greet  
him as a god with gentle reverence,  
And he is conspicuous amongst the assembled:  
Such is the holy gift of the Muses to men.*

6.4.1.2:

Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, 20:

*Truth will sooner come out from error than from  
confusion.*

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 449 (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.):

*If in employing the principles of understanding we do not merely apply our reason to objects of experience, but venture to extend these principles beyond the limits of experience, there arise pseudo-rational doctrines which can neither hope for confirmation in experience or fear refutation by it. Each of them is not only in itself free from contradiction, but finds conditions of its necessity in the very nature of reason – only that, unfortunately, the assertion of the opposite has, on its side, grounds that are just as valid and necessary.*

Transcribe any exchange amongst any cabal of cretinous cultural commentators on any moronic television magazine program. The result – sub-Joycean, staccato Pollock-in-words – wouldn't be acceptable even as a GCSE essay!

And that's saying something!

#### 6.4.1.3:

And Aristotle's contributions have particular resonance due to the recent reanimation of 'self-identification' or 'personal truth': Nothing more than a resurrection of Protagorean relativism:

*Metaphysics*, 1006a:

*There are some who, as we said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and say that people can judge this to be the case. And among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles.*

*Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education, for not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education;*

*For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no*

*demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.*

*Metaphysics, 1008b:*

*For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there?*

*Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way?*

*Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good?*

*Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse.*

*And if this is so, he must also judge one thing to be a man and another to be not-a-man, one thing to be sweet and another to be not-sweet.*

*For he does not aim at and judge all things alike, when, thinking it desirable to drink water or to see a man, he proceeds to aim at these things; yet he ought, if the same thing were alike a man and not-a-man.*

*But, as was said, there is no one who does not obviously avoid some things and not others.*

*Therefore, as it seems, all men make unqualified judgements, if not about all things, still about what is better and worse.*

*And if this is not knowledge but opinion, they should be all the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should be more anxious about his health than one who is healthy; for he who has opinions is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned.*

If the pragmatist's view that the truth is what works means anything, we feel it means that the *false* can be *assumed*, can be *presupposed*, to be false because it's *self-destructive*. Whoever acts on a false belief would, eventually, not exist to entertain that false belief.

Whoever believed that sulphuric acid was water, and then drank sulphuric acid would, *quickly*, no longer exist to *claim* that

sulphuric acid was water. *Coherence* would be, *logically*, impossible. *Self-destructive*, on this view, means *self-contradictory*.

There's nothing new in the *zeitgeist* of 'self-identification' or *volksgeist* of 'personal truth'. And it's as indefensible now as it was two-and-a-half-thousand years ago.<sup>40</sup>

Plato, *Theaetetus*, 170e-171a:

*What does all this entail for Protagoras? Isn't it necessarily the case that if he didn't believe in man being the measure of all things, and if the common run of mankind didn't either (as in fact it doesn't), then this book of his, "The Truth", would be true for no one. He did believe it, however, but most people don't share this belief. The first notable consequence of this is that it is more false than true by just so much as the unbelievers outnumber the believers.*

#### 6.4.1.4:

And the "Buddhist" *Milindapañha*, 3 – This points the same way:

*If, most reverend Nāgasena, no person can be apprehended in reality, who then, I ask you, gives you what you require by way of robes, food, lodging, and medicines? Who is it that consumes them? Who is it that guards morality, practices meditation, and realises the four paths and their Fruits, and thereafter Nirvana? Who is it that kills living beings, takes what is not given, commits sexual misconduct, tells lies, drinks intoxicants? Who is it that commits the five Deadly Sins? For if there were no persons, there could be no merit or demerit; no doer of meritorious or demeritorious deeds, and no agent behind them; no fruit of good and evil deeds, and no reward or punishment for them. If*

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<sup>40</sup> And see Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians*, 7; *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (*Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, 8, 5, 7 and 8, 5, 8 and 8, 5, 26); Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1011-b; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 519; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1010-b; and, very importantly, Plato, *Theaetetus*, 170e-171a.

*someone should kill you, O Venerable Nāgasena, he would not commit any murder. And you yourself, Venerable Nāgasena, would not be a real teacher, or instructor, or ordained monk!*<sup>41</sup>

This was in response to the doctrine of ‘impermanence’ or ‘emptiness’ or ‘Not-Self’ revealed in statements such as:

*ibid*, 2, 1, 1:

*I am known as Nāgasena, O King, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O King, give such a name as Nāgasena, or Sūrasena, or Vīrasena, or Sīhasena, yet this, Sire, – Nāgasena and so on – is only a generally understood term, a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter.’*

And to the outlook revealed in the *Visuddhimagga*, 512-513, of Buddhagosa:

*As to the void, all the truths in the ultimate sense are devoid of the person who feels, the agent, the person who has gone into peace, the person who goes. Hence it is said:*

*For there is ill but none to feel it;  
For there is action by no doer;  
And there is peace but none enjoy it;  
A way there is but no one goes it.*<sup>42</sup>

And it was as indefensible in ancient India as in ancient Greece.

6.4.1.5:

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<sup>41</sup> And see *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* (*Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, 8, 5).

<sup>42</sup> And see also *Poṭṭhapāda Sutta*, 21-23, 26-28, 48 and 52-53; *Mahānidāna Sutta*, 27-31; *Alagaddūpama Sutta*, 16-17, 26-27 and 40-41.

And we haven't even broached the crucially important epistemological question tantalisingly suspended before us by Plato: *Meno*, 80d-81a:

Meno proposes the conundrum:

*But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know?*

And Socrates responds:

*I know what you mean. Do you realise that what you are bringing up is the trick argument that a man cannot try to discover what he knows or what he does not know? He would not seek what he knows, for since he knows it there is no need of the enquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look for.*

From our position:

If you don't know the truth, how do you know the journalist or salesman or artist or soapbox orator is giving it to you?

If you know the truth, what's the point in listening to the journalist or salesman or artist or soapbox orator?

However, this topic deserves a more extensive treatment than can be given here.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> And see *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, 2, 4, 14. Any relationship between representation or appearance, and subject or object or reference – and the very *meaning* of those terms – and their possible or posited substrates has ramifications in and for *all* fields. Berkeley's system – the pluses *and* the minuses – can very usefully be adapted here: The Climate of Opinion or *zeitgeist* taking the place of Berkeley's "ideas". And one omission would be conspicuous by its absence: Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [idea, appearance], "The World as Representation. First Aspect, 1":



#### 6.4.1.6:

If Plato were around today, he wouldn't use the image of the cave<sup>44</sup> to illustrate our predicament, he'd use the complex continuum of our toxic engines of propaganda – the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine – and its persuasive and pervasive rhetoric.

He'd use the intricate gamut of columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts.

He'd describe the advertising industry.

He'd describe the "Media".

This is why we say the term "Media" is a misnomer.

#### 6.4.2:

The "Media" is not a *medi-um*.

It's/they're not a *vehicle* for the *transportation* of truths.

It's/they're not a *vehicle* for the *conveying* of facts.

It's/they're not a *vehicle* for the *imparting* of information.

The "Media" is not a vehicle, in the same way as, perhaps, a cargo ship is a vehicle for the transportation or conveying or imparting of goods via the medium of an ocean.

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*"The world is my representation [idea]": this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being ...*

*This truth is by no means new. It was to be found already in the sceptical reflections from which Descartes started. But Berkeley was the first to enunciate it positively ... On the other hand, how early this basic truth was recognised by the sages of India, since it appears as the fundamental tenet of the Vedānta philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is proved by Sir William Jones in the last of his essays: "On the Philosophy of the Asiatics" (Asiatic Researches, vol. IV, p. 164); "the fundamental tenet of the Vedānta school consisted in not denying the existence of matter ... (to deny which would be lunacy), but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms."*

For too many, a journalist's opinion is not just *assumed to be* or *taken as* reality; reality *is* the journalist's opinion.

<sup>44</sup> *Republic*, 514a-521b.

Plato was not afraid to tell us that ‘All the poets from Homer downwards, have no grasp of truth but merely produce a superficial likeness of any subject they treat, including human excellence’.

*We should not be afraid to continue the point.*

The painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is impressive – very impressive – but how far does it represent the truth?

Beethoven’s Ninth is stirring – but what sort of truth does it stir us up to advocate or defend?

The *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas is impressive – it’s *voluminous*, its words exhibit an impressive eloquence – but what similarity does it bear to any truth?

The bloke who sells the H2O X5 steam mop is eloquent – he gives the impression he knows what he’s talking about. But would we take for granted his mop is good simply because he tells us it is?

Would we say ‘Well... this mop must be good because the salesman says it is. And he should know... because he’s selling it’?

And what can we say about Leni Riefenstahl!?  
And Wagner?

What’s become entrenched as “The Media” is no more an impartial *conveyor* of objective truth than is Homer, Michelangelo, Beethoven, Aquinas; or Leni Riefenstahl or Richard Wagner; or the bloke who sells the H2O X5 steam mop.

They *impose* their paint or their ink or their vibrations in air.

#### 6.5.1:

And Thucydides in his *Peloponnesian War*, 3, 82 (describing the revolution at Corfu) gives us an example of the predicament; and suggests a motivation for it:

*The meaning of words no longer had the same relation to things, but was changed by them as they thought fit. Reckless doing was held to be loyal courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise of unmanly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing.*

And we have the unavoidable George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, “The Principles of Newspeak”:

*The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought – that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc – should be literally unthinkable ... History had already been rewritten.*

George Orwell is invoked *ad nauseam* when discussing or illustrating the features of any totalitarian use and abuse of language; but, unfortunately, his warnings are still valid. Clearly, we are subjected to the devices he describes:

“Peace” = “Desolation”.<sup>45</sup>

“Democracy” = *They’ve* won a vote.

“Populism” = *They lost* the vote.

“Moderate” = *Their* position.

“Centre Ground” = Wherever *they’re* standing.

“Independent” = Self-appointed *and* unqualified.

“Common Sense” = *Their* opinions.

“Open Minded” = Empty headed and accepting of *their* opinions.

“Radical” = Heretical.

“Extremism” = Everyone *else’s* opinions.

“Radicalism” = Everyone *else’s* opinions.

“Extreme” = Everyone else.

“Extremist” = Everyone else.

“The People” = *Themselves*.

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<sup>45</sup> *Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.* Tacitus, *Agricola*, 30.

“*Our* Way of Life” = *Their* Way of Life.

“Divisive” = *You* disagree with *them*.

*etc.*

*etc.*

*etc.*

#### 6.5.2:

Thus, we have the Government *of* filth, *by* filth, *for* filth.

#### 6.6:

The work of Plato and Aristotle, and the Enlightenment project was intended as an *antidote* to the woeful abuse of words as described by Thucydides or Orwell, not as a facilitator for it.

And the essence of this message was expressed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous proposition 7 from his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*:

*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann,  
darüber muß man schweigen:*

If you don’t know what you’re talking about

—

Keep your mouth shut.

So, what is to be done?

#### 6.7.1.1:

In Law, precedents are important.

Precedents have been set by the appearance of the sacrosanct adjectives or inviolable verbs and their concomitants.

*The Untouchables*, as we call them, have a privileged position under the Law.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> See Equality Act 2010.

There is a discrimination *in favour* of the bad, *in favour* of the degenerate, *in favour* of the foul.

And there is discrimination *against* the fair and the good.

Precedents have been set by the invention and imposition of the Orwellian/Stalinist “Thought Crime” and its concomitants:

‘We have great traditions of free speech... **but...**’ says Theresa May.

‘We must protect our great traditions of free speech... **but...**’ says David Cameron.

Like a Model-T Ford?

We can say anything we what – *apart from the things we can’t say*.

“Freedom of Speech” is transformed into a rhetorical term or device. Pinning down a reference for the expression is like nailing down fog.

Newspeak:

Opinions expressed against the prevailing wind, heretical talk, inconvenient facts are censored and suppressed and made *unthinkable* by categorising them as “Hate Speech”.

All in the service of a degenerate, depraved establishment.

*Sub Imperio Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum.*

All for the government of filth, by filth, for filth:

For the *benefit* of one group, and to the *detriment* of another:

The depraved, the degenerate, the filth are – in law – *untouchable*.

Precedents have been set.

6.7.1.2:

Therefore:

Incompetent tradesmen or professionals face prohibition.  
They may end up in prison.

Teachers can be sacked for incompetence or improper conduct.

They have no more right to coerce, say, a three-year-old girl into drinking bleach than they have to assault her with an axe.

We have laws against fraud or “passing off”.  
We have laws relating to assault and self-defence.

Carl Beech was sentenced to 18 years in prison, having been found guilty on 12 counts of perverting the course of justice, and one of fraud.

Words have consequences.

The Enlightenment project was intended as an *antidote* to the woeful *abuse of words*, not as a facilitator for it.

In 2016 S.I.I.N.R.I., a ‘reckless’ restaurant owner was jailed for *six years* for the manslaughter of a customer who had an allergic reaction to a curry. The restaurant owner *didn’t* tell the customer his curry contained peanuts.<sup>47</sup>

*That* was worth six years in prison.

Words have consequences.

We’d want our laser eye-surgeon to be *qualified*. We wouldn’t want any Tom, Dick or Harry firing laser beams into our eyes.

We’d want any gas fitter to be *qualified*. We wouldn’t want any Tom, Dick or Harry going at our gas pipes with a hammer and a blowtorch.

Bogus driving instructors would not be tolerated.

Counterfeit bank notes would not be tolerated.

Fake jewellery would not be tolerated.

Hoax calls to the fire brigade would not be tolerated.

False evidence in court would not be tolerated.

These have no more right to be tolerated than one has to persuade a three-year-old girl to drink bleach.

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<sup>47</sup> *Press Association*, “Restaurant owner jailed for six years over death of peanut allergy customer”, reported in *The Guardian*, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2016.

Plato, in the *Protagoras*, 319b-d, when describing the political situation in Athens *nearly two thousand five hundred years ago* describes, *exactly*, the activities of the pea-brained journalists and columnists and commentators of our own time; the toxic engines of propaganda: the advertising industry, the radio, the screen, and the rest and the rest:

*I observe that when we are met together in the Assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of shipbuilding, then the shipwrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of being taught and learned.*

*And if some person offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the command of the Prytanes. ...*

*But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a say - carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high and low - any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet giving advice.*

The parallels are dazzling and impossible to ignore or disregard.

#### 6.7.1.3:

But one may merely enter “Journalist” or “Radio Talk Show Host” or “Television Presenter” into a tax return form, and it’s as if that impudent little pipsqueak has picked up a magical shield of invincibility, or donned a magical cloak of invisibility.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Or body armour or a bullet-proof vest with **PRESS** written on it. The reader might recall the incident in Ukraine. A Sky crew were ambushed by snipers. The video sound-track featured members of the crew shouting to the snipers, like Harry Potter or Aleister Crowley enunciating a magic spell, ‘Journalists! Zhurnalistka!’; as if that was supposed to raise them above –

They can do whatever they want. They can say whatever they want.

*Power exercised without the constraint or the condition that they be held responsible for the power they exercise.*

They can't have it both ways –  
Either the pen is mightier than the sword or it isn't.

The new Sophists can say anything and get away with it.  
The new Rhapsodes can do anything, and there's no comeback.

They exercise unrestrained power with impunity.  
They wield arbitrary power without personal consequence.  
They exploit power without payback.

Saying something is doing something.  
Sticks and stones can break bones; and words can incite riots, cause bankruptcies, cause economic collapses, instigate wars. Words can cause, and have caused, enormous damage.

So, what is to be done?

An UnChristian administration would clarify the Fraud Act 2006 S.I.I.N.R.I. (Updated: 16<sup>th</sup> July 2020 S.I.I.N.R.I.).

An UnChristian administration would update and clarify the Criminal Damage Act 1971 S.I.I.N.R.I., the Criminal Law Act 1967 S.I.I.N.R.I., and also common law relating to the defence of the person.

#### 6.7.2.1:

Fraud:

The Fraud Act sets out three ways in which an offence can be committed; these are:

In Section 2: Fraud by false representation.  
Section 3: Fraud by failure to disclose information.  
And Section 4: Fraud by abuse of position.

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make their lives matter more than – the common run, and exempt them from attack.



The reader will recognize where we're going with this one.

Section 2 specifies dishonestly making false representation knowing that the representation was *or might* be untrue or *misleading*, and with the intent to make gain for himself or another, or to cause loss to another, or to expose another to risk of loss.

Section 3 specifies failing to disclose information, and dishonestly intending, by that failure, to make a gain or to *cause a loss*.

In Section 4 – fraud by abuse of position – the defendant *occupies a position in which he was expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the interests of another person* and he dishonestly abused that position intending to make a gain or cause a loss.

Knowing the UnChristian position regarding the toxic engines of propaganda: the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine. And the persuasive pervasive rhetoric of that intricate labyrinth of columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts, the advertising agencies: the “Media” – The reader will guess where we're going.

#### 6.7.2.2:

Section 6 of the Act – Possession of articles for use in fraud;

And Section 7 – Making or supplying articles for use in fraud – These broaden the parameters.

#### 6.7.2.3:

Section 2 (3) relates to any false representation *of any person*. This includes *the person making the representation* or any other person.

A representation is defined as false if it is untrue or *misleading* and the person making representation knows that it is, or *might be*, untrue or misleading.

Giving *false* information embraces a *failure to disclose* information.

If a defendant disclosed 90% of what he was required to disclose but failed to disclose an all-important remaining 10%, the *actus reus* of the offence would be complete.

### 6.7.3:

An UnChristian administration would include under Sections 2 and 3 of the Fraud Act those ‘direct falsehoods, misrepresentation, half-truths’ of the propagandists. It would include those ‘Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse[s] of language, [that] have long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, [which] have, by prescription ... a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation’ noted by Locke.

An UnChristian administration would use the Fraud Act to expose the natural magic of rhetoric inflicted by the toxic engines of propaganda: the press, the radio, the screen and the far spread magazine.

The Fraud Act will be used to remedy the persuasive pervasive rhetoric of that infestation of columnists and commentators, journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts, the advertising agencies: “The Media”.

It will strip them of the poetic colouring.

They are committing fraud in the strictest of senses when they claim or pretend to be qualified to comment on social issues or political issues or, indeed, *anything else!*

They have no more right to commit fraud than a bogus laser eye surgeon has to blind someone, or than a bogus gas fitter has to blow up someone’s house.

Their words, their *false representations*, have consequences.

*Misrepresenting themselves or their opinions* as having some claim to authority can cause loss or expose another to the risk of loss.

Their fraudulent activities can do a lot more than break bones.

They are no more qualified to pontificate on social issues than they are to perform laser eye-surgery, or to fit a gas cooker!

This is the crime.  
But what about the punishment?

#### 6.8.1:

If a “reckless” restaurant owner can be jailed for six years because one of his customers had an allergic reaction to peanuts in a curry, how ruthless, harsh, brutal must be the punishment for words that can incite riots, cause bankruptcies, instigate economic collapses, begin wars?

An updating and clarification of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 S.I.I.N.R.I., the Criminal Law Act 1967 S.I.I.N.R.I., and the common law relating to the defence of the person is required.

#### 6.8.2:

Self Defence:

Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 S.I.I.N.R.I. covers the understanding of fraud as outlined above:

*A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders.*

And the common law approach as set out in *Palmer v R* [1971] AC 814 and approved in *R v McInnes*, 55 Cr App R 551:

*It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he does ... what is reasonably necessary.*

These principles apply for the purposes of self-defence, defence of another, defence of property, prevention of crime, lawful arrest.

According to *R v Williams (G)* 78 Cr App R 267 and *R v Oatbridge*, 94 Cr App R 367, questions concerning the reasonableness of the force used can be answered on the basis of the facts as they were honestly believed to be.

*Palmer v R* 1971 AC 814 is clear regarding the reasonableness of force used:

*If there has been an attack so that self-defence is reasonably necessary, it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action. If [a jury] thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessary, that would be the most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken ...*

Moreover, Section 76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 S.I.N.R.I. allows *disproportionate* force to be used in certain circumstances.

According to *R v Deana*, 2 Cr App R 75, there is no rule in the existing law to say that a person must wait to be struck first before they may defend themselves.

According to Section 76(6) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 S.I.N.R.I., failure to retreat when attacked and when it is possible to do so, is not evidence that a person was not acting in self-defence.

Also, from *R v Rashford* [2005] EWCA Crim 3377:

*The mere fact that a defendant went somewhere to exact revenge from the victim did not of itself rule out the possibility that in any violence that ensued, self defence was necessarily unavailable as a defence.*

The reader will see the relevance.

If words or misrepresentations that can incite riots, cause bankruptcies, instigate economic collapses, begin wars – that can *cause loss to another, or expose another to risk of loss* – cannot justify *such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders*, or justify the recognition that [the] person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action – what can!?

#### 6.8.3.1:

Any UnChristian administration will need to make but small adjustments to the existing legislation.

The home addresses of the Rhapsodes, Sophists, rhetoricians and the other abusers of words will be published and made easily available.

The home addresses of the walnut-brained columnists and commentators, the journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts, the advertising business arbiters of the *zeitgeist*: the “Media”: the concocters of the *volksgeist* – their home addresses will be published and made easily available.

#### 6.8.3.2:

Extinction Rebellion’s Roger Hallam was cleared, after a three-day trial at Southwark Crown Court, of committing criminal damage worth £7,000 during a protest regarding fossil fuels.

He didn’t deny the charge, but used the ‘proportionate response’ argument as a justification. And the jury were satisfied.<sup>49</sup>

Rhian Graham, Milo Ponsford, Sage Willoughby, and Jake Skuse admitted *in court* to causing criminal damage, and they got away with it.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Sandra Laville, “Extinction Rebellion founder cleared over King’s College protest”, *The Guardian*, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2019.

<sup>50</sup> Damien Gayle, “BLM protesters cleared over toppling of Edward Colston statue”, *The Guardian*, 5<sup>th</sup> Jan 2022.

A teacher who received death threats after he showed a cartoon of Muhammad was forced into hiding and needed police protection.

There was no campaign from the heroic journalists supporting our supposed “Right to Free Speech”.

Government and Parliament didn’t step in to safeguard “Our Way of Life”.

There was no support from the teaching unions.

No one was charged with intimidation, or with threatening behaviour, or with making death threats.

The report on the incident recommended that the mob should *de facto* get its way.<sup>51</sup>

In Law, precedents are important.<sup>52</sup>

And we have the precedents.

6.9:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

6.10:

The UnChristian laws will apply also to the perhaps more recognisable abusers of words as indicated by Plato *et al.*<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Charlotte Wace, “Batley Grammar School teacher still in hiding after threats over Prophet cartoon”, *The Times*, 19<sup>th</sup> June 2021.

<sup>52</sup> And see Liam James, “Facebook and Instagram to permit posts calling for violence against Russians and death of Putin”, *Independent*, 11<sup>th</sup> March 2022; and Munsif Vengattil and Elizabeth Culliford, “Facebook allows Ukraine war posts urging violence against invading Russians, Putin”, *Reuters*, 11<sup>th</sup> March 2022; and James Clayton and Jasmin Dyre, “War in Ukraine: Facebook to allow calls for violence against Putin”, *BBC News*, 11<sup>th</sup> March 2022.

<sup>53</sup> And for anyone who agrees that something must be done, but is still reluctant *to actually do* something, we remind you of Plato, *Republic*, 359c-360e: The legend of Gyges and his ring. If you had the power, or weapon, or cloak of invisibility – what would you get up to? Your reluctance is very unlikely to be down to any philosophical, or moral, or scientific or logical objection. It’s very probably due to *old-fashioned cowardice*. The *fear* of being

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*caught* and *punished*. See ejaculation 15.2.2: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, *Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason*, p. 161.

## Part II.

### 7. Education.

- In the UnChristian Nation, *real*<sup>54</sup> Degrees, *real* students, and *real* Universities will be *fully funded* and *rewarded* with *substantial grants*.
- Selection will be made, at all levels, *solely* with regard to ability.<sup>55</sup>
- Our updated/clarified laws relating to the “Media” will be brought down with alacrity on fraudulent institutions offering, and dishing out, fraudulent certificates.
- Discrimination in favour of the good and against the bad will be a defining characteristic of our education system.
- The motto will be: *To each according to his ability*.

#### 7.1:

One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.

A First-Class Honours Degree in Mathematics from Cambridge University is a *real* Degree in a *real* subject from a *real* University.<sup>56</sup>

A Degree in Electronic Engineering from Imperial College is a *real* Degree in a *real* subject from a *real* University.

A Medical Degree is a *real* Degree in a *real* subject.

Whereas:

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<sup>54</sup> See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b15-32.

<sup>55</sup> And see *Meng Tzu*, 6, b, 15.

<sup>56</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 526b; and *Timaean*, 27-28. See also Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 74-169.



A “Modular” “degree” in Combined Humanities from Holborn Polytechnic (“LSE”) is not a real Degree; it’s equivalent to a Bronze Medal at the Special Olympics (James O’Brien).

*Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 2, 157-158:

*A Brahmanian who is not learned is like an elephant made of wood, like a deer made of leather: these three bear nothing but the name.*

*As an impotent man produces no fruit in women, as a cow produces no fruit in a cow, and as a gift made to an arrogant man is fruitless, so a Brahmanian who does not [know the verses] is fruitless.*

A “degree” in Broadcast Journalism from Bournemouth Polytechnic is not a real Degree; it’s equivalent to a Bronze Medal at the Special Olympics.

A “degree” in Photography from South Bank Polytechnic is not a real Degree; it’s equivalent to a Bronze Medal at the Special Olympics.

A “degree” in Drama, Interior Design and Black Studies from Birmingham Polytechnic is not a real Degree; it’s equivalent to a Bronze Medal at the Special Olympics.<sup>57</sup>

## 7.2:

The UnChristian temperament embraces Alexander Pope’s famous maxim from an *Essay on Criticism*, 2: ‘Of all the causes which conspire to blind man’s erring judgement, and misguide the mind, what the weak head with strongest bias rules, is PRIDE, the never failing vice of fools. ... A little learning is a dangerous thing; Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring: There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain, and drinking largely sobers us again.’

Newspeak:

‘Inclusive’ = Dumbed Down.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a1; Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.323-3.324; Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 74-169.

<sup>58</sup> *Iliad*, 1, 287.

‘Accessible’ = Dumbed Down.<sup>59</sup>

‘Relevant’ = Dumbed Down.<sup>60</sup>

1 Corinthians, 1, 19:

*For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.*

Byron, *Child Harold's Pilgrimage*, 3, 45:

*He who ascends to mountain tops, shall find the loftiest peaks most wrapped in clouds and snow; He who surpasses or subdues mankind, must look down on the hate of those below.*<sup>61</sup>

*One Law for the Lion and Ox is Oppression.*<sup>62</sup>

Most of the people allowed access to the tertiary level of schooling since the Major and Blair governments wouldn't've been entered *even for the mock 'O' Level exams*!<sup>63</sup>

And we end up with Rhapsodes and Sophists in positions of influence (and not just in politics and the “Media”). We end up with Śūdras getting the idea into their heads that they're *Brahmanias*.<sup>64</sup>

All this is the fault of Christian charity.

*So drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring.*<sup>65</sup>

7.3:

At the tertiary level, the *real* Degrees and those studying them will be fully funded with substantial grants.

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<sup>59</sup> *Lun yü* [Analects of Confucius], 10, 1.

<sup>60</sup> *Sigrdrifumal*, 24.

<sup>61</sup> Again *Iliad*, 1, 287.

<sup>62</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 4, 13, 1.

<sup>63</sup> *Lun yü*, 16, 9.

<sup>64</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 495d.

<sup>65</sup> And see Plato, *Phaedrus*, 271-278.

The “loans” system has led to the position where the people taking the real Degrees are *de facto* funding grants paid towards those totally fraudulent, bogus mock Bronze Medals at the Special Olympics.

The tax paid on wages should pay back the loan –

But the bogus fraudulent consoling pats-on-the-head do no more than put off entry into the job market for three years. The “loans” will never be repaid.

In the UnChristian Nation, *real* Degrees, *real* students, and *real* Universities will be *fully funded* and *rewarded* with *substantial grants*.

#### 7.4:

Selection will be made, at all levels, *solely* with regard to ability.

The polytechnics will be Polytechnics.<sup>66</sup>

And our updated laws relating to “The Media” will be hammered down, with gusto, on fraudulent institutions offering and dishing out fraudulent certificates.<sup>67</sup>

#### 7.5:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

#### 7.6:

The UnChristian embraces the Platonic and Wittgensteinian and Brahminical and Enlightenment injunction,<sup>68</sup> and looks forward to the day when the columnists

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<sup>66</sup> Hesiod, *Works*, 197-220.

<sup>67</sup> *The Merchant of Venice*, 2, 9, 39.

<sup>68</sup> *Havamal*, 122.

and commentators, the journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program hosts (and everyone else) are bound by it:

*If you don't know what you're talking about,  
Keep your mouth shut.*

The types of freedoms Locke or Mill had in mind were the freedoms to object to the sale of Indulgences or to claim that the earth moves around the sun: The freedom from the stake. They did not include the freedom of the Hogarthian and Dickensian filth to inflict themselves on everyone else.

Those who have drunk deep from the Spring of Knowledge will cheer this with gusto: those who know what they're talking about and have credentials to prove it:

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted;  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.<sup>69</sup>

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

## 8. "Economics" or fiscal policy.

- The poor in spirit shall be abased.
- They that mourn shall be abased.
- The meek shall be abased.
- The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted.
- Their altars shall be glorious.
- Their images shall be exalted.
- The images of their Gods shall be exalted.

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<sup>69</sup> Plato, *Gorgias*, 484-486.

- The first shall be exalted; the last shall be cast down.
- The motto will be: *To each according to his ability.*

#### 8.1.1:

We refuse to set out – to pretend to have – what’s usually called an “economic policy”.

As David Hume reminds us in *The Natural History of Religion*, 4, God need not be an old bloke with a big white beard sitting on a cloud:

*The only point of theology, in which we shall see a consent of mankind almost universal, is, that there is invisible, intelligent power in the world: But whether this power be supreme or subordinate, whether confined to one being, or distributed among several, what attributes, qualities, connexions, or principles of action ought to be ascribed to those beings; concerning all these points, there is the widest difference in the popular systems of theology.*

What’s called “The Economy” or “Economics” has all the characteristics of a religion: Religion as understood in the *Odyssey*, 1, 32-34:

*‘Ob for shame, how the mortals put the blame on us gods, for they say evils come from us, but it is they, rather, who by their own recklessness win sorrow beyond what is given...’*

F.D.E. Schleiermacher, in his *The Christian Faith*, characterised the religious condition as a feeling of ‘absolute dependence’.

“Economics” hardly differs from astrology.

It certainly shows very little similarity to the science of astronomy.

We see it as no coincidence that in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century S.I.I.N.R.I., as quickly as belief in the old bloke with the big

white beard receded, belief in the *invisible, intelligent power*; the incorporeal, omnipotent, omniscient, sempiternal power and authority of “The Economy”, or of “Human Rights”, or of “The Rule of Law” – mysterious entities upon which human beings are absolutely dependent, and are powerless before – gained ascendancy.

*Exodus*, 33, 19:

*And he said, I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the LORD before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy.*

In the tradition – Richard Dawkins, we shouldn’t be surprised to learn, in his *The God Delusion*, pp. 298-300, replaces the Old Bloke with another mysterious entity upon which he can feel absolutely dependent: This is why we say, with Aristotle, that most people are natural slaves, and that they *want* to be slaves. That “Bleeding-Heart liberalism”, the sanctimonious donning of sham/fraudulent *noblesse oblige*, the axiomatic self-abasement : –

The Christianity and suicidal Christian charity by another name: The effete, lifeless Christianity – the *real* Christianity – of the self-mutilating, effete, reedy-voiced, hair-shirt-wearing Anglican Bishop.

8.1.2:

In their *descriptions* rather than in their *prescriptions*, Karl Marx *and* Adam Smith were correct. Their predictions were, essentially, in agreement. They were concerned to see some “Invisible Hand” provide the “Swinish Multitude” with their “Bread and Circuses”.

Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 4, 2:

*Every individual ... neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it ... he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in*

*this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.*

Does a massive murmuration of starlings *intend* to be the spectacle of a *seeming* swirling Henry Moore sculpture for the watching humans below?

Should employees exist solely to provide employees for employers?

Should employers exist solely to provide employers for employees?

It may be that some dog enjoys chasing its own tail. But a *Person* isn't a *Dog*.

The industry and *intentions* described by Smith leads, mostly unintentionally, to the *end* desired by Marx.<sup>70</sup>

## 8.2:

Growth, development, and activity are not *one* thing; although they are often treated as such.

A dog chasing its own tail is activity, but who would call it growth or development?

The 35-stoner lying in his bed, shovelling food into his mouth, might exhibit activity and growth, but who would call the consequences development?

Most of what, in economics, is called growth or development is, in reality, just activity.<sup>71</sup>

An UnChristian administration will be concerned with ensuring that the material base does not inconvenience the mechanisms of the ideological superstructure – *And* with ensuring that the ideological superstructure does not corrupt the material base.<sup>72</sup> The means will justify the end.

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<sup>70</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony*, 27.

<sup>71</sup> Hesiod, *Works*, 398; *ibid.* 429.

<sup>72</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 4, 13, 1.

## 9. Environmental Issues.

- We will tackle Jonathan Porritt's taboo subject.
- We will approach environmental issues in a calm and humane, rather than in a romantic or sentimental manner.
- We will use Jonathan Porritt's 'taboo subject' as an exemplar of the insanity of Christian charity.
- We will stress that our Humane Socialism requires – compels – us to accept that there *is* such a thing as society, and that some people are a burden on it.
- We will advocate development rather than mere activity.
- We will move away from the “economics” (religion) of Smith/Marx.

### 9.1.1:

In 1984 S.I.I.N.R.I., in his book *Seeing Green*, p. 26, Jonathan Porritt wrote:

*There seems to be something about the sensibilities of all good liberals that makes it extremely uncomfortable for them to cope with population matters. It's obviously a problem, so obviously something's got to be done, but exactly what, by whom and in what way are emotive and controversial issues. So it remains a taboo subject.*

If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the whole face of the earth would have been changed.

What you do with your “Own Body” affects others.

What Marija Princip did with her “Own Body” affected, and is affecting, billions of people.

All this is the fault of Christian charity:



In 1985 S.I.I.N.R.I., before Bob Geldorf got his hands on the place, Ethiopia had a population of 40,650,000.  
Now, Ethiopia has a population of 117,530,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 205,411,000.

On a variety of measures, the poorest country on Earth is probably the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
Its population in 1960 S.I.I.N.R.I. was 15,248,000.  
Its population 2022 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 92,040,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 194,489,000.

The second poorest country is Mozambique.  
Its population in 1960 S.I.I.N.R.I. was 7,185,000.  
Its population 2022 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 32,050,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 65,314,000.

Third poorest is Uganda.  
Its population in 1960 S.I.I.N.R.I. was 6,767,000.  
Its population 2022 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 47,059,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 89,457,000.

Fourth is Rwanda.  
Its population in 1960 S.I.I.N.R.I. was 2,936,000.  
Its population 2022 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 13,242,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 23,048,000.

Fifth is Zimbabwe.  
Its population in 1960 S.I.I.N.R.I. was 3,777,000.  
Its population 2022 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 15,055,000.  
Its forecast population for 2050 S.I.I.N.R.I. is 23,948,000.

All this is the fault of Christian charity.

It used to be said – when the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were pointing their I.C.B.M.s at each other – that it's *man's* (and we use the term advisedly) *man's* aggressive, violent, murderous nature that will be the ruin of us.

Now, this clearly is not true.  
It's *Christian charity* that'll be our ruin.

What you do with your “Own Body” affects others.

What Marija Princip did with her “Own Body” affected, and is affecting, billions of people.

9.1.2:

If Mr and Mrs Princip hadn’t been at it in that bedroom in Oblaj in October 1893 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Gavrillo, wouldn’t have been around to assassinate the Austrian Emperor’s nephew 21 years later.

If Mr and Mrs Darwin hadn’t been at it in that bedroom in May 1808 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Charles, wouldn’t have been around to out-Copernicus Copernicus – *twice!* 51 *and* 63 years later.

If Mr and Mrs Einstein hadn’t been at it in that bedroom in June 1878 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son, Albert, wouldn’t have been around to shift the paradigms of physics 27 years later.

If Ian Brady’s parents hadn’t been at it in that bedroom in Glasgow in April 1937 S.I.I.N.R.I., their son wouldn’t have been around to commit his outrages 26 years later.

If Alistair Campbell’s parents hadn’t been at it in August 1956 S.I.I.N.R.I., we wouldn’t have been burdened with Alistair Campbell.

If James O’Brien’s parents hadn’t been at it in their stinking pit in April 1971 S.I.I.N.R.I., we wouldn’t have been burdened with James O’Brien.

Everything affects everything else.

A butterfly fluttering its wings in Damascus could, eventually, cause a hurricane in Dallas. One thing leads to another.

A clod of soil falling into the sea near Vladivostok can have a detrimental effect on someone standing on a mountain in Switzerland.

Someone falling from a mountain in Switzerland could matter as little as a clod of soil falling into the sea near Vladivostok.

### 9.2.1:

The position of the Green Left (call them) does not add up.

They've spent the last sixty or seventy years calling for the starving millions to be fed, for a more equal distribution of wealth, for active *re*-distribution of wealth.

Now, they're emphasising *over*-consumption, and calling for a decrease in it.

They are campaigning for a decrease in the consumption of food and for a decrease in the consumption of raw materials. That is – they're calling for a *decrease* in the application and employment and distribution of wealth.

### 9.2.2:

The Green Left still equates development with re-distribution.

Crude example:

Imagine one man having £1,000,000 and one kettle; and 999 people having no money and no kettles.

If we redistribute the wealth so that 1,000 people have £1,000 each, we'll probably end up with 1,000 kettles exploiting 1,000 times the raw materials and energy used by the one millionaire.

Does the Green Left want to redistribute wealth in favour of those projected 600,000,000 extra consumers in Ethiopia and the five poorest nations? Or what?

How will that 600,000,000 spend their newfound wealth?

The Green Left seem to be incapable of understanding basic arithmetic (or – and which is more likely – they are afraid to address or even to mention the issue).

Here is an exemplar of the *absolutely suicidal insanity* of *Christian charity* (*Mark*, 10, 21-22; *Al-Tawbah*, 60; *Acts*, 4, 34-35, *etc*).

### 9.2.3:

Business (enterprise, private enterprise, free enterprise, capitalism, the profit motive, trade; call it what you will) business works best with a more equal distribution of wealth/money/purchasing power:

Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 4, 3, 2:

*A rich man is likely to be a better customer to the industrious people in his neighbourhood than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation.*

There's no point producing stuff if no one has money to buy it.

And Marx's analysis of the process – *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, 1 – still holds good:

*The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, and establish connections everywhere.*

*The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country ...*

*The bourgeoisie ... has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of Nature's forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalisation of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground ...*

Business, Capitalism, the profit motive, by the nature of it, leads to greater wealth, more disposable income spread amongst a greater number of people – That's the problem.

Good business practise – not a thirty-year intensive study of Kantian morality – *demands* that business be conducted in a seemingly Kantian way: That the *outcome* of business would be the outcome of analogous sentiments:

Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 1, 2:

*It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their advantages.*

Business is led as if by an *invisible hand* to promote an end which was no part of its intention.

A “Swinish Multitude”, as it’s been called, want just “Bread” and “Circuses”. Business, capitalism, the profit motive needs an ever-greater multitude of “Swine” throughout which to distribute, sell, the bread and the circuses.

The *Vaiśya* and the *Śūdra*, the Bourgeoisie and proletariat were/are, in fact, one and the same thing.<sup>73</sup>

They stumble into the river, and they are swept along by the current.

They don’t give a toss about the ‘starry heavens above and the moral law within’. Their passions are the same.<sup>74</sup> Their motivations are the same. Their desires are the same. Their ambitions are the same.<sup>75</sup> They want the same thing – They just employ different methods in the getting of it.<sup>76</sup>

Give a man a fish, and he’ll feed himself for a day.

Teach a man how to fish, and he’ll provide business for the fishing rod manufacturers. He’ll also produce more mouths to be fed, and more hands eager for fishing tackle!<sup>77</sup>

The Green Left is silent on this point.<sup>78</sup>

In 1945 S.I.I.N.R.I the world’s population was around 2.5 Billion – most of whom had hardly a penny to scratch their backsides with.

Christianity – the *real* Christianity – was an idea whose time had come.

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<sup>73</sup> *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 1, 87-89; Plato, *Republic*, 434c; *Rigsthula*, 1-48.

<sup>74</sup> Plato, *Republic*, 580d-583a.

<sup>75</sup> *Lun yü*, 15, 34.

<sup>76</sup> And see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1124b24; and *Lun yü*, 1, 14; and also Tacitus, *Germania*, 15; and *Ecclesiastes*, 2, 24.

<sup>77</sup> And see Keynes, J. M., *Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren*.

<sup>78</sup> Juvenal, *Satire 10*, 71-81; *Dao De Jing*, 1, 3; Plato, *Republic*, 372c-d.

The poor, the starving, the *Wretched of the Earth*, were fed, and given the opportunity to increase their Carbon Footprint.

70 years later, the world's population was approaching 8 Billion.

Therefore...?

The Green Left is silent on this point.

### 9.3:

The European landmass (the European Commission and Parliament is *not Europe* any more than the 60 people on Hounslow Council *are* Hounslow) the European landmass is one of the most densely populated areas on the planet.

The Green Left still call for unconstrained migration *into* the countries that were industrialized pre-1945.

Increased population and increased consumption through increased wealth and wealth redistribution would lead to increased use of natural resources and increased burdens on infrastructure.

The Green Left's position is self-contradictory and self-defeating to the point of being suicidal.

This may not be that famous nightmare exactly as foretold by Malthus, but it's as near as damn it.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> And see Aeschylus, *The Suppliants*, 476-488. And Aristotle's observations, *Politics*, 1303a25-b3 are not unimportant:

*Another cause of constitutional change or of revolution is difference of peoples which do not acquire a common spirit; for a state is not the growth of a day, any more than it grows out of a multitude brought together by accident. Hence the reception of strangers in colonies, either at the time of their foundation or afterwards, has generally produced revolution.*

*For example:*

*The Achaeans who joined the Troezenians in the foundation of Sybaris, becoming later the more numerous, expelled them; hence the curse fell upon Sybaris.*

*At Thurii the Sybarites quarrelled with their fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out.*

*At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a conspiracy, and were expelled by force of arms;*

*The people of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought with them, and drove them out;*

Adoption of UnChristian principles would, obviously, solve the problem.

#### 9.4:

Jonathan Porritt talks of ‘the sensibilities of all good liberals’. The question is – What sort of liberals is he referring to?

We saw in Section 4 that John Stuart Mill’s liberalism was not the effete, fluffy type; but something rather different.

Permission for the “liberal” to move over to the UnChristian position – if permission be needed – is provided by Mill, *On Liberty*, 5:

*... that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, an individual is accountable and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishment if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection ... It is not in the matter of education only that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognised, and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the strongest grounds for the former always, and in many cases for the latter also.*

*The fact itself, of causing the existence of a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility – to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing – unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at*

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*And the Zancleans, after having received the Samians, were driven by them out of their own city.*

*The citizens of Apollonia on the Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colonists, had a revolution;*

*The Syracusans, after the expulsion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarrelled and came to blows;*

*The people of Amphipolis, having received Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by them.*

Here we might also, perhaps, adapt Hegel’s “Master/Slave Dialectic”, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, iv, A.

*least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being.*

*And in a country either overpeopled or threatened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour ...*

*Yet the current ideas of liberty which bend so easily to real infringements of freedom of the individual in things which concern only himself, would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequences of their indulgence is a life or lives of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions.*

With manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions:

And if James O'Brien or Shelagh Fogarty's parents hadn't been at it in their stinking pits (a revolting thought), the consequences of their indulgence wouldn't have been the curse that is James O'Brien and Shelagh Fogarty.

#### 9.5:

We obviously have a problem, as Porritt says, so what is to be done, by whom and in what way should not be taboo questions simply because they involve emotive and controversial issues.

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted;  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.



*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

9.6:

Like Malthus, we may suspect that the evil is gone too far to be remedied.

Not so.

If the *Brahmania* and the *Kshatriya* (φιλόσοφος βασιλιάς? φύλακες, φύλαξ?) resumed their proper affiliation, the evil could be remedied in *less than a fortnight*.<sup>80</sup>

How could those with no *θυμός* – the poor in spirit, they that mourn, the meek – defend themselves against those with an abundance of it?

It could even be argued that failure – if there were a renaissance, a revitalization, a resurgence of the proper affiliations – failure would be *logically impossible*.<sup>81</sup>

## 10. Illness.

- UnChristian health policy will emphasise *avoidance* of illness rather than *reaction* to it.
- We will address the semantics surrounding illness and the responses to it. Semantics is/are not *mere* semantics. Cleaning up the semantics concerning the “NHS” will remove 90% of the problem.
- Euthanasia will not be unacceptable or unavailable.
- The “NHS” will be renamed the Suicidally Christian Response to Illness: The SCRI.

10.1.1:

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<sup>80</sup> *Bhagavad-Gītā*, 2, 31-33; *Lun yü*, 9, 28.

<sup>81</sup> And see ejaculation 6.8.3.2.

As with our policies concerning migration, when we've analysed the problem and sorted out the semantics, any confusion concerning the **Suicidally Christian Response to Illness** will disappear.<sup>82</sup>

The Thames of 2020 S.I.I.N.R.I. was not the Thames of 1943 S.I.I.N.R.I. or of 1948 S.I.I.N.R.I.. The same fish are not swimming in it. The same ripples are not on its surface. The water is not the same water. Its course is not the same.<sup>83</sup> One name is used to refer to three different things: The only constant thing is the name:

Plato, *Cratylus*, 402a:

*Heraclitus somewhere says that all things are in process and nothing stays still, and likening existing things to the stream of a river he says that you would not step twice into the same river.*

10.1.2:

Our **Suicidally Christian Response to Illness** is not the National Health Service as envisaged in 1943 S.I.I.N.R.I. or as existed in 1948 S.I.I.N.R.I..

One name is used to refer to many different things.  
The only constant thing is the name.

Its "Use" is not *one* use.

The "Contributing" is not one contribution.

Someone who received a tube of spot cream when he was 14, and which he *didn't really need any way*, has "used" the "NHS".

Someone who's been in and out of hospital like a dog's cock since the day he was born has "used" the "NHS".

One term, "use", is employed to refer to two different things.

The verb exchanges its reference according to the context.

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<sup>82</sup> Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, 1, 22; Plato, *Republic*, 504b-c; Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.328; Aristotle, *Categories*, 1b25-2a4.

<sup>83</sup> And see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 991a.

Aristotle, *Physics*, Θ3, 253b9:

*And some say not that some existing things are moving, and not others, but that all things are in motion all the time, but that this escapes our perception.*

Some people contribute as much as they benefit.  
Some put in more than they take out.  
Some take out more than they put in.  
Some put an enormous amount in and take nothing out.  
Some take an enormous amount out and put nothing in.

The term “river” is associated with them, but the Thames and the Nile are not one and the same thing.

10.1.3:

All this is the fault of Christian charity.

10.2.1:

The “National Health Service” began as a good idea:

‘Once we’ve got rid of the ailments that’ve built up over the last two hundred years, TB and rickets and the like,’ the founders (probably) said, ‘which should take no more than ten years, all we’ll have to deal with are industrial accidents: Accidents down coal mines, and in ship yards, and in steel mills, and iron foundries; accidents in cotton mills and the factories, particularly in heavy industry... And as we’re also providing cheap and easily available food, the people will be the healthiest they’ve ever been...’

Obvious!  
Right?!

Who could possibly disagree with it!?

Well... obviously... *it didn’t work out like that.*

10.2.2:

Someone who's been in hospital 20 times isn't 20 times healthier than someone who's been in hospital just once.

Someone who's been in hospital 50 times is not infinitely healthier than one who's never used a hospital.

The *healthy* people *we actually see* are not healthy *because* they've used the services of the hospitals more times than have the *unhealthy* people!

In the majority of cases the "NHS" has, as it's turned out, provided licence for those who, in Mill's words, eschew 'restraint upon [their] inclinations when the consequences of their indulgence ... are prejudicial to the interests of others'.

10.2.3:

Here is an axiomatic case of the *suicidal insanity* of *Christian charity*.

Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*:

*From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!*

This is the motto, the axiom of the "NHS", and it is diametrically opposed to the original Labour Party's Clause IV:

*To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry.*

The *Old Labour* man wasn't *begging* for alms, or *pleading* for *charity* – He was *demanding* a *deserved share* of the *wealth he created*.

The "NHS" as turned out to be as *unjust* as was the Father's treatment for the Prodigal Son and of the Prodigal Son's brother.

10.2.4:

UnChristian health policy will emphasise *avoidance* of illness rather than *reaction* to it.

Rather than celebrate the fact that only half the building has burned down; wouldn't it be better not to have set the building on fire in the first place?

"The evil is perhaps gone too far to be remedied", so said Malthus in a related enquiry. Was/is he right? Tomorrow or next week, maybe. But in the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.<sup>84</sup>

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted;  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

10.3:

We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil:

So we know when a life is a good life or a bad life;  
We know when a death is a good death or a bad death.

One of the things that separate human beings *as* human beings from the rest of the animal kingdom, and from mere clods of soil, is the ability to know when our lives are good or bad.

Would a walrus or a brick wonder about whether 'tis nobler to grunt and sweat under a weary life than to fly to the undiscovered country, from whose bourn no traveller returns?

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

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<sup>84</sup> And see note 87.

There's nothing magnificent or heroic or admirable in clinging on to a bad life and in fearing a good death.

Knowing when a life causes more bad than good, and then discriminating against the bad in favour of the good, is magnificent and heroic –

And *Human*.<sup>85</sup>

Therefore, euthanasia will become an option.

*Miracles are ceased,*

*And therefore we must needs admit the means*

*How things are perfected.*

## 11. Christian Charity.

- Alms (the removal of them) will be included within illness policy.
- Our policy is to prevent the house catching fire rather than to congratulate ourselves on saving half of it.
- The UnChristian policy is to apply our international policy at the local level.
- The motto will be: *To each according to his ability.*
- Those sanctimonious souls wanting to ostentatiously, *or unostentatiously*, bestow their Christian charity *de haut en bas* will, along with the beneficiaries of that charity, be *vigorously encouraged* to seek refuge, to seek asylum in that Rainbow Paradise that is South Africa.

11.1:

Thomas Malthus, *Essay on the Principle of Population*, 5, 3:

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<sup>85</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1124b4-10, and 1115a10-16.

*The evil is perhaps gone too far to be remedied, but I feel little doubt in my own mind that if the poor laws had never existed, though there might have been a few more instances of very severe distress, yet that the aggregate mass of happiness among the people would have been much greater than it is at present.*

Christian charity doesn't solve problems. It produces and exacerbates them.<sup>86</sup>

James O'Brien *would not exist* if it were not for *Christian charity*.

11.2:

Distinctive material conditions produce associated ideologies.

Laws can be abrogated. Economic policies can be reversed. But you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear.

If the base is unsound, the superstructure falls.

Hogarth's *Gin Lane*, and *Marriage A-la-Mode*, and *A Rake's Progress* were intended as *warnings* – not as *eulogies* to the *decadent* and the *dissolute*.

The works of Dickens were intended as warnings – not as *celebrations* of *depravity* and *cesspit degeneracy*.

The degenerate, the decadent, the dissolute, the depraved of today *would not exist* but for *alms* bestowed in *previous generations*.

Christian charity doesn't *solve* the problem, it exacerbates and intensifies it.

James O'Brien – and his people, and the ideologies associated with that distinctive material condition (James O'Brien and his people) – *would not exist* if it were not for *Christian charity*.

*Lun yü* [Analects of Confucius], 4, 7:

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<sup>86</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 7.

*The Master said, 'In his errors a man is true to type. Observe the errors and you will know the man.'*

There's nothing wrong in *argumentum ad hominem*.

Certain personalities, certain persons, certain minds entertain certain ideas.<sup>87</sup>

Certain types of head contain certain types of ideas.

Edmund Burke<sup>88</sup>, *Letter to Charles-Jean-Francois de Pont*:

*Never wholly separate in your Mind the merits of any Political Question from the Men who are concerned*

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<sup>87</sup> And don't disregard the obvious. Don't turn your nose up at the vulgar and uncouth: Rolfe Daus Peterson and Carl L. Palmer, "Effects of physical attractiveness on political beliefs", *Politics and the Life Sciences*, Vol. 36 Issue 2, Cambridge University Press. And Hannah Summers, "Hunky Tory? Attractive people are more likely to be right wing, study finds", *The Guardian*, 30<sup>th</sup> Jan 2018. And reference to the description of Thersites, and to the response of Odysseus, *Iliad*, 211-277, is unavoidable: Darren Adam, Andrew Marr, Steven Kupakwesu Bush, Nick Cohen, Linda Bellos, Jenny Jones *et al.* And Hume in his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Introduction, makes a point which is applicable here:

*It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties ...*

*If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more close and intimate? ...*

*And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation.*

It might be seen as an uncouth remark – or maybe an unworthy bit of primary school playground name-calling – but we may be tempted to say that certain of the *Untouchables* very often look like Frank Zappa, or a caricature of David Baddiel, or Gandhi; or like Thersites or Frank Spencer. But a better insult would be to say they look like Jesus! Which they do! See for example Victoria and Albert Museum exhibits A.5-1956 and A.2,A.2:2-1986. Decomposing drowned rats.

<sup>88</sup> We needn't offer some slogan from the Frankfurt School! Edmund Burke will do!



*in it. You will be told that if a measure is good, what have you to do with the Character and views of those who bring it forward. But designing Men never separate their Plans from their interests.*

Particular people naturally seek out particular excuses or justifications or rationalizations.

Distinct material conditions produce associated ideologies.

Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface:

*[The condition of] material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life.*

*It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.*

And again Marx: *The German Ideology*, 1, B, *Conclusions from the Materialist Conception of History*:

*History ... shows that circumstances make men.*

Distinct material conditions produce associated ideologies.

If James O'Brien's mother had taken another path, chosen differently at the fork in the road, rather than offer him for adoption, we would not be burdened with James O'Brien.

In ancient Rome, James O'Brien's mother might've chucked him onto the local rubbish tip.

During the reign of George II, James O'Brien's mother might've tied a brick around his neck and chucked him into the river.

Hogarth and Malthus produced their works in the hope they'd help to *get rid* of people like James O'Brien.

But, due to Christian charity, we have the material base of James O'Brien and his filth, and the concomitant ideological superstructure in the government of scum, by scum, for scum.

There's nothing wrong in *argumentum ad hominem*.<sup>89</sup>

If the pragmatist's view that the truth is what works means anything, we feel it means that the *false* can be *assumed*, can be *presupposed*, to be false because it's *self-destructive*: Whoever acts on a false belief would, eventually, not exist to entertain that false belief.

If the conception of society entertained by Jesus Christ or James O'Brien – that fair is foul and foul is fair: *From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs* – were to be inflicted in full, any civilization adopting that conception would, *eventually*, no longer exist to *claim* that such a conception was desirable or advantageous. *Coherence* would be, *logically*, impossible. *Self-contradictory*, on this view, means *self-destructive*.<sup>90</sup>

The more famous, renowned, celebrated work refers to Aristotle, *Physicae Auscultationes*, 2, 8, 2:

*Why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, not because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity?*

*What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows.*

*Similarly if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this – in order that the crop might be spoiled – but that result just followed.*

*Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity – the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food – since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose?*

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<sup>89</sup> And see Aristotle, *Politics*, 1303a25-b3.

<sup>90</sup> And see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 10.

*Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come to be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish.*<sup>91</sup>

And his *Metaphysics*, 1008b:

*For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there?*

*Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way?*

*Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good?*

Christian charity doesn't *solve* the problem, it *exacerbates* and *intensifies* it.

11.3:

We will put down the sanctimonious sham/fraudulent *noblesse oblige*, the axiomatic self-abasement:

The Christianity and suicidal Christian charity by another name:

The effete, lifeless Christianity – the *real* Christianity – of the self-mutilating, effete, reedy-voiced, hair-shirt-wearing, flesh-mortifying, self-flagellating Anglican Bishop.

11.4:

We will decriminalize *θυμός*.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> We can hardly fail to regard Aristotle as taking precedence over another dignitary here. Or maybe, and contrary to the implication made in Richard Dawkins' *The God Delusion*, p. 411, that other dignitary's plagiarizing of Aristotle? See Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, "An Historical Sketch of the Progress of Opinion on the Origin of Species."

<sup>92</sup> And see *Bṛihadāranyaka Upanishad*, 1, 2, 6.

11.5:

Moreover, those sanctimonious souls wanting to ostentatiously, *or unostentatiously*, bestow their Christian charity *de haut en bas* will, along with the beneficiaries of that charity, be *vigorously encouraged* to seek refuge, to seek asylum in that Rainbow Paradise that is South Africa.

## 12. Defence.

- **An UnChristian defence policy would focus on the assassination of troublesome leaders.**
- **We will increase and enhance any arsenal of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.**
- **We will train a conventional army for and in guerrilla warfare.**
- **We will create a force of volunteer suicide Berserkers drawn from the old and the infirm. Participation as an alternative to euthanasia would not be unacceptable.**
- **We will remove the infiltrators and saboteurs.**

12.1:

The practicalities – one example:

China (at time of writing) had an estimated 3,355,000 military personnel comprising:  
2,185,000 active personnel;  
510,000 reserves;  
And 660,000 paramilitaries.

Of the country's 1,394,000,000 population,  
752,770,000 were regarded as available for service;  
And 617,270,000 were regarded as fit for service.  
19,750,000 reached military age annually.

The country had 3,205 tanks;  
35,000 armoured vehicles;  
3,100 artillery;  
And 2,250 rocket projectors.

It had a total aircraft strength of 3,260 including 1,200 fighters/interceptors and 371 attack aircraft.

It had 777 total naval assets including 50 destroyers, and 79 submarines.

Clearly, this argues for an increased and enhanced arsenal of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.

The *old fashioned* options are no longer options.

#### 12.2:

Also, an UnChristian government would train a conventional army for and in guerrilla warfare.

#### 12.3.1:

Realising that if you cut the dog's head off, the tail stops wagging – an UnChristian defence policy would prioritize the assassination of bothersome leaders.

Cyber-crime or cyber-warfare may be the up-and-coming things, but some-*one* is still needed to *make a decision*.

A *purpose* still requires a *person* to have it.  
It still needs some-*one* to *give the order* –  
If you prefer – To *pull the trigger*.

#### 12.3.2:

If a sword crashes down on someone's head – the person's no less dead than if a 15 Megaton Hydrogen bomb goes off under their backside.

12.4:

We must clarify *who it is* we're supposed to be defending, and *from what*.

Centuries of Christianity have produced too many people who are not *worth* defending, and a threat to them would turn out to be a benefit.

*Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant.*

Primarily, we must remove any infiltrators and saboteurs.

The assassination of troublesome leaders cannot be limited to leaders situated outside the locale of an UnChristian administration.

Recall:

*Deuteronomy*, 20, 10-11:

*When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then proclaim peace unto it.*

*And it shall be, if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be, that all the people that is found therein shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee.*

*Deuteronomy*, 7, 22-25:

*And the Lord thy God will put out those nations before thee by little and little: thou mayest not consume them at once, lest the beasts of the field increase upon thee.*

*But the Lord thy God shall deliver them unto thee, and shall destroy them with a mighty destruction, until they be destroyed.*

*And he shall deliver their kings into thine hand, and thou shalt destroy their name from under heaven: there shall no man be able to stand before thee, until thou have destroyed them.*

*The graven images of their gods shall ye burn with fire.*

And *Deuteronomy*, 6, 10-11:

*And it shall be, when the Lord thy God shall have brought thee into the land which he swore unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give thee great and goodly cities, which thou buildest not,*

*And houses full of all good things, which thou filledst not, and wells digged, which thou diggedst not, vineyards and olive trees, which thou plantedst not; when thou shalt have eaten to the full.*

This isn't the programme for a new, sunnier age of mutual aid and mutual respect. It is a plan of attack for *one* group against *another*:

It is a plan of attack for the *decadent* and the *dissolute*, the *depraved* and the *degenerate*:

The sewer filth of the earth.

A stratagem for the Government *of* scum, *by* scum, *for* scum.

There's no mysterious, mystical "Unity" against "Division"; There never *has* been.

There's no mysterious "People", oppressed and duped by powdered-wig-wearing drones –

There are the *decadent* and the *dissolute*, the *depraved* and the *degenerate*: The sewer filth of the earth –

*Against everyone else.*

James O'Brien, Shelagh Fogarty, Darren Adam, Ashley Tabor-King, David Baddiel, "Alf" Dubs *et al.* were born, dumped, fly-tipped within the borders of the UKofGBandNI; This doesn't mean they can destroy the gods of the city that opened unto them, and get away with it [see ejaculations 6.7.3 to 6.10].

12.5:

Our armed forces would include, as the inner sanctum of its inner sanctum, an elite of the elite of the elite hard core of champions – assassins.

We will create a force of volunteer suicide Berserkers drawn from the old and the infirm.

Participation as an alternative to euthanasia would be very acceptable.<sup>93</sup>

12.6:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted.  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

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<sup>93</sup> The principle is suggested or endorsed by Herodotus, *Histories*, 7, 205. And according to a press release from the Campaign for Dignity in Dying, dated 17<sup>th</sup> October 2021, and titled *Hundreds of terminally ill Brits take their own lives in UK each year, latest estimates suggest*: ‘The report, “Last Resort: The hidden truth about how dying people take their own lives in the UK”, for the first time brings together estimates from multiple sources, which suggest that between 300 and 650 terminally ill people take their own lives in the UK each year, with between 3,000 and 6,500 attempting to do so. This is in addition to the 50 Brits who travel to Switzerland for an assisted death each year on average, and 6,400 dying people who would suffer in pain in their final months in the UK even if there was universal access to palliative care.’ Those 300 to 6,500, and probably many more, need not fear punishment. They could do one last good deed before they go.



### 13. Foreign Policy.

- We will not turn the other cheek.
- We will not love our enemies.
- We will not bless them that curse us.
- We will not do good to them that hate us.

13.1:

Respect = Fear.

Pragmatism will be our principle.

The real is the rational and the rational is the real.

What works is what benefits us.

13.2:

Alexander didn't seek or need permission to cut the Gordian Knot.

He didn't consult any book of International Law to determine legality.

He didn't need to beg permission to conquer the Persian Empire.<sup>94</sup>

The *United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* will not be used as a weapon whereby our enemies – them that curse us, them that hate us – may spitefully use us and persecute us.

There will be no turning the other cheek, or loving our enemies, or blessing them that curse us, or doing good to them that hate us.

The poor in spirit shall be abased.

They that mourn shall be abased.

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<sup>94</sup> And see Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [idea, appearance], 1, 1.

The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted;  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased.

*We have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.*

13.3:

China will be forced to pay compensation for the CoViD-19 molestation.

13.4:

Moreover, we will remind Iran, Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda (or the remnants of it), the Islamic State (or the remnants of it), the Taliban, *et al.* that their religion requires or permits or does not categorically forbid them to declare war on, or to attack, or to invade China in defence of their Uighur brothers and sisters:

*Al-Baqarah*, 178:

*O believers, prescribed for you is  
retaliation; touching the slain;  
freeman for freeman, slave for slave,  
femail for femail ...  
In retaliation, there is life for you,  
men possessed of minds; haply you  
will be godfearing.*

*Al-Mā'idah*, 49:

*Whoso judges not  
according to what God has sent down –  
they are the unbelievers.  
And therein We prescribed for them:  
'A life for a life, an eye for an eye,  
a nose for a nose, an ear for an ear,*

*a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds  
retaliation’.*

*Al-Baqarah, 193:*

*The holy month for the holy month;  
holy things demand retaliation.  
Whoso commits aggression against you,  
do you commit aggression against him  
like he has committed against you;  
and fear you God, and know that God is  
with the godfearing.*

#### 14. Migration.

- The tempest-tossed, and the huddled masses yearning to breathe free, will be vigorously encouraged to go to South Africa.
- We will address the semantics surrounding migration and the responses to it. Semantics is/are not *mere* semantics. Cleaning up the semantics concerning “Migration” and “Migrants” will remove 90% of the problem.
- Adjustments to the material base would resolve any remaining issues.
- We will not provide a replacement proletariat for the bourgeoisie. *And* we will not provide a bourgeoisie for someone else’s surplus proletarians.

14.1:

Christianity.

The sanctimonious “Bleeding-Heart liberalism”: The ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity has caused enormous damage.<sup>95</sup>

Christianity.

The sanctimonious, ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity (a *dominant les nains* magic trick performed by inconsequential nonentities to make themselves appear big and important) has caused enormous damage.

Ostentatious Christian charity – and the exercising of it by inconsequential nonentities to make themselves feel big and important – Christian charity regarding wretched refuse and huddled masses is the best argument against itself.<sup>96</sup>

In his *A Brief History of Time*, p. 209, Stephen Hawking says:

*In the eighteenth century, philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science, to be their field and discussed questions such as: did the universe have a beginning? However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced the scope of their enquiries so much that Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher of this century, said, ‘The sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language.’ What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant!*

The allegation (similar to certain injustices committed in Descartes’ 6<sup>th</sup> *Discourse on Method*) the allegation in this statement doesn’t hold up. Empiricist philosophers have always been modest in their claims and ambitions. John Locke said of his own work, in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, “Epistle to the Reader” –

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<sup>95</sup> Aeschylus, *The Suppliants*, 476-488. And see note 79.

<sup>96</sup> See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1303a25-b3.

*It is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge.*

And William of Ockham:

F. C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 230-231:

*The new movement [via moderna] is commonly described as the nominalist or terminist movement. It was characterised in part by the development of a logic, beginning in the thirteenth century and representing pretty well the original medieval contribution to logical studies, in which attention was devoted to analysing the functions of terms in propositions ...*

*Another characteristic of the new movement was the insistence shown in the analytical treatment of particular problems rather than in the creation of comprehensive syntheses. Moreover, there was a strong tendency to regard as probable arguments previously regarded as demonstrative ... With fourteenth century thinkers such as Ockham and, still more, Nicholas of Autrecourt we can find a thoroughgoing criticism of traditional metaphysical arguments.*

Before we can answer any question, we should know *exactly what question it is* that we're attempting to answer. Isn't it best to know what we're talking about before we talk? If only the moronic journalists and cretinous commentators were *even that* ambitious!

Shelley, *Prometheus Unbound*, 2, 4:<sup>97</sup>

*He gave man speech, and speech created thought,  
which is the measure of the universe.*

14.2.1:

It's often claimed that philosophy is completely useless.  
This is wrong.

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<sup>97</sup> And see *Chāndogya Upanishad*, 3, 12, 1-2; and Plato, *Theaetetus*, 189e-190a.

Real philosophy is, and always has been, analysis:

Aristotle, *Categories*, 1a1:

*When things have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different, they are called homonymous. Thus, for example, both a man and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is different; for if one is to say what being an animal is for each of them, one will give two distinct definitions.*

Gottlob Frege, *On Sense and Meaning*:

*A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 'Bucephalus.' This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and sign's sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not a part or mode of the individual mind.*

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 369:

*If there be only a single word the established meaning of which exactly agrees with a certain concept, then, since it is of great importance that this concept be distinguished from related concepts, it is advisable to economise in the use of the word and not to employ it, merely for the sake of variety, as a synonym for some other expression, but carefully to its own proper meaning.*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 3.323-3.324:

*In everyday language it frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification – and so belongs to different symbols – or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.*

*Thus the word 'is' figures as a copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of something's happening.*

*(In the proposition, 'Green is green' – where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective – there words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)*

*In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them).*

Gilbert Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, Vol. 32, pp. 169-170:

*Philosophy must then involve the exercise of systematic restatement ...*

*Its restatements are transmutations of syntax, and transmutations of syntax controlled not by desire for elegance or stylistic correctness but by desire to exhibit the forms of the facts into which philosophy is the enquiry ...*

*I am for the present inclined to believe that this is what philosophical analysis is, and that this is the sole and whole function of philosophy ...*

*I would rather allot to philosophy a sublimer task than the detection of the sources in linguistic idioms of recurrent misconstructions and absurd theories. But that it is at least this I cannot feel any serious doubt.*

The columnists and commentators, the journalists and moronic radio talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program presenters – the Rhapsodes and the Sophists – could benefit from a lesson in elementary philosophical analysis.<sup>98</sup>

#### 14.2.2:

It frequently happens that, in the fantasy world of those columnists and commentators, journalists, and moronic radio

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<sup>98</sup> And see Plato, *Phaedrus*, 259-260.

talk-show hosts, and the cretinous daytime television magazine program presenters, one word having different modes of signification – and so belonging to different symbols – or two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.<sup>99</sup>

‘Settlers’, ‘Colonists’, ‘Colonizers’, ‘Squatters’, ‘Migrants’, ‘Refugees’, ‘Invaders’, ‘Locusts’, ‘Parasites’, ‘The Hungry’, ‘The Desperate’, ‘Huddled Masses’, ‘Vermin’, ‘Suppliants’, ‘Wretched Refuse’, ‘Slaves’, ‘Employees’, ‘Commodities’, ‘Surplus Proletarians’, ‘Surplus *Śūdras*’:

Here, different ideas can be connected with one name, and different names can be connected with one idea.<sup>100</sup>

### 14.2.3:

And it is often forgotten that there are such things as *internal* refugees.

There is *de facto* forced migration, or flight, from one area to another *within one country or region*. And this is not only true of Syria or Israel or Palestine (for example).

We can be driven from city to city or from street to street as much as from country to country or from continent to continent.

Certain populations may be forced out of areas such as Peckham or Croydon or Tower Hamlets or Hackney or Haringey – driven out due to the degraded, unbearable conditions found or inflicted there. This is no less a seeking of refuge than is the more usual reference for the term.

‘We’re looking to start a family’, they might say, or ‘We’re looking for a better school’. This is code for something else;

*And we know what that something else is.*<sup>101</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 569.

<sup>100</sup> A very nice little compendium of conjectures or speculations regarding vagueness, ambiguity, opacity, determinacy *v.* indeterminacy or under-determination – and their possible causes, and possible templates or plans of attack for their clarifications or refutations or solutions – might be found in W. V. Quine’s *Word and Object*. These may be employed in many fields addressed in this Manifesto. The issue is of relevance for the lofty *and* the mundane. We might examine Plato’s *Symposium* in parallel with *Word and Object* II, IV, and VII 48 and 55. We may say we love chips, and that we love our grannies. Here “Love” is *clearly* being used to refer to two different things.

<sup>101</sup> Equality Act 2010.



Some are driven out and into the surrounding counties.  
Some even end up in Australia!

It would be advisable to economise in the use of any word and not to employ it, merely for the sake of variety, as a synonym for some other expression, but carefully to its own proper meaning. In this way, the most fundamental confusions would be easily avoided.

14.3:

We will not provide a replacement proletariat for the bourgeoisie.

*And* we will not provide a bourgeoisie for someone else's surplus proletarians.

We will not provide replacement *Śūdras* for the *Vaiśyas*.

*And* we will not provide *Vaiśyas* for someone else's surplus *Śūdras*.

F. A. Hayek (ed), *Capitalism and the Historians*, "History and Politics", p. 16:

*The proletariat which capitalism can be said to have "created" was not a proportion of the population which would have existed without it and which it had degraded to a lower level; it was an additional population which was enabled to grow up by the new opportunities for employment which capitalism had provided. In so far as it is true that the growth of capital made the appearance of the proletariat possible, it was in the sense that it raised the productivity of labour so that much larger numbers of those who had not been equipped by their parents with the necessary tools were enabled to maintain themselves by their labour alone.*

Karl Marx, "1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts", 1, 1:

*The capitalist can live longer without the worker than can the worker without the capitalist.*

Once the UnChristian has sorted out exactly who are the slaves, the employees, the commodities *etc*, any confusion will disappear.

14.4:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

The tempest-tossed, and the huddled masses yearning to breathe free, will be *vigorously* encouraged to go to South Africa.

## 15. Crime and Punishment.

- An UnChristian axiom is that we are not beneficiaries or victims of God's grace.
- An UnChristian axiom is that human beings, *by definition*, cannot be victims of circumstance. Whoever – *whatever* – submits to the Will of God is not, or is no longer, a *human being*; is no better than a *clod of soil*; a *mere thing*; no better than a snooker ball being unconsciously, mindlessly knocked around a table.
- The deserving shall be rewarded.
- The undeserving shall be punished.
- There'll be no more time, or energy, or money wasted on prodigal sons or lost sheep.
- The sentencing guideline will be: Do what you would *not* want someone to do to you.
- We will decriminalize *θυμός*.

15.1.1:

The “Bleeding-Heart liberalism”: The ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity resembles

the old practice, by the Royal households, of employing and exhibiting dwarfs. They were engaged to make the royal personages appear bigger, more impressive, and more important.<sup>102</sup>

The ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity<sup>103</sup> is very much a *dominant les nains* magic trick performed by inconsequential nonentities to make themselves appear big and important.

They can make themselves at least *feel* bigger by bestowing charity on those who are, or are assumed or said to be, *even lower down the scale than themselves*.<sup>104</sup>

#### 15.1.2:

We feel that the issues involved in crime and punishment show up best the connections – or the uniformities or equivalences – between our UnChristian social, ethical, political position and our epistemological, ontological, teleological or, even, metaphysical standpoint: –

The issues, the ramifications wrung out, worked through to the minutest detail, and brought to our attention by Augustine, Pelagius, and Luther.

#### 15.1.3:

There's nothing new under the sun.

They may call themselves 'Humanists' or atheists or secularists.

They like to think of themselves as "Progressive";

Nevertheless, in reality, the self-mutilating, quivering-lipped, Bleeding-Heart liberals – the "Penal Reformers" – are just as *religious* as were their Bronze Age ancestors.<sup>105</sup>

This is why we say that some people, many people, most people *want* to be slaves – They are *born* for slavery.

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<sup>102</sup> And see *Meng tzu*, 2, a, 6.

<sup>103</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 66

<sup>104</sup> *Manavadharmaśāstra*, 7, 91-93; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1124b; Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Anti-Christ*, 7.

<sup>105</sup> The ethics argued for in Richard Dawkins' *The God Delusion*, Chs. 6, 7 and 8, is just plain, old-fashioned, suicidal Christianity. And consider the sentiments, the motivations behind John Lennon's "Utopian" *Imagine*, and those of the Sermon on the Mount.

The reader may think it at best an irrelevant distraction or, at worst, distractingly pretentious to throw in mention of the Augustinian and Lutheran investigations into Justification and Grace, but the principles discussed persist and persevere; only the names and terms and jargon and mantras change.<sup>106</sup>

Their position was/is that it is an impossibility – by definition – that human beings *as* human beings are or can be capable of saving themselves:

*Romans*, 1, 16-17:

*For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth: to the Jew first, and also to the Greek.*

*For therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith: as it is written, The just shall live by faith.*

*ibid*, 3, 19-28:

*Now we know that what things soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the law: that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God.*

*Therefore by the deeds of the law, there shall no flesh be justified in his sight: for by the law is the knowledge of sin.*

*But now the righteousness of God without the law is manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets;*

*Even the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all of them that believe: for there is no difference:*

*For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God;*

*Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus:*

*Whom God hath set forth to be the propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for*

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<sup>106</sup> See also *Al-Baqarah*, 124-126; 81-83; 129-313; *Al-Jathiyah*, 15-17; *Al-Ma'idah*, 75-79; *Al-Nisa'*, 47-50; *Al-Jum'ah*, 5; *Matthew*, 23, 1-31; *Mark*, 7, 8-13; *Luke*, 2, 25-35.

*the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God:*

*To declare, I say, at this time his righteousness: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.*

*Where is boasting then? It is excluded. By what law? of works? Nay: but by the law of faith.*

*Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.*

*ibid*, 5, 1-2:

*Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ:*

*By whom also we have access by faith into his grace wherein we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.*

In other words – *works*, for the Christian, are *nothing*.

In other words – for the Christian (as, according to *Qadar*, for the Muslim) – human beings cannot *earn* praise or *earn* reward<sup>107</sup>...

And cannot *earn* censure or blame or punishment either!<sup>108</sup>

## THE INJUSTICE OF IT!

And this is the position of the self-mutilating, quivering-lipped, reedy voiced, Bleeding-Heart liberal “Penal Reformer”.

And it’s essentially the position of James O’Brien and Shelagh Fogarty and Darren Adam and the rest of them.

So much for the “Progressive” epithet!

F. C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy*, p. 258 (again):

*The traditional theological teaching was that divine grace was required for man to perform acts which were meritorious in God’s eyes and to achieve salvation ... [William of Ockham] was convinced that no human act can be meritorious unless it is a free act, preceding from the human will as its cause ... The result of this insistence on human freedom, coupled with Ockham’s*

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<sup>107</sup> *Exodus*, 33, 19.

<sup>108</sup> And see *Al-Kahf*, 23-26; *Al-Qaṣaṣ*, 68-70.

*admission of the theoretical possibility of man's performing meritorious acts and achieving salvation without the intervention of grace as a secondary cause, was the impression in certain quarters that a new form of Pelagianism had arisen, concerned with emphasising human freedom and self-sufficiency at the expense of the universal divine causality and the divine omniscience. Hence the sharp attack made by Bradwardine in his De causa Dei contra Pelagium.*

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals*, 243:

*Inanimate objects may bear to each other all the same relations which we observe in moral agents; though the former can never be the object of love or hatred, nor are consequently susceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which over-tops and destroys its parent, stands in all the same relations with Nero, when he murdered Agrippina; and if morality consisted merely in relations, would no doubt be equally criminal.*

Our position – the UnChristian position – as is implicit in *Genesis* chapter 3 – is that it is a *defining characteristic* of human beings *as* human beings that they *must* be capable of self-salvation *and* of self-damnation.

This is why we say that some people, many people, most people *want* to be slaves.

This is why we say, along with Aristotle, that some, many, most people are *born* for slavery.<sup>109</sup>

They can't cope with the pressure, the burden of responsibility that freedom entails and awards<sup>110</sup>:

It's *easier* to submit – to an axiomised necessity, to the Fates, to “The Stars”, to God's Grace, to Law, to a mysterious

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<sup>109</sup> And see *Atrabasis*, 1, 3-4; and *Al-Baqarah*, 125-127.

<sup>110</sup> And see *Iliad*, 19, 86-94; and 11, 310-319; and 8, 139-144; *Bhagavad-Gītā*, 12, 5-6; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 2, 12; *Mārasamy Sutta*, 461-462; Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [idea, appearance], 1, 57; *Mahātanhāsankhaya Sutta*, 17; *Vasistha-dharmasutra*, 30, 10; *Ecclesiastes*, 4; *Genesis*, 3; *Potaliya Sutta*, 26; and *Deuteronomy*, 1, 17-18.

abstracted “Economy”, to an axiomised *force* of circumstance, or to anything else.<sup>111</sup>

The sun, the moon, and the stars cannot be guilty of our disasters.

We cannot be villains by necessity; fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance.

We cannot be drunkards, liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence;

Nor all that we are evil in, by a divine thrusting on:

Not because our fathers compounded with our mothers under the Dragon’s tail, and our nativities were under Ursa Major.

We should have been as we are had the maidenliest star in the firmament twinkled on our bastardising.

#### 15.2.1:

The UnChristians are uncompromisingly humane in their outlook, so torture and capital punishment will be the first resort.

We believe in treating human beings *as* human beings; not as insensible blocks or clods of soil.<sup>112</sup>

The parameter will be: Do what you wouldn’t want someone to do to you.

#### 15.2.2:

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<sup>111</sup> The principle is laid out in Aeschylus, *The Libation Bearers*, 1026-1031. And see *Kaushitaki Upanishad*, 3, 8; *Rig Veda*, 4, 23, 7-10; *Bhagavad Gītā*, 14, 21-27.

<sup>112</sup> And see Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 443-453; and also Aristotle, *De Anima*, 413a; and Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, II, iv. Discussions regarding any “Category-Mistake” – [representing] the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another – and the often alleged “inside” person and “outside” person – as is often invoked to circumvent any notion of personal responsibility – can be examined, and its relevance evaluated, in Gilbert Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind*; specifically Chapter 1, Section 2: “The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine”. The concept might also be examined profitably in conjunction with ejaculation 8.1.1.

We wouldn't *punish* a wall if it collapsed on us.  
We wouldn't *punish* a motorcar if it failed to start (Basil Fawlty).

We wouldn't *punish* a crocodile if it ate our granny.  
We wouldn't *punish* a lion if it ate a Wildebeest.

They don't know of good or evil.  
They haven't eaten of the Tree of Knowledge.  
They are *neither* evil *nor* good.<sup>113</sup>

*They know not what they do.*<sup>114</sup>

For the UnChristian, the *assumption*, or *presupposition*, of Free Will is a methodology.<sup>115</sup>

**Axiom:** Human Beings *as* Human Beings *cannot* be victims *or* beneficiaries of God's Grace.

There are the *deserving* and the *undeserving*.<sup>116</sup>

The poor in spirit shall be abased.  
They that mourn shall be abased.  
The meek shall be abased.  
The Kings shall be exalted; their names shall be exalted.  
Their altars shall be glorious.  
Their images shall be exalted.  
The images of their Gods shall be exalted.  
The first shall be exalted; the last shall be abased –  
*If* we have eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.<sup>117</sup>

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason, Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason*, p. 161:

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<sup>113</sup> And see Plato, *Laches*, 197a-c; and *Mahacattārisaka Sutta*, 10; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1135b.

<sup>114</sup> And see *Mānavadharmasāstra*, 2, 2-5; and *Al-Nisā'*, 92-93.

<sup>115</sup> And see Plato, *Hippias Minor*, 376a-b; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1105b2; and *Luke*, 12, 47-48.

<sup>116</sup> And see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason, Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason*, pp. 155-156.

<sup>117</sup> Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound*, 452-456.



*When a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on self examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his own eyes, then every good moral disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting influences from breaking into the mind.*

Whoever (*whatever*) is a victim of circumstance cannot, by definition, be a human being or a person but a mere thing: No more than a clod of soil. They can, thus or therefore, (and like other wretched refuse) be binned or put on the compost heap.

One could, if one felt the need, without too much difficulty argue that our methodology regarding free will, determinism, and responsibility resembles the elimination method for solving linear simultaneous equations: reducing the number of variables by taking appropriate linear combinations of the equations. The problematic entities being free will and determinism, and the seemingly insolvable problems thrown up by these two concepts.<sup>118</sup>

*Something* can be done on either side of the equation, and *doing nothing* isn't an option.

Rejoicing over "Found Sheep" or over Prodigal Sons isn't an option.

Here we may be reminded of Immanuel Kant's Third Antinomy, or even of Ramsey's redundancy theory.<sup>119</sup>

This manifesto is not the place for a detailed examination or exposition. Our *e80 25rs5e e8nn* goes deeper into the matter.

15.3:

Christianity is clearly at the root of present government policy regarding criminality:

*Matthew*, 18, 12-13:

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<sup>118</sup> Or *I Henry IV*, 3, 1, 11-17.

<sup>119</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pp. 472-481. And see *ibid*, pp. 370-371.

*How think ye? If a man have an hundred sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray?*

*And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that sheep, than of the nine and ninety which went not astray.*

*Luke, 15, 3-7:*

*What man of you, having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it?*

*And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing.*

*And when he cometh home, he calleth together his friends and neighbours, saying unto them, Rejoice with me: for I have found my sheep which was lost.*

*I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance.*

And who, *honestly*, hasn't been annoyed at the father of the "Prodigal Son"; annoyed by the injustice done to the brother?

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*Luke, 15, 11-32:*

*And he said, A certain man had two sons:*

*And the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me the portion of goods that falleth to me. And he divided unto them his living.*

*And not many days after the younger son gathered all together, and took his journey into a far country, and there wasted his substance with riotous living.*

*And when he had spent all, there arose a mighty famine in that land: and he began to be in want.*

*And he went and joined himself to a citizen of that country: and he sent him into his fields to feed swine.*

*And would fain have filled his belly with husks that the swine did eat: and no man gave unto him.*

*And when he came to himself, he said, How many hired servants of my Father's have bread enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger!*

*I will arise and go to my father, and I will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and before thee.*

*And am no more worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants.*

*And he arose, and came to his father. But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him.*

*And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son.*

*But the father said unto his servants, Bring forth the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet:*

*And bring hither the fatted calf, and kill it; and let us eat, and be merry.*

*For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found. And they began to be merry.*

*Now his elder son was in the field: and as he came and drew nigh to the house, he heard musick and dancing.*

*And he called one of the servants, and asked what these things meant.*

*And he said unto him, Thy brother is come; and thy father has killed the fatted calf, because he hath received him safe and sound.*

*And he was angry, and would not go in: therefore came his father out, and entreated him.*

*And he answering said to his father, Lo, these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment: and yet thou never gavest me a kid, that I might make merry with my friends:*

*But as soon as this thy son was come, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou hast killed for him the fatted calf.*

*And he said unto him, Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine.*

*It was meet that we should make merry, and be  
glad: for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again;  
and was lost, and is found.*

A paradigm case of the Christian suicidal insanity?

Sophocles, *Antigone*, 620-623:

*Evil appears as good in the minds of those whom  
god leads to destruction.*

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern  
Ireland – or, to be more accurate, *England* – is, *clearly*, the most  
Christian country on Earth.

The sanctimonious, reedy-voiced, quivering-lipped,  
affected, fraudulent *de haut en bas* “*noblesse oblige*” ostentatious  
proclaiming of “Redemption” –

*Concern for lost sheep, and rejoicing over prodigal sons –*

This is the basis of government policy regarding criminality  
S.I.I.N.R.I.

### **THE ABSOLUTE INJUSTICE OF IT!**

All this is the fault of Christian charity.

In the Nation of the UnChristian, the precious shall be  
cherished, the worthless shall be as pestilence.

The UnChristian Party advocates:

*The securing for the workers by hand or by brain  
the full fruits of their industry.*

The motto will be:

***To each according to his ability.***

15.4:

To paraphrase Locke from his *First Treatise of Government*  
(one of the most useful but criminally neglected works):

Nobody, by reason of birth – by reason of *conception* – has a God given right to inflict himself or herself on anyone else.

And even if such a right existed, there would be the corresponding and equally valid right of others – by reason of conception – to defend themselves by a corresponding and contrary act.

**A** has as little God given right to act upon **B** as **B** has to act upon **A**.

**B** has as much God given right to stop **A** acting as **A** has to stop **B** stopping any act of **A**.

**B** has as much natural right to act upon **A** as **A** has to act upon **B**.

**A** has as little right to stop an action of **B** as **B** has to act on **A**.

**A** has as little duty to tolerate **B** – by reason of conception – as **B** has – by reason of conception – to impinge, intrude or encroach upon **A**.

Moreover, even if definite – even God given – rights existed by the reason of birth – by reason of *conception* – so many conflicting rights and duties would exist that no inheritance of rights or duties could be certainly determined.<sup>120</sup>

The fact that Gavrillo Princip or James O'Brien's parents had been – gratuitously – at it does not inflict duties on anyone else.

Charles I did not inherit the right to rule from Adam. Equally, James O'Brien did not inherit the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness – or anything else – from his parents.

Gavrillo Princip did not inherit from his parents the right to assassinate the Austrian Emperor's nephew.

Hume, in his *Of the Original Contract*, makes a similar point when examining the conjecture that government or any legal system was arrived at by the consideration and consent of the governed, and that any laws engendered have enduring or binding force or authority:

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<sup>120</sup> And see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., p. 449; and Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.51.

*But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing that in the least corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical a system ...*

*The contract on which government is founded is said to be the original contract; and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under the knowledge of the present generation. If the agreement by which savage men first associated and conjoined their force be here meant, this is acknowledged to be the real; but being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it cannot now be supposed to retain any authority ...*

*[The Contract Theory] is not justified by history or experience in any age or country of the world.*

*ibid.*

*In vain we are asked in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was not written on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing, and all the other civilized arts of life.*

And while we're at it, we can confidently repudiate Rousseau:

"The Land" no more belonged to Woody Guthrie, by right of birth, than it did to George III.

George III had as much contractual claim to the land as did Woody Guthrie.

The Redwood Forest and the Gulf Stream waters were not *made for* Woody Guthrie any more than for George III.

15.5:

In the longer term, the UnChristian treatments and adjustments to the material base should resolve this particular predicament in the ideological superstructure.

### Part III.

#### 16. Points of Contact.

- The Churchgoer.
- Labour.
- Conservative.
- “Green”.
- liberal/Liberal.
- The Lost Rest.

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5, 106:

*Frequent observation has convinced me that when [a scientific] undertaking has been carried through to its end, that which, half way through it, seemed to me at times very dubious in view of other, extraneous doctrines was at the end found to harmonise perfectly, in an unexpected way, with what had been discovered independently, without the least regard for those doctrines and without any partiality or prejudice for them, provided I left this dubiousness out of sight for a while and attended only to the business at hand until I had brought it to completion. Writers would save themselves much error and much labour lost (because spent on delusion) if they could only resolve to work with somewhat more candour.*

##### 16.1.1:

The Churchgoer:

Christ associated with cesspit filth. The dregs of society. The dregs of humanity.

The usual Churchgoer has little in common with the effete, reedy-voiced, hair-shirt-wearing, flesh-mortifying, self-flagellating, self-mutilating Anglican Bishop.

The usual Churchgoer – let's face it – is concerned, primarily or *solely*, with the activities of the bedroom:

*Genesis* 3, 7;  
*Genesis* 18, 20 to 19, 36;  
*Leviticus* 18;  
*Matthew* 5, 27 to 32;  
And so on.

And so on:

Jezebels, harlots, and whores:<sup>121</sup>

These are the concerns of the customary Churchgoer; not the reedy-voiced, quivering-lipped, hair-shirted, Bleeding-Heart suicidal “liberalism” of the Bishops.

Christ associated with and allied himself with the dregs of society; the dregs of humanity.

The sewer filth – these were Christ's people.

The customary Churchgoer is – like the *Un-Christian* – and contrary to the entreaties and coaxings of *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* – **judgemental**.

They are clean, but they involve themselves with filth...

**What a waste!**

16.1.2:

We find it amazing that everyone – Churchgoers *and* Christians *and* atheists *and* amoralists *and* immoralists – everyone seems to have missed the point that what is a principal teaching or prerequisite of Christianity – what *necessitated* Christianity – is in fact an argument *in favour* of the Sexual Revolution (so called): the recapitulation of, and *Return* to, shamelessness.

Surprised?

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<sup>121</sup> And see *Mānavadharmaśāstra*, 2, 214; and *Gilgamesh* (Standard Babylonian Version), 6, 3 and 1, 4; and Plato, *Republic*, 458-d.



Puzzled?  
Astounded?

The confusion is understandable when we consider *Matthen*, 5, 27-32.

But consider:

*Genesis*, 3, 4-10:

*And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die:*

*For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.*

...

*And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons.*

*And they heard the voice of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day: and Adam and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God amongst the trees of the garden.*

*And the LORD God called unto Adam, and said unto him, Where art thou?*

*And he said, I heard thy voice in the garden, and I was afraid, because I was naked; and I hid myself.*

This cannot be put down to inaccurate translation in the King James version. The New American Standard Bible states:

*The serpent said to the woman, "You certainly will not die!*

*For God knows that on the day you eat from it your eyes will be opened, and you will become like God, knowing good and evil."*

...

*Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together and made themselves waist coverings.*

*Now they heard the sound of the LORD God walking in the garden in the cool of the day, and the*

*man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the LORD God among the trees of the garden.*

*Then the LORD God called to the man, and said to him, He said, "Where are you?"*

*"I heard the sound of You in the garden, and I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid myself."*

This passage plainly states that the knowledge of good and evil – the awareness that there *is* indeed a separation between the good and the evil – and the consequent appearance of sexual morality, is the primary sin; a sin that was punished by the expulsion from the Garden of Eden.

That is:

The immediate evidence that humanity had acquired the knowledge of good and evil was the appearance of sexual *morality* – *not* the appearance of sexual *immorality*.

What can we deduce from this other than that, in Jesus' *tradition*, sexual abandon, lack of inhibition, lack of restraint, shame-lessness – was, is, and should be the natural condition? And that in order to return to a right relationship with god, we should return to that state of shamelessness?

It seems to have been the *serpent* that led or opened mankind to the sexual morality that Churchgoers – and, apparently, everyone else – mistakenly take as Christian.

The Fall was the fall *from* shamelessness.

Also – *and let's face it* – it would not be very difficult to conclude, after our examination of *Matthew*, 5, 27-32, that Jesus Christ was a homosexual.

This may fit very nicely with the stance of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Anglican establishment; but how would, and should, the typical Churchgoer respond?

We say again –

We find it amazing that everyone – Churchgoers *and* Christians *and* atheists *and* amorlists *and* immoralists – seem to have missed the point that what is a prerequisite for

Christianity is in fact an argument in favour of the so-called Sexual Revolution (if a turning of 180 degrees back to the Garden of Eden can be called a revolution):

The immediate evidence for humanity's acquisition of the knowledge of good and evil was the appearance of sexual *morality* – *not* the appearance of sexual *immorality*:

*In Jesus' tradition*, sexual abandon, lack of inhibition, lack of restraint, shame-lessness – is, was, and *should be* the natural condition.

*In Jesus' tradition*, in order to return to a right relationship with god, we should return to that state of shamelessness.

### 16.1.3:

An examination of the nature of the material base and its effect upon the ideological superstructure; and a recognition that it is in fact Christian suicidal charity that is at the root of the problem should turn the Churchgoer away from the Church.

And whoever – someone with a misapplied, ill-placed brand loyalty – thinks that Christianity is an essential part of the culture and traditions of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland might be comforted or consoled by an examination of Tacitus' observations concerning the religious feeling amongst the northern tribes.

Or with the Pelagius/Augustine controversy...

The typical Churchgoer appears to have a very strong – and therefore *Un-Christian* – sense of personal responsibility:

N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 357:

*If Christianity had accepted Pelagius' account of human nature as its presupposition, it would have ceased to be a "religion" in any intelligible sense of the term.*

### 16.2.1:

Labour:

The 1918 S.I.I.N.R.I. Labour Party Constitution, drafted in November 1917 S.I.I.N.R.I. by Sidney Webb, had just one aim: the implementation of Clause IV:

*To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry.*

That was the *sole point* of the Labour Party.

The 1918 S.I.I.N.R.I. Constitution was created as a response to the specific circumstances of that time.

It was designed to secure *rewards* for the *sacrifices* and *privations* of the First World War – The Great War – and, as a nice little add-on, for the sacrifices and privations of the previous 800+ years.

That was the particular, unambiguous, clear-cut purpose of the Labour Party.

There is, *clearly*, a big difference between the Labour Party of 1918 S.I.I.N.R.I., and the Labour Party of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century S.I.I.N.R.I..

The original Fabians of the S.I.I.N.R.I. 1880s and '90s and of the Edwardian era, if they came back now, would be standing agape and aghast, holding their heads in their hands, and groaning – ‘This is NOT... AT ALL... what we had in mind...’<sup>122</sup>

Now, the Labour Party never talks of *wealth creators* – as did, for example, Tony Benn or Jimmy Reid or Arthur Scargill.

The Labour party is no more than a re-branding and a reincarnation of the old Claimants Union.

The TUC regarded this organization, concocted by the Socialist Worker’s Party, as a collection of deadbeats and parasites, and would have nothing to do with it.

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<sup>122</sup> See Lucassen, Leo, *A Brave New World: The Left, Social Engineering, and Eugenics in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. See also: Jonathan Freedland, “Eugenics: the skeleton that rattles loudest in the left’s closet”, *The Guardian*, 17<sup>th</sup> Feb’ 2012; and Paul, D, “Eugenics and the Left”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 567-590.

Jeremy Corbyn's Labour Party was *not* a return to *old* Labour.

For *Old* Labour, Corbyn and Starmer's people were regarded as being the *dregs* of society – the *dregs of humanity*. And this was the position of the original Fabian Society.<sup>123</sup>

#### 16.2.2.1:

Hogarth's *Gin Lane*, and *Marriage A-la-Mode*, and *A Rake's Progress* were intended as *warnings* – not as *eulogies* to the *decadent* and the *dissolute*.

The works of Dickens were intended as warnings – not as *celebrations* of *depravity* and *cesspit degeneracy*.

There's a big difference between the pre-WW1 intellectual Left, and what passes for an intellectual now.

The original Fabians didn't want to *tolerate* or propagate those dregs of society – the *burdens* on society – they wanted to *get rid* of them! They regarded them as *sewer filth*!

And this was *generally* the position of the pre-World-War-I intellectual Left.

H. G. Wells, G. B. Shaw, Bertrand Russell, Keynes, *et al.* were of the same mind.

If the original Fabians had got their way, James O'Brien *wouldn't exist*!

The *Old* Labour man wasn't *begging* for alms, or *pleading* for *charity* – He was *demanding* a *deserved share* of the *wealth he created*.

#### 16.2.2.2:

As we have seen (4.5 above), the original motto was Mill's:

*The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection ... The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised*

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<sup>123</sup> James O'Brien, Angela Rayner, Shelagh Fogarty, Darren Adam, Ashley Tabor-King, David Baddiel, "Alf" Dubs, Steven Kupakwesu Bush: Not at all what Beveridge had in mind.

*over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others ...*

*In the part that merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.*

That is: 'You can do what you want, *as long as it doesn't harm anyone else.*'

*But this is no longer the motto.*

Now the motto is changed to:

'The *decadent* and the *dissolute* (as depicted in Hogarth's paintings and prints), the *depraved* and the *degenerate* (as described in the works of Dickens), the burdens on society warned against by the original Fabians – *Christ's people* – *have the right to do whatever the hell they want.*

'They have the right to inflict themselves on everyone else, and *everyone else is obliged, has a duty to tolerate them, to put up with them, to indulge them.*'

As Rawls puts it in his *A Theory of Justice*, 1, 1:

*Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.*

Suicidal!

Education (*sic*) policy, the judicial system, foreign policy, the alms trade, and the rest S.I.I.N.R.I. is this new maxim in action.

This isn't the programme for a new, sunnier age of mutual aid and mutual respect: "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" (Mao Tsetung, *On*

*the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*, VIII). It is a plan of attack for *one* group against *another*.

The plan of attack for the *decadent* and the *dissolute*, the *depraved* and the *degenerate*: The sewer filth of the earth – Christ’s People.

It has nothing to do with “Unity”.

There’s no ‘pulling together’.

The burden-*ed* are being *pulled down* by the burden-*some*.

The *response* to CoViD-19 was this new maxim in action.

The self-abasement and self-flagellation provoked by George Floyd was this new maxim in action:

*All just suicidal, insane Christian charity by another name.*

Strip it of the natural magic of its poetic colouring, and we see what it amounts to, we’ll see the *purpose* of it.

We see all of the four abuses of language listed by Thomas Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, 1, 4 (see ejaculation 6.3.1).

#### 16.2.2.3:

The Labour Party is no longer concerned with placing the fruits of industry with the industrious.

Now, the Labour Party represents the dregs of society; the dregs of humanity: the filth, the vermin – the *decadent* and the *dissolute*, the *depraved* and the *degenerate* – Christ’s people.

The Labour party’s purpose *now* is in debasing, degrading, humiliating the exalted; and in exalting and lauding and acclaiming the debased.

The Labour party is concerned with putting the First last and the Last first.

Very significantly, *Jeremy Corbyn did not reinstate Clause IV*.

#### 16.2.2.4:

Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme*:

*From each according to his ability, to each according  
to his needs!*

This is the motto, the axiom of the Labour Party, and it is  
diametrically opposed to Clause IV.

It is concerned in securing for the filth, the dregs of  
society, the full fruits of *someone else's* industry.

All this is no more than Christian charity (*Luke* 18, 22-23;  
*Acts*, 4, 34-35; *etc*).

Fair is foul and foul is fair.

Cutting down.  
Dumbing down.  
Levelling down.  
Dragging down.

Evil is presented – and is *accepted* – as good.

Exalting the poor in spirit.  
Consecrating them that mourn.  
Sanctifying the meek.  
Resisting not evil.  
Turning the other cheek.  
Loving our enemies.  
Blessing them that curse us.  
Doing good to them that hate us and use us:

Suicidal self-mutilation and self-abasement.

This is the Labour Party.

16.2.3:

It would be very easy – it would require no corkscrew  
twisting of the language – to state that the UnChristian Party  
advocates:

*The securing for the workers by hand or by brain  
the full fruits of their industry.*



The motto will be:

***To each according to his ability.***

16.3.1:

Conservative:

The question used to be: What the hell does the Labour Party stand for now?

We now know what Labour stands for.

The new question is: What the hell does the Conservative Party stand for!?

16.3.2:

“Thatcherism”, the slogans of Keith Joseph or Milton Friedman, was no more than 19<sup>th</sup> Century S.I.I.N.R.I. *laissez-faire* economic liberalism.

Business (enterprise, private enterprise, free enterprise, capitalism, the profit motive, trade; call it what you will) business works best with a more equal distribution of wealth/money/purchasing power.

There’s no point producing stuff if no one has money to buy it.

Business, Capitalism, the profit motive, by the nature of it, leads to greater wealth, more disposable income, spread amongst a greater number of people – That’s the problem.

Any “Swinish Multitude”, as it’s been called, wants just “Bread” and “Circuses”. Business, capitalism, the profit motive needs an ever-greater multitude of “Swine” throughout which to distribute, sell, the bread and the circuses.<sup>124</sup>

The *Vaiśya* and the *Śūdra*, the Bourgeoisie and proletariat were/are, in fact, one and the same thing. They don’t give a toss about the ‘starry heavens above and the moral law within’.

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<sup>124</sup> And see *Meng Tzu*, 4, b, 19, and 3, a, 4; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095b20; and Tacitus, *Agricola*, 21.

Their passions are the same. Their motivations are the same. Their desires are the same. Their ambitions are the same. They want the same thing – They just employ different methods in the getting of it.

In their *descriptions* rather than in their *prescriptions*, Karl Marx *and* Adam Smith were, essentially, correct. Their predictions were, essentially, in agreement. They were concerned to see some “Invisible Hand” (or mysterious material forces) provide the “Swinish Multitude” with their “Bread and Circuses”.

#### 16.3.3:

Thatcherism worked out in the way that the systems of Adam Smith and Karl Marx predicted, but not in the way envisaged by most Conservative voters.

The 19<sup>th</sup> Century S.I.I.N.R.I. economic liberalism forced the jettisoning of the “Social Conservatism” (what used to be called *responsible, independent, and respectable* – now transformed and distorted into pejorative terms) the “Social Conservatism” of the traditional Conservative voter.

Marx described the process and predicted the consequences:

*Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1:*

*The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and*

*political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.*

*The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into its paid wage labourers.*

*The bourgeoisie has torn away from the family its sentimental veil, and has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation.*

*The bourgeoisie has disclosed how it came to pass that the brutal display of vigour in the Middle Ages, which reactionaries so much admire, found its fitting complement in the most slothful indolence. It has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades.*

*The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.*

#### 16.3.4.1:

No one would claim that politicians are entirely honest in all of their pronouncements or declarations or assertions. Margaret Thatcher was a politician.

Set aside what Margaret Thatcher said.

Set aside what she *appeared* to say.  
Set aside what she *appeared* to believe.  
Set aside whatever any critic *told you* she said.  
Set aside whatever *impression* she gave.  
Set aside the *image* created by *Spitting Image*.

And look at what she *actually did*.  
Look at what *actually happened*.  
Look at the *outcome* of it all.

#### 16.3.4.2:

The social liberalism of Kenneth Clarke, David Cameron, Theresa May, or Boris Johnson was/is entirely predictable.

We feel that the likes of “Chris” Patten, “Ken” Clarke, Matthew Parris, David Cameron, Boris Johnson, Theresa May, *in reality* felt more at home with the Liberal Democrats or the preceding Liberal Party; but they joined (or infiltrated) the Conservatives because they knew that that was the only way they’d get elected to parliament.

The dumbing down in the education system (so-called “education” system) necessitated and inaugurated by the Wilson governments was carried on by the Thatcher governments.

The Thatcher governments forced the pandering to a “Swinish Multitude”.

The reliance on credit/debt – the living beyond one’s means, the cultivation of irresponsibility – was begun by the Thatcher governments.

And these were only accelerated by Tony Blair.

Blair realised that wealth couldn’t be redistributed unless it had first been created. He realised that business was best conducted; wealth was best created, by those with talent for business, not by civil servants or politicians. Blair and Corbyn were working towards the same end; they just disagreed as to the methods.

The wealth creators under Blair were left to create the wealth and were then taxed (robbed). The loot, the swag was then *redistributed* as alms (social security benefits).

Margaret Thatcher and the Blairites knew exactly what was happening;  
And they knew exactly what they were doing.  
The whole process – believe it or not – conformed to the Marxist schema.

16.3.4.3:

David Cameron... How the hell he got into Oxford is a mystery. He said he's against all forms of discrimination. He seems not to know the meaning of the term.

Shouldn't we discriminate in *favour* of the *good* and discriminate *against* the *bad*!?

Anything else would be suicide.

We discriminate in favour of qualified gas fitters, and against bogus gas fitters.

We discriminate in favour of qualified laser eye surgeons, and against bogus laser eye surgeons.

We discriminate in favour of qualified (authorized or approved) child minders, and against bogus (dodgy) child minders.

What the hell could be a more *sensible* alternative?

16.3.4.4:

No one puts in *60 hours-a-week* because they want to land at the same level as someone who's put in *just 20 hours*.

No one spends *any* time studying because they want to land at the level they'd land if they'd spent *no* time studying.

No one does *something* because they want to end at the level they'd end if they'd done *nothing*.

Walk down any street. Ask someone, without prompting or coaching, what they want. They might say something like:

'I want a Lamborghini.'

Or 'I want a Georgian place in Mayfair.'

Or 'I want to win £100,000,000 on the Lottery.'

Or 'I want Charlize Theron.'

You'll be hard-pressed to find anyone who says:  
'I want more equality.'

You'll hear this on the television or on the radio, but you'll be hard-pressed to hear it anywhere else.<sup>125</sup>

You'll need to interview a lot of people before you get the response:

'I want no more and no less than anyone else has, and I want everyone to have no more and no less than I have.

'I want everyone to have exactly the same amount of money in the bank as I have.

'I want everyone's home to have exactly the same area of floor space as mine.

'I want everyone – any Tom, Dick or Harry – to be paid as much money as I'm paid.

'I want everyone – any Tom, Dick or Harry – to have an equal right to perform laser eye surgery on me – the same right as has a qualified laser eye surgeon.'

You'll be hard-pressed to find anyone who says:

*'I just want to be level with everyone else.'*

16.3.5:

The traditional Conservative and the traditional Labour supporter have very much in common.

Both would benefit from a jettisoning of the misplaced, inappropriate, self-destructive, misapplied, sham/fraudulent *noblesse oblige*, and from an open-minded examination of the UnChristian position.

The traditional (real) Conservative and the traditional (real) Labour supporter is – like the *Un*-Christian – and contrary to the entreaties and coaxings of *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* – **judgemental**.

They have a strong sense of personal responsibility.

Surprised?

Puzzled?

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<sup>125</sup> And see Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, 1, 2, pp. 26-27, para 12.

Astounded?

16.4:

And the “Greens”?:

A dispassionate *acceptance* of the value of logic; and a *jettisoning* of the romanticism and the sentimentality and the Christian charity and the Christian ascetism would put any “Environmentalism” on the right path.

A willingness to tackle Jonathan Porritt’s “taboo” subject would be a step in the right direction.

16.5:

And the liberal/Liberal?:

Likewise, a dispassionate *acceptance* of the value of logic; and a *jettisoning* of the romanticism and the sentimentality and the Christian charity and the sham/fraudulent sanctimonious donning of *noblesse oblige* – the *de haut en bas* affectations – would put any “liberal/Liberal” on the right path.

The “Bleeding-Heart liberalism”: The ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity resembles that older practice, by the Royal households, of employing and exhibiting dwarfs. They were engaged to make the royal personages appear bigger, more impressive, more important.

The customary ostentatious show of – or the *appearance* of – humanitarian magnanimity is very much the *dominant les nains* strategy by inconsequential nonentities to make themselves appear big and important. They make themselves at least *feel* bigger by bestowing charity on those who are, or are assumed or said to be, *even lower down the scale than themselves*.

A re-reading, a rediscovery, a reappraisal of Mill’s “liberalism” might be a step in the right direction.

16.6:

And the lost, unreachable rest can ♪♪ off back to Christ.

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 3, 10, 34:

*It is vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving  
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.*

## 17. Prospects for Success.

Like Malthus, we may suspect that the evil is gone too far to be remedied?

Not so.

If the *Brahmania* and the *Kshatriya* (φιλόσοφος βασιλιάς? φύλακες, φύλαξ?) resumed their proper affiliation, the evil could be remedied in *less than a fortnight*.

How could those with no *θυμός* – the poor in spirit, they that mourn, the meek – defend themselves against those with an abundance of it?<sup>126</sup>

It could even be argued that failure – if there were a renaissance, a revitalization, a resurgence of the proper affiliations – failure would be *logically impossible*.<sup>127</sup>

## 1. First Things Last.

One chooses dialectics only when one has no other expedient ... Dialectics can only be a *last-ditch weapon* in the hands of those who have no other weapon left.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*,  
“The Problem of Socrates”, 6.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> And see Plato, *Republic*, 375b-c; Aristotle, *Politics*, 1254b, 16-25.

<sup>127</sup> And see Plato, *Crito*, 43c – 44a.



1.1:

This manifesto is not *entirely* pointless; but it might seem odd that anyone ostensibly invoking Callicles or Meno would produce it.

It could be used as a point of reference for researchers.

But that's about it.

Thersites was eloquent – because he *needed* to be.

And we'd like the reader to recall Aristotle, *Politics*, 1329b35:

*It is true indeed that [political institutions] and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. ...*

*We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply what has not.*<sup>129</sup>

Hence our copious quoting from the classics.

We'd expect triangles to have three sides on September 12<sup>th</sup> just as on April 17<sup>th</sup>.

We'd expect apples to fall down rather than up on December 30<sup>th</sup> just as on January 2<sup>nd</sup>.<sup>130</sup>

Even those, *swell'd with wind*, who've taken the *shallowest draughts* from the *Pierian Spring* would not say, 'Oh, but *in this*

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<sup>128</sup> And see Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [idea, appearance], 1, 62.

<sup>129</sup> And see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1179a17-21; and Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 551.

<sup>130</sup> And see Plato, *Meno*, 81d.

*day and age*, apples ought to fall up rather than down, and triangles ought to have four sides.’ (!)<sup>131</sup>

How far the unavoidable scepticism can be divided into ontological scepticism, epistemological scepticism or teleological scepticism – or in what proportions they are combined – must be a question for another place. Nevertheless, it’s often forgotten that although scepticism seems to be self-defeating, it also seems to defeat its negation:

*Why* do *x*?

Why *not* do *x*?<sup>132</sup>

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1, 1, 5:

*If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.*

*ibid.* 1, 1, 6:

*’Tis of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him.*

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 415:

*Reason is the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.*

But there are the Christian passions and the *Un*-Christian passions.

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<sup>131</sup> And see Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 1065; and Simplicius, *Physics*, 145, 27.

<sup>132</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.51; and Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., p. 127.

1.2.1:

‘By what *right* did Xerxes invade Greece?’

Our socialism *does not* mean mob rule.

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

Alexander didn’t justify his cutting of the Gordian Knot. He didn’t seek or need permission to conquer the Persian Empire.

By what right does an apple fall down rather than up?

Whose permission does a triangle need to have three sides?

Thersites was eloquent – because he *needed* to be.

We’ll leave the reader to work out what **e80 25vs5e e8nn** means.

1.2.2:

To hammer the point home:

David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 244:

*It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.*

*Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries further, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.*

*Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the instrument of*

*pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.*

*It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account.*<sup>133</sup>

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 610:

*Describe the aroma of coffee. – Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking? – But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?*

*Lun yü*, 17, 19:

*The Master said, 'I am thinking of giving up speech.'*

*Tzu-kung said, 'If you did not speak, what would there be for us, your disciples, to transmit?'*

*'What does Heaven ever say? Yet there are the four seasons going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Heaven ever say?'*

G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, 1, 7:

*Definitions which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is something complex.*

*You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms,*

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<sup>133</sup> And see Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a15-b21; and Hesiod, *Theogony*, 939-942.

*then you can no longer define those terms. They are simply something which you think of or perceive, and to any one who cannot think of or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known ...*

*And so it is with all objects, not previously known, which we are able to define: they are all complex; all composed of parts, which may themselves, in the first instance, be capable of similar definition, but which must in the end be reducible to simplest parts, which can no longer be defined.<sup>134</sup>*

*Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad, 3, 6:*

*Then Gārgī Vākaṇavi asked. 'Yāgñavalkya,' she said, 'everything here is woven, like warp and woof, in water. What then is that in which water is woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In air, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then is air woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of the sky, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of the sky woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of the Gandharvas woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of Āditya, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of Āditya woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of Kandra, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of Kandra woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of the Nakṣhatras, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of the Nakṣhatras woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of the Devas, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

*'In what then are the worlds of the Devas woven, like warp and woof?'*

*'In the worlds of Indra, O Gārgī,' he replied.*

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<sup>134</sup> And see *Kena Upanishad*, 1-3; and Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.522.

*In what then are the worlds of Indra woven, like warp and woof?’*

*In the worlds of Pragāpati, O Gārgī,’ he replied.*

*In what then are the worlds of Pragāpati woven, like warp and woof?’*

*In the worlds of (The Ultimate), O Gārgī,’ he replied.*

*In what then are the worlds of (The Ultimate) woven, like warp and woof?’*

*Yāgñavalkya said: ‘O Gārgī, Do not ask too much, lest thy head should fall apart. Thou askest too much about a deity about which further questions cannot be asked. Do not ask too much, O Gārgī.’*

*After that, Gārgī Vākaknavī held her peace.<sup>135</sup>*

Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 4, 11, 10:

*It is folly to expect demonstration in everything;*

*Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting.*

*He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.*

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1012b:

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<sup>135</sup> And see *Vedānta-Sūtras*, 2, 3, 28; and *Dao De Jing*, 1, 1; and *Chāndogya Upanishad*, 1, 8, 4-6.

*If truth be nothing other than the assertion of what it is falsity to negate, then it is impossible that all things can be false, since one half of the pair of contradictories must be true. Indeed these arguments themselves fall victim to the very difficulty about which their defenders are always canting. They effectively destroy themselves. For if anyone says that all things are true then he is making even the negation of his own claim true, so that his own statement in turn is not true (that is, after all, what its negation asserts), while if anyone says that all things are false, then he is making his own claim false.*

*And if the first claimant excepts the contradiction of his claim on the grounds that it alone is not true and the second excepts his own claim as not being false, nevertheless they still require an infinite number of statements to be true and false, since the statement that says that the true statement is true is true and so on ad infinitum.*

Zhuangzi (Guo Xiang):

*There is a beginning.  
 There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning.  
 There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning  
 to be a beginning.  
 There is a being.  
 There is a nonbeing.  
 There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing.  
 There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning  
 to be nonbeing.  
 Suddenly there is being and nonbeing.  
 But between this being and nonbeing, I don't really  
 know which is being and nonbeing.  
 Now I have just said something.  
 But I don't know whether what I have said has  
 really said something or whether it hasn't said something.*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 265:

*Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary)  
 that exists only in our imagination. A dictionary can be*

*used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up only in the imagination? –*

*“Well, yes; then it is a subjective justification.” –*

*But justification consists in appealing to something independent. –*

*“But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don’t know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Isn’t it the same here?” –*

*No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct.*

*If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the first memory?*

*(As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true).<sup>136</sup>*

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006a:

*There are some who, as we said, both themselves assert that it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be, and say that people can judge this to be the case. And among others many writers about nature use this language. But we have now posited that it is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be, and by this means have shown that this is the most indisputable of all principles. Some indeed demand that even this shall be demonstrated, but this they do through want of education.*

*Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. For it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration).*

*But if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what*

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<sup>136</sup> And see Wittgenstein, *The Brown Book*, 1, 17.



*principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.*

Kurt Gödel, *On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems*, Propositions IX and XI:

*In all [the considered] formal systems ... there are undecidable problems of the restricted predicate calculus (i.e. formulae of the restricted predicate calculus for which neither universal validity nor the existence of a counter-example is provable) ...*

*If  $c$  be a given recursive, consistent class of formulae, then the propositional formula which states that  $c$  is consistent is not  $c$ -provable; in particular, the consistency of  $P$  is unprovable in  $P$ , it being assumed that  $P$  is consistent (if not, of course, every statement is provable).*

Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1008b:

*For why does a man walk to Megara and not stay at home, when he thinks he ought to be walking there?*

*Why does he not walk early some morning into a well or over a precipice, if one happens to be in his way?*

*Why do we observe him guarding against this, evidently because he does not think that falling in is alike good and not good?*

*Evidently, then, he judges one thing to be better and another worse.*

*And if this is so, he must also judge one thing to be a man and another to be not-a-man, one thing to be sweet and another to be not-sweet.*

*For he does not aim at and judge all things alike, when, thinking it desirable to drink water or to see a man, he proceeds to aim at these things; yet he ought, if the same thing were alike a man and not-a-man.*

*But, as was said, there is no one who does not obviously avoid some things and not others.*

*Therefore, as it seems, all men make unqualified judgements, if not about all things, still about what is better and worse.*

*And if this is not knowledge but opinion, they should be all the more anxious about the truth, as a sick man should be more anxious about his health than one who is healthy; for he who has opinions is, in comparison with the man who knows, not in a healthy state as far as the truth is concerned.*

Plato, *Parmenides*, 132d-135b-c:

*Nothing, then, can be like the form [pattern, idea] nor can the form be like anything else. Otherwise there will always appear a different form beyond the form; and if that is like anything, another still. And there will never be an end to the genesis of new forms as long as the form becomes like the thing that partakes of it. ...*

*"And yet," said Parmenides, "if someone, in turn, Socrates, after focusing on all these problems and others still, shall deny that there are forms of the beings and will not distinguish a certain form of each single thing, wherever he turns he'll understand nothing, since he does not allow that there is an ever-same idea for each of the beings. And so he will entirely destroy the power of dialogue. But you seem to me only too aware of this."*

*"That's the truth," he replied.*

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, 519:

*If you are obeying the order, for example, 'Bring me a book', you may have to check whether the thing you see over there really is a book, but then you do at least know what people mean by 'book'; and if you don't you can look it up, but then — you must know what some other word means. And the fact that a word means such-and-such, is used in such-and-such a way, is in turn an empirical fact, like the fact that what you see over there is a book.*

*Therefore, in order for you to be able to carry out an order there must be some empirical fact about which you are not in doubt. Doubt itself rests only on what is beyond doubt.*

*ibid*, 450:

*The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.*

Plato, *Meno*, 80d:

*But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know?*

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 37-46 (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.); pp. 125-126 (1<sup>st</sup> ed.):

*Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experience. For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (that is, to something in another region of space from that in which I find myself), and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer experience. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation. ...*

*Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. For neither coexistence nor succession could ever come within our perception, if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a priori. Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (successively). ...*

*The order and regularity in appearances, which we entitle nature, we ourselves introduce. We could never*

*find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there. For this unity of nature has to be a necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori certain unity of the connection of appearances; and such synthetic unity could not be established a priori if there were not subjective grounds for such unity contained a priori in the original cognitive powers of our mind, and if the subjective conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience, were not at the same time objectively valid.*<sup>137</sup>

A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Ch. 2, (iv):

*If our aim is never to succumb to falsehood, it would be prudent for us to abstain from using language altogether. Our behaviour might still be hesitant or misguided but it is only with the use of language that truth and error, certainty and uncertainty, come fully upon the scene. It is only such things as statements or propositions, or beliefs or opinions, which are expressible in language, that are capable of being true or false, certain or doubtful. Our experiences themselves are neither certain or uncertain; they simply occur. It is when we attempt to report them, to record or forecast them, to devise theories to explain them, that we admit the possibility of falling into error, or for that matter of achieving truth.*<sup>138</sup>

René Descartes, *Third Meditation*:

*When I will, fear, affirm or deny, I indeed conceive something as the object of the action of my mind, but I also add something else by this action to the idea that I have of the object; and of this class of thoughts, some are called volitions or affections, and the others judgements.*  
...

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<sup>137</sup> And see Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 3.031.

<sup>138</sup> And see *Dao De Jing*, 1, 23.

[One need not] *fear that falsity may be found in the affections or the will; for although I may desire things that are bad, or even things which never existed, it is nonetheless true that I desire them.*

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, “Of the influencing motives of the will”:

1. *Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every rational creature, 'tis said, is oblig'd to regulate his actions by reason; and if any other motive or principle challenge the direction of his conduct, he ought to oppose it, 'till it be entirely subdu'd, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there an ampler field, as well for metaphysical arguments, as popular declamations, than this suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of the former have been display'd to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceitfulness of the latter have been as strongly insisted on.*

*In order to shew the fallacy of all this philosophy, I shall endeavour to prove first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passion in the direction of the will.*

2. *The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas, or those relations of objects, of which experience only gives us information.*

*I believe it scarce will be asserted, that the first species of reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action. As its proper province is the world of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of realities, demonstration and volition seem, upon that account, to be totally remov'd, from each other.*

*Mathematics, indeed, are useful in all mechanical operations, and arithmetic in almost every art and profession: But 'tis not of themselves they have any influence.*

*Mechanics are the art of regulating the motions of bodies to some design'd end or purpose; and the reason why we employ arithmetic in fixing the proportions of numbers, is only that we may discover the proportions of their influence and operation.*

*A merchant is desirous of knowing the sum total of his accounts with any person: Why? but that he may learn what sum will have the same effects in paying his debt, and going to market, as all the particular articles taken together.*

*Abstract or demonstrative reasoning, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects; which leads us to the second operation of the understanding.*

3. *'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect.*

*Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it.*

*'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience.*

*It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us.*

*Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this*

*connexion, it cannot be by its means that the objects are able to affect us.*

*4. Since reason alone can never produce any action, or give rise to volition, I infer, that the same faculty is as incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion.*

*This consequence is necessary.*

*'Tis impossible reason cou'd have the latter effect of preventing volition, but by giving an impulse in a contrary direction to our passion; and that impulse, had it operated alone, wou'd have been able to produce volition. Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse; and if this contrary impulse ever arises from reason, that latter faculty must have an original influence on the will, and must be able to cause, as well as hinder any act of volition.*

*But if reason has no original influence, 'tis impossible it can withstand any principle, which has such an efficacy, or ever keep the mind in suspense a moment.*

*Thus it appears, that the principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only call'd so in an improper sense.*

*We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason.*

*Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.*

*As this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary, it may not be improper to confirm it by some other considerations.*

*5. A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification.*

*When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high.*

*'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent.*

6. *What may at first occur on this head, is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion.*

*According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, 'tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable:*

*First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist.*

*Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects.*

*Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.*

*'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.*

*'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.*

*'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.*

*A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation.*

*In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.*

7. *The consequences are evident.*

*Since a passion can never, in any sense, be call'd unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chooses means insufficient for the design'd end, 'tis impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions.*



*The moment we perceive the falsehood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition.*

*I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases.*

*I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir'd good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos'd effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me.*

8. *'Tis natural for one, that does not examine objects with a strict philosophic eye, to imagine, that those actions of the mind are entirely the same, which produce not a different sensation, and are not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception.*

*Reason, for instance, exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion; and except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtleties of the schools, scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness. Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first view and appearance.*

*Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds:*

*Either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such.*

*When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falsehood. Their nature and principles have been suppos'd the same, because their sensations are not evidently different.*

9. *Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same*

*kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty.*

*When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself.*

*When I am immediately threaten'd with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion.*

*10. The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: 'Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them.*

*In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposition of the person.*

*What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho' we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire.*

*From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.*

Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation* [idea, appearance], "On the Primacy of the Will in Self-Consciousness":

*The Will, as the thing-in-itself, constitutes the inner, true, and indestructible nature of man ...*

*The Will is the primary and substantial thing; the intellect, on the other hand, is something secondary and additional, in fact a mere tool in the service of the Will,*

*which is more or less complete and complicated according to the requirement of this service ...*

*[Nature provides] evidence of the complete difference between the Will and the intellect, and demonstrates the former's primacy and the latter's subordinate position.*

*The intellect grows tired; the will is untiring ... All knowing is associated with effort and exertion; willing, on the contrary, is our very nature, whose manifestations occur without any weariness and entirely of their own accord ... The Will alone is αὐτόματος ["Self-moving"].*

Parmenides, the "Hexameter Poem", Fr. 8, 5-21:

*[It] never was nor will be, since [It] is now, all together, one, continuous.*

*For what birth will you seek for [It]?*

*How and whence did [It] grow?*

*I shall not allow you to say nor to think "from not being": for it is not to be said nor thought that [It] is not; and what need would have driven [It] later rather than earlier, beginning from the nothing, to grow? Thus [It] must either be completely or not at all.*

*Nor will the force of conviction allow anything besides [It] to come to be ever from not being.*

*Therefore Justice has never loosed her fetters to allow [It] to come to be or to perish, but holds [It] fast.*

*And the decision about these things lies in this: [It] is or [It] is not. But it has in fact been decided, as is necessary, to leave the one way unthought and nameless (for it is no true way), but that the other is and is genuine.*

*And how could "what is" be in the future?*

*How could [It] come to be? For if [It] came into being, [It] is not: nor is it if [It] is ever going to be in the future.*

*Thus coming to be is extinguished, and perishing unheard of.*

Kena Upanishad, 1-2:

*By whom impelled soars forth the mind projected?  
 By whom enjoined goes forth the earliest breathing?  
 By whom impelled this speech do people utter?  
 The eye, the ear — what god, pray, them enjoineth?  
 That which is the hearing of the ear, the thought of  
 the mind, the voice of speech, as also the breathing of the  
 breath, and the sight of the eye! Past these escaping, the  
 wise, on departing this world, become immortal.  
 There the eye goes not;  
 Speech goes not, nor the mind.  
 We know not, we understand not how one would  
 teach it.  
 Other, indeed is It than the known,  
 And moreover above the unknown.  
 Thus we have heard of the ancients  
 Who to us have explained it.*

Gottlob Frege, *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, 90:

*To this day, scarcely one single proof has ever been  
 conducted on these lines [by producing a chain of  
 deductions with no link missing, such that no  
 step in it is taken which does not conform to  
 some one of a small number of principles of  
 inference recognised as purely logical]; the  
 mathematician rests content if every transition to a fresh  
 judgement is self-evidently correct, without enquiring into  
 the nature of this self-evidence, whether it is logical or  
 intuitive. A single such step is often a whole  
 compendium, equivalent of several simple inferences, and  
 into it there can still creep along with these some element  
 from intuition. In proofs as we know them, progress is by  
 jumps, which is why the variety of types of inference in  
 mathematics appears be so excessively rich; for the bigger  
 the jump, the more diverse are the combinations it can  
 represent of simple inferences with axioms derived from  
 intuition. Often, nevertheless, the correctness of such a  
 transition is immediately self-evident to us, without our  
 ever becoming conscious of the subordinate steps  
 condensed within it; whereupon, since it does not  
 obviously conform to any of the recognised types of logical*

*inference, we are prepared to accept its self-evidence forthwith as intuitive.*

Rig Veda, 10, 129, Nāsadiya:

*There was neither non-existence nor existence then;  
there was neither the realm of space nor the sky which is  
beyond. What stirred? Where? In whose protection?  
Was there water? Bottomlessly deep?*

...  
*Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it?  
Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation? The  
gods came afterwards, with the creation of this universe.  
Who then knows whence it has arisen?*

*Whence this creation has arisen – perhaps it formed  
itself, or perhaps it did not – the one who looks down on  
it, in the highest heaven, only he knows – or perhaps he  
does not know.*

Bertrand Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Ch.11:

*There is a common impression that everything we  
believe ought to be capable of proof ... But let us imagine  
some insistent Socrates, who, whatever reason we give  
him, continues to demand a reason for the reason. We  
must sooner or later, and probably before very long, be  
driven to a point where we cannot find any further  
reason, and where it becomes almost certain that no  
further reason is even theoretically discoverable ... And  
the same holds for other logical principles. Their truth is  
evident to us, and we employ them in constructing  
demonstrations; but they themselves, or at least some of  
them, are incapable of demonstration ...*

*When a certain number of logical principles have  
been admitted, the rest can be deduced from them; but the  
propositions deduced are often just as self evident as those  
that were assumed without proof.*<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Unsurprisingly, all those ‘intoxicated’ by their ‘little learning’ know, or think they know about logic is the syllogism or, and which is more likely, whatever impression Mr Spock gave regarding the subject. But anyone

1.3:

Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, 8, 29:

*If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the whole  
face of the earth would have been changed.*

What went on in Mr and Mrs Princip's bedroom in Oblaj  
in October 1893 S.I.I.N.R.I. changed the whole world.

Reason is the slave of the passions, and can never pretend  
to any other office than to serve and obey them.

Thersites was eloquent – because he *needed* to be.

**'By what *right* did Xerxes invade Greece?' said  
Callicles.**

**And by what right did Alexander cut the Gordian  
Knot;**

**By what right did he conquer the Persian Empire.**

**And by what right does an apple fall down rather than  
up?**

**And by what right does a triangle have three sides?**

**Did Usain Bolt win his races because a United  
Nations committee, together with the holder of the Chair  
in Moral Philosophy at Corpus Christi, decided he  
*ought*?<sup>140</sup>**

In other words: *To each according to his ability.*

If Isaac Newton said 'Apples fall down towards the ground  
rather than up towards the sky; and they'll fall down rather  
than up whether you like it or not', would he be condoning a  
"Might is Right Philosophy"?

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wanting a better understanding of what the topic *is* may find a nice  
introduction in W. and M. Kneale's, *The Development of Logic*.

<sup>140</sup> Plato, *Hippias Minor*, 375d.

If he said 'If an apple falls on your head, it'll do it whether you consent or not', would he be condoning a "Might is Right Philosophy"?

Was Jesse Owens condoning, advocating, encouraging a "Might is Right Philosophy" when he forced Ralph Metcalfe into second place?

Was Ralph Metcalfe condoning, advocating, encouraging a "Might is Right Philosophy" when he forced Tinus Osendarp into third place?

Are we condoning, advocating, encouraging a "Might is Right Philosophy" in expecting fair rewards, accolades, honours for Jesse Owens?

Was Clause IV essentially a "Might is Right Philosophy"? –

To *secure* for the workers by hand or by brain *the full fruits of their industry*?

Einstein's brain, his mind, his intellect, was of great power. Are we condoning, advocating, encouraging a "Might is Right Philosophy" in our admiration of it?

## Appendices



## Appendix 1

### DEMOCRACY – THE FACTS

*‘Justice’ is a word in every man’s mouth, but most commonly with a very undetermined, loose signification; which will always be so, unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of.*

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 3, 11, 9.

1.1:

There’s a lot of talk about democracy.  
Politicians use the Democracy Card to trump everything.

But what *is* democracy?

It’s one of those questions that everyone thinks they know the answer to, but, on proper examination, finding words to describe the thing is as difficult as nailing down fog.

So what, exactly, *is* Democracy?

1.2:

According to the *Cambridge English Dictionary*, democracy is:

*The belief in freedom and equality between people, or a system of government based on this belief, in which power is either held by elected representatives or directly by the people themselves.*

Here, we are assailed by those abuses of language described by John Locke in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, “Epistle to the Reader”; abuses which he and the other Enlightenment figures set themselves against:

*Vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language, have long passed for mysteries of science; and hard and misapplied words, with little or no meaning, have, by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation, that it will not be easy to persuade either those who speak or those who hear them that they are but covers of ignorance, and hindrance of true knowledge.*

This *very undetermined, loose signification* of the CED definition is clearly no help in telling us what democracy *is* – in giving us a *distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of*.

It is – in fact – indistinguishable from the rhetoric of the soapbox rant.

Perhaps a United Nations description would be better? :

*Democracy is a universal value based on the freely expressed will of people to determine their political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their lives.*

Again, this is no better – confusions and vague and insignificant forms of speech.

It's soapbox ranting.

#### 1.3.1:

So let us come close to committing *argumentum ad verecundiam* and enlist David Hume.

Let's take the hint from his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 132:

*If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.*

Taking his maxim into account, what conclusion might a student of Hume; enquiring into the meaning of Democracy, draw from the following: 1.3.2 – 1.3.5?

Or, indeed, what might Sherlock Holmes – an enthusiast for scientific precision and matters of fact against sophistry – deduce in what follows?

### 1.3.2:

The turnout in the 1860 United States Presidential Election was 81.2%.

Abraham Lincoln ended up with 39.8% of that 81.2% (there were four candidates running).

So – 67.6824% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Abraham Lincoln.

The turnout in the 1960 United States Presidential Election was 62.8%.

John F. Kennedy ended up with 49.72% of that 62.8% (Richard Nixon won 49.55%).

So – 68.77548% of the electorate DID NOT vote for John F. Kennedy.

The turnout in the 2008 United States Presidential Election was 58.2%.

Barack Obama ended up with 52.9% of that 58.2%.

So – 69.2122% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Barack Obama.

In the USA, in 1859, millions of voters DID NOT say ‘I’m going to vote for Abraham Lincoln BECAUSE I want him to start a civil war.’

The turnout in the 1983 UK General Election was 72.7%.

The Conservatives ended up with 42.4% of that 72.7%.

So – 69.1752% of the electorate DID NOT vote Conservative.

The turnout in the 1945 General Election was (surprisingly) 72.8%.

Labour ended up with (even more surprisingly) 47.7% of that 72.8%.

So – 65.2744% of the electorate DID NOT vote Labour.

The turnout in the 1997 General Election was 71.3%.  
Labour ended up with 43.2% of that 71.3%.  
So – 69.1984% of the electorate DID NOT vote Labour.

The turnout in the 2000 London Mayoral Election was 34.43%.  
Ken Livingstone ended up with 39% (!) of that 34.43%.  
So – 86.5723% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Ken Livingstone.

The turnout in the 2008 London Mayoral Election was 45.3%.  
Boris Johnson ended up with 43.2 % of that 45.3%.  
So – 80.4304% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Boris Johnson.

The turnout in the 2016 London Mayoral Election was 45.3%.  
Sadiq Khan ended up with 44.2% of that 45.3%.  
So – 79.9774% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Sadiq Khan.

The turnout in the 2021 London Mayoral Election was 42.2%.  
Sadiq Khan ended up with 40% of that 42.2%.  
So – 83.12% of the electorate DID NOT vote for Sadiq Khan.

The turnout in the 2015 UK General Election was 66.4%.  
The SNP ended up with 4.7% (!) of that 66.4%.  
So – 96.8792% of the UK electorate DID NOT vote SNP.

### 1.3.3:

In the 2010 British General Election, millions of voters DID NOT say ‘I’m going to vote for the Conservatives BECAUSE I want them to go into coalition with the Liberal Democrats.’

In the 2001 British General Election, millions of voters DID NOT say ‘I’m going to vote Labour BECAUSE I want Tony Blair to authorise the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq,

kill hundreds of thousands of people (including hundreds of British soldiers), and cause chaos around the Middle East and trouble around the rest of the world.'

In the 1910 British General Election, millions of voters DID NOT say 'I'm going to vote Liberal BECAUSE I want Asquith to plunge us into a World War which will kill millions of people; including some of my relatives.'

The millions of people voting for the Labour Party in 1945 or voting for the Conservative Party in 1951 DID NOT intentionally, purposely vote for the consequences of the 1948 Nationality Act as worked out in the 1950s or 1960s. They DID NOT vote for the situation existing 70 years later.

In NO British General Election did millions of voters say 'I have read every Party Manifesto, and I wholeheartedly approve of EVERY policy of THIS party, and wholeheartedly disapprove of EVERY policy of EVERY OTHER PARTY.'

In NO British General Election did millions of voters say:

'We live in a REPRESENTATIVE democracy, so I'm going to vote for THIS candidate because he (or she) is one of the 650 most knowledgeable, most talented, and most rational people in the country.

'He (or she) can take whatever decision he (or she) likes, and do whatever the hell he (or she) wants to do because by placing my cross next to his (or her) name I am authorising him (or her) to take decisions on my behalf.

'I am authorising this candidate to ignore any promise made in his (or her) party's manifesto.'

#### 1.3.4:

In the 2017 British General Election, of the 32,161,991 crosses available, Theresa May got 37,718 of them.

THAT IS – 99.88272492209826% of the electorate DID NOT vote to make Theresa May a Member of Parliament.

In the 2017 British General Election, the turnout in the North East Fife Constituency was 71.3%. The winning candidate got 32.9% of that 71.3%.

So 76.5423% of the electorate in that constituency – the UK's most marginal – DID NOT vote for the winning candidate.

#### 1.3.5:

China affects Britain. No one in Britain voted for Liu Kun.

Saudi Arabia affects Britain. No one in Britain voted for Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.

No one in the UKofGBandNI voted for Leo Eric Varadkar. Yet, he had an influence on the electorate of the UKofGBandNI.

In October 1893, Petar and Marija Princip were *at it* in their bed, and conceived their son, Gavrilo.

Nobody alive in 1894 voted for it.

Nobody affected by it voted for it.

99.846153846% of the British electorate cannot vote for 649 of the 650 Members sitting in Parliament.

The electorate in, for example, the North East Fife Constituency cannot vote for the candidates in the Hackney South and Shoreditch Constituency. The electorate in the Hackney South and Shoreditch Constituency cannot vote for the candidates in the North East Fife Constituency. Nevertheless, the MPs in each influence and affect the lives of the electorates in both.

So, if we take as an estimate 61.82095% as the number not voting for the winning candidate in any Constituency in the 2017 British General Election, 99.94126299994126% of the British electorate DID NOT vote for that Parliament as constituted.

The authors of the U.S. *Declaration of Independence* have consequences *now*.

*No one alive in 2022 voted for it!*

*et cetera.*

#### 1.4.1:

So, looking through these examples of abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, and reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence – What might Sherlock Holmes conclude?

Perhaps he'd conclude that the *δημοκρατία*, the “Rule by the People” and the associated verbiage is an example of those very *undetermined, loose significations*: those *misapplied words, with little or no meaning that have been mistaken for deep learning, and height of speculation*:

*i.e.* *δημοκρατία* is not what it's made out to be?

#### 1.4.2:

We are still no closer to determining what “Rule” amounts to, who or what “The People” are, or how “Government” might be exercised. The homonyms seem to have a life of their own: one term taken to cover many things.

Nevertheless, as a working hypothesis, I think we can say that *Democracy* does *not* mean, “Rule by anyone and everyone who doesn't wear a powdered wig, doesn't listen to harpsichord music, and doesn't walk around holding a perfumed handkerchief under his nose.”

Sherlock Holmes might detect, as did Locke, the ‘frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible terms’ and ‘vague and insignificant forms of speech, and abuse of language’ and ‘misapplied words, with little or no meaning’.

Perhaps he'd detect confusion – an Orwellian fog designed to disguise rather than to describe or designate.

Perhaps he'd detect in *δημοκρατία* not a process or an institution but a rhetorical device of the Sophists, or a poetic device of the Rhapsodes?

He'd detect something as intangible as a four-sided triangle?

#### 2.1:

So, what, then – we're still no nearer a proper answer – is the ‘Democracy’ that the politicians are always canting about?

Taking into account our abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number, and reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence, democracy might be something like –

(1) *Rule by SOME people which 70-80% of the electorate didn't ACTIVELY vote FOR, or voted actively AGAINST.*

Alternatively (2): *Rule by 650 people that 0.0587370001%, or 0%, of the electorate voted FOR.*

Alternatively (3): *Rule by 650 people that 99.9412629999413%, or 100%, of the electorate DID NOT VOTE FOR.*

2.2:

It might occur to us to submit this new definition to the *Oxford English Dictionary*:

**Democracy: A system in which somewhere between 70% and 100% of an electorate put their crosses (including tacit or functional crosses) against the LESS BAD OPTION.**

**That is: They put their crosses at the side of the candidate they consider or hope MIGHT DO the LEAST BAD.**

**Not knowing the future, they *do not* VOTE FOR the candidate they KNOW will do the MOST GOOD.**

**They vote, on balance, to keep the WORST OUT.**

What is Democracy?

The current *Oxford English Dictionary* definition does no good:

*Government by the people; esp. a system of government in which all the people of a state or polity (or, esp. formerly, a subset of them meeting particular conditions) are involved in making decisions about its affairs, typically by voting to elect representatives to a parliament or similar assembly; (more generally) a system of decision-making within an institution,*



*organization, etc., in which all members have the right to take part or vote. In later use often more widely, with reference to the conditions characteristically obtaining under such a system: a form of society in which all citizens have equal rights, ignoring hereditary distinctions of class or rank, and the views of all are tolerated and respected; the principle of fair and equal treatment of everyone in a state, institution, organization, etc.*

And the *Pocket Oxford English Dictionary* states:

*1. a form of government in which the people can vote for representatives to govern the state on their behalf, 2. a state governed by elected representatives, 3. control of a group by the majority of its members.*

It would be a complement to say the OED's definition is vague or intangible. As we have seen – It's *just plain wrong*.

[Although, it does us the service of reminding us (as did W. V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in *From a Logical Point of View*) that *mere people* construct the Oxford English Dictionary, and any other dictionary. The words are *defined*, or synonymised, by *mere people*. 'Are we to appeal to the nearest dictionary, and accept the lexicographer's formulation as law? Clearly this would be to put the cart before the horse.' (Quine, *op. cit*).]

'*p* means *q*' should not mean 'Maurice Waite said *p* means *q*'.

So what's democracy?

3.1:

Now, let us turn to Ludwig Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*, 569:

*Language is an instrument. Its concepts are instruments. Now perhaps one thinks that it can make no great difference which concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and in inches as*

*well as in meters and centimetres; the difference is merely one of convenience. But even this is not true if, for instance, calculations in some system of measurement demand more time and trouble than it is possible for us to give them.*

If we view language as a *tool* for *doing* something, might this give us a *eureka* moment?

If we employ the *language as use*, *language as an instrument*, *strategy* – if we view Locke’s ‘abuses of language’ not as *mistakes* but as *part* of language, may we not be on the way out of the labyrinth?

If we employ the *language as use* format, and see in what Locke and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* regarded as problems to be got rid of – *as an aspect of language to be taken into account*, might we be relieved of the need to find a *reference* for any problematic term, and instead be freed to concentrate our efforts on the what the term may be *employed to do*?

The Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, I, 23 recognised that language may be *used* to perform many tasks:

*'But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences"...*

*'Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.*

*Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:*

*Giving orders, and obeying them –*

*Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements –*

*Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –*

*Reporting an event –*

*Speculating about an event –*

*Forming and testing a hypothesis –*

*Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and in diagrams –*

*Making up a story; and reading it –*

*Play-acting –  
 Singing catches –  
 Guessing riddles –  
 Making a joke; telling it –  
 Solving a problem in practical arithmetic –  
 Translating from one language into another –  
 Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.  
 – It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the  
 tools in language and of the ways they are used, the  
 multiplicity of the kinds of word and sentence, with what  
 logicians have said about the structure of language.*

We might be reminded of Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 16b33:

*Every sentence is significant ..., but not every sentence is a statement-making sentence, but only those in which there is truth or falsity. There is not truth or falsity in all sentences: a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false ... consideration of them belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or poetry.*

Words are used not only to convey facts, to transfer information, to impart knowledge, or to name objects.

Words can be used as offensive weapons, to stir an emotion, to provoke a reaction, and to cause damage.

Also, it's well worth reminding ourselves of Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 1, 4: "Of Speech":

*To [the valid uses], there are also four correspondent abuses.*

*First, when men register their thoughts wrong by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions that which they never conceived, and so deceive themselves.*

*Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for, and thereby deceive others.*

*Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will which is not.*

*Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with*

*teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of speech to grieve him with the tongue, unless it be one whom we are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.*

We will again be forced to risk the charge of *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

Perhaps we should really be asking: What function, what *task* is the word *democracy* used to *perform*?

Aristotle, *Politics*, 131b6-1319a24 seems to give us a clue:

*The many are more interested in making money than in winning honours. An indication of this is to be found in the fact that they put up with tyrannies in the old days and oligarchies at the present time ... To have the sovereign power to vote at elections and to scrutinise outgoing officials makes up for any deficiencies which those who have ambition may feel ... Also, the class of person which is constantly milling around the city and the market-place, can all too easily attend the assembly. On the other hand, in a population dispersed over the country; its members neither appear at meetings nor feel the need of such gatherings to the same extent. And, in addition, where the people are widely dispersed, it is easy to make a good democracy and polity: the population have their homes far away from the market-place.*

In other words – To give them [the electorate, the voters] the illusion of power, allow them to stick a cross on a bit of paper every four or five years; but make the actual day-to-day, year-after-year processes of government, the barriers-after-barriers, the Kafkaesque jumping through hoops processes and practicalities of government, so tortuous and tangled and labyrinthine that anyone who has to spend time making a living will be selected out and driven away.

That sounds much more like it!

3.2:

Democracy is an illusion.

*δημοκρατία* – The word is a rhetorical device.

It's as intangible as a four-sided triangle.

Some of us have known this for a long time. Since the “EU” Referendum, it should have become obvious to everyone.

4:

The consent, the approval, the blessing of each *individual* – whether employer, employee, academic, professional, small businessman, big businessman, retired, unemployed, unemployable or anyone else – carries about as much (*sic*) weight as the consent, or lack of it, of any individual living under Kim Jong-Un, Stalin, Mao, Pol Pot, Hitler, Nicholas II, or Henry VIII, or Xi Jinping.

## Appendix 2

### NOTES TOWARDS A COMMENTARY ON PASCAL, GAME THEORY, GYGES AND THE THATCHER-PRIOR-MAJOR COROLLARY

*As soon as we are shown something old in the new,  
we are calmed.*

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 551.

*'To think that I can contemplate such a terrible act  
and yet be afraid of such trifles,' he [Raskolnikov]  
thought, and he smiled strangely.*

*'Hm ... yes ... a man holds the fate of the world in his  
two hands, and yet, simply because he is afraid, he just  
lets things drift – that is a truism ...*

*'I wonder what men are most afraid of ... Any new  
departure, and especially a new word – that is what they  
fear most of all ...*

*'But I am talking too much. That's why I don't act,  
because I am always talking.*

*'Or perhaps I talk too much just because I can't act  
...'*

Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, p. 1.

*When a human being dreads nothing more than to  
find, on self examination, that he is worthless and  
contemptible in his OWN eyes, then every good moral  
disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best,  
and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and  
corrupting influences from breaking into the mind.*

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*,  
*Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason*, p. 161.

## Part I.

If you use the self-service checkout at the supermarket, and you put a bag of broccoli tops through as carrots, and you get away with it, you'll probably "try it on" again – if you think the assistants are slipshod or nonchalant enough to miss it.

This isn't just an amusing, possibly out of place little example that occurred to us, and we couldn't resist bunging it in.

The above has been formalised, intellectualised, abstracted, obscurified, and made respectable (transformed into an academic discipline) through something called *Game Theory*.

And the importance of Game Theory – and the associated *modelling* – was made clear to the General Public during the CoViD-19 excursion into madness.

What the hell sort of utilities or rational choice modelling or probability axioms or rational expectations or statistical insights or posterior probabilities or prior probabilities or NE or QRE or Bayesian calculations were taken into account or employed regarding the responses to CoViD-19!?

1.1:

To recap the relevant laws relating to self defence as outlined in *UPM*, 6.8.1 – 6.10:

Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 S.I.N.R.I. relates to our understanding of fraud:

*A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders.*

And the common law approach as set out in *Palmer v R* [1971] AC 814 and approved in *R v McInnes*, 55 Cr App R 551:

*It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he does ... what is reasonably necessary.*

These principles apply for the purposes of self-defence, defence of another, defence of property, prevention of crime, lawful arrest.

According to *R v Williams (G)* 78 Cr App R 267 and *R v Oatbridge*, 94 Cr App R 367, questions concerning the reasonableness of the force used can be answered on the basis of the facts as they were honestly believed to be.

*Palmer v R* 1971 AC 814 is clear regarding the reasonableness of force used:

*If there has been an attack so that self defence is reasonably necessary, it will be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action. If [a jury] thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessary, that would be the most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken...*

Moreover, Section 76(5A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 S.I.N.R.I. allows *disproportionate* force to be used in certain circumstances.

According to *R v Deana*, 2 Cr App R 75, there is no rule in the existing law to say that a person must wait to be struck first before they may defend themselves.



According to section 76(6) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 S.I.I.N.R.I., failure to retreat when attacked and when it is possible to do so, is not evidence that a person was not acting in self defence.

Also, from *R v Rashford* [2005] EWCA Crim 3377:

*The mere fact that a defendant went somewhere to exact revenge from the victim did not of itself rule out the possibility that in any violence that ensued, self defence was necessarily unavailable as a defence.*

The reader will see the relevance.

If words or misrepresentations that can incite riots, cause bankruptcies, instigate economic collapses, begin wars – that can *cause loss to another, or expose another to risk of loss* – cannot justify *such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders*, or justify the recognition that [the] person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of his defensive action – What can!?

Any UnChristian administration need make but small adjustments to the existing legislation.

#### 1.2.1.1:

The understanding that it is ‘good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself’, as stressed in *Palmer v R* [1971] AC 814 and approved in *R v McInnes*, 55 Cr App R 551, already operates in unpublicised domains – areas not usually associated or acknowledged or *approved* as being compatible with the principle.

Notwithstanding the pompous puff of our Parliamentarians, and again from *Palmer v R* [1971] AC 814 and also *R v Rashford* [2005] – Physical force is acceptable to the courts, and, by inference or implication, it’s acceptable to Parliament:

*If [a jury] thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought necessary, that would be the most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken ... The mere fact that a defendant went somewhere to exact revenge from the victim did not of itself rule out the possibility that in any violence that ensued, self defence was necessarily unavailable as a defence.*

In other words – “It” (see below) works *and* is acceptable.

Moreover, it isn’t difficult to wring out the nuances – philosophically – in those *attacks* and *necessities* and *defensive actions*;

And of those unpublicised domains – areas not usually associated or acknowledged or *approved* as being compatible with the principle – where those *attacks* and *necessities* and *defensive actions* operate and have operated.

#### 1.2.1.2:

Our task in this essay is to work out why, when the evidence suggests something shouldn’t be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don’t* do it.

#### 1.2.2:

##### **Let us face facts.**

It’s difficult, painful to admit; but let’s admit it.

Let’s say it –

##### **The IRA won.**

We may not want to believe it.

Nevertheless, the conclusion is inescapable.

*It* [“It”] worked.

##### **“It” work-s.**

1.2.3:

We needn't dig into *Halsbury's Laws* to find beer or shoe buckles.

History provides us with evidence; provides us with *precedents*.

We needn't look to the Law to give us permission to expand the authorizations in an UnChristian way.

The precedents – important things in law – exist; and *dazzlingly*.

1.3.1.1:

James Prior, Margaret Thatcher's Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the early 1980s, said in a BBC Northern Ireland documentary on the 29th of September 2014:

*Violence probably does work, it may not work quickly and may not be seen to work quickly, but in the long run, one has to look back and say it did work.*

Norman Tebbit, whose wife was paralysed in the Brighton bombing, said:

*I have no sympathy for those who declared the war but having said all that, one way or another, a ceasefire was achieved and to that extent, it was a price that was worth paying.*

This was not some gutless capitulation by Jeremy Corbyn and Ken Livingstone, or by The Socialist Worker's Party and the Angry Brigade – *It was a surrender by John Major's Conservative Government.*

The very important question here is – Do James Prior and Norman Tebbit's declarations contravene the anti-terrorism legislation?

UK Public General Acts 2006, c. 11, Part 1; Encouragement etc. of terrorism:

*Encouragement of terrorism:*

*(1) This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by [a reasonable person] as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement [to some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published,] to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.*

*(2) A person commits an offence if—*

*(a) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement; and*

*(b) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he —*

*(i) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences; or*

*(ii) is reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences.*

*(3) For the purposes of this section, the statements that are likely to be understood by [a reasonable person] as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences include every statement which —*

*(a) glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and*

*(b) is a statement from which ... members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circumstances.*

*(4) For the purposes of this section the questions how a statement is likely to be understood and what*

*members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer from it must be determined having regard both –*  
*(a) to the contents of the statement as a whole;*  
*and*  
*(b) to the circumstances and manner of its publication.*

Is the broadcaster – in this case the BBC – and/or James Prior and/or Norman Tebbit committing an offence by making:

A statement that is likely to be understood by [a reasonable person] as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement [to some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published,] to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences?

James Prior plainly, clearly and blatantly stated that IRA violence worked.

Norman Tebbit plainly, clearly and blatantly stated that IRA violence turned out to be a good thing.

The broadcaster blatantly made the statements available to the public.

It could be easily argued that the broadcaster and/or James Prior and/or Norman Tebbit did not *intend*:

Members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism or Convention offences.

However, it could be just as easily argued that they were:

Reckless as to whether members of the public [would] be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences.

It could, possibly, be argued that the broadcast does not:

*Glorify* the commission or preparation  
(whether in the past, in the future or generally)  
of such acts or offences.

Nevertheless, it could be easily argued that the statements  
were statements:

From which ... members of the public  
could reasonably be expected to infer that  
[their statements glorify] conduct that should  
be emulated by them in existing circumstances.

The:

Contents of the statement as a whole; and  
... the circumstances and manner of its  
publication.

How could these affect how a statement is likely to be  
understood other than as a contravention of the anti-terrorism  
legislation?

To rephrase our original question:

Why is the broadcaster and/or James Prior and/or  
Norman Tebbit *not* committing an offence by publishing and  
making the statements?

Why, in fact, were they not *slung into prison*!?

Unavoidably – and unsurprisingly – that mysterious entity,  
the “Reasonable Person” enters the scene.

More on this later.

#### 1.3.1.2:

On the 10<sup>th</sup> of April 1992, the IRA blew up the Baltic  
Exchange. It was the biggest detonation on mainland Britain  
since World War II. It killed three people, and injured 91  
others.

On the 24<sup>th</sup> of April 1993, the IRA blew up Bishopsgate. One person killed, and 44 injured.

Sometime between the 10<sup>th</sup> of April 1992 and the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1994, John Major's Conservative Government surrendered.

They gave up the charade and surrendered.

*They gave in.*

On the 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1994 the Provisional IRA announced a three-day "temporary cessation of hostilities" to run from Wednesday the 6<sup>th</sup> to Friday the 8<sup>th</sup> of April.

On Wednesday the 31<sup>st</sup> of August, the Provisional IRA announced a "cessation of military operations".

This was a strange cessation.

It wasn't a ceasefire –

So what the hell *was* it?

On the 9<sup>th</sup> of February 1996, a truck bomb was detonated at Canary Wharf in London's Docklands. Two people killed; more than 100 injured.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1996, the IRA detonated a massive truck bomb that demolished a large area of Manchester city centre.

On the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1998 – four months after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement – the car bombing in Omagh killed 29 people and injured some 220 others.

It was the deadliest single terrorist incident of the IRA campaign in Northern Ireland.

And everyone ignored the fact that the naked emperor's knob was dangling in front of their noses.

#### 1.3.2.1:

And now we know that – despite all of her pompous puff about not talking to terrorists – Margaret Thatcher's representatives had been in talks with the IRA throughout the 1980s.

According to an account published in the *Guardian* (18<sup>th</sup> of March 2008), a Londonderry businessman, Brendan Duddy, and a series of MI5 and MI6 officers conspired to allow clandestine communications between the Labour and Conservative governments and the IRA leadership between 1973 and 1993.

*The Guardian* tells us:

*It is very hard for democratic governments to admit to talking to terrorist groups while those groups are still killing innocent people. Luckily [!] for this process, the British government's back channel to the Provisional IRA had been in existence whenever required from 1973 onwards.*

The surreptitious link was used to negotiate an IRA ceasefire in the mid-1970s; again during the first IRA hunger strike in 1980; and in the stages leading to the surrender of 1994.

Despite her public denunciations, Margaret Thatcher gave her personal approval to these meetings.

In one of her final acts before being deposed as Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, after consultations with MI5, allowed Peter Brooke, the then Northern Ireland secretary, to talk to the IRA through the secret “back channel”.

Regardless of Thatcher’s ostentatious rhetoric about never talking to terrorists, she also authorised talks in the same year that her friend and close colleague, Ian Gow, had been murdered.

According to *The Guardian* (16<sup>th</sup> of October 1999):

*A former official concluded, 'It is rather ironic that it was Thatcher who gave the go-ahead, given her ferocious language at the time'.*

1.3.2.2:



And corroboration, if we needed it, was given in the program, *The MI5 Spy and the IRA: Operation Chiffon*, broadcast on BBC 2 in March 2023.

A written summary, *MI5 spy reveals secret 'unauthorised' IRA talks*, was published on the BBC web site on Saturday 25<sup>th</sup> of March:

*An MI5 spy who helped bring peace to Northern Ireland by defying orders, has broken his silence to the BBC.*

For this read: "A one-time member of MI5 who was instrumental in the surrender of the Conservative Government to the IRA has broken his silence to the BBC."

The rest of the report reads:

*He has revealed he met IRA leaders in March 1993, despite talks being called off by the British government after IRA bombs killed two young boys in England.*

*What he said in that meeting encouraged them to declare the ceasefire and move towards the process that eventually led to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.*

*The BBC's Peter Taylor has been trying to find the spy for almost 30 years.*

*He has discovered that what the spy said during the talks was not authorised by the British government.*

*The minutes of the meeting had been published by Sinn Fein - the IRA's political wing - in 1994. They allege that the spy said: "The final solution is union... this island will be as one."*

*"Those words are so controversial and so important," says Taylor in a BBC documentary The MI5 Spy and the IRA: Operation Chiffon.*

*"To Unionists such words would be seen as the ultimate betrayal."*

*The journalist says he wanted to hear what was actually said from the spy's own lips, but to do that he would have to track him down.*

*It is extremely rare to hear an MI5 officer talk about a top-secret operation like this. Its codename was*

*“Chiffon” and it was designed to get the IRA to call a ceasefire and embrace the political process.*

The reader will note that the point was not to convince the IRA to *surrender*, but just to *declare* a ceasefire.

The report continues:

*“It was a seminal meeting that I believe in the long term culminated in the Good Friday Agreement 25 years ago,” the veteran reporter says in the documentary.*

*Set up in 1991, Operation Chiffon worked as a secret back channel of communication between the leaders of the IRA and the British government. By then the conflict had caused more than 3,000 deaths.*

*Taylor discovers that the spy was known to the IRA as “Fred” but his real name is Robert.*

*In the documentary, Robert reveals to Taylor that his face-to-face talks with the IRA on 23 March 1993 had not been authorised by the British government.*

The reader will have noticed that ‘had not been authorised’ does not mean ‘had been expressly forbidden.’

The report continues:

*“I was... on my own, dealing at one remove with the IRA’s leadership in the most crucial matter affecting Irish and probably British politics. I knew I had to succeed, and only consistency and patience would achieve this.” He said that for years, he felt guilty for doing what he did.*

*“Yes, I misled the prime minister so I misled the Queen as well. It was a hard and really very unpleasant thing to have on your conscience. I felt very alone.”*

*The IRA had just carried out a bomb attack in Warrington, injuring 50 people and killing two children aged three and 12. It put an end to the British government’s willingness to engage with the IRA, and the secret meeting was called off at the last minute by then-prime minister John Major.*

The reader will have noted that the Warrington bomb put only a *temporary* end to any meetings. The point is that *a secret*

*meeting, confirming the Conservative Government's willingness to engage with the IRA had been arranged.*

The report continues:

*But Robert had received a previous message from the IRA indicating they were shifting towards a political rather than military way forward and was worried that by not turning up for the meeting, the embryonic peace process would be put in jeopardy.*

*"I had all sorts of thoughts going through [my mind]. A concern that I was going against my own government and the Queen," Robert tells Taylor in the documentary.*

*After hours spent soul-searching in the countryside south of Stormont, the spy resolved to go ahead, defying his boss John Deverell, the head of MI5 in Northern Ireland who had ordered him not to go.*

*Senior republicans Martin McGuinness and Gerry Kelly were at the meeting, representing the leadership of the IRA and Sinn Fein. It lasted around three hours and took place in Londonderry at the home of Brendan Duddy, a nationalist businessman passionate about peace. The republicans had expected Robert to be accompanied by his boss, and were suspicious that he had turned up alone.*

Note the name Brendan Duddy.

*"McGuinness did most of the talking. It was not a friendly interrogation," says Robert.*

*During the meeting, Martin McGuinness asked what the intentions of the 'Brits' were, believing that Robert was speaking as he had presented himself – "the British Government Representative".*

*Robert said that the goal was ultimately to unify Ireland.*

*His exact words were noted down in minutes written by Gerry Kelly:*

*"The final solution is union. It is going to happen anyway. The historical train - Europe - determines that. Unionists will have to change. This island will be as one."*

To emphasize: *“The final solution is union. It is going to happen anyway. The historical train - Europe - determines that. Unionists will have to change. This island will be as one.”*

The report continued:

*Robert admits to Taylor that he had no authority to make such a claim and that it flew directly in the face of British government policy.*

*“Those words are so incendiary and so important because they appeared to indicate that, behind the scenes, the British government had a policy - that it wasn't divulging at this stage - to work towards Irish unity,” explains Taylor.*

Yes! Quite!

*His words appeared to have resonated with the Republicans.*

*Speaking to Taylor in February, Gerry Kelly described the meeting as a “seminal moment”.*

*“We were told he was a British government representative. We just took him at his word - that's what he was there for, he would represent the British government and therefore we were talking to the British government,” says Mr Kelly.*

*“It gave hope there was a possibility of a peace process through meaningful talks. I think he [Robert] did the right thing and he can claim to have been part of history,” he said.*

*During a break in the meeting, the host Brendan Duddy said to Robert, “I think you've got them, I think they're going to call a ceasefire.”*

*Robert did not come clean with the British government about the meeting but the secret came out later in the year [28 Nov 1993], when The Observer ran a front page scoop revealing that a British official had secretly met the IRA three days after the Warrington bomb.*

*“This is hugely embarrassing because the government had repeatedly denied that there had been any face to face meetings with the IRA,” Taylor explains in the documentary.*

To emphasize: *“This is hugely embarrassing because the government had repeatedly denied that there had been any face to face meetings with the IRA”*.

The report continued:

*Robert resigned from the Service.*

*Taylor tracked him down more than 20 years ago. The trail to Robert was triggered by a signed inscription in a book the spy presented to Brendan Duddy. The inscription - a quote in Latin from Virgil's Aeneid - translated, read: “Perhaps one day it will be good to remember these things,” and was signed “Robert”.*

*But, following MI5's rules, he lied to Taylor, and said he wasn't the man he was looking for. But in 2021, the journalist received a letter.*

*“Dear Mr Taylor: You will no doubt be surprised to hear from me after so many years. For a variety of reasons I could now give you some background which might fill in some gaps - were you so interested. Two of the leading figures from my involvement have died [Martin McGuinness and Brendan Duddy] the third, crucially for me, is my wife. It is her death, which puts me in a position to contact you. Yours sincerely Robert [surname withheld]”*

*“I'd like what I did to be remembered,” he tells Taylor in the documentary.*

So, in other words, and seeing past the Orwellian euphemisms – which are to be expected – in this BBC reporting:

*“Robert” did just what the Conservative Government were going to do before the inconvenience of the Warrington bomb.*

That is: surrender, but beg the IRA to allow that Conservative Government to save face.

And also – and very importantly – as insurance for any later development: The Conservative government, or any other government, could hold to the lie that violence doesn't work. Unfortunately, James Prior let slip that it did and does.

1.3.2.3:

Most, if not all, of the Tory grandees at that time had had an ‘old fashioned’ education (and “Robert” was familiar with Virgil), and if challenged in private – and after a few drinks – they’d probably have invoked the Platonic concept of the “Noble Lie” (*Republic*, 414b), or even the Buddhist concept of Skill in Means (*Saddharmapundarikasūtra*, 3).

But the Thatcher-Major contrivance was *just* a *lie*.

It sprang from no more than an ignoble and craven Hobbesian desire for order and security and quiet at *all* and *any* cost.

### 1.3.3:

And “It” worked again – this time just the *threat* of it:

The so-called “Backstop” was introduced to make certain there would be no border – sometimes called a Hard Border – between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

Article 16 of the Northern Ireland Protocol (Safeguards) stated:

*1. If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate safeguard measures. Such safeguard measures shall be restricted with regard to their scope and duration to what is strictly necessary in order to remedy the situation. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.*

*2. If a safeguard measure taken by the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, in accordance with paragraph 1 creates an imbalance between the rights and obligations under this Protocol, the Union or the United Kingdom, as the case may be, may take such proportionate rebalancing measures as are strictly necessary to remedy the imbalance. Priority shall be given to such measures as will least disturb the functioning of this Protocol.*

According to the Institute for Government web site, the provision is/was:

*A safeguarding mechanism within the Ireland/Northern Ireland protocol, the arrangements agreed as part of the UK–EU Withdrawal Agreement to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland.*

*Article 16 allows either party to undertake unilateral safeguarding measures if the protocol leads to “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade”.*

*Any actions taken must be “restricted with regard to their scope and duration” and must only address the issues explicitly identified. Article 16 is not intended to allow either party to suspend provisions of the protocol permanently or in their entirety.*

As to its invocation:

*The protocol does not define what constitutes either “serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties”, or a “diversion of trade”, so there remains ambiguity around threshold for taking unilateral measures.*

*Before undertaking such measures, however, the parties should follow the process set out in Annex 7 of the protocol. First, if either party is “considering” unilateral action, it must notify the other party as soon as possible through the UK–EU Joint Committee, the body established by the Withdrawal Agreement to oversee its implementation. At this point, both parties should enter negotiations to find a solution — though no measures can be implemented during the initial one-month negotiating period. If negotiations fail and either party adopts unilateral measures, the other may take “proportionate rebalancing measures”. All measures are subject to review every three months, although each party can also request a review at any point.*

The crucial phrase here is “serious societal difficulties”.

The societal difficulties were/are the IRA and their works.

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement removed security checkpoints from the Irish border. This was a *de facto* uniting of the regions of the island of Ireland. Thus, it was a *de facto* concession to the IRA's demand for Irish unity.

The implicit threat was that a return to that Hard Border would reignite IRA violence.

To all intents and purposes, a British government threatened its electorate with renewed IRA violence if the UK left the EU and of necessity set up a border between the Republic and the North.

And to add insult to injury, Leo Varadkar (who represented less than 16% of the Southern Irish electorate) and Michelle O'Neill (who represented less than 19% of the Northern Irish electorate) kindly assented to act as couriers for the PM/MP/IRA communiqué.

Holding their metaphorical fizzing bombs in their hands, they insinuated – 'If you don't do what we want, you know what'll happen.'

So much for the lies about not giving in to violence.

And everyone turned a blind eye to the fact that the naked emperor's knob was dangling in front of their noses.

#### 1.4.1.1:

And "It" is working for another group.

It can't be seen to work quickly, but, little by little, concessions and appeasements and allowances are being made.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 2017, Khalid Masood drove a car into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge. The attack killed four. More than 50 were injured. A police officer was stabbed to death attempting to protect MPs.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 2017, the Manchester Arena was bombed. 24 people were killed. 139 were wounded. More than half were children. The bomber was Salman Ramadan Abedi, a 22-year-old of Libyan ancestry.



The 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2017 saw the London Bridge terrorist attack. Eight people were killed and 48 were injured.

In the usual faux sombre address outside Number 10, Theresa May gave the usual sophistical rhapsodising about enough being enough, and claimed that there had been “far too much tolerance of extremism” in the UK, and promised to step up the fight against Islamist terrorism.

She proclaimed: ‘Everybody needs to go about their lives as they normally would. Our society should continue to function in accordance with our values. But when it comes to taking on extremism and terrorism, things need to change.’

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of March 2017, one day before the attack on Parliament in which a police officer was stabbed to death attempting to defend the place, Prime Minister Theresa May, in a gushing elegy on the death of Martin McGuinness, *Passionated*:

*‘Throughout his life, Martin [!] showed great determination (sic), dignity (sic) and humility (sic) and it was no different during his short illness.*

*‘He was a passionate (sic) republican who worked tirelessly for peace (sic) and reconciliation (sic) and for the re-unification (sic) of his country.*

*‘But, above all, he loved his family and the people of Derry (sic) and he was immensely proud of both.’*

This about a man, an IRA leader, who was responsible for the deaths of hundreds if not thousands.

So much for taking on terrorism in order to defend “our” values. It was clear to anyone who had listened to her Martin McGuinness speech that her “Enough is Enough” rhetoric was as empty as Thatcher’s denunciation of the IRA.

The Prime Minister heroically proclaimed that the ideology of Khalid Masood, Salman Abedi, and the London Bridge attackers:

*... is one of the great challenges of our time. But it cannot be defeated through military intervention alone.*

It soon became clear that her annexes to military intervention were to be the usual concessions and appeasements and allowances.

Little by little.

It's the old Thatcher-Prior-Major doctrine.

"It" cannot be seen to work quickly, but the outcome is the outcome.

In July 2016 Sajid Javid was appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government – A couple of months after Sadiq Khan became London Mayor.

On the 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2018 – the year following Westminster, London Bridge, and Manchester – Javid was appointed Home Secretary.

And other appeasements were performed.

Others were installed in positions of prominence and influence – In the Civil Service, in the professional bodies and trades unions and at the heads of charities, in the "Media". For the Orwellian "Positive Discrimination" or "Diversity" read "appeasement" (the 2010 Equality Act prevents us from going into detail here).

#### 1.4.1.2:

And affront followed affront.

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of May 2022, a Westminster City Council Election took place.

The Labour Party took 31 seats, and gained control of the Council from the Conservative Party with 23 seats.

There was mostly just a 30–35% turnout per ward.

The Labour Party was given 48% of that 30-35% (58,395 votes).

The Conservative Party was given 40.3% (49,067 votes).

The Labour Party gained little more than 15% of the possible vote.

That is – around about 85% of the electorate DID NOT vote Labour.

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of May 2022 – one month after the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Khalid Masood's Westminster attack, a few days before the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Salman Abedi's Manchester attack

– the Westminster City Council web site made the announcement:

*Westminster City Council is to vote in its first Muslim Lord Mayor [Hamza Taouzzale] and its youngest ever incumbent.*

Little by little.  
Indulgence by indulgence.  
Concession by concession.  
Appeasement by appeasement.

Resisting not evil.  
Turning the other cheek.  
Loving one's enemies.  
Blessing them that curse us.  
Doing good to them that hate us and use us.

And the heroic defenders of freedom and justice "Media" were completely silent.

1.4.1.3:

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 4:

*A civilization that can succumb to its vanquished enemy must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it.*

The assassination of David Amess MP by Ali Harbi Ali on the 15<sup>th</sup> of October 2021, was met not by the rallying cry to clamp down on other Ali Harbi Ali's, but by the call to outlaw any serious criticism of those *appointed priests and teachers* – or MPs or commentators or the rest.

In "PM urged to enact 'David's law' against social media abuse after Amess's death", *Guardian*, Monday 18<sup>th</sup> of October 2021, Jessica Elgot wrote:

*Boris Johnson is facing calls to enact "David's law" to crack down on social media abuse of public*

*figures and end online anonymity in the wake of the killing of Sir David Amess ...*

*Mark Francois, who described Amess as one of his closest friends and his political mentor, vowed he would dedicate his time in parliament to overhauling the rules governing social media.*

*Francois told the Commons he was “minded to drag Mark Zuckerberg [CEO of Facebook] and Jack Dorsey [CEO of Twitter] to the bar of the house ... if necessary kicking and screaming so they can look us all in the eye and account for their actions or rather their inactions that make them even richer than they already are”.*

*He said MPs should radically toughen up the pending online harms bill to prevent trolls and other abusers hiding behind pseudonyms. “In the last few years David had become increasingly concerned about what he called the toxic environment in which MPs, particularly female MPs, were having to operate in,” Francois said ...*

*Francois, the MP for Rayleigh and Wickford, which neighbours Amess’s Southend West constituency, added: “I suggest that if we want to ensure that our colleague didn’t die in vain, we collectively all of us pick up the baton, regardless of our party and take the forthcoming online harms bill and toughen it up markedly.*

*“Let’s put, if I may be so presumptuous, David’s law on to the statute book, the essence of which would be that while people in public life must remain open to legitimate criticism, they can no longer be vilified or their families subject to the most horrendous abuse, especially from people who hide behind a cloak of anonymity with the connivance of the social media companies for profit.”*

If Mark Zuckerberg or Jack Dorsey are to be held responsible for David Amess’s murder, what’s the status of Ali Harbi Ali?

So, in other words, we shouldn’t criticise whoever failed to stop the murder or who created the situation where murder was deemed an option – we should instead *stop any criticism* of

whoever failed to stop the murder or who created the situation where murder was deemed an option.

#### 1.4.1.4:

In “MI5 missed ‘significant opportunity’ to prevent Manchester Arena bombing: Report into atrocity concludes failure to act on intelligence means ‘realistic possibility’ to stop plot was missed”, *Guardian*, 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 2023 – following the inquiry into the 2017 Manchester Arena attack by Salman Ramadan Abedi – Josh Halliday wrote:

*The failure of MI5 to act swiftly on crucial intelligence was a “significant missed opportunity” to take action that might have prevented the Manchester Arena attack, a long-awaited report on the atrocity has concluded.*

*Sir John Saunders, the chair of the Manchester Arena inquiry, said there was a “realistic possibility” that investigators could have thwarted the plot had they acted more decisively on two key pieces of evidence in the run-up to the bombing.*

*In the final report of the inquiry, Saunders said it was “quite impossible” to say definitively whether any different action would have prevented the blast.*

*Nevertheless, he concluded that there was a “significant missed opportunity to take action that might have prevented the attack”.*

*The families of some of the victims described the findings as “devastating” and “unacceptable,” adding: “As a result of these failures, at the very least, a real possibility of preventing this attack was lost. This is a devastating conclusion for us.”*

...

*The report describes how an MI5 officer based in north-west England told the inquiry that it was “struggling to cope” with the workload in 2017, when the agency was running about 500 investigations into suspected Islamist extremists with a further 5,000 active subjects of interest.*

...

*It previously concluded that Abedi should have been identified as a security threat on the night of the*

*attack, and that at least two victims could have survived had they not faced an “interminable” wait for treatment by the emergency services.*

Surprise surprise!!!

Those heroic champions of freedom, truth and justice – the commentators, the columnists, the journalists: the “Media” – busied themselves in moving responsibility from Salman Ramadan Abedi to MI5 and the emergency services.

Why wasn’t the question asked – How the hell have we got into the position where MI5 has been overwhelmed by those 5,000 ‘active subjects of interest’, including 500 suspected “Islamist” extremists!?

1.4.1.5:

“It” works.

Alice in Wonderland.  
The Mad Hatter’s Tea Party.

On the 29<sup>th</sup> of March 2023, Humza Yousaf was installed as leader of the Scottish National Party.

Little by little.  
Indulgence by indulgence.  
Concession by concession.  
Appeasement by appeasement.

And the heroic defenders of freedom and justice “Media” were completely silent.

And other representatives of the oppressed were installed on the front benches of the Conservative Government (the 2010 Equality Act prevents us from going into detail here).

They were not of the same variety of oppressed as were Hamza Taouzzale or Humza Yousaf or Salman Abedi –

But they’d *do*.

Little by little.  
Indulgence by indulgence.  
Concession by concession.

Appeasement by appeasement.  
“Compromise” by compromise.

1.4.1.6:

And another of Mill’s degenerate *appointed priests and teachers*, Myriam François – a Franco-Irish journalist, senior fellow at the Centre for Global Policy, research associate at the Centre of Islamic Studies (SOAS University of London), and founder of *We Need To Talk About Whiteness* website – Myriam François wrote in *Time* magazine on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 2020:

*Since the 2015 terrorist attacks against the staff of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, France has faced a succession of such attacks by Muslim extremists, the most recent of which saw the October beheading of teacher Samuel Paty and the murder of three people at Notre Dame Basilica in Nice. The country has been left grappling with the question of why it has become such a target and how it ought to respond.*

And her proposal is to clamp down on, to outlaw, any criticism of Islam:

*Days after the murder of Samuel Paty, France’s youth minister cut short a previously scheduled meeting with students to discuss religion because she was uncomfortable with the concerns being expressed around prejudice and islamophobia. We all know free speech is never absolute, it certainly isn’t in France where laws already regulate hate speech. But young people are not naïve. They can spot the hypocrisy of politicians who lecture them about free speech when it comes to accepting deeply disturbing caricatures, but won’t listen to their concerns around discrimination.*

*The state of free speech isn’t measured at the Elysée pulpit. It can be measured in the silencing of those who resist the government’s narrative over who is the blame for France’s long list of woes. But more broadly, the state of a nation’s freedoms can always be assessed at the margins. The specter of terrorism is a useful ploy to dismiss the increasingly punitive measures faced by French Muslims.*

Little by little.  
Indulgence by indulgence.  
Concession by concession.  
Appeasement by appeasement.  
“Compromise” by compromise.

James Prior:

*Violence probably does work, it may not work quickly and may not be seen to work quickly, but in the long run, one has to look back and say it did work.*

And those heroic defenders of freedom and justice journalists are completely silent.

5.4.1.7:

*Guardian* newspaper, the 7<sup>th</sup> June 2022; Helen Pidd, Jessica Murray and Andrew Pulver wrote:

“UK cinema chain cancels screenings of ‘blasphemous’ film after protests: Cineworld cancels all showings of *The Lady of Heaven* after branches were picketed by Muslim activists.” –

*A UK cinema chain has cancelled all screenings of a “blasphemous” film about the daughter of the prophet Muhammad after branches were picketed by Muslim activists.*

*Cineworld said it took the decision to cancel all showings of *The Lady of Heaven* to “ensure the safety of our staff and customers”. ...*

*A video circulating online showed the manager of Sheffield Cineworld telling protesters that Sunday night’s screening had been cancelled, to cries of “Allahu Akbar” (God is great).*

*5Pillars, a Muslim news site, tweeted a photo of what it said was “200 Muslims protesting against sectarian hate film *Lady of Heaven* outside Cineworld in Broad Street, Birmingham” on Sunday. ...*

*A screening in Bolton was cancelled after 100 protesters turned up at the local Cineworld branch. The chair of the Bolton Council of Mosques had urged the cancellation of the screening, saying the film was*



*“underpinned with a sectarian ideology and is blasphemous in nature to the Muslim community”.*

*More than 117,000 people have signed a petition to try to get the film removed from all UK cinemas.*

*A spokesperson from Cineworld said: “Due to recent incidents related to screenings of The Lady of Heaven, we have made the decision to cancel upcoming screenings of the film nationwide to ensure the safety of our staff and customers.”*

*Cineworld was due to screen the film in Bradford, Birmingham, Bolton, London (Ilford and O2 Greenwich), Glasgow Silverburn, Milton Keynes, Sheffield and Wolverhampton.*

*Vue, a rival cinema chain, still had screenings listed for London and the south-east on Tuesday. Vue did not respond to claims it had pulled the film from selected cinemas but a spokesperson said: “Vue takes seriously the responsibilities that come with providing a platform for a wide variety of content and believes in showcasing films of interest to diverse communities across the UK.*

*“Vue will only show a film once the BBFC (the independent British Board of Film Classification) has assessed and rated a film. The Lady of Heaven has been BBFC accredited and is on show in a number of our cinemas.*

*“Decisions about how long a film remains on show are taken on a site-by-site basis and based on a variety of commercial and operational factors.”*

*Malik Shlibak, executive producer of the film, told the Guardian cinemas should “stand up and defend their right to show films that people want to see”.*

*“I think cinemas are crumbling to the pressure, and taking these decisions to quell the noise,” he said, adding the production company had received dozens of messages from people who were trying to book tickets to see the film but not being able to.*

*“What we don’t support, and what we vehemently stand against, is what they’re trying to do, which is to censor others and dictate what we can and cannot watch in UK cinemas.*

*“They have no right to do so and it’s something very dangerous. The general population really need to be*

*aware of this and stand up to this, because it is infringing and putting in danger their freedom of speech.”*

And on the 5<sup>th</sup> of June, 2022, the Muslim Council of Britain responded to the release of, as they called it, a “divisive” film in British cinemas:

*A new film entitled ‘The Lady of Heaven’ has been condemned as divisive and sectarian by scholars across the rich traditions of Islam.*

*The MCB, which proudly represents affiliates from across the different schools of thought in our faith, supports those scholars and leaders who are advocating for greater unity and for the common good, as commanded by our Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).*

*The MCB has always advocated for respectful dialogue of intra-faith relations.*

*There are some – including many of this film’s supporters or those engaging in sectarianism in their response – whose primary goal is to fuel hatred.*

And their response climaxed, in **bold** type, with the rallying cry –

***We must not let them succeed.***

Where were those heroic champions of freedom, truth, and justice – the commentators, the columnists, the journalists: the “Media”?

Where were the heroic parliamentarians riding to defend “our” way of life; to defend those great traditions of free speech they keep telling us about?

Nothing.

Nothing happened.

Except concession.

“Compromise”.

Appeasement.

And – what was perhaps the worst of it – no one *expected* any better.

1.4.2:

Little by little.  
Indulgence by indulgence.  
Concession by concession.  
Appeasement by appeasement.  
“Compromise” by compromise.

“It” works.

It’s the old Prior-Thatcher-Major doctrine.  
“It” cannot be seen to work quickly;  
But the outcome is the outcome.

They wept.  
They lit candles.  
They proclaimed ‘I am Charlie Hebdo’.

And it became *de facto* illegal to criticise Islam.

**Which is what Chérif Kouachi and Saïd Kouachi wanted.**

And those heroic champions of freedom, truth, and justice  
– the commentators, the columnists, the journalists: the  
“Media”?

And Lee Rigby?

And 7/7?

“It” can’t be seen to work.  
But, little by little, the outcome is the outcome.

1.5.1.1:

In *The Lost World of the Suffragettes*, broadcast on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February 2012 on BBC Radio 4, Elizabeth Crawford (author of *The Women’s Suffrage Movement: A Reference Guide*, and *The Women’s Suffrage Movement in Britain and Ireland: A Regional Survey*)

said she ‘can’t help but sympathise’ with the suffragettes, but believed their methods were:

*... A rather dangerous way of going about things  
... We tend to underestimate the amount of damage  
that was done. At the time they wouldn’t have used the  
term terrorism, but with our experience of terrorism  
now, if one group is trying to coerce the state, I think we  
might view it rather differently.*

Therefore:

*The laws relating to coercion and terrorism (and the very meaning  
of those terms) are de facto malleable and vague and ambiguous  
enough to be interpretable depending and dependent on context?*

*The laws relating to coercion and terrorism apply to some people  
and not to others?*

*The laws relating to coercion and terrorism exist for the benefit of  
some, and to the detriment of others?*

The arguments regarding the bombing of Dresden, or regarding Menachem Begin’s involvement in the bombing of the King David Hotel and other terrorist acts are well rehearsed, so we won’t repeat these here.

But the reader will see what we’re getting at.

#### 1.5.1.2:

On the 28<sup>th</sup> of October 2021, Richard Adams wrote in the *Guardian*: “Sussex professor resigns after transgender rights row: Kathleen Stock announces resignation as university says ‘no substantive allegations of wrongdoing’ were made against her”:

*Kathleen Stock, the philosophy professor at the  
centre of a row over her views on gender identification  
and transgender rights, has announced her resignation  
from the University of Sussex.*

*Stock’s resignation comes three weeks after a  
protest by some students at the university’s Brighton*

*campus, which included posters and graffiti calling for her dismissal.*

*She has said she believes gender identity does not outweigh biological sex “when it comes to law and policy”, and that people cannot change their biological sex.*

*In an email to staff, Adam Tickell, Sussex’s vice-chancellor, said: “We had hoped that Prof Stock would feel able to return to work, and we would have supported her to do so.*

*“She has decided that recent events have meant that this will not be possible, and we respect and understand that decision.”*

So – she was silenced by a gang of Mill’s degenerates.

And the degenerate appointed preists and teachers – and journalists and MPs – were silent.

“It” worked again.

#### 1.5.2:

And this isn’t applied just on the stage of Hegel’s “World Historic Events”, or to Dostoevsky/Raskolnikov’s “Extra-Ordinary Men” (‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ *etc.*); it’s applicable – evidently – in the kitchen and in the bedroom as well!

Some people – certain *types* of people – can, literally, get away with murder.

On Friday the 7<sup>th</sup> of June 2019 the headline in the *Guardian* newspaper read:

“Sally Challen walks free as court rules out retrial for killing abusive husband.

“... Crown accepts guilty plea to manslaughter”:

The story was by Amelia Hill and Matthew Weaver.

In the following passage, we’d like the reader to ponder the real meaning, the intention, related to the context, behind the statements:

‘She suffered years of controlling and humiliating abuse.’

And;

‘Quashed her conviction and ordered a fresh trial in light of new evidence about her mental state at the time of the killing.’

And;

‘You killed him by reasons of diminished responsibility.’

And;

‘Our story has become the landmark case society needs to recognise the true severity of coercive control.’

And;

‘Challen walked free from court to applause from supporters.’

And;

‘Challen said she hoped the justice system would take abuse more seriously.’

And;

‘Don’t know they’re in a relationship of coercive control.’

And;

‘She said schools should teach children about coercive control.’

And;

‘The criminal justice system continues to discriminate against women who kill.’

And;

‘The prospect of a retrial was seen as a key test of new laws on domestic abuse and coercive control. The family say Richard Challen subjected his wife to decades of psychological abuse, which is referred to as coercive control under laws introduced in 2015.’

And;

‘Sally Challen moved out of the family home in 2009 but was said to still be emotionally dependent on her husband. When she discovered he had contacted another woman, she hit him more than 20 times with a hammer.’

And;

‘The appeal court was told she had two mental disorders at the time of the killing, and that her condition was likely to have been made worse by the coercive control.’

And;

‘Carolyn Harris, said Challen’s was a “landmark case for victims of coercive control”.’

Hill and Weaver’s story states:

*Sally Challen, who was jailed for life for killing her husband in a hammer attack following decades of emotional abuse, has walked free from court after a judge announced she would not face a retrial.*

*Challen, 65, was sentenced at the Old Bailey in London on Friday to nine years and four months – time already served – for the manslaughter of her husband, Richard.*

*Speaking at a press conference afterwards, she said: “My family have served my sentence with me. They have kept me going for a long and terrible nine years. I want also to thank my friends in and out of prison who have stood by me.”*

*Challen said she suffered years of controlling and humiliating abuse before she killed her 61-year-old husband in August 2010.*

*She was jailed for life for murder after a trial at Guildford crown court in 2011. In February this year the court of appeal quashed her conviction and ordered a fresh trial in light of new evidence about her mental state at the time of the killing.*

*Challen, of Claygate, Surrey, admitted manslaughter but pleaded not guilty to murder. She was due to face a new trial on 1 July, but at a hearing before Mr Justice Edis at the Old Bailey on Friday the prosecution said the crown accepted her plea to the lesser charge.*

*“Allowing full credit of one-third because it has always been your case that you killed him by reasons of diminished responsibility, that means you have already served an equivalent sentence and are therefore entitled by law to be released at once,” Edis said.*

*Challen’s son David tweeted: “As a family we are overjoyed at today’s verdict and that it has brought an end to the suffering we have endured together for the past nine years. Our story has become the landmark case society needs to recognise the true severity of coercive control.”*

*In a victim impact statement read to the court, Challen’s other son, James, said: “We have lost a father and we do not seek to justify our mother’s actions.” He said his mother “does not deserve to be punished further”.*

*Challen walked free from court to applause from supporters. Sitting next to her sons at the packed press conference, she said: “Many other women who are victims of abuse as I was are in prison today serving life sentences. They should not be serving sentences for murder but for manslaughter.”*

*She added: “I still love Richard and miss him dreadfully and wish that none of this had happened. I’m just so happy I can begin to live my life again. I have had major ups and major downs. Without the support of my family and my endless telephone calls to them at inappropriate times, I don’t know how I would have coped.*

*“It has been a really long road and at one point I didn’t see any light at the end of it. It’s wonderful to be*



*free and to be able to see my sons. I'm so grateful to them."*

*Challen said she hoped the justice system would take abuse more seriously. "I met many women in prison who shouldn't be there. Getting an appeal is very difficult. I was turned down on the first attempt. The justice system needs to listen," she said.*

*"A lot of the problem is that women don't know they're in a relationship of coercive control. It's family, friends and relatives who do see it. Somehow they have to speak to that person and convince them to leave. They don't seem to be able to break that tie. It's a very strong tie and the women are very vulnerable."*

*She said schools should teach children about coercive control, as boys as well as girls suffered from it. "They're damaged and it's damage done to them for the rest of their lives. Teachers also should be aware and look around their classrooms and make the children aware of what could happen."*

*David Challen said: "There's no shame in what we've gone through. This has exemplified how the criminal justice system continues to discriminate against women who kill. We have sought justice and understanding."*

*The prospect of a retrial was seen as a key test of new laws on domestic abuse and coercive control. The family say Richard Challen subjected his wife to decades of psychological abuse, which is referred to as coercive control under laws introduced in 2015.*

*Richard Challen was unfaithful throughout the marriage and frequently visited brothels. Sally Challen moved out of the family home in 2009 but was said to still be emotionally dependent on her husband. When she discovered he had contacted another woman, she hit him more than 20 times with a hammer.*

*The appeal court was told she had two mental disorders at the time of the killing, and that her condition was likely to have been made worse by the coercive control.*

*Justice for Women said it was fighting 10 other similar cases. Harriet Wistrich, the organisation's founder, said the CPS had a commitment and obligation to understand domestic violence, "but you*

*don't see it in practice. You see them going ahead as though they just want to win these cases. I would like to see them honour their commitments."*

*Wistrich said her organisation had written to the director of public prosecutions about the case and was yet to receive a response.*

*The shadow equalities minister, Carolyn Harris, said Challen's was a "landmark case for victims of coercive control".*

So,

In other words –

*Even the laws relating to murder are de facto malleable and vague and ambiguous enough to be interpretable depending and dependent on context.*

*Even the laws relating to murder apply to some people and not to others!*

*Even the laws relating to murder exist for the benefit of some, and to the detriment of others.*

This isn't applied just on the stage of Hegel's "World Historic Events", or to Dostoevsky/Raskolnikov's "Extra-Ordinary Men" ('One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' *etc*); it's applicable – evidently – in the kitchen and in the bedroom as well!

#### 1.5.3.1:

This malleability and vagueness and ambiguity isn't a shortcoming in the rhetoric of a *Guardian* newspaper article, it's fundamental to the legislation.

The Serious Crime Act 2015, section 76 (Domestic abuse) specifies/states:

*Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship:*

*(1) A person (A) commits an offence if –*

*(a) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive,*

*(b) at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected,*

*(c) the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and*

*(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B.*

*(2) A and B are “personally connected” if –*

*(a) A is in an intimate personal relationship with B, or*

*(b) A and B live together and –*

*(i) they are members of the same family, or*

*(ii) they have previously been in an intimate personal relationship with each other.*

*(3) But A does not commit an offence under this section if at the time of the behaviour in question –*

*(a) A has responsibility for B, for the purposes of Part 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (see section 17 of that Act), and*

*(b) B is under 16.*

*(4) A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if –*

*(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or*

*(b) it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.*

*(5) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) A “ought to know” that which a reasonable person in possession of the same information would know.*

*(6) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b)(i) A and B are members of the same family if –*

*(a) they are, or have been, married to each other;*

*(b) they are, or have been, civil partners of each other;*

*(c) they are relatives;*

*(d) they have agreed to marry one another (whether or not the agreement has been terminated);*

*(e) they have entered into a civil partnership agreement (whether or not the agreement has been terminated);*

*(f) they are both parents of the same child;*

*(g) they have, or have had, parental responsibility for the same child.*

*(7) In subsection (6) –*

*“civil partnership agreement” has the meaning given by section 73 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004;*

*“child” means a person under the age of 18 years;*

*“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989;*

*“relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996.*

*(8) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for A to show that –*

*(a) in engaging in the behaviour in question, A believed that he or she was acting in B’s best interests, and*

*(b) the behaviour was in all the circumstances reasonable.*

*(9) A is to be taken to have shown the facts mentioned in subsection (8) if –*

*(a) sufficient evidence of the facts is adduced to raise an issue with respect to them, and*

*(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.*

*(10) The defence in subsection (8) is not available to A in relation to behaviour that causes B to fear that violence will be used against B.*

*(11) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable –*

*(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or a fine, or both;*

*(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both.*

#### 1.5.3.2:

Similarly, the Crown Prosecution Service statement on controlling or coercive behaviour:

*‘Controlling or Coercive behaviour’ describes behaviour occurring within a current or former intimate or family relationship which causes someone to fear that violence will be used against them on more than one occasion, or causes them serious alarm or distress that*

*substantially affects their day to day activities. It involves a pattern of behaviour or incidents that enable a person to exert power or control over another, such as isolating a partner from their friends and family, taking control of their finances, everyday activities like what they wear or who they see, or tracking their movements through the internet or mobile phone use.*

The domestic abuse definition specifically states:

*Controlling behaviour is: a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependant by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behaviour.*

*Coercive behaviour is: an act or a pattern of acts of assaults, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.*

The CPS also gives an indication of what constitutes abusive behaviour:

*... Listing broad categories to capture the different types of abuse. These include:*

*Physical or sexual abuse;*

*Violent or threatening behaviour;*

*Controlling or coercive behaviour;*

*Economic abuse (see subsection (4));*

*Psychological, emotional or other abuse;*

*The Domestic Abuse Act also clarifies that it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.*

*In terms of economic abuse, it also clarifies that this can include:*

*‘any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to acquire, use, or maintain money or other property, or obtain goods or services.’*

The Domestic Abuse Act 2021 (UK Public General Acts 2021 c. 17. Part 1, Section 1) itself states:

*Definition of “domestic abuse”*

(1) *This section defines “domestic abuse” for the purposes of this Act.*

(2) *Behaviour of a person (“A”) towards another person (“B”) is “domestic abuse” if—*

*(a) A and B are each aged 16 or over and are personally connected to each other, and*

*(b) the behaviour is abusive.*

(3) *Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following—*

*(a) physical or sexual abuse;*

*(b) violent or threatening behaviour;*

*(c) controlling or coercive behaviour;*

*(d) economic abuse (see subsection (4));*

*(e) psychological, emotional or other abuse; and it does not matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.*

(4) *“Economic abuse” means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on B’s ability to—*

*(a) acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or*

*(b) obtain goods or services.*

(5) *For the purposes of this Act A’s behaviour may be behaviour “towards” B despite the fact that it consists of conduct directed at another person (for example, B’s child).*

(6) *References in this Act to being abusive towards another person are to be read in accordance with this section.*

(7) *For the meaning of “personally connected”, see section 2.*

So,

In other words –

1.5.3.3.1:

*Even the laws relating to murder are de facto malleable and vague and ambiguous enough to be interpretable depending and dependent on context.*

Sally Challen *was, according to the courts*, justified in beating her husband to death with a hammer because, in Sally Challen's opinion, her husband's behaviour had a "serious effect" on her because it caused her to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence might be used against her; *or* it caused her serious alarm or distress which had a substantial adverse effect on her usual day-to-day activities.

But the immediate justification was 'she discovered he had contacted another woman.'

This, under the Law, made it perfectly acceptable for her to 'hit him more than 20 times with a hammer.'

So, in other words:

She killed him because she felt like it.

And she got away with it because she couldn't control herself.

Her sense of responsibility was diminished because couldn't control herself because she was alarmed or distressed, and, by definition, she couldn't be guilty of murder because her sense of responsibility was diminished!

And we know that her sense of responsibility *must have been* diminished – because she killed him!!!

It's a kind of Catch 22 situation.

She can't be held responsible, or blamed, or punished – because no one knowing good or evil would beat her husband to death with a hammer!

She knew not what she did.

She had, in fact, not eaten of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.

**So she could beat her husband to death with a hammer and get away with it.**

1.5.3.3.2:

*Even the laws relating to murder* apply to some people and not to others!

According to the Crown Prosecution Service, controlling or coercive behaviour involves a pattern of behaviour or incidents that enable a person to exert power or control over another, such as isolating a partner from their friends and family, taking control of their finances, everyday activities like what they wear or who they see, or tracking their movements through the internet or mobile phone use.

But isn't this a pretty good description of the workings of government?

What is perfectly acceptable in – and is, in fact, necessary for – the effective workings of government is a justification for murder in an intimate or family setting?

According to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, Behaviour is “abusive” if it consists of any of the following:

Physical or sexual abuse;

Violent or threatening behaviour;

Controlling or coercive behaviour;

Economic abuse;

Psychological, emotional or other abuse;

And it doesn't matter whether the behaviour consists of a single incident or a course of conduct.

The “Economic abuse” means any behaviour that has a substantial adverse effect on one's ability to acquire, use or maintain money or other property, or obtain goods or services.

We're clearly not stretching our line of argument to breaking point.

This isn't the reasoning of a caricature 1960s, 19 year-old first-year Sociology student.

#### 1.5.3.3.3:

*Even the laws relating to murder exist for the benefit of some, and to the detriment of others.*

It is clear that all this is a corroboration of Callicles' observation – Plato, *Gorgias*, 483:

*Our laws ... are made, in my opinion, for the weaklings ... They are established ... in an endeavour*



*to frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand. They say that ambition is base and wrong, and that wrong-doing consists in trying to gain an advantage over others.*

This isn't applied just on the stage of Hegel's "World Historic Events" – to those against whom the litany of private virtues – modesty, humility, philanthropy and forbearance – must not be raised; or to Dostoevsky/Raskolnikov's "Extra-Ordinary Men" ('One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' etc); it's applicable – evidently – in the kitchen and in the bedroom as well!

Considering the Challen case – *in Law, precedents are important* – it's clear that the laws against murder exist for the benefit of some, and to the detriment of others:

*Matthew, 23, 11-12:*

*But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant.*

*And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased, and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.*

Exalting the poor in spirit.  
Exalting they that mourn.  
Exalting the meek.  
Humbling the Kings and destroying their names.  
Destroying their altars.  
Breaking down their images;  
And burning the images of their Gods with fire.  
Exalting the infantile ignorance of good and evil.  
Exalting the last.  
Declaring war on the first; to cut them down.

Declaring war on the lofty – the *proud* and lofty.  
Declaring war on the greatest.  
Binding up the brokenhearted.  
Proclaiming liberty to the captives.  
Opening up the prison to them that are bound.  
Heralding the day of vengeance to comfort all that mourn.  
Bringing down them that dwell on high; in the lofty city;  
Laying it low; even to the ground;

Bringing it even to the dust;  
Treading it down, with the steps of vermin, and the feet of  
scum.

*Therefore they will not refrain their mouths; they will speak in the  
anguish of their spirit; they will complain in the bitterness of their souls.*

We think we've made our point.

1.6.1:

From all of this, we're forced to one conclusion:

"It" works.

1.6.2:

Notwithstanding the pompous puff of our  
Parliamentarians – "It" worked, and it's working again.

1.7:

The remainers did us a favour.

From 2016 it became clear that what is called  
"Democracy" is, and always has been, an Orwellian fog  
designed to disguise rather than describe or designate. It is as  
intangible as a four-sided triangle.

Democracy is an illusion.

Some of us have known this for a long time.

Now, everyone is forced to accept the fact.

Our government is *as* legitimate as *were* the regimes of  
Charles I, King Louis XVI of France, or of Tsar Nicholas II; *as*  
legitimate as the regimes of Saddam Hussein, of Colonel  
Gaddafi, or of Kim Jong-un.

If you can't accept that now – *you never will*.

It is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must  
also say it as we ought. We know what's what regarding  
Parliament. We need say no more here.

## Part II.

### 2.1.1:

Our task in this essay is to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

So where do we go now?

What does this tell us to *do*?

What might this, perhaps, *permit* us to do?

We remind the reader:

John Stuart Mill gives us a hint – *some might say*.

Mill is often regarded as the Isaac Newton or Charles Darwin or Albert Einstein of liberal political philosophy. The following – from *On Liberty*, Part I – is taken as the guiding principle:

*In the part that merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.*

But the Mill-invokers conveniently overlook the contiguous passages:

*The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection ... The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others ...*

*Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time*

*when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one.*

2.1.2:

We'll look into Game Theory, but the reader'll probably guess –

We need really only to ask the question –

If you possessed Gyges' Ring of Invisibility – *what would you get up to?*

Here's the story – from Plato, *Republic*, 359b-360d:

*Now, that those who [respect the law] do so involuntarily and because they have not the power to [violate it] will best appear if we imagine something of this kind:*

*Having given both to [those who respect the Law] and to [those who don't] power to do what they will, let us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in the very act the [observers of the Law] and [those who defy it] to be proceeding along the same road, following their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only diverted into the path of [obedience] by the force of law.*

*The liberty which we are supposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as is said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian:*

*According to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of Lydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth at the place where he was feeding his flock.*

*Amazed at the sight, he descended into the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse, having doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature, as appeared to him, more*

*than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring; this he took from the finger of the dead and reascended.*

*Now the shepherds met together, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about the flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his finger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the ring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the company and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present.*

*He was astonished at this, and, again touching the ring, he turned the collet outwards and reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same result — when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when outwards he reappeared.*

*So he contrived to be one of the chosen messengers who were sent to the court; whereas soon as he arrived he seduced the queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took the kingdom.*

*Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the [respector of the law] put on one of them and [the derider of it] the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in [his reverence for the Law].*

*No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men.*

*Then the actions of the [respector of the Law] would be as the actions of the [derider of it]; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man [respects Law], not willingly or because he thinks that [it] is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely [ignore the Law], there he [ignores it].*

*For all men believe in their hearts that [a contempt and a disdain for the Law] is far more profitable to the individual than [its opposite], and he*

*who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right.*

***If you could imagine anyone obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer harm.***

In other words – and reminding ourselves of Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*, p.1. – ***‘Hm ... yes ... a man holds the fate of the world in his two hands, and yet, simply because he is afraid, he just lets things drift – that is a truism.’***

In other words – our reluctance to act – to do what *should* be done – springs solely from *fear of being caught and punished*. It springs solely from a fear of retribution.

If there were *no possibility* of our being caught and punished – if, like Gyges, we could become invisible and do whatever we want, *what would we get up to?*

No matter what we may tell ourselves – some ridiculous metaphysics involving Kant’s Categorical Imperative perhaps – What’s stopping us is just plain, unadorned, old fashioned *cowardice*.

#### 2.1.3.1.1.1:

Let’s be honest –

In normal, mundane, every-day situations:

If people want something, they weigh up the options and the risks.

If they think they can get away with something, they “try it on”.

And if they get away with it, they get away with it.

That is:

If you use the self-service checkout at the supermarket, and you put a bag of broccoli tops through as carrots, and you get away with it, you'll probably "try it on" again if think the assistants are slipshod or nonchalant enough to miss it.

*This isn't just an amusing, possibly out of place, little example that occurred to us and we couldn't resist bunging in.*

The above has been formalised, intellectualised, abstracted, obscurified, and made respectable (transformed into an academic discipline) by something called Game Theory.

It's a real-life corroboration of the celebrated Bayes' Theorem; and, as we will see, Nash Equilibrium, and Quantal Response Equilibrium theory.

The formalised springs from the mundane rather than the mundane from the formal.

If you get away with trying it on, you'll be more likely to try it on again.

The tale of Gyges' Ring is not an argument in favour of one course of action over another. Our task here is to remind the reader that the *choice* of one course over another is unlikely to be motivated by lofty philosophical enquiries.

So, game theory (or decision theory) will be instructive here.

#### 2.1.3.1.1.2:

Throughout what follows, we'd like the reader to bear in mind the decisions taken – or the games played – in response to the CoViD-19 experience, and also to the actions taken following the George Floyd campaign.

What were, or may have been, the Expected Utilities?

What were, or could possibly have been, probabilistic calculations?

How could Bayes's Theorem have been utilised?

How could Nash Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium be recognised in the manoeuvrings?

What might have been the “standard decision-theoretic constraints”?

What might have been the degrees of belief?

What could have been the “probability axioms”?

What was the “conditionalisation”?

What might it have told us about epistemic rationality?

What were the ‘errors in choice’ that Quantal Response Equilibrium allows for?

What was the probability that was a function of the utility difference between the chosen strategy and other strategies?

What was the response with higher expected rewards? The response with better prospects of outcome?

What were taken as the realistic limitations to rational choice modelling?

What were assumed to be any sub-population’s ‘rational expectations’ based on experience regarding the rational efficiency of other members of the population?

What statistical insights were employed when interpreting data?

The *Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure*, (Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang), tells us:

*Another necessary condition for the convergence to Nash Equilibrium is that all players must be completely rational.*

*However, numerous sociological studies have shown that such an assumption does not hold in practice.*

*Some players, for example, may not want or do not have the computational resources to find the strategy that maximizes their payoff.*

How might these observations be applied in explaining the CoViD-19 experience, and also to the actions taken following the George Floyd campaign?



Our task in this essay is to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

We'll whet the reader's appetite by employing a famous strategy adapted by Pascal.

#### 2.1.3.1.2:

Pascal's Wager is still of great influence and relevance – not just in the service of Christian apologetics, but also in its impact on various lines of thought: Decision theory, probability, epistemology, psychology, and moral philosophy.

It has provided a case study for attempts to develop infinite decision theories, the question of whether there can be pragmatic reasons for belief, and the supposed difference between theoretical and practical rationality.

It raises subtle issues about the extent to which one's beliefs can be a matter of the will, and the ethics of belief.

While addressing another problem (he was pondering the existence of God as understood by the Roman Catholic Church), Pascal, through his famous Wager (*Pensées*, 3, 233) gives us a clue.

A decision matrix in Pascal's example might be constructed thus:

	God exists	God does not exist
Wager for God	Gain all	Status quo
Wager against God	Misery	Status quo

We can employ the strategy in answering the broader question – To *do* or not to *do*:

To risk punishment or retribution for a greater good:

If we *do*, and we turn out to be vindicated, we will have won a very great reward.

If we *do not*, have we lost something that is not worth having?

But Pascal prefaces this conclusion with an essential assumption: That of total ignorance or scepticism regarding the nature of his subject.

The translation is from John Warrington:

*Infinity. Nothingness. Our soul has been cast into the body, where it finds number, time and dimension. It reasons thereupon, and calls it nature, necessity, and can believe nothing else.*

*Unity added to infinity adds nothing to it, any more than does one foot added to infinite length. The finite is annihilated in presence of the infinite, and becomes pure nothingness. So does our mind before God; so does our justice before divine justice.*

*There is not so great a disproportion between human and divine justice as between unity and infinity.*

*The justice of God must be as vast as His mercy. But his justice done upon the reprobate is not so vast as, and should shock us less than, His mercy shown towards the elect.*

*We know that the infinite exists, but we are ignorant of its nature. Since we know it is false to say that number is finite, it must be true that there is infinity in number. But we do not know what it is. We cannot say that it is even, or that it is odd. Yet it is a number, and every number is either even or odd (this is certainly true of every finite number). So we may perfectly well know that God exists, without knowing what He is.*

*Is there not one substantial truth, seeing that there are so many things which are not truth itself?*

*We know then the existence and nature of the finite, because we too are finite and have extension. We know the existence of the infinite, but not its nature; for, like us, it has extension but no limits such as we have. But we know neither the existence nor the nature of God, because He has neither extension or limits.*

*But by faith we know His existence; in the light of glory we shall know His nature. I have already shown that there is nothing to prevent our knowing the existence of a thing, without knowing its nature. Let us speak now according to natural lights.*

*If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity with us. We are incapable, therefore, of knowing either what He is or if He is. That being so, who will dare undertake to decide this question? Not we, who have no affinity with Him.*

*Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their belief, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason. They declare, when expounding to the world, that it is foolishness, stultitiam (11 Cor. i. 18 1); and then you complain that they do not prove it! If they proved it they would give the lie to their own worlds; it is in lacking proofs that they do not lack sense.*

*'Yes, but while this is an excuse for those who offer it as such, and frees them from blame for not basing their beliefs upon reason, it does not excuse those who accept what they say.'*

This scepticism or ignorance is of crucial importance for our task.

What is the reasonable, sensible, rational, or sane course of action when knowledge is lacking?

Some may say – do nothing.

But we remind the reader of UPM ejaculations 1.1 and 1.2.2:

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1, 1, 5:

*If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.*

*ibid.* 1, 1, 6:

*'Tis of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him.*

*Ibid.* 4, 11, 10:

*It is folly to expect demonstration in everything. Whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (I will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting.*

*He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.*

What utilitarian calculations did Gavriilo Princip employ before he shot the Austrian Emperor's nephew? What do the consequentialists have to say here?

What utilitarian calculations *could* Christopher Columbus employ before he embarked upon his voyage?

Could Princip include in any calculation the possibility that Marylyn Monroe might stumble across a crumple in the Space-Time Continuum, and end up back in *August* 1914?

He'd better not shoot the Austrian Emperor's nephew; because if he were to be locked up or executed he'd miss out on any possibility of a night of passion with Marylyn Monroe?

Should the very – *very* great – improbability of this event be taken into account?

Would the possible – and actual – consequences of an assassination outweigh the possible pleasures of night of passion with Marylyn Monroe?

Going *too* far?

So, consider the EuroMillions lottery:

The odds of winning the jackpot are 1 in 139,838,160.

The odds of winning second prize are 1 in 6,991,908.

The odds at the lowest tier are 1 in 22.

The question is:

With those odds, is it more reasonable, sensible, rational, or sane to risk the £2.50 stake for the possibility of winning £184,202,899 or £14,140,600 or £3.80 or £2.71;

Or is it more reasonable, sensible, rational, or sane – given the odds – *not* to risk the £2.50 stake?

We may construct another decision matrix:

	You choose winning numbers	You don't choose winning numbers
Wager £2.50	Elation. Ecstasy	Small regret
Save your £2.50	Great regret	Small relief

But to better illustrate our point, the matrix might be:

	You choose winning numbers	You don't choose winning numbers
You risk a precious £2.50	Elation. Ecstasy	Small regret
You're <i>afraid</i> to risk even £2.50	Great shame	Small shame

Remember; beforehand, you don't *know* the result of the draw. You are in a state of complete ignorance.

But is it more reasonable, sensible, rational, or sane to bet or not bet?

We're not an arguing for one course of action over another. We're reminding the reader that the *choice* of one course over another is more likely to be motivated by Hume's sentiments or affections rather than by any scientific or mathematical or philosophical deliberations.

Warrington again:

*Let us examine this point of view and declare: 'Either God exists, or He does not.' To which view shall we incline? Reason cannot decide for us one way or the other: we are separated by an infinite gulf. At the extremity of this infinite distance a game is in progress, where either heads or tails may turn up. What will you wager? According to reason you cannot bet either way; according to reason you can defend neither proposition.*

*So do not attribute error to those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it?*

*No; I will not blame them for having made this choice, but for having made one at all; for since he who*

*calls heads and he who calls tails are equally at fault, both are in the wrong. The right thing is not to wager at all.' Yes; but a bet must be laid. There is no option: you have joined the game. Which will you choose, then? Since a choice has to be made, let us see which is of least moment to you. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to wager, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and unhappiness. Your reason suffers no more violence in choosing one rather than another, since you must of necessity make a choice.*

*That is one point cleared up.*

*But what about your happiness? **Let us weigh the gain and the loss involved in wagering that God exists. Let us estimate these two probabilities; if you win, you win all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager then, without hesitation, that He does exist.***

*'That is all very fine. Yes, I must wager, but maybe I am wagering too much.'*

*Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of winning and of losing, if you had only two lives to win you might still wager; but if there were three lives to win, you would still have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing); and being thus obliged to play, you would be imprudent not to risk your life to win three in a game where there is an equal chance of winning and losing.*

*But there is an eternity of life and happiness.*

*That being so, **if there were an infinity of chances of which only one was in your favour, you would still do right to stake one to win two, and you would act unwisely in refusing to play one life against three, in a game where you had only one chance out of an infinite number, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to win.***

*But here there is an infinity of infinitely happy life to win, one chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what you stake is finite. That removes all doubt as to choice; wherever the infinite is, and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against the chance of winning, there are no two ways about it, all must be given.*

***And so, when a man is obliged to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain which is just as likely to occur as loss of nothing.***

*For it is no use alleging the uncertainty of winning and the certainty of risk, or to say that the infinite distance between the certainty of what one risks and the uncertainty of what one will win equals that between the finite good, which one certainly risks, and the infinite, which is uncertain.*

*That is not so; every player risks a certainty to win an uncertainty, and yet he risks a finite certainty to win a finite uncertainty, without offending reason. There is no infinite distance between the certainty risked and the uncertainty of the gain; it is not true. There is, indeed, infinity between the certainty of winning and the certainty of losing, but the uncertainty of winning is proportionate to the certainty of what is risked, according to the proportion of the chances of gain and loss.*

***Hence, if there are many risks on one side as on the other, the right course is to play even; and then the certainty of the risk is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far are they from being infinitely distant.***

***Thus our proposition is of infinite force, when there is the infinite at stake in a game where there are equal chances of winning and losing, but the infinite to gain. This is conclusive, and if men are capable of truth at all, there it is.***



*I agree, I admit it; but is there no way of getting a look behind the scenes?’ Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc.*

*Quite; but my hand are tied and my mouth is gagged; I am forced to wager, and am not free; no one frees me from these bonds, and I am so made that I cannot believe. What then do you wish me to do?*

*That is true. **But understand at least that your ability to believe is the result of your passions; for, although reason inclines you to believe, you cannot do so. Try therefore to convince yourself, not by piling up proofs of God, but by subduing your passions. You desire to attain faith, but do not know the way. You would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and you ask for remedies. Learn of those who were bound and gagged like you, and who now stake all they possess. They are men who know the road you desire to follow, and who have been cured of a sickness of which you desire to be cured.** Follow the way by which they set out, acting as if they already believed, taking holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally cause you to believe and bunt your cleverness.*

*‘But that is what I fear.’*

*Why? What have you to lose?*

*But to show that such practices lead you to belief, it is those things which will curtail your passions which are your main obstacles.*

#### 2.1.3.2:

The standard objection to Pascal is not applicable here.

Our dilemma is to *do* something or *not do it*:

In this example – To be convinced by Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 (and the other points of ejaculations 6.7.2.1 to 6.8.3.2 of the *UPM*) and act on them, or not.

We have just two options, not the infinity of *possible* worldviews assumed in Pascal's particular application of the template.

#### 2.1.3.3:

The contention is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in a game in which the chances of winning and of losing are equal and there is the infinite to gain.

In other words:

	UnChristian – good	UnChristian – bad
UnChristian acts	Great good	Misery
Christian acts	Misery	Great good

Maybe?

Or are the relevant terms too vague or ambiguous?

The question is: Is there a rule that can accommodate different understandings of probability or utility when examining questions regarding Expected Utility?

We are usually – in the literature – forced onto the position that we may admit a number of acceptable options that return a number of choices that are includible in the acceptable options.

In other words: We can accept different understandings of probability or utility as long as they can be, perhaps pragmatically, forced to conform to our conception of Expected Utility.

We'll examine this shortly; when we look into *Decision Theory*.

Many, and maybe *all*, limits or theoretical restrictions involve one's *beliefs*.

We *don't* do what we believe *should* be done – because we don't *believe* we could *get away with it*.

We are asked to stake our destiny on some world outlook.

We cannot be certain of any particular outcome.

We cannot be certain of a good outcome.

*And* we cannot be certain of a bad outcome.

Our task here is to remind the reader that the *choice* of one course over another is more likely to be motivated by Hume's sentiments or affections rather than by any scientific, mathematical, or philosophical deliberations.

When asked to choose between a great good and possible pain, or great ill and probable absence of pain – it can only be *simple, unadorned, old-fashioned cowardice* that compels us to the latter;

Our reluctance to opt for the former is very unlikely to be based on any logical or scientific objection. And very – *very* – unlikely to be motivated by a thirty-year intensive study of Kantian or Rawlsian ethics!

W. F. Trotter has variations, but the substance remains:

*You must wager.*

*It is not optional.*

*You are embarked.*

*Which will you choose then? Let us see.*

*Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least.*

*You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery.*

*Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled.*

*But your happiness?*

*Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,*

*you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.*

*"That is very fine. Yes [you might say], I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much."*

*Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain.*

*But there is an eternity of life and happiness [or a great good]. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life [or, in the great scheme of things, a negligible punishment] against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life [or a very great good] to gain.*

*But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all.*

*And thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness.*

*For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the certainty of what is staked and the uncertainty of what will be gained, equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the uncertain infinite.*

*It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason.*

*There is not an infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the proportion of the chances of gain and loss.*

*Hence it comes that, if there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an infinite distance between them.*

***And so our proposition is of infinite force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.***

When asked to choose between a great good and possible pain, or great ill and probable no pain – it can only be *simple, unadorned, old-fashioned cowardice* that compels us to the latter.

	<b>You possess Gyges' ring of invisibility</b>	<b>You have no ring invisibility</b>
<b>Act</b>	Great gains; Probable no losses	Possible great gains with probable greater losses
<b>Don't act</b>	Possible great losses	No change; Possible losses

Our reluctance to opt for the former is very unlikely to be based on any logical or scientific objection. And very – *very* – unlikely to be motivated by a thirty-year intensive study of Kantian or Rawlsian ethics!

### Part III.

#### 3.1.1:

So, we've introduced the possibilities contained in Pascal's Wager. We may now broaden our examination.

Our purpose here – our *secondary* purpose – is to emphasise the fact that what may appear to be obvious – and thus cursory or shallow or simplistic – has generated mountains of academic literature during the seventy or so years since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's seminal *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* (Princeton University Press).

We will see that the obvious is very often, if not always, ignored – generally because the obvious is unpalatable.

In academic literature, precision is everything; so we'd expect von Neumann and Morgenstern to be taken (mistaken), by the un-academic, for obscurantists.

But even the introductory works, intended for the curious passer-by, succumb to the temptations of obfuscation.

And the obscurified is too often mistaken for the profound; and the clear for the cursory or shallow.

Rhetoric makes its appearance.

And we encounter the euphemisms and politenesses; the walking on egg shells, the tiptoeing around the subject: The "inclusive", "non-discriminatory" language that limits the scope of the subject, and causes much of the obfuscation.

#### 3.1.2:

K. Steele – Professor of Philosophy at ANU, ex of the LSE, specialist in ethics and risk, and author of works such as (with H. Stefánsson): *Beyond Uncertainty: Reasoning with Unknown Possibilities* (Cambridge University Press);

And also of: "Persistent Experimenters, Stopping Rules, and Statistical Inference", *Erkenntnis*, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 937-961; "Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling", *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 983-999; With Alexander Sandgren: "Levelling Counterfactual Scepticism", *Synthese*, 199 (1-2): pp. 927-947; "How to be Imprecise and yet Immune to Sure Loss", *Synthese* 199 (1-2): pp. 427-444; With Nicolas Wüthrich: "The Problem of

Evaluating Automated Large-Scale Evidence Aggregators”, *Synthese* (8): pp. 3083-3102; With Seamus Bradley: “Can Free Evidence Be Bad? Value of Information for the Imprecise Probabilist”, *Philosophy of Science* 83 (1): pp. 1-28; And, with Y. Carmel, J. Cross, and C. Wilcox: “Uses and Misuses of Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) in Environmental Decision Making”, *Risk Analysis: An International Journal* 29 (1), pp. 26-33... *etc... etc...*

– K. Steele (with Stefánsson) gives an introductory survey of the subject, but are, we feel, considering the context, *unnecessarily* verbose:

*Let us [summarise] the main reasons why decision theory ... is of philosophical interest.*

*First, normative decision theory is clearly a (minimal) theory of practical rationality. The aim is to characterise the attitudes of agents who are practically rational, and various (static and sequential) arguments are typically made to show that certain practical catastrophes befall agents who do not satisfy standard decision-theoretic constraints.*

*Second, many of these constraints concern the agents’ beliefs.*

*In particular, normative decision theory requires that agents’ degrees of beliefs satisfy the probability axioms and that they respond to new information by conditionalisation. Therefore, decision theory has great implications for debates in epistemology and philosophy of science; that is, for theories of epistemic rationality.*

*Finally, decision theory should be of great interest to philosophers of mind and psychology, and others who are interested in how people can understand the behaviour and intentions of others; and, more generally, how we can interpret what goes on in other people’s minds.*

*Decision theorists typically assume that a person’s behaviour can be fully explained in terms of his or her beliefs and desires. But perhaps more interestingly, some of the most important results of decision theory – the various representation theorems – suggest that if a*



*person satisfies certain rationality requirements, then we can read his or her beliefs and desires, and how strong these beliefs and desires are, from his or her choice dispositions (or preferences).*

*How much these theorems really tell us is a matter of debate ... But on an optimistic reading of these results, they assure us that we can meaningfully talk about what goes on in other people's minds without much evidence beyond information about their dispositions to choose.*

But, risking the charge of over-simplification and of diminishing the subject, in what follows, we'll attempt to give the reader just as much information as is necessary for the purposes of this essay:

Our task in this essay is to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

Throughout what follows, we'd like the reader to bear in mind the decisions taken – or the games played – in response to the CoViD-19 experience, to the actions taken following the George Floyd campaign, and in the calculations associated with taking a bag of broccoli to a self-service checkout and putting it through as carrots.

What were, or may have been, the Expected Utilities?

What were, or could possibly have been, probabilistic calculations?

How could Bayes's Theorem have been utilised?

How could Nash Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium be recognised in the manoeuvrings?

What might have been the "standard decision-theoretic constraints"?

What might have been the degrees of belief?

What could have been the "probability axioms"?

What was the "conditionalisation"?

What might it have told us about epistemic rationality?

What were the 'errors in choice' that Quantal Response Equilibrium allows for?

What was the probability that was a function of the utility difference between the chosen strategy and other strategies?

What was the response with higher expected rewards? The response with better prospects of outcome?

What were taken as the realistic limitations to rational choice modelling?

What were assumed to be any sub-population's 'rational expectations' based on experience regarding the rational efficiency of other members of the population?

What statistical insights were employed when interpreting data?

The *Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure*, (Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang), tells us:

*Another necessary condition for the convergence to Nash Equilibrium is that all players must be completely rational.*

*However, numerous sociological studies have shown that such an assumption does not hold in practice.*

*Some players, for example, may not want or do not have the computational resources to find the strategy that maximizes their payoff.*

How might these observations be applied in explaining the CoViD-19 experience, to the actions taken following the George Floyd campaign, or to the calculations behind the flying of two airliners into the World Trade Centre?

### 3.1.3:

*Decision Theory* is the rather grand name given to reasoning behind one's choices.

The person – *as a person* – must be capable of reflection and action. See *UnChristian Party Manifesto*, ejaculation 2.1.3 and 15.1.2-15.2.2.

These choices can range from the unremarkable to the earth shattering: From the choice of whether or not to kick a clod of soil into the sea, or whether to assassinate Archduke Ferdinand.

Customary thinking is that what one chooses to do is conditioned by beliefs and/or values and/or desires.

Decision Theory can be seen as a theory of beliefs, desires, and other significant attitudes as much as a theory regarding choice. The point is how these attitudes fit together.

The key question here is what criteria one's beliefs and/or values and/or desires should comply with in any non-specific situation.

This can be taken as a necessary but maybe not sufficient description of rationality. It puts to one side problems regarding *appropriate* desires and reasonable *beliefs* in any particular state of affairs.

The central concern for this description is the consideration of uncertainty.

Steele tells us that the conventional theory, *Expected Utility Theory*, basically claims that, rather obviously, in any situation of uncertainty, a human being – *as a Human Being* rather than as a clod of soil – should prefer the option with greatest probable value relevant to the person making the choice.

The essential concepts in *Decision Theory* are *preferences* and *prospects*.

When we say that a human being prefers option *p* over *q* we mean that the person – *as a Person* – takes *p* to be a better choice or more desirable than *q* (we said that “Decision Theory” was a rather grand title!).

Here preference is a comparative outlook.

There are areas for debate about what preferences over options amount to, or what it is about a human being that should be our point of interest when we talk about that person's preferences over options.

But here we should look at some basic possible characteristics of *rational* preference over options.

Preference is a relation between options. For a set of possible options, we refer to one's ‘preference ordering’. This is the ordering of options that is produced by one's preference regarding any two options in the relevant set.

In most situations, the choices available for preference are subject to personal or subjective issues.

Decision-makers take into account *their own* beliefs regarding the probability of one outcome rather than another

springing out of a specified option. Under such conditions, specific choices might be described as *Choices Under Uncertainty*.

*Expected Utility* theory can be expressed as *Bayesian Decision Theory*.

This categorization stresses a dedication to *probabilism*; that is, the recognition that beliefs may be of varying strength or vigour, and these can be represented as probabilities.

Bayes' Theorem is used when calculating posterior probabilities:

$$\Pr(A_i \mid B) = \frac{\Pr(B \mid A_i) \Pr(A_i)}{\Pr(B \mid A_1) \Pr(A_1) + \dots + \Pr(B \mid A_k) \Pr(A_k)}.$$

Here,  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_k$  represent mutually exclusive events whose union is every sample result of an experiment or observation. And  $B$  represents an event whose probability is anything other than zero.

*Prior* Probability refers to the probability of an event *before* relevant observations.

*Posterior* Probability refers to the probability of an event *after* the relevant observations.

Bayes' Theorem is used to determine the *posterior* probability of any event.

The conventional feeling is that this posterior probability can then be used to calculate a *prior* probability before further observations.

A Bayesian approach is regarded as one where a *prior distribution* is modified in the light of the outcomes of an experiment or set of observations or experiences.

Prior Distribution is taken to be the distribution attached to a *parameter* before data are obtained.

A *parameter* can be taken as any variable quality or characteristic of a collection or group.

There is some connection between *EU* theory and probabilism, or between rational preference and rational belief.

But how strong or essential this connection is is a matter for debate.

The connection between rational preference and rational belief can be taken as fundamental.

Some take the position that the very meaning of belief is bound up with the very meaning of preference.

But many question the validity of this position.

An alternative position is to see preferences as entailed by, but not identical with, the associated comparative beliefs.

A further question as to whether the justification for rational belief conforming to the probability calculus is a pragmatic one:

That is, whether any preferences are inconsistent or self-defeating.

Alternatively, we could argue that accounts of rational belief can and should be defensible via epistemic issues: the notion of overall “distance from the truth” of one’s beliefs.

But whatever the details or elaborations, Bayesians concur that pragmatic reflections play a role in controlling beliefs.

Whether or not to look for more evidence is a pragmatic consideration; it relies on the “value of information” we might expect regarding the problem under examination. Seeking more evidence is an action that is itself subject to choice.

The point we’re attempting to draw the reader’s attention to is that *EU theory or Bayesian decision theory lies at the base of fundamental rules regarding knowledge.*

It can be used as a fitting explanation of scientific inference. It can be used in clarifications of concepts such as “evidence”, “evidential support”, “induction” as opposed to “abduction”, and the relationship between “coherence” and “explanatory power” and truth.

EU theory is also of use when examining the make-up of rational desire.

However, EU theory has been attacked as being *unfalsifiable*.

The claim is that seemingly irrational preferences can, with ingenuity, be claimed as rational via an expedient description of the options being considered.

It can easily be argued that this is in fact the accurate description of day-to-day preferences: An appropriate representation of preference can be one that encompasses everything that the choice-maker holds as being important.

In reply to this, the charge of vacuity, we may say that:

There may be practical restrictions. The content of preferences might be shaped by some transaction in representing one’s domain of preference attitudes. Or there

may be normative restrictions on what sorts of outcomes one may reasonably distinguish.

Also, according to Steele, if we can take for granted the *separability* of outcomes in one state or another – if an outcome is independent of other outcomes – identical outcomes having identical probabilities might cancel each other out.

In any comparison of two options, this might entail that if two options share an outcome, then when comparing the options, the quality of the outcome is unimportant.

The reader will have noticed that an enormous amount of verbiage can be generated to express the bleedin' obvious;

And this is why we're including this section.

Our aim is not to convince the reader to accept one or another formulation or interpretation regarding Decision Theory. Our intention is to show the reader that Decision Theory *is* a respectable academic field, that much time and money is expended in the studying and the extrapolating of it, and thus that, as should become obvious at the end of this section, certain sub-fields are very relevant to the purpose of this appendix.

Such a sub-field involves completeness, or vague beliefs and desires.

Objections to any Expected Utility requirement for a definite and precise view of what our preferences are, the preferences regarding multiple preferences, can be encouraged on information/knowledge grounds and from considerations regarding desires and/or values.

Regarding value, we can say that one may hold that a number of options are incomparable because their qualities lack parity of value. Broad-spectrum properties or proportions of value might be regarded as incommensurate. One's opinions regarding the desirability of options may not be describable – recall the indescribability of the aroma of coffee.

Regarding belief, we may claim that any evidence may be such that it does not commit one to definite or measurable extents of belief covered by any expressible probability function.

In other words: vague or indistinct options or preferences or beliefs can be accompanied by vague or indistinct outcomes.

In other words, desire and expectation can be indistinct, and this has bearing on utility and any expectation of it.

The bleedin' obvious, verbosely expressed – but it has bearing on any decision matrix, as will be seen later.

In other characterizations of desire and belief, less distinct representations, are available.

If we put the probabilistic considerations to one side, we may investigate the differing ways of describing any information/knowledge scepticism.

We may use collections or spectrums of probability or utility functions to describe uncertainty in belief or desire. Here, probability and utility still features, so we may regard this as a minimal generalisation of the Expected Utility model.

And the more any sceptical considerations come into play, the more considerations of probability come into play.

Rational Belief has been referred to as *imprecise probabilism*.

Similarly, the more any sceptical considerations come into play regarding evaluations, the more utility regarding options needs to refer to one's desires.

Here we should not regard belief and desire as separate entities, but refer to one's vague preferences as being represented by a number of probability and utility options.

The question is: Is there a rule that can accommodate different understandings of probability or utility when examining questions regarding Expected Utility?

We are usually – in the literature – forced onto the position that we may admit a number of acceptable options that return a number of choices that are includible in the acceptable options.

In other words: We can accept different understandings of probability or utility as long as they can be, perhaps pragmatically, forced to conform to our conception of Expected Utility.

The options must be comparable.

In any choice the option having less or lower utility value must be rejected in favour of the higher.

The controversies appear in considerations of incomparable options; options passing admissibility tests but which affect one's interests.

The concept of caution is often introduced here. The *Maxmin* Expected Utility rule, which involves the choosing an option with the greatest *minimum* expected utility, is available.

Again – *the bleedin' obvious*. Nevertheless, it seems to limit us too severely, as it pays no attention to the full set of options. It's too cautious.

A variation on the Maxmin rule instructs us to aggregate the minimum and maximum expected utilities. The outcomes are seen as reflecting one's pessimism or caution when confronted by uncertainty.

*The reader will recognise our insinuation of Hume's views on passion versus reason here.*

*This is intentional.*

More on this later.

One's non-reducible preferences – or passions, whether accompanied by uncertainty or not – dig in when we consider the notion of *confidence* in the context of rules for choice.

Choices may be made between incomparable options based on expected utility related to confidence-weight. Such a position assumes that weights can, in fact, be assigned.

In addition, in the absence of precise and key weights, there are alternative systems that invoke confidence.

We may simply remove from the conversation any probability or utility function that falls below any confidence limit. We might then apply the Maxmin Expected Utility rule on what's left.

As a variation on the above, we may allow variation of confidence thresholds for varying probabilities and utilities with reference to any choice problem; although we may feel the need to impose a more pragmatic definition of confidence.

Another variation suggests that acts may be compared with reference to how much uncertainty they might support; and this depends on levels of confidence.

The reader will again recognise the traditional, unexceptional, obvious sceptical consideration here.

Other sceptical considerations make an appearance when we examine what has been called *unawareness*.

If we imagine a collection of possible outcomes, and also a collection of possible conditions or states of affairs; and if we define a collection of actions as the collections of all functions



from those possible outcomes to those possible conditions or states of affairs, then one might say that a rational person always performs the act that maximises expected utility, relative to a probability measure over conditions or states of affairs and a utility measure over possible outcomes.

The problem here regards how to interpret the conditions or states of affairs and the outcomes.

Such a standpoint may be consistent with seeing a collection of possible conditions or states of affairs and possible outcomes as, firstly, the collections of *possible* states and, secondly, the outcomes.

However, it is also consistent with interpreting those possible conditions or states of affairs and possible outcomes as, firstly, the sets of states and, secondly, outcomes that someone other than the chooser deems to be or understands as possible conditions or states of affairs and possible outcomes, or the collections of states and outcomes that the chooser accepts as true or valid conditions or states of affairs and possible outcomes.

Again, we can see Hume's passions making their inevitable appearance.

Obviously, one may be, and probably will be, *unaware* of many of the possible states and outcomes.

So where does the ultimate justification of any decision lie?  
Among the passions?

Furthermore, the "unawareness of unawareness" and the "awareness of unawareness" come into the equation – the conditions where one is unaware that there is a set of states of affairs available, and the condition where one at least suspects that there are some states of affairs of which they are unaware.

We may put to one side the unawareness of unawareness. If we are unaware that we are unaware, or even of the possibility of unawareness, how could that possibility make an appearance in any calculation?

But awareness of unawareness would be of relevance to the decision-making process.

If one at least suspects that there may be some state that one hasn't envisaged, and a related outcome, one may decide to at least propose some likelihood of the condition and characteristics of this state. One would probably see as

preferable at least some clue as to how good or bad this outcome might be – before one makes a choice.

One's confidence in any judgement may not be decisively affected by unawareness, but how one arrives at any judgment regarding probability and desirability is worth examining. Judgments may be made based on induction from previous states of affairs where one's knowledge or assumed knowledge has improved, but then we come to the familiar problems regarding the nature and validity of inductive reasoning. We may have experienced a genuine growth of knowledge in the past, but why should we assume this would be true for every event in the future? How would the probabilities be calculated?

The situations we've examined so far address the problems surrounding single decisions at a particular time: *static* decisions.

We now come to the more complex situations. That is: are our considerations so far applicable to situations that involve a *series* of decisions? Are they applicable to *sequential* decisions?

Static and sequential decision models have the initial appearance of disparity.

We may say that the static model has the tabular or *normal* form.

As we've seen: Each row of any table represents an act or option. The columns represent the possible states of affairs that give rise to a distinctive end point for the relevant act.

A *sequential* decision model has what we call a tree or *extensive* form.

The *tree* represents a series of expected choice events. The branches extending from these events represent options at that position. These branches may lead to further options.

The differences between these models – *static* or *sequential* – provoke conundrums regarding the way they might connect.

That is:

Do static and sequential forms illustrate the same *kind* of problem?

If so, what might be any static equivalent of a sequential form?

What further advantages or disadvantages, if any, does the sequential decision setting reveal regarding any aspect of Expected Utility theory?

Very importantly, from the point of this essay, do the ramifications and corollaries show up the limitations or, at least, the ambiguities or anomalies of normative choice theories?

At this point, the reader may be wondering why we've included this section on decision theory.

The reader may in fact suspect that this is, or has been, a deliberate obfuscation, or an excursion into obscurantism; perhaps inspired by our understandings of Diogenes Laertius or R. N. Carew Hunt or of the Irish censorship board (as described by Declan Kiberd)!?

So we'll give a few indications as to why decision theory is relevant here.

First, normative decision theory is a *minimal* theory of *practical* rationality.

Its endeavour is to depict the outlooks of one who is rational, who employs rationality, in any *practical* setting. The assorted static or sequential frameworks are constructed to illustrate how very real practical calamities can afflict one who does not heed and/or go along with very sensible theoretic limitations.

Second, many of those limits or theoretical restrictions involve one's *beliefs*.

Normative decision theory obliges one's beliefs, or the vigour or strengths of them, to comply with the axioms of probability, and that one's responses are conditioned by any new information.

So, we can see that decision theory has repercussions in any debate regarding epistemology or the philosophy of science.

And third, and perhaps most importantly, decision theory is very relevant in any understanding of the behaviour and intentions of others.

Decision theory is very relevant in any understanding or interpretation of the content or workings of the minds of others.

Decision theory might presuppose that one's behaviour can be explained in terms of one's beliefs and/or desires.

The results of decision theory, or at least some of them, assert that if one is sufficiently rational, then any associated beliefs and desires can be determined from any associated preferences.

### 3.2.1:

So, as we stated at the beginning of this section –

Our *secondary* purpose was to emphasise the fact that what may appear to be obvious has generated mountains of academic literature during the seventy or so years since the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern's seminal *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* (Princeton University Press).

The obvious is very often, if not always, ignored – generally because the obvious is unpalatable.

The *primary* point we've attempted to make is that behind the jargon or neologisms of *Decision Theory* lie the issues addressed in *The UnChristian Party Manifesto* Chapter 1 – “First Things Last”.

That is:

The ubiquitous issues regarding the inevitable scepticism;

And the inevitable corollary to those issues – those *pseudo* problems.

That is:

The existence of things which cannot be referred to anything else but must be desirable, or necessary, on their own account.

We remind the reader of Hume:

*An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 244:

*It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the*

*sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.*

*Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries further, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object.*

*Perhaps to your second question, why he desires health, he may also reply, that it is necessary for the exercise of his calling. If you ask, why he is anxious on that head, he will answer, because he desires to get money. If you demand Why? It is the instrument of pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.*

*It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account.*

As Steele puts it:

*Decision theory is concerned with the reasoning underlying an agent's choices, whether this is a mundane choice between taking the bus or getting a taxi, or a more far-reaching choice about whether to pursue a demanding political career. (Note that "agent" here stands for an entity, usually an individual person, that is capable of deliberation and action.) Standard thinking is that what an agent chooses to do on any given occasion is completely determined by personal beliefs and desires or values, but this is not uncontroversial ... In any case, decision theory is as much a theory of beliefs, desires and other relevant attitudes as it is a theory of choice; what matters is how these various attitudes (call them "preference attitudes") cohere together.*

*The focus [here] is normative decision theory. That is, the main question of interest is what criteria an agent's preference attitudes should satisfy in any generic circumstances. This amounts to a minimal account of rationality, one that sets aside more*

*substantial questions about appropriate desires and reasonable beliefs, given the situation at hand. The key issue for a minimal account is the treatment of uncertainty. The orthodox normative [what ought to happen] decision theory, expected utility (EU) theory, essentially says that, in situations of uncertainty, one should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value. (Note that in this context, “desirability” and “value” should be understood as desirability/value according to the agent in question.)*

That is:

The reasoning, the rationality expressed in Decision Theory, the mathematics associated with decision theory, are subservient to, as Hume had it, the sentiments and affections of mankind:

The “Utility” is the “Desirability or Value” according to the “Agent” in question.

Decision Theory would be concerned with – for example – *how* to play 18 holes of Golf or a session of Bridge. Decision Theory does not ask *or* answer the question: *What’s the point of playing Golf or Bridge?*

The *minimal* account of *rationality* is one that sets aside more substantial questions about *appropriate* desires and *reasonable* beliefs, given the situation at hand. The key issue for a minimal account is the treatment of *uncertainty*.

Recall:

John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1, 1, 5:

*If we will disbelieve everything, because we cannot certainly know all things; we shall do much-what as wisely as he, who would not use his Legs, but sit still and perish, because he had no Wings to fly.*

*ibid*, 4, 11, 10:

*It is folly to expect demonstration in everything ...  
He that, in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain demonstration would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him*

*reason to venture on it: and I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection.*

*ibid.* 1, 1, 6:

*'Tis of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom at such places as are necessary to direct his voyage, and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him.*

The epistemological point made in ejaculation 1.2 UPM by the celebrated Wittgenstein, and by Locke and Ayer and Moore and Russell; made in the *Vedas* and in the *Upanishads*; made by Plato and by Aristotle and by Confucius; or by Gödel or Frege – made in all lands in the ancient world and the modern:

The epistemological point is inescapable in any study of *decision theory*.

The formalisation, systematisation, or *mathematisization* – as, for example, in Bayes' Theorem – *may* be of *use* for the actuary, but, apparently, becomes a rhetorical tool when associated with *desires* and *preferences*:

Those things which cannot be defined in terms of anything else:

Those things which must be desired on their own account:

Those reasons beyond which it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.

Decision theory is as much a theory of beliefs, desires and other relevant attitudes as it is a theory of choice.

We may say:

Decision Theory is concerned with why we feel *confident* or *justified* in accepting *or* rejecting a prior probability from a posterior probability.

The term *rationality* as employed in decision Theory and in Game Theory is concerned with the *how* rather than with the *why*.

That is:

*Given* we *desire* something, *how* do we get it?

For example:

*Given* that we *desire* to play a round of golf;

*And* the golf club is one mile *north* of where we are, rather than one mile to the *south*...

It is *rational* to move in a northerly direction.

It is *not rational* to move in a southerly direction.

Any reason-*ing* is *not* concerned *with why the hell* we'd *want* – desire – to play golf *in the first place*!

Or:

*Given* that we've been walking through a desert;

*Given* that we're on the point of death through dehydration;

*Given* that we *thirst*;

*Given* that we *have the blind desire to drink*;

*And* an oasis is one mile *north* of where we are, rather than one mile to the *south*...

It is *rational* to move in a northerly direction.

It is *not rational* to move in a southerly direction.

Any reason-*ing* is *not* concerned *with the biochemical mechanisms behind* the *desire* – to drink!

To refuse to drink until we understand the biochemical mechanisms behind our desire – to demand a *reason* – would not only be *pointless* and *daft* –

It would be positively *un-reasonable*!

### 3.2.2.1:

Decision Theory introduces the newcomer to the possibility of formalisation in the process of decision-making.

But we feel that the associated *Game* Theory is more likely to convince the newcomer of the relevance of the discipline.

Game Theory is an attempt to represent and analyse mathematically some conflict situation in which the outcome depends on the choices made by *opponents*.



The applications of game theory are not primarily concerned with recreational activities.

Games may be used to investigate problems in business, personal relationships, military manoeuvres, and other areas involving decision-making.

We may also define it as being:

*The study of the ways in which interacting choices of economic agents produce outcomes with respect to the preferences (or utilities) of those agents, where the outcomes in question might have been intended by none of the agents.*

It is important to reemphasize that the *rationality* referred to in Game Theory is concerned solely with *how* to get to where you want to go *after* you've *decided where* you want to go.

The *definition* of rationality here is that you *will* and *should* want to go where you've decided to go; and that your *workings out* are *aimed at* getting to where you've decide to go.

This understanding of rationality does not assume that your workings out will be *correct* or *valid* or that your goals are *sensible* goals.

Once you've *settled* on your *Expected* or *Desired Utility*, the rationality advocated for in Decision Theory and Game Theory refers to *nothing more* than your *desire and activities* associated with the getting of what you want.

We may be reminded of the type of rationality described by Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, "Of the influencing motives of the will", 6:

*Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it.*

*'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.*

*'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.*

*'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.*

*A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation.*

Our task in this essay is to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

#### 3.2.2.2:

The *Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory* or Von Neumann's 'Minimax Theorem' is:

$$\max_x \min_y E(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \min_y \max_x E(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}).$$

Here  $E(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$  is the expectation, where  $\mathbf{x}$  and  $\mathbf{y}$  are mixed strategies for the two players.

Using a *maximin strategy*, one player ensures that the expectation is at least as large as the left-hand side of the equation appearing in the theorem. And, by using a *minimax strategy*, another player ensures that the expectation is less than or equal to the right-hand side of the equation.

#### 3.2.3:

We feel that illustrations, factual or fictional, are more likely to convince the newcomer of the relevance of *Game Theory*.

D. Ross – Professor of Economics and Dean of Commerce at the University of Cape Town, Research Fellow in the Center for Economic Analysis of Risk at Georgia State University, Professor of Philosophy at UCC; and author of works including: *Economic Theory and Cognitive Science*, Volume One: *Microexplanation*; *What People Want: The Concept of Utility from Bentham to Game Theory*; with A. Hofmeyr, "Team agency and conditional games" in: *Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Social*

*Science: A Dialogue*; and, With Glenn W. Harrison, “The Psychology of Human Risk Preferences and Vulnerability to Scare-Mongers: Experimental Economic Tools for Hypothesis Formulation and Testing”, *Journal Of Cognition And Culture*, 16 (5):383-414. – D. Ross provides us with some nice illustrations of Game Theory, the *point* of it, and some indication of its relation to Decision Theory:

Throughout what follows, we’d like the reader to bear in mind the decisions taken – or the games played – in response to:

The CoViD-19 experience;

The actions taken following the George Floyd campaign;

And in the calculations associated with taking a bag of broccoli to a self-service checkout and putting it through as carrots.

What were, or may have been, the Expected Utilities?

What were, or could possibly have been, probabilistic calculations?

How could Bayes’s Theorem have been utilised?

How could Nash Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium be recognised in the manoeuvrings?

What might have been the “standard decision-theoretic constraints”?

What might have been the degrees of belief?

What could have been the “probability axioms”?

What was the “conditionalisation”?

What might it have told us about epistemic rationality?

What were the ‘errors in choice’ that Quantal Response Equilibrium allows for?

What was the probability that was a function of the utility difference between the chosen strategy and other strategies?

What was the response with higher expected rewards? The response with better prospects of outcome?

What were taken as the realistic limitations to rational choice modelling?

What were assumed to be any sub-population’s ‘rational expectations’ based on experience regarding the rational efficiency of other members of the population?

What statistical insights were employed when interpreting data?

The *Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure*, (Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang), tells us:

*Another necessary condition for the convergence to Nash Equilibrium is that all players must be completely rational.*

*However, numerous sociological studies have shown that such an assumption does not hold in practice.*

*Some players, for example, may not want or do not have the computational resources to find the strategy that maximizes their payoff.*

How might these observations be applied in explaining the CoViD-19 experience;

The actions taken following the George Floyd campaign;

Or to the calculations behind the flying of two airliners into the World Trade Centre?

*Game theory in the form known to economists, social scientists, and biologists, was given its first general mathematical formulation by John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern. ... Limitations in their formal framework initially made the theory applicable only under special and limited conditions. This situation has dramatically changed ... over the past seven decades, as the framework has been deepened and generalized.*

*Refinements are still being made ... However, since at least the late 1970s it has been possible to say with confidence that game theory is the most important and useful tool in the analyst's kit whenever [one] confronts situations in which what counts as one agent's best action (for that agent) depends on expectations about what one or more other agents will do, and what counts as their best actions (for them) similarly depend on expectations about [the one agent].*

*Despite the fact that game theory has been rendered mathematically and logically systematic only since 1944, game-theoretic insights can be found among commentators going back to ancient times.*

*For example, in two of Plato's texts, the Laches and the Symposium, Socrates recalls an*

*episode from the Battle of Delium that some commentators have interpreted (probably anachronistically) as involving the following situation:*

*Consider a soldier at the front, waiting with his comrades to repulse an enemy attack. It may occur to him that if the defence is likely to be successful, then it isn't very probable that his own personal contribution will be essential. But if he stays, he runs the risk of being killed or wounded – apparently for no point.*

*On the other hand, if the enemy is going to win the battle, then his chances of death or injury are higher still, and now quite clearly to no point, since the line will be overwhelmed anyway.*

*Based on this reasoning, it would appear that the soldier is better off running away regardless of who is going to win the battle. Of course, if all of the soldiers reason this way – as they all apparently should, since they're all in identical situations – then this will certainly bring about the outcome in which the battle is lost.*

*Of course, this point, since it has occurred to us as analysts, can occur to the soldiers too. Does this give them a reason for staying at their posts? Just the contrary: the greater the soldiers' fear that the battle will be lost, the greater their incentive to get themselves out of harm's way. And the greater the soldiers' belief that the battle will be won, without the need of any particular individual's contributions, the less reason they have to stay and fight.*

*If each soldier anticipates this sort of reasoning on the part of the others, all will quickly reason themselves into a panic, and their horrified commander will have a rout on his hands before the enemy has even engaged.*

*Long before game theory had come along to show analysts how to think about this sort of problem systematically, it had occurred to some actual military leaders and influenced their strategies.*

*Thus the Spanish conqueror Cortez, when landing in Mexico with a small force who had good reason to fear their capacity to repel attack from the far more numerous Aztecs, removed the risk that his troops*

*might think their way into a retreat by burning the ships on which they had landed. With retreat having thus been rendered physically impossible, the Spanish soldiers had no better course of action than to stand and fight — and, furthermore, to fight with as much determination as they could muster.*

*Better still, from Cortez's point of view, his action had a discouraging effect on the motivation of the Aztecs.*

*He took care to burn his ships very visibly, so that the Aztecs would be sure to see what he had done.*

*They then reasoned as follows:*

*Any commander who could be so confident as to wilfully destroy his own option to be prudent if the battle went badly for him must have good reasons for such extreme optimism. It cannot be wise to attack an opponent who has a good reason (whatever, exactly, it might be) for being sure that he can't lose. The Aztecs therefore retreated into the surrounding hills, and Cortez had the easiest possible victory.*

*These two situations, at Delium and as manipulated by Cortez, have a common and interesting underlying logic.*

*Notice that the soldiers are not motivated to retreat just, or even mainly, by their rational assessment of the dangers of battle and by their self-interest. Rather, they discover a sound reason to run away by realizing that what it makes sense for them to do depends on what it will make sense for others to do, and that all of the others can notice this too.*

*Even a quite brave soldier may prefer to run rather than heroically, but pointlessly, die trying to stem the oncoming tide all by himself.*

*Thus we could imagine, without contradiction, a circumstance in which an army, all of whose members are brave, flees at top speed before the enemy makes a move.*

*If the soldiers really are brave, then this surely isn't the outcome any of them wanted; each would have preferred that all stand and fight.*

*What we have here, then, is a case in which the interaction of many individually rational decision-*

*making processes — one process per soldier — produces an outcome intended by no one.*

*Most armies try to avoid this problem just as Cortez did. Since they can't usually make retreat physically impossible, they make it economically impossible: They shoot deserters. Then standing and fighting is each soldier's individually rational course of action after all, because the cost of running is sure to be at least as high as the cost of staying.*

*Another classic source that invites this sequence of reasoning is found in Shakespeare's Henry V.*

*During the Battle of Agincourt Henry decided to slaughter his French prisoners, in full view of the enemy and to the surprise of his subordinates, who describe the action as being out of moral character.*

*The reasons Henry gives allude to non-strategic considerations: he is afraid that the prisoners may free themselves and threaten his position.*

*However, a game theorist might have furnished him with supplementary strategic (and similarly prudential, though perhaps not moral) justification.*

*His own troops observe that the prisoners have been killed, and observe that the enemy has observed this. Therefore, they know what fate will await them at the enemy's hand if they don't win. Metaphorically, but very effectively, their boats have been burnt.*

*The slaughter of the prisoners plausibly sent a signal to the soldiers of both sides, thereby changing their incentives in ways that favoured English prospects for victory.*

*These examples might seem to be relevant only for those who find themselves in sordid situations of cut-throat competition. Perhaps, one might think, it is important for generals, politicians, mafiosi, sports coaches and others whose jobs involve strategic manipulation of others, but the philosopher should only deplore its amorality. Such a conclusion would be highly premature, however.*

*The study of the logic that governs the interrelationships amongst incentives, strategic*

*interactions and outcomes has been fundamental in modern political philosophy, since centuries before anyone had an explicit name for this sort of logic.*

*Philosophers share with social scientists the need to be able to represent and systematically model not only what they think people normatively ought to do, but what they often actually do in interactive situations.*

*Hobbes's Leviathan is often regarded as the founding work in modern political philosophy, the text that began the continuing round of analyses of the function and justification of the state and its restrictions on individual liberties.*

*The core of Hobbes's reasoning can be given straightforwardly as follows:*

*The best situation for all people is one in which each is free to do as [they please].*

*One may or may not agree with this as a matter of psychology or ideology, but it is Hobbes's assumption.*

*Often, such free people will wish to cooperate with one another in order to carry out projects that would be impossible for an individual acting alone. But if there are any immoral or amoral agents around, they will notice that their interests might at least sometimes be best served by getting the benefits from cooperation and not returning them.*

*Suppose, for example, that you agree to help me build my house in return for my promise to help you build yours. After my house is finished, I can make your labour free to me simply by reneging on my promise. I then realize, however, that if this leaves you with no house, you will have an incentive to take mine. This will put me in constant fear of you, and force me to spend valuable time and resources guarding myself against you. I can best minimize these costs by striking first and killing you at the first opportunity.*

*Of course, you can anticipate all of this reasoning by me, and so have good reason to try to beat me to the punch. Since I can anticipate this reasoning by you, my original fear of you was not paranoid; nor was yours of me. In fact, neither of us actually needs to be immoral to get this chain of mutual reasoning going; we need only*



*think that there is some possibility that the other might try to cheat on bargains.*

*Once a small wedge of doubt enters any one mind, the incentive induced by fear of the consequences of being pre-empted — hit before hitting first — quickly becomes overwhelming on both sides.*

*If either of us has any resources of our own that the other might want, this murderous logic can take hold long before we are so silly as to imagine that we could ever actually get as far as making deals to help one another build houses in the first place.*

*Left to their own devices, agents who are at least sometimes narrowly self-interested can repeatedly fail to derive the benefits of cooperation, and instead be trapped in a state of 'war of all against all', in Hobbes's words. In these circumstances, human life, as he vividly and famously put it, will be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."*

*Hobbes's proposed solution to this problem was tyranny.*

*The people can hire an agent — a government — whose job is to punish anyone who breaks any promise.*

*So long as the threatened punishment is sufficiently dire then the cost of reneging on promises will exceed the cost of keeping them.*

*The logic here is identical to that used by an army when it threatens to shoot deserters. If all people know that these incentives hold for most others, then cooperation will not only be possible, but can be the expected norm, so that the war of all against all becomes a general peace.*

*Hobbes pushes the logic of this argument to a very strong conclusion, arguing that it implies not only a government with the right and the power to enforce cooperation, but an 'undivided' government in which the arbitrary will of a single ruler must impose absolute obligation on all.*

*Few contemporary political theorists think that the particular steps by which Hobbes reasons his way to this conclusion are both sound and valid.*

*Working through these issues here, however, would carry us away from our topic into details of contractarian political philosophy.*

*What is important in the present context is that these details, as they are in fact pursued in contemporary debates, involve sophisticated interpretation of the issues using the resources of modern game theory.*

*Furthermore, Hobbes's most basic point, that the fundamental justification for the coercive authority and practices of governments is peoples' own need to protect themselves from what game theorists call 'social dilemmas', is accepted by many, if not most, political theorists.*

*Notice that Hobbes has not argued that tyranny is a desirable thing in itself.*

*The structure of his argument is that the logic of strategic interaction leaves only two general political outcomes possible: tyranny and anarchy. Sensible agents then choose tyranny as the lesser of two evils.*

*The reasoning of the Athenian soldiers, of Cortez, and of Hobbes's political agents has a common logic, one derived from their situations.*

*In each case, the aspect of the environment that is most important to the agents' achievement of their preferred outcomes is the set of expectations and possible reactions to their strategies by other agents.*

*The distinction between acting parametrically on a passive world and acting non-parametrically on a world that tries to act in anticipation of these actions is fundamental.*

*If you wish to kick a rock down a hill, you need only concern yourself with the rock's mass relative to the force of your blow, the extent to which it is bonded with its supporting surface, the slope of the ground on the other side of the rock, and the expected impact of the collision on your foot. The values of all of these variables are independent of your plans and intentions, since the rock has no interests of its own and takes no actions to attempt to assist or thwart you.*

*By contrast, if you wish to kick a person down the hill, then unless that person is unconscious, bound or otherwise incapacitated, you will likely not succeed*

*unless you can disguise your plans until it's too late for him to take either evasive or forestalling action. Furthermore, his probable responses should be expected to visit costs upon you, which you would be wise to consider. Finally, the relative probabilities of his responses will depend on his expectations about your probable responses to his responses. (Consider the difference it will make to both of your reasoning if one or both of you are armed, or one of you is bigger than the other, or one of you is the other's boss.)*

*The logical issues associated with the second sort of situation (kicking the person as opposed to the rock) are typically much more complicated, as a simple hypothetical example will illustrate:*

*Suppose first that you wish to cross a river that is spanned by three bridges. (Assume that swimming, wading or boating across are impossible.)*

*The first bridge is known to be safe and free of obstacles; if you try to cross there, you will succeed.*

*The second bridge lies beneath a cliff from which large rocks sometimes fall.*

*The third is inhabited by deadly cobras.*

*Now suppose you wish to rank-order the three bridges with respect to their preferability as crossing-points.*

*Unless you get positive enjoyment from risking your life – which, as a human being, you might ... – then your decision problem here is straightforward.*

*The first bridge is obviously best, since it is safest. To rank-order the other two bridges, you require information about their relative levels of danger. If you can study the frequency of rock-falls and the movements of the cobras for a while, you might be able to calculate that the probability of your being crushed by a rock at the second bridge is 10% and of being struck by a cobra at the third bridge is 20%. Your reasoning here is strictly parametric because neither the rocks nor the cobras are trying to influence your actions, by, for example, concealing their typical patterns of behaviour because they know you are studying them.*

*It is obvious what you should do here: cross at the safe bridge.*

*Now let us complicate the situation a bit.*

*Suppose that the bridge with the rocks was immediately before you, while the safe bridge was a day's difficult hike upstream.*

*Your decision-making situation here is slightly more complicated, but it is still strictly parametric. You would have to decide whether the cost of the long hike was worth exchanging for the penalty of a 10% chance of being hit by a rock. However, this is all you must decide, and your probability of a successful crossing is entirely up to you; the environment is not interested in your plans.*

*However, if we now complicate the situation by adding a non-parametric element, it becomes more challenging. Suppose that you are a fugitive of some sort, and waiting on the other side of the river with a gun is your pursuer.*

*[The pursuer] will catch and shoot you, let us suppose, only if [the pursuer] waits at the bridge you try to cross; otherwise, you will escape.*

*As you reason through your choice of bridge, it occurs to you that [your pursuer] is over there trying to anticipate your reasoning. It will seem that, surely, choosing the safe bridge straight away would be a mistake, since that is just where [the pursuer] will expect you, and your chances of death rise to certainty.*

*So perhaps you should risk the rocks, since these odds are much better.*

*But wait ... if you can reach this conclusion, your pursuer, who is just as rational and well-informed as you are, can anticipate that you will reach it, and will be waiting for you if you evade the rocks. So perhaps you must take your chances with the cobras; that is what [the pursuer] must least expect.*

*But, then, no ... if [the pursuer] expects that you will expect that [the pursuer] will least expect this, then [the pursuer] will most expect it. This dilemma, you realize with dread, is general: you must do what your pursuer least expects; but whatever you most expect [the pursuer] to least expect is automatically what [the pursuer] will most expect.*

*You appear to be trapped in indecision.*

*All that might console you a bit here is that, on the other side of the river, your pursuer is trapped in exactly the same quandary, unable to decide which bridge to wait at because as soon as [the pursuer] imagines committing to one, [the pursuer] will notice that if [the pursuer] can find a best reason to pick a bridge, you can anticipate that same reason and then avoid [that pursuer].*

*We know from experience that, in situations such as this, people do not usually stand and dither in circles forever ... there is a unique best solution available to each player.*

*However, until the 1940s neither philosophers nor economists knew how to find it mathematically. As a result, economists were forced to treat non-parametric influences as if they were complications on parametric ones.*

*This is likely to strike the reader as odd, since, as our example of the bridge-crossing problem was meant to show, non-parametric features are often fundamental features of decision-making problems. Part of the explanation for game theory's relatively late entry into the field lies in the problems with which economists had historically been concerned. Classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, were mainly interested in the question of how agents in very large markets – whole nations – could interact so as to bring about maximum monetary wealth for themselves.*

*Smith's basic insight, that efficiency is best maximized by agents first differentiating their potential contributions and then freely seeking mutually advantageous bargains, was mathematically verified in the twentieth century. However, the demonstration of this fact applies only in conditions of 'perfect competition,' that is, when individuals or firms face no costs of entry or exit into markets, when there are no economies of scale, and when no agents' actions have unintended side-effects on other agents' well-being.*

...  
*Philosophers share with economists a professional interest in the conditions and techniques for the maximization of welfare. In addition, philosophers have*

*a special concern with the logical justification of actions, and often actions must be justified by reference to their expected outcomes. (One tradition in moral philosophy, utilitarianism, is based on the idea that all justifiable actions must be justified in this way.) Without game theory, both of these problems resist analysis wherever non-parametric aspects are relevant.*

So here we can detect those questions regarding the *appropriateness* of *desires*, and the reasonableness of *beliefs*.

We may detect those prerequisite, pre-conditional ‘affections of mankind’ or ‘passions’ described by Hume.

Are Ross’s anecdotes illustrations or clarifications of the formalisations?

Or are the formalisations illustrations or clarifications of the anecdotes?

The reasoning, the rationality expressed in Decision Theory, the mathematics associated with decision theory, are subservient to, as Hume had it, the sentiments and affections of mankind:

The “Utility” is the “Desirability or Value” according to the “Agent” in question.

Game Theory would be concerned with – for example – *how* to play 18 holes of Golf or a session of Bridge. Decision Theory does not ask *or* answer the question: *What’s the point of* playing Golf or Bridge?

The soldier at the Battle of Delium may have had – like the hero of Geoffrey Household’s *Rogue Male* – very personal motivations to be where he was. These sentiments or affections may have made irrelevant any aversion to or fear of death; and thus made irrelevant any fine distinctions regarding expected utility.

Cortez may have considered probabilities *when* he ended up faced with a mass of Aztecs, but how should we calculate the appropriateness of his desire to cross the Atlantic in the first place.

Would or wouldn’t it have been more reasonable for him to stay in Spain and tend his farm?

Hobbes’s contractee performs calculations when he *needs* to.

If he possessed Gyges' Ring, would the contractee give a toss about any contract?

Rawls makes use of Game Theory in his *A Theory of Justice*.  
He proposes a *Veil of Ignorance*.

Any decisions regarding contractual or constitutional matters should be made so that, according to Rawls, *op. cit.*, 1, 4, as we saw in the UCM, ejaculation 5.3:

*No one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune ... it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of one's own case [or] particular inclinations and aspirations, and [a] persons' conceptions of their good.*

And also Rawls, *op.cit.*, 3, 24:

*The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just ... Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.*

*It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve.*

This is to guarantee that *op. cit.*, 5, 46:

*Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.*

John Rawls was a vehement opponent of Pelagius.

Given the sentiments behind his Veil of Ignorance – This is not at all surprising!

The *sentiments* of *A Theory of Justice* come first, they are *given*, they are *axiomatic*. Those things which cannot be defined in terms of anything else:

Those things which must be desired on their own account:

Those reasons beyond which it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.

*They are placed at the beginning of any argument.*

They are not the *result* of any rational process, any rigorous calculation, any meticulous chain of reasoning.

The formalisation, systematisation, or *mathematisizations* are of *use* as *rhetorical tools* when obfuscating Rawls' *desires* and *preference*.

The *minimal* account of *rationality* is one that sets aside more substantial questions about *appropriate* desires and *reasonable* beliefs – given the situation at hand. The key issue for a minimal account is the treatment of *uncertainty*.

The epistemological point made in ejaculation UPM 1.2 by the celebrated Wittgenstein, and by Locke and Ayer and Moore and Russell; made in the *Vedas* and in the *Upanishads*; made by Plato and by Aristotle and by Confucius; or by Gödel or Frege – made in all lands in the ancient world and the modern:

The epistemological point is inescapable in any study of *game theory*.

The formalisation, systematisation, or *mathematisization* – as, for example, in Bayes' Theorem – *may* be of *use* for the actuary, but, apparently, becomes a rhetorical tool when associated with *desires* and *preferences*:

Those things which cannot be defined in terms of anything else:

Those things which must be desired on their own account:



Those reasons beyond which it is an absurdity to ask for a reason.

Game theory is as much a theory of beliefs, desires and other relevant attitudes as it is a theory of choice.

We may say:

Game Theory is concerned with why we feel *confident* or *justified* in accepting or rejecting a prior probability from a posterior probability.

Ross (effectively) concurs:

*How can the non-psychological game theorist understand the concept of an NE that is an equilibrium in both actions and beliefs?*

*Decades of experimental study have shown that when human subjects play games, especially games that ideally call for use of Bayes's rule in making conjectures about other players' beliefs, we should expect significant heterogeneity in strategic responses.*

*Multiple kinds of informational channels typically link different agents with the incentive structures in their environments. Some agents may actually compute equilibria, with more or less error. Others may settle within error ranges that drift around equilibrium values through more or less myopic conditioned learning. Still others may select response patterns by copying the behaviour of other agents, or by following rules of thumb that are embedded in cultural and institutional structures and represent historical collective learning. Note that the issue here is specific to game theory, rather than merely being a reiteration of a more general point, which would apply to any behavioral science, that people behave noisily from the perspective of ideal theory.*

*In a given game, whether it would be rational for even a trained, self-aware, computationally well resourced agent to play NE would depend on the frequency with which he or she expected others to do likewise.*

*If he or she expects some other players to stray from NE play, this may give him or her a reason to stray. Instead of predicting that human players will reveal strict NE strategies, the experienced experimenter or modeller anticipates that there will be a relationship between their play and the expected costs of departures from NE. Consequently, maximum likelihood estimation of observed actions typically identifies a QRE as providing a better fit than any NE.*

*An analyst handling empirical data in this way should not be interpreted as 'testing the hypothesis' that the agents under analysis are 'rational'. Rather, he or she conjectures that they are agents, that is, that there is a systematic relationship between changes in statistical patterns in their behaviour and some risk-weighted cardinal rankings of possible goal-states.*

*If the agents are people or institutionally structured groups of people that monitor one another and are incentivized to attempt to act collectively, these conjectures will often be regarded as reasonable by critics, or even as pragmatically beyond question, even if always defeasible given the non-zero possibility of bizarre unknown circumstances of the kind philosophers sometimes consider (e.g., the apparent people are pre-programmed unintelligent mechanical simulacra that would be revealed as such if only the environment incentivized responses not written into their programs).*

*The analyst might assume that all of the agents respond to incentive changes in accordance with expected-utility theory, particularly if the agents are firms that have learned response contingencies under normatively demanding conditions of market competition with many players.*

*If the analyst's subjects are individual people, and especially if they are in a non-standard environment relative to their cultural and institutional experience, he or she would more wisely estimate a maximum likelihood mixture model that allows that a range of different utility structures govern different subsets of his or her choice data.*

*All this is to say that use of game theory does not force a scientist to empirically apply a model that is*

*likely to be too precise and narrow in its specifications to plausibly fit the messy complexities of real strategic interaction.*

*A good applied game theorist should also be a well-schooled econometrician.*

#### 3.2.4.1:

NE refers to something called the *Nash Equilibrium* (after mathematician John Forbes Nash, Jr., who, with fellow game theorists John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten, was awarded the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science for his work in non-cooperative game theory: which he used for the RAND Corporation during the Cold War).

Nash Equilibrium represents an action profile for all players in a game and is used to predict the outcome their decision making interaction (i.e. a combination of strategies of all players) in which no payer can benefit by unilaterally changing its strategy. If a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the game, then all players are expected to converge to the state represented by the equilibrium if they are all rational – that is, each player aims to choose the strategy that maximizes its utility function.

That is:

A situation in which a player will continue with their chosen strategy, having no incentive to deviate from it, after taking into consideration the opponent's strategy.

Since some games have multiple Nash Equilibriums, there exist alternative outcomes that are both feasible and preferred by all players.

That is:

If you use the self-service checkout at the supermarket, and you put a bag of broccoli tops through as carrots, and you get away with it, you'll probably "try it on" again if think the assistants are slipshod or nonchalant enough to miss it.

Or:

If someone flies a couple of airliners into the World Trade Centre, and the associated civilization has become so

degenerate that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble to mount a proper response, you'll probably be more likely or willing to "try it on" again – or something similar.

Well...  
Obviously!

#### 3.2.4.2:

QRE – something called *Quantal Response Equilibrium*.

That is:

QRE is an extension of the standard model of NE which allows for errors in choice.

A QRE is Bayesian equilibrium to a game of incomplete information.

In a QRE, individuals do not choose the strategy with highest (observed) utility as certain, but rather choose it with a probability that is a function of the utility difference between that strategy and other strategies.

That is:

Players do not choose *the* or *a best* response: *a* or *the* response with a certain outcome, or with a probability of one 1 (as in Nash equilibrium);

Players choose responses with higher expected rewards with better prospects of outcome: They chose what are regarded as *better* rather than *best* or *certain* responses.

QRE modifies NE to incorporate realistic limitations to rational choice modelling of games.

QRE assumes players have 'rational expectations' based on experience regarding the rational efficiency of other players.

QRE employs statistical insights when interpreting data.

That is (from the *UnChristian Party Manifesto*, "Democracy – The Facts, 2.2):

*Democracy: A system in which somewhere between 70% and 100% of an electorate put their crosses (including tacit or functional crosses) against the LESS BAD OPTION.*

*That is: They put their crosses at the side of the candidate they consider or hope MIGHT DO the LEAST BAD.*

*Not knowing the future, they do not VOTE FOR the candidate they KNOW will do the MOST GOOD.*

*They vote, on balance, to keep the WORST OUT.*

#### 3.2.4.3:

And it is here, when employing Bayes or Nash Equilibrium theory or Quantal Response Equilibrium theory, that we encounter face-on Hume's observations and objections.

It is also where we encounter the euphemisms and politenesses; the walking on egg shells, the tiptoeing around the subject: The P.C., "inclusive", "non-discriminatory" language that limits the scope of the subject, and causes much of the obfuscation:

The *Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure*, (Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang), offers us the following:

*Another necessary condition for the convergence to Nash Equilibrium is that all players must be completely rational.*

*However, numerous sociological studies have shown that such an assumption does not hold in practice.*

*Some players, for example, may not want or do not have the computational resources to find the strategy that maximizes their payoff.*

Game theory is as much a theory of beliefs, desires, *computational resources* and other relevant attitudes and resources as it is a formalised, abstracted theory of choice.

Steven Hawking didn't have the computational resources to invent a cold fusion reactor, or to sort out the Dark Matter problem.

Einstein and Heisenberg *combined* didn't have the computational resources to reconcile Quantum Mechanics and Relativity Theory.

And some people don't have the computational resources to use the self-service checkout at the supermarket, put a bag of broccoli tops through as carrots, and get away with it.

The reader may find more on this in:

Dixit, S. Skeath and D. Reiley's, *Games of Strategy*.

A. Dixit and B. Nalebuff's, *Thinking Strategically*; and also *The Art of Strategy*.

T. Schelling, *Strategy of Conflict*; and also: *Micromotives and Macrobehavior*; "The Intimate Contest for Self-Command", *Public Interest*, 60: 94–118; *Choice and Consequence*; and *Strategies of Commitment*.

And R. Hardin, *One For All*.

And, enthused by this essay, the reader may be happy to part with £125 for Michael Maschler, Eilon Solan and Shmuel Zamir's 1050 page, Cambridge University Press, *Game Theory* (Second Edition).

### 3.3.1.1:

We may now be in a position to examine in a little more detail Pascal's Wager, the principles behind it, and its relevance.

Alan Hájek is Professor of philosophy at ANU.

His research interests include the philosophical foundations of probability and decision theory, epistemology, the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and the philosophy of religion.

His paper "What Conditional Probability Could Not Be" won the 2004 American Philosophical Association Article Prize for "the best article published in the previous two years" by a younger scholar.

The *Philosopher's Annual* selected his "Waging War on Pascal's Wager", *Philosophical Review*, 112(1): 27–56, as one of the ten best articles in philosophy in 2003.

His works include:

“Risky Business”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, vol. 35, no. 1, pp. 189-205.

“Deliberation Welcomes Prediction”, *Episteme*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 507-528.

“The Illogic of Pascal’s Wager”, Proceedings of the 10th Logica International Symposium, T. Childers et al. (eds.), *Philosophia*, The Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 239–249.

“Objecting Vaguely to Pascal’s Wager”, *Philosophical Studies*, 98(1): 1–16.

“Some Reminiscences on Richard Jeffrey, and Some Reflections on The Logic of Decision”, *Philosophy of Science*, 73(5): 947–958.

“Blaise and Bayes”, in Jake Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (eds.), *Probability in the Philosophy of Religion*, 167–186.

“Pascal’s Ultimate Gamble”, in Alex Byrne, Joshua Cohen, Gideon Rosen, and Seana Shiffrin (eds.), *The Norton Introduction to Philosophy*.

“The (In)validity of Pascal’s Wager”, in Bartha and Pasternack (eds.), 123–147.

As with Steele and Ross, we may treat him as an authority on the subject, and trust that his opinions are worth considering:

His opinions connected with decision and game theory as illustrated by Pascal’s Wager.

### 3.3.1.2:

In the following, we’d like the reader to take particular note of Hájek’s discussion of ‘mixed strategies’.

He tells us:

*“Pascal’s Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God.*

*The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single section of his *Pensées*, Pascal apparently presents four such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ – it is only the third of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal’s Wager”.*

***We find in it the extraordinary confluence of several important strands of thought: the justification of theism; probability theory and decision theory, used here for almost the first time in history; pragmatism; voluntarism (the thesis that belief is a matter of the will); and the use of the concept of infinity.***

*We will begin with some brief stage-setting: some historical background, some of the basics of decision theory, and some of the exegetical problems that the Pensées pose ...*

*All quotations are from §233 of Pensées (1910, Trotter translation), the 'thought' whose heading is "Infinite-nothing".*

*It is important to contrast Pascal's argument with various putative 'proofs' of the existence of God that had come before it.*

*Anselm's ontological argument, Aquinas' 'five ways', Descartes' ontological and cosmological arguments, and so on, purport to prove that God exists. Pascal is apparently unimpressed by such attempted justifications of theism: "Endeavour ... to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God..." Indeed, he insists that "we do not know if He is ...".*

*Pascal's project, then, is radically different. He aims to show that we ought to believe in God, rather than that God exists. And he seeks to provide prudential reasons rather than evidential reasons for believing in God.*

*To put it simply, we should wager that God exists because it is the best bet.*

*Ryan finds precursors to this line of reasoning in the writings of Plato, Arnobius, Lactantius, and others; we might add Ghazali to his list.*

*Franklin presents striking parallels to Pascal's Wager by Sirmond and Chillingworth from 1637 and 1638 respectively, thus predating Pascal by a few years.*



***But what is distinctive is Pascal's explicitly decision-theoretic formulation of the reasoning.***

***In fact, Hacking describes the Wager as "the first well-understood contribution to decision theory". Thus, we should pause briefly to review some of the basics of that theory.***

*In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent.*

*We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision table, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.*

*In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities to the states of the world.*

*Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here —*

*Suppose that you have two possible actions,  $A1A1$  and  $A2A2$ , and the worst outcome associated with  $A1A1$  is at least as good as the best outcome associated with  $A2A2$ ; suppose also that in at least one state of the world,  $A1A1$ 's outcome is strictly better than  $A2A2$ 's. Let's say in that case that  $A1A1$  superdominates  $A2A2$ . Then rationality seems to require you to perform  $A1A1$ .*

*A magician will toss a coin. You know nothing about the coin—it might be a normal coin, it might be two-headed, it might be two-tailed, and it might be biased to any degree. Suppose that in this state of complete ignorance about the coin, you do not assign any probability whatsoever to its landing heads.*

*Suppose that you can either bet on heads or on tails; it costs nothing to bet, and you will win \$1 if you bet correctly.*

*But I will pay you an extra \$1 if you bet on heads (I especially like bets on heads).*

*Your possible total pay-offs are given by this decision table:*

	Coin lands heads	Coin lands tails
Bet on heads	2	1
Bet on tails	0	1

*Betting on heads superdominates betting on tails.*

*The worst outcome associated with betting on heads (which pays \$1) is at least as good as the best outcome associated with betting on tails (which pays \$1); and if the coin lands heads, the outcome associated with betting on heads pays more than that associated with tails (\$2 > \$0). Moreover, it seems clear that you should bet on heads.*

*In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state's probability; then, add these numbers.*

*According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).*

Suppose that the utility of money is linear in number of dollars: you value money at exactly its face value. Suppose now that you know that a fair coin will be tossed, and so you assign probability  $1/2$  to heads and  $1/2$  to tails. It costs a dollar to play the following game. If the coin lands heads, you will win \$3; if it lands tails, you will get nothing (including the initial cost of playing, the total possible payoffs are \$1 less than these respective amounts.) Should you play? Here is the decision table:

	Coin lands heads	Coin lands tails
Play	2	-1
Do not play	0	0

The expectation of playing is  $(2 \times 1/2) + (-1 \times 1/2) = 1/2$ . This exceeds the expectation of not playing—namely 0—so you should play.

And now suppose that the payoff if the coin lands heads is reduced by \$1, so that the decision table becomes:

	Coin lands heads	Coin lands tails
Play	1	-1
Do not play	0	0

*Then consistent with decision theory, you could either play or not, for either way your expectation would be 0.*

*Considerations such as these will play a crucial role in Pascal's arguments.*

*It should be admitted that there are certain exegetical problems in presenting these arguments. Pascal never finished the Pensées, but rather left them in the form of notes of various sizes pinned together.*

*Hacking describes the "Infinite-nothing" as consisting of "two pieces of paper covered on both sides by handwriting going in all directions, full of erasures, corrections, insertions, and afterthoughts"*

*This may explain why certain passages are notoriously difficult to interpret, as we will see.*

*Furthermore, our formulation of the arguments in the parlance of modern Bayesian decision theory might appear somewhat anachronistic. For example, Pascal did not distinguish between what we would now call objective and subjective probability, although it is clear that it is the latter that is relevant to his arguments.*

*A number of authors who have been otherwise critical of the Wager have explicitly conceded that the Wager is valid – e.g. Mackie, Rescher, Mongin and Sober, and most emphatically, Hacking.*

*That is, these authors agree with Pascal that wagering for God really is rationally mandated by Pascal's decision table in tandem with positive probability for God's existence, and the decision theoretic account of rational action.*

*However, Duff and Hájek argue that the argument is in fact invalid.*

*Their point is that there are strategies besides wagering for God that also have infinite expectation – namely, mixed strategies, whereby you do not wager for or against God outright, but rather choose which of these actions to perform on the basis of the outcome of some chance device.*

Consider the mixed strategy: "Toss a fair coin: heads, you wager for God; tails, you wager against God".

By Pascal's lights, with probability  $1/2$  your expectation will be infinite, and with probability  $1/2$  it will be finite. The expectation of the entire strategy is:

$$1/2 \times \infty + 1/2 \times [f/2 \times p + f/3 \times (1-p)] = \infty$$

That is, the 'coin toss' strategy has the same expectation as outright wagering for God. But the probability  $1/2$  was incidental to the result. Any mixed strategy that gives positive and finite probability to wagering for God will likewise have infinite expectation: "wager for God iff a fair die lands 6", "wager for God iff your lottery ticket wins", "wager for God iff a meteor quantum tunnels its way through the side of your house", and so on.

It can be argued that the problem is still worse than this, though, for there is a sense in which anything that you do might be regarded as a mixed strategy between wagering for God, and wagering against God, with suitable probability weights given to each. Suppose that you choose to ignore the Wager, and to go and have a hamburger instead. Still, you may well assign positive and finite probability to your winding up wagering for God nonetheless; and this probability multiplied by infinity again gives infinity. So ignoring the Wager and having a hamburger has the same expectation as outright wagering for God.

Even worse, suppose that you focus all your energy into avoiding belief in God. Still, you may well assign positive and finite probability to your efforts failing, with the result that you wager for God nonetheless. In that case again, your expectation is infinite again. So even if rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility when there is one, here there isn't one. Rather, there is a many-way tie for first place, as it were.

**All hell breaks loose: anything you might do is maximally good by expected utility lights!**

Monton defends Pascal's Wager against this line of objection. He argues that an atheist or agnostic has

*more than one opportunity to follow a mixed strategy. Returning to the first example of one, suppose that the fair coin lands tails. Monton's thought is that your expected utility now changes; it is no longer infinite, but rather that of an atheist or agnostic who has no prospect of the infinite reward for wagering for God. You are back to where you started. But since it was rational for you to follow the mixed strategy the first time, it is rational for you to follow it again now – that is, to toss the coin again. And if it lands tails again, it is rational for you to toss the coin again ... With probability 1, the coin will land heads eventually, and from that point on you will wager for God.*

Similar reasoning applies to wagering for God just in case an  $n$ -sided die lands 1 (say): with probability 1 the die will eventually land 1, so if you repeatedly base your mixed strategy on the die, with probability 1 you will wind up wagering for God after a finite number of rolls.

*Robertson replies that not all such mixed strategies are (probabilistically) guaranteed to lead to your wagering for God in the long run: not ones in which the probability of wagering for God decreases sufficiently fast on successive trials. Think, for example, of rolling a 4-sided die, then a 9-sided die, and in general an  $(n+1)2(n+1)2$ -sided die on the  $nn^{\text{th}}$  trial ..., a strategy for which the probability that you will eventually wager for God is only  $1/2$ , as Robertson shows.*

However, Easwaran and Monton counter-reply that with a continuum of times at which the dice can be rolled, the sequence of rolls that Robertson proposes can be completed in an arbitrarily short period of time. In that case, what should you do next? By Monton's argument, it seems you should roll a die again.

Easwaran and Monton prove that if there are uncountably many times at which one implements a mixed strategy with non-zero probability of wagering for God, then with probability 1, one ends up wagering for God at one of these times. (And they assume, as is standard, that once one wagers for God there is no going back.) They concede that imagining uncountable rolls of

*a die, say, involves an idealization that is surely not physically realizable. But they maintain that you should act in the way that an idealized version of yourself would eventually act, one who can realize the rolls as described – that is, wager for God outright.*

*There is a further twist on the mixed strategies objection. To repeat, the objection's upshot is that even granting Pascal all his premises, still wagering for God is not rationally required. But we have seen numerous reasons not to grant all his premises. Very well then; let's not. Indeed, let's suppose that you give tiny probability  $p$  to them all being true, where  $pp$  is positive and finite. So you assign probability  $pp$  to your decision problem being exactly as Pascal claims it to be. But if it is, according to the mixed strategies objection, all hell breaks loose. Yet again,  $pp$  multiplied by infinity gives infinity.*

*Hence, it seems that each action that gets infinite expected utility according to Pascal similarly gets infinite expected utility according to you; but by the previous reasoning, that is anything you might do. The full force of the objection that hit Pascal now hits you too.*

*There are some subtleties that we have elided over; for example, if you also assign positive and finite probability to a source of negative infinite utility, then the expected utilities instead become  $\infty\infty - \infty\infty$ , which is undefined. But that is just another way for all hell to break loose for you: in that case, you cannot evaluate the choiceworthiness of your possible actions at all. Either way, you face decision-theoretic paralysis. We might call this Pascal's Revenge.*

*Jackson and Rogers, developing points in Jackson, argue that the mixed-strategies objection is a "structural, but not substantive" objection to Pascal's Wager. They provide cases in which it is clearly rational to prefer one infinite good to another. They suggest a reformulation of how prospects of infinite rewards should be compared. (This also provides a response to the many Gods objection.)*

*Hájek offers many valid reformulations of the Wager with more nuanced representations of the utility of salvation, such that the lower the probability of wagering for God, the lower the expected utility.*

### 3.3.2:

After this survey of the traditional matter of the wager, Hájek now stresses its importance for our discussion: ‘decision theory, probability, epistemology, psychology, and even moral philosophy. It has provided a case study for attempts to develop infinite decision theories.’ ... ‘the question of whether there can be pragmatic reasons for belief, and the supposed difference between theoretical and practical rationality. It raises subtle issues about the extent to which one’s beliefs can be a matter of the will, and the ethics of belief.’

*Pascal’s Wager vies with Anselm’s Ontological Argument for being the most famous argument in the philosophy of religion. Indeed, the Wager arguably has greater influence nowadays than any other such argument—not just in the service of Christian apologetics, but also in its impact on various lines of thought associated with infinity, decision theory, probability, epistemology, psychology, and even moral philosophy. It has provided a case study for attempts to develop infinite decision theories. In it, Pascal countenanced the notion of infinitesimal probability long before philosophers such as Lewis and Skyrms gave it prominence.*

*It continues to put into sharp relief the question of whether there can be pragmatic reasons for belief, and the putative difference between theoretical and practical rationality. It raises subtle issues about the extent to which one’s beliefs can be a matter of the will, and the ethics of belief.*

*Reasoning reminiscent of Pascal’s Wager, often with an explicit acknowledgment of it, also informs a number of debates in moral philosophy, both theoretical and applied.*

*Kenny suggests that nuclear Armageddon has negative infinite utility, and some might say the same for the loss of even a single human life.*

*Stich criticizes an argument that he attributes to Mazzeocchi, that there should be a total ban on recombinant DNA research, since such research could lead to the “Andromeda scenario” of creating a killer*



*strain of bacterial culture against which humans are helpless; the ban, moreover, should be enforced if the “Andromeda scenario has even the smallest possibility of occurring”, in Mazzocchi’s words. This is plausibly read, then, as an assignment of negative infinite utility to the Andromeda scenario.*

*More recently, Colyvan, Cox, and Steele discuss Pascal’s Wager-like problems for certain deontological moral theories, in which violations of duties are assigned negative infinite utility.*

*Colyvan, Justus and Regan canvas difficulties associated with assigning infinite value to the natural environment.*

*Bartha and DesRoches respond, with an appeal to relative utility theory.*

*Stone argues that a version of Pascal’s Wager applies to sustaining patients who are in a persistent vegetative state; see Varelius for a dissenting view.*

*Pascal’s Wager has even been appealed to in the medical debate over whether antibiotics should be used to prevent a certain kind of inflammation in the heart (Shaw and Conway).*

*Pascal’s Wager is a watershed in the philosophy of religion. As we have seen, it is also a great deal more besides.*

For further interesting discussions, the reader may consult:

William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications* (Volume II), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition.

And:

Hacking, Ian, “The Logic of Pascal’s Wager”, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 9(2): 186–92. And, *The Emergence of Probability*, Cambridge University Press.

## Part IV.

So:

### 4.1.1:

To emphasize, to repeat – *yet again*:

Our point in including this appendix is to make clear that  
(1) – as Hume had it –

*The ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties ...*

*It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired.*

*Something must be desirable on its own account.*

### 4.1.2:

The first declaration in Robert Nozick's, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* – which was intended as a riposte to Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* – asserts:

*Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights).*

This is not the product of any *deduction*.

It's the *starting point* for any deduction.

It hasn't been *proved*.

For Nozick, the assertion doesn't *need* a proof.

For Nozick, it is an *axiom*.

For Nozick, his assertion is an indemonstrable first principle;

It is a required assumption.

It is an ultimate end that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommends itself entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

It is something that must be desirable on its own account.

The foundational statement in John Rawls', *A Theory of Justice* asserts:

*Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. Therefore in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.*

This is not the product of any deduction.

It's the starting point for any deduction.

It hasn't been proved.

For Rawls, the assertion doesn't *need* a proof.

For Rawls, it is an *axiom*.

For Rawls, his assertion is an indemonstrable first principle;

It is a required assumption.

It is an ultimate end that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommends itself entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

It is something that must be desirable on its own account.

For some, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness are, self-evidently, Inalienable Rights.

This assertion is not the product of any deduction.

It's the starting point for any deduction.

It hasn't been proved.  
For its champions, the assertion doesn't *need* a proof.

For them, it is an *axiom*.

For them, the assertion is an indemonstrable first principle;  
It is a required assumption.

It is an ultimate end that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommends itself entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

It is something that must be desirable on its own account.

And for the Christian:

The poor in spirit *must* be exalted.  
They that mourn *must* be exalted.  
The meek must be exalted.

These assertions are not the product of any *deduction*.  
They are the *starting point* for any deduction.  
They haven't been *proved*.  
For the Christian, the assertions don't *need* a proof.

For them, they are *axioms*.

For them, the assertions are indemonstrable first principles;  
They are required assumptions.

They are ultimate ends that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommends themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

They are something that must be desirable on their own account.

For the Christian, the Kings *must* be humbled; their names *must* be destroyed.  
Their altars *must* be destroyed.  
Their images *must* be broken down.  
The images of their Gods *must* be burned with fire.

The last *must* be exalted.  
The first *must* be cut down.

For the Christian, the proud and lofty *must* be cut down.  
The greatest *must* be cut down.  
The broken-hearted *must* be comforted.  
The captives *must* be liberated.  
The bound *must* be liberated.  
All that mourn *must* have their day of vengeance.  
Them that dwell on high; in the lofty city; they *must* be brought down.  
The lofty city *must* be laid low; even to the ground;  
It *must* be brought even to the dust;  
It *must* be trodden down, with the steps of vermin, and the feet of scum.

*Therefore they will not refrain their mouths; they will speak in the anguish of their spirit; they will complain in the bitterness of their souls.*

For the Christian, these assertions are not the product of any deduction.  
They are the *starting point* for any deduction.  
They haven't been *proved*.  
For the Christian, the assertions don't *need* a proof.

For them, they are *axioms*.

For them, the assertions are indemonstrable first principles;  
They are required assumptions.

They are ultimate ends that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommends themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

They are something that must be desirable on their own account.

Attempting to disprove their axioms, or disprove their sentiments and affections, is like giving a fish a bicycle.  
The limits of their desires are the limits of their world.

For the Christian –

The first *must* be last *because* they are first, *and for no other reason*.

The last *must* be first *because* they are the last, *and for no other reason*.

The proud and lofty *must* be brought low *because* they are proud and lofty, *and for no other reason*.

The greatest *must* be cut down *because* they are the greatest, *and for no other reason*.

All that mourn *must* have their day of vengeance *because* they must have their day of vengeance, *and for no other reason*.

The bound *deserve* to be liberated *because* they are bound, *and for no other reason*.

Any reasoning *associated* with their axioms is of the type describe by Hume: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, “Of the influencing motives of the will”, 6:

*’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.*

*’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.*

*’Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg’d lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.*

For Immanuel Kant, his Categorical Imperative:

*Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.*

Or:

*Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.*

His Categorical Imperative is something desirable on its own account

To remind the reader of the *type* of rationality referred to in Decision Theory according to Steele/Stefánsson:

*The main question of interest is what criteria an agent's preference attitudes should satisfy in any generic circumstances. This amounts to a minimal account of rationality, one that sets aside more substantial questions about appropriate desires and reasonable beliefs, given the situation at hand. The key issue for a minimal account is the treatment of uncertainty. The orthodox normative [prescriptive; what ought to happen] decision theory, expected utility (EU) theory, essentially says that, in situations of uncertainty, one should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value. (Note that in this context, "desirability" and "value" should be understood as desirability/ value according to the agent in question.)*

The axioms of Nozick, or of Rawls, or of Kant, or of Christ set aside any questions regarding the appropriateness of their desires or beliefs. The desires or beliefs are *given*. Desirability or value are desirability or value according to Nozick or Rawls or Kant or Christ.

Their axioms are ultimate ends that can never be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections without any dependence on the intellectual faculties.

#### 4.1.3:

Our task in this essay is to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

We can see how Cortez might make a good guess regarding the possible reactions of the Aztecs or of the Spanish Sailors;

But what the hell sort of utilities or rational choice modelling or probability axioms or rational expectations did the *19 year-old* Gavrilo Princip take into account before he decided to let fly a bullet in the direction of the Austrian Emperor's nephew!?

The probability assumed in betting on assassination  
*superdominates...* what?

What sort of posterior probabilities could have suggested  
the First World War *and its results and ramifications?*

The Russian Revolution?

And the fall of the Ottoman Empire?

The importance of oil and thus of the Middle Eastern  
governments?

The rise of the USA?

The Great Depression and its causes?

Hitler and the Third Reich?

The USSR?

The birth (or rebirth) of Israel?

The rise of China?

The moving of general sentiment towards The Left?

The appearance the United Nations and its *Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights*.

And the rise of the real Christianity and of Christian  
Charity?

And the prior probabilities –

What could they be taken as –

And what would be their function?

What size of factorial would be involved?

How, or *why*, would we settle on the relevant elements of  
any factorial?

What sort of statistical insights did the Emperor Franz  
Joseph I employ when interpreting data?

What sort of statistical insights did he employ – 3 weeks  
before his 84<sup>th</sup> birthday – when he declared war on Serbia and  
Russia?

What sort of posterior probabilities were considered?

What sort of prior probabilities could have been  
anticipated?

What sort of utilities or rational choice modelling or  
probability axioms or rational expectations or statistical  
insights were taken into account or employed regarding the  
responses to CoViD-19?



What sort of posterior probabilities were considered?

What sort of prior probabilities could have been anticipated?

What sort of utilities or rational choice modelling or probability axioms or rational expectations or statistical insights were taken into account or employed before the masochistic, self-flagellating, suicidal response to the George Floyd incident!?

What sort of posterior probabilities were considered?

What sort of prior probabilities could have been anticipated?

And this, indeed, is one of the standard, one of the first, and still one of the best objections to Utilitarianism.

**What the hell sort of rational choice modelling or probability axioms or rational expectations went on or were considered when Mr and Mrs Princip were at it in their bedroom in Oblaj in October 1893!?**

**What sort of posterior probabilities were considered?**

**What prior probabilities could have been anticipated?**

What sort of posterior probabilities were pondered by Elvis Presley before he first walked into Sam Phillips' studio?

What type of prior probabilities could he deduce?

What sort of posterior probabilities were juggled by James Joyce before he embarked on his *Ulysses*?

What type of prior probabilities could he deduce?

What were the expected utilities?

**What good could come of it?**

#### 4.1.4:

A very useful thought experiment may be conducted with Jonathan Swift's satirical *A Modest Proposal* (For preventing the children of poor people in Ireland from being a burden on

their parents or country, and for making them beneficial to the publick) of 1729.

We reproduce it here in full.

We'd like the reader to bear in mind Hume's depiction of reason:

*'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.*

*'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.*

*'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.*

And also Steele/Stefánsson's:

*The main question of interest is what criteria an agent's preference attitudes should satisfy in any generic circumstances. This amounts to a minimal account of rationality, one that sets aside more substantial questions about appropriate desires and reasonable beliefs, given the situation at hand. The key issue for a minimal account is the treatment of uncertainty. The orthodox normative [prescriptive; what ought to happen] decision theory, expected utility (EU) theory, essentially says that, in situations of uncertainty, one should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value. (Note that in this context, "desirability" and "value" should be understood as desirability/ value according to the agent in question.)*

According to Hume and Steele/Stefánsson, the following is not irrational; the following could be justifiable as rational...

So why do we reject it as *completely unacceptable*?

Is it not because any rationality is overruled by Hume's 'sentiments and affections of mankind' that 'recommend themselves ... without any dependence on the intellectual faculties'?

That Swift's recommendations are completely unacceptable is axiomatic.

And that's the end of the matter.

In what follows, we'd like the reader to pause at every proposal and explanation, and coolly ask whether or not the statement is justifiable under Decision Theory and/or Game Theory constraints. Is the argument coherent? Does any part of it contradict any other? Is it *logical*?

Does Swift's piece satisfy the orthodox normative decision theory, Expected Utility theory stipulation that, in situations of uncertainty, one should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value?

But particularly Swift's suggestions in part *v*. –

Why might our sentiments and affections attract rather than repel us here?

Are these suggestions more rational, or logical, or coherent than the rest?

Are the statements justifiable under Decision Theory and/or Game Theory constraints?

Do they better satisfy the orthodox normative decision theory, Expected Utility theory stipulation that, in situations of uncertainty, one should prefer the option with greatest expected desirability or value?

So, Swift's *Modest Proposal*:

*i.*

*It is a melancholy object to those, who walk through this great town, or travel in the country, when they see the streets, the roads, and cabin-doors crowded with beggars of the female sex, followed by three, four, or six children, all in rags, and importuning every passenger for an alms. These mothers, instead of being able to work for their honest livelihood, are forced to employ all their time in strolling to beg sustenance for their helpless infants who, as they grow up, either turn thieves for want of work, or leave their dear native country, to fight for the Pretender in Spain, or sell themselves to the Barbadoes.*

*I think it is agreed by all parties, that this prodigious number of children in the arms, or on the backs, or at the heels of their mothers, and frequently of their fathers, is in the present deplorable state of the kingdom, a very great additional grievance; and therefore whoever could find out a fair, cheap and easy method of making these children sound and useful members of the commonwealth, would deserve so well of the publick, as to have his statue set up for a preserver of the nation.*

*But my intention is very far from being confined to provide only for the children of professed beggars: it is of a much greater extent, and shall take in the whole number of infants at a certain age, who are born of parents in effect as little able to support them, as those who demand our charity in the streets.*

*As to my own part, having turned my thoughts for many years upon this important subject, and maturely weighed the several schemes of our projectors, I have always found them grossly mistaken in their computation. It is true, a child just dropt from its dam, may be supported by her milk, for a solar year, with little other nourishment: at most not above the value of two shillings, which the mother may certainly get, or the value in scraps, by her lawful occupation of begging; and it is exactly at one year old that I propose to provide for them in such a manner, as, instead of being a charge upon their parents, or the parish, or wanting food and raiment for the rest of their lives, they shall, on the contrary, contribute to the feeding, and partly to the clothing of many thousands.*

*There is likewise another great advantage in my scheme, that it will prevent those voluntary abortions, and that horrid practice of women murdering their bastard children, alas! too frequent among us, sacrificing the poor innocent babes, I doubt, more to avoid the expence than the shame, which would move tears and pity in the most savage and inhuman breast.*

*ii.*

*The number of souls in this kingdom being usually reckoned one million and a half, of these I calculate there may be about two hundred thousand couple, whose wives are breeders; from which number I subtract thirty thousand couple, who are able to maintain their own children, (although I apprehend there cannot be so many under the present distresses of the kingdom) but this being granted, there will remain a hundred and seventy thousand breeders. I again subtract fifty thousand, for those women who miscarry, or whose children die by accident or disease within the year. There only remain a hundred and twenty thousand children of poor parents annually born. The question therefore is, How this number shall be reared and provided for? which, as I have already said, under the present situation of affairs, is utterly impossible by all the methods hitherto proposed. For we can neither employ them in handicraft or agriculture; they neither build houses, (I mean in the country) nor cultivate land: they can very seldom pick up a livelihood by stealing till they arrive at six years old; except where they are of towardsly parts, although I confess they learn the rudiments much earlier; during which time they can however be properly looked upon only as probationers; as I have been informed by a principal gentleman in the county of Cavan, who protested to me, that he never knew above one or two instances under the age of six, even in a part of the kingdom so renowned for the quickest proficiency in that art.*

*I am assured by our merchants, that a boy or a girl, before twelve years old, is no saleable commodity, and even when they come to this age, they will not yield above three pounds, or three pounds and half a crown at most, on the exchange; which cannot turn to account either to the parents or kingdom, the charge of nutriments and rags having been at least four times that value.*

*iii.*

*I shall now therefore humbly propose my own thoughts, which I hope will not be liable to the least objection.*

*I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed, is, at a year old, a most delicious nourishing and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricasee, or a ragoust.*

*I do therefore humbly offer it to publick consideration, that of the hundred and twenty thousand children, already computed, twenty thousand may be reserved for breed, whereof only one fourth part to be males; which is more than we allow to sheep, black cattle, or swine, and my reason is, that these children are seldom the fruits of marriage, a circumstance not much regarded by our savages, therefore, one male will be sufficient to serve four females. That the remaining hundred thousand may, at a year old, be offered in sale to the persons of quality and fortune, through the kingdom, always advising the mother to let them suck plentifully in the last month, so as to render them plump, and fat for a good table. A child will make two dishes at an entertainment for friends, and when the family dines alone, the fore or hind quarter will make a reasonable dish, and seasoned with a little pepper or salt, will be very good boiled on the fourth day, especially in winter.*

*I have reckoned upon a medium, that a child just born will weigh 12 pounds, and in a solar year, if tolerably nursed, encreaseth to 28 pounds.*

*I grant this food will be somewhat dear, and therefore very proper for landlords, who, as they have already devoured most of the parents, seem to have the best title to the children.*

*Infant's flesh will be in season throughout the year, but more plentiful in March, and a little before and after; for we are told by a grave author, an eminent*

*French physician, that fish being a prolifick dyet, there are more children born in Roman Catholick countries about nine months after Lent, than at any other season; therefore, reckoning a year after Lent, the markets will be more glutted than usual, because the number of Popish infants, is at least three to one in this kingdom, and therefore it will have one other collateral advantage, by lessening the number of Papists among us.*

*I have already computed the charge of nursing a beggar's child (in which list I reckon all cottagers, labourers, and four-fifths of the farmers) to be about two shillings per annum, rags included; and I believe no gentleman would repine to give ten shillings for the carcass of a good fat child, which, as I have said, will make four dishes of excellent nutritive meat, when he hath only some particular friend, or his own family to dine with him. Thus the squire will learn to be a good landlord, and grow popular among his tenants, the mother will have eight shillings neat profit, and be fit for work till she produces another child.*

*Those who are more thrifty (as I must confess the times require) may flay the carcass; the skin of which, artificially dressed, will make admirable gloves for ladies, and summer boots for fine gentlemen.*

*As to our City of Dublin, shambles may be appointed for this purpose, in the most convenient parts of it, and butchers we may be assured will not be wanting; although I rather recommend buying the children alive, and dressing them hot from the knife, as we do roasting pigs.*

*A very worthy person, a true lover of his country, and whose virtues I highly esteem, was lately pleased in discoursing on this matter, to offer a refinement upon my scheme. He said, that many gentlemen of this kingdom, having of late destroyed their deer, he conceived that the want of venison might be well supplied by the bodies of young lads and maidens, not exceeding fourteen years of age, nor under twelve; so great a number of both sexes in every county being now ready to starve for want of*

*work and service: and these to be disposed of by their parents if alive, or otherwise by their nearest relations. But with due deference to so excellent a friend, and so deserving a patriot, I cannot be altogether in his sentiments; for as to the males, my American acquaintance assured me from frequent experience, that their flesh was generally tough and lean, like that of our schoolboys, by continual exercise, and their taste disagreeable, and to fatten them would not answer the charge. Then as to the females, it would, I think, with humble submission, be a loss to the publick, because they soon would become breeders themselves: and besides, it is not improbable that some scrupulous people might be apt to censure such a practice, (although indeed very unjustly) as a little bordering upon cruelty, which, I confess, hath always been with me the strongest objection against any project, how well soever intended.*

*But in order to justify my friend, he confessed, that this expedient was put into his head by the famous Psalmanaazor, a native of the island Formosa, who came from thence to London, above twenty years ago, and in conversation told my friend, that in his country, when any young person happened to be put to death, the executioner sold the carcass to persons of quality, as a prime dainty; and that, in his time, the body of a plump girl of fifteen, who was crucified for an attempt to poison the Emperor, was sold to his imperial majesty's prime minister of state, and other great mandarins of the court in joints from the gibbet, at four hundred crowns. Neither indeed can I deny, that if the same use were made of several plump young girls in this town, who without one single groat to their fortunes, cannot stir abroad without a chair, and appear at a playhouse and assemblies in foreign fineries which they never will pay for, the kingdom would not be the worse.*

*Some persons of a desponding spirit are in great concern about that vast number of poor people, who are aged, diseased, or maimed; and I have been desired to employ my thoughts what course may be taken, to ease the nation of so grievous an incumbrance. But I am not in the least pain upon that matter, because it is very*



*well known, that they are every day dying, and rotting, by cold and famine, and filth, and vermin, as fast as can be reasonably expected. And as to the young labourers, they are now in almost as hopeful a condition. They cannot get work, and consequently pine away from want of nourishment, to a degree, that if at any time they are accidentally hired to common labour, they have not strength to perform it, and thus the country and themselves are happily delivered from the evils to come.*

*iv.*

*I have too long digressed, and therefore shall return to my subject. I think the advantages by the proposal which I have made are obvious and many, as well as of the highest importance.*

*For first, as I have already observed, it would greatly lessen the number of Papists, with whom we are yearly overrun, being the principal breeders of the nation, as well as our most dangerous enemies, and who stay at home on purpose with a design to deliver the kingdom to the Pretender, hoping to take their advantage by the absence of so many good Protestants, who have chosen rather to leave their country, than stay at home and pay tithes against their conscience to an episcopal curate.*

*Secondly, The poorer tenants will have something valuable of their own, which by law may be made liable to a distress, and help to pay their landlord's rent, their corn and cattle being already seized, and money a thing unknown.*

*Thirdly, Whereas the maintainance of a hundred thousand children, from two years old, and upwards, cannot be computed at less than ten shillings a piece per annum, the nation's stock will be thereby encreased fifty thousand pounds per annum, besides the profit of a new dish, introduced to the tables of all gentlemen of fortune in the kingdom, who have any refinement in taste. And*

*the money will circulate among our selves, the goods being entirely of our own growth and manufacture.*

*Fourthly, The constant breeders, besides the gain of eight shillings sterling per annum by the sale of their children, will be rid of the charge of maintaining them after the first year.*

*Fifthly, This food would likewise bring great custom to taverns, where the vintners will certainly be so prudent as to procure the best receipts for dressing it to perfection; and consequently have their houses frequented by all the fine gentlemen, who justly value themselves upon their knowledge in good eating; and a skilful cook, who understands how to oblige his guests, will contrive to make it as expensive as they please.*

*Sixthly, This would be a great inducement to marriage, which all wise nations have either encouraged by rewards, or enforced by laws and penalties. It would encrease the care and tenderness of mothers towards their children, when they were sure of a settlement for life to the poor babes, provided in some sort by the publick, to their annual profit instead of expence. We should soon see an honest emulation among the married women, which of them could bring the fattest child to the market. Men would become as fond of their wives, during the time of their pregnancy, as they are now of their mares in foal, their cows in calf, or sows when they are ready to farrow; nor offer to beat or kick them (as is too frequent a practice) for fear of a miscarriage.*

*Many other advantages might be enumerated. For instance, the addition of some thousand carcasses in our exportation of barrel'd beef: the propagation of swine's flesh, and improvement in the art of making good bacon, so much wanted among us by the great destruction of pigs, too frequent at our tables; which are no way comparable in taste or magnificence to a well grown, fat yearling child, which roasted whole will make a considerable figure at a Lord Mayor's feast, or any other publick entertainment. But this, and many others, I omit, being studious of brevity.*

*Supposing that one thousand families in this city, would be constant customers for infants flesh, besides others who might have it at merry meetings, particularly at weddings and christenings, I compute that Dublin would take off annually about twenty thousand carcasses; and the rest of the kingdom (where probably they will be sold somewhat cheaper) the remaining eighty thousand.*

*I can think of no one objection, that will possibly be raised against this proposal, unless it should be urged, that the number of people will be thereby much lessened in the kingdom. This I freely own, and was indeed one principal design in offering it to the world. I desire the reader will observe, that I calculate my remedy for this one individual Kingdom of Ireland, and for no other that ever was, is, or, I think, ever can be upon Earth.*

v.

*Therefore let no man talk to me of other expedients:*

*Of taxing our absentees at five shillings a pound:*

*Of using neither clothes, nor household furniture, except what is of our own growth and manufacture:*

*Of utterly rejecting the materials and instruments that promote foreign luxury:*

*Of curing the expensiveness of pride, vanity, idleness, and gaming in our women:*

*Of introducing a vein of parsimony, prudence and temperance:*

*Of learning to love our country, wherein we differ even from Laplanders, and the inhabitants of Topinamboo:*

*Of quitting our animosities and factions, nor acting any longer like the Jews, who were murdering one another at the very moment their city was taken:*

*Of being a little cautious not to sell our country and consciences for nothing:*

*Of teaching landlords to have at least one degree of mercy towards their tenants.*

*Lastly, of putting a spirit of honesty, industry, and skill into our shopkeepers, who, if a resolution could now be taken to buy only our native goods, would immediately unite to cheat and exact upon us in the price, the measure, and the goodness, nor could ever yet be brought to make one fair proposal of just dealing, though often and earnestly invited to it.*

*Therefore I repeat, let no man talk to me of these and the like expedients, till he hath at least some glimpse of hope, that there will ever be some hearty and sincere attempt to put them into practice.*

*vi.*

*But, as to myself, having been wearied out for many years with offering vain, idle, visionary thoughts, and at length utterly despairing of success, I fortunately fell upon this proposal, which, as it is wholly new, so it hath something solid and real, of no expence and little trouble, full in our own power, and whereby we can incur no danger in disobliging England. For this kind of commodity will not bear exportation, and flesh being of too tender a consistence, to admit a long continuance in salt, although perhaps I could name a country, which would be glad to eat up our whole nation without it.*

*After all, I am not so violently bent upon my own opinion, as to reject any offer, proposed by wise men, which shall be found equally innocent, cheap, easy, and effectual. But before something of that kind shall be advanced in contradiction to my scheme, and offering a better, I desire the author or authors will be pleased maturely to consider two points. First, As things now stand, how they will be able to find food and raiment for a hundred thousand useless mouths and backs. And secondly, There being a round million of creatures in humane figure throughout this kingdom, whose whole subsistence put into a common stock, would leave them in debt two million of pounds sterling, adding those who are beggars by profession, to the bulk of farmers, cottagers and labourers, with their wives and children, who are beggars in effect; I desire those politicians who*

*dislike my overture, and may perhaps be so bold to attempt an answer, that they will first ask the parents of these mortals, whether they would not at this day think it a great happiness to have been sold for food at a year old, in the manner I prescribe, and thereby have avoided such a perpetual scene of misfortunes, as they have since gone through, by the oppression of landlords, the impossibility of paying rent without money or trade, the want of common sustenance, with neither house nor clothes to cover them from the inclemencies of the weather, and the most inevitable prospect of intailing the like, or greater miseries, upon their breed for ever.*

*I profess in the sincerity of my heart, that I have not the least personal interest in endeavouring to promote this necessary work, having no other motive than the publick good of my country, by advancing our trade, providing for infants, relieving the poor, and giving some pleasure to the rich. I have no children, by which I can propose to get a single penny; the youngest being nine years old, and my wife past child-bearing.*

We ask the reader – are Swift’s satirical comments more or less crazy than a declaration of war by Britain, Germany, France and Russia because a 19 year-old Gavrilo Princip shot the Austrian Emperor’s nephew?

Why might our sentiments and affections view the former as being crazier than the latter?

Are the entreaties of *Matthew*, 5, 39-44:

*But I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.*

*And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also.*

*And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.*

*Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.*

*Ye have heard that it hath been said; thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy.*

*But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them  
that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray  
for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.*

Are these, and the sentiments and affections behind them, more or less crazy than Swift's satirical comments?

We'll leave the reader to read through the abortion statistics.

Classical or Error statistics is usually taken as the main opponent to Bayesianism regarding scientific inference. This denies any implication of "degrees of support" given to any hypothesis by evidence.

Classical or Error statistics focuses on how a hypothesis survives "severe tests". Inferences are made via the long-run outcomes of tests.

But the standard, ubiquitous, and *obvious* sceptical considerations and objections are here as much as with Bayesianism.

We might even introduce *Fuzzy Set Theory* here.

In standard set theory, an element either is or is not a member of a particular set (recall the Law of Excluded Middle). However, in decision making it might not be clear whether or not an element is in the set. Fuzzy Set Theory replaces the two-valued function with a probability distribution.

The problems are evident even at the most basic and introductory levels. Wilfred Hodges, FBA, author of *Mathematical Logic* (Oxford University Press), tells us in his *Logic*, pp. 243-244:

*Our calculus only tells us how to deduce likelihoods  
from other likelihoods. It is not clear how far  
likelihoods can be deduced from anything else. Certainly  
we all do estimate likelihoods all the time – what  
chance I'll reach the shops before closing time? Might  
James take offence? Will another drink make me feel  
sick? Is the ladder safe? Apparently we do it on the  
basis of the facts we know. But nobody has yet provided  
a complete and convincing account of how to deduce a*

*likelihood from brute facts alone. Maybe it can't be done, and estimating likelihoods is fundamentally different from deducing them. Maybe it can, but only by arguments which are too long to set down on paper.*

We can recognise Hume in this: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 139:

*There is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it ... even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience.*

And the purpose of this essay is also to make clear that (2) the preceding was recognised in the ancient world, and is an ever-present factor in the most abstract, cerebral and exotic of contemplations.

And (3) it is an ever-present factor in the most mundane, ordinary and face-to-face of doings as well as the abstract, cerebral and exotic.

And (4) problems arise, as Plato had it, *Republic*, 496a:

*When men are unfit for education have intimate dealings (which they don't deserve) with philosophy, are not the thoughts and opinion they produce fairly called sophistry, with nothing legitimate nor any trace of true wisdom among them?*

And recall the first lines of Aristotle's *On Sophistical Refutations*, 165b1:

*For some people it is better and more worthwhile to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without reality, and the sophist is one who [benefits] from an apparent but unreal wisdom).*

Problems arise when the moronic commentators and columnists and journalists with certificates in Combined

Humanities from Holborn Polytechnic (James O'Brien) get the idea into their heads that they have the right to inflict themselves on everyone else.

Alexander Pope (we can't avoid it), *An Essay on Criticism*, 2:

*For as in bodies, thus in souls we find  
What wants in blood and spirits, swell'd with  
wind:*

*Pride, where wit fails, steps in to our defence,  
And fills up the mighty void of sense.*

*A little learning is a dangerous thing;  
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:  
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,  
And drinking largely sobers us again.*

#### 4.2:

The reader may be convinced that "It" can and does work.

The reader may wholeheartedly agree that the activities of Martin McGuinness, Khalid Masood, Salman Abedi, Theresa May, James Prior, Margaret Thatcher and John Major prove that "It" works.

The reader may recall the leeway given to James Prior and Norman Tebbit regarding UK Public General Acts 2006, c. 11, Part 1 – and the ambiguities and vagaries incorporated.

The reader may agree with Elizabeth Crawford.

The reader may agree that the Challen case, the 2010 Equality Act, the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, and section 66 of the 2020 Sentencing Act show that even the laws relating to murder are vague and *interpretable*; and that, under the law *as it stands*, *some* people *matter* more than others – the lives of some *matter* more than the lives of others.

The reader may agree that the existing laws regarding fraud and self defence leave the door open for "It".

The reader may agree that the career of Gavrilo Princip proves that "It" works.



Added to this, the reader may be clear on:

Any Expected Utilities;

*And:*

The correct or valid probabilistic calculations;

*And:*

The correct utilisation and encouraging results regarding Bayes's Theorem;

*And:*

The encouraging results from any manoeuvrings regarding Nash Equilibrium or Quantal Response Equilibrium;

*And:*

The relevance or irrelevance of any "standard decision-theoretic constraints";

*And:*

The relative strengths of any degrees of belief;

*And:*

The validity or otherwise of any "probability axioms";

*And:*

The validity or otherwise of the "conditionalisation";

*And:*

The applicability, importance or relevance of any question concerning epistemic rationality;

*And:*

The possible ‘errors in choice’ that Quantal Response Equilibrium allows for;

*And:*

The probability that was a function of the utility difference between the chosen strategy and other strategies;

*And:*

And possible higher expected rewards – The response with better prospects of outcome;

*And:*

Whatever were taken as the realistic limitations to rational choice modelling;

*And:*

Whatever were assumed to be any sub-population’s ‘rational expectations’ based on experience regarding the rational efficiency of other members of the population;

*And:*

The quality, relevance, and validity of any statistical insights employed when interpreting data;

*And:*

The meaning of the statement – by Sajal K. Das, Krishna Kant, and Nan Zhang in their: *Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure* – that:

*Another necessary condition for the convergence to Nash Equilibrium is that all players must be completely rational.*

*However, numerous sociological studies have shown that such an assumption does not hold in practice.*

*Some players, for example, may not want or do not have the computational resources to find the strategy that maximizes their payoff.*

*And:*

The relevance of these points when applied in explaining the CoViD-19 experience;

*And:*

The relevance of these points when applied to the actions taken following the George Floyd campaign;

*And:*

The relevance of these points when applied to the calculations behind the flying of two airliners into the World Trade Centre.

The reader may, with Callicles, be convinced that:

*Our laws ... are made, in my opinion, for the weaklings ... They are established ... in an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and capable of getting the upper hand. They say that ambition is base and wrong, and that wrong-doing consists in trying to gain an advantage over others.*

The reader may see the doings of Martin McGuinness, Khalid Masood, Salman Abedi, Theresa May, James Prior, Margaret Thatcher and John Major as a vindication of Callicles's position.

The reader may have taken in and accepted the conclusions of our *Democracy – The Facts*;

The reader may be driven to the solution to those *Unacknowledged Legislators of the World*.

The reader may recognise, may not be able to escape, the conclusion that we are already in the midst of a war – a *real* war, not just a *metaphorical* war – with the *Unacknowledged Legislators of the World*.

The reader may orate a bit of Tennyson; or just settle for shouting and swearing at the television; or, maybe, both!

*Is it peace or war? Civil war, as I think, and that  
of a kind  
The viler, as underhand, not openly bearing the  
sword.*

*Is it peace or war? Better, war! Loud war by land  
and by sea,  
War with a thousand battles, and shaking a  
hundred thrones.*

The Unacknowledged Legislators of the World:

Exalting the poor in spirit.  
Exalting they that mourn.  
Exalting the meek.  
Humbling the Kings and destroying their names.  
Destroying their altars.  
Breaking down their images;  
And burning the images of their Gods with fire.  
Exalting the infantile ignorance of good and evil.  
Exalting the last.  
Declaring war on the first; to cut them down.

Article II of the United Nations General Assembly  
resolution 260 A (III).

Declaring war on the lofty – the *proud* and lofty.  
Declaring war on the greatest.  
Binding up the brokenhearted.  
Proclaiming liberty to the captives.  
Opening up the prison to them that are bound.  
Heralding the day of vengeance to comfort all that mourn.  
Bringing down them that dwell on high; in the lofty city;  
Laying it low; even to the ground;  
Bringing it even to the dust;  
Treading it down, with the steps of vermin, and the feet of  
scum.

Resisting not evil.  
Turning the other cheek.

Loving one's enemies.  
Blessing them that curse us.  
Doing good to them that hate us and use us.

The reader may realise that:

Tolerance  $\equiv$  Resisting not evil.  
Tolerance  $\equiv$  Turning the other cheek.  
Tolerance  $\equiv$  Loving one's enemies.  
Tolerance  $\equiv$  Blessing them that curse us.  
Tolerance  $\equiv$  Doing good to them that hate us and use us.

The reader may, with Geoffrey Household, realise that if you cut the dog's head off, the tail stops wagging.

The reader may have only three months to live, and have nothing to lose.

Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, 8, 29:

*If the nose of Cleopatra had been shorter, the whole face of the earth would have been changed.*

**But no matter how probable the good arising from "It" can be made out to be, it's always possible for the *passion* or *affection* of *fear*, fear of being *caught and punished* – the *passion* or *affection* of old-fashioned *cowardice* – to come up with an opposing probability that convinces one against *actually going ahead* with "It".**

The probability of one can always superdominate the other.

You may work out – and *completely* accurately – that your rational procedures predict that your application of "It" has a probability of success of 99.999999999% –

But the 'utility difference between the chosen strategy and other strategies' can always be bumped down to 0.000000001% chance of success after consideration of those 'standard decision-theoretic constraints'.

Even the assurance by a panel of medical professionals that one has only three months to live does not preclude the discovery of a miracle cure within those three months.<sup>141</sup>

The reader may like to go over again Hájek's discussion of mixed strategies.

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<sup>141</sup> See note 93.

## Part V.

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 415:

*Reason is the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.*

Whatever your validly worked out probabilities for success, it's always possible to validly and rationally come up with the 99.999999999% possibility of *failure* by introducing into any calculations the craven desire to *save your own skin*, and by assigning to it a suitably massive utility value.

Our task in this essay was to work out why, when all the evidence suggests something shouldn't be done, we sometimes do it;

And why, when all the evidence suggests something *should* be done, we *don't* do it.

So now, *we have the answer.*

Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason, Doctrine of the method of pure practical reason*, p. 161:

*When a human being dreads nothing more than to find, on self examination, that he is worthless and contemptible in his **own** eyes, then every good moral disposition can be grafted onto it, because this is the best, and indeed the sole, guard to prevent ignoble and corrupting influences from breaking into the mind.*

## Part VI.

As in *UPM* ejaculation 10.1, the reader may suspect that our excursion into Game Theory is, ultimately, pointless. Pointless, that is, except as a rhetorical device. This rhetoric might be associated with sophistry; and aren't we supposed to be battling against sophistry?

The reader may entertain the notion that Game Theory provides no more than the dispensation for – a rationalization for – a totally amoral drastic Machiavellianism. Game Theory provides a series of *hypothetical* rather than *categorical* imperatives?

The reader may harbour the nagging suspicion that we've brandished a couple of mathematical formulae in order to give the thing an air of respectability?

We can't, coherently, *argue* for scepticism via the traditional routes *or* via Game Theory?

On the other hand – the reader may harbour the nagging suspicion that we've referred to NE and to QRE and to Bayes for *another* reason?

Perhaps the reader thinks the document couldn't be brought to any Court of Law because the trial could never be fair – because at least one of the twelve jurors wouldn't possess the required *computational resources*?



## Part VII.

We've looked into Game Theory, but the reader's probably guessed –

Really, we need only to ask the question –

If you possessed Gyges' Ring of Invisibility – *what would you get up to?*

We should not be surprised to learn that John Rawls was a vehement opponent of Pelagius.

He says –

*No one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune ...*

*[If we are to] nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. [We must] assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.*

He asks –

*[If you] do not know certain kinds of particular facts [e.g. your] fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, [your] intelligence and strength, and the like, [what would you settle for]?*

We ask –

If you possessed Gyges' Ring of Invisibility – *what would you get up to?*

In situations of uncertainty, ask yourself – and answer the question honestly – 'If I possessed Gyges' Ring of Invisibility – *what would I do?*'

## Part VIII.

8.1:

Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1403b:

*It is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must also say it as we ought.*

8.2:

*Mundaka Upanishad*, 3, 2, 11:

*This is the truth, the rishi Angiras declared it in ancient time. One who has not performed the vow does not read this.*

*Adoration to the highest rishis!*

Plato, *Republic*, 378a:

*But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and they should sacrifice not an Eleusinian pig, but some huge and unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few indeed.*

Plato, *Phaedrus*, 271-273:

*The function of speech is to influence the soul. It follows that the would-be speaker must know how many types of soul there are... For such and such a reason a certain type of person can be easily persuaded to adopt a certain course of action by a certain type of speech, whereas for an equally valid reason a different type cannot...*

*A man who does not distinguish the various natures among his audience, and who cannot analyse things into their species and classify individuals under a*

*single form will never attain such mastery of the art of speaking as is open to man...*

*Saddharmapundarikasūtra* [Lotus Sutra], 2:

*“O Śāriputra! I too am now like this. Having understood the various desires and deep-rooted inclinations of sentient beings, I teach the Dharma according to their capacities through the power of skilful means, using various explanations and illustrations.”*

Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 9, 6:

*There is a book of his [Heraclitus] extant, which is about nature generally, and it is divided into three discourses; one on the Universe; one on Politics; and one on Theology. And he deposited this book in the temple of Artemis, as some authors report, having written it intentionally in an obscure style, in order that only those who were able men might comprehend it, and that it might not be exposed to ridicule at the hands of the common people.*

R. N. Carew Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, p. 141:

*Pitt refused to suppress [William Godwin's Political Justice] on the ground that a three-guinea book could do no harm.*

Declan Kiberd, Introduction, *Ulysses*, Bodley Head edition.

*The Irish responded with sarcasm and invective, but they never banned [James Joyce's] book. Perhaps no outraged citizen felt qualified to file the necessary critique with the censorship board, which was set up only some years after publication. By then the panel may have judged it beyond the intellectual scope of corruptible readers.*

## Part IX.

9.1:

Plato, Republic, 336b-c:

*Thrasymachus ... was no longer able to keep quiet but gathered himself and sprang on us like a wild beast, as if he wanted to tear us in pieces ...*

*What is all this nonsense, Socrates? [he said] ... If you really want to know what justice is, stop asking questions and then playing to the gallery by refuting anyone who answers you. You know perfectly well that it's easier to ask questions than to answer them.*

9.2:

Wink.

## Appendix 3

### AFTERTHOUGHT

The demons that possess a Valerie Solanas, or an Andrea Dworkin, or a Linda Bellos are addressed, and would be exorcised, via our *Manifesto*; particularly through ejaculations 8.1.2, 8.2, 4.1 to 4.3.1, and 2.1.2.<sup>142</sup>

What you do with your “Own Body” affects others.<sup>143</sup>

What Marija Princip did with her “Own Body” affected, and is affecting, billions of people.

We’ll leave discussions *vis-à-vis* Wage Slavery and Unpaid/Voluntary Prostitution for another place.

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<sup>142</sup> And see note 87.

<sup>143</sup> *Halsbury’s Laws of England*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed., purporting to contain every proposition of the law of England and Wales, is projected to run to around 103 volumes. Every one of the laws described in that publication imposes or authorizes a restraint or a limit on what one can do with one’s own body – from cycling, or angling, or playing music or setting up a barbeque in a public park; to embezzlement, or libel, or murder.