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MFA Fine Art-objects

2013

The Double-Bind of Art: The Mutual Reproduction of Capital and Art Institutions

5853 words

In previous essays I have been looking at the potential of 'art' (as understood ontologically) to in some way contribute to a collective project of emancipation. I use the word 'contribute' carefully here for, as we shall see at various points throughout the text that follows, to supplement it with terms such as 'productively', 'usefully', or 'valuably' would be to add extraordinarily loaded terms (even contribute seems loaded). I shall try to cover this potential at an ontological level and at other times from a more materialist (yet still abstract) level, noting interactions between the levels of abstraction where possible.

To what extent, if any, does the artist or their artworks create the conditions within which an emancipatory collective could recognise itself and, indeed, what would this collective subject 'look' like?

Brian Holmes' essay, *Liar's Poker* (2004) describes a state where the majority of art that purports to be political – in its claims and maxims – is, in fact, only indulging in what he calls 'picture politics'. Picture politics involve political themes and signs – and perhaps even mimic political forms – but are ultimately just *representations* of politics.

He goes on to describe how these artworks are merely playing a game – a game where institutions value the semblance of radical politics but balk at the occasional but rare actual appearance of radical politics. The obvious objection to this schema is that it is far too reductive. He wants art to produce clear and unambiguous political effects in the real world, in such a way that the causal relation between the work and the effect can be proven (his example being *Sans Papiers*); he essentially advocates a continuation of the old call for a collapse of the distinctions between art and life (in this instance a collapsing of the distinction between art and political activism).

Perhaps art's form of politics *is* in this very re-presentation of social antagonisms embedded in the conditions in which the art is made – but more on that later.

Rancière presents us with a model in which these 'picture politics' are in themselves affective politically. His theory of 'the Distribution of the Sensible' (2010) is one where social reality can be affected by “political statements and literary locutions” (Rancière, 2010: 39) – a soft example of what Žižek identifies as the prescriptive (Žižek, 2006: 322); speech that declares a state of being in such a way as to create that very state of being. Rancière's ideas are, however, much less causally direct than that. The Sensible is the sum of all that can be said or thought within social exchanges. It is the sum total of our fictionalised accounts of reality – not to say, as I have noted before, that is not to dismiss reality as fictional but to recognise that we only know it in the *form* of a fiction and that we can only understand reality *through* these fictions and narratives (Rancière, 2010: 35-36). It is also in this sense that those narratives of the Sensible are structured like, and indeed *are*, ideology (Althusser in Leitch (ed.), 2001). As such, the Sensible (and the interpretation of its parts) can be considered as the space within which battles for ideological hegemony can be fought. The hegemony of the Sensible is called Consensus but Consensus is divided by 'agonisms' (Mouffe, 2009), by social contradictions and exclusions. Those excluded from the hegemonic view of Consensus are without a place in the social order and are called the “part-of-no-part” (Rancière, 2010).¹ It is through a process of Dissensus (Rancière, 2011) that the part-of-no-part can affect a change in the texture of Consensus, in the Master narrative, and find a voice and place within it, thus leading to a redistribution of the Sensible.

1 We only need remember the manner in which the official political line on the London Riots of 2011 completely disregarded the potential political impetus of the rioters and the inarticulate attempts of some rioters to formulate their situation – it was as if both sides were literally speaking different languages. With their effective exclusion from not just the sphere of vicarious consumption but also from political representation, from (official state) political discourse, and from the ideology of petty-bourgeois communitarianism of those who swept-up afterwards it is little surprise they hadn't felt the call of the official ideologies, that they didn't identify with the 'normal' society.

This concept of the part-of-no-part is negatively defined (Rancière, 2011, 84), meaning that it is defined as a relation (in this case we are looking at the relation to a lack of apparent relation) and not a position as such – and this is where we can see the connection to ideology (as defined by Althusser), for ideology is the imaginary relations of subjects to their relation with reality. (Althusser in Leitch (ed.), 2001:)

The major problem with Rancière's theory is that, by being based purely at the level of symbolic exchanges, there is no mechanism within it to show how the concrete effects that Brian Holmes wanted from art are to be found, let alone identified. By ignoring the *material* conditions of the symbolic relations we find a process being set up whereby the range of the Sensible is widened and more subjects are included in it. But without an accompanying change in material conditions this could just as easily be seen as a process in which, by becoming more inclusive, the Consensus, functioning as an ideology, interpellates (Althusser in Leitch (ed.), 2001: 1506) those parts-of-no-part as subjects.

It is perhaps in this sense that Badiou radicalised Althusser's idea of the subject as only being able to be spoken of in relation to an ideology (and that ideologies exist only in the practices/rituals of concrete individuals, interpellated to an ideology as a subject) to the point where he proposed that we can only speak of subjectivity as a process, that “there are only processes without a subject” (Badiou, 2005: 60). This seems already implicit insofar that both only exist in relation to one-another and that this relation is itself a second level of abstraction from what it presumed to be the 'real' relation; that between the subject and their social situation. That is to say, that the subject's position (and therefore subject status) changes depending on not only their actual relation to the Real but also their relation (their level or mode of (mis)recognition) to that relation. The subject *as subject* has no prior content to its interpellation and is therefore always in a state of becoming.

Nancy's concept of Being-in-common (2000) essentially moves the emphasis from the relation between the subject and its conditions (what we shall here characterise as a vertical relation) to the relation between subjects (a horizontal relation). This is much more of an ontological claim (Rancière, 2011: 86), functioning like an axiom, and affirms the relation between subjects as the very cornerstone of their being, grounding it in a plural being. Despite being at a higher level of abstraction than Rancière's theory, it seems to make a more concrete claim (for want of a better word) about the subject of which it speaks. But the problem remains, indeed becomes even more pronounced: that of the separation of the subject, be it in their symbolic relations or ontological being, from the material conditions which effect it and which it can (hopefully) affect.

However, Being-in-common, as a concept also (if not more than Rancière's) ignores the material conditions in which the subject/concrete individual (whichever you prefer) exists. What can a change in our understanding of our ontological status achieve? The last time there was a change of this kind – one that spread to all of society – there was indeed a change. Only it took a few hundred years to noticeably change things. I am here speaking of the pre-enlightenment changes that (possibly) led to the development of capitalism. But for those of us who don't have that much time to wait around for, to what extent can we tell if the (re)distribution of the sensible or alterations in ontological understandings have had any significant affect?

Both Althusser and Habermas emphasised the separation between knowledge, ethics and aesthetics (Leitch (ed.), 2001). They require of the subject different levels of engagement, different levels of commitment – and, additionally, both writers emphasise the relative impotence of overdeveloping any single one of these forms of culture in isolation. Art, as a symbolic practice in the aesthetic realm, can be seen as a truth-procedure. For Badiou (2005), philosophy is a Truth-procedure – a truth-procedure whose conditions are affected by politics. Therefore by exploring its own immanent

conditions, Philosophy not only comes to understand itself, as a self-understanding of knowledge,² but also functions as a mode of politics' own self-understanding. Art, as a predominantly material form of symbolic production would seem to be under the (potential) influence of a wider range of influences. So what are art's immanent conditions? And would its exploration of them (and it is tirelessly claimed this is what it does) lead to a form of knowledge that changes the Sensible/ideological conditions in which it exists or, like the redistribution of the sensible, only the wider, overarching ideology that then may or may not be altered by subjects? (I say 'only' because the latter change would seem less direct and therefore inevitably more likely an unintentional and less predictable result than the former).

Firstly, we can say that the immanent conditions of art will be found in its form/s (and here we mean to understand not just its variety of (physical) formal appearances but much more so the social forms (relations) within which it is produced. Secondly we can say that these forms – the very form of art as an institutionalised mode of symbolic production – is like a form of ideology. The work artists produce are material (or dematerialised) 'expressions' of the artist's imagined relation to their art and the condition within which they work.³ As such, works of art will bear the traces of “the symbolic messages transmitted to us by the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations of modes of production” (Jameson writing on “the ideology of form” in Leitch (ed.), 2001: 1942).

There are many ways in which we can look at the immanent conditions of art production but I will here concentrate on modes of production and modes of reproduction – both material and symbolic. The mode of production of an individual artwork may be varied and may relate to the mode predominant in society or it may function as an atavism or an anticipation. That the mode of production of most (fine) art is not capitalist seems fairly uncontroversial. It seems possible to say that in its production it has not yet come under a *real* subsumption under capital (though this point does not preclude the likelihood that most art has been *formally* subsumed).⁴ It is not (generally speaking) directly made to valorise capital – indeed, capital doesn't come into direct contact with the work of art either in its production or its consumption except as surplus-value no longer intended for valorisation (unless the buyer happens to work for Sothebys).

We can assume for now that art is formally subsumed. Art (of the critical variety), unlike other non-profit areas of life, seems to be left as it is by capital. This could be because something in its nature makes a real subsumption inherently difficult. Or it could just be that as a system for the production of luxury objects it offers no real threat to the ruling class. But more on this later! Art, in its production, can be (and mostly is) formally subsumed under capital yet it is not under a real subsumption and, therefore, in its production, not the product of alienated labour. The work produced can be bought as a commodity but the nature, methods, execution etc. of the work's production are under the control of the artist who, if we accept that as an essence – and since it is a chosen, willed occupation this seems fair enough – is not (usually) alienated (made separate from) that essence. But then since that essence – that subjective position – is ideological, it will change

2 Once again use of the pathetic fallacy is here purely rhetorical.

3 Or, more specifically, their imagined relation to their work's (imagined) relation to an imagined (presupposed) viewer-subject *within* an imaginary relation to the conditions and institutions within which all these exist – themselves imagined in relation to wider conditions that will all, inevitably vary from the same relations as imagined by all the other actors in this play.

4 And as every good Marxist will remember, production that is *formally* subsumed under capital attaches itself (parasitically) to an existing mode production (for our argument we shall be thinking of this more in terms of its attaching to variant modes of production – symbolic and material – that function for themselves, for purposes other than profit, and parasitically draws profits from it, quantitatively), whereas in production under the *real* subsumption of capital, labour is paid for as an abstract entity separated from its specific context – the influx of capital spurs the development of the production forward and restructures it to its own needs, enabling it to gain profit from qualitative improvements in production (Marx, 1990).

depending on alterations in the relation. For now it is enough to acknowledge that most artists will produce according to what they perceive of as their own will.

However, when the work is bought things become a little less clear. The artist is paid a sum for the work (but not for their labour as a separate power from that product or the person who produced it – for there is no generalised artistic labour). The work then belongs to the buyer (as a physical object or a trace or certificate (Buskirk, 2005: 34)) and yet it still retains the name of and association with the artist. Is it the name of the artist – their very identity – alienated from them? Does the name of the artist become a commodity?! Maybe in some instances, but for us here it will be enough to acknowledge that more than a simple exchange of object and currency has taken place here.

But why should this product of a particular identity remain attached to the object? And, if we are allowed here to be cynical for a moment, why, for example, should two art objects, similar in their physical traits, vary so so greatly in price when one is created by a relative unknown and the other by a famous name? The identity of the artist – and the oeuvre that it labels are clearly of great interest – and we all know interest can inflate prices! What makes art valuable? We have already discounted labour in the case of artistic value. Sign-value? Prestige value? To say it was any of these would be to explain this value as the result of value! That may be how HBOS decide how to evaluate share prices but that won't work for art. Of course, art, like knowledge is often valued for its own sake (or at least how the individual in their individual experience feels it to be). The work will work on its own terms – terms which alter over time. But for this text we are concerned primarily with how this value is (mis)translated in its passage through various institutions so that we may find some of the immanent conditions that tie it to the material.

Giorgio Agamben described a movement – an historical shift – at work between the subjective experience of the artist and that of the spectator through the “pure creative-formal principle” (1999: 47).⁵ Similar to that process do we see here a swapping of subject positions in relation to the work of art (the material manifestation of ideology) in a formalised financial and contractual transaction? Jameson describes a similar process in the experiencing of some Postmodern artworks that terms, “enregimentment” (2009: 112). He describes these works as being in movement from the old aesthetic categories into a new fragmented field of experience, the experience of which seems to return in to subjectivity via this aesthetic movement from object to experience – making the material and the relation equivalent. This throwing back of the aesthetic from the object to the subject is, he says, a passive experience. This process may be a further de-fetishising of the art object, a form of dematerialisation but I would argue that it in fact continues and transforms laws of equivalence for their original purpose of distinction. These could just be reformulations of Barthes' *Death of the Author*, (Barthes in Harrison and Wood, 2001). Either way, we see here the birth pangs of a situation where the perceived distinction between subject and object is becoming more and more blurred in favour of the relation that constitutes both.⁶ But the addition of a formalised contractual element in the earlier example points to something beyond itself.

My contention here will be to claim that because we are dealing with a form of symbolic production and also because we are dealing with relations occurring within the confluence of various institutions, themselves multi-layered, and interwoven between more than one set of modes of

5 “...the supreme truth of the work of art is now the pure creative-formal principle that fulfils its potentiality in it, independently of any content. [...] what is essential for the spectator in the work of art is precisely what is alien to him and deprived of essence, while what he sees of himself in the work, that is, the content that he perceives, appears no longer as a truth that finds its necessary expression in the work, but rather as something of which he is perfectly aware as a thinking subject, and which therefore he can legitimately believe himself capable of expressing.” Agamben, Giorgio (1999: 47)

6 “Aesthetic experience is nothing that can be 'had' by the subject. The term 'experience' refers to a process between subject and object...” Julianne Rebutisch, quoted in (Malik, 2013)

production and reproduction, we are not dealing with a closed system that is somehow hermetically sealed from other value systems. As a result, we see what appears rather like *petitio principii*; the start of the process of valuation has been lost to us, thus appearing as either a pure tautology or a causal tennis-match where the ball, the starting point, is only in one court long enough to be returned to the other end.

Art, according to De Duve, is a proper name (1999). No particular property automatically includes or excludes it – it need only be named 'art' to become so.⁷ To some extent there is a level of jurisprudence levelled upon the decision process – something that evens out over time and place and yet still develops. Except (!) not all users of the proper name are equal.⁸ Certain works will be accepted into the canon/accrue sign value/cultural capital because of the cultural capital attached to the work's purchaser (or the curator or critic that chooses the work). It is based on their social difference. This cultural capital (in addition to the money paid for the work itself – which remains money as it isn't destined to be invested as capital) then accrues to the artist. That artist's cultural capital will increase/inflate or diminish depending on the standing (cultural capital/prestige/sign value) of the institutions with which they are associated, other artists and curators they subsequently show with, and whether the quality of the work is maintained in such a way that it can continue to attract collectors and curators of high prestige. Success in maintaining their level of cultural capital (only roughly measurable in prices) will contribute to their ability to maintain or build upon the prices they can ask – and higher prices can raise the confidence of their 'investors' in such a way as to bring more cultural capital their way.

For an artwork to be officiated as Art it must be bestowed with the proper name of 'Art'. However, it would seem not to attach it to the work itself (until it is sufficiently firmly established to enter the canon of Art History). In order to function, the proper name ('Art') appends itself to another proper name: that of the artist (although increasingly the name of the curator will also attach itself and for some time now the names of the owners of the work and the benefactors of the artist have also been attaching themselves, giving older works a family-tree-like provenance).

The proper name, attached then to the artist's name and the object, becomes/creates the (fine) art commodity. A normal commodity is valued according to how much necessary labour went into it and is sold at a price that will cover both those variable costs as well as fixed capital costs with a surplus amount. It is the measure of labour that went into the product that universalises the commodity, allowing it to be conceptualised in such a way that it can then be exchanged for a universal equivalent (a currency), allowing it to be exchanged against equivalent amounts of labour. The quantity of labour that goes into an artwork, whilst sometimes appreciated, does *not* decide whether or not an artwork is an artwork. It is the name, the nomination of an artwork as an artwork (by a suitable authority) that acts as a(n equivalent of a) universal equivalent (universal within the symbolic space of sign-exchange value (Baudrillard, 1993)). It is upon the quality of the work (its suitability to the “discursive fields” of the time (Malik, 2013)) and the reputation of the author (both the one who authored it and the authority who authorised it) that gains the work its nomination and the then flailing attempts to translate it into the prices of a currency derived primarily from the measure of abstract labour.

I hope the reader will allow me some further vulgarity with the diversion that follows. Between the processes of production and consumption we find in their repeat an end to finalities where the end becomes a new beginning (Baudrillard, 1993: 56). In *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, Baudrillard

7 For example, an artwork doesn't have to be blue to be an artwork – but likewise it doesn't have to be any colour but blue either. In a system of axioms we would, with regards to the property of 'blueness', find an axiom with the structure not- not-blue. And this axiom would hold for (almost) any property that fills it, for art is not beholden to its physical properties.

8 De Duve seems to neglect this qualification.

describes use value as an alibi for production, one that is assigned after it is produced, retroactively justifying the production process. The subject, seeing the object imagines a relation between the two that is most easily filled with the concept of utility. I want to tentatively suggest that the work is subsumed (still only formally but to a much greater degree than what was described before) primarily in its moment of 'consumption'. By this I don't necessarily mean just its purchase but also in its initiation into art institutions – that the institutionalisation of art is the form best suited to its being brought under the control of capital and that these forms act to regulate cultural capital. In some areas regulation is enacted through bureaucracy and direct interference from the State (in the case of art education) and in others the processes of admission and legitimation are enough for maintaining an ideology of quality and hierarchy. Cultural capital – like an education at a particularly esteemed institution – can serve as an alibi for the owners of capital (an example being that of an elite education through which meritocratic claims can be used to justify the outcomes of wealth disparity (Malik, 2012: *The Ruling Elite Have Feelings Too*)) – and therefore helps maintain hierarchical structures ideologically (the art helps in its structural/social form, regardless of its content or 'local' structural/social form. Yet I feel that to claim that the individuals who are part of those institutions aim to cooperate in the subjugation of art – or even that the art is actually subjugated – would be overstating things. But in saying this I need to specify a caveat. Art, neither prior to nor after production claims to be a product of utility.

Art as alibi seems reductive if applied to individuals but when abstracted up, that is, away from individuals, to the level of systems it quickly seems more plausible – one need not even go that far in the abstraction and remember the wonders art collections perform for banking institutions.

However, non-commercial art institutions don't exist to reproduce capital or the relations of capital as such. They function in ways that reproduce themselves (their own hierarchies). But because they are in one way or another reliant on an inflow of capital's surplus, they must reproduce in such a way that a contribution to the reproduction of capital (in most cases ideological) is a by-product.⁹ Insofar as this is the case, there is a dual reproduction of art institutions and non-art institutions (such as capital and the State): in their exchange with capital, art institutions are caught in a double bind not dissimilar in structure to the one in which labour finds itself caught.¹⁰

This perhaps shows that the relative autonomy which art has from capital is part and parcel of the relative autonomy of art institutions from capital. Like labour, an antagonistic relation can exist between the institutions and capital. The institutions, composed of the material practices of concrete subjects, are themselves manifestations of the ideologies to which their subjects are subject (interpellated). In order to reproduce in the form that they have currently they must reproduce materially in such a way as to maintain support from the guardians of capital (be they wealthy individuals, representatives of the State, or Art Directors...). However, not being really subsumed under capital, art and its institutions appear to have some room for manoeuvre. We start to see here some of the ground constituting the art object's immanent conditions and some of the areas where an equivalent of a redistribution the sensible might be seen at work. We already see what could be seen as a positive state of things: the institutionalised art world as it currently exists has managed to create conditions where not only is immanent critique possible but that the same critiques seem to

9 Lower level arts organisation and arts funding (from the State) also help reproduce the State (in whatever its current form happens to be). The current example being the dismantling of the welfare state and the official funnelling of money towards organisations/projects that essentially perform social work, that perform a community service (in place of trained and (previously) pensioned social workers) in aestheticised forms – stop-gaps, band-aids – for communities and more disparate groups of individuals being damaged/suffering the effects (and side effects) of movements of capital, underinvestment in education etc. (“don't worry that the education system systematically failed your children, that the neighbourhood is rife with drugs and that we've closed the only local youth centre and library: here's a poorly-paid artist to patronise you and provide you with 6 x 3 hour art lessons”).

10 *Endnotes #2*, April 2010: *Misery and the Value Form, Crisis in the Class Relation*, <http://endnotes.org.uk/articles/2> (accessed 01/08/13)

be one of the aspects of art that is most likely to generate cultural capital.

John Jordan once described how quickly institutions withdraw their money or put a stop to art works that push the remit of 'picture politics' too far for the comfort of those in positions of power (Jordan, 2011). But beyond being an accumulation of sign-exchange value, what is cultural capital (if we are to take it seriously as a category)? Could we compare it to that other new concept, knowledge capital?

Althusser, as mentioned earlier, made a distinction between knowledge (science) and experience/seeing/perceiving (of culture) (Leitch (ed.) 2001: 1480). Momentarily disregarding the very specific reference he used for the word 'science', we can see that the distinction he posited was that of being between *identity* and *difference*. The spread of knowledge capital seems to characterise the manner in which many Western economies have been developing for some time. The subject that embodies this mode of production is the figure of the knowledge-worker and in this figure we see a collapsing of the old distinction between living and dead labour. In this zombie-like apparition we see capital's Other of the artist.¹¹ The artist already incorporates their own means of production in the form of knowledge and, if I'm allowed to say it, creativity, so was the artist already a synthesis of living and dead labour? The knowledge-worker is still separated from full access to his or her means of production in circumstances similar to those created for the artist by some art institutions; where a separation from the means of production either isn't possible or is only partly possible then capital's enclosures extend to separating the subject in question from their mode of exchange and distribution. The artist lacking in cultural capital is more likely to be in this situation than a more established figure. Perhaps, however, it is the fixity of knowledge – the requirement of itself that it bear a clearer identity with its object of study, its instrumentalisation, its 'utility' – that enables it to have been more easily subsumed. There is also the consideration that its knowledge capital and the tools to which that knowledge is directed (primarily computers) were developed under regimes of real subsumption under capital. So we are left to either accept there are no useful similarities between cultural capital and knowledge capital – or that the relations in the equation are wrong. Whereas knowledge capital accrues to the figure of the worker, cultural capital flows from subject to object to subject. The movement of art 'value' from the creator of the aesthetic intervention to the recipient of the message seems to shadow both the work's recreation in the mind of the spectator and also the pattern of 'intellectual' consumption for the sake of cultural capital. Thought experiment: would cultural capital retain its value independently of money? It would retain a value since its value is based on difference whereas money develops from systems of equivalence. It is partly through equivalence that speculation can take place. To what extent is art prone to speculative inflation? Since the prices that art sells for rarely bears any relation to the labour performed in making the work it would seem so – but this would be a completely different to the kind of asset bubbles we have seen in other parts of the economy for, as said above, those are based on systems of equivalence that have completely lost their referents. Art price inflations are accumulations of cultural capital – they are competitive shows of prestige. (Not to say that asset inflation in other parts of the economy can't then help exaggerate the art market). The artist is, of course, not fully innocent, not a victim – they can gain more for their other works through this process and, depending on the collector's reputation (another alienated element?), can accrue as cultural capital.

As I attempted to outline elsewhere, Art History is another one of art's immanent conditions. It is against the historical canon that new art is measured and this must therefore be another piece in the process of assigning value to an artwork (something which, as said, occurs over time and through a

11 Cussans, 2000 for observations along the lines of: Is it a coincidence that in film/TV/games etc. the zombies of old (the lumbering, brainless automatons – possibly a stand-in for a lumpen-proletariat) have given way to a far more active, faster-moving species?

kind of jurisprudence). But as an immanent condition of art production the ability to move through art history is not even an option we have to consciously struggle to uncover since the pieces of the past are all around us in galleries, museums, etc. However, as with Jameson's remark that with postmodernism there is an increasing spatialisation of our experience of time, we see a "fragmentation of time into a series of perpetual presents" (Jameson, 1986: 118). We see this in the increasingly fast pace of news events, where these perpetual presents pass by in quick succession as if to consign those presents to the past as quickly as possible, before they can be reflected upon. And with regards to their becoming-history, this ever-changing series of perpetual presents also act so as to introduce a radical discontinuity between the past and the (various) presents (and therefore with the future also. Another outcome of this that once consigned to the past, these former-presents are, for the casual observer (so most people) seemingly fixed, reified.

Foster described the strength of the Neo-Avant-Garde as coming from its operating in both a synchronic and diachronic register (1996: xi) and that their relation to the earlier avant-garde was characterised by a form of deferred action or 'Nachträglichkeit'. He claimed that "avant-garde work is never historically effective [...] in its initial moments," it is "a continual process of pretension and retension [...] of anticipated futures and reconstructed pasts" (Foster, 1996: 29). These moments only become self-conscious in their repeat – or more specifically, through the almost unconscious acknowledgement of even the slightest changes in their immanent conditions for being.¹²

To this we could add Jameson's motto, "Always historicize!" (Leitch (ed.) 2001: 1933). I suggested using combining these notions with Bourriaud's concept of the Radicant (2009) in such a way that the exploration of historical forms does not merely become a quoting of styles. We can now see a bit more clearly that the emphasis on the synchronic must be more than a mere situating of the work in its time a place. What is needed from this balancing of the axes of the synchronic and the diachronic is a fully developed awareness of not only the immanent conditions of art as it exists now but also an understanding of how these immanent conditions have altered since the forms used (if, post-production-like, using historical forms) were last used. Only with the creation of an ideology (and let us not forget that art is a form/trace of ideology) will there be something to interpellate those who would otherwise be drawn to becoming part of a collective project; a collective subject. It is only by re-narrativising the links between the past and the present that we can once again start to see the possibility of a future.

12 Žižek writes about these subtle changes in background ideology in relation to film remakes (2010: 61-66)

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